Impeachment Complaint

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME
AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the
President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities
are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While
the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a
democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he
would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused
the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to
August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes
intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue

Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by
Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down
from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on
October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice"
of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo
resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic
Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator
Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department
of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together
with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator
Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21)
senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The
battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then
House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio
Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and
Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose
Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund
Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high
and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December
hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she
was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a
P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on
January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who
served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW
Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of
January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose

Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned
as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets
of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.19Senator
Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted
the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people
holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers
walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA
Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando
Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General
Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to
announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for the
resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced
he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26 There was no
turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and
orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo
Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary
Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto
Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola
between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The
negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the following
press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was
transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties
of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of
Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent
request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.1âwphi1.nêt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party."

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.34Recognition of
respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d'
honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a
hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave
the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives.37The
House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the
administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved
Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and
expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the
Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed
into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next day,
February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43Senators
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason
therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court.
Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved
Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two
(2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has
been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the
impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the
resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on
January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February
2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of
petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60%
in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D
or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-001629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-001754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder,
forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo
Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery,
plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed
by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges
against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against
him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any
other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if
legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He
prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on
GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a
non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR
Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February
15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice
Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel,
former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised
themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves.
Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit
their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag
Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of
the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited
for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I

Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond
the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the
"legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through
people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the
powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities
on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on
political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century,
the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations,
continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v.
Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of
'political questions', not of 'political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the
inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused
on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.60 With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the
new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are
other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is
section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve
the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral
reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one.
No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered
contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the
EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and
defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under
the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
ofpeople power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the
reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the
recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus
non."65 TheMalolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of
Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing,
through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and
which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or

collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the
Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it
is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried
over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are
now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The
reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to
provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more
adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and
necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the
"conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society."70 In Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus
curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the
right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this
means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar
stressed that "… it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to
petition for redress of grievances, all should listen.For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are
deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section
875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call
for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid
down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus,
respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it
involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to
judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,

removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20,
2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of
events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed
revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The
Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of
succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the
House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as
Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in
tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a
new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It
sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming
with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly
spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The
window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal
advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee
to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the
presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo
has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and
stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would
not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At
3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and
dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent
Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked
Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not
disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated

to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that
petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the
petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I
would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality
that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the
palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested,
"Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of
power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this
stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the
petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20,
that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open
the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner
was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact.According to Secretary Angara, at
2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the
reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his
name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of
the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x
x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:

'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities – Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
"Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this
second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was
further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to
await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted
by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore
attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot
and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been
signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is
there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.
In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say
he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as
the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is
to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the
petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did
not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner
reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter,
despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not
the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino
people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government
to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If,
however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation
from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is
the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance
to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a
matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019
originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain
a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo
Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to
the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative
investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following
provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act
or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act
for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the
provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above
became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the
immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate
on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative
cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or
retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a
violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings
against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that
when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case
Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that
as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as
pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any
insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA
3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But

even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time
petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the
opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and
duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the
January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;

2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001
at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S
GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police
and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition
to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing
and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to
the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment
thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
– qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:

"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served
the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus
officioand has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate
and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of
government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police,
the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power
or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of

the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of
inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman
should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; andsecond,
he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening.
The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes,
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the
Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In
granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded
and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law,
could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act
unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that
the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the
occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as
possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This
remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property
rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do
is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty,
any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy
between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining

whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for
damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority
to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that
position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such
men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as
a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in
wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office
he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government
itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the
tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In
1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men:
The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP
College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the
existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also
from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the
President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only
the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute
immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in
the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo,
who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office
is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort
failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution
in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the
1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second
sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But
would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President
shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an
immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it
will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the
peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost
the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed
against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v.
Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and
documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were
facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the
Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President
Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached
and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the
US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only
"official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts
is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our
jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as a
state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of
the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president
enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the
cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent
Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained
publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the
presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right
of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical
approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong
likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga
vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile
and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds
of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state
of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right
to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially.
xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even
by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its
companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes,
its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair
trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and
in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value
of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v.
United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing
people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons
as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United
States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment,
share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to
those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the
context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the
First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been
regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the
other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a
public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be
present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and
quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal
trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials,
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the
press be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation
of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extrarecord evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members
of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports,
and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been
quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is
postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of
the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be
compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the
petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue

A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and
then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice
will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the
respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair
investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135To be sure, the duty
of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord
Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose
judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a
democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy
has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the
majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's
progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Source:
Estrada vs Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, Available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/146710_15.htm

CASE DIGEST

G.R. Nos. 146710-15

FACTS
After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and members of the
President’s administration started resigning one by one. In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House to the Senate. The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the
President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally. On January 20, the President submitted two letters – one
signifying his leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section
11, Article VII of the Constitution. Arroyo then took oath as President of the Philippines.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner resigned as President and whether the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner
from resigning.
HELD
For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts
of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the resignation is clear. In the press
release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President. He emphasized he
was leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability and intent of assumption. He expressed his gratitude to
the people: He assured will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the
country. This is of high grade evidence of his intent to resign.
Petitioner’s contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court. The exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming that it is an administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending
at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted
against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors
filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was,
in effect, no impeachment case pending against the petitioner when he resigned.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 200242

July 17, 2012

CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIASAGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA,
REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining
order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona,
assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and
trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for
impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief
presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way
above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court the
following day, December 14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows:
ARTICLE I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY
AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS
APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET
WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or
employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law."
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as
required by the Constitution.
2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration
of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth,
acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been
reported that Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh
Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-required under
Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this
acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since his assumption as Associate and
subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public disclosure?
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII,
SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A
PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE
SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF
FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE
ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN
DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16
NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.

ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE HE
CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS
PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER
HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION
AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON
THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR
COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.1
On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the impeachment
complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate. Citing previous
instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of petitioner’s appointment as Chief Justice and
publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for "derailing his administration’s mandate," petitioner
concluded that the move to impeach him was the handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and supporters,
including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by his ouster. As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the
same but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and Vice-President during the term of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior
permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either
false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for
failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all
the articles of impeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference revealing
evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. The following day, newspapers carried front
page reports of high-priced condominium units and other real properties in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City
allegedly owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors led by respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. The prosecution
told the media that it is possible that these properties were not included by petitioner in his Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not been made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign,
Senators scolded the prosecutors reminding them that under the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment
Trials3 they are not allowed to make any public disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending
impeachment case.4 By this time, five petitions have already been filed with this Court by different individuals seeking
to enjoin the impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified complaint and lack of due process.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial
proceedings against the petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On January 18, 2012,
Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment
Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution
witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records
Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara,
Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).

In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their respective
memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the allegations in paragraphs
2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to disclose in SALN
such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par.
2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose to the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states:
IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the Articles of
Impeachment;
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment, with respect to which,
this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on the nature of any property or asset which
may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
SO ORDERED.6
In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s request for
subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar
currencies, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecution’s Requests for
Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI),
for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank accounts of Chief
Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as follows:
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV Building,
6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8,
2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for Bank Account no.
1445-8030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements showing the balances of the said
account as of December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008,
December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010.
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on
February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for the
following bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the
balances of the said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and
December 31, 2010:
SO ORDERED.8
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the
Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its
authorized representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for
petitioner’salleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including
the bank statements showing the year-end balances for the said accounts.

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed
by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2)
did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a "hodge-podge" of
multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or
hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain
Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its
earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the
presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to
due process because first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for
impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate
and distinct ground from "culpable violation of the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) issued the
subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same
being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the
prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency
Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation ofResolution
dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting
documents on petitioner’s or his family’s bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission
of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of
the Impeachment Complaint;
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011
[sic], as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and
(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the ground of
partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that they have been openly
touted as the likely replacements in the event that petitioner is removed from office.10
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing the
Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court,
both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for the inhibition of Justices
Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of any applicable compulsory ground and of any voluntary inhibition from the
Justices concerned."
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is being
violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the coldneutrality of
impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge Franklin S. Drilon, whose

inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further called attention to the fact that despite
the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution which disallowed the introduction of evidence in support of
paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for reconsideration would be entertained, "the allies of President
Aquino in the Senate abused their authority and continued their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without
fear of objection". In view of the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of
Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of Article II -for which President Aquino even thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution could not"-- petitioner
reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor General argues
that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved only by the
Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents "without submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional and
exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of
the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the case of
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise before this
Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily
long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment case.
Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents maintain that
subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They contend
that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets,
liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this case
were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated
and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public
accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being
claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed
that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.
The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or
incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due
process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
Impeachment and Judicial Review
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen as creating
divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that "the decision will
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt."15 Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter
of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of
checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review
if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens

and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US
Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner was
impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished
with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the
Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some SenatorJudges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of
certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation
of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this
Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the
proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges
are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus
failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment
Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of judicial
review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court resolved the question of
the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was
allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a violation
of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could
translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the
required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.1âwphi1
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.19
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on
the ground of MOOTNESS.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(No Part)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

(On leave)
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

(No Part)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E RT I F I CAT I O N

I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Source:
Corona vs Senate of The Philippines, G.R.No.200242, July 17, 2012 Available at
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/gr_200242_2012.html

CASE DIGEST
FACTS

G.R.No.200242

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C.
Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives
(HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines. The present petition was filed arguing that
the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1)
proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is
constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of
the complaint which do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion
and/or hearsay ;(3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth
which violates petitioner‘s right to due process because first and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of
petitioner‘s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act
considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts.
ISSUE
Are the constitutional issues raised in this case been mooted out?
HELD
The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required
majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his
office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the
President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from
among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been
mooted by supervening events and his own acts. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by
the dismissal of the petition.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 184379-80

April 24, 2012

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and
SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
What the Court decides today has nothing to do with the substance or merits surrounding the aborted deal of the
Philippine government with the National Broadband Network and ZTE Corporation, or any allegation of petitioner
Rodolfo Noel "June" Lozada, Jr., (Lozada) regarding the same. There is only one issue that we decide today –
whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the protection of the
writ of amparo. Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated 12 September 2008 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), dismissing the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.1
Petitioner Lozada was the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Forest Corporation (PFC), a
government-owned- and -controlled corporation under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).2 Petitioner Violeta Lozada (Violeta) is his wife, while petitioner Arturo Lozada (Arturo) is his brother.
At the time the Petition for the Writ of Amparo was filed, respondent former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(former President Arroyo) was the incumbent President of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Eduardo Ermita (ES Ermita)
was then the Executive Secretary; Avelino Razon (Razon), the Director General of the Philippine National Police
(PNP); Angel Atutubo (Atutubo), the Assistant General Manager for Security and Emergency Services of the Manila
International Airport Authority; and Rodolfo Valeroso (Valeroso), an agent of the Aviation Security Group (ASG) of the
PNP.
Antecedent Facts
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the Philippine
government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation (ZTE), a Chinese
manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.3 Former National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
Secretary Romulo Neri (Sec. Neri) sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN
deal.4 The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said
transaction involving certain public officials.5 These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon
Committee (Blue Ribbon Committee) to conduct an investigation thereon,6 for which it issued a subpoena directing
Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.7
On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Lozada left the country for a purported official
trip to London, as announced by then DENR Secretary Lito Atienza (Sec. Atienza).8 In the Petition, Lozada alleged
that his failure to appear at the scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then Executive Assistant
Undersecretary Manuel Gaite (Usec. Gaite).9 Consequently, the Senate issued an Order dated 30 January 2008: (a)
citing Lozada for contempt; (b) ordering his arrest and detention; and (c) directing the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to
implement the Order and make a return thereon.10

While overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former could be allowed to go back to the
Philippines.11Upon the approval of Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family that he was returning from Hong Kong on
5 February 2008 on board Cathay Pacific Flight No. 919, bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on the same day.12
In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon disembarking from the aircraft, several men held his arms and took his bag.
Although he allegedly insisted on meeting with his family, he later realized that it was wiser to just follow them,
especially when he overheard from their handheld radio: "[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga
senado."13
Lozada asked if he could go to the comfort room, an opportunity he used to call up his brother, petitioner Arturo, and
inform him of his situation.14 The men thereafter led him through the departure area of the airport and into a car
waiting for them.15 They made him sit alone at the back of the vehicle, while a man, whom he later discovered to be
respondent Valeroso, took the passenger seat and was always in contact with other individuals.16 Lozada observed
that other cars tailed their vehicle.17
Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with people from the government, and that the
former was going to confer with "ES and Ma’[a]m." Lozada surmised that these individuals referred to ES Ermita and
former President Arroyo, respectively.18 Sec. Atienza also purportedly instructed Lozada to pacify his wife, petitioner
Violeta, who was making public statements asking for her husband’s return.19
The vehicle traversed the South Luzon Expressway and drove towards the direction of Laguna.20 Along the way, the
men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection.21
Lozada requested that he be brought home to Pasig, but the men were allegedly compelled to deny his request on
account of unidentified security risks.22 Eventually, however, the vehicle turned around and drove to Libis, Quezon
City. The group stopped at The Outback restaurant to meet with certain individuals, who turned out to be Atty. Antonio
Bautista (Atty. Bautista) and Colonel Paul Mascarinas (Col. Mascarinas) of the Police Special Protection Office
(PSPO). At the restaurant, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of a prepared affidavit.23
After the meeting, the men informed Lozada that they were going to billet him in a hotel for a night, but he suggested
that they take him to La Salle Green Hills instead. The men acquiesced.24
Upon arriving in La Salle Green Hills, Lozada was met by Violeta and his sister, Carmen Lozada (Carmen).25 He
observed that the perimeter was guarded by policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening not only
his security, but also that of his family and the De La Salle brothers.26
On 6 February 2008, at around 10:00 a.m., Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista
to finalize and sign an affidavit.27
At about 1:00 p.m., Violeta filed before this Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus, docketed as G.R. No. 181342 (the
Habeas Corpus case).28 Arturo likewise filed before this Court a Petition for a Writ of Amparo, docketed as G.R. No.
181356 (the Amparo case), and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the authority ordering custody over
Lozada, as well as any other document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction.29
At around the same time that Arturo filed the Petition for a Writ of Amparo, Col. Mascarinas drove Lozada back to La
Salle Green Hills.30 Lozada was then made to sign a typewritten, antedated letter requesting police
protection.31 Thereafter, former Presidential Spokesperson Michael Defensor (Sec. Defensor) supposedly came and
requested Lozada to refute reports that the latter was kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged anomalies in the
NBN-ZTE deal. Sec. Defensor then purportedly gave Lozada P50,000 for the latter’s expenses.32

On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who
served the warrant of arrest on him.33 Lozada claimed that after his press conference and testimony in the Senate, he
and his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.34
On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution (a) consolidating the Habeas Corpus case and the Amparo case; (b)
requiring respondents in the Habeas Corpus case to comment on the Petition; (c) issuing a Writ of Amparo; (d)
ordering respondents in the Amparo case to file their verified Return; (e) referring the consolidated Petitions to the
CA; and (f) directing the CA to set the cases for hearing on 14 February 2008.35 Accordingly, the court a quo set both
cases for hearing on 14 February 2008.36
On 12 February 2008, respondents filed before the CA a Manifestation and Motion, praying for the dismissal of the
Habeas Corpus case.37 They asserted that Lozada was never illegally deprived of his liberty and was, at that time, no
longer in their custody. They likewise averred that, beginning 8 February 2008, Lozada had already been under the
supervision of the Senate and, from then on, had been testifying before it.38
In their verified Return, respondents claimed that Sec. Atienza had arranged for the provision of a security team to be
assigned to Lozada, who was then fearful for his safety.39 In effect, respondents asserted that Lozada had knowledge
and control of the events that took place on 5 February 2008, voluntarily entrusted himself to their company, and was
never deprived of his liberty. Hence, respondents prayed for the denial of the interim reliefs and the dismissal of the
Petition.40
During the initial hearing on 14 February 2008, Lozada and Violeta ratified the Petition in the Amparo case41 to
comply with Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,42 which imposes an order to be followed by those who can
sue for the writ.43 The CA also dismissed the Habeas Corpus case in open court for being moot and academic, as
Lozada was physically present and was not confined or detained by any of the respondents.44Considering that
petitioners failed to question the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus case, the said dismissal had lapsed into finality,
leaving only the Amparo case open for disposition.
Thereafter, Lozada filed a Motion for Temporary Protection Order and Production of Documents,45 while Arturo filed a
Motion for Production of Documents.46 Additionally, Arturo also filed a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties Romulo Neri, Benjamin Abalos, [Sr.],
Rodolfo Valeroso, "Jaime" the Driver and Other Respondents. Respondents opposed these motions.47 The CA
denied the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena on the ground that the alleged acts and statements attributed to
Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos (Abalos) were irrelevant to the Amparo case, and that to require them to testify would
only result in a fishing expedition.48 The CA likewise denied Arturo’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.49
In its Resolution dated 5 March 2008, the CA dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent on the ground that at
the time the Petition in the Amparo case was filed, she was still the incumbent President enjoying immunity from
suit.50 Arturo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,51 which the CA denied in its Resolution dated 25 March 2008.52
On 12 September 2008, the CA rendered its Decision denying petitioners the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and
dismissing the Petition.53 The CA found that petitioners were unable to prove through substantial evidence that
respondents violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Petitioners thus filed the instant Petition, praying for: (a) the reversal of the assailed CA Decision; (b) the issuance of
the TPO; and (c) the accreditation of the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines and the De La
Salle Brothers as the sanctuaries of Lozada and his family.54 In the alternative, petitioners pray that this Court remand
the case to the CA for further hearings and reverse the latter’s Orders: (a) denying the Motion to Issue a Subpoena
Ad Testificandum and (b) dropping former President Arroyo as a respondent. Petitioners raise the following issues:

(1) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in ruling to dismiss the petition for a writ of amparo and deny Petitioners’
prayer for a Temporary Protection Order, inter alia, because there is no substantial evidence to prove that
the right to life, liberty or security of Jun Lozada was violated or threatened with violation. This rule is not in
accord with the rule on the writ of amparo and Supreme Court jurisprudence on substantial evidence[.]
(2) Whether the Ponencia erred and gravely abused its discretion by prematurely ruling that the testimony of
witnesses which Petitioners sought to present and who are subject of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
ad testificandum were irrelevant to the Petition for a Writ of Amparo in a way not in accord with the Rules of
Court and Supreme Court decisions.
(3) Whether the Court a quo erred in using and considering the affidavits of respondents in coming up with
the questioned decision when these were not offered as evidence and were not subjected to crossexamination. This ruling is not in accord with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
(4) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria Arroyo despite her failure to
submit a verified return and personally claim presidential immunity in a way not in accord with the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.55
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that petitioners failed to adduce substantial evidence, as the
allegations they propounded in support of their Petition were largely hearsay.56 The OSG also maintains that it was
proper for the CA to have dropped former President Arroyo as respondent on account of her presidential immunity
from suit.57
Respondent Atutubo also alleges, among others, that: (a) Lozada voluntarily asked for security and protection; (b)
Lozada willingly submitted himself to the company of the police escorts; (c) Atutubo merely accompanied him to pass
through the contingency route customarily provided to VIP passengers, public figures, foreign dignitaries, and the
like; and (d) Atutubo only performed his job to ensure security and maintain order at the airport upon the arrival of
Lozada.58
In the face of these assertions by respondents, petitioners nevertheless insist that while they have sufficiently
established that Lozada was taken against his will and was put under restraint, respondents have failed to discharge
their own burden to prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence as public officials.59 Petitioners also maintain
that it was erroneous for the CA to have denied their motion for subpoena ad testificandum for being irrelevant, given
that the relevancy of evidence must be examined after it is offered, and not before.60Finally, petitioners contend that
the presidential immunity from suit cannot be invoked in amparo actions.61
Issues
In ruling on whether the CA committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision, three issues must be
discussed:
I. Whether the CA committed an error in dropping former President Arroyo as a respondent in the Amparo
case.
II. Whether the CA committed an error in denying petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum.
III. Whether petitioners should be granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Discussion
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people’s
right to life, liberty and security.62 Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said
human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action.63
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof.64 Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the
right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds,65 or in cases where the
alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.66 Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not
to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the
desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.67(Emphasis
supplied.)
Using this perspective as the working framework for evaluating the assailed CA decision and the evidence adduced
by the parties, this Court denies the Petition.
First issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.68 Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even
for acts committed during his or her tenure.69
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the original Petition and the
issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was
proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former President Arroyo can no
longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility
or accountability for the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on the issue of former
President Arroyo’s alleged responsibility or accountability. A thorough examination of the allegations postulated and
the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her
part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare
claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain "Ma’[a]m,"70 whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and
(b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that "the President was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy,"71 there is nothing in the
records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6
February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and his family purportedly received.
Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum

This Court, in Roco v. Contreras,72 ruled that for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear that the person or
documents sought to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy, to wit:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action
or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books,
records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil
Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it
concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books,
documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facierelevant
to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the
parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).73 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on
the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the
issues of the case. The court a quo aptly ruled in this manner:
The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner to Neri and Abalos are not relevant to the instant Amparo
Petition where the issue involved is whether or not Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security was threatened or
continues to be threatened with violation by the unlawful act/s of the respondents. Evidence, to be relevant, must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Further, Neri, Abalos and
a certain driver "Jaime" are not respondents in this Amparo Petition and the vague allegations averred in the Motion
with respect to them do not pass the test of relevancy. To Our mind, petitioner appears to be embarking on a "fishing
expedition". Petitioner should present the aggrieved party [Lozada], who has been regularly attending the hearings,
to prove the allegations in the Amparo Petition, instead of dragging the names of other people into the picture. We
have repeatedly reminded the parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not
involve the investigation of the ZTE-[NBN] contract. Petitioner should focus on the fact in issue and not embroil this
Court into said ZTE-NBN contract, which is now being investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the
Office of the Ombudsman.74 (Emphasis supplied.)
All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos were solely with respect to the ZTE-NBN deal, and not
to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or to the ensuing threats that petitioners purportedly received.
Although the present action is rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the said government transaction, the
testimonies of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless not prima facie relevant to the main issue of whether there was
an unlawful act or omission on the part of respondents that violated the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum.
Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada

Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial
evidence,75 or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.76The
use of this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing amparo situations.77
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner
in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.78 Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon v.
Tagitis:79
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem
in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when
they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than
two years after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the
continuing threat to the brothers’ right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their
enforced disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat
of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to
security of person.80 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial
evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the
veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this
regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally
deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the
departure area of the airport,81 as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents:
[Lozada] was one of the first few passengers to get off the plane because he was instructed by Secretary Atienza,
th[r]ough a phone call on the night of 04 February 2008, while he was still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly to the
Bureau of Immigration so that few people would notice him and he could be facilitated in going out of the airport
without any hassle from the people of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Again, [Lozada] stated that he wanted to get
away from the Senate people. [Lozada] even went to the men’s room of the airport, after he was allegedly "grabbed",
where he made a call to his brother Arturo, using his Globe phone, and he was not prevented from making said call,
and was simply advised by the person who met him at the tube to (sic) "sir, bilisan mo na". When they proceeded out
of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard from the radio track down, "wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong mga
taga Senado", so they took a detour and went up to the departure area, did not go out of the normal arrival area, and
proceeded towards the elevator near the Duty Free Shop and then down towards the tarmac. Since [Lozada] was
avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, said detour appears to explain why they did not
get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could be
properly stamped.
This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada] struggled or made an outcry for help when he was
allegedly "grabbed" or "abducted" at the airport. [Lozada] even testified that nobody held him, and they were not
hostile to him nor shouted at him. With noon day clarity, this Court finds that the reason why [Lozada] was fetched at
the airport was to help him avoid the Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain him at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms, until such time that he would appear and give his testimony, pursuant to the Order of the Senate
on the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada] clearly knew this because at that time, it was still his decision not to testify before
the Senate. He agreed with that plan.82 (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the help of Sec. Atienza to avoid the Senate
personnel, and thus knew that the men who met him at the airport were there to aid him in such objective. Surely, the

actions of Lozada evinced knowledge and voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who claims to have been
forcibly abducted.
However, these men’s subsequent acts of directing Lozada to board the vehicle and driving him around, without
disclosing the exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond what he had consented to and requested from Sec.
Atienza. These men neither informed him of where he was being transported nor provided him complete liberty to
contact his family members to assure them of his safety. These acts demonstrated that he lacked absolute control
over the situation, as well as an effective capacity to challenge their instructions.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his right to
liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has
consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not Lozada was deprived of
his liberty from the point when he was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to the time he was taken
to La Salle Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and his family continue to suffer various threats from
respondents remain unproven. The CA correctly found as follows:
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can
neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would
make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security.
xxx

xxx

xxx

He claims that he is threatened by the alleged presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the De La
Salle premises where he and his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where
he went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the
respondents.
[Lozada] also considers the installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as
indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for
[Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the
respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security.
[Lozada] further maintains that there is an alleged trend, i.e., wherever he goes, there is a bomb threat. There were
bomb threats in the places where he went to like in [the Polytechnic University of the Philippines], Dagupan, Cebu
and Bohol. However, [Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to ascertain where the bomb threats emanated.
Plainly, there is no evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their
instigation.
Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice that he was put on the watch list of the
Bureau of Immigration as a threat to his life, liberty and security. This alleged threat is again unsupported by
evidence, as in fact, [Lozada] testified that he did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name
was actually in the official watch list of the Bureau. At any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not one of the respondents
in the amparo petition, and there is no showing in the record that it was the respondents who ordered the same for
the purpose of threatening him.
[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged frivolous cases against him and his family as threat to his life, liberty and
security. xxx However, [Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the
respondents ordered the filing of these cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be determined
based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition filed against the
respondents.83 (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish their case by the required evidentiary
standard, respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove their defenses by substantial evidence and to show
that respondents exercised extraordinary diligence as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.84 This Court has
squarely passed upon this contention in Yano v. Sanchez,85 to wit:
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not
result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his
or her claim by substantial evidence.
Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence, and they cannot merely rely
on the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their defenses or their exercise of extraordinary diligence. In
this case, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and the
privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to
Lozada’s liberty.
B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ of amparo and its interim reliefs
As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of the writ of amparo, considering that the
illegal restraint alleged in this case had already ceased and there is no imminent or continuing restriction on his
liberty. In Castillo v. Cruz,86 this Court held as follows:
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo,
absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty,
and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the
issuance of the writ cannot be justified. (Emphasis supplied.)1âwphi1
Further, it appears that Lozada had already filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Complaint charging
respondents with kidnapping and attempted murder, docketed as I.S. No. 2008-467.87 In this regard, this Court’s
ruling in Rubrico v. Arroyo88 is worth considering:
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and
incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-CO7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded
individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed
out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the
meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is
filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo
Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the
present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition
by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the
Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary
hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E
named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition
impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the
top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call
for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.

Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and
effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the
literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the
premises. Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding
aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the
incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to
security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own
investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all
pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-PC-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is
to be fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action can
more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of
amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators.89 On the other hand, if there
is no actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of
the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to
have unduly restrained his liberty.
Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v. Sanchez,90 declined to grant the
prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated
public officials were not accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous
to grant herein petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule that
there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no
basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be anchored.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. The Court of Appeals’ denial of the
privilege of the writ of amparo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E RT I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Source:
Lozada vs Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012, http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/
2012/april2012/184379-80.htm

CASE DIGEST

G.R. Nos. 184379-80

FACTS

ISSUE
Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the
protection of the writ of amparo.
HELD

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to
privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone
of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentations;

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social
security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a
system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized
Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is
hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to
draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby
created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to
the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO
shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies.
The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of
their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in
coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other
concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to
educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security
Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from
the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to
the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred
and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL
REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED
AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
I

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As
a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to
implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No.
308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face.
His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the
respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced
that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification
system. 7 All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not
wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the
exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The executive power is
vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power
of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. 18 He has control
over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the

functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to
the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control
to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O.
No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and
"incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General
Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the
Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI
on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain
provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the
executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative
agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of
government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects
of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order
redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that
it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no
duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen
will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that
without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach
defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however,
bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations
is not an independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as
an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be
let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance
to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy
which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to
privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of
privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate

to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes
a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
dwelling. 40Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our
citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security

providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
"common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics
Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical
analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide
precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral
characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint,
retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality
and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal
identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual
holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns the
unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data
banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to
be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology
employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique
print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically
analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of biometric
achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a
unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to
the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science facts.
Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses
various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is
noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available
to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of
data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can
give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of
the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the dissenters do.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded — whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include
his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for

medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge
formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and
useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic
personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from
constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information
gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and
for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the
particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for
whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about
our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics
and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read
or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the
Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and
transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. 64 The computer is
capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied
purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date
is simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with
other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy
begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right
to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not
be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that
endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.67 The factual
circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as
customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this
expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology
becomes more widely accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical
inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so

widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement
the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the
metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act.
No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and
fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74These laws,
however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data
with the other government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of
A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3)
generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the
right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not
infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order.
Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized,
and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy
purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the
integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or
regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be
diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the
presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This
approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to
prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in
danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme
Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of
the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New
York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs
enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names
and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The
plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of
their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed,
it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in

independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's
interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a
grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the
enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was
a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed
commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained
numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for
the gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also
prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above,
A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use of
computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work
wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information system in
different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objective, such as better law enforcement,
faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help
good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and
make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed the
internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual, armed
only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and
databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy.
The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected
by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
disctinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector
— protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes
from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the
record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the

government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the
well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable
record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have
lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not
engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., I join Justices Kapunan and Mendoza in their dissents.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Davide, Jr., In the result and I join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Romero, J., Please see separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the dissents of Justices Kapunan and Mendoza.
Vitug, J., See separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., See dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Quisumbing, J., I join in dissenting opinion of JJ. Mendoza and Kapunan.
Purisima, J., I join in Justice Mendoza's dissenting.

Source:
Ople vs Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998, Available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/127685.htm

CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 127685

FACTS
Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of
Computerized Identification Reference System” on the grounds that The administrative order issued by the executive
is deemed to be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress
to make laws, and that It impermissibly intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy.
ISSUE
Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violate the constitutional right to privacy?
HELD
Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague
that will put people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper
safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and other means.
Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down
his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190293

March 20, 2012

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines,
EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under their
direction and control, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190294
DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES in his capacity as
Secretary of National Defense, RONALDO PUNO in his capacity as Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190301
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES' LAWYERS (NUPL) SECRETARY GENERAL NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE SATUR C. OCAMPO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE LIZA
L. MAZA, ATTY. JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, ATTY. EPHRAIM B. CORTEZ, ATTY. JOBERT ILARDE PAHILGA,
ATTY. VOLTAIRE B. AFRICA, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO
M. REYES, JR. and ANTHONY IAN CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VICTOR S. IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS A. VERZOSA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY AGNES VST
DEVANADERA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES EASTERN MINDANAO COMMAND CHIEF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAYMUNDO B. FERRER, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 190302
JOSEPH NELSON Q. LOYOLA, Petitioner,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF
GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS VERZOSA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190307
JOVITO R. SALONGA, RAUL C. PANGALANGAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, EMILIO
CAPULONG, FLORIN T. HILBAY, ROMEL R. BAGARES, DEXTER DONNE B. DIZON, ALLAN JONES F.
LARDIZABAL and GILBERT T. ANDRES, suing as taxpayers and as CONCERNED Filipino citizens,Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in his (sic) capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines, HON.
EDUARDO ERMITA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, in his capacity as
Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, DIRECTOR JESUS VERZOSA, in his capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190356
BAILENG S. MANTAWIL, DENGCO SABAN, Engr. OCTOBER CHIO, AKBAYAN PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES WALDEN F. BELLO and ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, THEODORE O. TE and IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ III, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, and THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190380
CHRISTIAN MONSOD and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.

The Facts and the Case
The essential background facts are not in dispute. On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the
ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946,
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar
lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons
that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in
writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao and risen against the government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,
quantity, and quality of the rebels’ weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in strategic positions, the
closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other
municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized "PNP/Police" markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to review the validity of the President’s action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress
could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302, 190307,
190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Proclamation
1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it and
before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanao’s inhabitants could arise, the Court
deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in
entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The
issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,1 must be the very issue of
the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the
same. The pertinent provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
xxxx
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to
Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or
suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the President’s proclamation or suspension, allow their
limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first
a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has
nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.2
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the
operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree
affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no
petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that

the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In
her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed
government presence.
In Lansang v. Garcia,3 the Court received evidence in executive session to determine if President Marcos’
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971 had sufficient factual basis. In Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile,4 while the Court took judicial notice of the factual bases for President Marcos’ proclamation of martial law in
1972, it still held hearings on the petitions for habeas corpus to determine the constitutionality of the arrest and
detention of the petitioners. Here, however, the Court has not bothered to examine the evidence upon which
President Arroyo acted in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely because it felt no need to, the proclamation having
been withdrawn within a few days of its issuance.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City that no probable cause exist that the accused before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao since the
prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime. But the Court cannot use such finding as basis for striking
down the President’s proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the Court did not delegate and could not delegate to
the RTC of Quezon City its power to determine the factual basis for the presidential proclamation and
suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that the RTC of Quezon City passed upon the same evidence that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had in her possession when she issued the proclamation
and suspension.
The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging
these are.5 This is especially true, said the Court in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of
Education,6 where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court’s
duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." The Court’s duty is to steer clear
of declaring unconstitutional the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department, given the assumption that it
carefully studied those acts and found them consistent with the fundamental law before taking them. "To doubt is to
sustain."7
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an
appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus –
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis supplied)
More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to annul Proclamation
1959.1âwphi1 When the Court did not decide it then, it actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question
having become moot and academic.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the President and Congress
respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as
sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it.
But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill its duty without pre-empting
congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in
writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene without
need of a call within 24 hours following the President’s proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for
quick action on the part of the Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court sufficient

time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its
issuance.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the
short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President’s action, and
ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension. But
what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his
dissent: that 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is
that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the
suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and
academic.
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as moot.
But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review. The proclamation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar Presidential
acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary use of
political power.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot
and academic.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Source:
Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 Available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2012/march2012/190293.htm

CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 190293

FACTS
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo
issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On
December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened
in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before
Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
ISSUE
Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the writ in Maguindanao, render the issues
moot and academic?
HELD
Yes. The Court dismissed the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become moot and
academic. The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for reasons that President
Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before
the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same.
Also the military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The
President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No
indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or
promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests
made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively
small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the
face of a determined and amply armed government presence.

COMMENTARY REGARDING NATIONAL ID SYSTEM DURING FVR’s PRESIDENCY
In July 23, 1998 the Supreme Court rendered a decision in favor of Senator Blas Ople who opposed
Administrative Order 308 issued by President Fidel Ramos establishing the National Computerized Identification
Reference System, more popularly known as the national ID system.
Personally, as an Information Technology graduate, I believe the Supreme Court made a mistake by
favouring Senator Ople. If implemented the National ID system would have helped provide a more efficient way to
identify and store records of people in the country. It has been 17 years since the decision in Ople. It is well to note
that within that time period, there has been a great leap as to how data privacy is viewed by the general public in
terms of their openness in giving out personal information and how the courts now treat technology and its products
as being more and more reliable or acceptable for use in its proceedings and decision-making. The use of today’s
generation of social media exemplifies that. People today are more open and less privy about the personal
information they choose to share to the world.
Ople’s main contentions were that the national ID system lays the groundwork for a system which will violate
the individual’s right to privacy and that its issuance is an encroachment upon the legislative powers of Congress not
only due to the fact that it involved appropriations of public funds but more so because of its subject matter and
scope. The decision of the Supreme Court in favor of Ople, primarily on the right to privacy, centered on the Court’s
strong apprehension as to the implications brought about by the AO 308’s failure to provide “what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage.”
It also held that the purpose of the generation of the PRN or the Population Reference Number was not confined to
the sole purpose of identifying each individual but may also be used for other things remotely related to the avowed
purposes of the administrative order.
As can be gleaned from the decision, there was also a doubt as to the data integrity or how the records will
be handled and protected from potential intrusions and misuse and as to how much control the data subject has over
the information he gave to the data controller. Also in the Ople case, one of the main apprehensions of the Supreme
Court was that AO 308 did not provide who has control and access to the personal data and under what
circumstances and for what purposes such data is to be accessed.
The dissenters were not as pessimistic as those who voted for the majority decision. They were not as
threatened and did not see AO 308 giving the government the power to go so far as gathering data which could
potentially work to the detriment of the individual by the apparent misuse or intrusion of the information by those who
would have access to them.
Personally, the pros of AO 308 outweigh the cons especially implemented in today’s world as with the threat
of crime and terrorism more prevalent, AO308 could combat such actions if such was set in place.