Labor Law

Brotherhood Labor Unity vs. Zamora FACTS: Petitioners-members of “Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines” (BLUM), workedas “cargadores” or “pahinante” since 1961 at the S M C P l a n t . S o m e t i m e i n J a n u a r y 1 9 6 9 , t h e p e t i t i o n e r w o r k e r s – n u m b e r i n g 1 4 0 o r g a n i z e d themselves and engaged in union activities. Believing that they are entitled to overtime andholiday pay, the petitioners aired their gripes andg r i e v a n c e s b u t i t w a s n o t h e e d e d b y t h e r e s p o n d e n t s . O n e o f t h e u n i o n m e m b e r w a s dismissed from work. Hence, the petitioners filed ac o m p l a i n t o f unfair labor practice againstrespondent SMC on the ground of illegal dismissal. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , S M C a r g u e d t h a t t h e complainant are not or have never been thei r e m p l o y e e s b u t t h e y a r e t h e e m p l o y e e s o f t h e Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an independentlabor contracting firm Labor Arbiter Nestor Lim rendered a decision in favor of the complainants which was affirmedby the NLRC On appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRCr u l i n g s t r e s s i n g t h e a b s e n c e o f a n e m p l o y e r - employee relationship Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationshipexists between petitioners and respondent San Miguel Corporation HELD: YES In determining the existence of an employeremployeer e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e e l e m e n t s t h a t a r e g e n e r a l l y considered are the following: (a) the selection andengagement of the employee; (b) the payment of w a g e s ; ( c ) t h e p o w e r o f d i s m i s s a l ; a n d ( d ) t h e employer's power to control the employee with respectto the means and methods by which the work is to beaccomplished. It is the called "control test" that is themost important elementI n t h e C A B , p e t i t i o n e r s w o r k e d c o n t i n u o u s l y a n d exclusively for an average of 7 years for the company.C o n s i d e r i n g t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r s h a v e w o r k e d , t h e r e i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o c o n c l u d e t h a t they were engaged to perform activities necessary ord e s i r a b l e i n t h e u s u a l b u s i n e s s o f t r a d e o f t h e respondent. Hence, petitioners are considered “regularemployees.” Even assuming that there is a contract of employmentexecuted between SMC and the said labor contractor,t h e court ruled that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors h a v e n e i t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l c a p i t a l n o r investment to qualify as an independent contractorunder the law. The premises, tools and equipmentsused by the petitioners in their jobs are all supplied bythe respondent SMC. It is only the manpower or laborforce which the alleged contractors supply, suggestingt h e e x i s t e n c e o f a " l a b o r o n l y " c o n t r a c t i n g s c h e m e prohibited by lawI t i s i m p o r t a n t t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h a t i n a t r u l y independent contractorcontractee relationship, thefees are paid directly to the manpower agency in lumpsum without indicating or implying that the basis of such lump sum is the salary per w orker multiplied by the number of workers assigned to the company.I n t h e C A B , t h e a l l e g e d i n d e p e n d e n t contractors were paid a lump sum representing onlythe salaries the workers were entitled to, arrived at byadding the salaries of each worker which depend onthe volume of work they had accomplished individually. Therefore, there is no independent contractor-contractee relationship.WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED. San Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Bersamira Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The employees of these contractors sought to be regular employees of San Miguel sayi ng that Lipercon and D’Rite are labor-only contractors. San Miguel sought injunction from the RTC to prevent the actions of the employees of the said employees of the contractors. Saying that RTC has jurisdiction because there is no employer-employee relationship between the employees of Lipercon and D’Rite. Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction because the present controversy is not a labor dispute due to the fact that there is no employeremployee relationship? Held: RTC has no jurisdiction. The present controversy is a labor dispute. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently, and as

defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negatived by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite and, in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "labor-only" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee relationship may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire strangers outside the working unit;-those are issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor laws, and SanMig's cause/s of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with those issues

HALAGUENA vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC.
Posted on March 14, 2013 by legendphil
FACTS: Patricia Halagueña, et. al, (Halagueña) are flight attendants employed by Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) as well as members of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), the exclusive bargaining agent of flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of PAL. Halagueña assails Sec. 144 of the CBA entered into by PAL-FASAP and FASAP, which provides for a younger retirement age for female cabin attendants than those of their male counterparts, to be unconstitutional. Due to Halagueña’s claim, Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP submitted their 2004-2005 CBA proposals and manifested their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations between the management and the association, at the soonest possible time. Halagueña also filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 147 a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PAL for the invalidity of the assailed provision of the CBA. The RTC eventually granted such petition. Aggrieved, PAL, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals praying that the order of the RTC, which denied its objection to its jurisdiction, be annulled and set aside for having been issued without and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The CA granted PAL’s petition on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over a labor dispute, hence the case at bar. ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the pro visions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP. HELD: Yes. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employer-

employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW

HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs. REYNALDO J. GULMATICO, Labor Arbiter, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, AND NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADES representing all the sugar farm workers of the HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE MILLING DISTRICT BIDIN, J.: Facts: Respondent union, the National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades (NFSW- FGT) filed a complaint against herein petitioner Hawaiian-Philippine Company for claims under Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952) with the Labor Arbiter. Respondent union claimed that the sugar farm workers within petitioner's milling district have never availed of the benefits due them under the law. RA 809 provides: Sec.9. In addition to the benefits granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase in participation granted to planters under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborers in the following proportions; Sixty per centum of the increase participation for the laborers and forty per centum for the planters. The distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made under the supervision of the Department of Labor. x x x Petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that public respondent Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the case as provided in Article 217 of the Labor Code because there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner milling company and respondent union and farmers, and that respondent union has no cause of action against petitioner. Public respondent denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against petitioner. 2. Whether or not respondent union and/or the farm workers represented by it have a cause of action against petitioner. Held: 1. No. The Supreme Court held for the petitioner. In the case at bar, it is clear that there is no employer- employee relationship between petitioner milling company and respondent union and/or its membersworkers. Absent the jurisdictional requisite of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent, the inevitable conclusion is that public respondent is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case with respect to petitioner. 2. No. The Supreme Court likewise held in the negative, respondents do not have a cause of action to institute the present case. To have a cause of action, the claimant must show that he has a legal right and the respondent a correlative duty in respect thereof, which the latter violated by some wrongful act or omission. In the instant case, a simple reading of Section 9 of R.A, would show that the payment of the workers' share is a liability of the plantersemployers, and not of the milling company/sugar central (petitioner). Petitioner, according to the Supreme Court, would be a proper third party dependent impleaded because it is directly liable to the planters (the original defendants) for all or part of the workers' claim. However, the planters involved in this controversy have not filed any complaint of such a nature against petitioner, thereby lending credence to the conclusion that petitioner has fulfilled its part vis-avis its obligation under RA 809. Hence, the petition is granted
SULPICIO LINES, INC. vs. NLRC

Private respondents Julio Viajedor and Isabelo Baylosis worked as stewards/messmen for petitioner Sulpicio Lines, Inc., a corporation engaged in domestic

passenger and cargo shipping. They were dismissed in 1995 for dishonesty/misconduct for allegedly giving free passage to a certain passenger. In July 1997, private respondents sued petitioner corporation for illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City. On September 2, 1998, Labor Arbiter Reynoso Belarmino rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay to private respondents separation pay equivalent to one half month pay for every year of service in Lieu of reinstatement. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC for their reinstatement and for payment to them of fullbackwages On the other hand, petitioner corporation did not appeal. On November 29, 1999, the NLRC rendered judgment partially granting private respondents’ appeal by ordering petitioner to pay private respondents full backw2ges and separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service but denied private respondents’ prayer for reinstatement in view of the strained relations between them and petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which denied the same. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition. The petition has no merit. Petitioner corporation reiterates its contention that the NLRC erred in granting separation pay and full backwages to private respondents because, as found by the Labor Arbiter, it had acted in good faith. As correctly noted by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, however, the labor arbiter in this case clearly found petitioner to have dismissed private respondents without just cause, thus the order for petitioner to pay the latter separation pay (although based on erroneous computation not to mention that he should have likewise required petitioner to pay full backwages to private respondents). Indeed, the labor arbiter found that petitioner was not able to prove its charges against private respondents. As petitioner did not appeal from this ruling, this finding of the labor arbiter became conclusive as to petitioner corporation and can no longer be questioned. Neither is there merit to petitioner’s claim that since private respondents filed their complaint for illegal dismissal more than two ears after they had been dismissed, they should not be awarded full backwages. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to full backwages (Labor Code, Art. 279) and private respondents filed their complaint for illegal dismissal within the four-year prescriptive period provided for such (Magno v. National Construction Corporation, 198 SCRA 230 (1991)). For the foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the petition for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL. vs. ANTONIO D. TODARO G.R. No. 154830 June 8, 2007
BELOW THIS DIGEST IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE CASE.

FACTS.

1. PIL and Todaro entered in to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines;

2. The PIL subsequently started its operation but fails to comply with his obligation to the respondent prompting the latter to file a complaint for sum of money and damages before the RTC.

3. The petitioner file a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because this falls under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.

4. The RTC denied the motion and so the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who affirmed the decision of the RTC.

5. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari before the Supreme Court alleging that the CA erred when it conclude that the complaint state a cause of action against the petitioner and affirming the decision of the RTC because the action is for breach of employment contract and so it is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.

ISSUE.

WHETHER OR NOT, A CAUSE OF ACTION EXIST AND WHETHER OR NOT, EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXIST BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

According to the Supreme Court, Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and, (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. In this case, the petitioner violates the right of the respondent when it fails to employ him on a permanent basis and private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement so this fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC and not to the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

JULIUS KAWACHI and GAYLE KAWACHI, Petitioners, vs. DOMINIE DEL QUERO and HON. JUDGE MANUEL R. TARO, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City, Respondents. FACTS Private respondent Dominie Del Quero charged A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., Virgilio Kawachi and petitioner Julius Kawachi with illegal dismissal, non-execution of a contract of employment, violation of the minimum wage law, and non-payment of overtime pay. The complaint was filed before NLRC. The complaint essentially alleged that Virgilio Kawachi hired private respondent as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain occasions, she worked beyond the regular working hours but was not paid the corresponding overtime pay. The complaint also narrated an incident on 10 August 2002, wherein petitioner Julius Kawachi scolded private respondent in front of many people about the way she treated the customers of the pawnshop and afterwards terminated private respondent’s employment without affording her due process.

On 7 November 2002, private respondent Dominie Del Quero filed an action for damages against petitioners Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi before the MeTC of Quezon City. The complaint for damages specifically sought the recovery of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint in the MeTC on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and forum-shopping. Petitioners argue that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the action for damages because the alleged injury is work-related. They also contend that private respondent should not be allowed to split her causes of action by filing the action for damages separately from the labor case.

The RTC held that private respondent’s action for damages was based on the alleged tortious acts committed by her employers and did not seek any relief under the Labor Code. ISSUE Whether or not the TRC has jurisdiction in this instant action. HELD The SC held that the RTC has no jurisdiction in the instant case. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations —in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. Under the reasonable causal connection rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. It is clear that the question of the legality of the act of dismissal is intimately related to the issue of the legality of the manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available as regards the first – the employee’s separation from employment – it does not at all deal with the second – the manner of that separation – which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from employment, no other damages may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence, the fact that the issue—of whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to him in the circumstances—is determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the matter beyond the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction. In the instant case, the allegations in private respondent’s complaint for damages show that her injury was the offshoot of petitioners’ immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy manner by which she had discharged her duties. Petitioners’ reaction culminated in private respondent’s dismissal from w ork in the very same incident. The incident on 10 August 2002 alleged in the complaint for damages was similarly narrated in private respondent’s Affidavit Complaint supporting her action for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Clearly, the alleged injury is directly related to the employer-employee relations of the parties. Where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation, the Court has not hesitated to uphold the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Where the damages claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a prior employment contract, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld. The scenario that obtains in this case is obviously different. The allegations in private respondent’s complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her alleged illegal dismissal. In the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising therefrom. She cannot be allowed to file a separate or independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the MeTC must be dismissed. Petition is granted CABALEN MANAGEMENT CO., INC., et al. v. JESUS P. QUIAMBAO, et al. 528 SCRA 153 (2007) FACTS: It is a well-established rule that the employer has the burden of proving a valid dismissal of an employee, for which it must be for a just or authorized cause and with due process. Jesus Quiambao, et al. were charged of tip pocketing and swapping of dining order slips with bar order slips, among others. They were dismissed from employment due to said acts. They filed a case against Cabalen Management Co., Inc. (Cabalen) for illegal dismissal but the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission was in favor of Cabalen. Quiambao, et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and the CA ruled otherwise. Cabalen sought to set aside the decision of the CA which reversed the earlier rulings provided for by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. They also questioned the Resolution given by CA which denied their Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed CA decision held that except for respondents Vizier Inocencio and Vincent Edward Mapa whose petitions were dismissed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of the Rules of Court and Section 4 (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the

NLRC, herein Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed from their employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision, hence, Cabalen’s Motion for Reconsideration became subject of this Resolution. To the Motion, Quiambao, et al. filed their Opposition. ISSUES: Whether or not Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed HELD: It is a well-established rule that the employer has the burden of proving a valid dismissal of an employee, for which two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. To establish a just or authorized cause for dismissal, substantial evidence or "such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion" is required. Further required is that an employee sought to be dismissed must be served two written notices before the termination of his employment. The first notice must appraise him of the particular acts or omissions upon which his dismissal is grounded; the second, to inform him of the employer’s decision to terminate his employment. While the failure of the employer to comply with these notice requirements does not make the dismissal illegal as long as a just or authorized cause has been proved, it renders the employer liable for payment of damages because of the violation of the worker’s right to statutory due process. In the instant case, only photocopies of the statements of Balen and Malana form part of the records despite Cabalen’s relian ce thereon to prove respondents’ purported transgressions. Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. NLRC held that the unsigned photocopies of daily time records (DTRs), which were presented by the therein employer to show that its employee was neglectful of his duties, were of "doubtful or dubious probative value." Cabalen, et al. did not even heed their own procedures on disciplinary actions. The only facts extant in the records are that respondents were issued above-said Corrective Action Report (CARE) Forms asking them to explain their alleged infractions within 48 hours; and they subsequently received notices of dismissal after they submitted their written explanations. There is, however, nothing to show that before their dismissal, Quimbao, et al. were informed of their immediate supervisors’ decision to terminate their services, or that they were thereafter invited to an administrative investigation before the HRD manager or officer who is tasked to conduct the investigation in the presence of the employees’ immediate supervisor/s and the witnesses, if necessary, as provided under Section IV of the company’s Code of Conduct. No record of any administrative investigation proceeding, which under the company’s rules was to be "minuted," had also been presented. Hence, only Cabalen’s allegation that the statements of the witne sses were taken as part of the administrative investigation is before this Court. Allegations without proof do not deserve consideration. Finally, on the dismissal of Quiambao allegedly on the ground of business losses, it was incumbent upon Cabe to len, et al. to prove it by substantial evidence. It did not, however. In fact, Quiambao presented documents to disprove the validity of his retrenchment on that ground. For petitioners’ failure to discharge its burden then, this Court is constrained to hold th at Quiambao’s dismissal was not valid
FERNANDO G. MANAYA vs. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 168988 FACTS: 1. Petitioner was dismissed by the respondent because his services is no longer needed by the respondent Alabang Country Clab. 2. Petitioner filed a complaint of illegal dismissal against the respondent before the LA claiming that with his more or less nine years of service with the respondent, he had become a regular employee and that he had not committed any infraction of company policies or rules and so he, therefore, demanded his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights with full backwages and all monetary benefits due him. 3. On the otherhand, respondent claim that petitioner is not its employee because he came to work with the respondent by virtue of a legitimate job contract and that its true employer is the First Staffing Network Corporation with which respondent alabang country clab has a memorandum agreement so it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint because the petitioner has no cause of action against it. 4. The LA ruled that the dismissal of the petitioner was no valid cause and that he is a regular employee of the respondent and order its reinstatement. 5. Respondent appealed to the NLRC who dismiss the case because it is filed beyond the statutory period of appealsso the decision of the LA had become final and executory and denied all the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. 6. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals who grant the petition and order the NLRC to give due course to respondent’s appeal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and denied all the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner . 7. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not, the CA commited an error when it give due course of the respondent’s appeal before the NLRC even if it is fil ed beyond the 10 days reglamentary period. According to the Supreme Court, The controlling date of the receipt of the decision is on December 11 2,000, when it was received by the lawyer of the respondent, and so the appeal was filed beyond the reglamentary period when they filed it on December 26 of the same year. For negligence not to be binding on the client, the same must constitute gross negligence as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process.

Wherefore, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 9 May 2005 and its Resolution dated 21 July 2005 is REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 20 November 2000 is reinstated. Let the records of the above-entitled case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for immediate execution of the Decision. No costs
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION V CA |CORONA GR 185220, JULY 27, 2009 | 594 SCRA 139 FACTS: Aries Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra (PRs) filed a illegal dismissal case against Laguna Metts Corp (LMC). LA decided in their favor but the NLRC reversed the LA decision. PRs filed an MR but it was denied. PRs’ counsel received the denial on MAY 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008 (the last day of the 60-D filing period of a petition for certiorari), PRs’ counsel filed a motion for extension to file the petition praying for an extension of 15 days. CA granted a non-extendible 15D period. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the resolution claiming that under the current Sec 4 of Rule 65 as amended by AM 07-7-12 dated Dec. 4 2007, extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed. CA denied LMC’s motion and said that the new rule only discouraged the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time but did not strip the CA of its discretionary power to grant extensions in exceptional cases, in the interest of justice. Aggrieved, LMC now files this petition for certiorari in the SC claiming GADALEJ of the CA. ISSUE: W/N a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari is still allowed? RULING: NO MORE. The amended rules explicitly deleted the last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 65 allowing for an extension of the period for not longer than 15 days due to compelling reasons.1 As a rule an amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Sec 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing such authority would have been preserved. The removal only meant that an extension is no longer allowed. The rationale for the amendment is to essentially prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. When the CA granted the extension, it arrogated unto itself the power it did not posses, a power only the SC may exercise. Even assuming, the CA retained the discretion to grant extension, the reasons (see footnote 3 of the case: lack of material time due to voluminous pleadings that have to be written and numerous court appearances to be undertaken; lack of funds) of PRs’ counsel and PR did not qualify as compelling. While technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest which all courts are devoted. Petition granted. CA decision was reversed and set aside. The petition of PR in the CA case is ordered dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Jaime S. Domdom vs. Sandigan

Facts: By Affidavit of February 15, 2002, Hilconeda P. Abril, State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit requested the Office of theOmbudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation on the transactions-bases of the claims of Jaime S. Domdom miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses as a Director of Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), the receipts covering which werealleged to be tampered. After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with nine counts of estafa through falsification of documents in view of irregularities in nine supporting receipts for his claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses, after verification with the establishments he had transacted with. It thus directed the filing of the appropriate Informations with the Sandiganbayan. The informations were raffled and lodged among the 5 divisions of the Sandiganbayan. 3 divisions granted petitioners motion for
1

Deleted portion says: No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days.

consolidation while 2 others disallowed it. Petitioner thus seeks relief from this Court via the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer fortemporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the cases against him during the pendency of this petition. Petitioner argues that, among other things, all the cases against him arose from substantially identical series of transactions involving alleged overstatements of miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses. Issue: Should the motion for consolidation be granted? Held: Yes, it should be granted. In Teston v. Development Bank of the Philippines, the Court laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases to wit: A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, and to simplify the work of the trial court – in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. In the present case, it would be more in keeping with law and equity if all the cases filed against petitioner were consolidated with that having the lowest docket number pending with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The only notable differences in these cases lie in the date of the transaction, the entity transacted with and amount involved. The charge and core element are the same – estafa through falsification of documents based on alleged overstatements of claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses. Notably, the main witness is also the same. It need not be underscored that consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible

major abbreviation of trial. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Above all, consolidation avoids the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION , AND BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, RESPONDENTS. FACTS St. Martin Funeral Homes, Inc. (St. Martin) was originally owned by the mother of Amelita Malabed. Bienvenido Aricayos, a former overseas contract worker, was granted financial assistance by Amelita’s mother. In return, Aricayos extended assistanc e to Amelita’s mother in managing St. Martin without compensation. There was no written employment contract between Amelita’s mother and Aricayos nor is he listed as an employee in the payroll of St. Martin. When Amelita’s mother died, she took over as manager of St. Martin. After discovering some alleged anomalies, Amelita removed the authority of Aricayos and his wife from taking part in managing St. Martin’s operations. Aricayos filed a complaints for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of back wages, and damages. After requiring the parties to submit memoranda, position papers, and other documentary evidences in support of their respective positions, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, in favor of petitioner declaring that his office had no jurisdiction over the case citing Dela Salle University vs. NLRC, 135 SCR 674, 677 (1988) where the existence of an employer-employee relationship is disputed and not assumed, as in these cases, the determination of that question should be handled by the regular courts after full dress trial and not by the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE Whether the Labor Arbiter made a determination of the presence of an employer-employee relationship between St. Martin and respondent Aricayos based on the evidence on record. HELD It is clear that the issue submitted for resolution is a question of fact which is proscribed by the rule disallowing factual issues in appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. This is explicit in Rule 45, Section 1 that petitions of this nature “shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.” Petitioner St. Martin would like the Court to examine the pl eadings and documentary evidence extant on the records of the Labor Arbiter to determine if said official indeed made a finding on the existence of the alleged employer-employee nexus between the parties based on the facts contained in said pleadings and evidence. Evidently this issue is embraced by the circumscription. Even with the inadequate information and few documents on hand, one thing is clear––that the Labor Arbiter did not set the labor case for hearing to be able to determine the veracity of the conflicting positions of the parties. On this point alone, a remand is needed. We held in a catena of cases that while a formal trial or hearing is discretionary on the part of the Labor Arbiter, when there are factual issues that require a formal presentation of evidence in a hearing, the Labor Arbiter cannot simply rely on the position papers, more so, on mere unsubstantiated claims of parties

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2

EMPLOYEES FILED A COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

. NLRC

RULED IN THEIR FAVOR AND ORDERED REINSTATEMENT OR IF NOTFEASIBLE

, .

PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY

J&J
ARGUES THAT IT HAS THE PREROGATIVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN

S

EPARATION PAY ANDREINSTATEMENT

(

THEY WERE CHOOSING THE FORMER

). SC . G

HELD THAT THE CHOICE IS NOT THEIRS

ENERAL RULE

:

REINSTATEMENT FIRSTBEFORE SEPARATION PAY

.

J&J
FAILED TO PROVE STRAINED RELATIONS TO JUSTIFY SEPARATION PAY INSTEAD OF REINSTATEMENT

.

1. Case stemmed from an illegal dismissal case filed by Bonsol and Hirondo Against J&J LA dismissed the complaint. On December 14, 2001 NLRC reversed, held that the violations of company procedure by Bonsol and Hirondo didn’t constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience

warranting their dismissal. NLRC held that they are entitled to reinstatement. Dispositive portion read “they are entitled to reinstatement to their respective former positions w/o loss of seniority right sand privileges but without any backwages or in the alternative,

to payment of separation pay each equivalent to ½ month pay for every year of service…” 2. J&J sought partial reconsideration but it was denied. Neither party appealed from the NLRC resolution within thereglementary period. NLRC resolution became

final and executory 3.
On March 5, 2002, J&J filed a motion to set case for conference before the NLRC, manifesting their willingness to pay the 2separation pay and other monetary awards. The 2 were not in attendance when the NLRC called for said conference.

LAsuggested that they prepare the check payment.4. The 2 employees sought the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the Dec. 14 resolution and prayed for immediatereinstateme nt to their former positions.5.

A conference was held and J&J reiterated its intention to pay the separation pay but the 2 employees refused. J&J then fileda manifestation and motion arguing that the Dec 14 resolution granted them the right to choose between reinstatementand payment of separation pay. They also claimed that reinstatement was

no longer feasible because of the strainedrelations between the company and Bonsol and Hirando.6. June 18, NLRC issued a resolution directing the reinstatement of the 2 pursuant to the Dec. 14 resolution. Though itrecognized their right to choose, NLRC disregarded the claim of

strained relations. J&J MR denied.7. At the CA, in a petition for certiorari, J&J alleged that the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by the 2employees had the effect of altering the Dec. 14 resolution which had already become final and executory. Said resolutiongranted

them the right to choose between reinstatement and separation pay. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. MRdenied. ISSUE/S:1. WON the choice between reinstatement and separation pay was with the petitioners (J&J) 1. NO-

an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. And in case reinstatement is notfeasible, expedient or practical, and that reinstatement would only worsen the tension and strained relations orwhere the relationship between the employer and the employees has been unduly strained by reason

of theirirreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position inthe company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement.Payment of separation compensation in lieu of reinstatement of an employee illegally

dismissed shall be allowed if and only if the employer can prove the existence of circumstances showing that reinstatement will no longer befor the mutual benefit of the employer and employee.J&J is wrong to think that they have the prerogative to choose whether to reinstate or pay separation pay.

Neitherparty can choose. NLRC has the authority to execute its judgment to settle any issue re: details of its judgmentNLRC properly exercised its authority to resolve the controversy when it ordered reinstatement. NLRC and CA disregarded J&J’s claim that the relation has been strained.

SC respects these findings (fac tual in nature)Said resolution didn’t modify Dec 14 resolution (final and executor) it only set reinstatement as the primary relief. An alteration would be adding an award that was not among those stated in the dispositive portion of

the earlierresolution. This is not the case here
J-PHIL MARINE, INC. and/or JESUS CANDAVA and NORMAN SHIPPING SERVICES v. NATIONAL LABOR COMMISSION and WARLITO E. DUMALAOG 561 SCRA 675 (2008) FACTS: Worked as a cook on aboard vessels plying overseas, Warlito E. Dumalaog was employed as a cook on board vessels plying overseas. He filed a pro-forma complaint on March 4,2002 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against J-Phil Marine, Inc., its then president Jesus Candava, and its foreign principal Norman Shipping Services. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for failure to attach to the petition all material documents and for defective verification and certification. Consequently, a petition was filed before the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the respondent entered into a compromise agreement and signed Quitclaims and Release. The same has been subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter. Accordingly, the case was dismissed. ISSUES: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the respondent, without his counsel, is valid HELD: A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to Dumalaoag's contention, the employee's counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise agreement. The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation. The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority. The circumstances of this case indicate that Dumalaoag's counsel is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement