Hill Def

CONFIDENTIAL/
ATTORNEY WORD PRODUCT

M_F HO RANOVM . NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

TO : ALLEN R . PURVIS, x-2152
FROM : KAREN X .

JASA,

X-2385

DATE : NAY 7, 199 0 R£ : SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS IN JOIN W . HILL COLLECTION

1 . INTRODUCTION

John Wiley Hill, founder of the public relations fire . Hill 5 Knowlton, Inc ., played a key role in the formation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee . His papers

were donated to

the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin,

in

April, 1964 . A significant portion of this collection, the client files, was only recently made available to the public . Sources
at the WSHS inform us that

Or .

Richard W . Panay, plaintiff's

visited the archive several tines since the private papers were released, in addition to at least one visit prior to the Cyg So~gOe trial . The existence of
advertising expert 1 C_yc}y,glye, has these documents raises difficult discovery and evidentiary issues .

Or .

Pollay first referenced the papers of John W . Hill

in the bibliography to his chronological "Notes on the History of

Adve rt ising," prepared for
15,

CiRoliene . More recently, the April I v90, issue of Tobdc ee On '1 ( th e Tobacco Products Liability Project-5 newsletter) contained a report that the Hill papers are the Davis for an upcoming article by Dr . Pollay . The TPLP article indicates that the ant : tobacco group has 'some archival records "

660704707

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Memorandum to Allen R . April 12, 199 0 Page 2

trivia

of TIRE, "detailing the industry's c

ordinated response to the

o 'health s e . Although to the best o f

our knowledge Pollay's

article has not yet appeared in print as promised, the TPLP article

on notice that plaintiffs intend to use the Hill materials to help "prove" that the industry carefully orchestrated" a response to the crisis that would "reassure" the
puts counsel for the industry public and protect industry profit s

In response to Dr . Pollay's activities, I visited the WSHS and took extensive notes on the collection .

The papers of Sohn W . Hill document the reasons for the

creation insider's

of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee and provjde

details of the Committee's early activities . They offer an view of the respense of the tobacco manufacturers to
Ci cUn a

the 1953-1954 'health scare . Edell argued during

that

the TIRC w essentially a public relations vehicle,

Conceived at

first to calm the controversy and employed to foster the

reassure

smokers and later

appearce of a controversy . The PipoPone

jury rejected Edell's argument that the tobacco industry c nspired . However, documents from the to confuse and mis in form the ppublic Hill collection could be used to provide new support for conspiracy and

misrepresentation claims -- especially When taken out of context and used with documents previously made available to plaintiffs'
from a

counsel through discovery . This is perhaps best typified by an

excerpt

document

that

was circulated among
1953 :

top Hill 4

Knowlton staff members in preparation for the agency's first setting

with the newly fornad Committee in De cembe r, There is only one problem -- confidence, tablishit public a and now to
a perhaps long interim

and how to -

create it sin entific hen scientifi cdoubts must remain .

And, most important, how toifree millions of American from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their biological depths -- regardless of any pooh-poohing logi c

680704708

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Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis

April 1 3 , 199 0
Page 3

logic

every time they light a cigarette . No resort to m ever red panic yet, whether on Madison Avenue,

Mail Street C Or in a psychologist's Office . And no recitation of a rguments pro, ignoring or argument s careful balancing of the two together, is going
to deal with such fear not . That, gentlemen, is the nature of the to this office .

unexampled challenge

Many of the Hill documents

istrative or Informational, with

concerning the TIRC are adminlittle or no sensitive content .
know-

This memorandum does not attempt to describe all of the Hill

meats, but focuses instead on those documents that are most likely
to be used to support a plaintiff's smoking and health case against

On e industry, based on issues raised in Cipollone . With a few ",Options, are documents described here have not been located in company files, and accordingly have not been made available to plaintiffs' counsel for use smoking and health casesThus, the Hill collection represents a new source of documents and information for plaintiffs' counsel as well as for the industry . Where duplicates of Hill documents were found in the Lorillard and Philip
Morris document collections in Kansas City they are noted herein ,
are duplicates of documents produced by CTR in New Jersey or

Texas cases,

and duplicates of documents produced by Reynolds in

Earner (although comparison of Hill documents with the Barnes pro-

duction is by no moans

complete) .

It is unlikely that Tobacco

Institute files hold duplicates of Hill documents ; however, a sea rch of TI produced documents was done .

John Hill began his public relations ca eer in 1927 .

His operating philosophy was established on two major principle s

680704709

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Memorandum to Allen R . Purv is April 13, 199 0

Page

4

that were included in a booklet Hill & Knowlton gave to new clients :

First, that public opinion is the altiaate arbiter of

most

questions in today's world of rapid evolution and

bewildering change .
second, that effective public relations must begin with the development of sound management policies that are in the public interest.

In

19 2 0, Hill took Donald Knowlton, with whom he had

worked at Union Trust Company of Cleveland, as his part ner . That

same
When

year,

Hill

moved to New York to establish an office to better

serve the firm's

new

client, the American Iron and Steel Institute .

John

Hill died in the late 19 7 01, the firm

was

the largest

public relations firm in the world . Hill S Knowlton is now a subsidia ry of the WPP Group of London, England .

association with the tobacco m nufacturers began in 1953 when Hill was asked to help the industry
Hill & Knowlton's deal with the crisis precipitated by news of a cancer-cigarette link . Hill described the industry's approach to the problem in his
1958 book, cQ ppatte Pub1 {„

Reltians :

[An] ample of sound policy expressed in effective public relations by an association of manufacturers is found in she tobacco manufacturing industry .
Scientific ations that cigarettes

were causing

lung cancer, which began to gather monAntum in 1954, had the immediate result of a drop in the industry's sales . Manufacturers and their employees were affected ; scares of thousands of tobacco growers Were economically

concerned . And

millions of American

smokers

had the

greatest of all stakes -- their on health -- involved . The industry retained public relations counsel, then formed organisation called the Tobacco Industry
Research Council, which

had

but one basic

policy ;

to

660704'710

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Memorandum to Allen R . Pu

April 13, 199 0
Page 5

follow all procedures that might be required in the public interest . The

accusation against the industry's chief product

was based on scientific suspicion growing out of statistical studies and experiments with Animal, . No conclusive or clinical proof was at hand . Hot the industry had no thought of waiting passively upon events . Expressing Its genuine concern over the whole problem
of cigarette smoking and health, it took a step unprecedented in American industry . It invited a group of outstanding scientists, each of unchallengeable reputation, "Scientific Advisory Board," to constitute themselves as

for the purpose of making grants to individuals and Institutions for research into the problem . Substantial funds were appropriated ($2 .200,000 in the first four years)

and more were promised a needed .
The money for in. . . grant, is provided by the industry without any strings any kind . The SAB's decisions as to the research grants are final . The results of the various research projects will be reported to the public in the font of scientific papers . There was no thought that even such a concrete demonstration of the industry's acceptance of public responsibility would shut off the critics, nor that it necessarily should . However, once this sound basis of public interest w and position to draw established the industry was some public attention to other sides of the question . The

normal

American

sense

of fair play

came

to bear at

this point, and the public evidently credited the fact that, despite sensational charges, the truth i not yet known and the industry itself is doing what it can to speed the availability of tree and reliable answe r

In 1958, the

industry formed

the Tobacco Institute in

response to a perceived need to distance the TSRC f rom public

role-

Hill, John W Corporate Public Relation AM, of Mo d Mangdroug ht, Harper is Brothers Publishers, New To

680704711

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Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0

Page

6

tions activities . Hill & Knowlton assisted the Institute in developing and implementing its public relations agenda until late 1968 when its contract was allowed to expire . Hill & 1L owlton's relationship with the TIRC/CTR endured on a limited basis until about 1969 when leopard Zahn left Hill & Knowlton to establish his own firm, taking the CTR account with him .

The John W Hiil Pacer s

11111's papers

were donated to the Wisconsin State Histori-

cal Society in 1964 .3 The WSHS divided the documents into two sets,

"non-client

files" and "client files ." The non-client set,

consisting of "correspondence " 1

and

non-correspondence ," was cram -

diately catalogued . The copies of letters, memoranda and othe r
cations with the firm's many clients are arranged alphabeti-

were in Hill's files . The non-correspondence subset is arranged by topic and includes drafts of Hill', two books,
cally,'t just as they newsletters, speeches, clippings and other printed material . The

documents in the non-client files were made available to the public and the
file names were listed in the register to the collection ,

The thi rt y-one ca rt ons of documents which make up the

Second

set, the client files,

were

sealed and placed

in

the

archive's storage facility . According to the terms of Hill's gift ,

Zahn became an employee of Hill & K owlton in January, 1954 . fie worked on the TIKC/cTH account from that time until he established his Own firm in 1969 . Zahn's activities on behalf of the industry came under attack in Hpone . The Hill documents contain additional "evidence" to support Edell's arguments .
The Wisconsin State Historical Society is located on the campus of the pniversity of Wisconsin, 30N . Carroll, Madison, Wisconsin .

660704712

Memorandum to Allen April 1 3 , 199 0 Page 7

EL Pervis

they became available for public

review

in April, 1989 . The

exis-

tence of the client files is noted in the register but no file

names are

give

, and

balance

of a sho rt age of personnel and funds

the HSErS does not intend to catalog the client files . However, n

the TSBC materials within these files are easily accessible because the file folders are clearly labeled and the years contained

in

each carton marked on the outside . It was here that Pollay found the documents reportedly referenced in his article . and non-client files contain documents correspondence files in the heretofore sealed, non-client set hold, for example, co_ -cations conce rn ing
Both the client

related to the TIRO . The

the arrangements for placement of °A Frank statement," the development of the White Paper and the selection o- SAS members . These Tier documents

are not readily discernable because they are interfiled chronologically within fifteen cartons of Hill A Knowlton correspondence, most of which is unrelated to tobacco matters .

On the other hand, the printed material and press releases on

in the nun-correspondence files (available to the public from the beginning) are easily identified because o l the file It was in this subset of the non-client file s names .
smoking and health issue, that Polley

found the two documents noted in his chronology .

Throughout the

Cipollone trial, Marc Ede ll relied heavily

upon a document produced by both Lorillard and CCR to support his allegations regarding the reasons for the formation of the TSBC .
He used the dccuaent,

' preliminary as

Recommendations for the Cigarette

Manufacturers,' in his opening statement when he characterized t,e formation of the TIRO careful, yell-planned

strategy" designed

to reassure the publica regarding the recently publicized hazard s

680704713

Memorandum to Allen R . Pu rv is April 13, 199 0 Page 6

of smoking . He quoted extensively from the document during his

Cullman, ]rd and utilized the document several other times during the Course Of the trial . Dr . Joel Cohen, examination of Joseph F .
expert witness for the plaintiff, referred to the document in presenting his "information environment" theories .

"Preliminary Recommendations" can be found i g the Hill collection . More importantly, its themes are repeated in other documents in the Hill collection which were not previously
A copy of

available .

These documents provide additional argumentation for

Edellla claims that it was the "serious problem of public relations"

that motivated

creation of the r1RC and that the industry's reasons

for creating the TSRC had more to do with selling tobacco than with getting at the t ruth about smoking and health .d One such document

reveals that R .S . Reynolds explored the possibility Of a
to the crisis before subscribing to the joint

unilateral respons
of

effort . "Suggested Approach and Co mm ents Regarding Attacks on Use

Cigarettes,"

December 14, 1953, asked "What can

or

should the

A .J . Reynolds Tobacco Company, Winston-Salem, N .C ., do

view

of

towering public attacks on its products by the medical profession
and others?" Hill 6 %nowlton's response stressed the importance of restoring public faith in the tobacco indust ry and put Reynolds

on notice that public relations considerations might have to guide Company policy :

That the two objectives were at least equally important is supported by a statement by W .T . Hoyt, executive secretary of TSRC, Janua ry 20, 1955, in a document produced by CPR (TM 0020074/0076 at 0076) : "Within this framework we have furthered and coordinated the two major purposes for which the Committee was organ zed, namely the public relations phase and the research program " Additional support for the argument that

viewed public relations as being as important as research is found in "Program Projects," January 15, 1954, a 11 111 document disco sed elsewhere in this memorandum .
the industry

680704714

Memorandum
Page 9

to A ll en R_ Purvis

April 13, 199 0

. there is probably a more serious issue involved here than solely charges concerning the harmful effects of cigarettes . These charges could well raise in the minds of the public the integrity of its manufacturers
producing cigarettes . If
ue loss of sale [ sic] in the immediate future as well as damage to the Company's reputation .
serious charges and/or implications have been levelled against the u of cigarettes by professional men who apparently have stature and reputation in thei r

unanswered

or left unchallenged, these charges could

counteract this situation, any public relations program must have either equally valid findings or scientific . data which discount or refute the acts already presen
To
to the public by the medical profession

In any program designed to c e the medical profession

or

the public about the validity of the a of the prod-

uct, independent and scientific research testing are absolute basic requirements .

and clinical

Regardless of what happens in the immediate situation, the Company should consider a basic long-range program . This would call for integration of new efforts with existing programs of communications with opinion leaders and the public at large .
Such a program should be designed to increase public confidence in the Company, well a acceptance its products . In some instances this will call for a dramatic approach .

But in any event it will call for a possible realignment of existing Company policy and perhaps the development of a new public relations policy for guidance throughout the entire Company .

Hill 6 Rncwlton also veconcended that Reynolds issue a statement designed to reassure the public . The eight points to be made in the statement corresponded closely to those eventuall y

680704715

C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0

Page 1 0

included in "A Frank Statement ." Hill wro te, "Until new data or facts

scientific

are available that the Company could tell the public -- a prediction
which could be

about, it would seem that they will have only a variation of the above message to communicate"

employed by a plaintiff's attorney to show just how li tt le the
industry's position has changed since 1953 .

Paul Hahn's telegrams led to a meeting of tobacco

man on

December 14, 1953 . It was at this meeting that a decision for

joint action was reached . The next day, Hill A Knowlton met with

hoe of the tobacco executives to explore a short list of topics which included the question : Are you ready to accept the concept that public health and public welfare are a sacred responsibility
and are paramount to all ether co siderations?'H Assuming an answer
in the affirmative, the Hill c Knowlton document listed n

the

available alternatives :

T Three co

s

Ignore the charges, hope the crisis subsides and depend upon consumer desire and habit to maintain long-term smoking volume ;

Telegram from Paul M . Hahn to tobac company presidents, at a1 ., December 10, 1953 . Hahn suggested that the objective of the proposed meeting "would be indust ry response to these charges exposing their lack of scientific foundation ." That Hahn resorted to suggesting a joint effort is an indication of how serious he believed the threat posed by the publicity to be . then, as n the industry was intensely competitive . Additionally, the industry had been prohibited from engagin g
any sort of concerted action since the 1911 Dissolution Decree which broke up the "Tobacco Monopoly . "

This commitent is reflected in the warding of "A Frank ." Statement

660704716

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Memorandum to A ll en R . Purvis

April 13, 199 0
Page 11

B . Counter-attack and fight back by challenging the attacks as based on inconclusive and/or inadequate research or due to ques-

tionable and unsound motives of the critics
or Otherwise confuse the issue : Neutralize effects of the charges by cooperating with the scientific critics, by sponsoring new independent scientific and clinical research broad scal eon a and by emphasizing impartial investigatio n until the charges ae eventually disproven (sic] or demolished, and by refraining from activities that stress dangerous aspects
of the use of

cigarettes . ' Hill & Knowlton got the

The presentation was successful :

assignment . The urgency of the situation demanded that the staff at Hill

& Knowlton work quickly to pull together a plan that would were
also consulted : Tommy Ross
(Philip Morris( and Sidney

address the indust ry 's needs . Public relations counsel for each

of the tobacco manufacturers
(American Tobacco Co .), Hen

Sonnenberg

Wain (Lorillard) lent their ideas and perspectives to the plan for
the TIRC .a

What was probably a early version of "Preliminary Recommendations" provided the basis for an evening meeting of the Hill 6 Knowlton Plans Board on ecumber 21, 1953 . This document contained the suggestion that the manufacturers' group be named "Cigarette Research Committee" .

7 . Liggett chose the first documents found in the Hill

company
whether

collection reveal that the tobacco

course .

Other

contemporanecuo

membe[ of the TIRO

war, di,id,d in opinion as to

course B or C was the app ropriate course of action .

"Letter of Transmittal to Manufacturers," December 22, 1953 .

660704717

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0

Page 1 2

It is believed that the work Core, word] "Research" is a to give weighand added credence to eeded in the n
the Committee's statements .

However,

the word

cannot

be

use unless the industry is prepared to back it up with The research action and support . d genuine joint to be sponsored by the Committee would be of two kinds,
mely (a) medical research to be financed jointly and (b)
editorial and statistical tions counsel .

cigarette problem to be carried on through public re la-

research in all phases of the

name "Cigarette Information Committee" i not favored because while the Committee will engage in communications to the public, to call it merely an "information" group s would be to Unit its cope and itsimpact upon the public
The

mind .9

The document also recommended as a first step the prepar e tion of

statement
of th e TIRC] and it with these points : a . Cigarette

announcing the action [the formation
purposes and reassuring the public
regard health of

macro

nation paramount to all other

consi-

derationsb . They are disturbed by widespread publicity given to adverse effects of cigarette smoking upon health . C . Unfortunately, the public has heard little of the reassuring results o f

"Prelimtary Rec endations" c ontained the sa suggestion for the group's name . These excerpted paragraphs contain significant statements which do not appear "Preliminar y Recommendations ." The comparable paragraph in "Preliminary Recommendations' reads, ' The word 'research' should be included in the name of the Committee to establish the fact that the group will carry on sponsor fundamental scientific research and will not be solely an information agency .'

G80704718

C
andum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0 Page 13

researches

(sic] of such distinguished

organizations National Cancer
Institute and others, which show no link between smoking and lung cancer .
d.

we are taking these stops ,

Because

of

our

deep

Concern in

the matter,

(i) rousing a joint research committee of Cigarette makers :
(ii) Setting aside a joint fund of 5500,000 or $1,00,000)

for further medical research into a problem of national importance ;
(iii) Pledging to the publi c

that it will get all the facts
as they become available .1 0

Hill a

Ak owlton submitted its plan to the indust ry on
the Plaza Hotel .

DICIMJOII 29, 1953, It

minutes )
was

from that meeting

show that "the 9Proposed program dated December 24, 199, (a reference to 'Preliminary Recommendations"

reviesee3 and accepted
The group also

In general by all present . This included agreement with the urgency
of getting such a program under way immediately . "
agreed to release "a frank statement of the cigarette manufacturers'

position on the recent lung cancer publicity" as soon as possible .
This statement was to be placed as an advcrtisementsince . .

Only thronch advertising Could such a statement be assured hig h

10 . "Draft Of Proposals for Cigarette Makers for Discussion by Hill and %nowlton, Inc . Planning Committee, Monday Evening, December 21, 1953 ." Again, note the similarity to the points Made in "A Frank Statement .'

680704719

Memorandum to Allen e . Purvis April 13, 199 0
Page 1 4

is ibility, full quotation and freedom from adulteration with negative in£ormationJ 1 1
v
The Hill collection contains many documents

re levant

to

the preparation for placement of "A Frank

Statement ."

The majority

of these documents are administrative, but they do show unequivocally that the industry

viewed

the announcement of the formation

of the TIKC as an advertisement, that the advertisement was written
by Hill E Knowlton and that it 'was intended to provide

reassurance

to the public . The Hill documents sh ow that this was done straightforwardly, with no intention to deceive . However, the fact that the language

we* developed by a public relations agency detracts from defendants' arguments that this We, an ea rn est statement of
intent from the manufacturers to the public .

The tone of these early documents makes i_ clear that the

conpanies'

initial reaction to the adverse research reports was

that they we exaggerations, with no

real scientific basis . A

good plaintiff's lawyer could use these documents to argue that

sincere about "A Frank Statement"-they only went along with it because it was recommended by public relations counsel as a way to quickly smooth over the erupting controversy . At the very least, these documents support an argument
the companies weren't really
that the TIAC was Hill & Knowlton's idea, and not the creation o_

a sensitive, responsible indust ry .

11 . "Notes on Minute, of the Tobacco Industry Research commttee Meeting December 28, 1953 ."

680704720

All,,
April a 13, 199 0 Page 15

F.

PurVi

III . OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES of THE TIR C

Edell argued during

Cipollone that the companies wanted

to "neutrali2e" info rmation regarding cigarette smoking's effect on health .

12

He suggested that the companies have always known

none about the health effects of smoking than they have communicated
to their customers . The Hill documents could be used to provide

support for the argument that the TTRC was formed to promote the public imp re ssion of a need faith effort to understand whether
tobacco had a role in cancer causation, while in reality them ufacturers used the TIRO to cloud

the

issues and confuse the public .

Documents written early in Hill E Xnwlton's assn iation
with the industry show that information work" was Seen ad a
important function of public relations

counsel .

A document

reported by

polity

to contain the v rning that it should be

-considered highly confidential and a receive the min-Inv of ci rculation" ("Report of Activities Through July 31, 1954") states :
A continuing important function is to build up the TIXC as a reliable and authoritative source of facts relating to the tobacco and health problem .

This dome document contains a case history" detailing the steps Hill 6 lo:owlton routinely took to insure attention to "positive" stories -- in this case the publicizing of the NCI's Dr . Russet's talk at Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1954 at the Sixt h

oollone transcript pp . 12492/1-3 through 12492/1-22 . Edell also charged that there was conspiracy among the t compan not to do in-house that charge has been found in

research . the Hill

No substantiation for documents .

680704721

C
anaum to Allen April 13, 199 0
Page 1 6

R.

Pu

International Cancer Congress . An advance copy obtained by Hill &

Kn ow lton revealed that Dr . material

Hooper '& speech contained 'new wo rt hy

concerning lung cancer and particularly concerning the

lack of a proven link between lung cancer and smoking ." No press distribution of the talk had been planned by the NCI . Hill 6
Knowlton reproduced the 5 venteen -page

created a shorter "highlight" vartion, and sent both under a cover note to editors,
paper,

science writers, editorial writers and feature writers .

Perhaps vo e, from a defense

standpoint,

the

description of

th e

contained an early

immediate problems confronting the indust ry inte rn al planning memoranda .

ttohle9

The very first problem to establish some public Confidence in the industry's leaders themselves, so that
the public will believe their assertions of their own

I

Interest in the public health .

.

.

.

problem 7 To reassure the public, and still instinctive fears, this interim when definitive facts for giving complete

still lacking ; when scientific doubts mos t yare rebels ; and when new "unfavorable' information can emerge from rsome laborator at any time, to act as a bomb shell
on the whole tobacco industry -- if it has meanwhile . . . tried to pooh-pooh the unfavorable finding to date . proble_ .

.For the How to validate this message of assurance . public, a issue touching the deepest of human fears and instinctsnis involved - the issues of uncontrollable disease and death . Hence cigarette companies eight not readily be forgiven, if their approach to this proble m
stemmed only from eagerness to protect their a ings,

and if they twisted the
seeks

to

save en)

into

e (which research of medical s , a device to save stockholder s

sso7047zz

andum to Allen F . Purvis April 13, 199 0 Page 1 7

In the past, indust ry has given little twists to the facts of science, to convert them into sales propaganda, without much risk . The cigarette industry has indeed
been doing this

for

years We

can

therefore readily

understand its assumptions that the sae technique will work now, in devising propaganda . But it highly important to note that the deep issues of life-and-death that are involved make highly doubtful the question as to whether the familiar techniques can be relied on . The stakes a e too large ; the penalties for l os ing could be too great . . . .

companies completely with concern for the public good? This accomplishment -- if we can manage it - would throe everything else into proper focus, and would show the
answers to the other eario a problems .
Problem 6

1 How can

we immediately

to identify the tobacco

we have one essential job . . . .Stop public panic, without even getting in the position of giving false
assurances, or of giving false emphases . . . .

A plaintiff's atto rn ey may suggest that the industry,

secure in its superior knowledge of the scientific issues and with the help of the most urbane public relations counsel available, purposefully manipulated public opinion and to a large degree public knowledge of an issue that, to repeat Fill & Knowlton's poetic phrase, touched -the deepest of human fears and instincts . "
An attachment to the January 18, 1936, TIRC meeting agenda
which outlined the objectives of the Committee's "Information Ser-

vic

could be interpreted as advocating suppression of information

and industry pressure an writers .

TO avoid encouraging or stimulating further publicity or, the subduer .

680:04'723

C
Memorandum to Allen R . Pu rv is

April 13, 199 0
Page 1e

To

or

see that those we know to be planning to write talk about smoking and health get all available

facts . 3 . To keep Committee members informed of the trend of publicity and public discussions on the inches of interest .

4 . To handle correspondence and inquiries from the press, public, ee oatoms, etc .1 3

In contrast, the description of the purposes and objectives of the TIRO which was given to candidates for the Research Director14 position emphasized that research would be directed toward illuminating the lung cancer-tobacco link and implied that the information given to the public would be directly related to progress in that area :

To aid and

and health, and particularly into th e alleged relationship between the use of tobacco and lung cancer . To make available to the public factual informa-

assist rsearch

into tobacco

use

tion on th is subjec t . 1 5
The "ground rules" developed during
attract a Scientific Director, listed ten

th e attempt to --responsibilities and

prerogatives" of the Scientific Director, including the provisio n

13 . "Program Projects," ennuary 15, 1954 .

14 . The terms "Research Director" and "Scientific Director" are used interchangeably throughout the Hill documents and in

this memorandum .

is .

"Objective," gating in part
of

the THRC 9y-Laws . Part of packet and Helen" developed under the direction of A . Grant

Clarke ofor submission to prospective Scientific Director s

680704724

C
Memorandum to Allen R . Pu rv is

April ll, 199 0
Page 1 9

that "The Scientific Director shall not be charged

with

the problems

of directly handling public information, but shall be available

for

consultation with individuals charged with that responsibilto direct "continuing

ity . .1e "Preliminary Recommendations,' however, specified that it was the Research Director`s responsibili ty

Public Relations Research," described as :

a continuing research project to collect, coordinate self di ss eminate (where practical) available information on various medical research activities bearing on pertinent phases of cigarettes and health . 1 2
Again, the contrast between publicly and privately stated objectives
might be used to plaintiff's advantage .

Plaintiffs may wish to call attention to the differences

between the True', publicly stated objectives and handwritten no es apparently taken by Hill during an October, 1954, TIRC meeting which arguably provide a more candid assessment of the objectives and progress of the TIRC :

1 . Stated policy of

committee (a) answer attacks where

possible (b) help writers and others who enquired and stimulate attention to benefit s
2. By this largely defensive procedure we hoped that the furor would die dow n

But it hasn't died

most .

The attacks

are continuing

and increasing from individuals and groups havin g
16 . "The

Scientific

Director ." Part of packet of "ground rules"

developed under the direction of Grant Clarke for submission
to prospective Scientific Directors .
17 . "Preliminary ReCmenlations For Cigarette Manufacturers," December 29 . 1953,prod uced in Cipollone by Lorillard and CTR .

680/04725

C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0 Page 20

various motivations, among which the most harmful is she desire for publicity . Then there are ders like Osehner and Graham who have taken aposlo ticn and seek to defend and justify it . And then there is the Carrie Nation type of anti-cigarette crensader . Taking them all together they are keeping public fear and hysteria stirred up . As time has gone [sic] the real motives of many of the crusaders have become and more clear . Unsoundness and fallacies haver become apparent Also any of the statistical studies and theories . m various scientists have Some up with views c ati-

cally opposed to the anti-cigarette people, ao

at

on their attacks] Haven't made page 1 .
least casting doubt

conclusions . (Most

However we have not taken issue with the attackers openly challenged their facts, 3 reasons (a) because of the policy of not keeping alive the controversy ('o) because if we entered into controversy,
with

scientists

this might

attend the S .A .B . and

(c) we wanted avoid any appearance of making the industry appear callous to human hurting . to

Last night the P .R . group discussed these matters and cre impatience was expressed "at the T . I . R .c . not more on the offensive . There was wer stron g feeling that the T .I .R .C . should take what Sec . Dulles calls a "agonised reappraisal" of policy . It was felt that with a ong B .A .B . at work the industry could [het roble be accused of id and indifference to the plain . ), Dr lts tosaid, and . if . it will I explain why heee today that while the S .A.B . cannot engage in scientific T I.R . C controversy at this stage, there was s no reason why the . A . C . cannot .
In addition to all the defensive things we are now doing it was suggested that we

1 . Prepare a comprehensive report to the public which will put the problem in proper prospective, point out in layman's language
the vulnerable points in the Hammon -Horn

report and other attacks

680704726

C
Allen R . Ynr,1S

April 13,
Page 21

199 0

That we explore the possibility of inspir-

some tobacco state which could take action to counteract the recent PH [Public Health]
resolutions That we proceed actively with . the work of informing Congress . That we find a way to smoke o t the govern-

ing

some sort

of meeting

or conference in

ment public health survey on the P .H . w [illegible )
That we find more platforms for telling the tobacco story . Make use of industry writings to put controversy in perspective .

Objectives net forth in Hill & Mowlton•s first annual Public Relations Report to the TIRC (December, 3954) also have a decidedly public relations slant :

(1) moderating hysteria by making it known that
the

cause o r causes
know

science evidence so far p roduced as establishing a causal rela-

of lung cancer and heart disease ar e ; (2) making it generally known that medica l cept statistical and other inconclusive does

tionship between smoking and disease ; (1) bringing to public attention any unsound methods or fallacious castlealong i connection with anti-smoking statistics or laborato ry experiments ; (4) gaining the active support of doctors and scientists still maintaining an open mind ; (5) establishing a soundly based relationship with the press aimed toward full and fair reflection of the
d P.Scoblisned facts ; and (6) earning public confidence by maintaining a nuiritific approach to the scientific Arablean and avoiding actions that would cast doubt on the

indstry's motives . l

"Public Relations Progress Report and Program for the Tobacco Indust ry Research Committee," December 30, 1954 . Produced by Reynolds in Bane? (50194 1204/12!61 .

680704727

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0 Page 22

John Hill offered his private opinion as to what the primary objective of the TIme

was

and how it might be

accomplished

in a January 11, 1955, letter to Tommy Ross, public relations Coun-

sel for American :

To my mind, the No . 1 objective of the program next year
should be to show up all of the s entific fallacies and
misrepresentations that have been

accepted at face

value

by an unsuspecting public . i believe this will be far more effective if it is accomplished by objective scion-

tists, rather than by i,terrstwd parties . But if it cannot be done by the fonder, it will have to be done by the latter .1 9
Documents in the Rill collection could be used by plain-

tiffs'

counsel to argue that there was a discrepancy between the
purposes
of the TSRC and privately articulated
goals . Using these documents, plaintiffs

publicly stated
industry

could

argue

that the manufacturers' most important short-term goal was to

reassure the public and that their long-term goal was to fund
scientific research which Would challenge the validity of the rese ar ch linking cancer to cigarette use .

TV . USE ORESIgj$OR_ FOR PUB Rd{ .i~T,LGj"5 $pW'OP P S .

During Cipollone, plaintiff claimed that the industry's Initial response upon learning of the studies linking cigarettes with cane was to consult a sophisticated public relations firs and that it was only upon the advise of that public relations firm that the decision to support independent research was finall y

on John W . Hill to T .J . Ross, January 11, 1955 .

680704728

C
Memorandum to Allen It April 13, 199 0
Page 2 3

Pu rvis

made .20 Edell tried to show that the research supported by the Tobacco Industry Research Committee was never intended to find out if cigarette smoking was a cause of cancer, ethat it was set up to either disprove the allegations that smoking was a primary ideological [sic, etiological] factor in sa diseases or to suggest ways of adopting or codifying cigarettes ." Edell also suggested that TIRC research was done to "convince the public of the complexity of the disease process of lung caer' and to "suggest that it was some kind of Rost Factor, s mething that was internal to the smoker, that resulted in the development of lung cancer ."2 1

Certain of the Hill documents can be Used defensively

by the industry to refute Edell's claims . For a apple, Hill good faith effo rt , as noted in "Suggested Approach and
Regarding Attacks

&

Knowlton's first advice to the industry was that it demonstrate a

Perrault

on

Use of Cigarettes," December 14, 1953 . HoW-

er, Hi ll

& Xnowlton's progress report nine months later could

be interpreted by plaintiffs'

central as revealing that the industry

research program was established primarily to meet public relations
objectives :

more

the industry had nothing to point to that it

ws

doing a year ago, it can now point to the Scientific Advisory Board and ScientificDirector (sic] . Study of editorials shows that a large portion of good will won by the industry has been due to favorable impression created 20 . In the opinion of plaintiff's advertising witness, Joel Cohen : "The industry's response to the emergency was public relations instead of conducting r search to find our more about what was going on and whether the public was adequately informed or providing informative to the public ." (Cipollone trial
transcript, 4]04/19-22) .
21 . C}pojle^ transcript p . 3108/5-7, p . 3100/11-14 and pp . 30]1/25-3032/1-6 .

660704729

Memorandum to Allen R . PUNTS April 13, 199 0

Page 24

the public appointment of announcement of minces a program .2 2

the Board and

The TIRC Was to undertake "medical laboratory r ch," under the guidance of the Research Director and the SAB g98 equal importance were . rBut of

Statistical

research pertaining to health and vital data,

to be done bastatistician hired for that purpose ;

research to answer inquiries and counteract erroneous statements, to be done by a ical science writer on the public relations staff ; and e 6
Editorial
Foreign study to ascertain the uterus of smoking and health matters in other countries .2 3

One of Hill 6 Knowlton's first actions upon being

consulted by the industry was to inte rv iew the research directors of four of the cigarette
ve ry

companies,

Reports of

theme Confidential,

candid 'talks" with Dr . Harris B . Percale (t.rillard), Or .

Robert N . Dupuis (Philip Morris), Mr . H .R . Hanmer (American) and
Mr . Grant Clarke (Reynolds'

'Morrie

of Research Information") are

found in Hill's TIRC files . The research directors provided general

information regarding current cancer research, liberally sprinkled with Opinion, hearsay and conjecture . For example, Dr . Dupuis , snting on Sloan-Kettering research, suggested a personal talk
with Messrs . Sloan or Kettering to bring to their attention the fact that lung of

cancer might also be correlated with the incidence
. .

atmospheric pollution from automobile exhaust :

how happy

would these automobile gentlemen be to have their Foundation gettin g 'Program of Tobacco Industry Research Committee," September
9, 3954 . "Program Projects," 3anuary 15, 1954 (paraphrased) .

660704730

Memorandum to

All,,

R . Purvis

April

13,

199 0

Page 2 5

into that subject?" Mr . Banes characterized Wynder as the men of an itinerant reformer . . . young, impetuo s, immature . . . .

I've heard stores [sic) . Said one research scientist to Me, His research stinks .' Another, '2 know he was taken off a team of interviewers, because he put words in people's mouths .'" Cancer also relayed a story of the origins of New York University's research on lung cancer and tobacco -- with paper and tobacco cooperating .-- Clarke apparently spent side time bragging about his connections with editors and science writers and then stated ;

We've been running s erch [sic), as you know . It wasn ' t publicized b cause we didn't believe it good to publicize . That has been o attitude . Maybe we'll have to change -- I don't knew r My own attitude is should continue our own independent research, each company doing its own, and even duplicating that done in other companies . We are coordinating, screening research righ t

One document might be used by plaintiff to show that the establishment of the Scientific Adviso ry Board and the selection

of a

respected scientist as Scientific Director were aimed primarily

at providing a foundation from which public relations activities
could be launched :

it contemplated that a basis for a positive program of public information would be provided when the
Scientific Advisory Board and Scientific Director had

were at work, and when various Preliminary editorial research projects were well under way . These things have been accomplished and the Committee now had th e basis needed for car ry ing on a
been selected and long-range plan of public relations activities aimed at keeping the following facts before the public :
1 . That there is no proof that smoking is a cause of lung cancer ;

680704731

r
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0

Page 26

That

scientists,
the TIRC,

an

impa rt ial and independent Board of doctors and educators IS advising

as a public Service, on all problems

of tobacco one and health ;
That the TIRC is determined, through a longrange program, to make every possible effort to help get the facts through laborato ry and statistical research ; That initial funds for research have been appropriated and m Ore will be provided as warranted to help in getting the answers by cientific means ~

That all of the laborato ry r search recommended
by the Advisory Hoard and financed

by the TIRC

will be carried on by recognized and independent

laboratories, institutions and hosp 2 tals .2 4

Any separation of the scientific and public relations aspects of the TIRC that may
Hill

have been intended wa clouded when
Will a Knowlton

&

Remelted endeavored to capitalize on the reputations and

achievements of the SAB .

For example,

elected

quickly to . new information linking cigarettes and health . A draft of a statement to he issued under T .V . Hartnett's name informed the public that the SAB had examined the report rega rd ing benzpyrene (referred to only a

the

compound found in burning cigarette

paper") and ached reassuring

conclusions

regarding it .n An

attentive plai tiff's a tt orney will notice that the statement was
dated the day before the report was released . It identified tobacco

interests with public interests,
menu actuvers and

concluding,

''What the cigarette

the

public want to know is whether or not burning

cigarette paper c ntains any element in an amount harmful to huma n

29 . Public Relations Report and % endations for Tobacco Industry Research Committee, June 1 , 1954 .

680704732

C
Memorandum to A ll en R . Purv is
April 13, 195 0
Page 2 7

beings . No evidence of this is now know [sic) to the manufaeturers .'x25

Leonard Zahn recommended that SAB activities be exploited

for public relations purposes :

As developments warrant, and Subject to approval of the Scientific Advisory Board, information on the work of the Board should be released to the public . Two such announcements have been made and a proposed third is attached .

careful analysis must be made of each TIRO stammered research grant as the results approach publication in regular scientific or medical journals to whether the information should receive wider publicity and distribution . Pallor towarsuch publicity must be in head ing with the well-accepted freedom Of action given the
SAB in its administration of the research program . . . .

There was a

realization

that the indust ry could not "speak

as

harshly or directly

as it might like, because of considerations

related to the 'position and attitude" of the SAB . However, H il l

was quick to reassure tobacco company representatives to TIRO that it was "going over the whole picture to be sure that we are doing eve ry thing possible to protect the indus tr y is such instances ."27 Edell argued during Ci o nfe that the tobacco each6 Knowlton

-A Statement by Mr . T .V . Hartnett," draft, October 31, 1954 .
Memorandum from Leonard Zahn to the TIRC, September 9, 1955 . This passage takes on added significance in light of Ede ll 's focus in c jCi oonh n zahn's treatment of Bomberger . Zahn's

cnolions deposition is, of course, available for use i n

27 .

Memorandum from R .W .

Darrow to W .T . Hoyt, March 6, 1956 .

680704733

C
Memorandum to Allen R . April 13, 199 0 Page 2 B

lecturers

tried to hide what they knew about the dangers of smoking,

that they tried to suppress unfavorable research while irrelevant o safe" toward the 1'IRC's

research, and that these tactics main purpose, which was to reassure

encouraging were directed
smokers that

smoking would not harp them . Plaintiffs will find support in these documents for the allegation that "protecting the industry" meant convincing the public that the industry

was sincere

its desire

to resolve the cigarette smoking and health issue .2 8

ROLE of THE RESEARCH DIRECTOR AND THE SAt l

Plaintiffs have suggested that one of the purposes of the TIRC was to provide the industry with scientific experts who could act as spokesmen on behalf of the industry . The Hill documents con irm that company executives and public relations counsel , well as the Industry Technical Committee, played an active role in the selection of the RIRC'S Scientific Director and the scientists Who were appointed to the SAS, and that certain scientists did make puffin statements promoting "the other side of the controray ."

The TIRC promised in "A Frank Statement" to select a scientist of unimpeachable integrity and national repute" to direct research activities of their new organization . The original plan War to select a Research Director immediately, and then allow him to guide and advise the Committee as they fulfilled other obligetions It forth in their announcement, including selection of mem-

Cipollone transcript p . 3117/12-14 . In addition to Edell's allegations, Judge Ice Sasokin ruled during the trial that from the evidence presented to that point, a jury could reasonhilly find that the TIPS had been 'nothing but a hoax created for public relations purposes ."

680704734

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvi April 13, 199 0 Pace 2 9

bars for the SAD . It fell to the company research directors (the
Indust ry Technical Committee) headed by A . Grant Clarke, to seek

scientist who would fill that job . The Committee a untered a discouraging reluctance on the part of scientists to become aff il iated with the TIRC . Public relations activities continued
out the

at full speed, while the research part of the plan faltered,
the absence of a knowledgeable and committed

in

leader-29

Dr . Harold

Larry Stewart, a respected pathologist employed by the United States Public Health Service (the National cancer institute) offered and declined the appointment . At

was first

One point, in March, the

committee was led by Clarke to believe that Or . Albert Tannenbaum3O 'would consent to the position of Scientific Director, if only he

dence of the position . Grant Clarke

could be satisfied of the objectives of th e TZRC and the indepenaccordingly drew up a set of "around mutes" which included a sho rt statement of the purposes

and objectives of the TIRC .

Despite TSRC's efforts, Tannenbaum did not

accept .

Pain-

aware of the increasing anount of time between release of " A

29 . Staff Memo No . 10, March 23, 1954, states, 'Staff has handled hundreds of interviews and phone calls and much a espondence with medical people, chemists, laboratory and equipment specialists, and others offering suggestions Or anting to do specialized work Careful files i

to be turned over to the director whe n s d chosen meanwhile, interest in the Committee continue s high, with the a staff receiving many calls from the various news and information media . " being maintaine 30 . That the person in question was Dr . Albert Tannenbaum is an assumptionThe Hill documents refer to the candidate only "Dr . Tannenbaum ." Dr . Albe rt Tannebaum was Director o f
Cancer Research at Chicago's Micheal Reese Hospital in the 1950s . A news article (Nw York JDUrra I_Am-riavn, October 5, 1956) quoted him as saying that he believed lung cancer

probably Wes caused by a multiplicity of influences . "

660704735

C
April 13, 1990

Page 3 0

Frank Statement" and the appointment of a Research Director, the TSRC decided to proceed with selection of the SAB . There was the hope that the scientists would feel more comfortable a members of a group and that one would eventually consent to become the leader .

John Hill attended

interviews

with prospective

SAS

members

whenever he could . Correspondence with Paul Hahn during March, 1954, reflected Hill's active interest in the search for BAB mem-

bers . At one point, Hill suggested that sidered for appointment to the of the problem in which

Dr . Max Cutler be con-

SAM, describing him a "student

we

interested," a past "witness in court

cases,` and monsoon who "gets along wonderfully wi th people . Hill sent Cutler's favorable quote from the White Paper (discussed later
in this memorandum) to George Whiteside (Chadbourne & Parke), who as a member of the TSRC Law Committee was involved in Clearing
candidates for the SAS .

The TTRC and Hill & enovlton recognized the value of maintaining close ties with scientists, even though they occasionally chafed under the restrictions imposed by this relationship .

By taking a firm stand on the work of this Board, the

is solid ground . But in doing this, it is preeluded from engaging in oggn femphasis in Original) scientific controversies without the approval of Dr . Little and th e Board .
TTRC
The December TO, 1954, "public Relations Progress Report and Program for the Tobacco Industry Research Committee" revealed the industry's strong motivation for selecting prominent scientists to serve on the SAD, no matter how intractable some of them might prove to be at times :

660701736

r
Memorandum to Allen R .
April 13, 1 99 O Page 31

. the basic component for dealing with the problem and public relations program . The greatest asset the Tobacco Indust ry Research
Committee has today is the Scientific Adviso ry Board symbol of wisdom, integrity and sinwhich stands as the scientific community friends and neutrals who will aid a

remains

.

Therein

are

any

cerity . Rest to that is the growing confidence of doctors and scientists in the validity of the basic approach of the Tobacco Indust ry Research Committee to the problem
through independent scientific research .3 1

John Hill's notes, referred to earlie r,
additional analysis of the worth of the SAP :

contained an - - . with a strong

S .A .B . at work the industry could (not ever) be accused of callous

indifference to the problem . "

Four weeks after the first set of invitations were

& Knowlton document announced, 'Wi th help of 36K, TIRC has succeeded in getting some of the top cancer expe rt s in the country to join its advisory board ." Dr . Little consented to move to the position of Research Director in Jul', 1954 . issued,
an internal Hill

One document referred to during the

Cis g

lone trial hinted

th at

there

was

tension between C .C . Little and the TIRC almost

from the beginning . Edell used a document produced by A rthur
little Co . to show that the Board of Directors of

D.

the

Tobacco Indus-

t ry Research Committee

was unhappy with D r . Little as far back as
. The document cable)tofihpsncetfiDro

late 1954, and tried to find sameo a else (who would be more tra

TIRE w asting about" for a c ssor for Dr . Little only six months after he accepted the appointment as Scientistated that the
31 . "Public Relations Progress Report and Program for the Tobacco Industry Research Committee," December 30, 1954 .

680704737

C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0

Page 3 2

neither confirmed nor contradicted by documents in the (till collection . However, th ere
Yic This charge

Director

of the TIR C .

is little doubt that Dr . Little's stubborn adherence to his principles caused industry exe cu tives some headaches . Correspondence between John Hill and Dr . Little produced

in

New Jersey and Texas confirms that the question as to how indus-

try interests

care

best served

won

a constant one . Dr . Little

continually advocated a

conservative approach, while less patient

Company representatives pushed to utilize the EAR to counteract adverse research results . For example, th e Hill files contain numerous drafts of "A Repo rt to the Nation by Perform of the Tobacco Industry R search Council ." This advertisement was to be th e "first annual report" of th e FIND, and relied heavily on the a Irk and
integrity of the BAB for content . According to the one proposed

version of the advertisement,

it is possible to say that all of

the pledges given to the public 12 months ago are being This draft described the aim of the Scientific Adviso

fulfilled ." ry Board :

to penetrate the fog of unproven theories and

in-

.... laniva evidence regarding the effect of tobacco on heal th , and seek out the truth . One of the first
steps to be taken by the s entific Advisory Board was the development of a program intended to ascertain facts not Only pertaining to smoking and heal th , but to contribute further understanding of cancer, heart disease and other public health problems .

The document restated the industry position regarding past and present charges against tobacco, cocduding :

Meanwhile, the public can be assured on

th ese

points :

1 . No proof exists today that tobacco is cause of lung cancer or heart disease .

a

680704738

Memorandum to Allen H . Purvis April 13, 199 0

Page 33

All phases of tobacco and health will be painsta3indly studied under a broad program of research developed by the Scientific

Advisory Board .
The scientific stature and unquestioned integrity of th e members of the Scientific

Adviso ry Board provide a guarantee to the
American people that the Board's ultimate finds will be objective, impa rt ial and wholly in the public interest . Whatever these finding may be, they will

be accepted by theCmoemmitte
Industry Research .3

2 the Tobacco

The question whether this advertisement should he placed generated a great deal of controversy, particularly between TIRC public relations counsel and Dr, Little . It appears that the project was eventually dropped and the advertisement never run .

Vi . OVEMEN9 TO A MOREAGGRFSSiV' P_TOR H

Documents in the Hill collection

reveal that although

the industry's first response to the acrisise may have been to defend itself against what it considered to be unsubstantiated and

unfair charges,

soon

gained a

th e m ment toward a more affirmative response foothold OVe There is no clearest date f ro m which the .

more aggressive posture ; indeed, th e pros and over of taking affirmative action against indust ry critics seems to have been debated regularly in early meetings of industry
leaders .

industry moved to a

AP

:_p~yt O

Ana

-yam- TjP " .Itch For Fact

filth,- November 30,

1954 .

680701739

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0

Page 34

From its relations

inception .

the TIRC was

advised by its public

Counsel and by others to keep a low profile . The industry

could

not allow itself to be drawn into public arguments regarding

the link between cigarette smoking and disease . The sane day that
"A Frank Statement" appeared, E .C .X . Read (an employee of Hill &

Knowlton) offered advice to

hill regarding how the TIRO should

proceed to meet its objectives :

There would sam to me to be for more. danger of fanning the flames by making too many statements, etc ., tha n

there would be in keeping relatively quiet except where

is necessary to nail down incorrect statements by Now that one good statement out from the others . committee, I believe the controversy should be given every chance to die a natural death . Maybe it won't,
it
but let's give it the benefit of the doubt .

The TIRC's strategy during the first year was to maintain a low profile, answering only those attacks which demanded a

We are not interested in stimulating or encouraging the publication of any a rt icles or news stories on the subject of tobacco and cancer or the work of the committee . our sole interest is in knowing what is being writted and in getting our side of the story over if an article is scheduled for publication .3 3

As stated by Leonard Zahn, "TIRC's public relations policy has been to avoid stimulating new or additional public attention to the subject and at the

same time to take steps that would help

the public maintain a balanced view of the situation ." Zahn cuun-

seled that the 'llRC should "continue its present policies and acti-

33 . Memorandum from Bert C . Goss to the publicity department of Hill 6 Knowlton, January 8, 1954 .

6&0704740

c
Memorandum to Allen R .
April 13, 199 0 Page 3 5

Retain

vities through which a steadily improving credibility and understanding is being established with the press and public ." On a more practical note, in June, 1956, members of the TIRC acknowledged that their organization till is not in a position to support strongly a positive stand against the charges made against smoking .' After his appointment as Research Director in nid-1954, Dr . Little reaffirmed the soundness of this position . Yet, some industry leaders were impatient with the apparent reluctance of Hill & Knowlton and the TIRE to adopt a more aggressive posture in dealing with industry 'enemies . Not everyone in the industry group agreed that maintaining a low profile would yield the desired results . Correspondence in Hill's files reveals that many members advocated a more affirmative, if not aggressive," approach, before the TIRC was a year old . Indeed, the adopted strategy was not as successful as had been hoped . Bert Coss wrote to Hill in March, 1954 : "The subject is hardly dying down . "

It fell to John Bill to maintain the balance between o e faction's desire for a strong statement of the industry case and or . Little's reluctance to allow the 5AB to be used let public relations purposes . hill took every opportunity to Convince the more aggressively postured members of the TIRC that the Research Director was working with them in their efforts :

Fortunately, Dr . Little has a keen understanding and appreciation of the industry's public relations problem, and has given many evidences of his willingness to cooperate . (Examples - his widely quoted sediments on the Hammond-Foxe Report, his press inte rv iew, his re lease on the industry research plans-)3 4

Industry Research Committee," December

"Public Relations Progress Repo rt and Program for the Tobacco 3 0, 1954 .

680704741

C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0 Page 3d

The on-going discussions probably prompted John Hill to suggest in late 1954 that members of his staff convene to discuss "full marshalling and statement of the case for tobacco to date ." Hill received support for his plan to put tobacco's case forward more assertively . A January It, 1955, letter from George Weissman (Philip Morris) to Hill stated, your progress report and public relations program for TIRO sounds fine . I am particularly interested in Your statement on page 4 concerning a core aggressive Program of public relations activity .' Paul Hahn (American) and T .V . Hartnett (Brown & Williamson) also pressed for a more vigorous response . And, a letter from Paul Hahn to John Hill dated February 5, 1958, noted that `In recent weeks, Or . Little has countenance and participated in a somewhat more affirmative approach . . . . 1 d1

By 1960, two years after the Tobacco Institute was forced, Hahn advocated a "drastic revision" in the industry approach to public relations, a redoubling of positive efforts to at the public toward straight ." In a letter to Tim Hartnett, Hahn stated that he had no quarrel with or . tittle's basic position that s ventific findings should be independent and free from nonscientific interpretation . "

on the other hand, the public relations problem calls for the creating of a general awareness of the fact that ,pientjbic findings and opinions contradict the exaggerated anti-tobacco material released to the press .

shield be done fl continuing and c istent campaign . It should not be stifled by a philosophy of relucThis tance in public utterance .3 5

35 . Is

on Paul Kahn to T .V . Hartnett, June 13, 1960 .

680704742

Memorandum to Allen R . April 1 3 , 199 0 Page 37

Purvis

Hill responded to Hahn-to criticism with the assurance that Hill & Knowlton would :

do what we could to utilize the positive aspects of tobacco`s case and that this program would represent some change of pace f row the past activity in that there would be a continuing endeavor to get public exposure for
each and

every

significant bit of evidence favorable to

smoking .3 6

It is clear that the differences of

opinion

as to the

industry's proper response to evidence of a cigarette-cancer link which exist today

are

long-standing . plaintiffs May use the Hill

recent industry publications to argue that the industry has a history of attempting to deceive
documents in conjunction With mo the public through aggressive public relations campaigns .

yrr THE WRITE PAPER

One of the first projects unde rtaken by Hill & Enowlton on behalf of their new client was publication of a White Paper,

onto formally known as "A Scientific perspective on the Cigarette Controversy .' Amer s public relations counsel had begun Work
On the white Paper prior to the formation of the TIRO : the daft

was offe re d to the Committee when the need for this kind of [ e became apparent The Hill papers

reveal that industry

people perceived urgent need for the White Paper project to help soothe the fears of the public . Hill described the booklet

as a compilation Of t

36 .

Memorandum r

"Meeting with Mr . Paul M . Habn," from John W .

Hill to T .V .e Hartnett, R .G . Darrow, C ar l 1TOmpson, W .T . Hoyt and Bart Goss, June 1 7 , 1960 .

680'704743

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0 Page 38

view

of the situation and pa rt icularly which present the other side of the controversy, as distinguished from the view promoted by Doctors Graham, Ochsn and Wynder, who have contended that cigarette smoking caused canaer .3 7

excerpts from important scientific articles published in this country and abroad which present a balanced

Plaintiffs will argue that the

white Paper was just one

more attempt by the industry to offer reassuring "science" to suck, when, in fact, many of the contributors to the White Paper had close ties to the industry . Additionally, although great care Was taken by Hill d Knowlton to obtain signed releases from the scientists quoted in the White Paper, the Hill papers reveal that some of these scientists later accused the industry of using the statements out of context .

One scientist apparently did not complain about being quoted out of context . Dr . Max Cutler (considered at one time as a candidate for the SAD) was asked to provide a "statement from you which we can quote" for the White Paper . The statement is described as "unsolicited" in the White Paper :

1 feel strongly that the blanket statements and perilssigns have appeared in the press that there is

direct and

causative relation [emphasis

riginal)

between smoking of cigarettes, and the numberoof cigarettes smoked, to cancer of the lung are absolutely unwarranted .

37 . Letter from

John

W . Hill to Alan Campbell-Johnson, February

17, 1954 . Hill &

Knowlton established a relationship with

Campbell-Sohnson, Ltd ., a public relations firm based in London, at about the mark time that the TSRC was forming . There are

number of communications with the English public relations firm in the Hill Papers . Mill relied on Campbell-Johnson to koep him abreast of developments overseas the smoking controversy and to keep hi, apprised of public response to these developments .

680704744

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0
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Medical literature has numerous examples of such fallanclusions which have been proved to be wrong in
the light of subsequent experience . This whole question . of cause and effect deducted on statistical basis is subject to the greatest fallacies . One way I like to emphasize it is to say the simply because one finds bullfrogs after a rain does not mean that it rained bullfrogs . To accept the conclusion that has been drawn of a direc t sal relationship between smoking and cancer of the

lung simply

because there has been an increase in both,

appears to me unscientific and hazardous .

From all the available evidence, I think it is u vable that in a very Small, probably infinitesimal percentage of s sitive individuals smoking may ultimately prove to be one of nume rous contributing factors in lung cancer .
Under these c

and create
on the .

mstances, is it wise to scare the public s widespread anxiety among millions of people flimsy evidence that has been presented?3 e

Concern that the white paper might be perceived as commercial in character, and designed to promote the smoking of tobacco

and tobacco consumption" caused the TTAC to limit its distribution to financial analysts, writer, physicians, tobacco trade organizations and the media . Still,

the white Paper was seen by the TIRc

and Hill b %nowlton as an important and beneficial resource .

38 . TI document 11560 and CTR documents cnco2o900/0919 and HT0021078/1n97, Produced in Cipollone, "A Scientific Perspective on the Cigarette Controversy ." Also, Lorillard Morris 100503998 7 /0008 and 1005070571/0590, neither produced .

00490805/0824 and 80690483/0503, neither produced ; Philip

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Memorandum to Allen R . Purv is April 10, 199 0

Page 40

VIII . CONTACTS W DITORS WRI HRS ANp PUBLIS RS

The Hill Papers do not provide explicit support for recent

allegations that the industry has used its advertising dollar clout

reveal the significant role meetings with editors, publishers and science writers played in th e public relations strategy, and the amount of time and effort
to gain influence . However, the documents do that went into preparing for

th em . A plaintiff may try to show
iation of

that the tobacco industry exploited the public. . ass

journalism with "objectivity" by offering so-called isleading oc information to science writers

in order to promote the impres on

th at there w a controversy . plaintiffs may also suggest that the independence and integrity of Clarence Cook Li tt le was compromised by his participation in this effo rt .
Hill E Knowlton representatives began and publishers almost

meeting with editors

immediately after the firm was retained by

the industry . Company executives and officers of the '1'1Rc, Or . Little and meetings,

even members of the sell were often included in these because it was re cognized that these meetings would be

"most effective if Messrs . Hartnett, Hahn, McComas and other top executives from New York, as well as Dr . Little, ban find it convenThe expressed Purpose othe meetings was to "give the publishers a full understanding of the objectives of the Committee and its approach to the problem, and to bring about
a better balanced treatment of the subject in the press . Alth ou gh Dr Little was fier ce ly protective of the integrity of the SAN, ient to participate ."

lie was are of the need for cooperation With

the public relations people The industry needed his help to
present and legitimize its position . From the beginning, it wa s

680704746

Memorandum to Allen R .

April 13, 199 0
Page 4 1

Par

understood that Dr . Little's duties at TXRC included meetings with

science writers, editors and publishers . Statements at meetings or press conferences and re ports on medical issues were often written by Hill & Knowlton using Dr . Little's distribution to the scientific and reported meetings of

name, with a eye toward general press . Staff memoranda

Or .

Little and science writers in the TIRC

offices at Hill 6 Knowlton . One such report is Hill and Knowlton,
Inc ., Staff Memo No . 19, September 22, 1955 . Another

memorandum

from Carl Thompson to A .W . Darrow, May 12, 1955, reports on the May 16 meeting of Dr . Little with

science

writers . Part of the

discussion concerned 'safe' cigarettes :

Diboll (Earl Ubell, one of the first syndicated 'heal th " writers] persisted iquestions relating to what kind of findings would be acceptable as proving cigarettes are harmful to health, maintaining th at, (sic] the longer sach
decision w c delayed the longer it would be before a

safe cigarette would be possible .
Dr . Little's best answer to this series of questions v that you can't talk about making a safe' cigarette until you know you have a harmful one .

Another inte rn al Hill 6 Knowl ton m an d
the importance of Dr . Little's attendance at all diced

people from Time and Reader's D'meet .

Hill 6 Knowlton's first mid-year public relations report
to TIRO noted :

Dr . Little would be the logical spokesman for the Board in connection with such reports or any other statement s

680704747

April 13, 1990 Page 4 2

to be made to the press, on the air, or before groups .3 9

Another mid-1954 c n cation from John Hill to TSAC P re sident, T .V . Hartnett

Outlined public

relations goals for the

TUC .

Among these

Were

"Top Level Press Contacts '

We are planning a series of meetings with top editors and publisher, of New York n wspapers and n magazines

over

the next few weeks .

.

e. The purpose of theme meet-

ings would be to give the publishers a full understanding of the objectives of the Committee and its approach to
the problem, and to bring about a better balanced treat-

ment of the subject in the press .

And, under "Press Activitiesl :

We are continuing to work with a number of publications and writers n suggestions for possible articles of a positive nature . Steps have been taken to inane, ailability to the press and other writers of all materials at hand which work toward a balanced perspective on the subjem .4 0

Hill

&

Knowlton Informational Memoranda produced in Cinol-

lone are replete with references to "positive" stories Which are

to

appear in one publication or another . These references ale internal documents from the client

vague, often saying no more than'informaticn was furnished to the wr . r . The Hill & Knowlton

files are more informative, in that

they

reveal many details o f

39 . "Public Relations Report and Recommendations For Tobacco Industry Research Commit[ , June 10, 1954 .

40 . Letter from John W . Hill to T .V . Hartnett, July 8, 1954 . similar language is found in a July a, 1954, memorandum from R . W, narrow to W .T. Hoyt .

680704748

Memorandum

to Allen R . Purv is April 13, 199 0 Page 4 3

these contacts . The objective, to get the indust ry sto ry before the public, is

side of the

mentioned in many documents . A report of a conversation with an eminent medical and science writer (not identified) warned, this type of writer obviously requires ve ry
special treatment, advice seeking, etc . Being highly respected in

writer in not going to he greatly affected by wishes of the publisher, etc .' Another memorandum noted that conference s
the field, this
a underway with the editor of peasant Magazine to work up a story on "the other side" to balance a negative article that had a recently been published in that magazine . A do nt article was eventually authored by SAB member Dr . William Rienhoff . A plaintiff's attorney could compile enough "evidence" from documents obtained through discovery and the Hill Papers to argue convincingly that the TIRC, through Hill 6 prowling, influenced the creation and/or placement of most, if not, all of the ,positive" stories that were written about smoking in the 19S0 s

Hill i anowlton

use

continually

arranging

"background

discussions" with important editors and publishers .
writers
their

on occasion,

were provided more than just background information for stories

are drafting various story outline, for submission to un top magazine writers . W will offer to provide backgroun d research to the writers . Such as review of history of
charges against tobacco, a B think-piece on hysterical undertones on cigarette controversy, et c

This sake memorandum also noted that a piece on the numero - approaches to the solution of cancer that would "place charges against cigarettes in perspective wa, also being prepared "for placement with a s,lected magazine writer ." The writer was not identifiable from the context .

880704748

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Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0 Page 44

Articles

were a constant
Indust ry

Published in Reader's-gjgest in the early 19505 source of irritation to the tobacco industry .

representatives were unsuccessful in getting the publishers
from John W . Hill to the TIRO, May 3 . 1954, reported

of eat Oioes *,t to move from their anti-cigarette stance . A

memorandum

that" uch factual material on the subject" of tobacco and health

had been given to James Morahan and Lois Mattox Miller :
They have assured as that they were studying all sides of the question and would do a balanced article . However, there arc indications that When it finally appears the pieta may prove to be another of the Header's Digest attacks against tobacco .

A series of documents in the Hill collection

regarding

what was apparently an

attempt to moderate the Reader's Digest

,trade demonstrates a tactic taken by Hill & Knowlton that is similar to that taken by Tiderock some years late r . Through Elect
Rabat

(Chairman of the Board of Warner-Hudnut, Inc . and a director writer
Whose work had

of the American Cancer Society), Hill & Anowlton contacted Dr .
Paul de Kruiff, a scien

been

published in

Rider's Digest The "Confidential Repo rt , Tobacco Indust ry • Research
Committee" (October 19, 1954) noted that meetings had been held

with Hobst the Hill documents provide a more complete picture of the events that transpired . Dr . de Eruiff

was approached by the

industry concerning the possibility of his writing an article that

Would 'bring in the balancing, and therefore contradictory [to the
Hammond-Horn report) testimony of other

scientific

authorities .'

Hill & Knowlton reported to T .V . Hartnett regarding the proposed

meeting ;

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Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0
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obviously, it would be beneficial to the industry's position if the READERS' DIC£ST were to present a balanced article which made it clear that the facts on the causes of lung cancer have not been established and that ther e

more than one side to the alleged relationship of
cigarette smoking to lung earner .
Such an article would gain stature from Dr . de Xruiff's reputation for integrity and his standing in the field of science .

There

was

the suggestion that both the TIRC and the ACS

' individually' with on de fruits in Writing the article . At one meeting, Dr . de Krviff had proposed
would benefit by cooperating
that there be a joint payment to him for his work by the American

Cancer Society and the TIRC .

Boost suggested that de Krviff be

paid for consultant se a , "possibly at the rate of $10,000 a

year for five years .

.

.

.

Negotiations with Dr .

CA

Kruiff broke down, ostensibly

because he "Wanted to engage in an extended

research project, the "
Dr . do Kruiff

results of which were
told the TIRC that : :

not too clearly defined

.he would not be content merely to give both sides
of the facts that he so could make positive statements . His views were not for sale, he said, and he Could not say in advance what his conclusions Would be . .Apparently, Mr . Boost had in end an article of a certain kind which could he prepared in a matter of weeks, while Mr, (sic, Dr .] de Rruif£ ha d mind a part-time consultant's job over extended period, serving both the TIRC and Me American Cancer article or series Society, with the possibilities of of articles which might or might not favor tobacco, and of the argument, but to be

which might or night not be printed in the Reader's Digest .

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Memora ndum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0 Page 4 6

Mr . Ha rt nett, Dr . Little and the Hill and Knowlton people

were

agreement that the proposal was too vague

And

nebulous to justify any immediate decision

Cr action .4 1

Or,

us Kruiff was finally told that for ethical reasons
be
in a position to pay Mr . [sic, Dr .] de

the TTRC could not

Krvi£f" and the proposal was not pursued further .

Other documents in the Hill collection reveal that it was not un sual for Hill & owlton to pay writers for stories . The 1955 TIRC budget proposal provided for costs of assignments contracted to outside scientific writers working on special Publication projects .' John Pfeiffer, a science writer, vas paid by Hill S Knowlton to prepare a booklet that was a popular approach to the subject of lung cancer . A memorandum from Carl Thompson to

John Hill noted, his article is to cover the positive aide Of the lung cancer smoking story .-

A memorandum from Darrow to Thompson dated March 17, 1955, stated that Darrow had reviewed an outline for "the Tibby Russell" story done by Jim Payne, a science writer who was
eventually put o staff .

No additional information is currently

available regarding this story . )
it sounds like an interesting and salable piece
should

.

concentrate our time and attention on those stories which directly carry out our TSRC assignment of focusing stature-building attention Dr . Little and his own . Jim understands that ve cannot afford to invest work
TIRC time in any articles which wilnot serve the idea s

41 . "Draft of letter from either Mr . Ha rtnett or Mr . Hill to Paul M . Hahn," November 15, 1954, repo rt ing on meeting of Elmer

Dobst, Or . Shaver and Paul de Kruiff with Dr . Little and Messrs . Hartnett, Hoyt, Hecker, Hill and Darrow .

690704752

C
memorandum to Allen It . Purvis
April 13, 199 e Page 4 7

behind our assignment focusing national attention n Dr . Little as a scientist, thereby un dergirdinc th e strength of his position with the Scientific Adviso ry
Board and

TIRC .4 2

A later giving Payne the

memorandum (April, 1955) bemoaned the fact that amount of money he w requesting for his work

would nn us well over our budget for writing activities this month ."

As noted earlier, Polley referred in his chronology to "Smoke Without Fear," the booklet written. by G . Cooley, with industry regarding Hill

science writer Donald

' encouragement .'

Several other documents

& Knowlton Contacts with Cooley may be found in writer of one memorandum advised that said be taken to insure that Hill d Knowlton and the TIRC nut be closely
these files . The associated with this particular editorial project :

. let's proceed most Carefully on the Fawcett project ["Snake Without Fear'], keeping in mind that the industry, the TIRO and H&K simply mutt not be in a Qosition of appearing to chant this title to the public .

Cooley`s

33 -page pamphlet was published by the edito r-

of TRUE Magazine . Hill & Knowlton
be made

arranged

for marked copies to

available

to participants in a meeting of the American

Cancer Society .

As part

If

its duties, Hill

&

Knowlton assembled and

dined a working catalog" of helpful scientific "backgroun d

42

Memorandum from R .W . Darrow to Carl Thompson, March 17, 1955 .

43 . "TSRC Checklist," August 17, 1954 .

66090.1'753

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0 Page 4 8

information" to be supplied to writers and "for

use in answering

attacks ." staff
and other

were available

to x rch stories for writers,

resources, including an extensive card file of c ent published views on smoking and health, a scientific bibliographical file on lung cancer and a complete indust ry , trade press and research mailing list, were developed . Two copies of the -working ; catalog" (requested of CTR by plaintiff in cjo11pne and Marc) may
be fo un d in the Hill collection .
R .W . narrow provided the x1RC wi th

Rill 8 Fnowlton's "public information 195$ . It explained that the increased

an explanation of activities" expenses for

activities and attendant expenses were made necessa ry by growing press and public interest
in the subject of tobacco and health, and by additional efforts to
get

th e industry's case before the public . A "quick rundown o n
projects underway in 1955" listed editorial projects,

incudinq : o

PAGUA story scheduled for April issue by Jr . entitled, our Ahead and Smoke Moderately . "4 4

Rienhoff

gEDgyd, T(l~g,X (pocket weekly) story for an early April issue on, roughly, the Phony Lung Cancer Scare .

Ostrow book

"Why

k

s being rushed .

Public Affairs mnitteepamgjliet i going into type after .Phis has been considerably changed further r from early iviolent anti-cigarette document, but still net acceptable . However, it is learned that American
Cancer Society, which v

hacked away from this

to buy ioo, 00 0 copies, now has commitment . It is known that the author (McCrady) and other, a cry upset about the toning do wn of original manuscript by Public Affair s

44 . William F . Rienhoff, Jr, wav a member of the SAb in 1955 .

66070475}

C
April 13, 1990 Page 4 9

Committee editors after scientists reviewed th 5 e4

manuscript .

.

.

.

Patrick McCrady took

a hard-line against

smoking and

was an

outspoken critic of will

&

knowlton's efforts on behalf of

the TIRO . The pamphlet he was writing for the American Cancer Society was

a

so of great

Concern

to Hill & Knowlton .

reveal that a great deal of effort went into achieving a "toning down ." A memorandum from Carl Thompson to R .W . narrow acknowledged the problems concerning the
Documents in the Hill collection
McCrady manuscript and outlined Hill b %nowlton's response !

1) We have

conferred

with

Its

click, Educational

Association for the Public Affairs mmittee (of

the

American Cancer Society), and advised him of the complete unectpbability of the document it is presently written . He advises that the w reason have th e to make whatever suggestions thin k emanuscript

necessary

to make a

acceptable
. . .

pamphlet for the Public

Affairs Committee to issue .

After this outline is discussed it is possible that w will Want to assign either Joe Lubin -- who would be acceptable - or Jack Pfieffer to prepare a version of . It is doubtful that the whole this manuscript . project can be killed . At this point it is questionable if it would even be desirable . Certainly we should see
how

booklet dealing with the lung cancer problem .4 6

for o effo rt s to cooperate are successful before running the risk of urging the on-publication of a

T .V . Hartnett

eventually reviewed

the p ro ofs for

M cC rady's pamphlet and pronounced the document 'materially improved
over its original statue ." Eventually titled "Smoking = Lun g

45 . Memorandum from Carl Thompson to John W . 1111.1, February 24, 1955 . 46 . Memorandum from Carl Thompson to A .W . Darrow, January 4, 1955 .

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C
April 13, 1990 Page 5 0

Cancer?," the Public Affairs Committee pamphlet was sent to the companies' individual public relations counsel with a note from Hill S Knowlton : "The original document underwent several revisions upon advice of competent scientists, cancer researchers and others The public relations progress report for 1954 noted only that "opportunity to review the manuscript add suggest changes and alterations has been obtained . "

Hill & %nawiton's earliest recommendations for action in response to adverse smoking and health stories included the suggestion that an attempt be made to interest Edward R . Marrow in 'a well-balanced discussion of the entire subject, use [sic] Company ideas and/or personnel . This is particularly important, and perhaps this is one single activity which now could neutralize loose talk on the subject ."4 7

When first approached by the Indust ry in December, 1953, Hill a Knowlton suggested that a statement "he read on radio and television by Ed

narrow or some equally important <oentator ."

The influential Morrow was seen as important factor to be utilized in the drive to

reverse public thinking . When Edward R . urr eventually decided to host a two-part show on lung cancer

in 1955, Hill & Knowlton stayed in close touch with the producer
of the show . A meeting between CBS's Arthur Morris and Dr . Little

was arranged at Morrow's request .

47 .

"Suggested Approach and Comments Regarding Attacks on Use of Cigarettes," December 14, 1953 . See also "Fear and Sitters," Hass car, Week, November 14, 1953, p . 54 .
Hi11 and Knowlton, Inc . Planning Committee, Monday Evening, December 31, 1953 ."

48 . "Draft of Proposals for Cigarette Makers for Discussion by

680704756

C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purv is
April 13, l99 0 Page 5 1

Dr . Little has convinced Morris that careful screening of inte rv iewees Should be conducted to determine in advance that those selected to appear on the 'See It Now' program be different in their Opinion about the effect of cigarettes on health but must speak With me
mind on the n eed for further research to ascertain the real facts . This is a matter that Morris intends to

stress in hisg dealings with Fred Friendly, co-producer of the show .

Dr . Little convinced Morris that nothing but harm would be done on a program that featured strong debate over the issues of tobacco and health . He suggested that he would not care to appear on the sane program with any of the two or threescientific men whose opinions about tobacco and health were more emotional than objective .

By December, the TIRO had been assured of advance notice of the data the "cancer show" would be presenting . More Laborrankly ,

Mr . Friendly had told him they had done their best to make the program a balanced o but that due to the superior presentation by the tobacco people, he [Friendly] believes that if anyone gets break in the program i t a would be the tobacco industry .5 0 In the meeting with M r . Runyan and Mr . Read of the

Ameri-

can

Cancer Society referred to earlier, Hill 6 %novlton denied segment on the subject

having initiated the idea of a 'See It Now '

of smoking and health . However, C&5' decision to listen to the industry's position may have been influenced by th e fact that Phili p

49 . Memorandum from Ed Doherty to Carl Thompson, August 26, 1954 . 50 . Memorandum from ache W . Hill to T .V . Hartnett, re "Edward R . Morrow Prograe, "SEE IT NOW ."

680104'75

Memorandum to Allen R . purvis April 13, 199 0
Page 5 3

Morris

such

advertised extensively on CBS during this time, sponsoring popular shows as "I Love Lucy" and "Public Defender ." Whatever

the origin of the idea, Hill E Knowlton and TSRC

Were pleased with

their efforts . Trans cr ipts of the two shows on that subject were

among materials routinely supplied to the press as "background
material ."

After only nine

months as TIRC public re lations counsel,

Hill A Knowlton expressed satisfaction with the results of its

efforts :

overwhelmingly swallowed the anti-cigarette state hook, line and s inker , today editorial opinion indicating a wide awareness that the case has not been proven . Editorial editorial San be cited to this ef-, fect . The sets is true for columnists .
Where then editorial opinion had
Where there v s little

scientific

material and few

facts on the side of the industry a year ago, such material is beginning to accumulate today . (Examples Hueper Russ, critical analyses of Hammond-Horn, etc . )
Where there appear

were

articles

of cigarettes a year ago, these

appearing on the side are beginning to

new .

(Examples - True magazine - booklet

"Smoke Without Fear," Saeger piece in Medical Digest, coming article Harper by Engel, Abatis l Press Service series on Reaper, to a tion a few .)51

AEN'RTISffiG CTAIM L

During Cipollone, Polley focused on advertisements froc
the 1930s and 19400 which attempted to reassure doctors as to th e

51 . "program of the Tobacco industry Research Committee," September
0, 1954 .

GS0704758

Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0 Page 5 ]

convinced, would marshalCate this reassurance to their patients, or at least would nut
harmful effects of smoking . Doctors, one warn them to quit smoking . The TPLP description of Pollay's impending article states that "[t]he companies voluntarily admitted that their o advertising and competitive practices had been a prin cipal factor in creating a health problem . . . .

11

Maynard brought to public attention the Philip Morris advertisements run ing cineuone

in medical journals which Edell introduced dur-

as "further evidence of the tobacco industry's calcu-

lated and successful efforts, beginning in the 1930's, to confuse

the

American public in general, and doctors in particular, about

the dangers of cigarette smoking ."5 2

The outrageous claims being made in cigarette advertising were

a source

of

concern

to Hill

&

Knowlton when the firm

was

first contacted by the industry . The public noted in a Hill 6 Knowlton memorandum :

was increasingly

skep-

tical of any action or statement by a cigarette manufacturer, as

The public probably is already irritated by existing cigarette advertising, witness the ridicule resulting from claims and counterclaims of the various factnrers . This attitude will have some bearing on the type of public relations activities to rbe underWhile it might be a delicate area for us, we should be emphatic about individual company advertising . I don't know anyone who doesn't think that cigarette advertisements are utter hogwash . I doubt if any other single factor has been as instrumental in bringing the FTC, th e

52 .

Helmond

P re ss Release, March 26,

680704759

C
andum to Allen R . Purvis April 13, 199 0

page 5 4

medical profession, and segments

the heads of the tobacco

.5 3

of

the public, down of

In preparation for the December 1953, meeting with R .J . Reynolds mentioned earlier, John S . Dudes (Hill d Knowlton) informed Hill of the circumstances surrounding the doctors survey that formed the basis of Reynolds' advertising claim that "more doctors smoke Camels than any other cigarette ." Ducar reported that the claim was not valid . Positive survey results were obtained through a clever artifice . Doctors going into a medical meeting were asked if they smoked and if so, what brand they were carrying .

Unbeknownst to the people who read the ads based on these claims, was the fact that the interv iewers had placed in the doctors' hotel turns on their arrival cartons of Camel cigarettes . The chances are that the doctors ran out of cigarettes on arrival, and conveniently put a
pack of Camels into their

own mockers . respect

This period Of Camel adve rt ising V already

because of the involvement of A . Grant Clarke, the smoking and health "expert" employed by A .J . Reynolds through its advertising agency . In addition to his involvement in the Camel Medical Relations Division and the Bureau of Information, Clarke took an active role

in the Search

for a Scientific Director for TIRC . Plaintiffs

may at se a point make much of the fact that C'_srke, the employee
of an advertising agency,

was

so widely involved and influential

in scientific matters .

53 . "Suggested Approach and Comments Regarding Attacks on Use Cigarettes," December 14, 1953,

o

660704760

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memorandum to Allen P . Purvis

April 1 3 , 199 0
Page 55

SIRMAR Y We can anticipate that the cigarette industry will at some point be compelled to respond to Policy's charges concerning the Tohn W . Hill documents . While the documents contain no "smoking gun," a plaintiff's attorney might use them effectively to supplement and support existing charges against the industry . The possibility of a broad distribution of the documents to plaintiffs necussitates that we be prepared to deal with the questions and fresco that would arise . on a more positive side, the Hill documents also contain some useful information that may help defense counsel place issues and events surrounding the formation of the TIRC in perspective .

680704761

r

68OtO47s8