Liabilities

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 389

February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint
charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations
of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations
therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section
25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then
Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her
counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as
well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The
respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with
complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the
handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and
disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging
respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and
respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said
respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way
the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before
going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon
Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first
floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to
complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her
that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling
of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's
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promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered
the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as
'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent
shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside
the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent
proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged
respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her:
'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing
the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured
complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will
marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed,
removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her
hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already
on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from
3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the
hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual
act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed
to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had
better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual
intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the
family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply
with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on
February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the
complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and
has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which
shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by
members of the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962.
Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that
he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of
marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He,
however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant
became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a
quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without
stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional
evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the
hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant
submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no
appearance for the respondents.
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Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to
present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to
present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27,
1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence
and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in
the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for
a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon
Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno,"
and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2)
shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at
3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958,
when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent
had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of
that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in
September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she
was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from
respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met
the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that
he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact
that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in
respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E),
which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity
and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth
certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a
certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's
Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent
whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of
Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the
complainant.

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The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the
respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent
averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955
only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is
established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant
(pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November
3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because
of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now
section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs.
Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at
all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to
the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958,
but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the
case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the
State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the
State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he
owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when
he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to
the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not
fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it
is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
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court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our
Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567,
citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104,
January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145,
December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral
conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has
committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to
the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in
either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
DIGEST
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an
educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years.
The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing
the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to
respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of
voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy
supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how
intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was,
the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he
asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute
grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the
former Rules of Court.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the
Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).
It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged
by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show
proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense
raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant
that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section
25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar
a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be
restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it
is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must
conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As
stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and
to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but
the administration of justice.
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Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5996. February 07, 2005]
MARIO
S.
AMAYA, complainant, vs.
TECSON, respondent.

ATTY.

DELANO

A.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In a Complaint dated March 20, 2003, Mario S. Amaya sought the
disbarment of Atty. Delano A. Tecson for “highly irregular actuations and/or
grave negligence in handling an appeal with the Court of Appeals.”
The complainant alleged that he retained the services of the respondent
to handle the said appeal when his former counsel suffered a stroke due to
acute hypertension. The respondent demandedP20,000.00[1] for the filing of
the notice of appeal, which the complainant immediately paid. The
respondent assured him that the appeal was going to be filed on time, and
demanded an additional sum ofP20,000.00 for the preparation and filing of
the appellant’s brief. The complainant paid the said amount on March 24,
2001.[2] The complainant further alleged as follows:
… I periodically visited Atty. Tecson in his office to follow up the progress of
the appeal with the Honorable Court of Appeals. During my earlier visits, I
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was assured by Atty. Tecson that our appeal will be given due course. …
However, sometime in the first week of December 2001, I was informed by
Atty. Tecson that the appeal was dismissed … due to the fact that [he] failed
to file it one day late…. I was shocked because I was so diligent in paying
Atty. Tecson and also in following up with him the progress of the appeal.
When I asked Atty. Tecson why he was not able to file on time the Notice of
Appeal, [he] merely replied that the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
mistake in dismissing the appeal because it failed to consider the inability to
file the appeal due to the fact that the post office was closed on Saturday
and Sundays. Atty. Tecson assured me that the appeal would be resurrected
once a Motion for Reconsideration would be filed by him. Thus, Atty. Tecson
told me that he would file a motion for reconsideration and would go to
Manila to personally follow it up. Atty. Tecson demanded from me the sum of
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS for the said motion for reconsideration.
I readily paid Atty. Tecson, but unfortunately, I did not anymore demand for a
receipt.[3]
The complainant narrated that he was no longer able to personally talk to
the respondent after this, and that the latter was always “out of town,”
attending to several court hearings in different cities and municipalities and
could not even be reached through his cellular phone.
On May 10, 2002, the complainant learned of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration through a friend. He tried contacting the respondent, to no
avail, and was constrained to hire another lawyer, Atty. Arsenio C. Tan. Atty.
Tan then filed a Notice of Appearance and Second Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated October 16,
2002.
In his Comment dated June 23, 2003, the respondent admitted that he
was the complainant’s counsel and that the appeal was dismiss because he
failed to file the docket fees on time. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said denial, which the appellate court, likewise,
denied.
According to the respondent, the complainant’s case was initially handled
by a different lawyer and was adversely decided by the trial court. The
complainant, who was “cocksure” of winning his appeal before the Court of
Appeals, approached the respondent regarding the said case. According to
the respondent:
… I told him that I would do my best to help him in his appeal but
considering that the records of his case with the RTC, Cebu, was so
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voluminous, I had to study them well, because he might be filing an appeal
which would just entail a big expense on his part, without any chance of
having the adverse decision reversed by the appellate court;
… There were very few more days left before the notice of appeal could be
filed within the 15-day reglementary period when he approached me.[4]
The respondent further narrated that the last day for paying the docket
fee was a Friday, and that he decided to pay the same through money order.
He then went to the customs area at the waterfront in Cebu City, planning to
send the docket fees through mail, addressed to the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court where the case had been tried. However, the teller
refused to accept the respondent’s letter with offer to buy the money order
for the docket fees in question. The respondent was told that his transaction
could no longer be accepted because of the new policy that the postal office
would no longer transact any business after 4:30 p.m. The respondent then
had a heated argument with the postal employee, but no one wanted to
accept his transaction. He then went to the other postal offices in the
neighboring cities of Talisay and Mandaue to try his luck, which was an
exercise in futility. He was able to purchase the money order and send the
same only the following Monday.
The respondent, likewise, claimed that there was no agreement as to the
amount of attorney’s fees that he would charge, and considered the
complainant’s case as pro bono. After he told the complainant that it was
customary for the client to spend the expenses in appealing a case and that
it was usually considered as an acceptance fee, the complainant voluntarily
gave him P20,000.00, and added anotherP20,000.00 three days later.
Contrary to the complainant’s claim, the respondent did not receive an
additional amount of P10,000.00. He also averred that he promised to return
the money to the complainant in case the appeal would not be successful.
He was true to his word and returned the P40,000.00 to the complainant, as
evidenced by a receipt.[5] The respondent also stressed that he made a
candid and honest opinion of the probable outcome of the case to the
complainant, and informed the latter that it was going to be very hard to win
in the appellate court.
In a Resolution[6] dated August 11, 2003, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In his Position Paper dated May 21, 2004, the complainant reiterated the
allegations in his complaint. He stressed that his appeal before the Court of
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Appeals was lost due to the negligence of the respondent, and, as such, the
latter was liable for damages to the complainant.
In his Report dated June 30, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Demaree
J.B. Raval found that the complainant’s appeal before the Court of Appeals
had, indeed, been lost through the respondent’s negligence. Thus:
As a lawyer, Atty. Tecson should have been aware of the Rules. His
negligence put to naught the remedies available to his client, that is, the
appeal and the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated November
7, 2001.
Atty. Tecson failed to file the corresponding docket fees, which he ought to
know as a pre-requisite for the docketing of the appeal in the Court of
Appeals. He also failed to file on time a motion for reconsideration on the
adverse resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Atty. Tecson even demanded from Complainant an additional amount of
Php10,000.00 and the latter was made to believe that Atty. Tecson would
personally go to Manila to file the said motion for reconsideration which was
already prepared as of December 7, 2001. Yet, Atty. Tecson did not even see
it fit to mail the Motion for Reconsideration immediately after it was prepared
on December 7, 2001. The Motion for Reconsideration reached the Court of
Appeals in Manila only on January 1, 2002, which was already three (3)
weeks after the Motion for Reconsideration was prepared. Clearly, the Motion
for Reconsideration was filed late, and Atty. Tecson had no plausible
explanation for his negligence.
Atty. Tecson had an obligation to the Complainant as regards the appeal. His
gross negligence, committed twice over, was the root cause for the dismissal
of the appeal.[7]
It was recommended that the respondent be reprimanded, having fallen
short of the diligence required of him under the circumstances. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, thereafter, resolved to adopt and approve the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in Resolution No. XVI2004-389 dated July 30, 2004.
The findings of the Investigating Commissioner are well taken.
It is settled that acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the similar duty of fidelity to the
client’s cause.[8] As we ruled in Perea v. Almadro:[9]
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… [W]hile a lawyer may decline a person to become a client for valid
reasons, once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he begins to owe
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. As a lawyer, he must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Indeed, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law
legally applied. His client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.[10]
Indeed, Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the
responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence.
[11]
Thus, it is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of
the law the interest of his client. [12] It is not enough that a practitioner is
qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare adequately
and give the appropriate attention to his legal work.[13]
The Court rules that in failing to zealously attend to a legal matter
entrusted to him, the respondent failed to live up to the duties and
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.
It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such
as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.
[14]
Considering that the respondent in this case returned the money for
litigation expenses to the complainant after the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, the Court sees fit to reprimand the respondent for his
actuations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delano E. Tecson is adjudged GUILTY of
violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
REPRIMANDED. He is STERNLY WARNED that similar conduct in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
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Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondent’s files which are
with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Mario S. Amaya sought the disbarment of Atty. Delano A. Tecson for
“highly irregular actuations and/or grave negligence in handling an appeal
with the Court of Appeals.”
The complainant alleged that he retained the services of the respondent to
handle the said appeal when his former counsel suffered a stroke due to
acute hypertension. The respondent demanded P20,000.00 for the filing of
the notice of appeal, which the complainant immediately paid. The
respondent assured him that the appeal was going to be filed on time, and
demanded an additional sum of P20,000.00 for the preparation and filing of
the appellant’s brief. The complainant paid the said amount on March 24,
2001.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Tecson is guilty for violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

HELD: Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. A
lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. Thus, it is the duty of a
lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert
his best efforts to protect within the bounds of the law the interest of his
client. It is not enough that a practitioner is qualified to handle a legal
matter; he is also required to prepare adequately and give the appropriate
attention to his legal work.
The Court rules that in failing to zealously attend to a legal matter
entrusted to him, the respondent failed to live up to the duties and
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.
Atty. Delano E. Tecson is adjudged GUILTY of violating Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
Considering that the respondent in this case returned the money for litigation
expenses to the complainant after the denial of the motion for
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reconsideration, the Court sees fit to reprimand the respondent for his
actuations.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 4934

March 17, 2004

DANIEL S. AQUINO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA LOURDES VILLAMAR-MANGAOANG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint1 prays that respondent be disbarred for
allegedly introducing false evidence in a case and for breaching her duties to
the legal profession.
Complainant avers that prior to his present assignment, he was a Special
Investigator of the Legal and Investigation Staff of the Bureau of Customs,
Customs Police Division, Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District
Command, Pasay City, headed by respondent.

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On July 2, 1996, a passenger named Christopher B. Gomez arrived at the
NAIA from San Francisco, California under Flight No. PR-105.2 When one of his
balikbayan boxes passed through the Bureau of Customs x-ray machine, the
image of what looked like handgun parts appeared.3 A rigid examination
conducted by Customs Examiner Manolito Ermitaño confirmed that the items
were assorted gun parts. The Chairman of the NAIA-DOJ Prosecution Task
Force caused the filing of a criminal complaint against Gomez with the
Department of Justice.4
Complainant claims that prior to or during the preliminary investigation of
the case, particularly on September 2, 1996, NAIA Customs Police Officer
Apolonio Bustos and respondent ordered the transfer of the gun parts inside
Gomez’s balikbayan box to another box. She then ordered Office Messenger
Joseph Maniquis to deliver to the State Prosecutor the balikbayan box without
the gun parts. According to complainant, respondent did this because Gomez
was a close friend.5 The switching of the balikbayan boxes and the
substitution of the evidence resulted in the dismissal of the criminal charges
against Gomez.6
Complainant argues that respondent exercised dishonesty, committed acts
of legal impropriety, and compromised her duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer, an officer of the court and a public official, thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the government.
In her Answer,7 respondent avers that she could not have switched the
contents of the balikbayan box of Gomez because she was not in charge of
the physical disposition of the evidence. She pointed out that if
complainant’s allegations were true, he should have filed a complaint against
her after the case against Gomez was dismissed in 1996. However, he
waited more than two years before bringing these unfounded and false
accusations against her.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.8 On March 4, 2003, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit.
The recommendation is well-taken.
The complaint against respondent is anchored primarily on the affidavit of
Joseph P. Maniquis, Office Messenger of the Legal and Investigation Staff
dated August 5, 19989 who stated that in the evening of September 2, 1996,
respondent instigated, planned and supervised the substitution of Gomez’s
balikbayan box.10 His affidavit is a grammatically well-drafted document
written in English which contains statements that neatly dovetail with the
allegations in the complaint.
On April 1, 2002, Maniquis executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay where he
admitted the following:
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xxxxxxxxx
2. Noong ika-5 ng Agosto 1998, matapos ako painumin ng alak ni
DANIEL AQUINO ay pinapirma nya ako sa isang affidavit na nakasulat
as (sic) Ingles na di ko nabasa;
3. Nalaman ko na lamang kelan lang na yung affidavit na pinirmahan
ko ay ginamit para kasuhan si Atty. Lourdes Mangaoang;
4. Hindi tutuo na ako ay inutusan ni APOLONIO BUSTOS o ni ATTY.
MANGAOANG na ilipat ang balikbayan box mula sa opisina ng Legal
and Investigation Staff, NAIA sa sasakyan ni Bustos noong ika02 ng
Septyembre 1996. Lalong walang katotohanan ang paratang na inilipat
naming ang balikbayan box sa kotse ni Atty. Mangaoang;
5. Pinabubulaanan ko ang mga salaysay ko sa affidavit na pinirmahan
ko noong ika-5 ng Agosto 1998.
6. Lahat ng sinabi ko sa sinumpaang salaysay na ito ay pawing
katotohanan. x x x
xxx
x x x.11
The foregoing has a more authentic ring of truth compared to the verbose
and grammatically precise English statements contained in his purported
affidavit.
Moreover, there are other circumstances which demonstrate the instant
complaint’s lack of merit.
The claim of complainant that respondent was in her office on September 2,
1996 with Customs Police Officer Apolonio Bustos to substitute the
balikbayan box of Christopher Gomez is belied by the attendance
logbook12 for September 2, 1996, which shows that she was not present
during that time and, thus, could not have ordered Joseph B. Maniquis to
switch Gomez’s box. It also appears that respondent was not even aware of
the scheduled hearing at the DOJ on September 3, 1996 considering that she
received a subpoena duces tecum relative to the case only at 4:00 p.m. of
that day.13
Equally damaging is the fact that Apolonio Bustos vehemently denied having
ordered Maniquis to load Gomez’s balikbayan box onto his car on September
2, 199614 and having driven the same to the International Container Terminal,
because all the physical evidence were stored in the evidence room which
was under the supervision of the Evidence Custodian. Bustos further
asserted that he regularly left the office at 5:00 p.m.15
Complainant’s allegation that respondent together with Customs Police
Officers Edgardo R. Galang and Juan B. Turqueza met with the counsel of
Christopher Gomez at the Kamayan Restaurant on August 8, 1996 was
contradicted by no less than Galang and Turqueza themselves, who denied
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the claim and declared that the same is "merely a product of [complainant’s]
imagination done in retaliation for the several instances we required him to
pay the correct taxes and duties for articles the release of which he
facilitated at the Arrival Area, NAIA."16
The duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only limited to the
administration of discipline to those found culpable of misconduct but also to
the protection of the reputation of those frivolously or maliciously
charged.17 In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the
complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.18 In the case at bar, complainant failed to meet the required
evidentiary standard. In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant
evidence, as in this case, the complaint for disbarment against respondent
should be dismissed.19
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
FACTS: On July 2, 1996, a passenger named Christopher B. Gomez arrived at
the NAIA from San Francisco, California under Flight PR105. When one of
his balikbayan boxes passed through the Bureau of Customs x-ray machine,
the image of what looked like handgun parts appeared. A rigid examination
conducted by Customs Examiner Manolito Ermitaño confirmed that the items
were assorted gun parts. The Chairman of the NAIA-DOJ Prosecution Task
Force caused the filing of a criminal complaint against Gomez with the
Department of Justice. Complainant claims that prior to or during the
preliminary investigation of the case, particularly on September 2,1996, NAIA
Customs Police Officer Apolonio Bustos and respondent ordered the transfer
of the gun parts inside Gomez’s balikbayan box to another box. She then
ordered Office Messenger Joseph Maniquis to deliver to the
State Prosecutor the balikbayan box without the gun
parts. According to complainant, respondent did this because Gomez
was a close friend. The switching of the balikbayan boxes and the
substitution of the evidence resulted in the dismissal of the criminal charges
against Gomez. Respondent avers that she could not have switched the
contents of the balikbayan box of Gomez because she was not in charge of
the physical disposition of the evidence. She pointed out that if
complainant’s allegations were true, he should have fi led a complaint
against her after the case against Gomez was dismissed in
1996.However, he waited more than two years before bringing
these unfounded and false accusations against her. The case was referred to
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the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. On March 4, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the administrative complaint prays that respondent be
disbarred for allegedly introducing false evidence in a case and for
breaching her duties to the legal profession

RULING: The duty of the Court towards members of the bar is not only
limited to the administration of discipline to those found culpable of
misconduct but also to the protection of the reputation of those
frivolously or maliciously charged. In disbarment proceedings, the burden
of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. In the case at bar, complainant failed to meet the
required evidentiary standard. In the absence of convincing or clearly
preponderant evidence, as in this case, the complaint for disbarment
against respondent should be dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 632

June 27, 1940

In re Attorney MELCHOR E. RUSTE, respondent,
The respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
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LAUREL, J.:
By virtue of an administrative complaint filed by Mateo San Juan against
Melchor E. Ruste on February 27, 1934, to which the respondent made
answer on March 15, 1934, this Court, by resolution of December 1, 1934,
referred the case to the Solicitor-General for report. The reference brought
forth the following formal complaint filed by the Solicitor-General against the
respondent on March 26, 1935:
Comes now the undersigned Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands
in the above entitled administrative case, and pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 5 of the rules concerning disbarment or suspension
of attorneys-at-law, to this Honorable Supreme Court, respectively
alleges:
1. That in cadastral case No. 6, G. L. R. O. Record No. 483 of the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga, the respondent, Melchor E. Ruste,
appeared for and represented, as counsel, Severa Ventura and her
husband, Mateo San Juan, the herein complainant, who claimed lot No.
3765; and as a result of said cadastral proceedings, an undivided
eleven-twentieth (11/20) share of said lot was adjudicated by said
court to said claimants;
2. That there was no agreement the respondent and his said clients as
to the amount of his fees; but that they paid to him upon demand on
different occasions the sums of (30 and P25 as attorney's fees;
3. That after said payments, the respondent again demanded of the
complainant and his wife as additional fees the sum of P25, but they
had no money to pay, him, and so he asked them to execute in his
favor a contract of lease, and a contract of sale, of their share in said
lot No. 3764 in order that he may be able to borrow or raise said sum
of P25;
4. That in accordance with said respondent's request, the complainant
and his wife executed on September 22, 1930, a contract of lease,
whereby in consideration of P100, they leased to him their coconut and
banana plantation in said lot No. 3764 for a term of five years, and also
a deed of sale, whereby in consideration of P1,000, they sold and
transferred to him their undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share in
said lot No . 3764, although, ,in fact and in truth, neither of the
consideration mentioned in said contracts of lease and sale were ever
receive by them;
5. That on March 21, 1931, the respondent executed a deed of sale,
whereby in consideration of P370 he sold and transferred to Ong Chua
said undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share in lot No. 3764 excluding
the house and its lot, occupied by the complainant and his wife; and on
March 28, 1931, the respondent executed another deed of sale,
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whereby in consideration of the same amount of P370 paid to him by
the same Ong Chua, he sold and transferred to the latter the same
undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20") share in lot No. 3764, but already
including said houses and its lot;
6. That by virtue of the sale to him, Ong Chua has taken possession of
said eleven-twentieth share in lot No. 3764;
7. That notwithstanding said second deed of sale, the respondent
obtained from Ong Chua to allow the complaint and his wife to
continue living house for a period of two years without paying any rent;
8. That on October 10, 1933, however, the respondent notified the
complainant and his wife in writing that the said house still belonged to
the respondent, and requires said spouses to pay, the sum of P40.50,
representing ten months' rental in arrears, and thereafter a monthly
rental of P1.50; and
9. That the respondent did not turn over to the complainant and his
wife the amount of P370 paid by Ong Chua nor any part thereof.
Wherefore, the undersigned prays that disciplinary action be taken
against the respondent.
To the foregoing complaint, the respondent, on April 23, 1935, interposed the
following answer:
Comprarece el infrascrito, en su propiarepresentacion y a la Honorable
Corte Suprema, alega:
Niega, general y especificamente sus alegaciones en dicha demanda,
sobretodo en cuanto al pago de cantidades monetarias alli
especificadas, y como defensa especial, alega:
Que el denunciante Mateo San Juan, y sus testigos Esperato Bucoy y
Severa Ventura han infringido la Ley del Perjurio; ademasd el Fiscal
Provincial Jose Evangelista es una parte interesada en el resultado de
este asunto;
Por todo lo expuesto, al Honorable Tribunal pide:
(a) Que para la substanciacion de esta causa que actue de Fiscal, el
Honorable Enrique Braganza, Fiscal de Jolo, Sulu;
(b) Que dicho Honorable Fiscal Enrique Braganza, sea requerido a
investigar a los testigos, Esperato Bucoy y Severa, Ventura, y la Ley del
Perjirio tal como esta enmendada.
Sometido respetuosamente.
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By resolution of this court of April 24, 1935, the said formal complaint and
answer were referred to the judge of First Instance of Zamboanga for
investigation, report, and recommendation. After various and
postponements, transpiring between August 3, 1935 and October 18, 1939,
the Honorable Catalino Buenaventura, then presiding over the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga, elevated the record of the case of this court. On
October 31, 1939, the case was included in the January, 1940 calendar, and
at the hearing thereof on February 1, 1940, the respondent submitted the
case without oral argument, and the memorandum presented by the
Solicitor-General, recommending the dismissal of the complaint filed against
respondent, was ordered attached to the record.
From a perusal of the entire record, particularly of the formal complaint filed
by the Solicitor-General against the respondent attorney, we gather the
following material charges formulated against the latter, to wit, (1) that he
engineered the execution in his favor, by the spouses Mateo San Juan and
Severa Ventura, of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, and of the deed of sale,
Exhibit B, covering the property in question; (2) that he did turn over the
considerations therefor to the said spouses; (3) that he likewise deeded the
same property to one Ong Chua, for P370, without paying the spouses the
said purchase price, and (4) that he required the spouses to pay (40.50 for
ten months' rental in arrears, and thereafter a monthly rental of P1.50 for the
house occupied by the said spouses.
Sometime in July, 1930, the respondent acted as counsel for the complainant
and his wife when the latter laid claim of ownership upon lot No. 3764 in
case No. 6, G. L. R. O., Cadastral Record 483 of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, eleven-twentieth of said lot having been eventually adjudicated
to the wife, Severa Ventura, on December 20, 1933. On September 22, 1930,
that is, during pendency of said cadastral case, the spouses purportedly
leased a part of said lot to the respondent for P100, which lease was
cancelled and superseded by a deed of sale executed on the same date,
whereby the said spouses, in consideration of P1,000, conveyed eleventwentieth of the same land in favor of the respondent. This is also the finding
of the Solicitor-General in his report submitted in this case:
. . . convinieron cancelar el arrendamiento y otorgar en sustitucion un
contrato de compraventa absoluta a favor del recurrido, como en
efecto se hizo y es el Exhibito B (pp. 37-38, Rollo 1), por cuyo
documento Severa Ventura con el consentimiento marital
correspondiente vendio definitivamente al recurrido su participacion
pro indivisa da 11/20 partes en el rferido lote, y estando aun el mismo
pendiente de vista u decision el Expediente Catastral No. 6, Record No.
483, del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Zamboanga. (Pp. 19-20.)
The property being thus in suit, which the respondent was waging on behalf
of his clients, his acquisition thereof by the deed of sale, Exhibit B,
constitutes malpractice. (Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil., 775; In
re Calderon, 7 Phil. 427.) Whether the deed of sale in question was executed
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at the instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as contended by
the respondent, or at the latter's behest, as contended by the complainant,
is of no moment. In either case as attorney occupies a vantage position to
press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so
amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist
between attorney and client, and of the rights of both."
(Hernandez vs. Villanueva, supra.)
There is evidence to show that the respondent has failed to account to the
aggrieved spouses for the various amounts received by him on account of
the transactions effected by him pertaining to the portion of lot No. 3764.
However, as the evidence is conflicting and the statements of the parties are
contradictory on this point, it is believed that the determination of the exact
amount due them by the respondent should better elucidated and
determined in an appropriate action which the complaint and his spouse may
institute against the respondent for this purpose.
For having improperly acquired the property referred to in Exhibits A and B,
under the above circumstances, which property was then subject matter of a
judicial proceedings, in which he was counsel, the respondent is found guilty
of malpractice and is hereby suspended for a period of one year, reserving to
the complainant and his spouse such action as may by proper for the
recovery of such amount or amounts as may be due from the respondent. So
ordered.
DIGEST
FACTS: Melchor Ruste appeared as counsel for the San Juan spouses in
cadastral proceeding. An 11/12 share of the estate was adjusted in spouses
favor.

Ruste demanded for his fees. The couple did not have enough money to pay
him, so he asked the to execute in his favor a contract of sale of their share
Lot No. 3764, intending to apply a portion of the wound-be proceeds as
payment for his fees. The spouses complied.

On March 21, 1981, the land was sold to Ong Chua. The P375 payment of
Chua through Ruste never reached the hand of the San Juan couple.

ISSUE: WON Ruste committed malpractice

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HELD: Yes, suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. Whether the deed
of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by
financial necessity (as contended by Ruste) or at their request (as contended
by the couple) is immaterial. The lawyer occupies a vantage position to press
upon or dictate his terms to harass a client.

Reinstatement, basis – 1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18727

August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the
plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma.
Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro
Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive
properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the
deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly
and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may
nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the
deed of donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar,
nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de
nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho
sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de
Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio
Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN
JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad,
que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
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legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que
posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o
a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de
mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion.
Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor
Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica,
apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta
Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the
second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio
Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of
controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator,
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next
day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui,
however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's
assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to
him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with
the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened,
claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another
one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of theHospicio in their deed
of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two
and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate
descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado."
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of
Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed
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the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand,
is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator of theHospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the
phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer,
but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or
purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but
a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of
Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo
de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying
one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola,
1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho
positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los
derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las
cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree
alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a
fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons
who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute
and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under
the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission
requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
"successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil
Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to
qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado"
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because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law
school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the
highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because
under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe
the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the
rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value —
for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law
and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as
against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that
although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by
virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in
the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court
on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact,
however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed
the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the
Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to
the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent
in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend,
generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be
conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an
attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good
moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court
will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he
was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
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Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have
been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except
that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original
admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether
applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that
phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper
person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to
discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are
to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental
qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking
reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that
implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office
which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of
time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66
(formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of
action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the
office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as
long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo
warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of
theHospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and
complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order
of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60
Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated
in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby
Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal
adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant
administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial
maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter
dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made
clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio."
He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he
had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however,
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he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after
receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare
Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as
stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled
situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who,
in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another
opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer,
was not entitled to the administration of theHospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On
4 March 1950, the Hospiciocommenced an action against the Philippine
National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because
the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a
third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who
had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950,
having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was
relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of theHospicio.
The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February
1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before
President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in
Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a
case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary
that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus
taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties
in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The
plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal
and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November
1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the
effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal,
however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties,
who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ...
should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the
incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a
right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July
1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no
action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as
indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this
Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro
Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio"
between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court
decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to
the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position
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of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file an action inquo warranto against said Dr.
Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu
Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the
conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action — all
these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of
the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after
the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff
did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of
the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And
the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position
any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is
from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted,
not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said
office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a
lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of
the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the
line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano
Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la
muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed
itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas
edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides
being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he
and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the
administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews
named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the
last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line,
the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms
of the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from
is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in
intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and
intervenor-appellant.
DIGEST
FACTS: Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and Doña
Antonia Perales who died intestate in1939. Jesus alleged that during the marriage of
Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their parents acquired certain properties in the City of
Cebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319. Upon the death of their mother, the
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properties were placed under the administration of their dad. That while the latter
was 84 years of age, Antonio by means of deceit, secured the transfer to
themselves the said lots without any pecuniary consideration; that in
the deed of sale executed on March 8, 1946, Rosario Cui appeared as one
of the vendees, but on learning of this fact she subsequently renounced her
rights under the sale and returned her portion to Don Mariano Cui by executing a
deed of resale in his favor on October 11, 1946; that defendants, fraudulently and with
the desire of enriching themselves unjustly at the expense of their father,
Don Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co-heirs, secured a loan of
P130,000 from the Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained,
defendants constructed thereon an apartment building of strong materials
consisting of 14 doors, valued at approximately P130,000 and
another building on the same parcels of land, which buildings were leased to
some Chinese commercial firms a monthly rental of P7,600, which defendants
have collected and will continue to collect to the prejudice of the plaintiffs; Jesus
alleged that the sale should be invalidated so far as the portion of the
property sold to Antonio Cui is concerned, for the reason that when that sale was
effected, Antonio was then acting as the agent or administrator of the properties of Don
Mariano Cui. Jesus lays stress on the power of attorney Exhibit L which was executed by
Don Mariano in favor of Antonio Cui on March 2,1946, wherein the former has
constituted the latter as his "true and lawful attorney" to perform in his name
and that of the intestate heirs of Doña Antonia Perales.

ISSUE: WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.
HELD: YES. While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or administrator is
disqualified from purchasing property in his hands for sale or management, and, in this
case, the property in question was sold to Antonio Cui while he was already the agent
or administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui, we however believe
that this question cannot now be raised or invoked.

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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2532. November 17, 1910. ]
In re MACARIO ADRIATICO, Petitioner.
W. A. Kincaid, for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AT LAW; REINSTATEMENT; POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO
REINSTATE AN ATTORNEY WHO HAS BEEN DISBARRED. — The Supreme Court
may reinstate an attorney at law who has been disbarred, for reasons and
upon assurances satisfactory to the court. (In re Boone, 90 Fed. Rep., 793, 83
Fed. Rep., 944; In re Treadwell, 114 Cal., In re King, 54 Ohio State, 415.)
DECISION
JOHNSON, J. :
On the 11th day of December, 1906, the petitioner was by this court
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removed from his office as a lawyer, and the certificate permitting him to
practice law theretofore issued to him was canceled and annulled, for the
reasons set out in the decision. (See in re Adriatico, 7 Phil. Rep., 173.) He
now, through his attorney, Mr. W. A, Kincaid, presents a petition asking for
reinstatement.
This petition or motion is not only presented by one of the leading members
of the Philippine Bar, but the reinstatement of Mr. Adriatico is also urged and
recommended by the Philippine Bar Association.
Mr. Adriatico was elected a member of the First Philippine Assembly, as well
as of the Second, from the same Assembly District, the Island of Mindoro. His
conduct as a member of the Legislature has merited the approval of the
Philippine Islands, and Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the Philippine Assembly.
His good conduct is also certified to by the Hon. Mariano Cui, judge of the
Seventh Judicial District.
No objection is made by anyone to the motion which he presents. The
petitioner promises that, should he be reinstated by this court, he will, in the
future, observe the laws and will, in all respects, act honestly and uprightly.
Considering his conduct since his suspension and considering the power of
this court in the premises (In re Boone, 90 Fed. Rep., 793, 83 Fed. Rep., 944;
In re Treadwell, 114 Cal., 24; In re King, 54 Ohio State, 415), we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that Macario Adriatico may be admitted to the bar of
the Philippine Islands upon taking the usual oath. It is so ordered.
FACTS: ON DECEMBER 1906, ATTY. MACARIO ADRIATICO WAS REMOVED
FROM HIS OFFICE AS A LAWYER, AND THE CERTIFICATE PERMITTING HIM TO
PRACTICE LAW. LATER ON, THROUGH HIS LAWYER, HE PRESENTS A PETITION
ASKING FOR REINSTATEMENT. MR. ADRIATICO WAS ELECTED A MEMBER OF
THE FIRST PHILIPPINE ASSEMBLY, AS WELL AS OF THE SECOND, FROM THE
SAME ASSEMBLY DISTRICT, THE ISLAND OF MINDORO. HIS CONDUCT AS A
MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATURE HAS MERITED THE APPROVAL OF BOTH
GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND SPEAKER OF THE PHILIPPINE ASSEMBLY. THE
JUDGE OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ALSO CERTIFIES TO HIS GOOD
CONDUCT.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ADRIATICO BE REINSTATED IN THE PHILIPPINE BAR

HELD: ONE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS IN ORDER TO GRANT REINSTATEMENT
IS THE EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT SERVICE, IN WHICH, ADRIATICO
SUCCESSFULLY ATTAINED AS BEING MEMBER OF THE FIRST PHILIPPINE
ASSEMBLY. THE COURT, THEREFORE, HELD THAT MACARIO ADRIATICO MAY
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BE ADMITTED TO THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS UPON TAKING THE
USUAL OATH. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2756 June 5, 1986
PRUDENTIAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.

PER CURIAM:
Prudential Bank (Complainant Bank) instituted this administrative case on
April 11, 1985, praying this Court to investigate Respondent Judge Jose P.
Castro, presiding over Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, (Respondent Judge), and Atty. Benjamin M.
Grecia (Respondent Grecia), in connection with their actuations in a civil case
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(the RTC CASE), tried and decided by Respondent Judge and where plaintiff
was represented by Respondent Grecia.
The RTC CASE was entitled "Macro Textile Mills Corporation, Plaintiff, vs.
Prudential Bank & Trust Co., Aka The Prudential Bank and Benjamin Baens
del Rosario, Notary Public for Quezon City, Defendants". Plaintiff in the RTC
Case shall hereinafter be referred to simply as MACRO. It was the registered
owner of a 19,493 sq. m. lot in Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 261842 (the
"MACRO PROPERTY"), alleged to have a value of about P20 million.
What has been prayed for by Complainant Bank is the exercise by this Court
of its power to discipline Respondent Judge, and the initiation of proceedings
for the disbarment or suspension of Respondent Grecia.
Based on documents submitted to this Court, the relevant facts upon which
this Resolution is based may be stated as follows:
1. The President and General Manager of MACRO is named Go Cun Uy. He is
also a partner of, or a signatory for, a partnership named Galaxy Tricot
Manufacturing Co. (GALAXY, for short).
2. As of January 24, 1983, MACRO and GALAXY, together, were indebted to
Complainant Bank in the principal sum of P9,510,000.00.
3. On the said date of January 24, 1983, MACRO, through Go Cun Uy,
executed a mortgage over the MACRO PROPERTY ("notarized" on January 26,
1983) in favor of Complainant Bank to guarantee the then, as well as future,
obligations of MACRO and/or GALAXY in favor of the mortgagee.
4. More than a year after, or on April 11, 1984, Complainant Bank sent a
letter of demand to MACRO/GALAXY demanding payment of their pending
obligations in the total sum of P l1,629,503.92, exclusive of interest.
5. On July 12, 1984, Benjamin Baens del Rosario, as a Notary Public for
Quezon City, issued a "Notice of Sale By Notary", scheduled for August 6,
1984, for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the MACRO PROPERTY.
6. On August 2, 1984, MACRO filed the Complaint in the RTC CASE through
Atty. Mario E. Valderama, alleging principally that Go Cun Uy had no authority
to mortgage the MACRO PROPERTY and that his execution of the mortgage
was due to fraudulent manipulations of Complainant Bank. The Complaint
further stated that MACRO was entitled "to actual damages amounting to at
least P50,000,000.00 as well as to compensatory damages." Preliminary
attachment was prayed for on "so much of the properties of defendant Bank
and defendant Notary as may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may
be rendered against them. "
7. Four days thereafter, or on August 6, 1984, the Complaint was amended
over the signature of Respondent Grecia. The amendments are of no
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substantial relevance to this Resolution. The same prayer for preliminary
attachment was reiterated.
8. On the same date of August 6,1984, Respondent Judge, stating that the
sale had not taken place on that date, issued an Order temporarily
restraining the Register of Deeds of Quezon City from registering any Deed of
Sale of the MACRO PROPERTY
9. Respondent Judge then resolved the RTC CASE through a summary
judgment rendered on November 16, 1984. In the Decision, the mortgage of
the MACRO PROPERTY was declared null and void, and Complainant Bank
and Notary Public Del Rosario were ordered to pay MACRO more than P33
million in damages plus 20% attorney's fees.
10. Further, paragraph 2 of the dispositive part of the Decision provided as
follows:
2. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel immediately
the registration and annotation of the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage dated January 26, 1983, as well as its foreclosure,
notice of sale and certificate of sale on the Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 261842;
The foregoing paragraph 2 is of primary relevance to this Resolution. What
will be noted therein is that the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 261842, still in
the possession of Complainant Bank, was not declared cancelled. The
continued existence of that owner's duplicate could prevent the registration
of a sale of the MACRO PROPERTY without it being surrendered to the
Register of Deeds as the law requires the production of the owner's duplicate
certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration
(Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree).
11. On December 7, 1984, Complainant Bank filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the summary judgment.
12. Without ruling on Complainant Bank's Motion for Reconsideration,
Respondent Judge, in an Order dated January 7, 1985, amended paragraph 2
of his Decision, by directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City —
... to cancel immediately the registration of the Deed of real
estate mortgage dated January 24, 1983 on the back of TCT No.
261842 pursuant to the aforesaid decision, and to issue in favor
of the plaintiff another owner's copy of said transfer certificate of
title after said cancellation, in lieu of the copy in the possession
of the defendant-bank which is hereby deemed cancelled.
The amendment of paragraph 2 ordered the cancellation of the owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 261842, in the possession of Complainant Bank, and the
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issuance of a new owner's duplicate of said TCT to MACRO. Thus, MACRO
was placed in a position to dispose of the MACRO PROPERTY.
13. (a) Seven days thereafter, or on January 14, 1985, MACRO sold the
MACRO PROPERTY to Falconi Marketing and Manufacturing, Inc. (FALCONI for
short) for P6 million.
(b) On January 15, 1985, TCT No. 261842 was cancelled and TCT No. 326740
was issued in the name of FALCONI.
14. On February 7, 1985, Respondent Judge denied Complainant Bank's
Motion for Reconsideration "not only for being pro forma but also for lack of
merit." Upon receipt of the corresponding Order on February 13, 1985,
Complainant Bank filed a notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
15. Consequent to the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Complainant Bank, Respondent Judge, in his Order of February 13, 1985,
considered his Decision in the RTC CASE to be final and ordered the issuance
of a Writ of Execution, which also constituted a denial of Complainant Bank's
appeal.
16. (a) On February 18, 1985, Complainant Bank came to this Court on
Mandamus/Certiorari (G.R. No. 69907), asking that Respondent Judge be
ordered to allow its appeal from the Decision rendered in the RTC CASE to
the Intermediate Appellate Court and to annul the Order and Writ of
Execution he had previously issued.
(b) probably because of the Order of this Court restraining execution of the
Decision in the RTC CASE, Respondent Judge, on March 13, 1985, gave
course to the appeal of Complainant Bank to the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
17. (a) On April 1, 1985, Complainant Bank caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to
be annotated on FALCONI's title.
(b) In G.R. No. 69907, this Court on May 31, 1985, set aside the Resolution of
January 7, 1985 of Respondent Judge.
(c) On June 26, 1985, the Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City denied the
request of Complainant Bank, invoking this Court's resolution in G.R. No.
69907, for the cancellation of TCT No. 326740 in the name of FALCONI.
(d) Sometime in June, 1985, FALCONI instituted a Complaint against
Complainant Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on its TCT No. 326740, which case is
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXVI.

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(e) On September 23, 1985, this Court in G.R. No. 69907, ordered the
Register of Deeds (i) to cancel the new owner's DUPLICATE OF TCT No.
261842; (ii) to restore the old TCT No. 261842, with the annotated mortgage
lien in favor of Complainant Bank; and (iii) to cancel TCT No. 326740 in the
name of FALCONI.
Nothing in this Resolution should be construed as a determination of a
factual issue in the controversy between Complainant Bank and MACRO in
the RTC CASE, which is now pending before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
This Resolution deals only with the steps taken by Respondent Judge in
regards to the RTC CASE when he was still acting on it. Considered in the
light of the facts related above, we find he had committed serious and grave
misfeasance in connection with his actuations in the said RTC CASE in that:
(a) In both original and amended Complaints in the RTC CASE, it was
apparent that MACRO was suing for an amount of at least P50 million. On the
very date of August 6, 1984, when the Amended Complaint was filed, which
was only four days after the original Complaint was instituted, Respondent
Judge was already aware, per his Order of attachment, that MACRO "in its
verified complaint and affidavit", was asking defendants "to pay the sum of
P50,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages which plaintiff seeks
to recover from defendant in this case."
In the original and amended Complaints, the prayers did not ask for
damages specifically in the sum of more than P50 million clearly in order to
avoid payment of filing fees of more than P100,000.00. The filing fee actually
paid was only P210.00.
Ordinarily, a Trial Judge may be excused from immediately noting a mistake
made by the Clerk of Court in assessing filing fees. However, considering
Respondent Judge's realization of the mistake, on August 6, 1984, the date
he issued his Order for preliminary attachment, and his actuations thereafter
in the RTC CASE, his failure to require payment of the correct amount of filing
fees indicated his partiality towards, not to say confabulation with, MACRO
and/or its lawyers.
(b) The summary judgment was ill-conceived. For one thing, the Amended
Complaint had charged Complainant Bank with fraud and deceit. Under the
law, good faith is to be presumed, and the fraud and deceit imputed to
Complainant Bank cannot be other than a question of fact, which should
have been resolved after due reception of evidence pro and contra. There
was nothing in the Answer, and in its pleadings in connection with MACRO's
Motion for summary judgment, which could indubitably be deemed an
admission, or proof, of Complainant Bank's alleged fraud and deceit.
Respondent Judge's statements to the contrary are bereft of veracity.
Worse errors have been committed by Trial Judges but, in the RTC CASE, the
erroneous promulgation of the summary judgment indicates, in the light of
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the entire scenario, that the error was deliberate in order to favor plaintiff, or
that it was in actual confabulation with plaintiff and its lawyers.
(c) The issuance of the summary judgment was bad enough. The grant
therein of damages in the amount of more than P33 million, plus 20%
attorney's fees, when the property involved in the litigation was alleged in
the amended complaint (Annex "F") as.P20 million (sold to FALCONI for P6
million) immediately raises the thought that Respondent Judge had really
taken a stand of partiality in favor of MACRO and its lawyers.
(d) The Order of January 7, 1985 of Respondent Judge also shows his
partiality to, or his confabulation with MACRO and the latter's lawyers.
The summary judgment was rendered on November 16, 1984, and notice
thereof was served on Complainant Bank on November 26, 1984. The latter
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 6, 1984. If, as Respondent
Judge has ruled, the Motion for Reconsideration was pro forms the summary
judgment became final on December 11, 1984. Respondent Judge, therefore,
would no longer have authority to amend his Decision on January 7. 1985.
When the Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 7, 1985,
Respondent Judge should also have set aside his Order of January 7, 1985
amending the summary judgment. It can now become clear that deferment
of action on Complainant Bank's Motion for Reconsideration was precisely for
the purpose of allowing amendment of the Decision on January 7, 1985.
The Order of January 7, 1985 was set aside in G.R. No. 69907. It is now for us
to state herein that Respondent Judge, in issuing such Order, clearly intended
to favor MACRO by allowing it to sell, as it did sell, the MACRO property to
FALCONI on January 14,1985.
(e) Respondent Judge, in his Order of March 13, 1985, gave course to the
appeal of Complainant Bank although he had already ruled that the latter
had lost the right of appeal. That Order of March 13, 1985 was issued after
Complainant Bank had instituted G.R. No. 69907 on February 19, 1985,
asking that Respondent Judge be ordered to allow its appeal from the
summary judgment. The Order of March 13, 1985 was clearly intended to
render G.R. No. 69907 moot and academic. Said Order was disrespectful of
this Court. If at all, Respondent Judge should have come to this Court in said
G.R. No. 69907, to ask for leave to allow the appeal of Complainant Bank
with admission that he had realized that his previous denial of the appeal
was erroneous. And it may be recalled that, in De Leon vs. Castro, 104 SCRA
241 (1981), this Court had occasion to state that Respondent's Judge's
"submission of false certificates of service under Section 5 of the Judiciary
Law is not excusable."
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES:
1. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to
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reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. This decision is immediately executory.
2. The Complaint for disbarment and suspension of respondent Atty.
Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Let the relevant pleadings in this
case in regards to Respondent GRECIA, and relevant pleadings as well as the
Decision in G.R. No. 69907 be furnished the Solicitor General for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST

Facts: In a Decision, dated 12 November 1987, this Court, upon finding that
respondent Benjamin Grecia had "proven himself unfit to continue in the
pursuit of his profession," ordered his disbarment.

On 24 November 1989, respondent filed a "Motion for Permission to
Reiterate his Petition for Reinstatement" stating that he humbly begs
permission to plead again for its forgiveness and clemency; that he has
suffered the harsh and supreme sanction of disbarment for two long years
now; that this is his first offense; that he solemnly declares that he has fully
realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully
repentant and learned the most bitter lesson of his life to such an extent that
he solemnly vows never to commit any offense again; that his sufferance of
the extreme sanction of disbarment has changed him for the better; that he
had fully purged himself in the proper and irreproachable manner and that
he prays that he be forgiven and pardoned by this Court. The Motion was
denied with finality in the Resolution of 21 December 1989.

On 21 May 1990, Mrs. Maria Luisa B. Grecia, wife of respondent wrote a
letter addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court
stating that she has long wanted to write and if it need be, on bended knees,
to ask the Court sincerely to forgive her husband and permit him to practice
his profession; that it is not only he who is suffering the anguish and shame
caused by his disbarment but also his children and herself; that it is now two
and a half (2 1/2) years since her husband has been disbarred and
completely without any means to support his family; that their youngest
daughter may altogether have to stop studying; that during these years, her
husband has deeply repented and is now very humble and prayerful and has
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reformed for the better and that she pleads that her husband be forgiven
and reinstated as a lawyer. The letter was Noted for the time being in the
Resolution of 28 June 1990.

On 17 October 1990, the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar,
submitted to the Bar Confidant for the Court's consideration, Resolution No.
90-057, adopted on 9 October 1990, praying that the Court extend its judicial
clemency to respondent Grecia and reinstate him as a member of the
Philippine Bar, reasoning among others, that he has been "sufficiently
punished," has reformed and rehabilitated himself, and can again be
entrusted with the exercise of the noble profession of law.

In a letter, dated 21 November 1990, addressed to the Chief Justice
and Associate Justices of the Court, respondent Grecia pleaded anew that
once the Court restores him to the practice of law, he "unreservedly bind(s)"
himself "henceforth to act and behave carefully as a worthy member of the
Philippine Bar.
Issue: Whether or not a previously disbarred member of the bar who has
proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of his profession may be
allowed for readmission?

Held: "The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to
practice, by one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the
applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the
effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been
successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be readmitted to a profession
which is intrinsically an office of trust. (In Re: Rusiana, Adm. Case No. 270, 29
March 1974, 56 SCRA 240)

"The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as follows: Whether or
not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on
whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation
therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant
must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law.
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The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he
was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that
has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement."
(5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443, cited in In Re: Juan T. Publico, February 20,
1981, 102 SCRA 721).

Cognizant, therefore, "that the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle," (In re Juan T. Publico, supra), we heed
respondent's plea for reinstatement. His expiation subsequent to his
disbarment; his realization of his mistake and the gravity of his offense; the
testimonials from exemplary members of the Bar as to his fitness to resume
the practice of law; and his solemn pledge to the Court, that if his
disbarment is lifted, he will always closely and faithfully abide by the ideals,
canons and ethics of the legal profession, call for this affirmative response.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby ordered
READMITTED to membership in the Bar.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 44 November 29, 1983
EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Bar Matter No. 59 November 29, 1983
BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 624 November 29, 1983
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, complainants,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T Poculan for respondent Sabandal in BM 59.
Alberto Concha for oppositors in BM 44.
RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
At issue in the above-entitled consolidated cases is the petition of
respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal, a successful Bar examinee in 1978, to be
admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Complainants-oppositors , namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan (Bar Matter No. 44,
Eufrosina Y. Tan vs. Nicolas E. Sabandal); Benjamin Cabigon (Bar Matter No.
59, Benjamin Cabigon vs. Nicolas E. Sabandal) and Cornelio Agnis, et al.
(SBC-624, Cornelio Agnis, et al. vs. Nicolas E. Sabandal), have opposed the
petition. They have charged respondent with: illegal practice of law for
accepting clients and for his appearances as a lawyer even if he has not yet
been admitted to the Bar; dishonesty, for filling up daily tune records as an
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Investigator of the Bureau of Lands during those days that he appeared as
counsel; falsification of public documents; gross dishonesty in public service;
and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The above-entitled cases, upon respondent's Motion, were ordered
consolidated in the Resolution of the Court dated November 12, 1982, and
were referred to the Office of the Chief Attorneys for investigation, report and
recommendation.
At the hearings conducted on search 23, 24 and 25, 1983, only
complainants-oppositors Eufrosina Y. Tan and Benjamin Cabigon,
complainants in Bar Matters 44 and 59, respectively, appeared birth their
respective counsel and presented their evidence oral and documentary . The
other complainants-oppositors namely Diomedes D. Agnis, Dr. Gabriel
Catane, Hedy Catane, Antonio Agnis and Fe E. Agnis, complainants in SBC624, failed to appear at the hearings despite several notices sent to them by
registered mail at their addresses of record. Cornelio Agnis had died in the
meantime.
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal waived his right to attend the investigations
for reasons of financial constraints and his belief that the evidence he had
already submitted together with his pleadings are sufficient to prove his case
so that he felt it unnecessary to submit additional evidence.
In support of her charge of deception by appearing as counsel and accepting
clients, Eufrosina Yap Tan, in Bar Matter No. 44, testified on and submitted
the following documentary evidence: (1) photostatic copies of transcripts of
stenographic notes of (a) the hearing in CAR Case No. 347 entitled Eufrosina
Y. Tan vs. Spouses Daniel Imanand Rosa Carreon, et als., before the Court of
Agrarian Relations, XVI Regional District, Branch III, on June 23, 1981,
wherein respondent manifested "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the
defendants, Your Honor" and alleged that Atty. Senen Angeles, counsel of
record, was sick (Exhibits "A " and "A-I "); (b) the hearings in Civil Case No.
98 entitled Benjamin Cabigon, et al. vs. Florentina Buntoran, et al., for
Forcible Enter and Damages, before the Municipal Court of Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte, on September 23, 1980, wherein one of the
appearances recorded was that of "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal: For the
defendants", and where respondent manifested "Your Honor please,
appearing for the defendants in collaboration with Atty., Angeles " (exhibits "
H ", " H-1 " and " H-3 "), and on December 16, 1980 when respondent made
a manifestation for the defendants (Exhibits "I" and "I-2"); (2) xerox copy of a
letter dated June 21, 1981 written by respondent to the Station Commander
of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, Obdulio Villanueva, which respondent wrote
in part: "we are informed that our office is being used by Mrs. Tan to harass
our clients . ... (Exhibits "B" and "B-1"): and (3) copy of the Order of Judge
Nicanor M. Ilicito, Jr., in CAR Case No. 326, entitled Sps. Daniel and Rosk
Iman vs. Eufrosina Yap Tan, stating in part that "plaintiffs, through Atty.
Nicolas Sabandal, informed the Court that plaintiff's counsel on record, Atty.
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Cyril Ruiz, is in bed and could not come in today's hearing" (Exhibits "G" and
"G-1)
On the same issue, in Bar Matter No. 59, complainant Benjamin Cabigon
testified on and presented the following exhibits: (1) the appearance of
respondent in, Civil Case No. 98, the Forcible Entry case entitled. Cabigon vs.
Bonturan before the Municipal Court of Roxas (Exhibit "B"), already
mentioned by Eufrosina Tan in Bar Matter No. 44; (2) a Certification by the
Court Clerk, Interpreter 1, of the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del
Norte, that respondent had appeared before said Court on October 1, 1981 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607, and 622; on October 16, 1981 and August 12,
1981 in Criminal Case No. 622; and on July 29, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 667
(Exhibit "A" );(3) the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 667
(People vs. Florentina Bonturan, et als.) for qualified Theft of Forest Products
wherein Felipe Inggo testified that respondent was the lawyer of the
Bonturans (Exhibit "D-3"), while accused Bernardo Gatina declared that
respondent was his lawyer (Exhibits "D-6 " and "D-7 "); so also with the
accused, Antonio Ganuran, who gave the same declaration and added that
he used to pay respondent and Atty. Angeles for handling his cases (Exhibits
"D-8" and "D-9").
To prove her other charges as to the unfitness of respondent to be a member
of the Bar, Eufrosina IX an exhibited a Warrant of Arrest against respondent
in Criminal Case No. 667 entitled People vs. Florentina Buntoran, et a]. for
the crime of Qualified Theft of Forest Products for having allegedly ordered
the falling and sewing of a day tree (Exhibit "E"), and the Amended
Complaint in the same case including respondent among the accused
(Exhibits "F" and "F-1"); and the administrative charge against respondent in
the Bureau of Lands and before the Tanodbayan for falsification of public
documents.
For his part, Benjamin Cabigon (in Bar Matter No. 59) also presented a
transcript of proceedings during the preliminary investigation on July 6, 1981
in the same Criminal Case No. 667 (People vs. Florentina Buntoran, et al.)
before the municipal Court for Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherein the
defense of three of the accused was that it was respondent who had ordered
the cutting of the day tree (Exhibits "D-2 ", "D-4 " and "D-5 ").
In his defense, respondent maintained that the charges against him were
"baseless and mere products of oppositor's bedevilled mind, for the truth
being that petitioner's admission to the Philippine Bar is a sharp thorn in the
throat of oppositor Eufrosina Tan, who had been waging a campaign of
ejectment against her tenant-farmers some of whom are relatives and
friends of petitioners"; and a scheme by Cabigon "to stifle anybody who
extends assistance to his opponents and to press the Subano settlers of
Gusa, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, to give up their ancestral lands to
Cabigon"; that he was merely assisting his parents-in-law, Daniel Iman and
Rosa Carreon, in CAR cases Nos. 347 and 326 as allowed under Sec. 14(k) of
PD 946, and that it was the stenographer who had inadvertently entered his
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name as "Atty. Sabandal" in those cases; that being an employee of the
Bureau of Lands does not bar him from attending to personal cases applying
by analogy section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, nor does he need any
authority to appear from said Bureau since the cases are not work
connected; that insofar as Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 of the
Municipal Court of Roxas are concerned, it was Atty. Senen O. Angeles who
was the counsel of record as shown by the Notice of Hearing (Annex "3",
Amended Comment); that on the dates that those cases were set on hearing,
he was on leave as shown by a Certification of the District Land Officer
(Annex "9", Amended Comment); that in appearing in those cases he was
merely helping distressed friends and relatives; that if he had absented
himself from office it was to attend to his personal needs and procure
materials for the nipa house that he was building and not to attend to the
case of Lito Dandoy, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 606 and 607;
that the term "chant" should be construed as a "dependent or person under
the protection of another and not a person who engages in the profession";
and that the Code of Ethics does not apply to him but only to members of the
Bar.
As his documentary evidence, respondent submitted: (1) a copy of a
subpoena for the first day of trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622
issued by the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, addressed to
Atty. Senen O. Angeles, Dipolog City and Atty. Benedicto O. Cainta, Dipolog
City, dated September 3, 1980, to show that they, not respondent, were the
counsel of record (Annex "3", Amended Comment); (2) Certification from the
Clerk of Court of the Municipal Court of Roxas that the dates of respondent's
appearance in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 was October 1, 1980
and not 1981; and in Criminal Case No. 622, the date was October 16, 1980
and not October 16, 1981 (Annex "1", Comment); (3) a certification by the
District Lands Officer, Benjamin Cabading, of the District Land Office No. IX-8,
Bureau of Lands, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte on the leaves of
absences of respondent on October 1, 1980, October 16, 1980 July 29, 1981
and August 12, 1981 (Annex "3", Comment), together with Civil Service Form
No. 48 (Annexes "6", "7", and "8" Amended Comment) wherein he recorded
his leaves of absences to prove that he applied for leave whenever he
appeared either for a friend or his parents-in-law, and to disprove dishonesty
(Annex "3", Comment); (4) duplicate copies of the reinvestigation report
(Annex "A ") and the Amended Information (Annex "B") filed by Second
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Rodolfo T. Mata, in the Court of First Instance, 16th
Judicial District, Dipolog City in Criminal Case No. 2734 for Qualified Theft of
Forest Products wherefrom respondent's name was dropped as one of the
accused on the ground that his inclusion was based on hearsay evidence
(Annex "A", Motion to Submit Additional Counter Evidence); as well as the
Order of the Court dropping him from the Information (Annex "C", Ibid.); (5)
the dismissal of the charge against him by the Director of Lands in Dagpin
vs. Sabandal, et al. (Annex " I ", petitioner's Motion to Dismiss); (6) the
dismissal of the charge against him for falsification of public document by
the Tanodbayan (Annex " I ", petitioner's Manifestation dated February 9,
1981; Annex "2", Reply); (7) Affidavit of Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, who had
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helped respondent prepare his original Comment, denying the truth of the
statement in the Comment that "respondent absented himself from his work
and appeared to protect the rights of Dandoy" alleging that respondent's
purpose in absenting himself was "to procure materials for his nipa
residence" (Annex " 1 ", Amended Comment); (8) Affidavit of Atty. Senen 0.
Angeles wherein Atty. Angeles declared that he was the counsel of record in
Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622, not the respondent who merely
accompanied accused Lito Dandoy in Criminal Case 622 to the Court (Annex
"4", Amended Comment); (9) an Affidavit of Lito Dandoy, one of the accused
in Criminal Cases Nos. 606 and 607 for Qualified Theft of Coconuts, and the
accused in Criminal Case No. 622 for Slight Physical Injuries, to the effect
that respondent was his intimate friend to whom he turned for help when a
Warrant of Arrest was issued against him; that it was upon his insistence that
respondent accompanied him to the Municipal Court of Roxas and that he
gave no compensation, in cash or kind, to respondent for the latter's help
(Annex "5", Amended Comment).
From the array of evidence presented by the parties, it is evident that the
charges of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross
dishonesty in public service and falsification of public documents, have not
been substantiated.
However, the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
While respondent's infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his
in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were parties, it is clear
from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only
after the opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he
specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the
defendants, Your Honor" (Exhibit 'A-1 '). He called himself "Attorney" knowing
full well that he was not yet admitted to the bar. Oppositors' evidence
sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an attorney" in
the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors.
Respondent cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have
easily asked for rectification. Even if respondent appeared merely in
collaboration with Atty. Senen Angeles in the several cases, that
collaboration could only have been ostensibly as a lawyer. Oppositors had
also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses testified as to
respondent's being their lawyer and their compensating him for his services
(Exhibits "D-8 " and "D-9 It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even
non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent
had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did,
however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station
Commander of Roxas, complaining of harassment to "our clients", when he
could not but have known that he could not yet engage in the practice of law.
His argument that the term "client" is a "dependent or person under the
protection of another and not a person who engages in the profession" is
puerile.

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Respondent's additional defense that the code of professional ethics does not
apply to him as he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be
admitted to the profession that exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its
members, and good moral character even for applicants for admission to the
Bar. He could at least have shown his fitness for admission by showing
adherence to and observance of the standards of conduct required by all who
aspire to profess the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take the
oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in
accordance with Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby denied.
For failure of complainants-oppositors, namely, Diomedes D. Agnis, Dr.
Gabriel Catane, Hedy Catane, Antonio Agnis and Fe E. Agnis in SBC-624 to
appear before the Investigator of this Court, their oppositions to the petition
of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys are hereby dismissed, with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
DIGEST
FACTS: Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations
but because of pending administrative complaints filed against him
regarding instances when he called himself “attorney” knowing full well that
he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was not allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath. Oppositor’s evidence sufficiently show that respondent had held
himself out as an attorney in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases and he
was paid for his “legal services”
He then filed a petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. In a resolution promulgated on
November 29, 1983 respondent petition was denied. Respondent asks for
forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given a
chance to be a member of the Phil. Bar, he would always be faithful to the
lawyer’s oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar

HELD: Rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the Court. An
applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character,
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fit and proper to practice law. Sabandal hereby allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974
In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu
City.
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana,
who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955, committed acts
of misconduct as a notary public and "has exhibited such a frame of mind
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and observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a member of the
legal profession," ordered his
disbarment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for re-admission,
supported by resolutions from members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions,
newspaper editors and reporters, members of professional and civic
organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to respondent's good
conduct and moral character since his disbarment, and petitioning for his
reinstatement to the legal profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to
practice, by one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not the
applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive evidence that the
effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been
successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a profession
which is intrinsically an office of trust.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13, 1972, he
filed a verified petition for reinstatement, submitting proofs of his honesty
and integrity and other indications of his good moral character (clearances
from the City Courts and Court of First Instance of Cebu, Police Department
of Cebu City, testimonials on his character by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of City
Courts and of the Court of First Instance, resolutions of the Cebu Lions Club,
Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the Knights of Columbus, Bar Association of
Cebu, Cebu Lawyers League, Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for
reinstatement on July 18, 1972, the Court issued a resolution on July 20,
1972, to wit:
... [A]cting on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a member of the
Philippine Bar, and considering (a) that respondent movant had been
disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that since then the said respondent may be
considered as having undergone adequate punishment; (c) that he has
observed exemplary conduct since then, according to credible certifications
attesting to his repentance for the offense committed by him thirteen (13)
years ago, and may be reasonably expected to scrupulously observe the
Canons of Legal Ethics in the future; (d) but that, in view of the numerous
changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some
guarantee of his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients;
the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is
hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a
recognized law school, and that upon his filing with the Clerk of this Court of
sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attesting
to his having regularly attended and passed their subjects, under the same
conditions as ordinary students said movant Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted
as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyer's oath
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and signing the Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this Supreme
Court.
Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the
Court's above-quoted resolution, as evidenced by the sworn certificates by
the individual professors of the review classes attended by him attesting to
his having regularly attended and passed their subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students, and the separate letters, both dated
February 25, 1974, of the Registrar and the Dean of the Gullas Law School, of
the University of the Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's
Deputy Clerk of Court and Acting Bar Confidant, confirming the truth of the
professors' statements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, conformably with the Court's resolution dated July 20, 1972,
respondent Carlos C. Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's
oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to this court the requisite
fees.
DIGEST
NO AVAILABLE

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
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EN BANC
A.C. No. 126

October 24, 1952

In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero.
Tranquilino Rovero in his own behalf.
PARAS, C.J.:
The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, on the grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent
Tranquilino Rovero, having been found in a final decision rendered by then
Insular Collector of Customs to have violated the customs law by fraudulently
concealing a dutiable importation, was fined in an amount equal to three
times the customs duty due on a piece of jewelry which he omitted to
declare and which was subsequently found to be concealed in his wallet",
and that on October 28, 1948, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero was convicted
of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No.
CA-G.R. No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,500 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent practice against
customs revenue, as defined and penalized by Section 2703 of the Revised
Administrative Code." The respondents admits the existence of the of the
decision of the Collector of Customs, and his conviction by the Court of
Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient to disqualify him
from the practice of law, especially because the acts of which he was found
guilty, while at most merely discreditable, had been committed by him as an
individual and not in pursuance or in the exercise of his legal profession.
Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney for a conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, and this ground is apart from any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as lawyer. Moral turpitude
includes any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.
(In re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.)
Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of
Appeals certainly involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or good
morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is aggravated by the
fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but
the Government.
Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred from the
practice of law, and he is hereby directed to surrender to this Court his
lawyer's certificate within 10 days after this resolution shall have become
final.
So ordered.
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