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Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 47, No. 5, 807–824, September 2011

Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept of Governance (wilayat al-faqih) and the Classical Shi‘i Doctrine of Imamate
HAMID MAVANI

The serious misgivings and apprehensions that Ayatullah Khomeini’s doctrine of al-wilaya al-mutlaqa (the jurisconsult’s [wali-ye faqih] all-encompassing and absolute authority) could regress into arbitrary religious and clerical despotism (istibdad) became a reality right after Iran’s June 2009 presidential election. Ayatullahs Mahmud Taliqani (d. 1979) and Muhammad Kazem Shariatmadari (d. 1986) astutely foresaw this possibility in 1979, during the revolution’s early phase, and expressed their alarm at the clergy’s excessive involvement in political affairs. Even worse, they stated, the clergy viewed their new role as an entitlement that required no accountability. Thus many of them compromised Islam’s integrity in the pursuit of more power, which led to the development of a culture of clerical elitism. In response, the two ayatullahs called for the ‘clergy to return to the mosques’.1 In Ayatullah Khomeini’s formulation, the jurisconsult (the supreme leader) derives his legitimacy exclusively from God, as opposed to the people, which ruptures the relationship between society and the clergy and, moreover, places his claims beyond contestation or deliberation. Ayatullahs Husayn ‘Ali Montazeri (d. 2010),2 Yusef Saanei, Mohsen Kadivar, Bayat Zanjani, Kazemeyni Boroujerdi, Mojtaba Shabestari, and Mehdi Karrubi have pointed out the disparity and tension between this model and the one adopted by the first Shi‘i Imam, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (d. 661), who based his political mandate on divine bestowal (nass) and also anchored it in public investiture that validated his caliphate through a public oath of allegiance (bay‘a). By citing this historical model, they seek to restore public sovereignty and place checks and balances on the jurisconsult’s power and authority as he is viewed as accountable and answerable to the public. Ayatullah Khomeini first promulgated this concept during his 1970 series of Najaf (Iraq) lectures.3 Relying upon both rational and traditional proofs, he supported his case that during the messianic infallible Imam’s4 prolonged occultation, the jurisconsult, by virtue of being his indirect deputy, has both the mandate and the responsibility not only to interpret Islamic rulings on matters of devotion and personal affairs, but also in the social realm, and to manage the state’s affairs on behalf of the Imam. In other words, the jurisconsult’s authority is an extension of that enjoyed by the infallible Imams. This understanding reveals the intimate and
ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/11/050807-18 ª 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2011.613208

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organic relationship between the Imamate and wilayat al-faqih. Ayatullah Khomeini revolutionized the former, such that it came to be viewed as uninterrupted and continuous (mustamarr), with the right to rule assigned to jurists during the occultation. He asserted that the awaited Imam’s primary function upon his reappearance will be to defend and safeguard the Islamic state and to attain martyrdom in pursuit of this noble cause. In his lectures, he advocated an Islamic state led by a qualified jurisconsult who would ensure that Islamic rulings are adhered to and implemented within the broad outlines and general principles of the Shari‘a. Thus, his scope of authority was at least circumscribed by the human interpretation of the nebulous concept of Shari‘a, a fact reflected in his establishing a planning council (majlis-i takhtit) rather than a legislative body. Toward the end of his life, however, he realized that traditional fiqh could not resolve contemporary challenges, ones that had earlier forced the Sunnis to invoke maslaha (public welfare) and darura (imperative necessity). As such, Ayatullah Khomeini attempted to fill this void by formally institutionalizing a suitable mechanism: the Council to Determine the Regime’s Welfare (majma‘-i tashkhis-i maslahat-i nezam).5 Ultimately, he stretched wilayat al-faqih to its farthest limit and expanded the scope of the jurisconsult’s authority even further by proclaiming, in January 1988, that this individual can bypass the Shari‘a if (in his opinion) it conflicts with society’s general welfare and best interests.6 Just what constitutes this ‘general welfare’ and ‘imperative necessity’, as well as how they are measured, remains nebulous and vague. Moreover, the customary checks and balances are conspicuously absent. With this proclamation, Ayatullah Khomeini elevated the state’s preservation to a primary central injunction (al-ahkam al-awwaliyya) and downgraded rituals (e.g., the obligatory prayers and fasting) to secondary injunctions (al-ahkam al-thanawiyya). In his own words: ‘I should state that the government, which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and hajj.’7

Over time, Ayatullah Khomeini’s concept of wilayat al-faqih expanded the jurists’ scope and authority. He began by calling upon religious scholars to supervise the monarchy’s legislative and executive branches to ensure that the laws conformed with the Shari‘a. In 1953 he modified this position by adducing proofs and evidence that their scope of authority included governance. This shift, which occurred while he was in Qum and Najaf, can be seen in his Al-Rasa’il, Tahrir al-wasila, and Kitab al-bay‘. Between 1977 and 1980 he reverted to his preference for the jurists to have a supervisory role and placed greater emphasis on an ‘Islamic Republic’. While in Paris in 1978, he explicitly stated that rather than seeking or accepting any official government position, he would confine himself to the supervisory role of a guide in order to pursue the society’s best interest. Moreover, he would interject himself into situations only when he saw treachery and deceit that would harm the public welfare.8 Yet this stance is hardly credible, given his vociferous support for wilayat al-faqih while in Najaf: ‘It is our duty to preserve Islam. This duty is one of the most important obligations incumbent upon us; it is more necessary even than prayer and fasting.’9

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The fourth and final phase began in early 1988 and lasted until his death in June 1989. During this period, he called for a full-fledged and comprehensive authority that would give the jurisconsult the prerogative to override Islam’s primary injunctions and suspend or void acts of worship or articles of the constitution if he deemed such actions to be in the interest of the people and the state. His remarks during a 1978 interview in Paris, shortly before his return to Iran, should not be taken at face value, for they contain no details of his government’s structure or of his future role and that of the religious scholars.10 It is no secret that he subscribed to the jurisconsult’s comprehensive authority, as he explicitly pointed this out in his 1970 Najaf lectures on Islamic government. Thus, his later remarks in Paris may have been issued to placate and appease those worried about the clergy’s role in the new government. To counter this misgiving, he added that he did not want the clergy to involve themselves in politics because their primary function, that of guiding the country, was a far nobler and more praiseworthy one.11 About one year after his return, Hamid Algar asked him during an interview about the religious scholars’ role in the new political structure. He replied: The religious scholars do not wish to become Prime Minister or President, and indeed it is not in their interest to do so. They do, however, have a role to play . . . the role they have is one of supervision, not of assuming executive positions without the proper expertise . . . the expertise of the religious scholars lies in the area of Islamic law.12 After his return, however, he claimed that he could find very few non-clerical people capable of governing the country in a way that would preserve Iran’s sovereignty and integrity. Therefore, he decided to temporarily (muwaqqat) allow the clergy to enter the political arena, asserting that they would abandon it and confine their role to supervision and guidance as soon as capable, righteous, and trustworthy non-clerical individuals emerged who could administer the country in the manner that God desires.13 These ambiguous and conflicting statements ought to be measured against his 1970 Najaf lectures on Islamic government, in which he categorically subscribed to the jurisconsult’s comprehensive authority with executive powers to implement the laws of Islam instead of being confined to a limited supervisory role. Many of the government’s critics have challenged it to hold a referendum to measure public support for wilayat al-faqih on the grounds that the earlier generation has no right to impose its will on the present generation when it comes to choosing the model of governance. Ayatullah Khomeini used this very argument in his inaugural speech at the Behesht-i Zahra cemetery upon his return to Iran in 1979: ‘what right do our fathers have to make decisions for us?’ The overwhelming majority of today’s Iranians never had an opportunity to vote for the 1979 constitution and, as such, a referendum is needed. In the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election, Ayatullah Karrubi and Hojjatoleslam ‘Abdallah Nouri called upon the government to set aside its repressive and brutal measures to quell the protest movement, which it claimed had only nominal support, and instead appoint one day for pro-government citizens and another day for anti-government citizens to come out on the streets so that, in the absence of any show of force or intimidation, the public can make its opinion known.14 As expected, the government

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contemptuously rejected this call and construed it as a foreign plot to divide and fragment the united Iranian community, which is unstintingly loyal to the concept of wilayat al-faqih and the current jurisconsult, Ayatullah Khamena’i. The deep divisions within the revolution’s senior and founding members, who are locked in a power struggle, along with President Ahmedinejad and Ayatullah Khamena’i’s recent ruptured relationship over the forced resignation of Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi, not to mention the country’s ongoing social and economic malaise, do not bode well for the present model of government.15

In general, Shi‘i ulama believe that certain aspects of the messianic Imam’s wilaya have been bestowed upon them since they function as his general deputies (nowwabi‘amm) during his occultation on the basis of traditional and rational proofs.16 They disagree, however, over the scope and nature of this authority. The jurists’ arrogation of certain functions, such as issuing legal opinions, adjudicating disagreements under the rubric of qada’ (judgeship) in matters of hisbiyya,17 and assuming trusteeship for those who need a guardian, are not in dispute. Even those jurists who dismiss al-wilaya al-mutlaqa as lacking in evidence and outlandish admit that the ulama are entrusted with some of his duties during his absence. Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), the most eminent Shi‘i jurist of the nineteenth century, and considered the ‘seal of the mujtahids’, delineated three functions advanced by jurists as having been invested in them during the occultation: (1) Issuing legal opinions and adjudicating religious issues for the laity’s benefit. There is consensus upon this view; (2) Administering justice based on extrapolations from hadiths such as the maqbula (accepted tradition) of ‘Umar b. Hanzala and mashhura (well-known tradition) of Abu Khadija. There is also consensus upon this view; (3) A jurist’s discretionary authority (wilayat al-tasarruf), which includes the political domain. It is here that the jurists have not reached a consensus.18 The Usulis’ triumph over the Akhbaris as regards the use of independent judgement (ijtihad), as well as the methodological advances made by the former, enabled Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829) to systematically explore the nature and scope of authority vested in the jurisconsult during this period.19 Up until then, this issue has been dealt with sporadically in different chapters of jurisprudence, such as qada’, khums, and jihad. Employing rational arguments, he advanced religious ordinances and traditions in favour of the jurisconsult’s expansive wilaya (but only at the theoretical level) to validate the ulama’s discretionary authority (which was to remain within the confines of normative law [the Shari‘a]) in a form of juristic speculation; however, these were not to be implemented. This is evident from the fact that he never tried to actualize or implement his theory. Moreover, he provided legal tools to legitimate the rule of a government headed by a non-jurisconsult and formally acknowledged and sanctioned the ruler of his time, Fath ‘Ali Shah.20 Among Ayatullah Khomeini’s contemporaries, the most eminent and revered jurist was Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i (d. 1992) of Najaf, the marja‘ al-taqlid (point of reference) for the majority of the world’s Shi‘is. After having examined all of the proofs and evidence normally advanced in favour of general wilaya (the jurisconsult’s authority over the people on general issues), he proclaimed that none of them, either individually or collectively, convincingly proved that it extends

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beyond the narrow sphere of hisbiyya. While the jurist does have a limited right of disposal and administration (tasarruf) on the basis of necessity and exigency to intervene in the area of hisbiyya, this exigency must be invoked only to preserve the individual welfare. In other words, it cannot be extended to the country’s social or public welfare (masalih ijtima‘). In the absence of a qualified jurisconsult, this obligation is transferred to just Muslims (wilaya ‘udul al-mu’minin): During the occultation [of the Imam] the wilaya of the jurists cannot be established by reference to any proof. The wilaya is exclusive to the Prophet and the Imams. That which is established in favor of the jurists from the hadith reports is in two fields: in adjudication or judgeship (qazawat) and issuing of legal opinions ( fatawa) . . . accordingly, that which is established for the jurist is permission of disposal and administration (tasarruf) but not general wilaya.21 Ayatullah ‘Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, a student of Ayatullah Khu’i and considered to be the most distinguished jurist of our times with a majority following among the Shi‘is, espouses a similar view. In August 2010, however, he added a conditional clause: if a faqih (jurisconsult) wants to possess wilaya in the state’s administration, he must secure the people’s general approval (maqbuliyya ‘amma).22 Some have interpreted this as an objection to Ayatullah Khamena’i’s fatwa, issued around the same time, that accorded to the qualified jurisconsult the same scope of authority as that enjoyed by the Prophet and the Imams. In fact, it viewed the jurisconsult’s wilaya as deriving from that of the Imams. Although this is the view of his mentor Ayatullah Khomeini, the issue of the governing jurisconsult’s degree of power and authority was left in abeyance and accorded a low profile after Ayatullah Khomeini’s death because there was no one of equal charismatic status ‘who had created and established his own personal legitimacy over and above both constitutional and institutional frameworks’.23 When this fatwa was placed on Khamena’i’s official website, the ensuing uproar was so intense that it had to be removed. Other senior government-affiliated jurists have had to enter the fray. For instance, Ayatullah Nasir Makarim Shirazi and Jawadi-ye Amuli have said in the past that everyone, even the mujtahids and maraji‘ al-taqlid must obey the wali-ye faqih’s decrees because this matter does not require rational proofs for its validity (ta‘abbudi).24 Ayatullah Mehdi Karrubi, a candidate in the 2009 presidential election and an opposition Green Movement leader, sarcastically remarked that the amount of discretionary authority bestowed upon this person has expanded to such a degree that it is unlikely that even the Prophet or the Imams had ever enjoyed so much authority. He added that even God would not arbitrarily act in a whimsical and unjust manner, despite the fact that He truly is the Sovereign and the Lord.25

The juridical opinion of Najaf’s Ayatullah Sistani on wilayat al-faqih is diametrically opposed to the views of many pro-government jurists in Iran, especially those of Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, director of the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qum and member of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-i khobregan), which is tasked by the constitution with choosing the

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jurisconsult.26 He is infamous for his fiery and inflammatory speeches, statements, and rhetoric, all of which have created a culture of hate and intolerance. In the post-election debate on whether the public could hold the jurisconsult accountable, he has vociferously championed the model of government proposed by Ayatullah Khomeini, in which the public has no role in validating or holding the jurisconsult accountable. According to him, this person, whom the Assembly of Experts discovers by the grace of God, is to be viewed as the infallible messianic Imam’s deputy. As such, he is presented to the people only for the purpose of information, not to obtain their consent or endorsement. If any infallible Imam sought the public’s endorsement to become caliph, this was done merely to empower him to carry out the reforms with the public’s assistance. In no way can it be interpreted as meaning that the messianic Imam’s post in the socio-political domain depends upon public approval for its validation.27 In addition, Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi declares that the wali-ye faqih obtains his legitimacy from God by virtue of being the messianic Imam’s indirect deputy and, as such, the validity of the presidential election depends upon his approval and endorsement. He further asserts that obeying the president is equivalent to obeying God, because once the wali-ye faqih accepts the president, the latter receives the legitimacy and benefits from the light of the former’s sacred authority. Accordingly, it then becomes religiously mandatory upon everyone to obey the president.28 In May 2010 he asserted that one way of deducing the messianic Imam’s consent and pleasure is to seek out the jurisconsult’s (currently Ayatullah Khamena’i) opinion, suggesting that the latter is almost infallible and that his actions have been approved by the messianic Imam.29 The recent dispute between President Ahmedinejad and Ayatullah Khamena’i over the reinstatement of the intelligence minister represents the first instance of a government official publicly challenging the wali-ye faqih’s decree. This has prompted zealous supporters of Ayatullah Khamena’i, such as Ayatullah Kazem Seddighi, to assert that unquestioning obedience of the wali-ye faqih is demanded because he has been vested with the all-encompassing divine mandate. For example, he would be within his rights to divorce a married couple without their consent. According to Ayatullah Seddighi, if the wali-ye faqih were to do this in the case of Ahmedinejad and his wife, their marriage would be over.30 Such claims represent a radical break with traditional Shi‘i understanding of Imamate and the jurists’ indirect deputyship. Ayatullah ‘Ali Sa‘idi, Ayatullah Khamena’i’s representative among the Sepah forces, made an even more bizarre and audacious claim: he warned the soldiers about the harmful consequences that would befall them if they failed to heed Ayatullah Khamena’i’s admonition, advised them not to entangle themselves with any political group or party, and told them to accept and follow the plan based upon the jurisconsult’s strategy and directive. Moreover, they should not be concerned about the views of others, because the jurisconsult’s edict is equivalent to that of the messianic Imam himself (hukm-i o hukm-i Imam-i zaman ast).31 In August 2010, Ayatullah Sa‘idi outlined the many internal and external challenges facing Iran and stated that it is passing through a critical phase. It is at times difficult, in his opinion, for the general public to distinguish truth from falsehood, because advocates of every group claim to be following the Qur’an.

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In such a situation, the Qur’an cannot be made the criterion for distinguishing one group from another because it is subject to different interpretations and exegesis, as mentioned by Imam ‘Ali: ‘The Qur’an is a book, covered, between two flaps, and it does not speak. It should therefore necessarily have an interpreter. Human beings alone can be such interpreters.’32 The only available option is to view the jurisconsult as the standard for discovering the truth and reality, because in every age God sends a hujja (proof) to provide certainty. The reference here is, of course, to Ayatullah Khamena’i. This is a daring appropriation from Shi‘i tradition, in which the Prophet and the infallible Imams are exclusively referred to as the proofs (hujaj, pl. of hujja) of God on Earth. He continues that just as in the past, when some people who had initially supported Imam ‘Ali and his right to the caliphate after the Prophet’s death eventually abandoned him and acted treacherously, such individuals exist today. In particular he mentioned Abu Dharr Ghiffari and Ammar Yasir on one side and Talha and Zubayr on the other, thereby suggesting that those who oppose the leader can be liquidated, just as Imam ‘Ali had to fight his enemies and kill some of those who were Muslim and his former allies.33 Ayatullah Khamena’i also made this latter point in one of his June 2010 Friday sermons in Tehran. While commemorating the anniversary of Ayatullah Khomeini’s death, he mentioned that Imam ‘Ali had fought with resoluteness and determination and, likewise, that Ayatullah Khomeini had shown no leniency to those who had betrayed the revolution. In fact, he had them executed although they had been quite close to him and had accompanied him on the plane to Tehran in February 1979.34 The post-election crisis and Ayatullah Khamena’i’s inability to contain it,35 along with his unequivocal preference for Ahmedinejad,36 both of which destroyed any appearance of impartiality and instead encouraged factional politics, has given fresh momentum to a critical interrogation of the merit and validity of Ayatullah Khomeini’s interpretation of wilayat al-faqih.37 The hazard of such blind imitation and emulation (taqlid) was brought to the fore in November 2002 by Dr. Hashim Aghajari, an Iranian professor of history, during one of his lectures in Hamadan (Iran), entitled ‘From Monkey to Man: A Call to Islamic Protestantism’: ‘The people are not monkeys who merely imitate. They understand and react, and they try to expand their own understanding, so someday they will not need the teacher.’38 His comments, viewed by the Islamic revolutionary court as pejorative and denigrating to the jurists’ honour and dignity, earned him a death sentence. Among jurists, the pre-eminent role of critically analysing Ayatullah Khomeini’s concept of governance has been undertaken by Ayatullah Montazeri,39 his one-time ´ ´ designated heir and protege (he was removed in 1989), who attempts to reconceptualize it by adding democratic principles. The end result is something called the ‘electoral and limited guardianship of the jurist’ (velayat-i entekhabi-ye muqayyadeh-ye faqih).40 He has met with questionable success, however, because even in this revised form the jurist’s mandate could easily approach authoritarianism. Before this radical shift from full-fledged authority of the jurisconsult which undermined popular sovereignty, to his supervisory role in politics,41 he had written a four-volume Arabic-language work to justify the legitimacy and validity of

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Ayatullah Khomeini’s concept by citing Qur’anic verses and hadiths, as well as by using reason (‘aql); however, his interpretation was quite anomalous within Shi‘i scholarship.42 In this work, he advocated concentrating authority in the jurisconsult, who would be chosen not by the people but rather selected on account of his proficiency and expertise in temporal and religious matters. At the same time he began to express his own views forcefully, views that were diametrically opposed to Ayatullah Khomeini’s, on matters dealing with the state administration and the treatment of political prisoners. As a result, Ayatullah Khomeini removed him from the post of succession about two months before he died. When Ayatullah Montazeri became even more vocal, his seminary classes were cancelled, his assets (part of the religious dues sent to him by his followers) were frozen, and his movements were curtailed. He had argued in the past that the people who had written the constitution had never intended to endow the jurisconsult with absolute power and thus render him immune from criticism: He can never be above the law and he cannot interfere in all the affairs, particularly the affairs that fall outside his area of expertise, such as complex economic issues, or issues of foreign policy and international relations. The most important point to be highlighted is that Islam is for the separation of powers and does not recognize the concentration of power in the hand of a fallible human being.43 He also scathingly rebuked Ayatullah Khamena’i in 1997, after the reformist leader Ayatullah Muhammad Khatami’s landslide presidential victory, for trying to monopolize power and interfering in the people’s political, economic, social, and religious life. According to Ayatullah Montazeri, the wali-ye faqih is entitled to oversee and supervise the state’s activities, but cannot meddle in each and every aspect of it because he lacks the necessary expertise to do so. In addition, he reminded Ayatullah Khamena’i of his junior rank in the clerical leadership and his lack of scholarly credentials, prestige, and charisma in comparison with the late Ayatullah Khomeini: ‘Whatever your supporters may claim, you give no evidence of filling the scholarly position of Imam [Khumayni], may God have mercy upon him.’44 Recently, he expressed sorrow and apologized for having supported the absolutist form of this particular concept. He exhibited similar contrition in a 2001 interview with Geneive Abdo, in which he said that ‘no one can claim to have access to the absolute truth, and that everyone should always strive to correct one’s positions and views in the direction of the superior truth’.45 In his September 2009 message, which he circulated among the senior jurists, he went so far as to say that he viewed himself as partially complicit in the state-inflicted loss of life and injuries after the presidential election, the underpinnings and foundation of which are supported by his earlier writings. The present state has degenerated into a military guardianship (wilayat-i nizami) and can no longer claim to be based on the concept of wilayat-i faqih.46 Towards the end of his life, he strove to make a case that popular participation and endorsement are integral to legitimizing the jurisconsult’s mandate. One of his primary arguments is that even Imam ‘Ali, traditionally viewed by the Shi‘is as having been explicitly designated by God as the Prophet’s successor, adopted this

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mode of securing popular investiture.47 A similar line of argument has recently been advanced by one of Qum’s senior ayatullahs, Behjat Zanjani, who asserts that the best paradigm on governance can be gleaned from the years of ‘Ali’s caliphate (656–61) because his son Hasan, the only other Imam who became caliph, only ruled for a few months. He also proposed that the epistle that ‘Ali prepared for Malik al-Ashtar before appointing him the governor of Egypt be highlighted to demonstrate the equality of all human beings and the people’s right to dissent and hold the ruler accountable.48 In his estimation, freedom occupies the supreme position in the hierarchy of rights, and voiding it would be equivalent to robbing the people of their religion and the essence of what makes them human. People have been granted the designation of ‘God’s vicegerent’ (khalifa) because they are free agents possessing autonomy and intellect. He cautions that an inequitable religious system of governance would cause far more harm than a secular one because the former would motivate people to become irreligious and develop a distaste and revulsion toward religion.49 Ayatullah Khomeini, who sought legitimacy on the ground that the jurists were the messianic Imam’s general deputies (nowwab-i ‘amm), did not regard public allegiance as necessary for their legitimacy. At the same time, advocates of an authoritative, theocratic government have insisted, somewhat paradoxically, that an Islamic state is compatible with democratic principles and underpinnings.50 The resulting tension and, at times, contradictions finally erupted after the controversial result of the 2009 presidential election. This widespread discontent has gradually transformed itself into a movement that seeks to dismantle the wilayat al-faqih itself. According to Ayatullah Kadivar, ‘reconciliation between democracy and government based on velayat-e faqih is impossible’.51 Instead, he proposes a ‘divine-democratic sovereignty’ (mashru‘iyyat-i ilahi-ye mardom) system of governance.52 Ayatullah Salehi Najafabai (d. 2006) broached the notions of public participation, social contract theory (‘aqd wa qarardad-i ijtima‘i), and pledged allegiance to the jurisconsult in 1984 in his Wilayat-i faqih: hukumat-i salihan.53 Scholars like him, along with Ayatullah Montazeri, have attempted to investigate and explicate how the infallible divine guides were chosen – divine decree, public investiture, or both – to make a case that even ‘Ali sought public allegiance and that his actions were circumscribed by divine law.54 This clearly conflicts with the current official process for selecting the jurisconsult whose authority is considered so great that he can even override the divine law. In other words, Ayatullah Montazeri is attempting to bring the elements of popular sovereignty and national identity into the election process of the wali-ye faqih.55 Ayatullah Kadivar provides an elaborate, penetrating, and systematic critique of wilayat al-faqih in his many works and speeches. He was at the forefront of challenging the absolute authority of the jurisconsult and the system of governance at a time when these tenets were treated as sacrosanct and beyond reproach. His February 1999 article ‘The Basic Problem of Iran is Wilayat-i Faqih’, written during President Khatami’s term in office, landed him in jail for 18 months on the charges of ‘propagating slander and lies against the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran’ and ‘publishing untruths and disturbing public minds’.56 His major works include Nazariyyeh-ha-ye dawlat dar fiqh-i Shi‘a,57 Hukumat-e Velayi,58 and Haqq

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al-nas: Islam wa huquq-i bashar.59 A reform-oriented religious intellectual who was active during the Iranian revolution, he has received both academic and theological training from the University of Tehran and the seminaries in Qum, respectively. Quickly becoming a stellar student in Qum, he obtained his certificate in ijtihad from Ayatullah Montazeri in the early 1990s. He has been a vocal critic of the government’s brutal post-election crackdown. At the time, he was serving as a guest lecturer at the University of Virginia and thus took advantage of the freedom he has to speak out against his country’s system of governance.60 At present, he is a lecturer at Duke University and would be ill-advised to return home.

Substantial evidence can be found in the Nahj al-balagha, a compilation of sermons, letters, and proverbs attributed to ‘Ali, as well as other works recording his statements, which suggest that he regarded public endorsement and the pledge of allegiance (bay‘a) as integral parts of legitimizing his caliphate. This mode of endorsement, a common practice among the tribal Arabs of his time, was expressed in several pledges of allegiance offered to the Prophet, such as the first and second pledges of ‘Aqaba61 along with the pledge to fight (jihad) alongside him.62 The following instances can be advanced to make a case for public investiture: 1. An early eighteenth-century work composed by Sulaym b. Qays relates a report that shortly after ‘Uthman’s murder, ‘Ali emphasized the obligatory nature of choosing a caliph and the great urgency of doing so in the aftermath of the previous caliph’s death or assassination: It is a mandatory ruling by God and of Islam upon the Muslims that immediately upon the death or assassination of their leader (imam) – whether guided or led astray; oppressed or oppressor; lawful to shed his blood or unlawful – not to engage in any activity of any sort or begin anything without selecting from among themselves a leader (imam) who is compassionate, knowledgeable, pious, and intimately aware of giving rulings and the sunna.63 2. The Kharijis, his inveterate enemies, initially belonged to ‘Ali’s party but abandoned him after the Battle of Siffin (657). The famous account of this group’s origin states that they felt remorseful and guilty for ending this battle by accepting a truce, the terms of which would be articulated by nominees from both camps. Initially they favoured this approach because Mu‘awiya’s soldiers had raised parchments of the Qur’an on their lances to indicate their deference to it in resolving the dispute. Later on, they regretted their actions because it let people, instead of God, decide the battle’s outcome. They therefore adopted the slogan: ‘No judgment but God’s’ (La hukm illa li Allah). In response to this call, ‘Ali stated: The sentence is right but what [they think] it means, is wrong. It is true that the verdict lies but with Allah, but these people say that [the function of] governance is only for Allah. The fact is that there is no escape for men from ruler good or bad . . . Through the ruler tax is collected, enemy is fought, roadways are protected and the right of the weak is taken from the strong till the virtuous enjoys peace and allowed protection from [the oppression of] the wicked.64

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In the above passage, he objects to the Kharijis’ faulty interpretation and emphasizes that there must be a ruler, regardless of whether he is a just or an unjust person; however, he does not add that this person has to be divinely appointed. Second, he asserts that this person’s role and function are temporal in nature, and thus appears to suggest that as the system of governance is a temporal (non-religious) affair it is left to the people’s choice. Dissenters have pointed out that in response to the Kharijis’ claims that having a leader to arbitrate disputes or to govern was not necessary, ‘Ali was making a general statement on the imperative for every society to have a government. Thus his statement cannot be applied specifically to the Muslim community as regards who would lead it after the Prophet’s death. As such, the issue of succession is not a matter of mu‘amalat (transactions dealing with human interrelationships), where the people can negotiate the outcome. 3. After ‘Uthman’s murder, Talha, Zubayr, and many other people converged on ‘Ali’s house and pleaded with him to become caliph. He told them: ‘I am in no need of your government. I will provide my consent and satisfaction with whomever you choose.’65 In a version preserved by Tabari, ‘Ali went even further by assuring them that he would be among the most heedful and obedient of people to whomever was chosen as caliph.66 Ibn Qutayba records in al-Imama wa al-siyasa that Ali told the delegation which had come to pledge allegiance to him that they were not entitled to select the next caliph; rather, this was restricted to the Ahl al-Badr, those people who had participated in the Battle of Badr. Whomever they choose, via consultation, should be regarded as the next caliph.67 In another report, ‘Ali is alleged to have written to Mu‘awiya: ‘Consultation is confined to the muhajirun and the ansar. If they agree on an individual and take him to be Caliph it will be deemed to mean Allah’s pleasure.’68 In response to their repeated appeals, he issued a stern warning that they might not be able to tolerate and endure his austere and disciplined form of leadership and suggested that they choose someone else. If they decided to do so, he would be prepared and willing to listen and obey this individual and confine himself to providing advice. Once again, ‘Ali appears to be exhibiting his stance that choosing a caliph falls under the rubric of public choice: Leave me and seek someone else. We are facing a matter which has (several) faces and colours, which neither hearts can stand nor intelligence can accept. Clouds are hovering over the sky, and faces are not discernible. You should know that if I respond to you I would lead you as I know and would not care about whatever one may say or abuse. If you leave me then I am the same as you are. It is possible I would listen to and obey whomever you make in charge of your affairs. I am better for you as a counsellor (wazir) than as chief (amir).69 Ibn Abi al-Hadid, in his commentary on this sermon, points out that the Sunni community has invoked it as proof that the Prophet did not designate ‘Ali as his successor.70 4. ‘Ali tells his supporters that if they leave him no choice but to accept their appeals, then they must pledge their allegiance to him at the mosque and before the general public. In other words, the people’s presence and consent legitimates his

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rule.71 During this public event, he outlined his expectations of them and again stressed that no one has the right to govern without public acknowledgement and support: ‘O people, these are your affairs and mandate [government], and no one has a right to assume the position [of the caliph] except the one whom you bestow with this authority.’72 Another time, he reiterated the people’s freedom to choose their caliph in response to Talha and Zubayr, who he claimed had no right to oppose him after having freely pledged their allegiance to him and then transferring it to ‘A’isha (his opponent) before the Battle of the Camel (656): Now, both of you know, although you conceal it, that I did not approach the people till they approached me, and I did not ask them to swear allegiance to me till they themselves swore allegiance to me, and both of you were among those who approached me and swore me allegiance. Certainly, the common people did not swear me allegiance under any force put on them or for any money given to them.73 5. ‘Ali was confident that if the matter of succession was placed before the public, instead of being hastily decided upon by a small group of people, he would have been chosen due to his merit and excellence: O’ people, the most rightful of all persons for this matter [caliphate] is he who is most competent among them to maintain it, and he who knows best Allah’s commands about it. . . . By my life, if the question of Imamah was not to be decided unless all the people were present, then there would be no such case. But those who agreed about it imposed the decision on those who were absent, so much so that he who was present could not dissent and the one who was absent could not choose.74 ‘Ali underlined the voluntary and free nature of the pledge, which he saw as a covenant between the people and their leader: ‘The people offered their pledge of allegiance to me neither out of fear or disgust nor on account of compulsion or force. Rather, they surrendered on their free choice and volition.’75 More importantly, the person chosen to lead the community would be graced with divine pleasure: ‘If they agree on an individual and take him to be caliph, it will be deemed to mean Allah’s pleasure.’76

Alongside ‘Ali’s call for free and unhindered public investiture, he clearly presented himself as the most qualified and competent person to lead the community because of his merits, knowledge of Islam, and close association and kinship with the Prophet: ‘Beware! By Allah the son of Abu Quhafa (Abu Bakr) dressed himself with it [the caliphate] and he certainly knew that my position in relation to it was the same as the position of the axis in relation to the hand-mill’77 and ‘When I was only a child he [Muhammad] took charge of me . . . I used to follow him like a young camel following the footprints of its mother.’78 When he was dragged in front of Abu Bakr to pledge his allegiance, ‘Ali is reported to have said: ‘I am better qualified and more deserving to be the leader instead of you. As such, I will not pledge allegiance to

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you and instead you ought to pledge allegiance to me.’79 He also made a similar statement upon ‘Uthman’s selection: ‘You have certainly known that I am the most rightful of all others for the Caliphate.’80 Ali was amazed and bewildered that the Arabs chose someone else, although his own merits outshone those of all other Companions and were manifestly clear and unique: By God, it never occurred to me, and I never imagined, that after the Prophet the Arabs would snatch away the caliphate from his Ahlu’l-bayt [the members of the Prophet’s house], nor that they would take it away from me after him, but I suddenly noticed people surrounding the man [Abu Bakr] to swear him allegiance.81 In addition, he was bitter and angry with the Quraysh for robbing him of that which he, and he alone, was entitled to and worthy of: ‘O’ my God! I beseech You to take revenge on the Quraysh and those who are assisting them, for they have cut asunder my kinship and over-turned my cup, and have joined together to contest a right to which I was entitled more than anyone else.’82 When ‘Uthman was selected as caliph after ‘Ali refused to accept the terms put forth by ‘Abd al-Rahman, he is reported to have said: You have certainly known that I am the most rightful of all others for the Caliphate. By Allah, so long as the affairs of Muslims remain intact and there is no oppression in it save on myself I shall be keeping aloof from its attractions and allurements for which you aspire.83 Nevertheless, I remained patient despite length of period and stiffness of trial, till when he [Umar] went his way [of death] he put the matter [of Caliphate] in a group and regarded me to be one of them. But good Heavens! What had I to do with this ‘consultation’? Where was any doubt about me with regard to the first of them that I was now considered akin to these ones?84 In other words, ‘Ali considered himself the Prophet’s designated successor in both the temporal and religious domains85 and, as such, viewed himself as the only legitimate Imam possessing wilaya. However, he was neither duty-bound to become caliph nor to seek that position by force so long as the people withheld their allegiance from him. Thus, the Imam is designated by divine decree to the post of Imamate, as distinct from the caliphate, and his mandate covers the religious and spiritual spheres. If necessary, and if the public voluntarily gives its consent, it can be expanded to cover the governmental and social spheres. This is diametrically opposed to the views of many pro-government jurists, especially those of Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi, who sees no substantive role for public participation other than endorsing the Assembly of Experts’ designated supreme leader.

Iran’s post-election crisis has expedited the scholarly and vibrant discussion of different paradigms and models of governance in a Muslim country. It appears that a noticeable shift is now underway in the discourse and practice of Shi‘i authority, one

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that is moving away from Ayatullah Khomeini’s absolutist and comprehensive formulation and toward one that is pluralistic and allows the public to help devise a civil society that incorporates various democratic values and institutions. This outcome is emerging due to the critical re-examination of the traditional and rational proofs advanced by Ayatullah Khomeini along with a study of the people’s role in confirming or validating the political mandate of the Twelver Shi‘i Imams. ‘Ali, the first Shi‘i Imam, clearly sought public investiture through a public oath of allegiance when a large group of Muslims converged upon his house after ‘Uthman’s assassination (656). The Prophet and the Imams are idealized and regarded as perfect role models and, as such, their conduct represents the norm and is binding. Ali’s seeking of public allegiance instead of imposing himself in the political realm, despite being divinely designated (according to the Shi‘is), is of great significance for those who advocate a state model that bestows public sovereignty.86 Arguments in favour of public sovereignty and limiting the wali-ye faqih’s power and holding him accountable, as well as engendering a culture of tolerance and diversity of opinions are being framed in this new medium by reinterpreting the very concept of religious authority. Such voices, which were present in the revolution’s early years, are now resurfacing with a greater intensity. This is true to such an extent that it may not be so far-fetched to envision a significant curtailment of his authority because the present model of wilayat al-faqih seems to have disillusioned and alienated many people. After all, it has (in their opinion) failed to deliver on its promise of a just and egalitarian society. But even more importantly, the evidence for such a wide-ranging and absolute mandate is simply not there; rather, it is clearly limited to dealing with hisbiyya issues. In this regard, Ayatullah Muhammad Mahdi Shamsuddin (d. 2000) asserts that it is perfectly clear that no one has wilaya over anyone else except in an exigency, and even then such authority is strictly limited to the individual sphere and pertains to those who cannot decide for themselves (e.g., orphans, minors, and the mentally incompetent). Resolving social issues and establishing a government constitutes a collective responsibility (wajib-i kifa’i) and, as such, devolves upon the entire community (not just the jurists). He even coined a phrase for this concept: al-wilayat al-umma ‘ala nafsiha, namely, the authority to arrange society resides in the people themselves, who are obliged to formulate a system of governance via consultation that accords with Islam’s general principles: ‘The believers, both men and women, support each other; they order what is right and forbid what is wrong’ (Q. 9:71). Ayatullah Shariatmadari, at the very outset of wilayat al-faqih’s incorporation into the constitution in 1979, raised the possibility of clerical despotism if power were to be concentrated in the wali-ye faqih. Instead, he advocated wilayat al-fuqaha (guardianship by a group of jurisconsults) to reduce this possibility and limiting its members’ power to monitoring judicial issues to ensure that they conform with Islamic principles.87 More recently, Ayatullah Kadivar has argued that ‘people’s sovereignty over themselves has been delegated to them from God and no one has the right to deny them this divine right’.88 According to these and other ayatullahs, the public retains its right to choose its political system through consultation and to seek its own benefit and welfare because no particular governing model is prescribed in the revelatory textual sources or by the conduct of the infallible divine guides. The tasks associated with administering

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a society and polity are issues that intelligent and qualified people can undertake successfully, as they do not require any special training in the religious sciences. Therefore, jurists have no priority over non-jurists. The whole discourse of religious authority is permeated with transitioning from the jurisconsult’s actual governance and unchallengeable authority to one in which he supervises (nezarat) and guides (hidayat) the society. This trend, in all likelihood, will be accentuated with the ascendancy of the religious seminaries (hawza) in Iraq, especially Najaf, where the majority of senior jurists disagree categorically with Ayatullah Khomeini’s concept of governance. They desire no active political role because, first, this concept cannot be found in the revelatory sources and, second, they fear that any such involvement on their part will reduce Islam to no more than an ideological and/or political movement.89 Notes
1. S. Akhavi, ‘Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Taliqani and Ali Shariati’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.24, No.4 (Oct. 1988), p.415. 2. It is ironic that the person who insisted on placing this concept in the 1979 constitution and institutionalized it become the most vocal dissident and opponent of its adherents’ excesses and its mode of implementation. Ayatullah Montazeri made the following remark during discussion of the draft constitution in 1979: ‘Let the gentlemen be sure that we [the Assembly] will never endorse a constitution that does not include the issue of velayat-e faqih and laws based on the Book and sunna.’ S. Saffari, ‘The Legitimation of the Clergy’s Right to Rule’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.1 (1983), p.71. 3. Until the late 1960s, Ayatullah Khomeini had only called for the clergy to have a supervisory rule (nezarat) and for the shah to abide by Islam’s dictates. At this time, he did not advocate the overthrow of the monarchy. 4. President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad has been exploiting the messianic Imam’s promised return (millenarianism) to enhance his religious legitimacy and give the impression that this figure has somehow endorsed his appointment. One finds such eccentric ideas in his statement, such as when he told Ayatullah Jawadi-ye Amuli that he felt a ‘halo of light’ around himself while delivering his speech to the UN General Assembly and that the audience had been so fixated on him that no one blinked until he had finished. He also makes a point of offering prayers to expedite the Mahdi’s return, which is common in Shi‘i gatherings but odd and bizarre in a setting like the UN. http://tehranlondon.com/ article.php?id¼38222 (accessed 22 Jan. 2010). 5. M. Tamadonfar, ‘Islam, Law, and Political Control in Contemporary Iran’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol.40, No.2 (June 2001), pp.213–15. 6. A. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p.101. 7. R.M. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, trans. H. Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), pp.82–3. 8. M. Kadivar, Hukumat-i vilayi (Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 1998), pp.141–6. 9. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p.75. 10. R.M. Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nur (Tehran: Sazman-i madarik-i farhanghi-ye inqilab-i Islami, 1990), Vol.4, p.206; Vol.3, pp.107, 56, 75, 88, and 96. 11. Ibid., Vol.22, p.128. 12. Kadivar, Hukumat-i vilayi, pp.342–3. 13. Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nur, Vol.16, pp.211–12. 14. http://www.iranuk88.com/article.php?id¼43136; http://www.iranuk88.com/article.php?id¼53898 (accessed 20 Dec. 2010); http://www.payvand.com/news/09/oct/1277.html (accessed 12 Oct. 2010). 15. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13155282 (accessed 12 June 2011). 16. N. Calder, ‘Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi‘i Jurisprudence: Khomeini and the Classical Tradition’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.18, No.1 (Jan. 1982), p.4. 17. The scope of hisbiyya consists of having limited authority over people and properties such as a discretionary mandate over children, orphans, people of unsound mind, endowments, unclaimed

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18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40. 41.

property, and similar matters. In the absence of a qualified jurist who can assume these responsibilities, the authority devolves upon those Muslims who possess the ethical attribute of justice (‘udul al-mu’minin). However, the basic principle is that no one has authority (wilaya) over another person or his/her property under normal circumstances. M. Ansari, al-Makasib (Qum: Mu’assasat al-hadi, 1997), Vol.3, pp.545–6. R.J. Abisaab, Converting Persia (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2004), pp.105–12. A.K. Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), p.155. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, al-Tanqih fi sharh al-‘Urwat al-wuthqa, ed. M. ‘Ali Gharawi Tabrizi (Qum: Bustan, 1990), p.424. Ayatullahs Mulla Muhammad Kazim Khurasani (d. 1911), Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim Tabataba’i (d. 1970), and Sayyid Ahmad Khwansari (d. 1984) also held this opinion. http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules¼nav&nid¼5&cid¼366 (accessed 5 June 2011); Question 1. H. Katouzian, ‘Problems of Political Development in Iran: Democracy, Dictatorship or Arbitrary Government’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.22, No.1 (1995), p.13. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn¼8905080088 (accessed 4 May 2011). http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/article/2010/july/31//-f200da7bdd.html (accessed 8 Feb. 2011). S. Siavoshi, ‘Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi: Politics, Knowledge, and the Good Life’, The Muslim World, Vol.100 (January 2010), pp.124–44. Mesbah Yazdi, Huquq wa siyasat dar Qur’an, ed. M. Shahrabi (Qum: Intisharat-i mu’assasa-ye amuzashi wa pazhuhashi-ye imam Khomeini, 1999), p.317. http://www.tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼40442 (accessed 12 Nov. 2009). http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼50323 (accessed 8 Aug. 2010). http://www.parsine.com/fa/pages/?cid¼37133 (accessed 22 May 2011). http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼49488 (accessed 21 Dec. 2010). ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, Nahj al-balagha, compiled by S. Radi, trans. S.A. Reza (Rome: European Islamic Cultural Centre, 1984), Sermon 124, p.278. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼52876 (accessed 5 Dec. 2010). http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼50568 (accessed 10 March 2011). Ayatullah Khamena’i, clearly eager to accept the disputed results, sent out a congratulatory message to the Iranian people informing them of the ‘divine assessment’ and the great bounty bestowed upon them by the election, in which about 85% of eligible voters participated. In his later messages, he equated any dissent or questioning with being the ‘greatest crime’ that one could commit against the nation of Iran. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼40955 (accessed 2 Jan. 2011). In his first post-election Friday sermon, Ayatullah Khamena’i said: ‘Of course, since the 2005 elections, there have been differences between Mr Hashemi and Mr President. The differences still continue. They have differences of opinion on foreign issues, on how to implement social justice and on certain cultural issues. However, the viewpoints of the President are closer to those of mine’ and ‘Sometimes the difference is 100,000, 500,000 or even 1 million. In that case, one could say that there might have been vote-rigging, but how can they rig 11 million votes?’ http://www.cnn.com/2009/ WORLD/meast/06/19/iran.amanpour.analysis/index.html (accessed 10 April 2010). On 10 Nov. 2009, presidential candidate Mir. Hossein Mousavi called for constraining the jurisconsult’s powers and holding him accountable by revising those articles of the constitution that give him absolute power. He added that the constitution should not be viewed as an immutable sacred or revealed document that cannot be subject to change or modification. http://www.tehranlondon. com/article.php?id¼41630 (accessed 10 June 2010). A. Amanat, ‘From Ijtihad to wilayat-i faqih: The Evolution of the Shi‘i Legal Authority to Political Power’, in A. Amanat and F. Griffel (eds.), Shari‘a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p.121. Ironically, he supported it, including its in the constitution. Recently, he expressed his regret over the American hostage incident and now considers it an error because of its negative impact on American– Iranian relations. F. Vahdat, ‘Post-revolutionary Discourses of Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar: Reconciling the Terms of Mediated Subjectivity’, Critique, Vol.17 (Fall 2000), pp.151–2. S. Akhavi, ‘The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein’ali Montazeri in the Politics of the Post-1979 Iran’, Iranian Studies, Vol.41, No.5 (Dec. 2008), p.665.

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42. H. ‘Ali Montazeri, Dirasat al-wilaya al-faqih wa fiqh al-dawlat al-Islamiyya, 4 vols., 2nd ed. (Lebanon: al-Dar al-Islamiyya li al-matbu‘at wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi‘, 1988). 43. G. Abdo, ‘Rethinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘‘Conversation’’ with Ayatullah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri’, Middle East Journal, Vol.55, No.1 (Winter 2001), p.11. 44. C. Kurzman, ‘Critics Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protest against the Islamic State in Iran’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol.15, No.2 (Winter 2001), p.347. 45. Abdo, ‘Rethinking’, p.13. 46. ‘Grand Ayatullah Montazeri’s Letter to Marjas, Islamic Scholars and Seminaries’, http://khordaad88. com/?p¼570 (accessed 22 Jan. 2011). 47. W. Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 48. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, pp.534–49. 49. https://bayatzanjani.net/fa/news/article-239.html (accessed 10 May 2011). 50. V. Nasr, ‘The Present and Future of Iranian Politics’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.15, No.1 (Fall/Winter 2008), pp.37–8. 51. Vahdat, ‘Post-revolutionary Discourses’, p.148. 52. Ibid., p.150. 53. S. Najafabadi, Wilayat-i faqih: hukumat-i salihan (Tehran: Rasa, 1984). Qur’an 5:1 is of crucial significance: ‘O you who believe, fulfill your obligations.’ So are Qur’an 3:159 and 42:38, which deal with consultation. I have translated his work on religious exaggeration into English as: Religious Extremism: Intellectual and Doctrinal Deviance in Islam, trans. H. Mavani (Montreal: OAIK, 2009). 54. S. Akhavi, ‘Shiite Theories of Social Contract’, in Amanat and Griffel (eds.), Shari‘a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context, p.147. 55. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼41120 (accessed 10 July 2010). 56. Y. Matsunaga, ‘Mohsen Kadivar, an Advocate of Postrevivalist Islam in Iran’,’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.3 (Dec. 2007), p.318. 57. M. Kadivar, Nazariyyeh-ha-ye dawlat dar fiqh-i Shi‘a (Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 1993). 58. Kadivar, Hukumat-i vilayi. 59. M. Kadivar, Haqq al-nas: Islam wa huquq-i bashar (Tehran: Kavir, 2008). 60. The understanding of wilayat al-faqih expounded by Iran’s reformist scholars is probably close to the model proposed by Ayatullah Husayn ‘Ali Sistani, an eminent jurist and marja‘ al-taqlid (source of emulation) residing in Najaf. A student of Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, he, like his mentor, remained apolitical and circumscribed the scope of the jurisconsult’s authority. This conception, however, does not preclude political involvement if the jurist believes that it would be in the best interest of religion and the community, as has sometimes been the case with Ayatullah Sistani in the post-Saddam era in Iraq. See A. Kadhim, ‘Forging a Third Way: Sistani’s maja‘iyya between Quietism and wilayat al-faqih’, in Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.66–100. 61. Some have argued that the Prophet sought his followers’ allegiance (bay‘a) because this was the norm in pre-Islamic Arabia; however, this should not be taken to mean that it is a condition for legitimizing his prophethood, ministry, or mandate over the people in all aspects of their lives, including the sociopolitical sphere. 62. ‘Those who pledge loyalty to you [Prophet] are actually pledging loyalty to God Himself – God’s hand is placed on theirs – and anyone who breaks his pledge does so to his own detriment’ (Q. 48:10). 63. Sulaym b. Qays Hilali ‘Amiri Kufi, Kitab Sulaym b. Qays, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Tehran: Matba‘at al-huda, 1994), Vol.2, p.752. 64. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Sermon 40, p.175 (emphasis added). 65. Ibid., Sermon 91, p.234. 66. Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Tabari, ed. M.A. al-Fadl Ibrahim (Cairo: Dar al-ma‘arif, 1977), Vol.4, p.434. 67. Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imama wa al-siyasa, ed. T.M. al-Zayni (Cairo: Mu’assasat al-halabi, 1967), p.47. 68. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Letter no. 6, p.465. 69. Ibid., Sermon 91, p.234. 70. Ibn Abi al-Hadid ‘Abd al-Hamid b. Hibat Allah, Sharh Nahj al-balagha (Beirut: Dar al-jil, 1987), Vol.2, p.170. 71. Baqir Majlisi, Bihar al-anwar, 110 vols., 2nd ed. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-wafa’, 1983), Vol.32, p.24.

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72. Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Tabari, 4:435. Appointment to the post of Imam is made by divine decree and thus requires no public validation for it to be actualized or religiously legitimized (mashru‘iyyat). In contrast, the caliph is duty-bound to undertake the office’s responsibilities but only when he has sufficient public support. See S.‘A. Q. Maqami, Qudrat wa mashru‘iyyat (Tehran: Intisharat-i sura, 2000), pp.135–6. 73. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Letter 54, p.549. 74. Ibid., Sermon 172, p.343. 75. Ibid., letter 54, p. 549 and letter 1, p.460. 76. Ibid., letter 6, pp.464–5. 77. Ibid., Sermon 3, p.105. This is the most important sermon, known as Shaqshiqiyya, concerning ‘Ali’s serious objections to the previous three caliphs and his assertion that only he was entitled to assume the caliphate. Some scholars, such as Ibn Abi al-Hadid in his Sharh Nahj al-balagha, have cast doubt on the authenticity and attributed it to the compiler, Sayyid Radi. However, ‘Allama Amini has demonstrated that this sermon originates with ‘Ali by providing 28 chains of transmission, some of which pre-date the compiler’s birth. See Abd al-Husayn al-Amini al-Najafi, Al-Ghadir fi al-kitab wa al-sunna wa al-adab, 11 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1977), Vol.7, p.82. 78. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Sermon 191, p.393. 79. Ana ahaqq bi hadha al-amr minkum, Ibn Qutayba, al-Imama, p.18. 80. Anni ahaqq bi-ha min ghayri, ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Sermon 73, p.201. 81. Ibid., Letter 62, p.554. 82. Ibid., Sermon 216, p.436. 83. Ibid., Sermon 73, p.201. 84. Ibid., Sermon 1, p.106. 85. Wilferd Madelung cites several examples from the Qur’an that previous prophets had transmitted their authority and charisma to their immediate family members who were accorded an elevated position in the Qur’an. Thus, it would not be far-fetched to expect that Muhammad would have envisioned his succession in a similar light. See Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad, pp.8–18. See also Qur’an, 3:33–4, 19:58, 6:84–9, 37:76–7, 57:26, 11:71–3 and 4:34. 86. In the early days of the Iranian revolution, Ayatullah Khomeini underlined the need for the world to pay heed to the millions of Iranians who had demonstrated their will to remove the Shah, as an inalienable right in keeping with the charter of human rights. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼ F8O4xrjMLPc (accessed 10 March 2011). 87. Saffari, ‘The Legitimation of the Clergy’s Right to Rule’, p.79. 88. Vahdat, ‘Post-revolutionary Discourses’, p.150. 89. A.R. Norton, ‘Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious and University Center’, Middle East Policy, Vol.18, No.1 (Spring 2001), p.138.