McGuire Texas Supreme Court Appeal f1

Cause No._____________________

In the
Supreme Court of Texas

___________________________________________________________

JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE,
Petitioner,
v.
FANNIE MAE A/K/A FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.


On appeal from cause no. 02-11-00312-CV
Second District Court of Appeals
Fort Worth, Texas


PETITION FOR REVIEW















Respectfully submitted,

James Allen McGuire (Pro Se)
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
Ph. 817 420-4151
Email: [email protected]
Appeal Page 1


IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
Petitioners
James Allen McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
Ph. 817 420-4151








Respondent
Fannie Mae a/k/a Federal
National Mortgage Association

Counsel Representing
Janna W. Clarke
Broude, Smith & Jennings, P.C.
309 West 7
th
Street
Suite 1100
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Appeal Page 2


TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL ............................................. 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................... 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................ 4,5
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................... 6
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .......................................... 7
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...................................... 8

1. Did the trial Court of Appeals error in rendering an opinion based upon
evidence not raised in the trial court? Appendix, Exhibit A.

2. Did the Court of Appeals error in not rendering an opinion based on evidence
entered into the trial court record? Appendix, Exhibit A.

3. Did the trial court and Court of Appeals commit an error of common law in
not properly applying law and protecting the Appellee’s rights as guaranteed
by the United States Constitution?

4. Did the trial court and Court of Appeals error in their opinions violate
Appellee’s rights as guaranteed by the U S Constitution in violation of 18
USC § 242 - Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law?

5. Did the Court of Appeals error in their opinion violate Appellee’s rights as
guaranteed by the U S Constitution by failing to address violations of 18 USC
§ 1621 – Perjury Generally?

6. Did the Court of Appeals error in their opinion violate Appellee’s rights as
guaranteed by the U S Constitution by failing to address violations of § 1623–
False Declarations before Grand Jury or Court?

7. Did the trial court commit gross error and did the Court of Appeals itself
further violate Appellee’s right by failing to address violations of 18 USC §
1001 – Statements or Entries Generally?

8. Did the Court of Appeals error and deprive Appellee of Due Process of Law
by denying Appellee’s request for a true and correct copy of the trial Court’s
record? Appendix, Exhibit D.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................... 11

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................... 12

VI. ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 13
Appeal Page 3

Petition For Review - Texas Supreme Court

VII. PRAYER ...................................................................................... 15
VIII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................. 16


INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bullock v. Amoco Production Co., 608 SW2d 899 - (Tex. 1980) ......... 9
Randall's FoodMkts, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.1995) .. 9
Employees Ret. Sys. of Tex. v. Blount, 709 S.W.2d646 (Tex. 1986) .. 10
Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.1993) 10
Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226
(Tex.2004) ............................................................................................. 10
Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Council of
Co-Owner of Saida II Towers Condominium Association, 706 S.W.2d
(1986)………………………………………………………………………….10
Crumpton v. Stevens, 936 S.W.2d 473, 476
(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ) .................................................. 15

Statutes
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Tex Cr. Code Ann. § 47.01(a) ................................................ 12
TEXAS CONSTITUTION
Article V, §1-a(6)A ................................................................. 12
TEXAS PENAL CODE
TEXAS CIVIL CODE
TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE
§22.001(a)(2) ........................................................................................ 9
§22.001(a) (6)........................................................................................ 9
Tex. Gov't Code §311.016(3)

TEXAS PROPERTY CODE
§24.001-24.011
Appeal Page 4


§24.002
§24.002(b) ............................................................................................. 16
§§24.002(b) - 24.005(f) ......................................................................... 16
§24.005 ................................................................................................. 16
§24.005( f ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
OTHER
Canons of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0364 (2005)
Larry York D/B/A York Tank Trucks (Petitioner) v State of Texas
(Respondent) as Cause No. 09-0905
RULES
TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Tex. R. App. P. 56.1(a)(5) .................................................................... 9
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 ............................................................................. 16
Tex. R. Civ. P. 21 ................................................................................. 16
Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a ............................................................................... 16
Tex. R. Civ. P. 753 ............................................................................... 16

APPENDIX
Court of Appeal Opinion - Exhibit A .................................................... 192
Appellant 1
st
Amended Brief – Exhibit B ............................................. 17
Appellant Response Brief to Appellee Brief – Exhibit C ..................... 155
Order Denying True Copy of Record – Exhibit D ................................ 206
Appellee Brief – Exhibit E .................................................................... 175
JP Order – Exhibit F ............................................................................. 201
Motion to Dismiss at JP – Exhibit G .................................................... 203
Notice to Court of Appeal Potential Record Tampering – Exhibit H .. 209
Appellee Order of Indigence – Exhibit I ............................................... 210




Appeal Page 5

Petition For Review - Texas Supreme Court

PETITION FOR REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS:
Petitioner, James Allen McGuire, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure, respectfully submits this Petition for Review seeking review
of the Second District Court of Appeals' opinion in this matter. As set
forth below, this Honorable Court should grant this Petition.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: This dispute began as a forcible detainer action
initiated by a party not having lawful standing to invoke a trial court’s
jurisdiction. Petitioner (Appellant) filed a general denial and a Motion to
Dismiss for want of standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. The
justice court opined in favor of Appellee. The court without jurisdiction
awarded possession of real property to Appellee. Appellant timely
appealed the judgment to the County Court at Law One, Tarrant
County, Texas. This court also lacking jurisdiction also awarded
possession of real property to Appellee relying upon an unproven
Substitute Trustee Deed unlawfully filed of recorded by Appellee as the
sole evidence to grant possession. Appellant timely perfected an Appeal
to the Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth, Texas. Appellant noticed
in written letter (Appendix, Exhibit H) the Appellate Court that the trial
courts records where inaccurate, this inaccuracy would have shown that
the trial court was aware that the evidence may have been tainted, but
such fact was removed from the record supplied to the Court of Appeals.
Upon notice being sent by Appellee of such error to the Court of Appeals,
the appeal court then requested a response from Appellee concerning the
incorrect trial court’s record who objected to a true and correct copy of the
record be proved up. The appeal court sided with Appellee (Appendix,
Appeal Page 6


Exhibit D); therefore Appellant’s rely upon a non-true and non-correct
copy of the trial court’s record and as such, Appellee was denied a
guaranteed constitutional right.

Opinion of the panel: The panel that decided the case and affirmed the
trial court was composed of Justices Livingston, C.J., Gardner and
Gabriel, JJ. Upon the court of appeals rendering judgment issued in
opinion on 22 March 2012. On March 27, 2012, Appellant was left with
no option but to appeal to the Texas Supreme Court for the benefit of all
citizens of Texas as the side effect of the appeals court’s civil ruling would
create havoc in regards to “TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, Title 1.”
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Texas
Government Code §22.001(a)(6) because the court of appeals has
committed errors of law of such importance to the state's jurisprudence
that they should be corrected. See Tex. Gov't Code §22.001(a)(6); Tex. R.
App. P. 56.1(a)(5), (6); Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d
640, 643 (Tex.1995)
2. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under
Government Code §22.001(a)(2) because the court of appeals decision
conflicts with this Court's decision in the following:
(A) ”These statutes created a right not existing at common law and
prescribed a remedy to enforce the right. Thus, the courts . . . [only
have jurisdiction according to the rules] provided by the statute
Appeal Page 7

Petition For Review - Texas Supreme Court

which created the right." See, e.g., Bullock v. Amoco Production Co.,
608 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. 1980).
(B) ”Statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive and must be
complied with in all respects." e.g. Employees Ret. Sys. of Tex. v.
Blount, 709 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. 1986).
(C) Subject-matter jurisdiction is fundamental and may be raised for
the first time on appeal. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.1993).
(D) Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, subject to de novo
review. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
226 (Tex.2004)
(E) Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Council of
Co-Owner of Saida II Towers Condominium Association, 706 S.W.2d
644 (Tex. 1986). ("because relevant cause of action derives from
statute, not common law, statutory provisions are mandatory and
exclusive and must be complied with in all respects'")
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1) The Second Court of Appeals committed an error of such
magnitude, such order as written has the potential for the citizens of
Texas to be deprived of constitutional rights and loss of faith in the
judicial system.
The Preamble to the Texas Judicial Canons states in part:
“Preamble
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and
competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The
role of the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule
of law. Intrinsic to all sections of this Code of Judicial Conduct are the
Appeal Page 8


precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and
honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and
maintain confidence in our legal system.”

Courts that rely upon “Rice v Pinney” and its derivatives defy in logic
what is lodged into law
1
and potentially could provide that the state is
liable for actions of an individual acting in an official capacity to take
such property, but I would rather fathom such justice(s) would be held
easier accountable in their personal capacity:

Where a citizen is prohibited from filing a criminal complaint due to law
enforcement not willing to accept such criminal complaint, one is
deprived of a guaranteed constitutional right. All facts report that only
law enforcement officials can file, i.e. AO-91, criminal complaint with the
federal courts.

“TEX CR. CODE ANN. § 47.01a : Texas Statutes - Article 47.01A:
RESTORATION WHEN NO TRIAL IS PENDING
(a) If a criminal action relating to allegedly stolen property is not
pending, a district judge, county court judge, statutory county court
judge, or justice of the peace having jurisdiction as a magistrate in the
county in which the property is held or a municipal judge having
jurisdiction as a magistrate in the municipality in which the property is
being held may hold a hearing to determine the right to possession of the
property, upon the petition of an interested person, a county, a city, or the
state….
Added by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 2034, ch. 813, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1977.
Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 548, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 31, 1987; Acts
1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 860, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 30, 1993; Subsec. (a) amended
by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 184, Sec. 3, eff. May 23, 1995.”

2) The Second Court of Appeals did commit a grave error when not
opining on all points appellant raised, including facts filed of court record

1
Appellant does not address property that has a per se government mandated licensing requirement
such as for automobile.
Appeal Page 9

Petition For Review - Texas Supreme Court

that a fraud has been committed against a trial court, not by testimony,
but by admission into the courts record and such admission was by the
Appellee; the public could only view this non-addressing of an issue as a
criminal act to conceal a fraud and as such Article V, §1-a (6) A of the
Texas Constitution would come to bear as well as violation under 18
USC. Petitioner will not speculate as to why notice of such criminal
actions was not addressed. Again, such actions have the potential for
citizens to lose faith in the judicial system. Failure to properly opine in
accordance to law in this instant suit could only be seen as a violation of
the Texas Judicial Canons, amongst others, and the record provides no
escape from:

“TEX CR. CODE ANN. § 38.18 : Texas Statutes - Article 38.18:
PERJURY AND AGGRAVATED PERJURY
(a) No person may be convicted of perjury or aggravated perjury if proof
that his statement is false rests solely upon the testimony of one witness
other than the defendant.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this article does not apply to prosecutions for perjury
or aggravated perjury involving inconsistent statements.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. Amended by Acts 1973, 63rd
Leg., p. 973, ch. 399, Sec. 2(A), eff. Jan. 1, 1974.”

In referencing “Respondent State of Texas’s Brief on the Merits” that is
before this court in Larry York D/B/A York Tank Trucks (Petitioner) v
State of Texas (Respondent) as Cause No. 09-0905 submitted by Greg
Abbott, Attorney General Abbott of Texas appears to be acting for the
best interest of the citizens of Texas as noting the opinion authored by
the Second Court of Appeals is in error.

When the Texas Attorney General steps forward to protect the interest of
millions of Texas citizens from errors made by appellate courts, it could
only be thought of that faith in the court is in dire state of distrust. Many
a learned in the legal profession has said always hold your cards tight to
the vest. Maybe it makes legal sense but logically it lacks, as an author, I
Appeal Page 10


have released hundreds of writings which explain the civil and criminal
fraud surrounding today’s financial fiasco. Some in academia have made
notice to the public that such writings might be of interest to readers. At
last extrapolation, the number of readers is in the million with half of
readership being that of foreign nationality.
IX. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The court of appeals identifies the issue incorrectly as a forcible detainer
action begun by a lawful entitled party. As the appellate court opined,
"In a forcible detainer action, the only issue the trial court determines is
whether the party seeking to obtain possession is entitled to actual and
immediate possession, and the merits of whether a party has title shall
not be determined. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 746; Black v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 318
S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.);
Williams v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2010, no pet.), herein, “is entitled”, this short partial fact alone provides
that only an entitled party is permitted to file a forcible detainer. In this
instant suit, there is currently and never again will be a party entitled.
The court furthers opined in error: “To the extent that McGuire complains
of defects in the foreclosure process, he may pursue that complaint in
district court, but it may not be considered in this action. See Shutter, 318
·S.W.3,d at 471; Williams, -315 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Scott, 127 Tex. at
35,90 S.W.2d at 818-19).” Appellant argued as per the opinion: “he
disputes, in essence, only whether the seller had the authority to sell the
property to Fannie Mae in the first place.” Herein, the court’s opinion
conflicts with criminal prosecution under Title 47 of the Criminal Code:
Thus, Chapter 47 requires both (1) a determination whether there is
probable cause that the item was illegally obtained and… [Then Step 2]
This twisting of words and truth add to the disdain of the people to have
faith in the judicial system. As this instant suit was civil in nature, the
opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals has a byproduct of upending
decades of criminal law in essence saying a thief in possession of stolen
Appeal Page 11

Petition For Review - Texas Supreme Court

property cannot be prosecuted until the unlawful seller is under
prosecution and until such time, a criminal has right to possession. By
the time an innocent party could retrieve the receipts to prove a crime,
the cake would spoil and such the lawful owner would have been
deprived of what he legally owned. Herein, the rights of the cake thief
exceed the rights of the lawful owner. Where a court refuses to hear
evidence presented by an owner proving theft deprives the owner of a
constitutional rights that ownership grants. If such court is restricted
from hearing such evidence, then constitutional rights of owners have
been violated. This court has the authority and the duty to the people to
see that laws are written in a constitutional manner and the lower courts
follow constitutional rights the people are entitled too. Herein, this
instant suit, the rights granted under the constitution and by due
process of law were violated.
V.SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This dispute began as a forcible detainer action by a party not lawfully
entitled to possession filing a suit for forcible detainer. Petitioner
(Appellant) filed a general denial. The judgment of the justice court
signed a judgment in favor of the Appellee. The court awarded possession
of real property to Appellee. The Appellant timely appealed the
judgment to the County Court at Law One, Tarrant County, Texas. This
court also awarded possession of real property to Appellant relying upon
a false Substitute Trustee Deed filed of recorded by Appellant. Appellant
timely perfected an Appeal to the Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth
which found trial court decision was not in error, Texas and timely files
this Petition for Review with the Texas Supreme Court. If such party had
a lawful right to file suit for forcible detainer then such order by the court
may have been found valid, but this is not the facts in this case.
Appeal Page 12


Many of the background facts written in the opinion are based on
allegations and not of evidence introduced. The fact is, tortuous acts
were committed by the alleged seller of the real property. It is
unfortunate that the Appellee was not aware of the precise legal issues.
However, Appellee was aware of legal implication and thus could not
claim a right of being an innocent purchaser. The Court of Appeals did
correctly notice that Appellee has legal remedies available to pursue
under other legal action, a right to clear the clouds appearing upon title
to property. This factor alone should have been sufficient to prevent
Appellee from taking property that rightfully belongs to the Appellant.
The court of appeals neglected to take into account that the jurisdiction
of the appellate court is contingent upon the jurisdiction of the trial court
and that the trial court's jurisdiction is contingent upon the jurisdiction
of the justice court. Crumpton v. Stevens, 936 S.W.2d 473, 476
(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (The appellate jurisdiction of a
statutory county court is confined to the jurisdictional limits of the
justice court, and the county court has no jurisdiction over an appeal
unless the justice court had jurisdiction.) As the Appellate Court was
limited in taking legal actions which should have been reversing the
lower court’s ruling and dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. The
Second Court of Appeal failed in its duty to follow law, violated Appellant
Constitutional Rights which led to this appeal being brought forward to
this court.
VI. ARGUMENT
1: The petitioner hereby incorporates by reference petitioner's appeal
brief submitted to the Second District Court of Appeals (Appendix
Exhibit B), petitioners reply brief submitted to the Second District Court
Appeal Page 13

Petition For Review - Texas Supreme Court

of Appeals (Appendix Exhibit C) and the Second District Court of
Appeals Opinion (Appendix Exhibit A).
Opining, the court of appeals overruled the petitioner's first issue as if
the petitioner had argued a claim to title. The court of appeals' misread
the facts presented and penned an opinion that appeared to be based
upon an argument not raised by Appellant.
"The demand for possession must be made in writing by a person
entitled (emphasis added) to possession of the property and must
comply with the requirements for notice to vacate under Section 24.005."
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §24.002(b) (Vernon 2000). The word "entitled"
creates or recognizes a condition precedent, Tex. Gov't Code §311.016(3).
In the instant case the Appellee did not satisfy conditions precedent prior
to the filing of the forcible detainer action in the justice court; secondly,
Appellee would never be able to satisfy the conditions precedent.
2: The court of appeals did not address the challenge to the jurisdiction of
the trial court to convene a hearing or trial on the issue of possession. See
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 Tex. R. Civ. P. 21, 21a, 753 Issue 1 and Issue 2 are
indeed challenges to the jurisdiction of the lower courts but that is where
the similarity ends. The justice court and the trial court did not acquire
subject matter jurisdiction as discussed above. Tex. Prop. Code
§24.005(f). The trial court convened the trial or hearing in the complete
absence of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21, 21a.


VII. PRAYER
Appeal Page 14


For the reasons stated in this petition, petitioner, James Allen McGuire,
respectfully asks this Honorable Court to grant this petition for review.
Petitioner also requests this court order law enforcement to investigate
all criminal activity that is presented in the Appellant’s Briefs and
concealment of fraud covered up by the opinion penned by the Second
Court of Appeals.
Lest of pray that this court has not lost sight of rights found in the
United States Constitution:
Preamble
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
For if sight is lost; then faith is lost.
Respectfully Submitted,


___________________________
James Allen McGuire, Pro Se
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, TX 76039
Ph: 817 420-4151
Email: [email protected]













CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Appeal Page 15

Petition For Review - Texas Supreme Court

I certify that a copy of petitioner's Petition for Review to the Texas Supreme Court
(Cause No. 02-11-00312-CV in the Second District Court of Appeals) was served on
respondents, Fannie Mae through counsel of record, Janna W. Clarke, whose
address is 309 West 7
th
Street, Suite 1000, Fort Worth 77102, by USPS on
March ___, 2012.
Appeal Page 16

NO. 02-11-00312-CV

IN THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE
Appellant

In Re: FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE
MAE
Appellee,
V.
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 902 RUSK
DRIVE, EULESS, TEXAS 76039
Appellant

APPELLANT’S FIRST AMENDED BRIEF

APPEAL FROM
CAUSE NO. 2011-004521-1
IN THE County Court at Law #1, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

James McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Page 1 Appeal Page 17

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant Counsel

JAMES ALLEN McGUIRE


Pro Se
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039

Appellee Counsel

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE


Janna Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building,
309 West Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas
76102


County Court at Law #1:
Judge Don Pierson
100 West Weatherford Street, Room 409
Fort Worth, Texas 76196











Page 2 Appeal Page 18

TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page 4
CASES Page 5- 6
JURISDICTION Page 7
JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 7
REFERENCES Page 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Page 8
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT Page 8
ISSUE PRESENTED Page 8
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OPINING WITHOUT
JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF FACTS Page 9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Page 9, 10
ARGUMENT Page 10-20
SUMMATION Page 21-24
CONCLUSION Page 24
PRAYER Page 25
CERTIFICATION Page 25
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE Page 25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Page 26
APPENDIX
Exhibit A – Motion to Dismiss JP Standing Page 27 -29
Exhibit B – 141
st
Lost Note Affidavit Page 30 - 32
Exhibit C – 141
st
Order Page 33
Exhibit D – BDFTE March 07 Letter Page 34
Exhibit E – Court Appeals Response by Wells Fargo Page 35 -42
Exhibit F – Trial Court Order Page 43-44
Page 3 Appeal Page 19


INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Texas Government Code §22.220
Texas Government Code §51.903
Texas Government Code §74.041-74.062
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Local Government Code §192.001
Texas Local Government Code §192.007
Texas Property Code § 11.001
Texas Property Code §24.001
Texas Property Code §24.004
Texas Property Code §24.011
Texas Property Code, Chapters §11, §12, §13
Texas Property Code
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 738 to 755. See id. at 739
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 746
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §489
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Penal Code Chapter §32
Texas Penal Code




Page 4 Appeal Page 20

CASES
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.
2002)
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008)
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no
pet.)
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001)
SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2007, pet. denied)
State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980)
World Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gantt, 246 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Austin
2007, pet. denied)
Collins v. Tex Mall, L.P., 297 S.W.3d 409, 418 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no
pet.)
Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004)
Page 5 Appeal Page 21

Combs v. Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin
2009, no pet.)
Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446)
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [141st District Court, Cause No. 141-
223599-07]
In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-
00140-CV, Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas) (Pending Opinion)
Cattin v. Highpoint Village Apartments, 26 S.W.3d 737, 738-39 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)
Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
denied)
Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)
Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 270
Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no
writ)
Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.)
Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 865
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005)
Page 6 Appeal Page 22

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Government Code §Sec.22.220,
Texas Government Code §74.041Ͳ74.062, Texas Government Code.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Appellant received from the Second Court of Appeals the records of the trial courts
on December 11, 2011. Page 5 of Volume 1 of the Reporter’s Record [R, V1, pg
5], the Court Reporter notes that the Reporter’s transcription is a true and correct
copy of the oral argument held before the trial court. In fact, the transcription has
omissions of critical words spoken by the trial court judge where such omission is
detriment to Appellant’s appeal.

The trial courts record also show an omission of Appellant filing of a Motion to
Dismiss to the Justice Court where service was rendered upon Lauren Christoffel,
Bar I.D. # 24065045, 15000 Surveyor Blvd, Suite #100, Addison, Texas 75001 on
May 11, 2011 by U S Mail. [Exhibit A]

Appellant can only consider these known errors as willful actions to deny the
Appellant due process to law and this court should consider the matter as being
severe acts of injustice and possibly criminal and take appropriate action for the
preservation of justice.

However, Appellant has filed this Brief based on the inaccuracies of the record and
whereas the court finds the records are of error, this court, if required, should allow
Appellant to file an Amended Brief based on true and correct copies of the record.



Page 7 Appeal Page 23

REFERENCES
The Clerks Records will be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where
appropriate) e.g. “CR p. [page]. para.[¶]” or “CR p.[page]. The Reporter’s Records
will be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where appropriate) e.g. “RR,
V, p. [page]. para.[¶]” or “RR, Volume#, p.[page].
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee without legal Standing filed with the Justice Court a Forcible
Detainer action, (CR, p. 2). Appellant filed a General Denial and a Motion to
Dismiss (Exhibit A) the suit as Appellee’s lacked standing to invoke the Justice
Courts and the trial court’s jurisdiction. Appellant was forced to file an appeal to
Justice Court to the County Court (CR, p.79) and ultimately to this court Second
Court of Appeal.
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests Oral Argument

ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred in incurring jurisdiction where Appellee lacked
standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction?


Page 8 Appeal Page 24

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Federal National Mortgage Association filed in Tarrant County Public
Records an ineligible and unlawful Substitute Trustee’s Deed (CR, p.7)
conveying equitable title ownership away from Appellant.
2. Federal National Mortgage Association without lawful standing filed a
Forcible Detainer suit against Appellant as a tenant in the Justice Court.
3. Appellant argued the Justice Court was without jurisdiction and timely
appealed the Justice Courts opinion (CR, p. 20) to the County Court of Law.
4. Appellant argued jurisdiction before the County Court of Law and Appellant
further appealed to this court the trial court’s improper acceptance of
jurisdiction.
5. The trial courts erred in entering an order (CR, p. 75) as Appellee’s were
without standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. The trial court
lacking jurisdiction is incapable of rendering any opinion.
6. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal with this court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First error, the Trial Court erred by issuing a ruling based on an improper
acceptance of a ineligible filed claim to equitable title as being colorable and
extending jurisdiction to a party that lacked standing.
Second error, the Trial Court was made aware that legal and equitable title disputes
existed and relied upon a ineligible instrument as being close enough colorable
Page 9 Appeal Page 25

claim to title; this rendered the court without jurisdiction and as such reliance was
placed upon an ineligible instrument for determination and should be considered a
decision upon issues of title.
Facts entered into public and court records clearly show that claims made to title
by Appellant are not factual.
ARGUMENT
Standing: Legal Principles
1. For a court to invoke its authority, the court must have been given jurisdiction
by a party that has legal standing. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n
v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); see Mayhew v. Town of
Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Standing is a component of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852
S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman,
252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008) (ʊA court has no jurisdiction over a
claim made by a plaintiff without standing to assert it.). If a party lacks
standing to bring an action, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear the case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444–45.

2. The issue of Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action.
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The
general test for standing is whether there is a real controversy between the
parties that will actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n
of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. ʊTo establish standing, a person must show a
personal stake in the controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex.
1996).
Page 10 Appeal Page 26


3. Standing to sue may be predicated upon either statutory or common law
authority. Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); see Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79
(Tex. 2001). The common law standing rules apply except when standing is
statutorily conferred. SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148,
153 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. denied).

4. The court must look to the substance of a motion or a pleading, rather than its
caption or format, to determine the nature of the filing. See State Bar of Tex.
v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (explaining that - we look to the
substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not
merely at the form of title given to it).

5. During the pendency of an action involving title to real property, the
establishment of an interest in real property, or the enforcement of an
encumbrance against real property, a party seeking affirmative relief may
file a lis pendens in the real property records of the county where the
property is located. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 2004).

6. Generally speaking, the purpose of lis pendens notice is twofold: (1) to protect
the filing party‘s alleged rights to the property that is in dispute in the
lawsuit and (2) to put those interested in the property on notice of the
lawsuit. See World Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gantt, 246 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see also Countrywide Home
Page 11 Appeal Page 27

Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet.
denied).

7. A lis pendens does not prevent conveyance; it merely puts the purchaser on
notice as to the status of the land. See Collins v. Tex Mall, L.P., 297 S.W.3d
409, 418 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) as such, Appellant did not
file such.

8. We may consider evidence that the parties have submitted and must do so
when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)
9. In a plea to the jurisdiction, a party may present evidence to negate the
existence of a jurisdictional fact alleged in the pleadings, which we would
otherwise presume to be true. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227; see also Combs
v. Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin
2009, no pet.).

10. The U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution require parties to have
standing to bring a claim in court, and the general test is whether there is a
controversy between the parties that will actually be determined by the
judicial declaration sought. Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New
Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing
Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446).

Page 12 Appeal Page 28

11. Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action. Patterson v.
Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The general test for
standing is whether there is a real controversy between the parties that will
actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852
S.W.2d at 446. -To establish standing, a person must show a personal stake
in the controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996).

12. Standard of review: A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a trial court’s
authority to decide a specific cause of action. See Texas Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004).
Secured Party – UCC

13. Whereas, approximately 3 years ago, the 141
st
Judicial District Court granted
Summary Judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [Exhibit B], two
facts are of court record. [In Re: James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
141
st
District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-07], 1) A Lost Note Affidavit
[Exhibit C] was accepted by the court as substitution for the “wet ink”
negotiable instrument; 2) Federal National Mortgage Association was not
adjudicated as the owner of Appellants negotiable instrument and as such
could not ever become a subsequent secured party or beneficiary of a lien
securing such lost instrument.

a. Practice for lending monies to purchase real property requires a financial
instrument (note) to be executed as a promise for the borrower to repay the
Noteholder.
Page 13 Appeal Page 29

b. Parties to a note would be the maker (Payor, Obligor) making the instrument
payable to a Payee/Obligee
c. To protect and assure the Lender (Obligee, Secured Party, SP1 when the note is
secured by a lien) will be repaid, the Obligee noted on the face of the note
normally requires the Obligor to offer additional collateral (security) such as
attaching a Deed of Trust (lien) to the instrument thereby making the Obligee
the Original Secured Party (SP1) and thus you have the creation of a Secured
Note perfected in a Secured Party’s name.
d. A Deed of Trust is that only of a lien providing security to a note.
e. The two principle parties appearing on a valid lien would be the Obligor as
noted on the face of the note (Grantor on the lien) and the Obligee as noted on
the face of the note would be the Original Secured Party [SP1} (Grantee on the
lien).
f. Where the note and lien are concurrently signed at closing, the lien would
attach to the note and temporary perfection of the lien would be perfected in
SP1’s name according to law.
g. The lien is then required by law to be filed of public record resulting in
temporary perfection becoming a permanently perfected lien filed of record in
Secured Party’s (SP1) name.
h. Note: Texas Recording Statutes do not require filing of record. Legal
requirement to file are noted under other state statutes.
i. As stated, Obligor of the note is identified within the lien as the Grantor and the
Obligee is noted to be the Grantee (Secured Party – SP1).
j. To further market the Secured Note beyond origination, the Secured Note must
meet the requirements of being a negotiable instrument as defined by the UCC
or the states equivalence.
Page 14 Appeal Page 30

k. Where Secured Party (SP1) elects to negotiate the Secured Note to a
subsequent Secured Party (SP2) under UCC or BCC, the Secured Party can
elect to sell the Secured Negotiable Note by indorsement or in blank.
l. Where the Secured Negotiable Note is sold and negotiated by Secured Party
(SP1) by indorsement, the subsequent Secured Party purchaser (SP2) takes the
Secured Negotiable Note with the lien being temporary perfected in the
Secured Party’s (SP2) name, the Secured Party owning such Secured
Negotiable Note identity would be known by completing the negotiation by
identifying itself (Secured Party - SP2) as the Indorsee.
m. Thusly, the Indorsee (Secured Party - SP2) now noted on the face of the
Secured Negotiable Note has also been conveyed lien rights in a temporary
perfected status.
n. Indorsee (Secured Party - SP2) under the Recording Statutes then may take the
legal steps to permanently perfect the liens conveyance in SP2’s name by filing
of record. However, other state statutes mandate the assignment of the lien
must be filed of record.
o. However, if SP2 fails to timely file of record a conveyance of ownership right
to the lien to convert temporary perfection into a permanent perfection, the lien
would expire by operation of law. Failure to Permanently Perfect.
p. Herewith, the recording of an ownership interest in real property title is
required by Texas Local Government Code §192.001.
1

q. Any change of ownership interest in real property title (legal or equitable)
requires notice of change of ownership interest to be filed of record per Texas
Local Government Code §192.007.
2


1
§192.001. GENERAL ITEMS. The county clerk shall record each deed, mortgage, or other instrument that is
required or permitted by law to be recorded.

2
§192.007. RECORDS OF RELEASES AND OTHER ACTIONS. (a) To release, transfer, assign, or take another
action relating to an instrument that is filed, registered, or recorded in the office of the county clerk, a person must
file, register, or record another instrument relating to the action in the same manner as the original instrument was
required to be filed, registered, or recorded.

Page 15 Appeal Page 31

r. Additionally, to file an instrument of record, the instrument must be eligible for
recording as per Texas Property Code § 11.001.
3

s. Where an Indorsee (Subsequent Purchaser-Subsequent Secured Party) noted on
the face of the note fails to timely perfect the conveyance of the lien into their
name as a subsequent Secured Party, the lien would expire by operation of law.
t. Where there are multiple subsequent purchasers of a secured negotiable note,
each subsequent purchaser in turn, as Indorsee would need to file of record,
notice of conveyance of legal title to allow the secured negotiable note to
remain a Secured Note and perfected in each subsequent Secured Party’s
(Subsequent Purchaser) name.
u. Where a party neither appears in the chain of the notes indorsements as
Obligee/Indorsee nor in the chain of title as a Secured Party/Grantee filed of
record, a filing of an instrument by a non Secured Party is only that of a wild
deed and would not create a colorable claim to title, legal or equitable.
v. As an execution of a Deed of Trust is action taken by the Obligor/Grantor in
granting collateral to a Secured Party, the Obligor/Grantor grants legal title to a
Trustee while Obligor retains equitable title to the real property. Equitable title
gives the Obligor the rights to enjoyment of the property.
w. Where a Grantor grants to a Trustee legal title to real property via a lien, a
Trustee is without legal capacity to act on any action affecting legal title except
for that of Secured Party filed of record.
x. As there are only three parties to a Deed of Trust, 1 [Grantor under the Deed of
Trust and Obligor under a Secured Note], 2 [Grantee under the Deed of Trust
and Obligee under a Secured Note] and the 3 [Trustee as noted on the face of
the Deed of Trust.] Therefore, names such as “Mortgagee”, “MERS as
Nominee for Lender and Lender’s Successors and Assigns” and “Beneficiary”
could only be representative of a Secured Party of a perfected lien.

3
§11.001. PLACE OF RECORDING. (a) To be effectively recorded, an instrument relating to real property
must be eligible for recording and must be recorded in the county in which a part of the property is located….

Page 16 Appeal Page 32

y. Where a Deed of Trust is lawfully conveyed by lawful negotiation of the
Secured Note, the Secured Party that was the Indorser of the Secured Note
should be noted in public records Grantor/Grantee indexing as the Assignor of
the lien.
z. The subsequent Indorsee which is the subsequent Secured Party would be noted
in Grantor/Grantee indexing as the Assignee.
aa. By reasons of logic and law, only a Secured Party being of that as the same
name as the Assignee filed of record could become the owner of lien rights
secured to the Secured Party if such lien is properly conveyed and subsequently
timely perfected in a subsequent purchaser’s (subsequent Secured Party’s)
name.
bb. Where a note is secured by a perfected lien, such note would be considered to
be a Secured Note. Regardless of possession, only the owner of the Secured
Note as Secured Party filed of record would havr rights to enforce the Secured
Note. For a Secured Note, a Secured Party’s right would extend to the security
(Deed of Trust - lien) securing the Secured Note if perfection remains valid.
cc. Where a Secured Note is to be sold by the original Obligee SP1 to a subsequent
purchaser Obligee SP2, the Secured Note must also meet the legal requirements
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code/UCC to be that of a Negotiable
Instrument.
dd. A Lost Note Affidavit does not meet the legal requirements of the Uniform
Commercial Code or the Texas Business and Commerce Code to be that of a
Negotiable Instrument.
ee. Under Texas law, to convey collateral (Deed of Trust – lien) securing a Secured
Negotiable Note to a subsequent Secured Party requires perfection of the lien to
be filed of record in the subsequent purchaser’s name (SPx).
ff. Whereas if the second Secured Party (SP2) fails to timely permanently perfect a
conveyance of lien rights into the second Party’s name (P2), the second Party
(P2) then fails to remain a Secured Party (SP) and where such status is void,
Page 17 Appeal Page 33

any future assignment to convey lien rights from the second Party (P2) to
subsequent Purchasers 3, 4, etc would be void ab initio as the second Secured
Party (SP2) failed to comply with laws governing perfection and only
negotiated a unsecured note.
gg. As the Texas Property Code only provides who as an agent can execute legal
actions and when, other Texas laws proscribe that only a Secured Party filed of
record has any legal authority to invoke any power contained within a valid
lien.
hh. In today’s mortgage world, the buying and selling of Mortgage Servicing it is
not uncommon, thus it would not be difficult to see a number of subsequent
Mortgage Servicer’s claiming to be the Mortgagee of a lien.
ii. Where a Mortgagee claims to be the Mortgagee of a lien, that claim lacks
sufficient legal definition to identify the Mortgagee as a Secured Party.
jj. Similarly, where a claim is made by one to be that of a subsequent Beneficiary
of a lien, that claim lacks sufficient legal definition to identify a claimed
subsequent Beneficiary is a Secured Party.

Equitable – Legal Title
14. The court states in part; “The only thing the Plaintiff has to show is color of
title.” [RR,V2,pg 8, Line 13-14]
15. Appellee in submitting into evidence, Appellant’s Deed of Trust [RR,
Exhibit 1] notes ownership of equitable title was in the Appellant name and
owner of legal title by means of the Deed of Trust lien was not in Appellee’s
name.
16. The evidence submitted by Appellee’s clearly shows Appellant was the
equitable owner of title and Appellee’s now claim in this suit they are the
equitable owner of title. Whereas, it can be seen that Appellant and Appellee
Page 18 Appeal Page 34

have a dispute involving equitable title, a forcible detainer action must be
abated until issue of equitable title ownership has been resolved.
17. Under the principles of Nemo Dat, whereas a party is not a bona fide holder
of valid perfected legal title (lien holder) and not being a secured party of
record would not be able to convey a greater right to a subsequent party.
18. There is nothing filed of public record or submitted into court evidence that
would support ownership of legal title by virtue of the Deed of Trust was
ever conveyed to Appellee so as to become a secured party to any
indebtedness.
19. In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-
11-00140-CV, Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas), Wells Fargo
Banks, N.A. response filed of record as of July 6, 2011 with the Second
Court of Appeals claims “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the current owner and
holder of the lien documents”, but there is no claim that Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. was a secured party to an indebtedness. [Exhibit E]


20. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated March
07,2011 claims that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the Mortgagee of the lien
[Exhibit D], makes no claim as to be a secured party of record:

Page 19 Appeal Page 35

21. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated April 25,
2011 further confounds issue of title by claiming Federal National Mortgage
Association is the beneficiary named on the lien. This exhibit does not note
Appellant is a secured party of record. [RR, V3, Exhibit 3]


22. As the 141
st
District Court opined only a Lost Note Affidavit exists, it is a
legal impossibility that Wells Fargo Bank N.A. could have negotiated a non
negotiable Lost Note Affidavit to Federal National Mortgage Association
between March 7, 2011 and April 25, 2011 and filed of record a conveyance
of any rights to legal title to that of Federal National Mortgage Association
to allow Federal National Mortgage Association to be a Secured Party of
record..

23. Tarrant County public records reflect a filing of a Substitute Trustee’s Deed,
[RR, V3, Exhibit 2] by Appellee as an attempt to convey equitable title from
Appellant to Federal National Mortgage Association without any legal
authority to execute such conveyance of equitable title. As public records
reflect that Federal National Mortgage Association was not a secured party
of record, the Substitute Trustee’s Deed should be considered a “wild deed”
without force.

24. Tarrant County property records are devoid of any notice of an assignment
of lien “Deed of Trust” being timely assigned and perfected in Federal
National Mortgage Association name as to be a secured party to any
indebtedness.
Page 20 Appeal Page 36

SUMMATION
Federal National Mortgage Association filed with the trial court a claim to
possession of Appellant’s equitable rights to real property by executing a unlawful
legal title action by means of unlawfully filing a Substitute Trustee’s Deed
[Exhibit] in Tarrant County property records and whereas Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
in the Second Court of Appeals has made claim to legal title and whereas
Appellant has disputed both claims, a dispute of title exists between two parties
claiming legal title and the Appellant claims to equitable title. These title conflicts
alone would deny the justice court jurisdiction to determine who has the right to
immediate possession until issues of title, legal and equitable are resolved by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
A forcible detainer action is the procedure by which the right to immediate possession of real
property is determined. See Cattin v. Highpoint Village Apartments, 26 S.W.3d 737, 738-39
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). It is a special proceeding governed by
particular statutes and rules found in sections 24.001 to 24.011 of the Texas Property Code
and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 738 to 755. See id. at 739. Forcible detainer actions are
intended to be a summary, speedy, and inexpensive remedy for resolving the question of who
is entitled to immediate possession of real property. See id.; see also Ward v. Malone, 115
S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). Rule 746 provides that “the
only issue shall be as to the right to actual possession [,] and the merits of the title shall not
be adjudicated.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 746; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2001, no pet.). Thus, to prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required
to prove title but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a
superior right to immediate possession. See Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 270; Goggins v. Leo, 849
S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).

Page 21 Appeal Page 37

Jurisdiction over a forcible detainer suit is given to a justice court in the precinct where the
property is located. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (Vernon 2000); Aguilar v. Weber, 72
S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).

A court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim only if the claimant has
standing to assert the claim. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 865. ʊThe issue of standing focuses
on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a
justiciable interest‘ in its outcome . . . .ԡ Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d
845, 848 (Tex. 2005).

A party filing a Forcible Detainer to obtain Immediate Possession is dependent
upon having standing under a Valid Substitute’s Trustee Deed. Appellee’s counsel;
without a durable power of attorney which is required by TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 489
4
and Appellee was not a secured party of record and under this
premise lacked standing as a non interested party but was that of an intruder.

Herewith, Appellee’s counsel without a filed legal power of attorney of a perfected
secured party filed a null Substitute’s Trustee’s Deed in Tarrant County public
records naming Appellee’s as equitable title owner. Normally, the filing of a
Substitute’s Trustee Deed would provide standing for filing of a Forcible Detainer,
but not in this case, standing in this instant suit is dependent upon a provable claim
to legal title. Claim to legal title is currently being adjudicated in the Second Court
of Appeals, Tarrant County, Texas as Cause No. 02-11-00140-CV.

In a contract for purchase or a contract for deed, a forcible detainer action is dependent
on proof of a landlord-tenant relationship. Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 733; see Ward, 115

4
A durable power of attorney for a real property transaction requiring the execution and delivery of an instrument
that is to be recorded, including a release, assignment, satisfaction, mortgage, security agreement, deed of trust,
encumbrance, deed of conveyance, oil, gas, or other mineral lease, memorandum of a lease, lien, or other claim or
right to real property, shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the property is
located. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 489.

Page 22 Appeal Page 38

S.W.3d at 271.

Herein, the validity of legal title must be fully adjudicated, when on only when a
court of jurisdiction rules ownership of equitable title is in Appellee’s name, which
is impossible, could Appellee attempt to prove a landlord-tenant relationship and
then and only then would Appellee have standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.
The issue of a durable power of attorney and the filing of a null Substitute
Trustee’s Deed is a subservient issue to standing and title dispute and would be
rendered a moot issue when a court(s) of jurisdiction fully adjudicates legal title.
Regardless of the durable power of attorney, until and unless the court(s) having
jurisdiction over title issues has ruled in Appellee’s favor, equitable title exists in
Appellee’s name, a court with limited jurisdiction without power to determine
legal or equitable title would be unable to determine immediate possession on a
Forcible Detainer action.
A justice court is expressly denied jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate title to land, as
is a county court-at-law on appeal of a forcible detainer action. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon 2004); Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 732.
This court should notice, not only is there one, but several issues of standing
that prohibits Appellee from invoking a court’s limited jurisdiction. To
prevail in a forcible detainer action, a party is not required to prove title, but
is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a
superior right to immediate possession. Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 270. Herewith,
Appellee can only present a null Substitute Trustee’s Deed and in a more
Page 23 Appeal Page 39

prominent position, a “VOID” Substitute Trustee Deed, if and when the
Second Court of Appeals rules and enters an opinion of legal title ownership,
this ownership would not be adjudicated in favor of the Appellee. Title
issues must be fully adjudicated before a limited court’s jurisdiction can be
invoked by any party.
“Title Was In Dispute and Appellee Lacked Standing”
“Appellee Was Not a Secured Party of Record and Lacked Standing”
CONCLUSION
Federal National Mortgage Association’s claims that an unproven Trustee’s Deed
is sufficient evidence to prove ownership of equitable title to obtain possession is a
falsehood. Federal National Mortgage Association does not have of record and
never can have of record in Tarrant County property records an assignment of legal
title from a previous secured party showing they are the current secured party with
legal rights or standing to invoke a court’s jurisdiction. Whereas Federal National
Mortgage Association filed an ineligible instrument in violation of Texas Property
Code §11.001, this court must upon such finding must render the matter to the
proper law enforcement agency as being a possible violation of Chapter 32 of the
Texas Penal Code.

Page 24 Appeal Page 40

PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant prays that the Court finds that the lower
courts were without jurisdiction to render an order and issue any such other order
and equitable relief as the court deems appropriate in the best interest of justice.
Respectfully Submitted,
______________________________
James McGuire (Pro Se)
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

CERTIFICATION
I acknowledge that every factual statement in this petition is supported by
competent evidence included in the appendix or record.


James McGuire (Pro Se)
Appellant


CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
Appellant and counsel for Appellee have personally conducted a conference at
which there was a substantive discussion and despite efforts no resolution was
obtainable.

Certified as to this _____ day of December 2011 by James McGuire/Appellant
Page 25 Appeal Page 41


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on December ___, 2011 a true and correct copy of Appellant’s
Brief was served by U S Mail [Return Receipt] on Jana Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil &
Gas Building, 300 West Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102.



James McGuire (Pro Se)



Page 26 Appeal Page 42
Befenuantǯs 0iiginal Notion to Bismiss Page ͳ
CAUSE NO. F5506
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE
Plaintiff,
V.
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE AND ALL
OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 902 RUSK
DRIVE, EULESS, TEXAS 76039
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
IN THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
COURT
PRECINCT NO. 3
TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
MOTION TO DISMISS
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES, Defendant, James Allen McGuire, in the above styled and numbered
cause and would show the Court the following:
I.
Defendant brings this cause as: Barrett Burke Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P. has not
since 2009 had an effective Power of Attorney on file in Public Records of Tarrant County to
represent Plaintiff’s in any legal capacity. Barrett Burke Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P.,
filed a Forcible Detainer against Defendant without appropriate authority for Plaintiff, and
were without legal authority or standing to file a Forcible Detainer suit in this court.
II.
Page 27 Appeal Page 43
Befenuantǯs 0iiginal Notion to Bismiss Page ʹ
Defendant attaches an online search of Tarrant County Public Records (Exhibit “A”).
The online search reveals all filed Power of Attorneys filed by FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE since 1999. Public records does reflect a
Power of Attorney filed as Instrument #D207418592 whereas FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE provides a General Power of Attorney
(Exhibit “B”) expiring January 1, 2009. Public records reveal not additional Power of Attorney filed
by Fannie Mae to note Barrett Burke Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P. is counsel of record.
III.
Plaintiff has more than one fatal issue that would disallow standing to invoke the
court’s jurisdiction. This Motion to Dismiss is not meant to disallow Defendant from
presenting additional fatal issues that would also notice the court there is a lack of standing.
IV.
Defendant prays that this court will dismiss the suit for lack of standing. Award the
Defendant interim attorney fees in the Amount of $7,500, and any other equitable relief that
is available.
Respectfully submitted,
By:
James Allen McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
817 420-4151
Pro Se
Page 28 Appeal Page 44
Befenuantǯs 0iiginal Notion to Bismiss Page ͵
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on May 11, 2011 a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Memorandum in
Support was served by U S Mail on Lauren Christoffel, Bar I.D. # 24065045, 15000 Surveyor Blvd,
Suite #100, Addison, Texas 75001.
James Allen McGuire
Page 29 Appeal Page 45
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Appeal Page 60
Motion–ObjectiontoLateFilingofAppellee’sObjection
NO. 02-11-00312-CV
IN THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE
Appellant
V
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE
Appellee,
APPELLANT’S OBJECTION TO APPELLEE’S OBJECTION
TO CORRECT RECORDS
APPEAL FROM
Trial Court Cause NO: 2011-004521-1
IN THE County Court at Law #1, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
James McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151
Appeal Page 61
Motion–ObjectiontoLateFilingofAppellee’sObjection
1. Appellant’s use of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 20.1 (e) is not
appropriate in their objection response dated December 29, 2011.
20.1 (e) Contest to Affidavit. The clerk, the court reporter, the court recorder, or
any party may challenge an affidavit that is not accompanied by a TAJF
certificate by filing—in the court in which the affidavit was filed—a contest to the
affidavit. The contest must be filed on or before the date set by the clerk if the
affidavit was filed in the appellate court, or within 10 days after the date when the
affidavit was filed if the affidavit was filed in the trial court.
The contest need not be sworn.
2. Whereas surgery that is not of an emergency, such surgery is usually an
elected action whereas counsel for Appellee failed to notice Appellant and
according to the court’s docket failed to notice the court of being out of office.
3. If such medical was of an emergency that required unscheduled surgery,
such evidence should be presented to warrant Appellant’s late filing of objection to
Appellee’s Motion for Correct Records and acceptance.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant prays that the Court overrules Appellee’s
Objection to Appellant’s Request for a True and Correct copy of the court record.
Respectfully Submitted,
______________________________
James McGuire (Pro Se)
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151
Appeal Page 62
Motion–ObjectiontoLateFilingofAppellee’sObjection
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on December 31, 2011 a true and correct copy of Appellant’s
Objection to Apellee’s Objection Requesting True and Correct Copy of Records
was served by U S Mail on Jana Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building, 300 West
Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102.
James McGuire (Pro Se)
Appeal Page 63
NO. 02-11-00312-CV
IN THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE
Appellant

In Re: FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE
MAE
Appellee,
V.
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 902 RUSK
DRIVE, EULESS, TEXAS 76039
Appellant

APPELLANT’S RESPONSE BRIEF
TO APPELLEE’S BRIEF
January 27, 2012
APPEAL FROM
CAUSE NO. 2011-004521-1
IN THE County Court at Law #1, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

James McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
PAGE 1 Appeal Page 64
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant Counsel

JAMES ALLEN McGUIRE


Pro Se
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039

Appellee Counsel

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE


Janna Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building,
309 West Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas
76102


County Court at Law #1:
Judge Don Pierson
100 West Weatherford Street, Room 409
Fort Worth, Texas 76196











PAGE 2 Appeal Page 65
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page 4
CASES Page 5- 6
JURISDICTION Page 7
JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 7
REFERENCES Page 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Page 8
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT Page 8
ISSUE PRESENTED Page 9
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OPINING WITHOUT
JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF FACTS Page 9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Page 10
ARGUMENT Page 10-16
SUMMATION Page 16
CONCLUSION Page 16-17
PRAYER Page 17
CERTIFICATION Page 17
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE Page 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Page 18
APPENDIX
Exhibit A – Norwest Assignment Page 19-20





PAGE 3 Appeal Page 66
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Texas Government Code §22.220
Texas Government Code §51.903
Texas Government Code §74.041-74.062
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Local Government Code §192.001
Texas Local Government Code §192.007
Texas Property Code § 11.001
Texas Property Code §24.001
Texas Property Code §24.004
Texas Property Code §24.011
Texas Property Code, Chapters §11, §12, §13
Texas Property Code
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 738 to 755. See id. at 739
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 746
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §489
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Penal Code Chapter §32
Texas Penal Code
Texas Local Government Code Chapter §193



PAGE 4 Appeal Page 67
CASES
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008)
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001)
SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007,
pet. denied)
State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980)
World Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gantt, 246 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007,
pet. denied)
Collins v. Tex Mall, L.P., 297 S.W.3d 409, 418 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)
Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004)
Combs v. Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009,
no pet.)
Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446)
PAGE 5 Appeal Page 68
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [141st District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-
07]
In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-00140-CV,
Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas) (Pending Opinion)
Cattin v. Highpoint Village Apartments, 26 S.W.3d 737, 738-39 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)
Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied)
Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)
Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 270
Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ)
Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.)
Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 865
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005)
First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976)
Henke v. First Southern Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. – Waco 1979,
writ refused n.r.e.):

Fenley v. Ogletree, 277 S.W.2d 135, 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)

Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 448 (1859)

Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001)
PAGE 6 Appeal Page 69

ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred in incurring jurisdiction where Appellee lacked standing to
invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction?
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Government Code §Sec.22.220,
Texas Government Code §74.041Ͳ74.062, Texas Government Code.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Appellant was shocked and surprised in discovering an Assignment of “Deed of Trust”
from Norwest Mortgage Services, Inc to G E Capital Mortgages Services Inc., dated
December 5, 1995 filed in Tarrant County Public Records [Exhibit A] while awaiting
Apellee’s Brief is further evidence that Apellee’s lacked standing as a bona fide
purchaser to obtain a court’s jurisdiction.

The discovery of this instrument filed of record is prima facie proof that the Lost Note
Affidavit filed in Cause No. 141-223599-07 [James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
141st District Court] is a fraudulent filing in the 141st Court and fraudulent statements
have been provided to this court in Cause Number #02-11-00140-CV and this court
PAGE 7 Appeal Page 70
should consider rendering these illegal actions to proper authorities for criminal warrants
to be considered and possible sanction violations against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and the
counsels of record, Richard Illmer, Bar ID# 24056116 and Elizabeth Bloch, Bar ID#
02495500 to preserve justice.
Appellant apologizes to this court for this unexpected surprise as such was a surprise
upon Appellant. Tarrant County Public Records indexes are based upon Grantor/Grantee
Indexing. The instrument uncovered was filed noting Norwest Mortgage Services, Inc
was the Grantor.
REFERENCES
The Clerks Records will be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where
appropriate) e.g. “CR p. [page]. para.[¶]” or “CR p.[page]. The Reporter’s Records
will be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where appropriate) e.g. “RR,
V, p. [page]. para.[¶]” or “RR, Volume#, p.[page].
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee without legal Standing filed with the Justice Court a Forcible
Detainer action, (CR, p. 2). Appellant filed a General Denial and a Motion to
Dismiss (Exhibit A) the suit as Appellee’s lacked standing to invoke the Justice
Courts and the trial court’s jurisdiction. Appellant was forced to file an appeal to
Justice Court to the County Court (CR, p.79) and ultimately to this court Second
Court of Appeal.
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
PAGE 8 Appeal Page 71
As Appellant has been surprised by recent uncovering unknown filed records and due to
the complexity involved, Appellant request that Oral Arguments be held so that
Appellant be allowed to explain in great detail how this unexpected filing affects this
instant suit.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred in incurring jurisdiction where Appellee lacked
standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Federal National Mortgage Association filed in Tarrant County Public Records an
ineligible and unlawful Substitute Trustee’s Deed (CR, p.7) conveying equitable
title ownership away from Appellant.
2. Federal National Mortgage Association without lawful standing filed a Forcible
Detainer suit against Appellant as a tenant in the Justice Court.
3. Appellant argued the Justice Court was without jurisdiction and timely appealed
the Justice Courts opinion (CR, p. 20) to the County Court of Law.
4. Appellant argued jurisdiction before the County Court of Law and Appellant
further appealed to this court the trial court’s improper acceptance of jurisdiction.
5. The trial courts erred in entering an order (CR, p. 75) as Appellee’s were without
standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. The trial court lacking jurisdiction
is incapable of rendering any opinion.
PAGE 9 Appeal Page 72
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal with this court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First error, the Trial Court erred by issuing a ruling based on an improper acceptance of a
ineligible filed claim to equitable title as being colorable and extending jurisdiction to a
party that lacked standing.
Second error, the Trial Court was made aware that legal and equitable title disputes
existed and relied upon an ineligible instrument as being close enough colorable claim to
title; this rendered the court without jurisdiction and as such reliance was placed upon an
ineligible instrument for determination and should be considered a decision upon issues
of title.
Facts entered into public and court records clearly show that claims made to title by
Appellee are not factual.
ARGUMENT
Standing: Legal Principles
1. For a court to invoke its authority, the court must have been given jurisdiction by a
party that has legal standing. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy,
74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); see Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d
922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex.
Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993); see
also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008) (ʊA
court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff without standing to assert
it.). If a party lacks standing to bring an action, the trial court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444–45.

2. The issue of Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action.
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The general
PAGE 10 Appeal Page 73
test for standing is whether there is a real controversy between the parties that will
actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446. ʊTo establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the
controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996).

3. Standing to sue may be predicated upon either statutory or common law authority.
Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no
pet.); see Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001). The common law
standing rules apply except when standing is statutorily conferred. SCI Tex.
Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet.
denied).

4. We may consider evidence that the parties have submitted and must do so when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34
S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)
5. In a plea to the jurisdiction, a party may present evidence to negate the
existence of a jurisdictional fact alleged in the pleadings, which we would
otherwise presume to be true. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227; see also Combs v.
Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no
pet.).
6. The U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution require parties to have standing
to bring a claim in court, and the general test is whether there is a controversy
between the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial declaration
sought. Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919,
925 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446).
PAGE 11 Appeal Page 74
7. Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action. Patterson v.
Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The general test for
standing is whether there is a real controversy between the parties that will
actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446. -To establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the
controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996).

8. Standard of review: A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a trial court’s authority
to decide a specific cause of action. See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004).

9. In First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976), the Texas
Supreme Court confirmed that:
[A] a purchaser under a power at a foreclosure sale obtains only such title as to
trustee had authority to convey. 533 S.W.2d at 341.

Herein this instant suit, the trustee that executed the sale of Appellant’s real property
had no authority to convey title and any action executed by such trustee should be
noted as being “Void” and not “Voidable.”

As explained by the Court of Appeals in Henke v. First Southern Properties,
Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. – Waco 1979, writ refused n.r.e.):

[T]he doctrine of good faith purchaser for value without notice does not
apply to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale. One who bids upon
property at a foreclosure sale does so at his peril. If the trustee conducting
the sale has no power or authority to offer the property for sale, or if there
PAGE 12 Appeal Page 75
is other defect or irregularity which would render the foreclosure sale
void, then the purchaser cannot acquire title to the property.
The general rule is that one claiming to be a good-faith purchaser has the
burden of proof on that issue. Fenley v. Ogletree, 277 S.W.2d 135, 141
(Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Watkins v. Edwards, 23
Tex. 443, 448 (1859).

Bona Fide Purchaser
The most recent definition of the bona fide purchaser by the Texas Supreme Court is
found in Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001), in which the Court considered
the issue of constructive notice arising from possession of the property by one other than
the seller. The Court in Madison v. Gordon held that a purchaser was not charged with a
duty to investigate possible ownership claims of a tenant who was in possession of one
unit in a four-plex multifamily apartment building. The Court stated:
Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute. A bona
fide purchaser is not subject to certain claims or defenses. To receive this special
protection, one must acquire property in good faith, for value, and without notice
of any third-party claim or interest. Actual notice rests on personal information
or knowledge. Constructive notice is notice the law imputes to a person not having
personal information or knowledge.

10. Appellee, even though not clearing stating, appears to be arguing a bona fide
purchaser defense and thus cannot claim a bona fide purchaser defense as
PAGE 13 Appeal Page 76
constructive notice was filed of record as evidenced by the filed Norwest
assignment.
11. Whereas, the 141
st
Judicial District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., two facts are of court record. [In Re: James McGuire v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 141
st
District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-07], 1) a
Lost Note Affidavit was accepted by the court as substitution for the “wet ink”
negotiable instrument and Wells Fargo Bank N.A. was the secured party and per
the recently uncovered filed instrument reflects the lien was assigned from Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. to a third party a decade before such Lost Note Affidavit was
filed provides evidentiary proof that a fraudulent document was submitted to the
trial court. 2) Appellee was not adjudicated as the owner of Appellants negotiable
instrument nor the owner of the lien securing the note.
12. In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-
00140-CV, Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas), Wells Fargo Banks, N.A.
response filed of record as of July 6, 2011 with the Second Court of Appeals
claims “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the current owner and holder of the lien
documents”, this could only be considered as fraudulent statement made to the
Second Court of Appeals. [Appellant’s First Amended Brief, Exhibit E]


PAGE 14 Appeal Page 77
13. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated March 07,2011
claims that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the Mortgagee of the lien, Appelee makes
no claim as to being a secured party of record: [Appellant’s First Amended Brief,
Exhibit D]

14. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated April 25, 2011
further confounds issue of title by claiming Federal National Mortgage
Association is the beneficiary named on the lien. This exhibit does not note
Appellee is a secured party of record. [RR, V3, Exhibit 3]


15. As the 141
st
District Court opined only a Lost Note Affidavit exists, it is a legal
impossibility that Wells Fargo Bank N.A. could have negotiated a non negotiable
Lost Note Affidavit to Federal National Mortgage Association between March 7,
2011 and April 25, 2011 and filed of record a conveyance of any rights to legal
title to that of Federal National Mortgage Association to allow Federal National
Mortgage Association to be a Secured Party of record.

PAGE 15 Appeal Page 78
16. Tarrant County public records reflect a filing of a Substitute Trustee’s Deed, [RR,
V3, Exhibit 2 ] by a predecessor to Appellee as means to convey equitable title
from Appellant to a subsequent purchaser who in this case is Federal National
Mortgage Association (Appellee) without any legal authority to execute such
conveyance of title. As public records reflect that Federal National Mortgage
Association was not a secured party of record nor a lawful purchaser of a void
Trustee’s Deed, such Substitute Trustee’s Deed was nothing more than a “wild
deed” without force.
17. Tarrant County property records are devoid of any notice of an assignment of lien
“Deed of Trust” being timely assigned and perfected in Federal National Mortgage
Association name so as to name Appellee as secured party to a indebtedness.
SUMMATION
Federal National Mortgage Association filed with the trial court a claim to possession of
Appellant’s equitable rights to real property by unlawful purchase of Appellant’s real
property by virtue of an unlawful use of void Substitute Trustee’s Deed in Tarrant County
property records. Additionally, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. in the Second Court of Appeals
has made claim to title and whereas Appellant has disputed both claims, a dispute of title
exists between all parties. Title issues alone would suffice to deny the justice court
jurisdiction to determine who has the right to immediate possession until all issues of title
are resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
PAGE 16 Appeal Page 79
Federal National Mortgage Association’s claims purchase of real property via unproven
Trustee’s Deed is sufficient evidence to prove ownership of equitable title to obtain
possession is a falsehood. Federal National Mortgage Association does not have of record
and never can have of record in Tarrant County property records a legal right to a lien nor
can they purchase the real property from a non valid third party.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant prays that the Court finds that the lower courts were
without jurisdiction to render an order and issue any such other order and equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate in the best interest of justice.
This court should look into the matter of fraudulent statements being made and filed into
the courts of Texas and take such action as required to prevent this absurd behavior.
Respectfully Submitted,
______________________________
James McGuire (Pro Se)
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

CERTIFICATION
I acknowledge that every factual statement in this petition is supported by competent
evidence included in the appendix or record.


James McGuire (Pro Se)
Appellant
PAGE 17 Appeal Page 80

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
Appellant attempted to contact counsel for Appellee and was unavailable.

Certified as to this 27th day of December 2011 by James McGuire/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on December 28th, 2011 a true and correct copy of Appellant’s Brief
was served by U S Mail on Jana Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building, 300 West
Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102.


James McGuire (Pro Se)
PAGE 18 Appeal Page 81













































































































































































































PAGE 19 Appeal Page 82













































































































































































































PAGE 20 Appeal Page 83
NO. 02-11-00312-CV
IN THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE
Appellant

In Re: FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE
MAE
Appellee,
V.
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 902 RUSK
DRIVE, EULESS, TEXAS 76039
Appellant

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
TO APPELLEE’S BRIEF
January 27, 2012
APPEAL FROM
CAUSE NO. 2011-004521-1
IN THE County Court at Law #1, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

James McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Page 1 Appeal Page 104
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant Counsel

JAMES ALLEN McGUIRE


Pro Se
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039

Appellee Counsel

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE


Janna Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building,
309 West Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas
76102


County Court at Law #1:
Judge Don Pierson
100 West Weatherford Street, Room 409
Fort Worth, Texas 76196











Page 2 Appeal Page 105
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page 4
CASES Page 5- 6
JURISDICTION Page 7
JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 7-8
REFERENCES Page 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Page 8
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT Page 8-9
ISSUE PRESENTED Page 9
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OPINING WITHOUT
JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF FACTS Page 9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Page 9-10
ARGUMENT Page 11-16
SUMMATION Page 16-17
CONCLUSION Page 17
PRAYER Page 17-18
CERTIFICATION Page 18
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE Page 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Page 18
APPENDIX
Exhibit A – Norwest Assignment Page 19-20





Page 3 Appeal Page 106
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Texas Government Code §22.220
Texas Government Code §51.903
Texas Government Code §74.041-74.062
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Local Government Code §192.001
Texas Local Government Code §192.007
Texas Property Code § 11.001
Texas Property Code §24.001
Texas Property Code §24.004
Texas Property Code §24.011
Texas Property Code, Chapters §11, §12, §13
Texas Property Code
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 738 to 755. See id. at 739
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 746
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §489
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Penal Code Chapter §32
Texas Penal Code
Texas Local Government Code Chapter §193



Page 4 Appeal Page 107
CASES
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008)
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001)
SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007,
pet. denied)
State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980)
World Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gantt, 246 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007,
pet. denied)
Collins v. Tex Mall, L.P., 297 S.W.3d 409, 418 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)
Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004)
Combs v. Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009,
no pet.)
Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446)
Page 5 Appeal Page 108
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [141st District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-
07]
In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-00140-CV,
Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas)
Cattin v. Highpoint Village Apartments, 26 S.W.3d 737, 738-39 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)
Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied)
Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)
Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 270
Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ)
Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.)
Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 865
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005)
First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976)
Henke v. First Southern Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. – Waco 1979,
writ refused n.r.e.):

Fenley v. Ogletree, 277 S.W.2d 135, 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)

Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 448 (1859)

Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001)
Page 6 Appeal Page 109
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Government Code §Sec.22.220,
Texas Government Code §74.041Ͳ74.062, Texas Government Code.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Appellant was shocked and surprised in discovering this week an Assignment of “Deed
of Trust” from Norwest Mortgage Services, Inc to G E Capital Mortgages Services Inc.,
dated December 5, 1995 filed in Tarrant County Public Records [Exhibit A] an on
December 27, 2012 retrieved from public records such instrument is further evidence that
Apellee’s lacked standing as a bona fide purchaser to obtain a court’s jurisdiction.

The discovery of this unknown instrument filed of record is prima facie proof that the
Lost Note Affidavit filed in Cause No. 141-223599-07 [James McGuire v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 141st District Court] is a fraudulent filing in the 141st Court and fraudulent
statements may have been provided to this court in Cause Number #02-11-00140-CV and
this court should consider rendering these illegal actions to proper authorities for criminal
warrants to be considered and possible sanction violations against Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. and counsel of record, Richard Illmer, Bar ID# 24056116 to preserve justice.
Page 7 Appeal Page 110
Appellant apologizes to this court for this unexpected surprise as such was a surprise
upon Appellant. Tarrant County Public Records indexes are based upon Grantor/Grantee
Indexing. The instrument uncovered was filed noting Norwest Mortgage Services, Inc
was the Grantor. Appellant has not addressed the validity of said surprise instrument as a
memorialization of an event that lawfully could not occur.
REFERENCES
The Clerks Records will be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where
appropriate) e.g. “CR p. [page]. para.[¶]” or “CR p.[page]. The Reporter’s Records will
be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where appropriate) e.g. “RR, V, p.
[page]. para.[¶]” or “RR, Volume#, p.[page]. Appellant will cite by Exhibit Number
Exhibits contained within Appellants First Amended Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee without legal Standing filed with the Justice Court a Forcible Detainer
action, (CR, p. 2). Appellant filed a General Denial and a Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit A)
the suit as Appellee’s lacked standing to invoke the Justice Courts and the trial court’s
jurisdiction. Appellant was forced to file an appeal to Justice Court to the County Court
(CR, p.79) and ultimately to this court Second Court of Appeal.
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
As Appellant has been surprised by recent uncovering unknown filed records and due to
the complexity involved, Appellant request Oral Argument of this court if required so
Page 8 Appeal Page 111
that Appellant can explain in detail how this unexpected instrument affects this instant
suit.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred in incurring jurisdiction where Appellee lacked
standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Federal National Mortgage Association purchased Appellants via an ineligible and
unlawful Substitute Trustee’s Deed (CR, p.7) that conveyed equitable title
ownership away from Appellant.
2. Federal National Mortgage Association without lawful standing filed a Forcible
Detainer suit against Appellant as a tenant in the Justice Court.
3. Appellant argued the Justice Court was without jurisdiction and timely appealed
the Justice Courts opinion (CR, p. 20) to the County Court of Law.
4. Appellant argued jurisdiction before the County Court of Law and Appellant
further appealed to this court the trial court’s improper acceptance of jurisdiction.
5. The trial courts erred in entering an order (CR, p. 75) as Appellee’s were without
standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. The trial court lacking jurisdiction
is incapable of rendering an opinion.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal with this court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Page 9 Appeal Page 112
First error, the Trial Court erred by issuing a ruling based on an improper acceptance of a
ineligible filed claim to equitable title as being colorable and extending jurisdiction to a
party that lacked standing.
Second error, the Trial Court was made aware that legal and equitable title disputes
existed and relied upon an ineligible instrument as being close enough colorable claim to
title; this rendered the court without jurisdiction and as such reliance was placed upon an
ineligible instrument for determination and should be considered a decision upon issues
of title.
Facts entered into public and court records clearly show that claims made to title by
Appellee are not factual.
ARGUMENT
Standing: Legal Principles
1. For a court to invoke its authority, the court must have been given jurisdiction by a
party that has legal standing. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy,
74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); see Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d
922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex.
Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993); see
also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008) (ʊA
court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff without standing to assert
it.). If a party lacks standing to bring an action, the trial court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444–45.
2. The issue of Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action.
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The general
test for standing is whether there is a real controversy between the parties that will
actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446. ʊTo establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the
controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996).
Page 10 Appeal Page 113
3. Standing to sue may be predicated upon either statutory or common law authority.
Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no
pet.); see Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001). The common law
standing rules apply except when standing is statutorily conferred. SCI Tex.
Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet.
denied).
4. We may consider evidence that the parties have submitted and must do so when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34
S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)
5. In a plea to the jurisdiction, a party may present evidence to negate the
existence of a jurisdictional fact alleged in the pleadings, which we would
otherwise presume to be true. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227; see also Combs v.
Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no
pet.).
6. The U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution require parties to have standing
to bring a claim in court, and the general test is whether there is a controversy
between the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial declaration
sought. Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919,
925 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446).
7. Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action. Patterson v.
Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The general test for
standing is whether there is a real controversy between the parties that will
actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446. -To establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the
controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996).
8. Standard of review: A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a trial court’s authority to
decide a specific cause of action. See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004).
Page 11 Appeal Page 114

9. In First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976), the
Texas Supreme Court confirmed that:
[A] a purchaser under a power at a foreclosure sale obtains only such title
as to trustee had authority to convey. 533 S.W.2d at 341.

Herein this instant suit, the trustee that executed the sale of Appellant’s real property
had no authority to convey title and any action executed by such trustee should be
noted as being “Void” and not “Voidable.”

As explained by the Court of Appeals in Henke v. First Southern Properties,
Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. – Waco 1979, writ refused n.r.e.):

[T]he doctrine of good faith purchaser for value without notice does not
apply to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale. One who bids upon
property at a foreclosure sale does so at his peril. If the trustee conducting
the sale has no power or authority to offer the property for sale, or if there
is other defect or irregularity which would render the foreclosure sale
void, then the purchaser cannot acquire title to the property.
The general rule is that one claiming to be a good-faith purchaser has the
burden of proof on that issue. Fenley v. Ogletree, 277 S.W.2d 135, 141
(Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Watkins v. Edwards, 23
Tex. 443, 448 (1859).

Page 12 Appeal Page 115
Bona Fide Purchaser
The most recent definition of the bona fide purchaser by the Texas Supreme Court is
found in Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001), in which the Court considered
the issue of constructive notice arising from possession of the property by one other than
the seller. The Court in Madison v. Gordon held that a purchaser was not charged with a
duty to investigate possible ownership claims of a tenant who was in possession of one
unit in a four-plex multifamily apartment building. The Court stated:
Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute. A bona
fide purchaser is not subject to certain claims or defenses. To receive this special
protection, one must acquire property in good faith, for value, and without notice
of any third-party claim or interest. Actual notice rests on personal information
or knowledge. Constructive notice is notice the law imputes to a person not having
personal information or knowledge.

10. Appellee, not clearing stating so, appears to be arguing a bona fide purchaser
defense and thus cannot claim a bona fide purchaser defense as constructive notice
was filed of record as evidenced by the filed Norwest assignment.
11. Whereas, the 141
st
Judicial District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., two facts are of court record. [James McGuire v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 141
st
District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-07], 1) a Lost Note
Affidavit was accepted by the court as substitution for the “wet ink” negotiable
instrument and Wells Fargo Bank N.A. was the secured party and per the recently
Page 13 Appeal Page 116
uncovered filed instrument reflects the lien was assigned from Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. to a third party a decade before such Lost Note Affidavit was filed provides
evidentiary proof that a fraudulent document was submitted to the trial court. 2)
Appellee was not adjudicated as the owner of Appellants negotiable instrument
nor the owner of the lien securing the note.
12. In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-
00140-CV, Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas), Wells Fargo Banks, N.A.
response filed of record as of July 6, 2011 with the Second Court of Appeals
claimed “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the current owner and holder of the lien
documents”, this could only be considered as fraudulent statement made to the
Second Court of Appeals. [Appellant’s First Amended Brief, Exhibit E]


13. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated March 07,2011
claims that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the Mortgagee of the lien, Appellee makes
no claim as to being a secured party of record: [Appellant’s First Amended Brief,
Exhibit D]
Page 14 Appeal Page 117

14. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated April 25, 2011
further confounds issue of title by claiming Federal National Mortgage
Association is the beneficiary named on the lien. This exhibit does not note
Appellee is a secured party of record. [RR, V3, Exhibit 3]


15. As the 141
st
District Court opined only a Lost Note Affidavit exists, it is a legal
impossibility that Wells Fargo Bank N.A. could have negotiated a non negotiable
Lost Note Affidavit to Federal National Mortgage Association between March 7,
2011 and April 25, 2011 and filed of record a conveyance of any rights to legal
title to that of Federal National Mortgage Association to allow Federal National
Mortgage Association to be a Secured Party of record.
16. Tarrant County public records reflect a filing of a Substitute Trustee’s Deed, [RR,
V3, Exhibit 2] by a predecessor to Appellee as means to convey equitable title
from Appellant to a subsequent purchaser who in this case is Federal National
Mortgage Association (Appellee) without any legal authority to execute such
conveyance of title. As public records reflect that Federal National Mortgage
Page 15 Appeal Page 118
Association was not a secured party of record nor a lawful purchaser of a void
Trustee’s Deed, such Substitute Trustee’s Deed was nothing more than a “wild
deed” without force.
17. Tarrant County property records are devoid of any notice of an assignment of lien
“Deed of Trust” being timely assigned and perfected in Federal National Mortgage
Association name so as to name Appellee as secured party to a indebtedness.
SUMMATION
Federal National Mortgage Association filed with the trial court a claim to possession of
Appellant’s equitable rights to real property by unlawful purchase of Appellant’s real
property by virtue of an unlawful use of void Substitute Trustee’s Deed in Tarrant County
property records. Additionally, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. in the Second Court of Appeals
has made claim to title and whereas Appellant has disputed both claims, a dispute of title
exists between all parties. Title issues alone would suffice to have denied the justice court
jurisdiction to determine who has the right to immediate possession until all issues of title
are resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim
Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-00140-CV, Court of Appeals, Second District
of Texas), the court opined on December 27, 2012 an expressed no opinion to the validity
or invalidity of the assignment. The court also noted: “it merely purports to transfer an
existing note from one lender to another.” If one applies this note thinking to the Norwest
Mortgage Services, Inc to G E Capital Services assignment, and if such was true, then the
Lost Note Affidavit introduced into evidence in James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank,
Page 16 Appeal Page 119
N.A., 141
st
District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-07 is fraudulent and the Transferee has
committed a fraudulent act. As the Lost Note Affidavit is a replacement for the
Negotiable Instrument and fraudulent act committed by virtue of the Lost Note Affidavit
would extend to the non-existent negotiable instrument and this further amplifies
Appellant’s claim that Appellee lacked standing.
§3-203. TRANSFER OF INSTRUMENT; RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY
TRANSFER

(b) Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in
the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any
right as a holder in due course, but the transferee cannot acquire rights of a
holder in due course by a transfer, directly or indirectly, from a holder in due
course if the transferee engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument.

CONCLUSION
Federal National Mortgage Association’s claims purchase of real property via unproven
Trustee’s Deed is sufficient evidence to prove ownership of equitable title to obtain
possession is a falsehood. Federal National Mortgage Association does not have of record
and never can have of record in Tarrant County property records a legal right to a lien nor
can they purchase the real property from a non valid third party.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant prays that the Court finds that the lower courts were
without jurisdiction to render an order and issue any such other order and equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate in the best interest of justice.
Page 17 Appeal Page 120
This court should look into the matter of fraudulent statements being made and filed into
the courts of Texas and take such action as required to prevent such absurd behavior.
Respectfully Submitted,
______________________________
James McGuire (Pro Se)
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

CERTIFICATION
I acknowledge that every factual statement in this petition is supported by competent
evidence included in the appendix or record.

James McGuire (Pro Se)
Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
Appellant attempted to contact counsel for Appellee by phone on December 27, 2012 and
counsel was unavailable. Certified as to this 27th day of December 2011 by James
McGuire/Appellant

James McGuire (Pro Se)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on December 28th, 2011 a true and correct copy of Appellant’s Brief
was served by U S Mail on Jana Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building, 300 West
Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102.


James McGuire (Pro Se)
Page 18 Appeal Page 121
NO. 02-11-00312-CV
IN THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE
Appellant
V
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE
Appellee,
APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO APPELLEE’S MOTION
TO STRIKE
APPEAL FROM
Trial Court Cause NO: 2011-004521-1
IN THE County Court at Law #1, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
James McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151
Page 1 Appeal Page 132
Index of Authorities
Cases
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000) Page 4
Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 Page 4
(Tex. 2004)
Combs v. Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 Page 4
(Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.)
List of Parties and Counsel
Appellant James Allen McGuire (Pro Se)
817 420-4151
Appellee Federal National Mortgage Association
Counsel for Appellee Janna Clarke
State Bar Number 20844150
309 West Seventh Street
1100 Oil & Gas Building
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
817 335-1615
Fax 817 335-1603
Page 2 Appeal Page 133
Response to Motion to Strike
Appellant is arguing Standing and Jurisdiction in accordance to case law, as such,
Appellant’s introduction of evidence beyond the Clerk and Court’s Record is
allowable, and therefore Appellant’s Reply Brief should be entered into the record.
Argument
Appellee on Page 6 of their Motion to Strike admitted not only did a Norwest
Mortgage, Inc to GE Mortgage Service, Inc dated June 1, 1995 assignment existed
but identified an assignment still unknown to Appellant from GE Capital Mortgage
Services, Inc to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. dated May 27, 2005. This admission
provides additional prima facie proof that the Lost Note Affidavit filed in the 141
st
District Court was fraudulent and suggest the affiant committed perjury as such
Lost Note Affidavit relied upon the First Preference Mortgage Corporation
Services, Inc to Norwest Mortgage, Inc assignment dated June 1, 1995 as
supporting evidence of indebtedness. It is a legal impossibility to subsequently
negotiate a Lost Note Affidavit and where such evidence is noted to be that of the
GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. assignment dated
May 27, 2005 could not represent a memorialization of a notes negotiation and it
is these facts that go to the heart of standing. Where a Note does not exist, no lien
can exist and no third party has standing in any court of law. When one applies
law, one needs to apply law to both the note and the lien in tandem. Appellee’s
Page 3 Appeal Page 134
lack standing in both, the lack of a note and the lack of a valid assigned lien as
evidence must be entertained by this court as it dwells to the heart of standing and
jurisdiction.
We may consider evidence that the parties have submitted and must do so when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34
S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)
In a plea to the jurisdiction, a party may present evidence to negate the existence of a
jurisdictional fact alleged in the pleadings, which we would otherwise presume to be
true. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227; see also Combs v. Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292
S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.).
Appellee on Page 6 of Appellee’s motion again provides a fact point for Appellant
to challenge Standing. Appellant’s brief noted Federal National Mortgage
Association claimed to be the Beneficiary of Appellant’s Deed of Trust in a letter
received from Barrett Daffin Frappier & Turner and Apellee’s brief and Appellee’s
motion again appears to argue Federal National Mortgage Association is only a
bona fide purchaser.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
It appears to be unusual as Appellee have only objected to admission of
Appellant’s Reply Brief containing one Exhibit to negate standing and did not
object to Appellant’s Amended Brief that contained many Exhibits to negate a
Page 4 Appeal Page 135
claim of standing. It appears to Appellant that Appellee’s counsel is more
concerned with protecting BAR buddies as such evidence presented by
Appellee and additional evidence as identified would allow Appellee to file suit
upon the wrong doer who sold the property to Appellee. As Appellant is
allowed to enter evidence into the record to negate standing, Appellee has no
such legal recourse available to introduce evidence not entered into the trial
courts record and such action is exactly what Appellee did in Appellee’s
Motion to Strike.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant request the Court deny Appellee’s Motion to
Strike.
Respectfully Submitted,
______________________________
James McGuire (Pro Se)
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on February 5th, 2012 a true and correct copy of Appellant’s Response to
Motion to Strike was served by U S Mail on Jana Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building,
300 West Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102.
James McGuire (Pro Se)
Page 5 Appeal Page 136
NO. 02-11-00312-CV
IN THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE
Appellant

In Re: FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE
MAE
Appellee,
V.
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 902 RUSK
DRIVE, EULESS, TEXAS 76039
Appellant

APPELLANT’S RESPONSE BRIEF
TO APPELLEE’S BRIEF
January 27, 2012
APPEAL FROM
CAUSE NO. 2011-004521-1
IN THE County Court at Law #1, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

James McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
PAGE 1 Appeal Page 155
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant Counsel

JAMES ALLEN McGUIRE


Pro Se
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039

Appellee Counsel

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE


Janna Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building,
309 West Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas
76102


County Court at Law #1:
Judge Don Pierson
100 West Weatherford Street, Room 409
Fort Worth, Texas 76196











PAGE 2 Appeal Page 156
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page 4
CASES Page 5- 6
JURISDICTION Page 7
JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 7
REFERENCES Page 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Page 8
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT Page 8
ISSUE PRESENTED Page 9
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OPINING WITHOUT
JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF FACTS Page 9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Page 10
ARGUMENT Page 10-16
SUMMATION Page 16
CONCLUSION Page 16-17
PRAYER Page 17
CERTIFICATION Page 17
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE Page 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Page 18
APPENDIX
Exhibit A – Norwest Assignment Page 19-20





PAGE 3 Appeal Page 157
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Texas Government Code §22.220
Texas Government Code §51.903
Texas Government Code §74.041-74.062
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Local Government Code §192.001
Texas Local Government Code §192.007
Texas Property Code § 11.001
Texas Property Code §24.001
Texas Property Code §24.004
Texas Property Code §24.011
Texas Property Code, Chapters §11, §12, §13
Texas Property Code
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 738 to 755. See id. at 739
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 746
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §489
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(b)(4) (Vernon 2004)
Texas Penal Code Chapter §32
Texas Penal Code
Texas Local Government Code Chapter §193



PAGE 4 Appeal Page 158
CASES
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008)
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001)
SCI Tex. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007,
pet. denied)
State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980)
World Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gantt, 246 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, 240 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007,
pet. denied)
Collins v. Tex Mall, L.P., 297 S.W.3d 409, 418 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)
Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004)
Combs v. Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009,
no pet.)
Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446)
PAGE 5 Appeal Page 159
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)
In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996)
James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [141st District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-
07]
In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-00140-CV,
Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas) (Pending Opinion)
Cattin v. Highpoint Village Apartments, 26 S.W.3d 737, 738-39 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)
Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied)
Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)
Ward, 115 S.W.3d at 270
Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ)
Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.)
Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 865
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005)
First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976)
Henke v. First Southern Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. – Waco 1979,
writ refused n.r.e.):

Fenley v. Ogletree, 277 S.W.2d 135, 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)

Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 448 (1859)

Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001)
PAGE 6 Appeal Page 160

ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred in incurring jurisdiction where Appellee lacked standing to
invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction?
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Government Code §Sec.22.220,
Texas Government Code §74.041Ͳ74.062, Texas Government Code.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Appellant was shocked and surprised in discovering an Assignment of “Deed of Trust”
from Norwest Mortgage Services, Inc to G E Capital Mortgages Services Inc., dated
December 5, 1995 filed in Tarrant County Public Records [Exhibit A] while awaiting
Apellee’s Brief is further evidence that Apellee’s lacked standing as a bona fide
purchaser to obtain a court’s jurisdiction.

The discovery of this instrument filed of record is prima facie proof that the Lost Note
Affidavit filed in Cause No. 141-223599-07 [James McGuire v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
141st District Court] is a fraudulent filing in the 141st Court and fraudulent statements
have been provided to this court in Cause Number #02-11-00140-CV and this court
PAGE 7 Appeal Page 161
should consider rendering these illegal actions to proper authorities for criminal warrants
to be considered and possible sanction violations against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and the
counsels of record, Richard Illmer, Bar ID# 24056116 and Elizabeth Bloch, Bar ID#
02495500 to preserve justice.
Appellant apologizes to this court for this unexpected surprise as such was a surprise
upon Appellant. Tarrant County Public Records indexes are based upon Grantor/Grantee
Indexing. The instrument uncovered was filed noting Norwest Mortgage Services, Inc
was the Grantor.
REFERENCES
The Clerks Records will be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where
appropriate) e.g. “CR p. [page]. para.[¶]” or “CR p.[page]. The Reporter’s Records
will be cited by page number and paragraph number, (where appropriate) e.g. “RR,
V, p. [page]. para.[¶]” or “RR, Volume#, p.[page].
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee without legal Standing filed with the Justice Court a Forcible
Detainer action, (CR, p. 2). Appellant filed a General Denial and a Motion to
Dismiss (Exhibit A) the suit as Appellee’s lacked standing to invoke the Justice
Courts and the trial court’s jurisdiction. Appellant was forced to file an appeal to
Justice Court to the County Court (CR, p.79) and ultimately to this court Second
Court of Appeal.
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
PAGE 8 Appeal Page 162
As Appellant has been surprised by recent uncovering unknown filed records and due to
the complexity involved, Appellant request that Oral Arguments be held so that
Appellant be allowed to explain in great detail how this unexpected filing affects this
instant suit.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred in incurring jurisdiction where Appellee lacked
standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Federal National Mortgage Association filed in Tarrant County Public Records an
ineligible and unlawful Substitute Trustee’s Deed (CR, p.7) conveying equitable
title ownership away from Appellant.
2. Federal National Mortgage Association without lawful standing filed a Forcible
Detainer suit against Appellant as a tenant in the Justice Court.
3. Appellant argued the Justice Court was without jurisdiction and timely appealed
the Justice Courts opinion (CR, p. 20) to the County Court of Law.
4. Appellant argued jurisdiction before the County Court of Law and Appellant
further appealed to this court the trial court’s improper acceptance of jurisdiction.
5. The trial courts erred in entering an order (CR, p. 75) as Appellee’s were without
standing to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. The trial court lacking jurisdiction
is incapable of rendering any opinion.
PAGE 9 Appeal Page 163
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal with this court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First error, the Trial Court erred by issuing a ruling based on an improper acceptance of a
ineligible filed claim to equitable title as being colorable and extending jurisdiction to a
party that lacked standing.
Second error, the Trial Court was made aware that legal and equitable title disputes
existed and relied upon an ineligible instrument as being close enough colorable claim to
title; this rendered the court without jurisdiction and as such reliance was placed upon an
ineligible instrument for determination and should be considered a decision upon issues
of title.
Facts entered into public and court records clearly show that claims made to title by
Appellee are not factual.
ARGUMENT
Standing: Legal Principles
1. For a court to invoke its authority, the court must have been given jurisdiction by a
party that has legal standing. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy,
74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); see Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d
922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex.
Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993); see
also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008) (ʊA
court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff without standing to assert
it.). If a party lacks standing to bring an action, the trial court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444–45.

2. The issue of Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action.
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The general
PAGE 10 Appeal Page 164
test for standing is whether there is a real controversy between the parties that will
actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446. ʊTo establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the
controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996).

3. Standing to sue may be predicated upon either statutory or common law authority.
Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no
pet.); see Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001). The common law
standing rules apply except when standing is statutorily conferred. SCI Tex.
Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet.
denied).

4. We may consider evidence that the parties have submitted and must do so when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34
S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)
5. In a plea to the jurisdiction, a party may present evidence to negate the
existence of a jurisdictional fact alleged in the pleadings, which we would
otherwise presume to be true. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227; see also Combs v.
Entertainment Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no
pet.).
6. The U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution require parties to have standing
to bring a claim in court, and the general test is whether there is a controversy
between the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial declaration
sought. Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919,
925 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (Citing Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446).
PAGE 11 Appeal Page 165
7. Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action. Patterson v.
Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The general test for
standing is whether there is a real controversy between the parties that will
actually be determined by the judgment sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446. -To establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the
controversy. In re B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996).

8. Standard of review: A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a trial court’s authority
to decide a specific cause of action. See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004).

9. In First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976), the Texas
Supreme Court confirmed that:
[A] a purchaser under a power at a foreclosure sale obtains only such title as to
trustee had authority to convey. 533 S.W.2d at 341.

Herein this instant suit, the trustee that executed the sale of Appellant’s real property
had no authority to convey title and any action executed by such trustee should be
noted as being “Void” and not “Voidable.”

As explained by the Court of Appeals in Henke v. First Southern Properties,
Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. – Waco 1979, writ refused n.r.e.):

[T]he doctrine of good faith purchaser for value without notice does not
apply to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale. One who bids upon
property at a foreclosure sale does so at his peril. If the trustee conducting
the sale has no power or authority to offer the property for sale, or if there
PAGE 12 Appeal Page 166
is other defect or irregularity which would render the foreclosure sale
void, then the purchaser cannot acquire title to the property.
The general rule is that one claiming to be a good-faith purchaser has the
burden of proof on that issue. Fenley v. Ogletree, 277 S.W.2d 135, 141
(Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Watkins v. Edwards, 23
Tex. 443, 448 (1859).

Bona Fide Purchaser
The most recent definition of the bona fide purchaser by the Texas Supreme Court is
found in Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2001), in which the Court considered
the issue of constructive notice arising from possession of the property by one other than
the seller. The Court in Madison v. Gordon held that a purchaser was not charged with a
duty to investigate possible ownership claims of a tenant who was in possession of one
unit in a four-plex multifamily apartment building. The Court stated:
Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute. A bona
fide purchaser is not subject to certain claims or defenses. To receive this special
protection, one must acquire property in good faith, for value, and without notice
of any third-party claim or interest. Actual notice rests on personal information
or knowledge. Constructive notice is notice the law imputes to a person not having
personal information or knowledge.

10. Appellee, even though not clearing stating, appears to be arguing a bona fide
purchaser defense and thus cannot claim a bona fide purchaser defense as
PAGE 13 Appeal Page 167
constructive notice was filed of record as evidenced by the filed Norwest
assignment.
11. Whereas, the 141
st
Judicial District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., two facts are of court record. [In Re: James McGuire v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 141
st
District Court, Cause No. 141-223599-07], 1) a
Lost Note Affidavit was accepted by the court as substitution for the “wet ink”
negotiable instrument and Wells Fargo Bank N.A. was the secured party and per
the recently uncovered filed instrument reflects the lien was assigned from Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. to a third party a decade before such Lost Note Affidavit was
filed provides evidentiary proof that a fraudulent document was submitted to the
trial court. 2) Appellee was not adjudicated as the owner of Appellants negotiable
instrument nor the owner of the lien securing the note.
12. In Re: A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire (Cause No. 02-11-
00140-CV, Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas), Wells Fargo Banks, N.A.
response filed of record as of July 6, 2011 with the Second Court of Appeals
claims “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the current owner and holder of the lien
documents”, this could only be considered as fraudulent statement made to the
Second Court of Appeals. [Appellant’s First Amended Brief, Exhibit E]


PAGE 14 Appeal Page 168
13. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated March 07,2011
claims that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the Mortgagee of the lien, Appelee makes
no claim as to being a secured party of record: [Appellant’s First Amended Brief,
Exhibit D]

14. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP postal letter dated April 25, 2011
further confounds issue of title by claiming Federal National Mortgage
Association is the beneficiary named on the lien. This exhibit does not note
Appellee is a secured party of record. [RR, V3, Exhibit 3]


15. As the 141
st
District Court opined only a Lost Note Affidavit exists, it is a legal
impossibility that Wells Fargo Bank N.A. could have negotiated a non negotiable
Lost Note Affidavit to Federal National Mortgage Association between March 7,
2011 and April 25, 2011 and filed of record a conveyance of any rights to legal
title to that of Federal National Mortgage Association to allow Federal National
Mortgage Association to be a Secured Party of record.

PAGE 15 Appeal Page 169
16. Tarrant County public records reflect a filing of a Substitute Trustee’s Deed, [RR,
V3, Exhibit 2 ] by a predecessor to Appellee as means to convey equitable title
from Appellant to a subsequent purchaser who in this case is Federal National
Mortgage Association (Appellee) without any legal authority to execute such
conveyance of title. As public records reflect that Federal National Mortgage
Association was not a secured party of record nor a lawful purchaser of a void
Trustee’s Deed, such Substitute Trustee’s Deed was nothing more than a “wild
deed” without force.
17. Tarrant County property records are devoid of any notice of an assignment of lien
“Deed of Trust” being timely assigned and perfected in Federal National Mortgage
Association name so as to name Appellee as secured party to a indebtedness.
SUMMATION
Federal National Mortgage Association filed with the trial court a claim to possession of
Appellant’s equitable rights to real property by unlawful purchase of Appellant’s real
property by virtue of an unlawful use of void Substitute Trustee’s Deed in Tarrant County
property records. Additionally, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. in the Second Court of Appeals
has made claim to title and whereas Appellant has disputed both claims, a dispute of title
exists between all parties. Title issues alone would suffice to deny the justice court
jurisdiction to determine who has the right to immediate possession until all issues of title
are resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
PAGE 16 Appeal Page 170
Federal National Mortgage Association’s claims purchase of real property via unproven
Trustee’s Deed is sufficient evidence to prove ownership of equitable title to obtain
possession is a falsehood. Federal National Mortgage Association does not have of record
and never can have of record in Tarrant County property records a legal right to a lien nor
can they purchase the real property from a non valid third party.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant prays that the Court finds that the lower courts were
without jurisdiction to render an order and issue any such other order and equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate in the best interest of justice.
This court should look into the matter of fraudulent statements being made and filed into
the courts of Texas and take such action as required to prevent this absurd behavior.
Respectfully Submitted,
______________________________
James McGuire (Pro Se)
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
(817) 420-4151

CERTIFICATION
I acknowledge that every factual statement in this petition is supported by competent
evidence included in the appendix or record.


James McGuire (Pro Se)
Appellant
PAGE 17 Appeal Page 171

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
Appellant attempted to contact counsel for Appellee and was unavailable.

Certified as to this 27th day of December 2011 by James McGuire/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on December 28th, 2011 a true and correct copy of Appellant’s Brief
was served by U S Mail on Jana Ward Clarke, 1100 Oil & Gas Building, 300 West
Seventh Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102.


James McGuire (Pro Se)
PAGE 18 Appeal Page 172













































































































































































































PAGE 19 Appeal Page 173













































































































































































































PAGE 20 Appeal Page 174
COURT OF ApPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CHIEF JUSTICE CLERK
TERRIE LIVINGSTON TIM CUM Y CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER DEBRA SPISAK
401 W. BELKNAP, SUITE 9000
JUSTICES FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76196 CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT MEAGAN POLK
ANNE GARDNER TEL: (817) 884·1900
SUE WALKER CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY
BOB McCOY FAX: (817) 884·1932 LISA M. WEST
BILL MEIER
LEE GABRIEL www.2ndcoa.cQuns.stale.tx.us
March 22, 2012
James Allen McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, TX 76039
Janna W. Clarke
309 W. 7th Street, Suite 1100
Fort Worth, TX 76102
RE: Court of Appeals Number: 02-11-00312-CV
Trial Court Case Number: 11-04521-1
Style: James Allen McGuire
v.
Fannie Mae a/kJa Federal National Mortgage Association
Dear Counsel:
The judgment of the trial court in the above cause was affirmed today.
Copies of the opinion and judgment of this court are hereto attached.
Respectfully yours,
DEBRA SPISAK, CLERK
Appeal Page 192
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
FORT WORTH
NO.02-11-00312-CV
James Allen McGuire § From County Court at Law NO.1
§ of Tarrant County (11-04521-1)
v.
§ March 22, 2012
Fannie Mae a/k/a Federal National
Mortgage Association
§ Opinion by Justice Gabriel
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court's judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By J
.f------==----..!.----­
Appeal Page 193
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00312-CV
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE APPELLANT
v.
FANNIE MAE AlKJA FEDERAL
NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION
APPELLEE
FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO.1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
1
James Allen McGuire, pro se, appeals the county court's award of
possession of 902 Rusk Drive, Euless, Texas to Fannie Mae a/k/a Federal
National Mortgage Association. We will affirm the county court's judgment.
1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Appeal Page 194
Background Facts
In 1995, McGuire purchased the Rusk Drive residence and executed a
deed of trust encumbering the property in favor of First Preference Mortgage.
When McGuire failed to make his mortgage payments, First Preference's
successor-in-interest Wells Fargo sold the property to Fannie Mae at a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Fannie Mae then filed a petition for forcible detainer
in the justice of the peace court. A tria! was held and the court rendered
judgment in favor of Fannie Mae.
McGuire appealed to the county court, which tried the case de novo. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 749, 751. At trial, Fannie Mae submitted the deed of trust, the
substitute trustee's deed showing that Fannie Mae acquired the property at a
foreclosure sale on April 5, 2011, and the notice to McGuire to vacate. McGuire
objected to the substitute trustee's deed on the grounds that Fannie Mae had not
perfected its chain of title and that he was concurrently contesting legal title in a
separate action in our court. The county court admitted the substitute trustee's
deed over McGuire's objection, The county court then rendered judgment in
favor of Fannie Mae. McGuire now appeals to this court.
Forcible Detainer
In a forcible detainer action, the only issue the trial court determines is
whether the party seeking to obtain possession is entitled to actual and
immediate possession, and the merits of whether a party has title shall not be
determined. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 746; Black v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d
2
Appeal Page 195
414, 416 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); Williams v.
Bank of N. Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
Thus, questions over whether a sale of property encumbered by a deed of trust is
invalid "must be brought in a separate suit." Williams, 315 S.W.3d at 927; Rice v.
Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). "To prevail in a
forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required .to prove title, but is only required
to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to
immediate possession." Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. A court may determine which
party has a superior right to possession without determining title when a landlord­
tenant relationship exists between the parties. Id. at 712. The existence of the
landlord-tenant relationship prOVides a basis for determining the right to
possession without resolving the issue of who owns the property. See Salaymeh
v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.) (stating that in a forcible detainer action, a landlord-tenant
relationship presents "an independent basis on which the trial court [can]
determine the right to immediate possession without resolving underlying title
issues"); Brown v. Kula-Amos, Inc., No. 02-04-00032-CV, 2005 WL 675563, at *3
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that a forcible detainer
action based on contract for deed depends upon landlord-tenant relationship and
that contract for deed may provide for party to become tenant at sufferance upon
default).
3
Appeal Page 196
Discussion
On appeal, McGuire argues that the county court was without jurisdiction
to hear the case for two reasons. First, McGuire claims that Fannie Mae does
not have standing because the substitute trustee's deed is "ineligible and
unlawful." He argues that the deed of trust "clearly shows that [he] was the
equitable owner of title," and because he did not convey title to Fannie Mae,
Fannie Mae's substitute trustee's deed "should be considered a 'wild deed'
without force."
The deed of trust that Fannie Mae submitted at trial shows that McGuire
granted First Preference a lien on the property to secure payment of a note and
includes a provision that if McGuire defaulted on the note and the property was
sold at a foreclosure sale, McGuire would become a tenant at sufferance. This
kind of provision in a deed of trust is generally sufficient to establish a landlord­
tenant relationship between the mortgagor and the purchaser of the property at a
foreclosure sale. See Scott v. Hewitt, 127 Tex. 31, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818 (1936).
As stated above, such a relationship provides a basis for determining the right to
possession without resolving the issue of who owns the property. See
Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 436.
Fannie Mae submitted a substitute trustee's deed showing that it
purchased the property from First Preference's successor-in-interest Wells Fargo
at a foreclosure sale on April 5, 2011. Fannie Mae's status as grantee under the
substitute trustee's deed is sufficient to confer standing on Fannie Mae to assert
4
Appeal Page 197
a forcible detainer action regarding the property. See Morris v. Am. Home Mortg.
Servicing, Inc., No. 01-09-00768-CV, 2011 WL 1631762, at *2 (Tex. App.­
Houston [1 st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2011, no pet.) (overruling appellant's standing
argument when appellee demonstrated a landlord-tenant relationship through
substitute trustee's deed). The landlord-tenant relationship between Fannie Mae
and McGuire, established by the substitute trustee's deed, provided the basis for
the trial court's finding of Fannie Mae's superior right to possession. See id.;
Shutter v. Wells Fargo Bank, 318 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet.
dism'd w.o.j.) (op. on reh'g) (holding that the bank demonstrated its right to
possession of property because tenant-at-sufferance relationship existed).
Second, McGuire argues that he was contesting legal title in a separate
action and until title was resolved, the trial court could not award possession.
The existence of a title dispute will not deprive a justice court of jurisdiction in a
forcible detainer action unless the right to possession cannot be determined
without resolving the title issue. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 713. Thus, McGuire was
required to demonstrate that the title dispute prevented the county court from
determining right to possession, depriving it of jurisdiction over the action. See
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Young, No. 02-08-00088-CV, 2009 WL
1564994, at *5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 4, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding that the county court did not have jurisdiction over a forcible detainer
action when defendant properly disputed title by submitting deeds showing that
5
Appeal Page 198
plaintiff had conveyed ownership of the property to another party after acquiring it
at the foreclosure sale).
McGuire argues that documents attached to his reply brief on appeal
demonstrate that Wells Fargo had previously assigned the deed of trust to
another party and thus, could not have later assigned it to Fannie Mae.
McGuire's argument challenges the validity of title. Fannie Mae was not required
to demonstrate valid title in order to demonstrate superior rlight of possession.
Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. As stated above, Fannie Mae established superior right
of possession through its submission of the deed of trust, the substitute trustee's
deed, and the notice to McGuire to vacate. Further, the other action McGuire
references was a challenge to the assignment of the lien from First Preference to
Wells Fargo. See In re A Purported Lien or Claim Against James McGuire, No.
02-11-00140-CV, 2012 WL 254066, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 26, 2012,
no pet. h.) (mem. Op.).2 McGuire's attempt to dispute title is unlike the
defendant's attempt in Young because in Young, the defendant presented
evidence of a conveyance after the plaintiff had purchased the property, thereby
demonstrating that the plaintiff no longer had an interest in the property. See
Young, 2009 WL 1564994, at *3-5. McGuire challenges a conveyance that
2McGuire challenged the validity of the assignment under government
code section 51.903. See Tex. Gov. Code Ann. § 51.903 (West. Supp. 2011).
We held that section 51.903 does not apply to assignments and, thus, McGuire
could not rely on it to challenge the assignment. McGuire, 2012 WL 254066, at
*1.
6
Appeal Page 199
occurred before Fannie Mae purchased the property. McGuire does not dispute
that Fannie Mae purchased the property or that Fannie Mae has retained its
alleged interest in the property; he disputes, in essence, only whether the seller
had the authority to sell the property to Fannie Mae in the first place. To the
extent that McGuire complains of defects in the foreclosure process, he may
pursue that complaint in district court, but it may not be considered in this action.
See Shutter, 318 ·S.W.3,d at 471; Williams, -315 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Scott, 127
Tex. at 35,90 S.W.2d at 818-19).
We hold that the county court was able to determine Fannie Mae's right to
immediate possession of the property at trial, and it did not err in granting
possession of the property to Fannie Mae. We overrule McGuire's issues.
Conclusion
Having overruled all of McGuire's issues, we affirm the county court's
judgment. Because we affirm the county court's judgment, we deny Fannie
Mae's motion to strike appellant's response brief as moot.
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: March 22, 2012
7
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Page 43
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Page 44
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Defendant’s Original Motion to Dismiss  Page 1 
 
CAUSE NO. F5506

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE

Plaintiff,

V.

JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE AND ALL
OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 902 RUSK
DRIVE, EULESS, TEXAS 76039
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
IN THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
COURT



PRECINCT NO. 3



TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
§
§
§
§
§
§
§


MOTION TO DISMISS


TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

NOW COMES, Defendant, James Allen McGuire, in the above styled and numbered
cause and would show the Court the following:
I.
Defendant brings this cause as: Barrett Burke Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P. has not
since 2009 had an effective Power of Attorney on file in Public Records of Tarrant County to
represent Plaintiff’s in any legal capacity. Barrett Burke Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P.,
filed a Forcible Detainer against Defendant without appropriate authority for Plaintiff, and
were without legal authority or standing to file a Forcible Detainer suit in this court.
II.
Appeal Page 203
Defendant’s Original Motion to Dismiss  Page 2 
 
Defendant attaches an online search of Tarrant County Public Records (Exhibit “A”).
The online search reveals all filed Power of Attorneys filed by FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE since 1999. Public records does reflect a
Power of Attorney filed as Instrument #D207418592 whereas FEDERAL NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/K/A FANNIE MAE provides a General Power of Attorney
(Exhibit “B”) expiring January 1, 2009. Public records reveal not additional Power of Attorney filed
by Fannie Mae to note Barrett Burke Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P. is counsel of record.

III.
Plaintiff has more than one fatal issue that would disallow standing to invoke the
court’s jurisdiction. This Motion to Dismiss is not meant to disallow Defendant from
presenting additional fatal issues that would also notice the court there is a lack of standing.

IV.
Defendant prays that this court will dismiss the suit for lack of standing. Award the
Defendant interim attorney fees in the Amount of $7,500, and any other equitable relief that
is available.


Respectfully submitted,


By:
James Allen McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
817 420-4151
Pro Se

Appeal Page 204
Defendant’s Original Motion to Dismiss  Page 3 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on May 11, 2011 a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Memorandum in
Support was served by U S Mail on Lauren Christoffel, Bar I.D. # 24065045, 15000 Surveyor Blvd,
Suite #100, Addison, Texas 75001.



James Allen McGuire


Appeal Page 205
Rule of appellate procedure 34.6(e)(1) and (2) provides that if there are
inaccuracies in the reporter's record, the parties may either correct the
inaccuracy by agreement or submit the disagreement to the trial court for
resolution after notice and hearing. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(e)(1), (2). Rule
34.6(e)(3) permits an appellate court, "jf the dispute [concerning the accuracy of
the reporter's record] arises after the reporter's record has been filed in the
appellate court, [to] submit the dispute to the trial court for resolution." Tex. R.
App. P. 34.6(e)(3). In his motion to correct the reporter's record,
1
Appellant
states: "Upon review of the Reporter's Record it was noticed that reference,
verbatim, 'closest thing I have to a colorable claim' is missing from the record.
[Page 8 of the Reporters Record, Approximately in the area of lines 17 to 22][.]"
In his appellate brief, however, Appellant contends in one issue that Appellee did
not have standing to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction. Thus, even taking the
statements in Appellant's motion as true, the allegedly missing statement relates
to Appellant's "colorable claim" and does not affect Appellee's standing in the trial
court. See generally Landry's Seafood House-Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233
S.W.3d 430, 437 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (overruling issue
concerning missing testimony raised pursuant to rule 34.6(f) because missing
testimony did not relate to matters at issue in the appeal).
1Appellant actually filed a letter with this court dated December 11, 2011, and we
construed the letter as a motion to correct the reporter's record. [misc. file]
2
Appeal Page 207
Notice to 2
nd
Court of Appeal (Potential Record Tampering)

Debra Spisak, Clerk December 11, 2011
Second Court of Appeals
Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center
401 W. Belknap, Suite 9000
Fort Worth, Texas 76196

Re: No. 02-11-00140-CV
Trial Court 342-252174-11


Appellant is in receipt of the trial courts record.

Upon review of the Reporter’s Record it was noticed that reference, verbatim, “closest thing I
have to a colorable claim” is missing from the record. [Page 8 of the Reporters Record,
Approximately in the area of lines 17 to 22]

Appellant request that the court direct that the audio version of the hearing be placed under
appropriate custody for use at a later date and that the proper agencies are notified that there is a
possibility that court records have been tampered with.

Appellant will still prepare and submit Appellant’s Brief upon the records as provided by
December 22, 2011 and if it is proved of fact that the court records have been tampered with, the
Appellant would be offered the opportunity to amend the Appellant’s Brief based on a true and
correct copy of the record.

Appellant provides this advance notice to the 2
nd
Court of Appeals so evidence can be secured
before the offenders have received notice which will be contained in Appellant’s Brief.


Respectfully



James McGuire
902 Rusk Drive
Euless, Texas 76039
817 420-4151
Appeal Page 209
CAUSE NO. 2011-004521-1
FEDERAL NATIONAL
*
IN THE COUNTY COURT
MORTGAGE ASSOC.
*
VS.
*
AT LAW NO. 1
JAMES ALLEN MCGUIRE
*
AND ALL OCCUPANTS
*
TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER ON CONTEST TO AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY COSTS
On October 11,2011, this Court heard the contest to the affidavit ofJAMES ALLEN
MCGUIRE, Petitioner, of inability to pay costs in the above-numbered and entitled cause;
and Petitioner, appearing pro se, and the County Clerk, appearing by and through the Office
of the Criminal District Attorney, Tarrant County, Texas; and the Court having heard the
evidence and arguments, if any, is of the opinion and so finds that Petitioner HAS/-HAS
-
~ sustained his burden of proof that he is indigent.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the contest to the affidavit of inability to pay
costs is SUS'f1\:lNRB/ OVERRULED.
SIGNED on October 11,2011.
JUDGE PRESIDING
scANNEO
OC1 26 20U
Page 92
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