Jeffrey Hudak v State Police
Content
Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 1 of 14
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY HUDAK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BENJAMIN CLARK, KYLE
HNAT, JOHN DOE #1, JOHN
DOE #2, JANE DOE #1 and JANE
DOE #2,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Jeffrey Hudak (“Plaintiff”), by his undersigned counsel, hereby
complains of the above-named defendants, as follows:
I.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1.
This is a civil rights action resulting from circumstances which
constitute an unlawful arrest in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
2.
On or about September 12, 2014, Pennsylvania State Trooper Bryon
Dickson was murdered, and Pennsylvania State Trooper Alex Douglass was
seriously injured, in a highly publicized shooting which took place at the
Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Blooming Grove, PA.
Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 2 of 14
3.
In the immediate aftermath of the aforesaid attack, it goes without
saying that every member of the Pennsylvania State Police was highly emotional,
understandably angry and strongly motivated to pursue and apprehend the person
or persons responsible for said attack.
4.
Unfortunately for Plaintiff, however, he became an innocent victim
and/or target of the Pennsylvania State Police’s zealous, fast-moving and
emotionally driven pursuit of the aforesaid attacker.
5.
In an incredible and threatening display of law enforcement presence,
manpower and authority, Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, without warrant, at his
mother’s private residence in Scranton, PA on the morning of September 13, 2014,
less than twelve (12) hours after the attack in question.
6.
As set forth more fully below, the Pennsylvania State Police had
absolutely no legal basis for the warrantless arrest of Plaintiff for the murder of
Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass in the morning
hours of September 13, 2014.
7.
While the Pennsylvania State Police were understandably emotional
and angry with the unspeakable ambush of their fellow troopers, they unfortunately
ignored, trampled and violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during their zealous
and emotionally driven pursuit of the actual person responsible for same.
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II.
PARTIES
8.
Plaintiff Jeffrey Hudak (“Plaintiff”) is a competent adult individual
residing at 2662 Ransom Road, Clarks Summit, PA 18411.
9.
Defendant Benjamin Clark (“Clark”) is a competent adult individual
who, at all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State
Police. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Clark acted under color of state
law, in his individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant
Clark personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.
10.
Defendant Kyle Hnat (“Hnat”) is a competent adult individual who, at
all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police.
At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hnat acted under color of state law, in his
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant
Hnat personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.
11.
Defendant John Doe #1 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in his
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individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
12.
Defendant John Doe #2 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in his
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
13.
Defendant Jane Doe #1 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in her
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
14.
Defendant Jane Doe #2 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
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all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in her
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
15.
Defendants Clark, Hnat, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Jane Doe #1 and
Jane Doe #2 will be referred to herein collectively as the “Defendants”.
III.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
16.
This Court possesses jurisdiction over the claims set forth herein
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
17.
Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391
because a substantial part of the events and/or omissions giving rise to the claims
set forth herein occurred in this district.
IV.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
18.
As referenced above, Defendants detained and/or interrogated
Plaintiff under circumstances which constitute an arrest on September 13, 2014.
19.
More specifically, in what can only be described as an incredible and
threatening display of law enforcement presence, manpower and authority, the
roadways outside Plaintiff’s mother’s home were blocked, surrounded and/or
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littered with multiple marked and unmarked law enforcement cars and sport utility
vehicles.
20.
The home was also surrounded by a multitude of heavily armed law
enforcement officers, some or all of whom possessed SWAT type weapons and/or
were dressed in SWAT type gear.
21.
After appearing at the side door of his mother’s private residence in
response to the doorbell, Plaintiff was stunned when two (2) Pennsylvania State
Police Troopers (one female and one male) confronted and accosted Plaintiff at
gunpoint with the use of what appeared to be a semi-automatic assault rifle. Those
troopers are referenced herein as John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #1.
22.
While held at gunpoint in a threatening fashion, the troopers directed
Plaintiff to come out of the house with his hands up, and then immediately placed
Plaintiff in handcuffs with his hands behind his back.
23.
Without providing Plaintiff with any reason or justification for their
actions, the troopers then quickly escorted and placed Plaintiff in the back seat of a
State Police cruiser, at which time Plaintiff was transported in a parade of law
enforcement vehicles to the Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Dunmore, PA.
24.
During transport, Plaintiff remained handcuffed in the back seat while
at all times supervised by another fully armed and currently unidentified female
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trooper who sat directly beside Plaintiff. That female trooper is identified herein as
Jane Doe #2, and the driver of the vehicle is identified herein as John Doe #2.
25.
Upon arrival at the Dunmore Barracks, the troopers physically
removed Plaintiff from the back seat of the car, and held on to his handcuffed arms
while they walked him into the barracks.
26.
At that time, it is believed and therefore averred that various members
of the media were tipped-off to Plaintiff’s arrival at the Dunmore Barracks as
various news media outlets were parked outside the barracks.
27.
In fact, Plaintiff and his family would also learn that the Pennsylvania
State Police released Plaintiff’s identity and disseminated his photograph to the
media and general public prior to his unlawful arrest and interrogation.
28.
Once inside in the barracks, the troopers brought Plaintiff back into a
locked interrogation room, where he was met by Defendants Clark and Hnat.
29.
Prior to his arrival at the barracks, Plaintiff still had absolutely no idea
why he was forcefully taken into custody by the State Police.
30.
However, based on the nature and tone of the questioning by
Defendants Clark and Hnat, and to his utter shock and surprise, it soon became
apparent to Plaintiff that he was being directly accused of the murder of Trooper
Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass.
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31.
While locked in the interrogation room inside the barracks, Plaintiff
underwent hours of intense questioning and unsubstantiated accusations by
Defendants Clark and Hnat, and his requests for an attorney, to use the restroom
and/or to make a phone call were ignored and/or denied.
32.
Although the troopers finally allowed Plaintiff to use the restroom and
to call his sister, they only did so after they compelled Plaintiff to provide them
with a DNA sample and undergo gunpowder residue testing.
33.
Moreover, Plaintiff was not allowed to use the restroom without being
detained and accompanied by one of the troopers, who stood directly beside
Plaintiff the entire time, and even refused to allow Plaintiff to wash his hands.
34.
And while Plaintiff was eventually allowed to call his sister, he was
not allowed to do so in private but, again, only while still detained in the presence
and under the supervision of the troopers.
35.
To make matters worse, Plaintiff would learn from his sister that, after
being taken away by the state police, she immediately contacted and arranged for
an attorney, Bernard J. Brown, Esquire, to represent and protect Plaintiff’s interests
in this matter.
36.
In fact, Plaintiff learned from his sister that Attorney Brown was on
site at the Dunmore Barracks for several hours waiting to see and counsel Plaintiff.
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37.
To that end, when he first arrived at the barracks, Attorney Brown
went to the front desk, presented his business card, and alerted those present to his
representation of, and demand to see, Plaintiff.
38.
Not only did the troopers deny Attorney Brown access to Plaintiff, but
they also intentionally failed and/or refused to even notify Plaintiff of Attorney
Brown’s presence.
39.
Instead, Defendant Clark and Hnat continued with their intense,
lengthy, unjustified and/or unlawful seizure and/or interrogation of Plaintiff, where
they continued to falsely accuse Plaintiff of the unspeakable murder of Trooper
Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass. They also continued to
deny Plaintiff’s requests for a lawyer.
40.
Due to his ongoing concern for Plaintiff’s rights and the troopers’
intentional refusal to even notify Plaintiff of his presence, Attorney Brown had
separate counsel, Robert M. Buttner, Esquire, prepare and fax a letter to the Pike
County District Attorney, Raymond Tonkin, Esquire.
41.
In that letter, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit “A”, Attorney Butner alerted the
District Attorney to the troopers’ failure and/or refusal to allow Attorney Brown
access to Plaintiff, as well as their failure and/or refusal to even alert Plaintiff to
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Attorney Brown’s presence in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under both the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
42.
Accordingly, Attorney Butner further requested that the District
Attorney contact said troopers and immediately advise them to alert Plaintiff to
Attorney Brown’s presence. (See Exhibit “A”).
43.
It was only late that afternoon after the District Attorney finally
intervened at the insistence of Plaintiff’s counsel that Defendants Clark and Hnat
finally discontinued their relentless, unjustified and/or unlawful seizure and/or
interrogation of Plaintiff.
44.
At no point prior thereto was Plaintiff told or given any indication that
he was free to leave, or that he could refuse any of law enforcement’s demands or
instructions or otherwise terminate the encounter and/or interrogation.
45.
Plaintiff was at all times accosted by Defendants who, by a show of
significant force and authority, restrained his freedom to walk away.
46.
Indeed, in light of the aforesaid circumstances, no reasonable person
would believe that he was free to leave. On the contrary, Plaintiff would have been
physically restrained if he had refused to accompany Defendants or try to escape
their custody.
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47.
Notably, various members of the Pennsylvania State Police continued
to follow Plaintiff everywhere for a period of days after his unlawful arrest and/or
interrogation.
COUNT I
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unlawful Seizure/Wrongful Arrest/False Imprisonment
Plaintiff v. Defendants
48.
The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated herein
by reference as though fully set forth.
49.
In view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident set forth
more fully above, the actions of Defendants on September 13, 2014 constitute a
seizure and arrest of Plaintiff within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
50.
To that end, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a law enforcement
officer from arresting a person unless there is probable cause to do so.
51.
Significantly, probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion that
the person committed the crimes he or she is accused of.
52.
Here, Defendants had absolutely no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff
for the murder of Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper
Douglass on September 13, 2014.
53.
Nevertheless, Defendants initiated Plaintiff’s arrest without probable
cause in that the facts and circumstances available to the Defendants at that time
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were clearly insufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that
Plaintiff committed the serious and highly stigmatizing criminal acts of murder
and/or attempted murder of two (2) Pennsylvania State Troopers for which he was
being wrongfully accused.
54.
In fact, the Defendants knew there was no probable cause to detain
and arrest Plaintiff under the facts and circumstances available to them at the time.
If they did, Defendants would have prepared an affidavit of probable cause and
secured an arrest warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate judge following
the proper process and procedure.
55.
Defendants took this unlawful action against Plaintiff based solely on,
at best, the mere suspicion that Plaintiff must have committed these brutal acts
because Plaintiff’s wife, who was separated from Plaintiff for approximately a year
and a half, was in an alleged relationship with Trooper Douglass. This wholly
conclusory accusation, gross innuendo and/or rank speculation -- bereft of any
supporting fact, evidence and/or detail whatsoever -- does not, and cannot, form
the basis for probable cause for Defendants’ actions.
56.
Plaintiff’s constitutional right not to be detained and arrested without
probable cause as aforesaid was clearly established and known by Defendants at all
times relevant to the conduct giving rise this action and, therefore, Defendants are
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not entitled to qualified immunity. Clearly, an arrest without probable cause is,
and has been, a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
57.
Moreover, Defendants’ unlawful detainment and arrest of Plaintiff as
aforesaid was willful, wanton, malicious and taken with a reckless or callous
disregard for Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.
58.
At all times relevant to conduct complained of herein, the Defendants
acted in their individual capacities and under color of state law. Moreover, each of
the Defendants personally directed, participated, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in said conduct.
59.
As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conduct as
aforesaid, Plaintiff has suffered an unlawful seizure and restraint of his liberty in
violation of his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as severe
emotional distress, mental anguish, inconvenience, personal humiliation,
embarrassment and/or damage to his name and reputation.
60.
The facts and circumstances surrounding Defendants’ encounter with
and arrest of Plaintiff were highly and widely publicized by the national and
international print and/or news media. To make matters worse, Plaintiff’s name
and photograph quickly appeared on social media, in multiple newspaper articles
and/or televised news broadcasts for the whole world to see.
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61.
Due to the widespread release of his name and photograph, Plaintiff
and/or his family received multiple phone calls/messages inquiring of the
unfolding situation and Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in the murder of Trooper
Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass.
62.
Moreover, when conducting a Google search using Plaintiff’s name
and other relevant search criteria, the story surrounding the false accusations
against Plaintiff in connection with the murder of Trooper Dickson and the
attempted murder of Trooper Douglass still appear.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment in this action in his favor and
against Defendants, jointly and/or severally, together with compensatory and
punitive damages, interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees and such other and further
relief to which this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
WRIGHT & REIHNER, P.C.
By: /s/ George A. Reihner
George A. Reihner
148 Adams Avenue
Scranton, PA 18503
(570) 961-1166
(570) 961-1199 – fax
Dated: February 18, 2016
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY HUDAK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BENJAMIN CLARK, KYLE
HNAT, JOHN DOE #1, JOHN
DOE #2, JANE DOE #1 and JANE
DOE #2,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Jeffrey Hudak (“Plaintiff”), by his undersigned counsel, hereby
complains of the above-named defendants, as follows:
I.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1.
This is a civil rights action resulting from circumstances which
constitute an unlawful arrest in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
2.
On or about September 12, 2014, Pennsylvania State Trooper Bryon
Dickson was murdered, and Pennsylvania State Trooper Alex Douglass was
seriously injured, in a highly publicized shooting which took place at the
Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Blooming Grove, PA.
Case 3:16-cv-00288-RDM Document 1 Filed 02/18/16 Page 2 of 14
3.
In the immediate aftermath of the aforesaid attack, it goes without
saying that every member of the Pennsylvania State Police was highly emotional,
understandably angry and strongly motivated to pursue and apprehend the person
or persons responsible for said attack.
4.
Unfortunately for Plaintiff, however, he became an innocent victim
and/or target of the Pennsylvania State Police’s zealous, fast-moving and
emotionally driven pursuit of the aforesaid attacker.
5.
In an incredible and threatening display of law enforcement presence,
manpower and authority, Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, without warrant, at his
mother’s private residence in Scranton, PA on the morning of September 13, 2014,
less than twelve (12) hours after the attack in question.
6.
As set forth more fully below, the Pennsylvania State Police had
absolutely no legal basis for the warrantless arrest of Plaintiff for the murder of
Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass in the morning
hours of September 13, 2014.
7.
While the Pennsylvania State Police were understandably emotional
and angry with the unspeakable ambush of their fellow troopers, they unfortunately
ignored, trampled and violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during their zealous
and emotionally driven pursuit of the actual person responsible for same.
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II.
PARTIES
8.
Plaintiff Jeffrey Hudak (“Plaintiff”) is a competent adult individual
residing at 2662 Ransom Road, Clarks Summit, PA 18411.
9.
Defendant Benjamin Clark (“Clark”) is a competent adult individual
who, at all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State
Police. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Clark acted under color of state
law, in his individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant
Clark personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.
10.
Defendant Kyle Hnat (“Hnat”) is a competent adult individual who, at
all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police.
At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hnat acted under color of state law, in his
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant
Hnat personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.
11.
Defendant John Doe #1 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in his
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individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
12.
Defendant John Doe #2 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in his
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
13.
Defendant Jane Doe #1 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in her
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
14.
Defendant Jane Doe #2 is a competent adult individual who, at all
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
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all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in her
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
15.
Defendants Clark, Hnat, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Jane Doe #1 and
Jane Doe #2 will be referred to herein collectively as the “Defendants”.
III.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
16.
This Court possesses jurisdiction over the claims set forth herein
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
17.
Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391
because a substantial part of the events and/or omissions giving rise to the claims
set forth herein occurred in this district.
IV.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
18.
As referenced above, Defendants detained and/or interrogated
Plaintiff under circumstances which constitute an arrest on September 13, 2014.
19.
More specifically, in what can only be described as an incredible and
threatening display of law enforcement presence, manpower and authority, the
roadways outside Plaintiff’s mother’s home were blocked, surrounded and/or
5
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littered with multiple marked and unmarked law enforcement cars and sport utility
vehicles.
20.
The home was also surrounded by a multitude of heavily armed law
enforcement officers, some or all of whom possessed SWAT type weapons and/or
were dressed in SWAT type gear.
21.
After appearing at the side door of his mother’s private residence in
response to the doorbell, Plaintiff was stunned when two (2) Pennsylvania State
Police Troopers (one female and one male) confronted and accosted Plaintiff at
gunpoint with the use of what appeared to be a semi-automatic assault rifle. Those
troopers are referenced herein as John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #1.
22.
While held at gunpoint in a threatening fashion, the troopers directed
Plaintiff to come out of the house with his hands up, and then immediately placed
Plaintiff in handcuffs with his hands behind his back.
23.
Without providing Plaintiff with any reason or justification for their
actions, the troopers then quickly escorted and placed Plaintiff in the back seat of a
State Police cruiser, at which time Plaintiff was transported in a parade of law
enforcement vehicles to the Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Dunmore, PA.
24.
During transport, Plaintiff remained handcuffed in the back seat while
at all times supervised by another fully armed and currently unidentified female
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trooper who sat directly beside Plaintiff. That female trooper is identified herein as
Jane Doe #2, and the driver of the vehicle is identified herein as John Doe #2.
25.
Upon arrival at the Dunmore Barracks, the troopers physically
removed Plaintiff from the back seat of the car, and held on to his handcuffed arms
while they walked him into the barracks.
26.
At that time, it is believed and therefore averred that various members
of the media were tipped-off to Plaintiff’s arrival at the Dunmore Barracks as
various news media outlets were parked outside the barracks.
27.
In fact, Plaintiff and his family would also learn that the Pennsylvania
State Police released Plaintiff’s identity and disseminated his photograph to the
media and general public prior to his unlawful arrest and interrogation.
28.
Once inside in the barracks, the troopers brought Plaintiff back into a
locked interrogation room, where he was met by Defendants Clark and Hnat.
29.
Prior to his arrival at the barracks, Plaintiff still had absolutely no idea
why he was forcefully taken into custody by the State Police.
30.
However, based on the nature and tone of the questioning by
Defendants Clark and Hnat, and to his utter shock and surprise, it soon became
apparent to Plaintiff that he was being directly accused of the murder of Trooper
Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass.
7
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31.
While locked in the interrogation room inside the barracks, Plaintiff
underwent hours of intense questioning and unsubstantiated accusations by
Defendants Clark and Hnat, and his requests for an attorney, to use the restroom
and/or to make a phone call were ignored and/or denied.
32.
Although the troopers finally allowed Plaintiff to use the restroom and
to call his sister, they only did so after they compelled Plaintiff to provide them
with a DNA sample and undergo gunpowder residue testing.
33.
Moreover, Plaintiff was not allowed to use the restroom without being
detained and accompanied by one of the troopers, who stood directly beside
Plaintiff the entire time, and even refused to allow Plaintiff to wash his hands.
34.
And while Plaintiff was eventually allowed to call his sister, he was
not allowed to do so in private but, again, only while still detained in the presence
and under the supervision of the troopers.
35.
To make matters worse, Plaintiff would learn from his sister that, after
being taken away by the state police, she immediately contacted and arranged for
an attorney, Bernard J. Brown, Esquire, to represent and protect Plaintiff’s interests
in this matter.
36.
In fact, Plaintiff learned from his sister that Attorney Brown was on
site at the Dunmore Barracks for several hours waiting to see and counsel Plaintiff.
8
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37.
To that end, when he first arrived at the barracks, Attorney Brown
went to the front desk, presented his business card, and alerted those present to his
representation of, and demand to see, Plaintiff.
38.
Not only did the troopers deny Attorney Brown access to Plaintiff, but
they also intentionally failed and/or refused to even notify Plaintiff of Attorney
Brown’s presence.
39.
Instead, Defendant Clark and Hnat continued with their intense,
lengthy, unjustified and/or unlawful seizure and/or interrogation of Plaintiff, where
they continued to falsely accuse Plaintiff of the unspeakable murder of Trooper
Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass. They also continued to
deny Plaintiff’s requests for a lawyer.
40.
Due to his ongoing concern for Plaintiff’s rights and the troopers’
intentional refusal to even notify Plaintiff of his presence, Attorney Brown had
separate counsel, Robert M. Buttner, Esquire, prepare and fax a letter to the Pike
County District Attorney, Raymond Tonkin, Esquire.
41.
In that letter, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit “A”, Attorney Butner alerted the
District Attorney to the troopers’ failure and/or refusal to allow Attorney Brown
access to Plaintiff, as well as their failure and/or refusal to even alert Plaintiff to
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Attorney Brown’s presence in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under both the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
42.
Accordingly, Attorney Butner further requested that the District
Attorney contact said troopers and immediately advise them to alert Plaintiff to
Attorney Brown’s presence. (See Exhibit “A”).
43.
It was only late that afternoon after the District Attorney finally
intervened at the insistence of Plaintiff’s counsel that Defendants Clark and Hnat
finally discontinued their relentless, unjustified and/or unlawful seizure and/or
interrogation of Plaintiff.
44.
At no point prior thereto was Plaintiff told or given any indication that
he was free to leave, or that he could refuse any of law enforcement’s demands or
instructions or otherwise terminate the encounter and/or interrogation.
45.
Plaintiff was at all times accosted by Defendants who, by a show of
significant force and authority, restrained his freedom to walk away.
46.
Indeed, in light of the aforesaid circumstances, no reasonable person
would believe that he was free to leave. On the contrary, Plaintiff would have been
physically restrained if he had refused to accompany Defendants or try to escape
their custody.
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47.
Notably, various members of the Pennsylvania State Police continued
to follow Plaintiff everywhere for a period of days after his unlawful arrest and/or
interrogation.
COUNT I
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Unlawful Seizure/Wrongful Arrest/False Imprisonment
Plaintiff v. Defendants
48.
The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated herein
by reference as though fully set forth.
49.
In view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident set forth
more fully above, the actions of Defendants on September 13, 2014 constitute a
seizure and arrest of Plaintiff within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
50.
To that end, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a law enforcement
officer from arresting a person unless there is probable cause to do so.
51.
Significantly, probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion that
the person committed the crimes he or she is accused of.
52.
Here, Defendants had absolutely no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff
for the murder of Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper
Douglass on September 13, 2014.
53.
Nevertheless, Defendants initiated Plaintiff’s arrest without probable
cause in that the facts and circumstances available to the Defendants at that time
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were clearly insufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that
Plaintiff committed the serious and highly stigmatizing criminal acts of murder
and/or attempted murder of two (2) Pennsylvania State Troopers for which he was
being wrongfully accused.
54.
In fact, the Defendants knew there was no probable cause to detain
and arrest Plaintiff under the facts and circumstances available to them at the time.
If they did, Defendants would have prepared an affidavit of probable cause and
secured an arrest warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate judge following
the proper process and procedure.
55.
Defendants took this unlawful action against Plaintiff based solely on,
at best, the mere suspicion that Plaintiff must have committed these brutal acts
because Plaintiff’s wife, who was separated from Plaintiff for approximately a year
and a half, was in an alleged relationship with Trooper Douglass. This wholly
conclusory accusation, gross innuendo and/or rank speculation -- bereft of any
supporting fact, evidence and/or detail whatsoever -- does not, and cannot, form
the basis for probable cause for Defendants’ actions.
56.
Plaintiff’s constitutional right not to be detained and arrested without
probable cause as aforesaid was clearly established and known by Defendants at all
times relevant to the conduct giving rise this action and, therefore, Defendants are
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not entitled to qualified immunity. Clearly, an arrest without probable cause is,
and has been, a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
57.
Moreover, Defendants’ unlawful detainment and arrest of Plaintiff as
aforesaid was willful, wanton, malicious and taken with a reckless or callous
disregard for Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.
58.
At all times relevant to conduct complained of herein, the Defendants
acted in their individual capacities and under color of state law. Moreover, each of
the Defendants personally directed, participated, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in said conduct.
59.
As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conduct as
aforesaid, Plaintiff has suffered an unlawful seizure and restraint of his liberty in
violation of his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as severe
emotional distress, mental anguish, inconvenience, personal humiliation,
embarrassment and/or damage to his name and reputation.
60.
The facts and circumstances surrounding Defendants’ encounter with
and arrest of Plaintiff were highly and widely publicized by the national and
international print and/or news media. To make matters worse, Plaintiff’s name
and photograph quickly appeared on social media, in multiple newspaper articles
and/or televised news broadcasts for the whole world to see.
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61.
Due to the widespread release of his name and photograph, Plaintiff
and/or his family received multiple phone calls/messages inquiring of the
unfolding situation and Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in the murder of Trooper
Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass.
62.
Moreover, when conducting a Google search using Plaintiff’s name
and other relevant search criteria, the story surrounding the false accusations
against Plaintiff in connection with the murder of Trooper Dickson and the
attempted murder of Trooper Douglass still appear.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment in this action in his favor and
against Defendants, jointly and/or severally, together with compensatory and
punitive damages, interest, costs of suit, attorneys’ fees and such other and further
relief to which this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
WRIGHT & REIHNER, P.C.
By: /s/ George A. Reihner
George A. Reihner
148 Adams Avenue
Scranton, PA 18503
(570) 961-1166
(570) 961-1199 – fax
Dated: February 18, 2016
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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