Laila Tanyag vs Manolito San Jose digested

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA
Seventeenth Division
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
Members:
- versus -

CA-G.R. CV No. 73286
SABIO, J., JR. (Chairman)
Tijam, N.,
Punzalan Castillo, M. JJ .:

MANOLITO SAN JOSE,
Respondent-Appellee,
Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Oppositor-Appellee.
___________________
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
SABIO, J. L., JR., J.:
Before Us on appeal is a decision (dated July 17, 2001) of
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 70) in Pasig City, in JDRC Case
No. 4862 (declaration of nullity of marriage).
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.” (page 4 of the Assailed

Decision; page 63 of the Record).
The relevant facts of the present case as well as its findingswere outlined by the
trial court in this wise, to wit:
“This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code filed by
petitioner, Laila Tanyag-San Jose. “Per Sheriff’s Return dated May 31, 1999, summons,
together with a copy of the petition and its Annexes was (sic) served personally upon the
respondent, Manolito San Jose, on May 25, 1999. However, respondent neither filed an
answer nor appeared in Court to contest the present petition.
“xxx
“On July 8, 1999, Prosecutor Conrado B. Tolentino filed a ‘Report’ stating that after conducting
an investigation, he found no collusion existed between the parties. “After the hearing and
before his case was considered submitted for decision, an Order was issued directing the
Office of the Solicitor General to submit a Certification stating the reasons, if any, for its
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the instant petition, but despite receipt of
copy of the order, no Certification was filed. “Petitioner’s evidence, discloses as follows:
“She and respondent were married on June 12, 1988 at Iglesia Filipina Independiente
Church, Tag[u]ig, Metro Manila, solemnized by Rev. Fr. Nixon T. Jose, xxx. Petitioner then
was eighteen (18) years old and still studying while respondent was nineteen (19) years old.

Out of their union, two (2) children were born, namely, Joana Marie xxx and Norman xxx, both
surnamed San Jose.
“After their marriage, petitioner and respondent lived at the house of the latter’s parents
located at Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. In their nine (9) years of cohabitation following
their marriage, respondent was jobless. Petitioner was left with no option but to earn a
living by vending fish to support their children. Even with the birth of their children,
respondent remained indifferent to their needs and never bothered to look for a job.
Thinking that respondent’s irresponsible attitude was irremediable, and tired of working alone,
petitioner left respondent on August 20, 1998. Since then, petitioner and respondent have
never communicated with, much less, seen each other.
“At present, their eldest child Joana Marie is living with petitioner while the other child
Norman is in the custody of respondent’s parents. “Clinical psychologist, Nedy Tayag, who
did a series of clinical tests and interviews on the petitioner, came up with the following
findings in her Psychological Report xxx, to wit: ‘ TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION :
‘Petitioner’s cognitive ability is approximated as being on the Dull Normal to Average range.
Decision-making skills as well as sensitivity to environmental details are both deemed to
be functionally adequately.
‘Protocols project her to be an independent person who can withstand trials in her life
especially if it means keeping her family intact and protected. However, being a rational
person, she cannot allow herself to become a push-over who cannot defend herself from
being manipulated. In retrospect, she would rather save what is left of her waning selfesteem by leading a solitary but worry-free life with her children and that can only be possible
once she is freed from her disappointing marriage. The petitioner’s protocols reveal that the
intensity of her emotional sufferings extend to the point of her being confused of her gender
role expectations. She identifies with the male role, possibly because of her status as the
provider of her family as well as being the protector of her children. Furthermore, inspite of this
notion, women are perceived to be the dominant sex as opposed to men whom she regards as
weak and clinging.
‘Traces of any gross pathological condition are not apparent as well as marked personality
disorders (sic) that could render her psychologically incapacitated.
‘ REMARKS : ‘Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews and
description of their marital plight, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the disintegration
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the latter’s
psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles and obligations of a
married man and a father.
‘His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack of concern for
the welfare of others, self-centered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and
his involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits under the classification of AntiSocial Personality Disorder. ‘Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply emersed
within the system. It continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life.’
“In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano
Molina (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court, reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of
Leonel Santos vs. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20), to the effect that ‘psychological
incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical incapacity xxx) and that there is

hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorder clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage and that such incapacity ‘must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.’
“Viewed in the light of the above guidelines, the present petition must necessarily be denied.
“Petitioner’s portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As the
Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra), ‘(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.’
“Petitioner’s case is not in any way enhanced by the psychological evaluation and
assessment done by psychologist Nedy Tayag as per her Psychological Report xxx.
Although the body of the report mentions that the respondent is affected with ‘Anti-Social
Personality Disorder’, the same cannot sway this Court from its above disposition. There is no
showing that Ms. Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his relatives in order to
arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which the finding or conclusion was
based is inadequate.”

Not satisfied with the foregoing, Laila Tanyag-San Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on August 09, 2001 (pages 64-70 of the Record) and a
Comment therein was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for
short) on November 07, 2001 (pages 102-106 of the Record). On November 13,
2001, the trial court issued an Order denying the said Motion for Reconsideration
(page 109 of the Record), hence, a Notice of Appeal was filed by the petitioner
(pages 110-111 of the Record). On November 28, 2001, the lower court ordered
that the records of the present case be immediately elevated to Us (page 116
of the Record). In her Brief, Laila Tanyag-San Jose interposed that the lower
court:
“I. GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESENT PETITION FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES OF THE MOLINA CASE (268 SCRA 198).
“II. COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE UNREFUTED
EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT.” (page 3 of the Appellant’s Brief; page 26

of the Rollo).
We will discuss the foregoing assignment of errors jointly. The herein appellant
interposed that the lower court erred in holding that the present petition failed to
comply with the guidelines enumerated in the case of Court of Appeals vs. Molina
(268 SCRA 198) (pages 3-4 of the Appellant’s Brief; pages 26-27 of the Rollo).
We rule in favor of the herein appellant. Justice Isagani A. Cruz of the Supreme
Court once said: “The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in
curios conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply
the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus
querried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are

a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our
mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic”. (Alonzo vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 259). The present case is an illustration.
Moving on--Article 36 of the Family Code states that, “(a) marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
The Supreme Court in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20, (reiterated in
Molina case) came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the foregoing Article, to wit: “Psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be legitimate.
“The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
“Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or
even desirable.”

We now proceed to determine whether the herein appellant was able to prove
Manolito San Jose’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
She (Laila Tanyag-San Jose) posited that Manolito San Jose failed to meet his
duty to care for and support his family, inasmuch as he: never worked; is
irresponsible; is a gambler; and, takes drugs (pages 5-7, TSN of January 14,
2000).

Apparently, whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, G.R. No.
109975, February 9, 2001, citing the Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro R.
Padilla in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198).
Essential in a petition for annulment “is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220
to 225 of the Family Code and such noncomplied marital obligations must
similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the
decision.” (Brenda B. Marcos vs. Wilson G. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October
19, 2000).
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the petitioner was subjected to
psychological evaluation (pages 52-57 of the Record), conducted by Clinical
Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag. Based from the said evaluation, Psychologist Tayag
was able to establish--which was reiterated during her testimony (page 7, tsn of
April 13, 2000) that:“Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews
and description of their marital plight, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the disintegration
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the latter’s
psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles and obligations of a married man
and a father. “His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack
of concern for the welfare of others, selfcentered orientation, absence of remorse, violent
tendencies and his involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits under the
classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder. “Such disorder is considered to be grave
and is deeply emersed within the system. It continues to influence the individual until the later
stage of life.”

We find the foregoing sufficient ground to prove that, indeed Manolito San Jose
is psychologically ill to perform the marital obligations he assumed, or as
would make him unable to assume them. It should be remembered that “the

opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience
or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence”
(Rule 130, Section 49 of the Rules of Court). An expert witness is “one who
belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry
relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes
to express an opinion.” (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary [1988 ed.] page 348).
There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge
that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the
following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand
familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or
standards upon which his opinion is based. (Ibid.).
Here, the herein psychologist can qualify as an expert witness based on the
above standard—she possessed the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in
the field of psychology. Additionally, We perused the records of the present case
and unearthed that the totality of the evidence presented in the present case—
including the testimony of the petitioner, were enough to sustain a finding
that Manolito San Jose is psychologically incapacitated within the
contemplation of the Family Code. We believe that his (respondent’s) defects
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. If
being jobless (since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of the
present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or
physically ill—what then can We describe such acts? Are these normal
manners of a married man? We are not at all swayed that a union affirmed in
church rites and subsequently having children, are proofs that either of the
spouses is mature and responsible enough to assume marital responsibilities.
Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. This Court, finding the gravity of
the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but to
declare the marriage between the herein petitioner and the respondent
herein dissolved. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (article 68 of the
Family Code), however, what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as an inviolable social
institution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to rise from the ashes
and begin a new life--freed from a marriage which, to Us, was hopeless from the
beginning and where the bonding could not have been possible.

Again, “(a)s judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence.
‘Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,’ so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, ‘where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them.’ While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have
the power to apply the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature.
While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless
have the right to read out the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not
to ‘the letter that killeth’ but to the ‘spirit that vivifieth.’ To give effect to the
lawmaker’s will.” (Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra).
While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the Molina case in arriving
at Our present conclusion--We have reason to deviate from the same. In view
of the peculiar circumstances attendant in this case, We were constrained to
take exception from the Molina case. Note that the “(c)ommittee did not give
any example of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to apply the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decision of Church tribunals
which although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law.” (page 37, Handbook of the
Family Code of the Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991 reprinted). Hence, whether or
not psychological incapacity exists is for Us to establish, as there is no hard and
fast rule in the determination of what maybe considered indicia of psychological
incapacity. To Our mind there are sufficient grounds for Us to conclude that
indeed psychological incapacity exists so as to warrant declaration of the marriage
void ab initio. Finally, the herein appellee ought to be reminded that while it is
settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, even
finality on appeal, however, the same admits exceptions as when it has failed to
appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would
materially affect the result of the case. (Evangeline Danao vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 122353, June 06, 2001). Suffice it to say that such exception is present
here.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated July 17,
2001) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 70) of Pasig City, in JDRC Case No.
4862 is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered--DECLARING the
marriage between Laila Tanyag-San Jose and Manolito San Jose void ab
initio. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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