Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain

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Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain Author(s): Omar G. Encarnación Source: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 950-972 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20072832 . Accessed: 27/03/2014 05:04
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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Democracy

and Dirty Wars

in Spain

Omar

G.

Encarnaci?n*

ABSTRACT
This essay examines the rise of government-sponsored anti-terrorist death

the return to power of the Left since squads in Spain that accompanied the interwar Second Republic. It locates the roots of this disturbing and in the institutional culture of the military inherited puzzling development
from cies. the This Franco argument regime as shaped by its history of counter-terrorism about a clean challenges widespread assumptions poli break

in authoritarian practices in Spain following the democratic transition of 1977. Italso calls into question the claim that civilian supremacy over the military was established in Spain by the time democracy was deemed to
have reached "consolidation'' in 1982. The conclusion culls the lessons of

the Spanish experience of battling terrorism with terror for the comparative It suggests that dirty wars intended to eradicate study of democratization.
terrorist organizations can erode the legitimacy of a nascent democracy

and, paradoxically,

prolong the fight against terrorism.

I.

INTRODUCTION

stellar democratic the biggest stain in Spain's otherwise per Undoubtedly, in the post-Franco era is the dirty war waged against the separatist formance Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, (ETA), (Basque Country and Liberty). organization

*

Omar

He is the author of is Associate Professor of Politics at Bard College. G. Encarnaci?n Politics: Democracy after Dictatorship The Myth of Civil Society (forth (2003) and Spanish transitions. and consequences of democratic and numerous essays on the causes coming) at a panel on "Democratization and Political An earlier version of this essay was presented Political Science Associa of the American for the 2006 annual meeting Violence" organized tion, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. on this essay made the comments The author gratefully by the panel's acknowledges a grant in Spain was facilitated Research and Nancy Bermeo. discussants, by Larry Diamond from the Bard Research Council.

Human

Rights Quarterly

29

(2007)

950-972

?

2007

by The

Johns Hopkins

University

Press

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2007

Democracy

and Dirty Wars

in Spain

951

in 1977, ETA's terrorist campaign on behalf Since the return of democracy of Basque independence made Spain the epicenter of domestic terrorism in a Western counter-terrorism As 1983 between and 1987, Europe.1 strategy, a government-sponsored de force, the Grupos Anti-terroristas paramilitary Liberaci?n battled ETA using (GAL), (Anti-terrorist Liberalization Groups), ETA's own tactics: assassinations, and bombings. The GAL's aim kidnapings, was the complete eradication of ETA by eliminating its leadership. To that a wave of indiscriminate on both sides violence end, the GAL unleashed of the Spanish-French resulted in the deaths of numerous in border, which nocent civilians. A full third of those killed by the GAL had no connection to terrorism whatsoever. Not surprisingly, once exposed by the media during the late 1990s, the GAL's existence created the most sensational political in recent Spanish history. Among scandal was the scandal's consequences the end of the fourteen-year whose accelerating reign of Felipe Gonz?lez, is generally credited with modernizing administration Spanish political and economic institutions. At the center of this analysis is unpacking the puzzle of why one of the new democracies world's most celebrated adopted a dirty war as the corner stone of its counter-terrorism This is even more compelling question policy. was that when GAL the born and itsmurderous agenda, considering executing was ruled the Partido Socialista Obrero Spain by left-wing party Espa?ol human (PSOE), (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party). Championing rights and are signature issues for Spain's ethnic minorities advocating self-governance for the PSOE. Moreover, many of the party's leaders themselves were victims of Franco's repression. In exploring the rise of the GAL and its campaign of in this extra-judicial Spain, killings study hopes to help fill one of the most obvious lacunae in the comparative literature on democratization. Why are even most ones democratic the successful like states, newly Spain, suscep tible to waging dirty wars? How effective are dirty wars as a state weapon against terrorism? Finally, what effect do dirty wars have upon the processes of democratic transition and consolidation? to Spain's dirty war has been Strangely enough, scholarly attention scant.2 This may well be the result of how ill fitting the story of disturbing the GAL iswithin the prevailing narratives of Spain's Cinderella-like trans formation from a paradigm of authoritarian rule under Franco to a model
1. to the Spanish Ministry of Justice, as of 2004, ETA is responsible for 3,391 According terrorist acts, resulting in the killing of 836 people and injuring 2,367, of whom 1,294 were rendered ETA's most Since 2004, act of ter physically incapacitated. significant rorism is the 30 December 2006 of a parking lot at Madrid's bombing Barajas airport that killed two Ecuadorian immigrants. The only extensive analysis of the origins of the GAL is by the journalist PaddyWoodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy For a summary of (2003). the book see his essay Paddy Woodworth, Using Terror against Terrorists: The Spanish in The Politics of Contemporary Spain 61 (Sebastian Balfour ed., 2005). Experience,

2.

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952

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

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new democracy. The broad consensus on Spain is that its is fully democracy and that this notoriously difficult political undertaking was "consolidated," in Spain in almost record speed. The 1982 completed general elections, staged a mere four years after the enactment of a new democratic are constitution, institutions and widely regarded as the precise juncture inwhich democratic became in rooted practices firmly however, Spain.3 Journalistic accounts, and compelling for the emergence provide a straightforward explanation of the GAL: the desire of the incoming socialist administration to shed its on as soft to and need the to demonstrate the terror, reputation military and the right-wing opposition that the PSOE possessed the will and know-how to battle ETA. Doubts about the capacity of the PSOE to deal with terrorism featured prominently the during the 1982 electoral contest and dominated first years of the socialist administration. This analysis offers an alternative explanation, one that finds its inspira tion in the theoretical notion that the institutional-historical legacies of the state are critical to the nature of its actions.4 In particular, understanding this analysis makes the case for the rise of the GAL as the product of the institutional culture of the Spanish military inherited from the Franco regime and shaped largely by its history of counter-terrorism practices. Extra-judi cial activities have a long and prominent history in the state's dealing with from the first attempt to eradicate the organization ETA, running seamlessly its embrace of armed struggle in 1968 the of following through dismantling the GAL in 1987. The survival of these strategies during this com period transition and consolidation. Thus, fortably spans the years of democratic the emergence of government-sponsored death squads after 1983 is best as a continuation understood rather than a departure of the state's counter terrorism strategies. By making the military and its institutional culture the root cause behind the rise of the GAL, this study poses a powerful to a principal challenge in the study of Spanish democratization: conventional wisdom that Spain secured effective and unambiguous civilian control over the military al most simultaneously with the end of the Franco regime and the advent of This democracy. point is one of the pillars upon which many scholars have made the case for the breathtaking is speed at which Spanish democracy to have consolidated. rise the the GAL of the However, thought during mid-1980s and influence suggests a higher degree of military autonomy

3.

as the the studies that point to the 1982 elections in the con Among defining moment are Juan J. Linz & Alfred L. Stepan, Problems of Democratic of Spanish democracy solidation Transition and Consolidation & Joan Botella, (1996); Richard G?nther, Jos? Ram?n Montero inModern Democracy Spain (2004). 5ee Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism & Frank Longstrech Sven Steinmo, 1992). eds., in Comparative Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Kathleen Politics, Thelen,

4.

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2007

Democracy

and Dirty Wars

in Spain

953

over policymaking in particular) than previously (counter-terrorism policy was nation's the This autonomy by "pacted" demo protected recognized. or military purges. cratic transition, which did not entail any bureaucratic was also enhanced It leaders, who either by the behavior of post-transition or were unwill on to ETA to how best handle the deferred military freely on In issue. to sensitive either case, the this the confront very military ing for confronting allowed military approaches politicians into the democratic under Franco to be transported In some cases, this also enabled military leaders period virtually unchanged. to to circumvent the institutions and procedures established government by on in the influence. military's reign behavior of civilian terrorism developed

II. THE RISE OF THEGAL
The GAL was born in 1983, one year after the PSOE's historic electoral victory. Not only did the party obtain an absolute majority of seats in the since 1977 to achieve this feat), the national parliament (the first government 1982 landslide represented the return of the Left to power in Spain since the the (1931 to 1936). Among days of the brief and chaotic Second Republic new was PSOE the administration terrorism, principal problems confronting the opening of the political system and the advent of ETA-related deaths rose from forty-three in 1975, the year Franco democracy. to in constitution 1978, the year the new democratic died, seventy-eight was enacted, to 118 in 1980 (a record for a single year to date), the year of the first regional elections.5 Officially, the PSOE's main strategy for battling laws passed this tidal wave of terrorism was to strengthen the anti-terrorist as seen were anchored the which, later, upon a by previous government, a in the terrorism. of This occasioned definition very expansive swelling on In terrorism. of for of those arrested 1985, instance, population charges which intensified with the Spanish police arrested 940 Basques for political reasons, pushing the to prison in Spanish jails from ninety-seven number of Basques sentenced in December 1978 to 484 by March 1988.6 The extra-judicial PSOE's counter-terrorism of the aspects policy, includ most its of the have drawn the most GAL, however, ing notably sponsorship attention. in the late 1990s absolved the investigations convened Although Prime Minister of any wrongdoing, clear they established Felipe Gonz?lez links between his administration and the GAL. The investigations resulted

5. 6.

& Juli?n Santamar?a, Crisis del franquismo: transici?n pol?tica y con Jos? M. Maravall en Espa?a, 68-69 de la democracia Sistema 79, 105 (1985). solidaci?n to Peace in the Basque Country, Robert P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles 1975-1988, at 46-65 (1990).

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an officer of the in the sentencing in 1995 of Enrique Rodriguez Galindo, Guardia Civil (National Police Corps), and Julen Elgorriaga, a top PSOE of ficial, on charges of kidnaping and murder. Three years later, in 1998, two of Gonzalez's the secretary of state for security, Jos? Barrionuevo, ministers, and Rafael Vera, minister of the interior, and Juli?n Sancristobal, the civil were the of of found the governor Viscaya, province Spanish Su guilty by in another GAL kidnaping. preme Court of participating The trials of socialist officials destroyed the story (which those involved in the creation of the GAL had promulgated) that the GAL was comprised in retaliation for of mercenaries hired by the Basque business community to tax." Since its the so-called pay inception, ETA has "revolutionary having schemes relied upon extortion upon Spanish and especially perpetrated to its activities. The businesses underwrite investigations also revealed Basque 1983 and 1987, a period that roughly that the GAL was active between coincides with the PSOE's first term in office. They further revealed that the GAL's operations as Anti-terrorismo Anticomunista. for the France's Basque provinces were the main theater of operations one a a On GAL of the the reflection hand, GAL, strategy. two-pronged ETAwhere many of its leaders resided. By the late 1960s aimed to decapitate a terrorist heaven for ETA given the unwillingness of France had become French authorities to extradite anyone suspected of terrorism to Spain for fear flames in of instigating a backlash from ETA and inciting Basque nationalist France's own Basque provinces. On the other hand, bringing the fight against to force the French government into greater ETA into France was meant in the with the Basque conflict. solving cooperation Spanish government for twenty-seven Over the course of its life, the GAL was responsible and three times as many assassinations injuries. Roughly a third of those of those injured had no con killed (nine) and an even higher proportion in Bayonne in took place nection to ETA at all.7 The GAL's first operation two ETA Lasa and of 1983 with the October Joxean members, kidnaping of the Guardia Joxe Zabala. They were transferred to Spain, where members were in before shot the back and Civil tortured them for several weeks, they resort attacks by in quicklime in the buried city of Alicante. Subsequent the GAL tellingly mirror ETA's own terrorist activities and included placing This accounts in commercial used by ETA members. establishments bombs In one incident the in the crossfire. for why so many civilians got caught even though at the time a bar frequented by ETA members GAL bombed of the bombing the killers could see children playing inside. Two little girls violent brought together multiple Armados ETA, Grupos Espa?oles right-wing groups such and Alianza Apost?lica

7.

Using Paddy Woodworth, supra note 2, at 63.

Terror against

Terrorists,

in The Politics

of Contemporary

Spain,

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2007 were with

Democracy

and Dirty Wars

in Spain

955

in the attack after the GAL killers sprayed the bar seriously wounded bullets.8 The GAL's two-pronged immediate success, strategy met with almost to its which explains why the organization curb murderous campaign began had become a reliable partner of the by 1987. By then the French government in its fight against ETA. In 1984, the French government Spanish government ETA members and extradited three directly to Spain. deported twenty-three Cross-national further intensified after Jacques Chirac became cooperation Prime Minister in 1986, partly from pressure from the French public com climate of violence created by the GAL within ing from the unprecedented In this sense, the GAL's indiscriminate use of France's Basque provinces. to most be violence the stimulus for French proved important cooperation

As noted by the Irish Times journalist Paddy the Spanish government. to 'The threat French citizens was indeed much more persuasive Woodworth, to the French government, to French public opinion, and especially than the ETA of The of of the land became price killing refugees. asylum simply being too high, even for those French Basques who regarded the ETA diaspora with some benevolence."9 with In this context of a languishing leadership and increasing Franco-Span ish cooperation, ETA entered into negotiations with the Spanish government inAugust 1987. Inmeetings held inAlgeria, of the Spanish representatives ETA met to and discuss the of is government possibility negotiations, which all the meetings actually accomplished. ETAwanted negotiations directly with the government rather than with police representatives and demanded that include the the of of Navarra into the negotiations incorporation province of the right to self-determination Basque Country and an acknowledgment by the Basque people. The Spanish government, which was principally interested in matters of public order and security, regarded most of ETA's agenda as matters to be negotiated between the central state and the Basque regional not ETA. For its part, the Spanish government demanded that government, ETA halt all violence the before into negotia government against entering tions. This made negotiations basically a non-starter for ETA since violence was the organization's to come to only currency for forcing the government the negotiating table in the first place. Why did the PSOE embrace a strategy of using terror to fight terrorism? As noted previously, the PSOE came into office determined to erase the within the was soft that it impression military and the right-wing opposition on terrorism. reasons rest behind this Compelling widespread impression. The PSOE had a long history of supporting regional rights in Spain, some be lax thing that afforded the military the impression that the party would

8. 9

Id. at 70-71. Id. at 72.

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

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in dealings with Basque nationalists. As one of the leading parties fronting the PSOE supported the inter-war Second autonomy sweeping Republic the for Catalonia and Basque Country. The goal was the eventual fed rights the Right and the military have historically of Spain, something eralization in 1977, the PSOE was quick to In the democratic period began opposed. restore its reputation as a defender of regional rights. The party's leaders of the post-Franco administration the first democratic frequently attacked a era headed by Prime Minister Adolfo Su?rez for being "rigid defender of Su?rez this attack was unfair because Spanish centralism."10 On the whole and his Uni?n de Centro Democr?tico (UCD), (Democratic Center Union) that eventually compromise party were the architects of the constitutional led to the partition of Spain into seventeen regions. self-governing at as the the More party inception of de important, leading opposition from the other the Left, PSOE, mocracy, harshly criticized parties alongside ETA. This in handling for its heavy-handedness the Su?rez administration in November claim had more merit. After Franco's death 1975, the lead were united in petitioning ing political parties from both the Left and Right as his successor, to grant pardon Franco anointed Juan Carlos, by King crimes committed under the old for to all Basques political imprisoned the 1975 March and Between November 1976, King issued three regime. of that decrees political prisoners. amnesty virtually emptied Spanish jails into society also provided programs for the r?int?gration The government renounce with the to association their for ETAmembers organization's ready from the govern terrorist activities. These early overtures of reconciliation a spike ETA. Instead, Spain experienced failed to appease ment, however, of 1977, the country's first elections in terrorist activity as the democratic were 1936, approaching. from ETA, the Su?rez administration In the face of relentless provocations introduced the first anti-terrorist period. Laws legislation of the democratic to Civil detain and of the Guardia 1978 the after powers expanded passed arrest anyone suspected of involvement with terrorism, even if peripherally. and highly This was made possible by the adoption of the very expansive in the 1981 "Law for the De terrorism articulated definition of ambiguous Itdefined terrorism not only as "embracing any fense of the Constitution." attack on the integrity of the Spanish nation" but also as "any effort to secure of any part of its territory, even if non violent."11 This law led independence of virtually the entire leadership of conviction to the arrest and eventual Herri Batasuna (HB), (Popular Unity party), generally regarded to be ETA's of the organization radicalization the thereby accelerating political wing, stances. its political by hardening since

10. 11.

Richard Clark,

Government,

Socialist The Spanish G?nther, Opposition Party: From Clandestine Spain 8, 42 (Stanley G. Payne ed., /hThe Politics of Democratic supra note 6, at 39-47.

to Party of 1986).

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in 1977 by former ETAmembers Created HB rapidly and sympathizers, a thorn in the side of the became In newly elected government. striking contrast to most of the Spanish political establishment, HB has traditionally ETA and its terrorist activities, which refused to criticize the party regards as critical to the In the view of HB struggle for Basque independence. leaders, ETA terrorists are "soldiers fighting for their country's freedom," whose victims are "either fascists or representatives of a repressive foreign in the institutions of the new power."12 HB has also shunned participation In 1978 the party opposed the ratification of the new democratic democracy. in 1979 it refused to occupy the seats that it had gained in the constitution; national parliament in that year's elections in a sign of protest against the new political to a Herri Batasuna the party statement, regime. According not "will in the Spanish parliament because it is the legislative participate state."13 Such claims are based on the refusal of body of a nondemocratic the Spanish government to incorporate into the text of the 1978 constitution the right to self-determination and secession.14 the PSOE contended that it Finally, during the 1982 electoral campaign could do a better job dealing with ETA than any other political party. This claim was based on two assumptions that proved to be totally wrong and in a difficult position on administration subsequently placed the Gonz?lez the issue of ETA terrorism. First, Gonz?lez that ETAwould believed naively a reprieve from its terrorist This grant his government campaign. impression was based on the that ETAwould eagerly welcome the coming perception of a left-wing government without any ties to the Franco regime. Unlike the Su?rez administration, which was dominated by former Francoist insid ers, beginning with Su?rez himself, a former head of the Francoist party Movimiento the Gonz?lez administration was not tainted by an Nacional, affiliation with the old regime. But the PSOE's hope for some breathing space from ETAwas dashed early as the organization treated the incoming social no ist government than the previous one. Days after Gonzalez's differently a ETA murdered inauguration, high-profile General. By the end of the year, the organization had killed five other military officials, a chorus occasioning of complaints from the citizenry and the military for the government take a tougher stance ETA. A the 16 Cambio against poll by Spanish magazine revealed that "[t]he percentage of those dissatisfied with the government's anti-terrorism efforts declined in December 1984 steadily from 54 percent to 39 percent in February 1985, then increased to 57 percent dramatically inOctober 1985."15

12. 13. 14. 15.

John F. Coverdale, at the Polls 226, Cynthia Country Coverdale, G?nther,

and the Elections in the in Spain Regional Nationalism Basque Country, 245 (Howard R. Penniman & Eusebio M. 1985). eds., Mujal-Le?n Nationalism: and Party in Ireland and the Basque Between Movement Irvin, Militant 120 (1999). supra note 12. supra note 10, at 39.

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about ETA terrorism was also rapidly shattered: The second assumption in Spain would make France's that the advent of a socialist administration more willing own socialist government to help Spain in its struggle against ETA. Paris seemed unmoved by the plight of its sister socialist administra tion in Madrid. refused to take French Prime Minister Fran?ois Mitterand administration's requests. The repeated extradition seriously the Gonz?lez French government also strenuously denied that France had become a refuge known to the police of both countries for ETA even though itwas widely that senior ETA members moved freely in the streets of Bayonne and other border. French towns along the Franco-Spanish

AND PRACTICES MILITARY CULTURE III. STATE
offered above for the rise of the problem with the explanations to consider the prominent role that the military is that they neglect in in policy Spain after the formal disman played shaping anti-terrorism was firmly in the hands of the tling of the Franco regime. Battling terrorism case well past military during the late Franco period, and this remained the transition marked by the 1977 elections. the democratic Indeed, it appears control over other aspects of the that as the military gradually surrendered in the late 1960s and state's policymaking sphere (first over the economy it tightened later over the reform of Francoist institutions in the mid-1970s), its grip over counter-terrorism policy. into the idea of Under the Franco regime, the military was socialized a culturally the and indivisible Spain and was tasked with homogenous of dealing with any internal threat to that view of the nation. responsibility of powers from the This was a counter reaction to a process of devolution A serious the Basque Country central state to the regions beginning with Catalonia, that took place during the Republican and Galicia period.16 Enforcing the made the Basque Country, histori state's agenda of cultural homogeneity a one of the region, principal targets of Francoist fiercely independent cally repression. in almost every In Franco's Spain, Basque nationalism imaginable was State the public manifestation policy prohibited severely repressed. its claim use of Euskera, the Basque Country's ancient and chief language a separate nation from the rest of Spain, even though only to constituting

GAL

16.

inCatalonia was regional autonomy fully realized. The Basque statute of autonomy Only was passed in 1937 when the region was half at the height of the Spanish Civil War ref had voted on their autonomy army. The Galicians by Franco's nationalist occupied in advancing their in 1936, but they were less successful the Basques erendum before control from the onset of the since the region was under Francoist autonomy project war.

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a small minority of Basques can actually speak it. The Franco regime also instituted a ban on the public display of the Basque flag as well as the very intrusive and seemingly perplexing policy of forbidding parents from giving their children Basque names. These policies resulted in thousands of ordinary Basques being arrested, tortured or forced into exile by the Franco regime during the years leading to the democratic transition.17They also insured that in the Basque Country would the conflict Franco's most complex become new for the legacy democracy. The attempt to eradicate of Basque every vestige of the uniqueness culture had the predictable effect of radicalizing many sectors of Basque Notable society, eventually giving rise to extreme nationalist organizations.18 was was in 1959 them which created middle class ETA, among by young to the passivity toward the Franco regime of (PNV), (Basque Nationalist Party), the historic of advocate Basque nationalism.19 Until ETA's embrace of armed struggle in the 1968, with an attack on a train full of soldiers and civil war veterans, violence had been limited to acts of vandalism such as blow organization's and setting up bombs in front of Guardia Civil stations. ing up monuments nationalist confessional, By 1968, however, "what had been a conservative, university students in reaction the Partido Nacionalista Vasco movement joined by a radical, leftist, revolutionary organization."20 After 1968, the military to repress the spared no effort in attempting onset of ETA terrorism. So pronounced was the militarization of the Basque was

17.

As would

18.

be expected, the repression of Basque culture under Franco is a central ex behind the persistence of the conflict in the Basque Country. It has given rise planation to ETA's claim state in the Basque Country that the presence of the Spanish amounts to cultural genocide. this calculus, the democratic nature of the state in Spain Under is irrelevant, as is the strong recognition of minority cultures guaranteed by the 1978 can guarantee democratic because the survival constitution, only complete independence are of Basque as the central government culture. These claims obviously exaggerated no longer imposes a national to de Since the transition policy of cultural homogeneity. as unique within is recognized the Iberian context and Euskera mocracy, Basque culture is taught in schools and widely used in the affairs of the Basque regional government. sector of Basque Another radicalized the Basque society by Franco's repression was Church. The large-scale Catholic of human violations in rights by the Franco regime the Basque to openly the govern many Country prompted Basque priests disobey ment. Many began to conduct mass in the local language, the Franco directly violating In 1960, 350 priests in linguistic policy of "one nation, one language." regime's official a letter to their local the Basque country wrote the Franco regime's Bishop protesting in the region. It led to the trial of several Basque priests on inMadrid policies charges to state of insubordination policy.

19.

At the heart of ETA's

20.

is the creation of an independent, state incorporat socialist struggle of Vizcaya, and Navarra. The most extreme Avala, Guip?zcoa ing the Spanish provinces nationalists also seek to incorporate the French provinces of Labourd, Basse Basque in their plan for the creation Navarre and Soule of an all-Basque nation. For more on ETA's origins see Jos?Mar?a Garmendia, Historia de ETA (1979). On the evolution of ETA's see Robert P. Clark, The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond (1979); separatist struggle Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents (1984). & Botella, supra note 3, at 76. G?nther, Montero

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after 1968, that the region gained the appearance of being an oc a in contrast to rest much of the where cupied territory, Spain relatively open of consequence prevailed. This had the unintended political environment in real claim the the stated late-1800s Sabino the Arana, making by founding father of Basque nationalism, that the Basque Country was a nation militar Country the "occupation" were anti-terrorism ily occupied by Spain. Underscoring to the Basque provinces and that produced laws that applied exclusively some of the most emblematic of episodes political repression of the late Franco era. In the 1970 Burgos trial, sixteen ETA members, including two and two Basque priests, were collectively court-martialed and nine to death. of them were sentenced International pressure spared them their lives. In 1975, despite pleas from the Vatican and the United Nations, the two ETA members Franco regime executed and three Communist leaders. No fewer than thirteen countries withdrew their ambassadors from Madrid in protest for the killings. em violence Barely noticed by the outside world was the extra-judicial state ETA. of The words Manuel Franco's former Fraga, ployed by the against Minister of Communication and Tourism, and long-time President of the in the post-transition of Galicia period, aptly capture regional government the extra-judicial side of the Franco regime's counter-terrorism approach: terrorism is for the state to kill more terrorists than "The key to defeating the terrorists kill civil guards."21 Central to this mission was the employment of state-sponsored paramilitary death squads with the intention of hunting that the PSOE down and killing ETA leaders. This suggests the unlikelihood it not for the strategy of violence have embraced would against ETA were women the military. Surely, this contention the existence of such proclivities within in for its involvement is not intended to absolve the PSOE of culpability into the operations of the GAL the GAL. As seen already, the investigations a link between the death squads and the PSOE. Rather, clearly established to the it is intended pattern within suggest that there was an established in its fight against ETA that ran virtually activity military of extra-judicial uninterrupted Admiral heir, whose up until the coming Luis Carrero Blanco, of the Socialist administration. Franco's alter ego and apparent political assassination by ETA in 1973 remains to date the

spectacular is the GAL's intellectual father. Fol boldest act of terrorism, organization's act in Carrero ETA's Blanco began to devise a plan terrorist first 1968, lowing to eradicate ETA. For Carrero Blanco, "not even the formidable repressive to him under Francoist available machinery legality could stem the rising anti-terrorist tide of militant democratic opposition."22 Only a specialized

21. 22.

un muerto cada 60 horas, El Pa?s Digital, Espada, Aquel a?o de at www.udel.edu/leipzig/270500/elb270800.htm. Woodworth, Using Terror against Terrorists, supra note 2, at 67. Arcadi Available

27 August

2000.

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force that would fight the terrorists with their own tactics could defeat the terrorists. Carrero Blanco did not have to look far to staff this new military force, given that the Franco regime had already created a very auspicious environment for the flourishing of a broad assortment of mercenary, right in Spain. The job of these seasoned wing groups paramilitary groups was that erupted in Franco's Spain during hunting and killing the insurgencies the 1940s and 1950s. Their first target was the huidos, the Republicans that chose to take to the hills rather than surrender to Franco. Subsequently, the Spanish exiles who played a prominent role they targeted the maquis, in the French Resistance to Fascism and began to enter Spain in the hopes of toppling Franco after the end of World War II.23 Carrero Blanco's plan for a dirty war against ETA was interrupted by his assassination in 1973, though "his lieutenants gradually brought it to fruition."24 In 1975, military officers formed the little-known Batall?n Vasco Battalion) to target ETA. In every sense, the Espa?ol (BVE), (Basque-Spanish BVE was the prototype for the GAL. Indeed, the GAL is best regarded as a carbon copy of the BVE. its misleading name, the BVE operated Despite in France. Like the GAL, the BVE was also staffed by mercenaries mainly and coordinated the same con by units of the Spanish military. Virtually stellation of radical right-wing groups that originated the BVE would go on to form the core of the GAL, ETA, Grupos including the Anti-terrorismo Armados Espa?oles, Alianza Apost?lica Anticomunista, and the Guerrilleros de Cristo-Rey. Not surprisingly, it has been widely reported in the Spanish media that some individuals went directly from the BVE to the GAL. Finally, like the GAL, indiscriminate violence was a hallmark of the BVE. Between 1975 and 1981, the BVE engaged in anti-terrorist activities that resulted in the killing of five ETA members and injured over two-dozen others without to terrorism. The most infamous attack of the BVE left three any connection dead fetus made for a gypsies dead, including a pregnant woman whose cover page in many of the nation's gruesome newspapers.25 the creation of the BVE in 1975 coincided with Perhaps not by accident, the beginning of the transition to because the military probably democracy reasoned that battling ETA under democracy would be a lot more difficult than under the Franco regime. Franco passed away that same year, which provided the opportunity for the King to appoint Su?rez to orchestrate a regime transition to democracy anchored upon reform rather than rupture with the old regime. His expert management of the transition to democracy got him

23.

On eds.,

Franco's 1995). supra

Rural Guerrilla 24. 25. Woodworth, Espada,

of the huidos and the maquis see Paul Preston, The Urban and repression of the 1940s, in Spanish Cultural Studies 229(Helen Graham & Jo Labanyi Using note Terror against 21. Terrorists, supra note 2, at 67.

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in 1977 to head the first democratic elected of the post-Franco government era. Little is known for sure about Su?rez's involvement with the BVE, but it is generally thought that his administration deferred to the military on matters of national security, including Law of Political Reform, which This explains why the 1976 legalized political parties in Spain and put the into of democratization excluded the Spanish Communist motion, process which out like had been ETA, Party (PCE), singled by the Franco regime as an state. Until of the the the enemy early 1970s, leadership of the PCE advocated the overthrow of the Franco regime by means of a popular revolution. Civilian deference toward the military is also an important factor in un counter-terrorism.

the rise of the so-called Pacto del Olvido (Pact of Forgetting), the derstanding term to for the agreement grant immunity to the military over euphemistic human rights violations committed under Franco. This was no small deal that the Franco regime is directly responsible for the deaths of considering some 200,000 disease, and hunger in prisons be Spaniards by execution, tween 1939 and 1943.26 The pact of forgetting has, until recently, effectively of the past in Spain. This is quite in discussion any meaningful prevented contrast to the experience in Latin America and of other new democracies Eastern and Central Europe where truth commissions and military trials have to account for the crimes of the old regime.27 been organized To be sure, civilian politicians did not always obey the military's com In 1977, Su?rez legalized the PCE against virulent opposition mands. from the military. That same year he merged three military ministries under a Su?rez also infuriated the military when Ministry of Defense. services under one single agency, the Centro eleven intelligence to "centralise the intelligence Informaci?n de la Defensa de (CESID), Superior flow of information and to work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff."28 on 1 July 1980 redefined An organic law approved the jurisdiction and civilian-led he brought of the leading civil and military authorities that emphasized responsibilities civilian supremacy over the military. These reforms, however, did not bring about effective civilian control as suggested most vividly by the Tejerazo, over the military the failed on came 23 1981. of of This the heels the advent February military coup of regional self-governance in Catalonia and the Basque Country, which

26. 27. 28.

comes from Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the This figure of Franco's victims at 539 (1965). Civil War, 1931-1939, Is Spain Recovering its Memory? the Pacto del Davis, See, e.g., Madeleine Breaking 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 858 (2005). Silencio, the Spanish, Argen The Degree Political Autonomy of Military during Jorge Zaverucha, can conclude 25 J. Latin Am. Stud. 283 at 286 (1993). We tine and Brazilian Transitions, in 1981 is that Su?rez paid dearly for his affronts to the military. His sudden resignation over his political rumored to have been engineered decisions, by the military including of the Communist the legalization party nance to the Basques and the Catalans in 1977 in 1981. and the granting of limited self-gover

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the military with the dismemberment of the na regarded as synonymous to be acting on behalf of the King, paramilitary groups tion. Claiming led Antonio the General held The coup by Tejero Spanish parliament hostage. served as a waking call to the civilian elite of the continuing threat that the this realization did not military posed to the new democracy. Paradoxically, a more assertive stance toward the into assuming embolden the civilians military; quite the contrary. As reported by Stanley Payne, during the twenty that followed months the coup Spain was said to live under a democracia or conditional that required the government vigilada (guarded democracy) to "negotiate each new step in policy or major personnel change with the
senior commanders."29

The Socialist administration inaugurated in 1982 did not break any new on As reported by Payne, there was "no very relations. ground civil-military distinct 'Socialist policy' vis-a-vis the armed forces as distinct from that of the UCD."30 This explains much about the seemingly seamless transfer of over counter of the issue terrorism and military autonomy policy despite the reforms put in place by the Su?rez government. Ironically, some of these in the creation of the GAL. Its very reforms were subverted by the military can as noted previously, to be traced the Su?rez CESID, which, founding had created to centralize the gathering of intelligence information and report to the government. However, by 1982, the agency had "deviated from its and started to report to the armed forces rather than the original purposes,
government."31

A new purpose for the CESID was plotting a new dirty war against ETA. Indeed, this office became the unintended brainchild intelligence of the GAL. According toWoodworth, the "the 1980s, pros and by early cons of launching a new dirty war were indeed being seriously analysed at the highest level by Spanish military also intelligence."32 Woodworth inclined to launch an attack reports of intense lobbying by military officers forces on ETA. He quotes security officials as having said: by paramilitary "Give us the money and cover, and we will clean things up for you. Ifyou give us a free hand, we will finish off ETA in a very short space of time." Also revealed is the knowledge by the military that a socialist government cover the best for their clandestine "We want to do it provided operations. with the security of knowing and democratic party."33 that we have the political support of a left-wing

29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

of the Armed Stanley G. Payne, Modernization supra note 10, at 181, 184. Id. at 185. Zaverucha, supra note 28, at 286.

Forces,

/7?The Politics

of Democratic

Spain,

The War against Terrorism: the Spanish Paddy Woodworth, Experience 17 Int'l J. Iberian Stud. 172 (2004). Qaeda, Woodworth, Using Terror against Terrorists, supra note 2, at 70.

from ETA to al

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El Mundo (which is credited newspaper Reporting by the conservative with breaking the story of the GAL), details the heavy involvement of the of the GAL. The paper reports the agency's kid CESID in the development teens for the purpose of using them of and drug addicted beggars naping as guinea pigs in anticipation of the kidnaping and torturing of Basque ter rorists.34 The CESID's authorship of the GAL was broadly corroborated by the investigations of the late 1990s headed by Judge Baltazar Garz?n, better known to the world for having issued the indictment that led to the arrest leaked to the Pinochet. A CESID document strongman Augusto GAL" Document of underscores considered the the media Spanish "Founding in the leading role played by the Spanish military creating the intelligence the use of extra-judicial GAL and enticing the PSOE into embracing killings in its struggle against ETA. Itcontains the very revealing statement that: "We form of action to be the use of disappearances the most advisable consider of Chilean through kidnaping."35 to By refusing to reign in on the military's plans (and in fact agreeing an war To in ETA. its the PSOE the became them) against dirty accomplice to CESID had the how mindful of credit, and perhaps democracy dangerous in 1984 the Gonz?lez administration become, began to chip away at the and influence of the agency. That same year, the CESID became autonomy but functionally sub Minister, upon the Defence dependent "organically established to the Prime Minister."36 Moreover, the government ordinated over the agency. These measures were intended to oversight parliamentary use of the intelligence service apparatus to regulate end the "[?Indiscriminate internal affairs," and to uproot the "Francoist mentality concerning vigilance against the internal enemy."37

CHANGE AND MILITARY ANALYSIS:REGIME IV. COMPARATIVE AUTONOMY
This analysis yields important lessons for students of Spanish politics. At the so much of the literature the myth that permeates broadest level, it exposes on Spain's democratization that the end of the Franco regime in 1977 meant is the authoritarian "a clean break with past."38 Ironically, this assertion
34. 35. 36. 37. 38. at news.bbc. 29 July 1998, available El Mundo, death squads, Spain's state-sponsored co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/141720.stm. at www.elmundo.es/nacional/gal/investiga available Los papeles del CESID, El Mundo, cion/6.html. Zaverucha, supra note 28, at 287. Id. Felipe Ag?ero, South America, Perspective 124, eds., 1995). in Southern and and the Military Democratic Consolidation Europe Southern Europe inComparative in The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Puhle & Hans-Jurgen P. Nikiforos Diamandouros 128 (Richard G?nther,

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in connection most frequently with the study of civil-military encountered of civilian control over that the establishment relations, which presumes with the completion of the transi the military was attained simultaneously tion to democracy. The most authoritative of relations study civil-military in Spain by Felipe Ag?ero concludes that "Franco's authoritarian regime was clearly civilianized"39 transition "the and that during the democratic and did not military remained within well-bounded spheres of competence interfere with political decisions civilian officials."40 Similar claims are by echoed in other assessments of civil-military relations in Spain. One from the mid-1990s from Jorge Zaverucha concludes that: "The constituted civil . . . civilian control over the has been institutionalised hierarchy military now appears quite similar has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy to the older European democracies."41 If not wrong, new

in Spain's these assertions about the role of the military were at at the least time the when very premature democracy they were issued.42 The GAL affair clearly suggests that extra-judicial strategies for fighting terrorism developed to survive under the Franco regime managed and even thrive under two democratic administrations. also suggest a They more significant level of military autonomy and influence over public policy than previously acknowledged. These findings, which were vividly brought to the into the operations of the GAL of the mid-1990s, investigations light by the of how scholars misread the state of civilian-military prompt questions relations in Spain following the demise of the Franco regime, and why they were willing to declare Spain a paradigmatic example of "civilian supremacy over the military."43 We can point to at least two that in hindsight assumptions now appear seriously flawed. The first assumption is that during the late Franco period the military had been effectively removed from the day-to-day operations of the government. The rise of groups like Opus Dei accelerated the de-militarization of the Franco regime, which in turn led to an overall neglect of military institutions. As contended by Payne, one of the ironies of the Franco regime, generally as a "military dictatorship," characterized is that it "left a weak and back ward set of military institutions." By 1970, the military's budget "amounted

39. 40. 41. 42.

Id. at 140. Id. at 125. Zaverucha, supra note 28, at 283-84. scholars have been slow to question the notion of civilian control Oddly enough, while of the military in post-Franco have not. Narcis Serra, the Span Spain, Spanish politicians ish minister of defense between the years of 1982-1995, has argued that civil-military relations during to democracy the transition in Spain need to be reconsidered in light of the experience of the GAL. See Narcis Serra, Threats to Democracy from the Armed Services: based on the Spanish Forces, Police and Intelligence case, avail Suggestions able at www.clubmadrid.org/cmadrid/fileadmin/2-Serra.pdf. supra note 38. Felipe Ag?ero,

43.

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of the Spanish GNP, having been outstripped by on education for the first time in Spanish history."44 government expenditures the military however, comes with a caveat that while Payne's assessment, did not play a direct corporate role during the late Franco period, this did not apply to the country's internal security, which remained firmly within the sphere of military affairs through the end of the regime. The second point that gives false support to the notion of Spain having full civilian control over the military by the early 1980s was the perceived effectiveness of the military reforms undertaken after the democratic transition of 1977 and the military coup of 1981.45 They included the centralization of intelligence the creation of a civilian-led services, Ministry of Defense, on routine defense and the separation of the matters, legislative hearings state of the between those forces concerned with the in security apparatus are measures state. and external of the These the ternal that, in the security view of military analysts, distinguish Spain (where civilian control over the to have been attained) from those where is presumed this is thought military a as seen to remain work in progress, most notably Latin America. However, in this analysis, military reforms in Spain did not immediately transform the relations and the behavior of the military itself. As landscape of civil-military service (the CESID) suggests, the military the case of the central intelligence into a hotbed of autonomous turned this new agency decision successfully an instrument continuation for the of established and extra-judicial making measures terrorism. Perhaps attaining civilian for combating supremacy over the military is a more complex and laborious process than realized, of institutional reforms, but also the entailing not only the implementation and practices. of institutional cultures passing gradual much model of transition to democracy played Spain's praised Oddly, a significant in the Spanish military role in retarding attitudinal changes in with respect to counter-terrorism practices. The transition to democracy transition. Spain is generally viewed as a prototype of a "pacted" democratic inwhich the authoritarian This is a type of regime change regime does not a democratic it into reformed instead becomes regime through collapse; transitions These have with the democratic direct negotiations opposition. to deliver safe and peaceful means been rightly praised for their capacity to a democracy. about They provide political actors with broad assurances a pacted of the attempt at democratization.46 the final outcome However, the vehicle for allowing parts of the state appa transition can also become

44. 45. 46.

the Army, Payne, Modernizing See Jorge Zaverucha's analysis verucha, supra note 28. 5ee Omar American G. Encarnaci?n, Lessons, 28 W.

supra note of military

29,

at 181. in Spain, Brazil, and Argentina. Spanish and Za South

politics Pacts

Do Political Eur. Pol. 182

Freeze

Democracy?

(Jan. 2005).

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ratus to transfer its authoritarian vices and pathologies from the old regime to the new one, a point underscored the by Spanish experience. Although era have endeavored in the post-transition to reform the state's governments neither bureaucratic purges nor sweeping personnel agencies, intelligence were ever of Not such effort.47 part changes surprisingly, subverting reforms new institutions and procedures and misusing intended to curb military were to to carry on with business critical the autonomy military's capacity as usual in its struggle to defeat ETA.

V. DEMOCRATIZATION AND TERRORISM
The Spanish experience also yields important lessons about the interaction of and terrorism. First, dirty wars intended to eradicate terrorism democratization can have unintended consequences. These include engendering sympathy for terrorist organizations terrorist and, paradoxically, activity. This prolonging contention echoes the argument commonly in the literature on encountered contentious groups generally gain legitimacy politics that violent opposition and public support when the state employs indiscriminate violence.48 Clearly, the dirty wars waged against ETA from 1975 to 1987 were a boon for ETA into the organization's the they played directly strategy of provoking into launching a military attack on the organization. politi Although cal loyalties in the Basque Country have not shifted away from the central state toward the terrorists (as has been the case in other new democracies afflicted by terrorism), support for ETA among the Basques has been highest whenever the state has unleashed its repressive apparatus. 1975 and 1981 generated By most signs, the killings of the BVE between tremendous support for ETA among the Basques at a critical juncture when was grappling with how to survive the end of the Franco the organization in the organization's whose violence dictatorship, greatly aided growth. this period, the Basque people held large demonstrations and Throughout strikes in major Basque cities, protesting use of terror the state's continued tactics to fight ETA. Not surprisingly, the highest level of support for ETA and its radical political agenda among the Basques was registered in 1981 at the height of the first dirty war. That year 8 percent of ordinary Basques agreed totally with ETA's violent strategies and political goals.49 since state

47.

is stressed in histories This point see An of Spain's services. For instance, intelligence tonio M. D?az Fern?ndez, Los Servicios de Inteligencia Espa?oles: Desde al Guerra Civil Hasta el 11-M: Historia de una Transici?n (2005). Tilly & Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (2007). of Democracy in the Basque The Weakness Jos? Manuel Mata, of Contemporary Spain 101 (Sebasti?n Balfour ed., 2005). See Charles Country, in The Politics

48. 49.

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The GAL had similar unintended consequences. Ironically, the GAL's suc in killing many ETA leaders in the 1980s ensured ETA's survival during the 1990s. The violent excesses of the GAL were skillfully employed by ETA to facilitate its recruitment efforts. For instance, the funerals of the innocent victims of the GAL were useful fodder for ETA in its efforts to embarrass So were the government. the revelations of the GAL's violent and ruthless when operations they began to seep through the media. They were used by to sustain the claims that, despite the transition ETA's propaganda machine to democracy, the state operated no differently than it did under the Franco own violent tactics were a mere defense and that their to the dictatorship state's brutality. in killing several ETA heavy Additionally, although the GAL succeeded in and from the French, it prompted weights bringing greater cooperation to shift its target from public officials to civilians. This ex the organization cess level of violence sustained by ETA did not see any plains why the overall in operation. the GAL was In the that the years significant change during a ETA 1990s to of "socialized strategy early developed suffering" designed state targets (most notably military officers and extend the terror beyond into society at large by singling out for attacks ordinary business civilians, leaders, judges, and celebrities. journalists, academics, to the Spanish NGO Gesto por la Paz, ETA's list of potential targets According in the Basque region alone exceeds 42,000 people, including 200 teachers over 1,200 politicians and intellectuals, and party officials, approximately over 25,000 350 judges and attorneys, 15,000 entrepreneurs, policemen, 400 journalists and 800 prison officers.50 These individuals are forced to to live their lives in perpetual avoid company and crowds, fear, careful installations) and their vehicles for bombs, and constantly changing their itineraries, checking even hiring bodyguards.51 Less known (at least outside of Spain) about ETA's repertoire of terrorist activities is the phenomenon of Kale borraka (street struggle), youth gangs active in major Basque towns on both sides of the border. The goal of the of terror and vandalism Kale borraka is twofold: to sustain an environment for the recruitment of new ETAmembers. and to serve as a foundation Both of these goals are critical to ETA's survival given the success of the govern as ment in recent years in capturing some of the organization's leadership in support for ETA's political tactics by the Basque well as the overall decline in people. Total support for ETA among the Basques has basically collapsed recent years and today stands at 1 percent.52

50. 51. 52.

de persecusi?n, por la Paz, Violencia cucion1.htm. Mata, supra note 49, at 100. This data is from Euskobarometro surveys, Gesto

available

at www.gesto.org/violenciaperse

available

afwww.ehu.es/cpvweb.

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is that dirty wars can lesson shown by the Spanish experience Another ones. exact a high price on democracies, By going outside fledgling especially the Spanish govern of the law in its struggle against terrorist organizations, In turn, this served to underscore ment itself became a terrorist organization. as lacking any real commitment to the ETA's portrayal of Spanish democracy rule of law and respect for civil and human rights; in effect, no different than in the Basque the previous authoritarian regime. This resonates most deeply as the transi state of and violence where the repression experience territory, tion to democracy began to unfold tainted the Basques' early impressions "Given this experience of dirty of democracy. As remarked by Woodworth, war not to transition it is that the this surprising perhaps period, throughout in in the than elsewhere looked rather less rosy Basque Country democracy most that of the ambivalence the The Basque people Spain."53 telling sign have showed toward Spanish democracy was the mass abstention of Basque voters in the constitutional referendum of 1978. The radical factions of the movement nationalist (ETA and HB) rejected the document while the Basque more moderate wing boycotted vote on the new constitu the parliamentary from the constitutional tion, resulting in a rate of abstention in two Basque provinces.54 than 45 percent vote of more

VI. RETAINING DEMOCRATICLEGITIMACY
suggests how newly democratic governments Finally, the Spanish experience can fight terrorism without and how losing their credentials as democracies, they can redeem themselves after falling victim to the temptation of fighting terrorism with terror. Spain is hardly the only country to have experienced an outburst of terrorist activity in the midst of a full-blown process of de mocratization. it is almost alone among recent cases of democ However, in having confronted ratization the threat of terrorism without discrediting to Peru (to say nothing From Russia to the Philippines itself as a democracy. of Iraq) the fight against terrorism has involved not only dirty wars but also or postponed cancelled the closing of representative elections, institutions, serious and violations of civil and political rights. Indeed, the fight against terrorism in new democracies is a key factor behind the spectacular spread of so-called democratic "illiberal practices of the state.55 democracies," coexist with and other regimes inwhich elections rampant abuses of power from the part

53. 54. 55.

Paddy Woodworth, Using Terror against Terrorists, supra note 2, at 67. Coverdale, supra note 12, at 233. at Home and Abroad See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy

(2003).

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Spain has actually followed a two-prong embracing democracy, to counter terrorism. The most obvious is the dirty war strategy Basque ran to ETA 1975 1987 that from intention with the of eradicating against Less is state de-cen the organization's evident the of process leadership. in the democratic in tralization begun which resulted the granting period, to of an extraordinary of the degree self-governance Basques by the central state. Among seventeen Spain's regional governments, only the Basques are accorded as to such the have their own police special privileges right to taxes.56 in and collect local These the estimate of (ertzaintza) provisions, some analysts, have "endowed the Basque Country with the highest level of in the European Union."57 None of this has satisfied regional self-governance which demands from Spain, ETA, nothing short of outright independence but it has had a palpable effect in shaping the dynamics of the politics of Basque nationalism. to portray the Spanish ETA's campaign has undermined Self-governance state as a colonial oppressor ETA since its of (a goal inception) and to turn the Basque people against Spain. This, in turn, has prevented the conflict one between in the Basque Country from becoming the central government and ordinary rather than a conflict between the central Basque people state and radical Basque nationalists. A majority of the Basque electorate statute in 1979 and public opinion the Basque autonomy data approved suggest that the Basque public has remained supportive of this arrangement ever since. This point is highlighted in the data from the Euskobarometro, a polling outfit at the University of the Basque Country that traces public The 2003 data reveals that 30 opinion polls among the Basque population. percent of Basques express to be "satisfied" with the present stipulations of like the statute, 40 percent are "partially satisfied," (and presumably would status to see it expanded), and 25 percent are "dissatisfied." As to political 35 32 percent express support for the status quo (autonomy), preferences, percent prefer a federal state, and 30 percent prefer independence.58 Clearly, the preference by the Basques for some sort of affiliation with the central inMadrid is overwhelming. administration to Spanish democracy fell the task of restoring credibility Ironically, upon the Partido Popular (PP), an organization with deep roots in the Franco

56.

57. 58.

of autonomy whereas the new regions the highest regions enjoy degree imbalances have been the subject of periodic tend to possess the least. These in an communities of the whole system of autonomous by the government to the re to bring some evenness to the devolution of administrative powers attempt Law for the Harmonization Process of the Autonomy such as the 1982 Organic gions, status of the Basque the approval (LOAPA). The special region may soon change with to the Catalan in June 2006. charter approved of the revisions autonomy Mata, supra note 49, at 82. Euskobarometro, supra note 52. The historic generally revisions

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in a direct jab at his predecessor, Prime Upon entering office, dictatorship. Minister Jos? Mar?a Aznar pledged to fight terrorism "within the law and with the full extent of the law." This statement carried special meaning because most memorable of Aznar's well-known hatred for ETA. The organization's in the post-Franco era occurred in attempt on the life of a Spanish politician in the almost when succeeded the assassination Aznar. of 1995, organization The PP's most notable anti-terrorist strategy was the 1999 anti-terrorist pact it signed with the socialist party, an attempt to forge an intra-party consensus on counter-terrorism policy. This pact cleared a path for the legislation that banned HB and the newspaper Egunkaria on grounds that they had formal links to ETA.59 Italso served to provide checks and balances on government actions against terrorist organizations, by requiring that the governing party not take any action on counter-terrorism policy without consulting with the opposition party. Aznar's most important anti-terrorist actions, however, targeted the state rather than ETA. Despite the inherent difficulties involved in scrutinizing the activities of any state's security apparatus, the extensive judicial investiga tions into the creation and operation of the GAL set an example for how can come clean about their misdeeds in any war against ter democracies rorism. Woodworth observes that "the relative success of the investigations was an would do well democracies example which much more established to follow."60 Although the investigations cleared Prime Minister Gonz?lez of as seen to led the indictment and any wrongdoing, already, they sentencing of several high-level PSOE officials and former government ministers. The Spanish government's to stay within decision the law in its fight as to terrorism have off, appears against paid suggested by ETA's decision of April 2006 to renounce violence and use the existing political system to advance its separatist agenda. To be sure, as with previous cease-fires, In December this one was short-lived. a 2006 the organization detonated bomb at Madrid's But ETA is in a Barajas airport that killed two civilians. state of crisis. It has never been more politically isolated and support from the public has never been lower. Many to ETA's factors have contributed counter-terrorist between growing weakness, greater including cooperation Paris and Madrid and the Spanish public's weariness with terrorism ensuing from the terrorist attacks on Madrid's Atocha station inMarch 2004. Origi and subsequently attributed nally pinned on ETA by the Aznar government

59.

60.

Not all parties supported this pact, including, most notably, (United Left, Izquierda Unida to the left of the PSOE), which accused the PP and the PSOE of endorsing legislation that could prove an initial step on a slippery civil and political slope toward abridging International human also criticized the Spanish government. rights. rights organizations See Press Release, The Lethal Cost of Freedom of Expression in International, Amnesty the Basque Country (11 Feb. 2003). Woodworth, Using Terror against Terrorists, supra note 2, at 76.

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to radical Islamic groups, the bombing of Atocha resulted in the death of over 191 people worst terrorist attack on and 2,050 people the injured, era. in is It that ETA's current soil the postwar European unlikely, however, come state not abandoned into fruition would have had the predicament anti-terrorism its extra-judicial campaign.

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