Death
Content
DEATH
From Manuel B. Dy, Jr., “Martin
Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Death”
Martin Heidegger (26 September 1889 - 26 May 1976),
German philosopher, influenced literary, social,
aesthetic and political theory, anthropology,
architecture, psychoanalysis and environmentalism
Man’s being is Dasein (there-being, ≠
‘biological human,’ or even ‘person’), as
being-in-the-world (who, “in its very Being,
that Being is an issue for it” [Heidegger,
Being and Time 4:32])
“Being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has
and sometimes does not have, and without which it could
just be as well as it could be with it. It is not the case that
man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationshipof-Being towards the ‘world’ – a world with which he
provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never
‘proximally’ an entity which is, so to speak, free from
Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take
up a ‘relationship’ towards the world. Taking up
“Understood as a unitary phenomenon (as opposed to a
contingent, additive, tripartite combination of Being, inness, and the world), Being-in-the-world is an essential
characteristic of Dasein. […] [Dasein’s Being-in-theworld thus results to] a large-scale holistic network of
interconnected relational significance.” (SEP)
“According to Heidegger, the being of man is a beingin-the-world. Man is primordially directed towards the
world and has the power-to-be in the world. His being
in the world consists of being alongside with things …
what Heidegger calls ‘concern’; and in being with
others, ‘solicitude’. The being of man is Dasein, ‘Therebeing’. ‘There-being is the There of Being among
beings – it lets beings be (manifest), thereby rendering
all encounter with them possible.’ (Dy 253)
“Dasein confronts every concrete situation in which it
finds itself (into which it has been thrown) as a range of
possibilities for acting (onto which it may project itself).
Insofar as some of these possibilities are actualized,
others will not be, meaning that there is a sense in
which not-Being (a set of unactualized possibilities of
Being) is a structural component of Dasein's Being. Out
of this dynamic interplay, Dasein emerges as a delicate
balance of determination (thrownness) and freedom
(projection).” (SEP)
- Sorge or care as “being ahead-of-itself-already-being-in(the world) as being-together-with beings encountered
(within the world)” (BT 231). Our understanding of Sorge
as the structural constitution of Dasein is therefore in
terms of three temporal dimensions:
a. Past (Thrownness and thus Disposedness),
Geworfenheit: in Dy (254), “Being-already-in [as
facticity]” in that “I ineluctably find myself in a world
that matters to me in some way or another” (SEP)
b. Future (Projection and thus Understanding):
“has nothing to do with comporting oneself
towards a plan that has been thought out […]
but the essential fore-structure of Dasein itself,”
(BT 31:185, 32:195) in Dy (254) “ahead-of-itself [ as
existence or “ek-sistence,” meaning “outstanding” as
in “not-yet”]”
c. Present (Fallenness and thus Fascination), in Dy (254)
“Once thrown into the world, Dasein realizes its own
possibilities, it constantly actualizes its potentialities of
existence. […] As long as man exists in the world, his
potentiality for being is never exhausted [, always having] an
unfinished character.” (Dy 237). As such, Dasein is also beingahead-of-itself (i.e., fore-structure) as long as he exists, he is
incomplete (≠ unfulfilled, or lacking togetherness) as long as
he exists. This incompleteness is not like the unripeness of a
fruit. Whereas the fruit fulfills its being by being ripe, Dasein
does not necessarily fulfill its being in death.
Given his fore-structure, its ahead-of-itself, “Dasein, therefore,
as long as it exists, is already, its end. The end of Dasein is
not to be understood as being-at-end but as being-towards[death]. […] Man, being ahead of himself, as project, comes
to the disclosure of his extreme possibility, the possibility that
he will no longer be ‘there.’” (Dy 254)
“Death is a possibility in being that Da-sein always has to
take upon itself. […] In this possibility, Da-sein is concerned
As the end of Dasein, death is the most nonrelational,
certain and as such, indefinite and unsurpassable
possibility of Dasein. As the end of Dasein, death is the
Being of this being towards its end. (BT 239)
Ownmost, nonsubstitutional, total:
“all relations to other Da-sein are dissolved in it.”
(BT 232)
The possibility of his
impossibility:
“Death is the possibility of the
absolute impossibility of Dasein.” (BT 232); “Death is in
the being of this beingPossible
at any moment:
towards-its
end.” (BT 239)
“[Death] is an eminent imminence.
[…] A thunderstorm can be
imminent, remodeling of a house,
the arrival of a friend. […] Imminent
death does not have this kind of
being.” (BT 232)
Inevitable,
necessary:
“[Dasein’s] existential
possibility is grounded
in the fact that Dasein is essentially
disclosed to itself, in
the way of beingahead-of-itself. […]
When Da-sein exists,
.: Dasein has the following modes as a being-towardsdeath:
Inauthentic being-towards-death – concealed in the
everydayness and publicness of concern, in impersonal,
tranquilized indifference (re: fallenness or Verfallen, in Sorge).
“Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an
authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the
world.” (BT 38:220) “Such fallen-ness into the world is
manifested in idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity:” (SEP) “The
publicness of everyday-being-with-one-another ‘knows’ death
as a constantly occurring event, as a ‘case of death.” Someone
or another ‘dies,’ be it a neighbor or a stranger. People
unknown to us ‘die’ daily and hourly. ‘Death’ is encountered as
a familiar event occurring within the world. […] In such talk,
death is understood as an indeterminate something which first
has to show up from somewhere, but which right now is not yet
objectively
present
oneself,
and
is but
thusme
no– those
threat.
[…]
With
“By
‘Others’ we
do not for
mean
everyone
else
over
and
against
whom the ‘I’
stands out.
those from
whom, for
such ambiguity,
Da-sein
putsThey
itselfare
inrather
the position
of losing
itself
the
most
part,.”one
not distinguish oneself – those among whom one
in the
they
(BTdoes
234)
is too […] By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the world is
always the one I share with Others [das Man].” (BT 26:154-155)
Authentic being-towards-death – If death is my
ownmost, nonrelational, certain, indefinite possibility,
then “it must be understood as possibility, cultivated as
possibility, and endured as possibility in our relation to it.”
(BT 241) As such, “Being-toward-death is the anticipation
of a potentiality-of-being of that being whose kind of
being is anticipation itself. […] Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face
with the possibility to be itself, primarily unsupported by
concern taking care of things, but to be itself in
passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free
“In
anticipating
the
certainty
of death,
Da-sein of
opens
itself
of the
illusions
ofindefinite
the they,
factical,
and certain
itself.”
to a constant threat arising from its own there. […] In Angst, Da-sein
(BT 253, 245)
finds itself faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of
its existence. Angst is anxious about the potentiality-of-being of the
being thus determined, and thus discloses the most extreme
possibility. Because the anticipation of Da-sein absolutely
individualizes it and lets it, in this individualizing of itself, become
certain of the wholeness of its potentiality-of-being. […] Beingtowards-death is essentially Angst.” (BT 245)
“Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees
one from one’s lostness in chance possibilities urging
themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities lying
before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first
authentically understood and chosen. Anticipation
discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility
lies in giving itself up and thus shatters all one’s clinging
to whatever existence one has reached. In anticipation,
Da-sein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or
behind the potentiality-for-being that it has understood.
[…] Free for its ownmost possibilities, that are determined
by the end and so understood as finite, Da-sein prevents
the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of
existence, fail to recognize that it is getting overtaken by
the existence-possibilities of others, or that it may
misinterpret these possibilities, thus divesting itself of its
.: “Death ends the continuous incompleteness of Dasein”
(Wang Tangjia, “Concepts of Death in Heidegger and
Levinas” 144) for he is still ahead-of-itself, a not-yet
(Noch-Nicht) as long as he is
.: Death individualizes man and “reveals the ‘there’ of
man, his being-alongside” as “nothing when his ownmost
potentiality for being is itself an issue in death.” As such,
authentic being-towards-death “means projecting oneself
upon his ownmost potentiality foe being rather than upon
the possibility of the ‘they’ self.” (Dy 256)
.: Authentic being-towards-death thus understands the
indefinite certainty of death: its indefiniteness springs
from Dasein itself, and its certainty corresponds to the
certainty of being-in-the-world.
From Manuel B. Dy, Jr., “Martin
Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Death”
Martin Heidegger (26 September 1889 - 26 May 1976),
German philosopher, influenced literary, social,
aesthetic and political theory, anthropology,
architecture, psychoanalysis and environmentalism
Man’s being is Dasein (there-being, ≠
‘biological human,’ or even ‘person’), as
being-in-the-world (who, “in its very Being,
that Being is an issue for it” [Heidegger,
Being and Time 4:32])
“Being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has
and sometimes does not have, and without which it could
just be as well as it could be with it. It is not the case that
man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationshipof-Being towards the ‘world’ – a world with which he
provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never
‘proximally’ an entity which is, so to speak, free from
Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take
up a ‘relationship’ towards the world. Taking up
“Understood as a unitary phenomenon (as opposed to a
contingent, additive, tripartite combination of Being, inness, and the world), Being-in-the-world is an essential
characteristic of Dasein. […] [Dasein’s Being-in-theworld thus results to] a large-scale holistic network of
interconnected relational significance.” (SEP)
“According to Heidegger, the being of man is a beingin-the-world. Man is primordially directed towards the
world and has the power-to-be in the world. His being
in the world consists of being alongside with things …
what Heidegger calls ‘concern’; and in being with
others, ‘solicitude’. The being of man is Dasein, ‘Therebeing’. ‘There-being is the There of Being among
beings – it lets beings be (manifest), thereby rendering
all encounter with them possible.’ (Dy 253)
“Dasein confronts every concrete situation in which it
finds itself (into which it has been thrown) as a range of
possibilities for acting (onto which it may project itself).
Insofar as some of these possibilities are actualized,
others will not be, meaning that there is a sense in
which not-Being (a set of unactualized possibilities of
Being) is a structural component of Dasein's Being. Out
of this dynamic interplay, Dasein emerges as a delicate
balance of determination (thrownness) and freedom
(projection).” (SEP)
- Sorge or care as “being ahead-of-itself-already-being-in(the world) as being-together-with beings encountered
(within the world)” (BT 231). Our understanding of Sorge
as the structural constitution of Dasein is therefore in
terms of three temporal dimensions:
a. Past (Thrownness and thus Disposedness),
Geworfenheit: in Dy (254), “Being-already-in [as
facticity]” in that “I ineluctably find myself in a world
that matters to me in some way or another” (SEP)
b. Future (Projection and thus Understanding):
“has nothing to do with comporting oneself
towards a plan that has been thought out […]
but the essential fore-structure of Dasein itself,”
(BT 31:185, 32:195) in Dy (254) “ahead-of-itself [ as
existence or “ek-sistence,” meaning “outstanding” as
in “not-yet”]”
c. Present (Fallenness and thus Fascination), in Dy (254)
“Once thrown into the world, Dasein realizes its own
possibilities, it constantly actualizes its potentialities of
existence. […] As long as man exists in the world, his
potentiality for being is never exhausted [, always having] an
unfinished character.” (Dy 237). As such, Dasein is also beingahead-of-itself (i.e., fore-structure) as long as he exists, he is
incomplete (≠ unfulfilled, or lacking togetherness) as long as
he exists. This incompleteness is not like the unripeness of a
fruit. Whereas the fruit fulfills its being by being ripe, Dasein
does not necessarily fulfill its being in death.
Given his fore-structure, its ahead-of-itself, “Dasein, therefore,
as long as it exists, is already, its end. The end of Dasein is
not to be understood as being-at-end but as being-towards[death]. […] Man, being ahead of himself, as project, comes
to the disclosure of his extreme possibility, the possibility that
he will no longer be ‘there.’” (Dy 254)
“Death is a possibility in being that Da-sein always has to
take upon itself. […] In this possibility, Da-sein is concerned
As the end of Dasein, death is the most nonrelational,
certain and as such, indefinite and unsurpassable
possibility of Dasein. As the end of Dasein, death is the
Being of this being towards its end. (BT 239)
Ownmost, nonsubstitutional, total:
“all relations to other Da-sein are dissolved in it.”
(BT 232)
The possibility of his
impossibility:
“Death is the possibility of the
absolute impossibility of Dasein.” (BT 232); “Death is in
the being of this beingPossible
at any moment:
towards-its
end.” (BT 239)
“[Death] is an eminent imminence.
[…] A thunderstorm can be
imminent, remodeling of a house,
the arrival of a friend. […] Imminent
death does not have this kind of
being.” (BT 232)
Inevitable,
necessary:
“[Dasein’s] existential
possibility is grounded
in the fact that Dasein is essentially
disclosed to itself, in
the way of beingahead-of-itself. […]
When Da-sein exists,
.: Dasein has the following modes as a being-towardsdeath:
Inauthentic being-towards-death – concealed in the
everydayness and publicness of concern, in impersonal,
tranquilized indifference (re: fallenness or Verfallen, in Sorge).
“Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an
authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the
world.” (BT 38:220) “Such fallen-ness into the world is
manifested in idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity:” (SEP) “The
publicness of everyday-being-with-one-another ‘knows’ death
as a constantly occurring event, as a ‘case of death.” Someone
or another ‘dies,’ be it a neighbor or a stranger. People
unknown to us ‘die’ daily and hourly. ‘Death’ is encountered as
a familiar event occurring within the world. […] In such talk,
death is understood as an indeterminate something which first
has to show up from somewhere, but which right now is not yet
objectively
present
oneself,
and
is but
thusme
no– those
threat.
[…]
With
“By
‘Others’ we
do not for
mean
everyone
else
over
and
against
whom the ‘I’
stands out.
those from
whom, for
such ambiguity,
Da-sein
putsThey
itselfare
inrather
the position
of losing
itself
the
most
part,.”one
not distinguish oneself – those among whom one
in the
they
(BTdoes
234)
is too […] By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the world is
always the one I share with Others [das Man].” (BT 26:154-155)
Authentic being-towards-death – If death is my
ownmost, nonrelational, certain, indefinite possibility,
then “it must be understood as possibility, cultivated as
possibility, and endured as possibility in our relation to it.”
(BT 241) As such, “Being-toward-death is the anticipation
of a potentiality-of-being of that being whose kind of
being is anticipation itself. […] Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face
with the possibility to be itself, primarily unsupported by
concern taking care of things, but to be itself in
passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free
“In
anticipating
the
certainty
of death,
Da-sein of
opens
itself
of the
illusions
ofindefinite
the they,
factical,
and certain
itself.”
to a constant threat arising from its own there. […] In Angst, Da-sein
(BT 253, 245)
finds itself faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of
its existence. Angst is anxious about the potentiality-of-being of the
being thus determined, and thus discloses the most extreme
possibility. Because the anticipation of Da-sein absolutely
individualizes it and lets it, in this individualizing of itself, become
certain of the wholeness of its potentiality-of-being. […] Beingtowards-death is essentially Angst.” (BT 245)
“Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees
one from one’s lostness in chance possibilities urging
themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities lying
before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first
authentically understood and chosen. Anticipation
discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility
lies in giving itself up and thus shatters all one’s clinging
to whatever existence one has reached. In anticipation,
Da-sein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or
behind the potentiality-for-being that it has understood.
[…] Free for its ownmost possibilities, that are determined
by the end and so understood as finite, Da-sein prevents
the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of
existence, fail to recognize that it is getting overtaken by
the existence-possibilities of others, or that it may
misinterpret these possibilities, thus divesting itself of its
.: “Death ends the continuous incompleteness of Dasein”
(Wang Tangjia, “Concepts of Death in Heidegger and
Levinas” 144) for he is still ahead-of-itself, a not-yet
(Noch-Nicht) as long as he is
.: Death individualizes man and “reveals the ‘there’ of
man, his being-alongside” as “nothing when his ownmost
potentiality for being is itself an issue in death.” As such,
authentic being-towards-death “means projecting oneself
upon his ownmost potentiality foe being rather than upon
the possibility of the ‘they’ self.” (Dy 256)
.: Authentic being-towards-death thus understands the
indefinite certainty of death: its indefiniteness springs
from Dasein itself, and its certainty corresponds to the
certainty of being-in-the-world.
