Muslim Brotherhood

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10 H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W • Fall 2011
GLOBAL NOTEBOOK
remains enormously popular, with
approval ratings hovering around
80 percent. From a Machiavellian
perspective, Putin’s leadership has
been phenomenal. During his first two
terms as president, Russia experienced
a 72 percent increase in GDP, an
eightfold increase in average monthly
salary, and a restoration of government
stability. However, the political
corruption, human rights violations,
and propaganda that Putin has used
to strengthen his regime threaten to
undermine the foundation of Russian
democracy.
Many had hoped to see Medvedev
compete against Putin in the upcom-
ing elections on a liberal moderniza-
tion platform. If these two titans of
the Kremlin were to run against each
other, the contest would reinvigorate
Russian democracy. A functional de-
mocracy requires elections that are
competitive enough to make elected
officials accountable to voters. With
Medvedev out of the race, Russians can
expect a landslide victory for Putin and
several more years of his increasingly
authoritarian rule. In February 2011,
Mikhail Gorbachev broadly criticized
Russia’s electoral system, particularly
the undemocratic way in which Putin
and Medvedev privately decided who
would stand for the presidency in 2012.
Additionally, Medvedev’s recent an-
nouncement that he will step aside for
Putin lends credence to the commonly
held belief that Medvedev has been a
mere puppet for Putin throughout his
presidency. Putin has also manipulated
the electoral system by changing the
Russian constitution’s provision for
direct election of provincial gover-
nors to a presidential appointment
system. This new model allows Putin
to reward loyal supporters and further
inhibits government accountability to
the electorate.
A former KGB officer, Putin is
no stranger to the use of violence as a
means to achieve political objectives.
In fact, a 2008 Human Rights Watch
report ranked Putin’s human rights
record on the same level as the leaders
of Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Dissidents,
such as former world chess champion
Garry Kasparov and Russia’s richest
man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, have
been arrested on questionable grounds,
and journalists who report negative
stories about the government’s policy
on Chechnya, for instance, have the
tendency to be assassinated. Putin has
even promoted a high school Russian
history textbook that downplays the
atrocities committed by Stalin and ren-
ders him a harsh but effective leader.
Although Putin’s strong-arm tactics
pale in comparison to Stalin’s massive
purges, it is not too much of a stretch
to call Putin a new “man of steel” who
seeks to restore Russia’s prominence
in global affairs.
Putin’s careful attention to his
public image has always been a vital
aspect of his political strategy. Lately,
he has made appearances throughout
the country to foster the popular no-
tion that he is some sort of superhero.
Whether he is scuba diving, climbing
a rock wall, arm wrestling, or flying a
fighter jet, Putin crafts the personal im-
age of an awe-inspiring man of action.
If he can drive a Formula One race
car, perform skilled judo maneuvers,
stare down wild animals, and swim
across freezing Siberian lakes, it seems
entirely plausible that he can solve all
of Russia’s problems without breaking
a sweat, or so the logic goes. A recent
popular comic in Russia features “Su-
per Putin,” a hero who saves the world
from both zombies and terrorists. This
comic captures the true adoration that
many constituents feel for Putin and
the sensational propaganda techniques
that make him such a formidable threat
to democracy.
Those who regard Putin as Rus-
sia’s savior are not entirely misguided.
After all, Putin did salvage Russia from
what many considered to be a failed
democratic experiment in the 1990s.
After a severe economic crisis during
which GDP fell by 50 percent, the Rus-
sian people sacrificed liberty in favor of
stability under Putin. His guidance has
consistently led to good results, even
when his methods have been less than
desirable. However, Putin’s reign has
had drawbacks as well. For example,
regardless of how effective he has been,
his United Russia party obstructs prog-
ress because it does not leave room for
constructive public discourse.
Through clever political scheming
and tireless self-promotion, Putin has
taken on the role of a superhero whose
mission is to enhance the power of
Russia. It remains to be seen whether
the return of “Super Putin” to the
presidency will be the “kryptonite” of
Russian democracy.
MIDDLE
EAST
Big Brother Politics
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
staff writer
LENA BAE
A
s Egypt moves f rom the
euphoria of revolution to
the less heady questions of
timetables, candidates, and elections,
the Arab world’s oldest and dominant
Islamist organization, the Muslim
Brotherhood, is again stepping into
the Egyptian political and global media
limelight. The country’s military rulers
have just announced that voting for
the People’s Assembly will begin on
November 28 of this year, marking the
first parliamentary elections since the
ousting of Hosni Mubarak. Amid fears
that the vote would divide Islamist
parties and youth secular groups,
however, the Muslim Brotherhood
appears confident in its role in the
transition process from military to
civilian rule. Although attention
has centered predominantly on the
group’s future policy directions, the
Brotherhood’s key significance lies
with its historical role in shaping the
very institutions that will determine
the power of Egypt’s democracy.
As the best organized force among
Egypt’s political actors, the Muslim
Brotherhood, with its widespread
and deeply entrenched grassroots
network, is eager to play its part in
Egypt’s post-revolutionary regime.
Fall 2011 • H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W 11
GLOBAL NOTEBOOK
Western commentators are quick to
raise apprehensions about the Broth-
erhood’s potential for radical Islamist,
anti-Western, and anti-Israeli policies,
potentially akin to post-revolutionary
Iran. However, the Brotherhood’s
composition, structure, guiding ide-
ology, and political history discount
such fears.
The Brotherhood has revoked
violence as a legitimate strategy de-
cades ago under leaders such as Hassan
al-Hudaybi and Umar al-Tilmisani,
and radical groups such as Al Qaeda
have long scoffed at the Brotherhood’s
involvement in politics. Moreover, the
Brotherhood recruits members from
lay professionals instead of clerics, and
its guiding ideology affirms the belief
that an ideal politics will follow, not
lead, a society polished by Muslim val-
ues, belying the idea of a government
that will strong-arm its people toward
more overt expressions of faith. Under
the Brotherhood, shari’a law may have
greater influence in legislation , but as a
complex organization deeply imbedded
with its grassroots and parliamentary
procedure, this influence will do more
to reflect than force popular beliefs.
Finally, while the Brotherhood’s views
on Israel are negative, this is hardly the
mark of an outlier in the region.
More importantly, whether pub-
licly supported or not, personal or
organizational attitudes are not the
only factor that will influence the
Brotherhood’s Peace and Justice Party
when in government. The Brother-
hood’s participation in the People’s As-
sembly reveal a shift over the decades
from religion and morals to practical
issues of legal and political reform,
socioeconomic policies, and human
rights. It will likely continue to act in
a politically pragmatic manner, and any
new government will be aware of the
significant economic and bureaucratic
issues it must prioritize before catalyz-
ing geopolitical challenges.
In sum, the Brotherhood’s politi-
cal history foretells a group that will
govern in the pragmatic, wary way it
has thus far guided itself. Moreover,
the dominance of inquiries regarding
the Brotherhood’s likely actions in gov-
ernment unfortunately overshadows
the immediately relevant question of
where, in the coming months, it will
stand. The stability and depth of the
transition will largely depend on both
the youth and the liberals, who want
larger social and political change, and
the military, which has a status quo bias
as it currently benefits from involve-
ment in many of Egypt’s key industries.
Such a spectrum includes elections as
well as a more fundamental shift in
Egypt’s power structure that encom-
passes trials of former regime mem-
bers, reforms targeted at correcting
institutional corruption, and potential
retreat of the military’s influence in
the economy. The Brotherhood has
the organizational incentive to favor
stability and avoid risky behavior that
could jeopardize its political lead or
further taint its international reputa-
tion. However, as Egyptian youth
continue to mobilize, the Brotherhood
faces the challenge of holding its own
complex internal currents together
while preserving legitimacy in the face
of the public.
Therefore, its political stance
will not only influence how far the
transition process will proceed, but
also reflect whether the Brotherhood
can move beyond its savvy for self-
preservation to lead, instead of simply
ride, the wave of democratic change.
Thus far, those internal dynamics
seem not so much flexible as divisive.
During the May 27
th
protests in Tahrir
Square over trials of old members of
the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood
chose not to join in, remaining skepti-
cal of the movement. However, hun-
dreds of its youth decided to participate
anyway. The Muslim Brotherhood
youth have again stood in solidarity
with the youth movements in response
to the military’s June communiqué
(which declared that April 6 is receiv-
ing foreign funds and accused it and
Kifaya, youth movements heavily in-
volved in the protests early this year, of
attempting to divide the army and the
people), declaring on their Facebook
page that it is inappropriate to ques-
tion the movements’ intentions. The
Brotherhood is not beyond casting off
its own, as evidenced by the expulsions
of several of its youth leaders due to
their support for former Brotherhood
member and current presidential
candidate Abdel Aboul-Fotouh, their
decision to form the Egyptian Cur-
rent party, and even deeper questions
regarding disagreement with the orga-
nization’s policy.
Yet, even if the Brotherhood is
unable to move with the youth for
deeper political change, and Egypt’s
first democratic years see more en-
ergy expended in managing instability
than significant institutional reform,
the Brotherhood’s lackluster leader-
ship during the transition process can
have unintended, long-term boons for
democracy.
Members of the Brotherhood will
leave the organization when they feel
that it is no longer the most effective
conduit for change amid this window
of opportunity. Already, various break-
away parties have emerged, such as the
Hezb al-Wassat or Center Party, which
was blocked from party status in 2000
but has now re-emerged, and Al Nah-
da, the Renaissance. Such groups not
only diversify the political spectrum,
but also transport the Brotherhood’s
significant organizational knowledge
through former members to the work
of building effective parties, another
significant challenge for the establish-
ment of a vibrant democracy.
Egypt’s democratic transition con-
tinues to face obstacles at this critical
juncture of institutional destruction
and creation. Unfortunately, it seems
so far that the Muslim Brotherhood
has focused more on preparing itself
for the coming political competition
than taking a significant role in manag-
ing the transition process. Continuing
protests and incipient signs of irritation
between the youth and the military
reflect the lack of effective mediation
among actors in this drama. While
scholars can debate the causes of the
Brotherhood’s modest presence, it
brings to light the unfortunate fact that
our debate has, by its focus on what the
Brotherhood may do once in power,
failed to judge it as a forceful and
legitimate player in the establishment
of democracy, and has subsequently
also alleviated it of the responsibilities
of this role.
Reproducedwith permission of thecopyright owner. Further reproductionprohibited without permission.

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