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FEATI v. Bautista Facts: Certain cases arose in the Court of Industrial Relations between FEATI and the Faculty club. FEATI contended that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the cases because it is an educational institution and it is not considered an employer under the industrial peace act. Issues: 1. Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over cases involving unfair labor practices of educational institutions? 2. Whether or not FEATI may be considered an employer under the industrial peace act? Held: 1. In this case, YES. The cases cited by FEATI bolstering its claim that CIR has no jurisdiction over educational institutions only apply to non-profit educational institutions. Therefore, having admitted that FEATI is an educational institution organized for profit, CIR has jurisdiction over the case. 2. YES. It will be noted that in defining the term "employer" the Act uses the word "includes", which it also used in defining, "employee" (Sec. 2[d], and "representative" (Sec. 2[h]); and not the word "means" which the Act uses in defining the terms "court" (Sec 2[a]), "labor organization" (Sec. 2[e]), "legitimate labor organization" (Sec. 2[f]), "company union" (Sec. 2[g]), "unfair labor practice" (Sec. 2[i]), "supervisor" (Sec. 2[k]), "strike" (Sec. 2[I]) and "lockout" (Sec. 2[m]). A methodical
variation in terminology is manifest. This variation and distinction in terminology and phraseology cannot be presumed to have been the inconsequential product of an oversight; rather, it must have been the result of a deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we consider that as legislative records show, Republic Act No. 875 had been meticulously and painstakingly drafted and deliberated upon. In using the word "includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition includes not only "a principal employer but also a person acting in the interest of the employer"; and secondly, the Act itself specifically enumerates those who are not included in the term "employer", namely: (1) a labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer), (2) anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization (Sec. 2[c]), and (3) the Government and any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the terms and conditions of employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer". This Court, however, has ruled that those educational institutions that are not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.5
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"An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618).
On February 8, 1995, herein petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia Publico as a sewer. Under the terms and conditions of her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but required to work from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight. On the average, she earned P185.00 daily.
"An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly (Sec. 2-c, Rep. Act 875)."
Under none of the above definitions may the University be excluded, especially so if it is considered that every professor, instructor or teacher in the teaching staff of the University, as per allegation of the University itself, has a contract with the latter for teaching services, albeit for one semester only. The University engaged the services of the professors, provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services. Even if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included in the term "employer". "Running through the word "employ" is the thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person to perform a certain service in return for compensation to be paid by an employer. When you ask how a man is employed, or what is his employment, the thought that he is under agreement to perform some service or services for another is predominant and paramount.
At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she be allowed to leave the work place early, as she was not feeling well due to a bout of influenza. Permission was refused but nonetheless, Publico went home. The following day, Publico called up her employer and notified management that she was still recovering from her ailment. On May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work. To her mortification and surprise, however, the security guard prevented her from entering the NYK premises, allegedly on management’s order. She begged to be allowed inside, but the guard remained adamant. It was only when Publico declared that she would just complete the unfinished work she had left on May 7 that the guard let her in. Once inside the factory, Publico requested to see the owner, one Stephen Ng. Her request was declined. She was instead asked to come back the following day. On May 10, 1997, Publico returned to NYK as instructed. After waiting for three and half (3½) hours, she was finally able to see Stephen Ng. When she inquired why she was barred from reporting for work, Mr. Ng told her she was dismissed due to her refusal to render overtime service.
NYK International v. NLRC Facts: Labor 2 Digests|Disini G Ricasata
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner corporation and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng. Issue: Whether or not Cathy Ng may be held solidarily liable with NYK? Held: Yes. Anent petitioners’ assertion that they cannot be solidarily liable in this case as there was no malice or bad faith on their part has no leg to stand on. What the Court finds apropos is our disquisition in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, which held that since a corporation is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the “person acting in the interest of the employer.” In other words the corporation, in the technical sense only, is the employer. In a subsequent case, we ordered the corporate officers of the employer corporation to pay jointly and solidarily the private respondents’ monetary award. More recently, a corporation and its president were directed by this Court to jointly and severally reinstate the illegally dismissed employees to their former positions and to pay the monetary awards. In this case Cathy Ng, admittedly, is the manager of NYK. Conformably with our ruling in A. C. Ransom, she falls within the meaning of an “employer” as contemplated by the Labor Code,[17] who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, Cathy Ng, in her capacity as manager and responsible officer of NYK, cannot be
exonerated from her joint and several liability in the payment of monetary award to private respondent.
Allied Free Worker’s Union v. Compañia Maritima Facts: MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business. Teves is its branch manager in the port of Iligan City. And AFWU is a duly registered legitimate labor organization with 225 members. On August 11, 1952, MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a CONTRACT 4 with AFWU to do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all its vessels or boats calling in the port of Iligan City, beginning August 12, 1952. During the first month of the existence of the CONTRACT, AFWU rendered satisfactory service. So, MARITIMA, through Teves, verbally renewed the same. This harmonious relations between MARITIMA and AFWU lasted up to the latter part of 1953 when the former complained to the latter of unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work. This deteriorating situation was admitted as a fact by AFWU's president. To remedy the situationsince MARITIMA's business was being adversely affected -Teves was forced to hire extra laborers from among "stand-by" workers not affiliated to any union to help in the stevedoring and arrastre work. The wages of these extra laborers were paid by MARITIMA through separate vouchers and not by AFWU. Moreover, said wages were not charged to the consignees or owners of the cargoes.
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On July 23, 1954, AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal5 for a collective bargaining agreement. This demand embodied certain terms and conditions of employment different from the provisions of the CONTRACT. No reply was made by MARITIMA. AFWU sued MARITIMA for unfair labor practice saying that MARITIMA refused to bargain collectively. CIR dismissed the case on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the case. Issue: Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over the case? Whether or not MARITIMA can be considered an employer of the members of AFWU? Held: No to both. It is true that MARITIMA admits that it did not answer AFWU's proposal for a collective bargaining agreement. From this it does not necessarily follow that it is guilty of unfair labor practice. Under the law the duty to bargain collectively arises only between the "employer" and its "employees". Where neither party is an ''employer" nor an "employee" of the other, no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is no duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no right. The court a quo held that under the CONTRACT, AFWU was an independent contractor of MARITIMA. Neither is there any direct employment relationship between MARITIMA and the laborers. The latter have no separate individual contracts with MARITIMA. In fact, the court a quo
found that it was AFWU that hired them. Their only possible connection with MARITIMA is through AFWU which contracted with the latter. Hence, they could not possibly be in a better class than AFWU which dealt with MARITIMA.
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC Facts: Prefatorily, at the time the instant controversy started, petitioner was placed by the then Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) under a conservator for the purpose of protecting its assets. It appears that when the union sought the implementation of Section 1, Article XI of the CBA regarding the retirement plan and Section 4, Article X thereof, pertaining to uniform allowance, the acting conservator of the petitioner expressed her objection to such plan, resulting in an impasse between the petitioner bank and the private respondent union. The deadlock continued for at least six months when the union, to resolve the issue, decided to file a case against the petitioner for unfair labor practice and for flagrant violation of the CBA provisions. Issue: The petitioner asserts since the employees have retired, as a consequence of which no employee-employer relationship exists anymore between it and the employees, the union no longer had the personality to file the complaint for them. Held: Petitioner's contention in untenable. Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee
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whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees to sever his employment with the former.14 [Soberano v. Secretary of Labor, 99 SCRA 549 (1980)] The very essence of retirement is the termination of the employer-employee relationship. Hence, the retirement of an employee does not, in itself, affect his employment status especially when it involves all rights and benefits due to him, since these must be protected as though there had been no interruption of service. It must be borne in mind that the retirement scheme was part of the employment package and the benefits to be derived therefrom constituted, as it were, a continuing consideration for services rendered, as well as an effective inducement for remaining with the corporation. It is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, releasing him from the burden of worrying for his financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty.15 [Laginlin v. WCC, 159 SCRA 91 (1988)] When the retired employees were requesting that their retirement benefits be granted, they were not pleading for generosity but were merely demanding that their rights, as embodied in the CBA, be recognized. Thus, when an employee has retired but his benefits under the law or the CBA have not yet been given, he still retains, for the purpose of prosecuting his claims, the status of an employee entitled to the protection of the Labor Code, one of which is the protection of the labor union.
Issue: What are the rights and privileges of reinstated employees during the layoff period? Held: Where, in the resolution of the CIR, it was held that the reinstated employees were entitled to back wages from the date of their dismissal to the date of their reinstatement and without prejudice to their “seniority rights and privileges,” it was held that the resolution intended to restore the said employees to theri status immediately prior to their dismissal and this means that they should receive Christmas bonus, accumulated sick leave privileges and transportation allowance during the layoff period. They were treated as if they had not been absent from work and had been uninterruptedly working during the layoff period. However, said employees are not entitled to the free trip passes which were not given automatically or indiscriminately.
Airline Pilots Association v. CIR Facts: There is a provision in the by-laws of ALPAP giving pilots who resigned from PAL the option to remain as a member of the union or resign from the said union. On January 2, 1971, the Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines, represented by Ben Hur Gomez who claimed to be its President, filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations praying for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of "all the pilots now under
PAL v. PALEA Facts: Certain illegally dismissed PAL employees were ordered reinstated by the CIR which was affirmed by the SC.
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employment by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and are on active flight and/or operational assignments." The petition which was docketed in the sala of Judge Joaquin M. Salvador as Case 2939-MC was opposed in the name of the same association by Felix C. Gaston (who also claimed to be its President) on the ground that the industrial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the petition "because a certification proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the question as to who is the lawful president of a legitimate labor organization." It must be noted that Gaston was originally the president of the union. Upon his resignation from PAL (not the union), Gomez staged an election with 45 other pilots to institute him as the president of the said union. CIR sided with Gomez, stating that Gaston and company already resigned from PAL, as a sign of protest in the current labor dispute, therefore cannot represent the union in collectively bargaining with PAL. It also held that the union cannot adopt a provision in its by-laws which in effect allows membership of non-employees of PAL. Issue: Whether or not non-employees can represent and be a member of a union of employees of a certain employer? Held: YES. This Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as "any union or association of employees which exists, in whole or in
part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of a particular employer is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of the Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or association of employees is established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A. 875 "representative" is defined as including "a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that a labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." (Section 2(j), R.A. 875). There is, furthermore, nothing in the constitution and bylaws of ALPAP which indubitably restricts membership therein to PAL pilots alone.1 Although according to ALPAP (Gomez there has never been an instance when a non-PAL pilot became a member of ALPAP, the complete lack of any such precondition for ALPAP membership cannot but be interpreted as an unmistakable authority for the association to accept pilots into its fold though they may not be under PAL's employ. The fundamental assumptions relied upon by the industrial court as bases for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office and funds of ALPAP being, in this Court's opinion, erroneous, and, in the absence of any serious dispute that on December 18-22, 1970 Felix C. Gaston, and four other pilots, were elected by the required majority of ALPAP members as officers of their association, this Court hereby rules that the mentioned authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the
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office, funds and name of ALPAP was done with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, this Court cannot hold as valid and binding the election of Ben Hur Gomez as President of ALPAP. He was elected et a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called just one day after the election of Felix C. Gaston as President of ALPAP who, as shown, received a majority of 180 votes out of a total membership of 270. Under the provisions of section 4, article III of the Constitution and By-Laws of ALPAP, duly elected officers of that association shall remain in office for at least one year: "The term of office of the officers of the Association shall start on the first day of the fiscal year of the Association. It shall continue for one year or until they are reelected or until their successors have been elected or appointed and takes office in accordance with the Constitution and by-laws." While this Court considers the ruling of the court below, on the matter of who has the exclusive rights to the office, funds and name of ALPAP, as having been erroneously made, we cannot hold, however, that those belonging to the group of ALPAP (Gomez) do not possess any right at all over the office, funds and name of ALPAP of which they are also members. In our opinion, it is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly elected officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain collectively with a particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on matters that directly affect the terms and conditions of their particular employment. As the circumstances pertinent to the case at bar presently stand, ALPAP (Gaston) has extended recognition to ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and conclude collective
bargaining contracts with PAL. Having given ALPAP (Gomez) this authority, it would be clearly unreasonable on the part of ALPAP (Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be required to enable ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a proper manner, its delegated authority to bargain collectively with PAL. Clearly, an intelligently considered adjustment of grievances and integration of the diverse and varying interests that not infrequently and, often, unavoidably permeate the membership of a labor organization, will go a long way, in achieving peace and harmony within the ranks of ALPAP. Of course, in the eventuality that the pilots presently employed by PAL and who subscribe to the leadership of Ben Hur Gomez should consider it to their better interest to have their own separate office, name and union funds, nothing can prevent them from setting up a separate labor union. In that eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or participation they may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as a result of their membership therein should properly be liquidated in favor of such withdrawing members of the association.
Cebu Seamen’s Association v. Ferrer-Calleja Facts: The records show that sometime on 23 October 1950, a group of dock officers and marine engineers on board vessels plying Cebu and other ports of the Philippines organized themselves into an association and registered the same as a non-stock corporation known as Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI), with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Later, on 23 June 1969, the same group registered its association with
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this Bureau as a labor union known as the Seamen's Association of the Philippines, Incorporated (SAPI). API has an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Aboitiz Shipping Corporation which will expire on 31 December 1988. In consonance with the CBA said company has been remitting checked-off union dues to said union until February, 1987 when a group composed of members of said union, introducing itself to be its now set of officers, went to the company and claimed that they are entitled to the remittance and custody of such union dues. This group, headed by Manuel Gabayoyo claims that they were elected as such on January 20, 1987 under the supervision of the SEC. On 26 May 1987, another group headed by Dominica C. Nacua, claiming as the duly elected set of officers of the union in an election hold on 20 December 1986, filed a complaint, for and on behalf of the union, against the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI) as represented by Manuel Gabayoyo for the security of the aforementioned CBA, seeking such relief, among others, as an order restraining the respondent from acting on behalf of the union and directing the Aboitiz Shipping Corp. to remit the checked-off union dues for the months of March and April 1987. Issue: Who is entitled to the release and custody of union dues from Aboitiz? Nacua Representing SAPI or Gabayoyo representing CSAI? Held: Nacua representing SAPI.
As stated in the findings of fact in the questioned resolution of Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, on October 23, 1950, a group of deck officers organized the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc., (CSAI), a non-stock corporation and registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEQ. The same group registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) as Seamen's Association of the Philippines (SAPI). It is the registration of the organization with the BLR and not with the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights and privileges granted under the Labor Code. We gathered from the records that CSAI, the corporation was already inoperational before the controversy in this case arose. In fact, on August 24, 1984, the SEC ordered the CSAI to show cause why its certificate of registration should not be revoked for continuous inoperation (p. 343, Rollo). There is nothing in the records which would show that CSAI answered said showcause order. Also, before the controversy, private respondent Dominica Nacua was elected president of the labor union, SAPI. It had an existing CBA with Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. Before the end of the term of private respondent Nacua, some members of the union which included Domingo Machacon and petitioner Manuel Gabayoyo showed signs of discontentment with the leadership of Nacua. 'Phis break-away group revived the moribund corporation and issued an undated resolution expelling Nacua from the association (pp. 58-59, Rollo). Sometime in February, 1987, it held its own election of officers supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It also filed a case of estafa against Nacua sometime in May, 1986 (p. 52, Rollo). The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which she denied being a member, has however, not affected her
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membership with the labor union. In fact, in the elections of officers for 1987-1989, she was re-elected as the president of the labor union. In this connections, We cannot agree with the contention of Gabayoyo that Nacua was already expelled from the union. Whatever acts their group had done in the corporation do not bind the labor union. Moreover, Gabayoyo cannot claim leader. ship of the labor group by virtue of his having been elected as a president of the dormant corporation CSAI. Public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations correctly ruled on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties that SAPI, the legitimate labor union, registered with its office, is not the same association as CSAI, the corporation, insofar as their rights under the Labor Code are concerned. Hence, the former and not the latter association is entitled to the release and custody of union fees with Aboitiz Shipping and other shipping companies with whom it had an existing CBA.
Held: It is a labor dispute. The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee." The test of whether a controversy comes within the definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy involves or concerns "terms, tenure or condition of employment" or "representation." All the admitted facts (the 2 letters, the response from the University’s lawyers; the strike; the cases filed) show that the controversy between the University and the Faculty Club involved terms and conditions of employment, and the question of representation. Hence, there was a labor dispute. 2
FEATI v. Bautista Facts: (Facts already stated above) Issue: FEATI contends that the President cannot certify, via section 10 of RA 8751, this controversy because it is not a labor dispute.
1
San Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Bersamira Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
the employees, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment.
2
When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining orader forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout
From the UP Labor 2 reviewer
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The employees of these contractors sought to be regular employees of San Miguel saying that Lipercon and D’Rite are labor-only contractors. San Miguel sought injunction from the RTC to prevent the actions of the employees of the said employees of the contractors. Saying that RTC has jurisdiction because there is no employer-employee relationship between the employees of Lipercon and D’Rite. Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction because the present controversy is not a labor dispute due to the fact that there is no employer-employee relationship? Held: RTC has no jurisdiction. The present controversy is a labor dispute. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions
of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negatived by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite and, in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "laboronly" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee relationship may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite
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in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire strangers outside the working unit;-those are issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor laws, and SanMig's cause/s of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with those issues.
In the Notices of Dismissal which they received from Nestlé, the private respondents had been directed to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or return them to the company for proper disposition. As they failed and refused to avail of either option, the company filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati a civil suit to recover possession of the cars. The Court issued an Order dated March 7, 1988 directing the Deputy Sheriff to take the motor vehicles into his custody. The private respondents sought a temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortizations pending the final resolution of their appeals in the illegal dismissal case. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue such TRO? Held: NLRC has no jurisdiction. There is no labor dispute. 'Labor dispute' includes any controversy or matters concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Nestlés demand for payment of the private respondents' amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.
Nestle Phils v. NLRC Facts: The private respondents were employed by the petitioner either as sales representatives or medical representatives. By reason of the nature of their work they were each allowed to avail of the company's car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. All of the private respondents availed of the petitioner's car loan policy. On September 14, 1987, private respondents Nuñez, Villanueva, Villena and Armas were dismissed from the service for having participated in an illegal strike. On December 26, 1987, respondents Kua and Solidum were also dismissed for certain irregularities. All the private respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and upheld the legality of their dismissal. They appealed to the NLRC where their appeals are still pending.
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Petitioner Nestlé Philippines, Inc., correctly pointed out that: "The twin directives contained in petitioner's letters to the private respondents to either (1) settle the remaining balance on the value of their assigned cars under the company car plan or return the cars to the company for proper disposition; or (2) to pay all outstanding accountabilities to the company are matters related to the enforcement of a civil obligation founded on contract. It is not dependent on or related to any labor aspect under which a labor injunction can be issued. Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them. "As noted, the options given to the private respondents are civil in nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no labor aspect involved in the enforcement of those obligations." (p. 7, Rollo.) The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.
Facts:
Kiok Loy v. NLRC Labor 2 Digests|Disini G Ricasata
variation in terminology is manifest. This variation and distinction in terminology and phraseology cannot be presumed to have been the inconsequential product of an oversight; rather, it must have been the result of a deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we consider that as legislative records show, Republic Act No. 875 had been meticulously and painstakingly drafted and deliberated upon. In using the word "includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition includes not only "a principal employer but also a person acting in the interest of the employer"; and secondly, the Act itself specifically enumerates those who are not included in the term "employer", namely: (1) a labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer), (2) anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization (Sec. 2[c]), and (3) the Government and any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the terms and conditions of employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer". This Court, however, has ruled that those educational institutions that are not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.5
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"An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618).
On February 8, 1995, herein petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia Publico as a sewer. Under the terms and conditions of her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but required to work from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight. On the average, she earned P185.00 daily.
"An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly (Sec. 2-c, Rep. Act 875)."
Under none of the above definitions may the University be excluded, especially so if it is considered that every professor, instructor or teacher in the teaching staff of the University, as per allegation of the University itself, has a contract with the latter for teaching services, albeit for one semester only. The University engaged the services of the professors, provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services. Even if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included in the term "employer". "Running through the word "employ" is the thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person to perform a certain service in return for compensation to be paid by an employer. When you ask how a man is employed, or what is his employment, the thought that he is under agreement to perform some service or services for another is predominant and paramount.
At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she be allowed to leave the work place early, as she was not feeling well due to a bout of influenza. Permission was refused but nonetheless, Publico went home. The following day, Publico called up her employer and notified management that she was still recovering from her ailment. On May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work. To her mortification and surprise, however, the security guard prevented her from entering the NYK premises, allegedly on management’s order. She begged to be allowed inside, but the guard remained adamant. It was only when Publico declared that she would just complete the unfinished work she had left on May 7 that the guard let her in. Once inside the factory, Publico requested to see the owner, one Stephen Ng. Her request was declined. She was instead asked to come back the following day. On May 10, 1997, Publico returned to NYK as instructed. After waiting for three and half (3½) hours, she was finally able to see Stephen Ng. When she inquired why she was barred from reporting for work, Mr. Ng told her she was dismissed due to her refusal to render overtime service.
NYK International v. NLRC Facts: Labor 2 Digests|Disini G Ricasata
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner corporation and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng. Issue: Whether or not Cathy Ng may be held solidarily liable with NYK? Held: Yes. Anent petitioners’ assertion that they cannot be solidarily liable in this case as there was no malice or bad faith on their part has no leg to stand on. What the Court finds apropos is our disquisition in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, which held that since a corporation is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the “person acting in the interest of the employer.” In other words the corporation, in the technical sense only, is the employer. In a subsequent case, we ordered the corporate officers of the employer corporation to pay jointly and solidarily the private respondents’ monetary award. More recently, a corporation and its president were directed by this Court to jointly and severally reinstate the illegally dismissed employees to their former positions and to pay the monetary awards. In this case Cathy Ng, admittedly, is the manager of NYK. Conformably with our ruling in A. C. Ransom, she falls within the meaning of an “employer” as contemplated by the Labor Code,[17] who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, Cathy Ng, in her capacity as manager and responsible officer of NYK, cannot be
exonerated from her joint and several liability in the payment of monetary award to private respondent.
Allied Free Worker’s Union v. Compañia Maritima Facts: MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business. Teves is its branch manager in the port of Iligan City. And AFWU is a duly registered legitimate labor organization with 225 members. On August 11, 1952, MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a CONTRACT 4 with AFWU to do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all its vessels or boats calling in the port of Iligan City, beginning August 12, 1952. During the first month of the existence of the CONTRACT, AFWU rendered satisfactory service. So, MARITIMA, through Teves, verbally renewed the same. This harmonious relations between MARITIMA and AFWU lasted up to the latter part of 1953 when the former complained to the latter of unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work. This deteriorating situation was admitted as a fact by AFWU's president. To remedy the situationsince MARITIMA's business was being adversely affected -Teves was forced to hire extra laborers from among "stand-by" workers not affiliated to any union to help in the stevedoring and arrastre work. The wages of these extra laborers were paid by MARITIMA through separate vouchers and not by AFWU. Moreover, said wages were not charged to the consignees or owners of the cargoes.
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On July 23, 1954, AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal5 for a collective bargaining agreement. This demand embodied certain terms and conditions of employment different from the provisions of the CONTRACT. No reply was made by MARITIMA. AFWU sued MARITIMA for unfair labor practice saying that MARITIMA refused to bargain collectively. CIR dismissed the case on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the case. Issue: Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over the case? Whether or not MARITIMA can be considered an employer of the members of AFWU? Held: No to both. It is true that MARITIMA admits that it did not answer AFWU's proposal for a collective bargaining agreement. From this it does not necessarily follow that it is guilty of unfair labor practice. Under the law the duty to bargain collectively arises only between the "employer" and its "employees". Where neither party is an ''employer" nor an "employee" of the other, no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is no duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no right. The court a quo held that under the CONTRACT, AFWU was an independent contractor of MARITIMA. Neither is there any direct employment relationship between MARITIMA and the laborers. The latter have no separate individual contracts with MARITIMA. In fact, the court a quo
found that it was AFWU that hired them. Their only possible connection with MARITIMA is through AFWU which contracted with the latter. Hence, they could not possibly be in a better class than AFWU which dealt with MARITIMA.
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC Facts: Prefatorily, at the time the instant controversy started, petitioner was placed by the then Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) under a conservator for the purpose of protecting its assets. It appears that when the union sought the implementation of Section 1, Article XI of the CBA regarding the retirement plan and Section 4, Article X thereof, pertaining to uniform allowance, the acting conservator of the petitioner expressed her objection to such plan, resulting in an impasse between the petitioner bank and the private respondent union. The deadlock continued for at least six months when the union, to resolve the issue, decided to file a case against the petitioner for unfair labor practice and for flagrant violation of the CBA provisions. Issue: The petitioner asserts since the employees have retired, as a consequence of which no employee-employer relationship exists anymore between it and the employees, the union no longer had the personality to file the complaint for them. Held: Petitioner's contention in untenable. Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee
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whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees to sever his employment with the former.14 [Soberano v. Secretary of Labor, 99 SCRA 549 (1980)] The very essence of retirement is the termination of the employer-employee relationship. Hence, the retirement of an employee does not, in itself, affect his employment status especially when it involves all rights and benefits due to him, since these must be protected as though there had been no interruption of service. It must be borne in mind that the retirement scheme was part of the employment package and the benefits to be derived therefrom constituted, as it were, a continuing consideration for services rendered, as well as an effective inducement for remaining with the corporation. It is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, releasing him from the burden of worrying for his financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty.15 [Laginlin v. WCC, 159 SCRA 91 (1988)] When the retired employees were requesting that their retirement benefits be granted, they were not pleading for generosity but were merely demanding that their rights, as embodied in the CBA, be recognized. Thus, when an employee has retired but his benefits under the law or the CBA have not yet been given, he still retains, for the purpose of prosecuting his claims, the status of an employee entitled to the protection of the Labor Code, one of which is the protection of the labor union.
Issue: What are the rights and privileges of reinstated employees during the layoff period? Held: Where, in the resolution of the CIR, it was held that the reinstated employees were entitled to back wages from the date of their dismissal to the date of their reinstatement and without prejudice to their “seniority rights and privileges,” it was held that the resolution intended to restore the said employees to theri status immediately prior to their dismissal and this means that they should receive Christmas bonus, accumulated sick leave privileges and transportation allowance during the layoff period. They were treated as if they had not been absent from work and had been uninterruptedly working during the layoff period. However, said employees are not entitled to the free trip passes which were not given automatically or indiscriminately.
Airline Pilots Association v. CIR Facts: There is a provision in the by-laws of ALPAP giving pilots who resigned from PAL the option to remain as a member of the union or resign from the said union. On January 2, 1971, the Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines, represented by Ben Hur Gomez who claimed to be its President, filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations praying for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of "all the pilots now under
PAL v. PALEA Facts: Certain illegally dismissed PAL employees were ordered reinstated by the CIR which was affirmed by the SC.
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employment by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and are on active flight and/or operational assignments." The petition which was docketed in the sala of Judge Joaquin M. Salvador as Case 2939-MC was opposed in the name of the same association by Felix C. Gaston (who also claimed to be its President) on the ground that the industrial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the petition "because a certification proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the question as to who is the lawful president of a legitimate labor organization." It must be noted that Gaston was originally the president of the union. Upon his resignation from PAL (not the union), Gomez staged an election with 45 other pilots to institute him as the president of the said union. CIR sided with Gomez, stating that Gaston and company already resigned from PAL, as a sign of protest in the current labor dispute, therefore cannot represent the union in collectively bargaining with PAL. It also held that the union cannot adopt a provision in its by-laws which in effect allows membership of non-employees of PAL. Issue: Whether or not non-employees can represent and be a member of a union of employees of a certain employer? Held: YES. This Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as "any union or association of employees which exists, in whole or in
part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of a particular employer is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of the Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or association of employees is established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A. 875 "representative" is defined as including "a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that a labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." (Section 2(j), R.A. 875). There is, furthermore, nothing in the constitution and bylaws of ALPAP which indubitably restricts membership therein to PAL pilots alone.1 Although according to ALPAP (Gomez there has never been an instance when a non-PAL pilot became a member of ALPAP, the complete lack of any such precondition for ALPAP membership cannot but be interpreted as an unmistakable authority for the association to accept pilots into its fold though they may not be under PAL's employ. The fundamental assumptions relied upon by the industrial court as bases for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office and funds of ALPAP being, in this Court's opinion, erroneous, and, in the absence of any serious dispute that on December 18-22, 1970 Felix C. Gaston, and four other pilots, were elected by the required majority of ALPAP members as officers of their association, this Court hereby rules that the mentioned authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the
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office, funds and name of ALPAP was done with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, this Court cannot hold as valid and binding the election of Ben Hur Gomez as President of ALPAP. He was elected et a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called just one day after the election of Felix C. Gaston as President of ALPAP who, as shown, received a majority of 180 votes out of a total membership of 270. Under the provisions of section 4, article III of the Constitution and By-Laws of ALPAP, duly elected officers of that association shall remain in office for at least one year: "The term of office of the officers of the Association shall start on the first day of the fiscal year of the Association. It shall continue for one year or until they are reelected or until their successors have been elected or appointed and takes office in accordance with the Constitution and by-laws." While this Court considers the ruling of the court below, on the matter of who has the exclusive rights to the office, funds and name of ALPAP, as having been erroneously made, we cannot hold, however, that those belonging to the group of ALPAP (Gomez) do not possess any right at all over the office, funds and name of ALPAP of which they are also members. In our opinion, it is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly elected officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain collectively with a particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on matters that directly affect the terms and conditions of their particular employment. As the circumstances pertinent to the case at bar presently stand, ALPAP (Gaston) has extended recognition to ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and conclude collective
bargaining contracts with PAL. Having given ALPAP (Gomez) this authority, it would be clearly unreasonable on the part of ALPAP (Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be required to enable ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a proper manner, its delegated authority to bargain collectively with PAL. Clearly, an intelligently considered adjustment of grievances and integration of the diverse and varying interests that not infrequently and, often, unavoidably permeate the membership of a labor organization, will go a long way, in achieving peace and harmony within the ranks of ALPAP. Of course, in the eventuality that the pilots presently employed by PAL and who subscribe to the leadership of Ben Hur Gomez should consider it to their better interest to have their own separate office, name and union funds, nothing can prevent them from setting up a separate labor union. In that eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or participation they may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as a result of their membership therein should properly be liquidated in favor of such withdrawing members of the association.
Cebu Seamen’s Association v. Ferrer-Calleja Facts: The records show that sometime on 23 October 1950, a group of dock officers and marine engineers on board vessels plying Cebu and other ports of the Philippines organized themselves into an association and registered the same as a non-stock corporation known as Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI), with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Later, on 23 June 1969, the same group registered its association with
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this Bureau as a labor union known as the Seamen's Association of the Philippines, Incorporated (SAPI). API has an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Aboitiz Shipping Corporation which will expire on 31 December 1988. In consonance with the CBA said company has been remitting checked-off union dues to said union until February, 1987 when a group composed of members of said union, introducing itself to be its now set of officers, went to the company and claimed that they are entitled to the remittance and custody of such union dues. This group, headed by Manuel Gabayoyo claims that they were elected as such on January 20, 1987 under the supervision of the SEC. On 26 May 1987, another group headed by Dominica C. Nacua, claiming as the duly elected set of officers of the union in an election hold on 20 December 1986, filed a complaint, for and on behalf of the union, against the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI) as represented by Manuel Gabayoyo for the security of the aforementioned CBA, seeking such relief, among others, as an order restraining the respondent from acting on behalf of the union and directing the Aboitiz Shipping Corp. to remit the checked-off union dues for the months of March and April 1987. Issue: Who is entitled to the release and custody of union dues from Aboitiz? Nacua Representing SAPI or Gabayoyo representing CSAI? Held: Nacua representing SAPI.
As stated in the findings of fact in the questioned resolution of Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, on October 23, 1950, a group of deck officers organized the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc., (CSAI), a non-stock corporation and registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEQ. The same group registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) as Seamen's Association of the Philippines (SAPI). It is the registration of the organization with the BLR and not with the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights and privileges granted under the Labor Code. We gathered from the records that CSAI, the corporation was already inoperational before the controversy in this case arose. In fact, on August 24, 1984, the SEC ordered the CSAI to show cause why its certificate of registration should not be revoked for continuous inoperation (p. 343, Rollo). There is nothing in the records which would show that CSAI answered said showcause order. Also, before the controversy, private respondent Dominica Nacua was elected president of the labor union, SAPI. It had an existing CBA with Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. Before the end of the term of private respondent Nacua, some members of the union which included Domingo Machacon and petitioner Manuel Gabayoyo showed signs of discontentment with the leadership of Nacua. 'Phis break-away group revived the moribund corporation and issued an undated resolution expelling Nacua from the association (pp. 58-59, Rollo). Sometime in February, 1987, it held its own election of officers supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It also filed a case of estafa against Nacua sometime in May, 1986 (p. 52, Rollo). The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which she denied being a member, has however, not affected her
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membership with the labor union. In fact, in the elections of officers for 1987-1989, she was re-elected as the president of the labor union. In this connections, We cannot agree with the contention of Gabayoyo that Nacua was already expelled from the union. Whatever acts their group had done in the corporation do not bind the labor union. Moreover, Gabayoyo cannot claim leader. ship of the labor group by virtue of his having been elected as a president of the dormant corporation CSAI. Public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations correctly ruled on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties that SAPI, the legitimate labor union, registered with its office, is not the same association as CSAI, the corporation, insofar as their rights under the Labor Code are concerned. Hence, the former and not the latter association is entitled to the release and custody of union fees with Aboitiz Shipping and other shipping companies with whom it had an existing CBA.
Held: It is a labor dispute. The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee." The test of whether a controversy comes within the definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy involves or concerns "terms, tenure or condition of employment" or "representation." All the admitted facts (the 2 letters, the response from the University’s lawyers; the strike; the cases filed) show that the controversy between the University and the Faculty Club involved terms and conditions of employment, and the question of representation. Hence, there was a labor dispute. 2
FEATI v. Bautista Facts: (Facts already stated above) Issue: FEATI contends that the President cannot certify, via section 10 of RA 8751, this controversy because it is not a labor dispute.
1
San Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Bersamira Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
the employees, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment.
2
When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining orader forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout
From the UP Labor 2 reviewer
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The employees of these contractors sought to be regular employees of San Miguel saying that Lipercon and D’Rite are labor-only contractors. San Miguel sought injunction from the RTC to prevent the actions of the employees of the said employees of the contractors. Saying that RTC has jurisdiction because there is no employer-employee relationship between the employees of Lipercon and D’Rite. Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction because the present controversy is not a labor dispute due to the fact that there is no employer-employee relationship? Held: RTC has no jurisdiction. The present controversy is a labor dispute. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions
of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negatived by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite and, in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "laboronly" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee relationship may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite
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in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire strangers outside the working unit;-those are issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor laws, and SanMig's cause/s of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with those issues.
In the Notices of Dismissal which they received from Nestlé, the private respondents had been directed to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or return them to the company for proper disposition. As they failed and refused to avail of either option, the company filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati a civil suit to recover possession of the cars. The Court issued an Order dated March 7, 1988 directing the Deputy Sheriff to take the motor vehicles into his custody. The private respondents sought a temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortizations pending the final resolution of their appeals in the illegal dismissal case. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue such TRO? Held: NLRC has no jurisdiction. There is no labor dispute. 'Labor dispute' includes any controversy or matters concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Nestlés demand for payment of the private respondents' amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.
Nestle Phils v. NLRC Facts: The private respondents were employed by the petitioner either as sales representatives or medical representatives. By reason of the nature of their work they were each allowed to avail of the company's car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. All of the private respondents availed of the petitioner's car loan policy. On September 14, 1987, private respondents Nuñez, Villanueva, Villena and Armas were dismissed from the service for having participated in an illegal strike. On December 26, 1987, respondents Kua and Solidum were also dismissed for certain irregularities. All the private respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and upheld the legality of their dismissal. They appealed to the NLRC where their appeals are still pending.
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Petitioner Nestlé Philippines, Inc., correctly pointed out that: "The twin directives contained in petitioner's letters to the private respondents to either (1) settle the remaining balance on the value of their assigned cars under the company car plan or return the cars to the company for proper disposition; or (2) to pay all outstanding accountabilities to the company are matters related to the enforcement of a civil obligation founded on contract. It is not dependent on or related to any labor aspect under which a labor injunction can be issued. Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them. "As noted, the options given to the private respondents are civil in nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no labor aspect involved in the enforcement of those obligations." (p. 7, Rollo.) The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.
Facts:
Kiok Loy v. NLRC Labor 2 Digests|Disini G Ricasata
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