Digests for Family Law

G.R. No. L-20089
December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendantappellant

CASE FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.
On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note for Wassmer stating the marriage to be
postponed as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. On September 3, 1954,
he sent a telegram stating that nothing has changed, that he is returning and that
he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default
and was rendered to pay for damages. The defendant now asserts that the
judgment against him is contrary to law for the reason that there is no provision in
the New Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE: Whether or not a “mere breach of a promise to marry” is an actionable
wrong.

DECISION: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
However, the invitations have been sent, the apparel for the important occasion
have been purchased, the matrimonial bed (with accessories) have been bought,
and bridal showers were given and gifts were received. To formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides
that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.”

G.R. No. 198780
October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D.
ALBIOS, Respondent.

CASE FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Abios were
married before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Mandaluyong city, evidenced with a
Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. The testimony of Albios stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American Citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not a marriage declared as sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent.
DECISION: The court declared the marriage between Fringer and Albios valid and
subsisting. Albios claims that their marriage was a marriage in jest. A marriage in
jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
However, the court did not consider the respondent’s marriage analogous to a
marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application
for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine
consent was, therefore, clearly present. Furthermore, there is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they
see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title,
provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a

marriage. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Only the circumstances listed under Article
46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul
a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration
laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

G.R. No. 154994.
June 28, 2005
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO
GUALBERTO V, respondent

G.R. No. 156254. June 28, 2005
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
et. al., respondents

CASE FACTS: On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for
custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for
brevity), whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and
his school when she decided to abandon Crisanto. Despite efforts exerted by
Crisanto, he has failed to see his child.
Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was
commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up with the
conclusion that she is having lesbian relations. The findings of Renato Santos were
corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that the
mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on
one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child.
The trial court awarded the custody of the minor pendente lite to Crisanto. Joycelyn
thereafter filed a Motion Dismiss with an ancillary prayer to lift the award of custody
pendente lite but she did not present any evidence to support her motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not homosexuality disqualifies a mother from having custody of
a minor child.
DECISION: The court grants the custody of the child to Joycelyn. When love is lost
between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the bitterest
tussle is often over the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle
the opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is
less than seven years of age. There being no sufficient proof of any compelling
reason to separate the minor from his mother, custody should remain with her. The
mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more
of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or
affliction with a communicable disease. Sexual preference or moral
laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact
that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her

unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband
must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the
welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 213 of the Family Code provides that
“In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit.”

G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R.
VILLAR, respondents.

CASE FACTS: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent
Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man
and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between
petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of
which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was
followed by two more children. The relationship became known to private
respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in
Angeles City. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his
house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of
age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused
to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
The RTC rendered justice in favor of Daisie, stating that the rightful custody of the
minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother.
The CA reversed on appeal holding that Habeas Corpus was not proper and that the
question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a Habeas Corpus case
contemplates a situation where the parents are married to each other but are
separated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of Habeas Corpus proper
DECISION: It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the
determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases
where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated
from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time
of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the
Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein
petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of
him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her
child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground
for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the

child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving
petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been
able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. That she receives
help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point
against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the
family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and
have made it what it is.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: Article 213 of the Family Code provides that
“In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit.” Also, the first sentence of Article 176 of the Family Code
applies to this case, which provides that “Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.”

G.R. No. 185064
January 16, 2012
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR., et.al., Respondents.
CASE FACTS: The petitioners jointly purchased a parcel of land situated at No. 3
Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) issued
by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under Araceli’s
name, on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before their
marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the
petitioners thereafter occupied as their family home after they got married
sometime in January 1987.
Sometime in September 1988, De Mesa obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero,
Jr. worth P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property.
Due to failure of payment, Acero filed a complaint and was granted.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte levied upon
the property by selling it on public auction. The certificate of sale was issued to
Claudio, and was leased on the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva. They then
defaulted on the payment again so Acero filed a complaint for ejectment. On July
1999, MTC rendered a decision favoring the Acero’s and ordering the petitioners
to vacate the property. On October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed against the
respondents a complaint to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) and other documents with
damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that
the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the
Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of
satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.
ISSUES: Whether or not the the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio’s
Torrens title TCT No. T-221755 (M) over the subject property.
DECISION: The court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’
complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). The subject property is a family
home, however the family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. It is evident
that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time.
APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE: The foregoing rules on constitution of family
homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code
or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either
judicially or extra judicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus
exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extra judicially
constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
Also, Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that “A redemptioner must
produce to the officer, or person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his
notice to the officer a copy of the judgment or final order under which he claims the
right to redeem, certified by the clerk of the court wherein the judgment or final
order is entered, or, if he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of
the record thereof, certified by the registrar of deeds, or an original or certified copy
of any assignment necessary to establish his claim; and an affidavit executed by
him or his agent, showing the amount then actually due on the lien.”

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, et. al., complainants, vs.HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.,
et.al., respondents
CASE FACTS: Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo,
and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server,
respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents
Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the
Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by
the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the
absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco
Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt
from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions
to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to
file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so and that in order
to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by
securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which
was filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did
not contain the date and place of marriage. He claims that copies of the marriage
contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo and that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato
Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license. The marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid
embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage
contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

DECISION: On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently
provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that
the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
APPLICABLE LAWS AND RATIONALE: Article 3(2) of the Family Code provides
that one of the requisites of marriage is a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of the same code. Article 4 of the same code also applies
to the case at bar as it states that the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.

G.R. No. 104818
September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD
AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents
CASE FACTS: private respondent Delia Soledad Avera and petitioner Roberto
Domingo were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as
evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite. Unknown to her, he had a previous marriage
with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing. She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy. Furthermore, when she came home from
Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto
cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties
which are administered by Roberto. On May 29, 1991, Delia filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore,
superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes
of remarriage.
DECISION: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la
Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which
drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
The court concluded that the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law
states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and

distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." Hence, the
petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless.
APPLICABLE LAWS AND RATIONALE: Article 4 of the Family Code provides that
“the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.” The misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the
term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely"
instead of "only," which the Committee approved.
Article 43(2) of the Family Code provides that in cases of termination of the
subsequent marriage, referred to in Article 41 of the same code, absolute
community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith,
his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the
innocent spouse.

G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents
CASE FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in
Manila, and gave birth to a son, Andre O. Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since
he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered
his money. He depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them. Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. In
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them. The parties are
separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
ISSUE: Whether or not opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as
psychological incapacity.
DECISION: The Supreme Court granted the petition. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. In the present case, there is
no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
APPLICABLE LAWS AND RATIONALE: Article 36 of the Family Code provides that
“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.”
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the

most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the
time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the
essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

G.R. No. L-27930
November 26, 1970
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendantappellee
CASE FACTS: Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4
December 1953. Defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage
on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. On 23 September 1959, judgement was rendered dismissing the
complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle
the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their
marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to
her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud, in
obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil
Code. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.
Defendant Fernando denied the allegation of the complaint and denied having had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative. He averred that under no circumstance
would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the
day following their marriage on 4 December 1953. He denied having committed any
fraud against her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit.
Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its
dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."
ISSUE: The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
DECISION: The court agrees with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice
of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under
Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital
relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that
would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman
may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not
assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same,
whether it agrees with the rule or not.

G.R. No. L-12790
August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant,
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant

CASE FACTS: In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955, the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for
a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on
3 August, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too small to
allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. He alleged the
condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist. For that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day
after they had been married. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but
the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to
physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given
another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and
therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife
was and is impotent.
DECISION: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought
and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings
until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although
her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature
coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence
to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency."The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.

G.R. No. 165803
September 1, 2010
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners, vs. DIONISIO Z.
PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN, Respondents
CASE FACTS: Involved in this case are two parcels of land at BF Homes, Parañaque
City and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63376 and TCT No.
63377 in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and
Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been estranged from one another.
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the property
to the petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the rundown condition
of the improvements, but Atanacio’s persistence prevailed upon them. On February
2, 1991, they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the site of the property. During
their meeting, Ma. Elena showed to them the following documents, namely: (a) the
owner’s original copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT No. 63377;
(c) three tax declarations; and (d) a copy of the special power of attorney (SPA)
dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the
property. Before the meeting ended, they paid P20,000.00 as earnest money, for
which Ma. Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money, whereby the
parties stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional payment of P130,000.00 on
February 4, 1991; (b) they would pay the balance of the bank loan of the
respondents amounting to P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991; and (c)
they would make the final payment of P700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over the
property on March 31, 1991.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and
the Assessor’s Office of Parañaque City to verify the TCTs shown by Ma. Elena in the
company of Atanacio and her husband (also a licensed broker). Following their
verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment on
February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12,
1991, which then released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63377 to them.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma.
Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did
not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy
was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them
that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be turned over after a
week. On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was issued
in the name of the petitioners.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 as
promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of
TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who
appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell
both lots. The spouses met with Dionisio’s brother, Atty. Parulan on March 25, 1991,

who told them that he is the one with the power to sell the property. He demanded
P800,000 for said property and gave the spouses only until April 5, 1991 to decide.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on
April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena.
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action,
praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by
Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue
thereof. In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific
performance with damages against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated
for trial and judgment in the RTC.
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled
the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels
of registered land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of
respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family
Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent
of Dionisio?
DECISION: The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of
the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124
of the Family Code. Also, the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not
apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. They argue
that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the
administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor
of his brother. Also, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a
counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no
consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans
the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence,
ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.
APPLICABLE LAWS AND RATIONALE: The relevant part of Article 124 of the
Family Code provides that xxx In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. xxx

G.R. No. 106720
September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents

CASE FACTS: In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners
Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong,
Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and
their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was
of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and
was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and,
the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as
she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic
will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate
of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic
will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain
dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in disallowing the probate
of the will based on the provisions of Art Art 813 and Art 814.
DECISION: In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of
Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It
held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with,
hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous. The court cited
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any
of the following cases:(a) If not executed and attested as required by law; (b) If the
testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of
its execution; (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of

the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads: Art. 839: The will shall be
disallowed in any of the following cases; (1) If the formalities required by law have
not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed
through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a
petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the
will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the
whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the
unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate
the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes. It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes
and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of
the holographic will (Article 810).
APPLICABLE LAWS AND RATIONALE: Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides
that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will,
at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did
not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his
signature thereto.
Also, Article 839 of the New Civil Code provides that the will shall be disallowed in
any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a
will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear,
or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.