ncc case

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De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society
FACTS: Appellant was Executive Secretary of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society
(Society for short)until the past Board of Directors declared her position vacant on
May 29, 1974, and seven of thedirectors appointed Alberto Romulo to the position.
More than one year after her removal,appellant filed a complaint with the trial court
against the said appointing directors, the Society,the new Board of Directors, and
Alberto Romulo, questioning the legality of her summary cutterfrom her office and
seeking reinstatement thereto; contending That the action of the past Boardwas a
nullity since four of the directors were not qualified to be elevated to the position
becausethey were not members of the Society; and claiming that the removal was
in violation of herrights under the By-Laws of the Society, the New Civil Code, and
the New Constitution, whichthereby rendered the individuals responsible therefor,
countable for damages. The trial courtrendered a decision holding that the suit was
one for quo warranto and has thus prescribed; that,nevertheless, appellant had not
been illegally removed because she was holding an appointmentat the pleasure of
the Board, temporary in nature, and terminable at any time; and, that
thequalifications of the members of the Board could not be attacked collaterally.
Appellant appealedto the Court of Appeals, but the same was certified to the
Supreme Court as only questions oflaw were involved
ISSUE: W/N The appellant can claim damages under the new civil code? - NO
HELD: The Supreme Court held, that even if the complaint questions appellant’s
removal
from her position and seeks her reinstatement thereto, the suit is not necessarily
one of quo warranto sincethe allegations in the complaint constituting her cause
of action show that the case is for damagesand the defendants-appellees, except
one, are not actually holding the office in question; thatappellant is not entitled to
damages because she has not been illegally ousted since pursuant to
the Society’s Code of By
-Laws, the Executive Secretary holds office at the pleasure of the Boardof Directors
unless the term of employment has been fixed in the contract of employment,
which
in the case of appellant has not been so fixed.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general provisions of the New Civil
Code on Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles of the New
Constitution on preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present some
basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and the stability of social order, these are merely guides for human conduct
in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In
the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific provision
governing the term of office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights
under the New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the
appointment.
Moreover, the act of the Board in declaring her position as vacant is not only in
accordance with the Code of By-Laws of the Society but also meets the exacting
standards of honesty and good faith. The meeting of May 29, 1974, at which

petitioner ,petitioner's position was declared vacant, was caged specifically to take
up the unfinished business of the Reorganizational Meeting of the Board of April 30,
1974. Hence, and act cannot be said to impart a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing to wrong but rather emanates from the desire of the
Board to reorganize itself.
Chato v. fortune tobacco
FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be
less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a
rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune)
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property
without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her
part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official
function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as
an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying the motion to dismiss was
elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that underArticle 32,
liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subject to ad valorem [accdg to value] tax [20-45%]. Two
days prior (1 Jul ’93) to RA 7654’s effectivity, VC [Comm., BIR] issued the RMC reclassifying the brands as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% AV tax (brands were subjected to RA 7654, Sec. 142
(c)(1) before it took effect). On 2 Jul, BIR Deputy Comm sent a copy of RMC to Fortune via fax. It was only on 15 Jul
when Fortune received a certified photocopy of the RMC.
Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC’s recall but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV
tax deficiency (9M~) was demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which
issued an injunction enjoining RMC’s implementation (defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the CA,
and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance.
Fortune filed a complaint for damages against VC in her private capacity in the RTC, saying that she should be
held liable for damages under NCC 32 (RMC issuance violated right against property deprivation without due process
+ equal protection of the laws). VC filed a motion to dismiss since she issued RMC in the performance of her fxn,
within authority, and said that being an agent of RP, the latter is the one responsible for her acts, and that the
complaint did have a cause of axn because there was no allegation of malice/bad faith.
RTC denied VC’s motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case as well, saying that under NCC 32, liability may
arise even if defendant did not act with malice/bad faith. CA also said that Admin Code is the general law on puboff’s
civil liab while NCC 32 is the special law governing this case, and that malice/bad faith need not be alleged in the
complaint for damages. VC filed this complaint, saying that what shld be applied is the Admin Code [liab attaches only

when there is a clear showing of bad faith / malice / gross negligence] and said that Admin Code is the special law,
and that NCC is the general law.

ISSUES: Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her
office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official
duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for
damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims
without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In
Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a
special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one,
without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in
person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil
liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant
has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather,
the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an
invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact
that defendant acted without evil intent.

1.

2.

NCC 32 or Admin Code Sec. 38, Book I? NCC 32
A.
LegMeth knowledge – gen, special law shld be harmonized if possible; special law prevails; the circ
that special law is passed before or after gen law does not change principle
B.
Discussion of Code Comm (Dean Bocobo)
i.
There was a proposal re NCC 32 that puboff be held liable for consti right violation only if
there is malice / bad faith but he said that Code Comm opposes this
a.
Nature of NCC 32 – wrong may be civil or criminal
b.
To make such a requisite would defeat main purpose (effective protection of
individual rights)
c.
Object is to put an end to abuse by plea of good faith; in US the remedy is in the
nature of tort
C.
NCC 32 patterned after Am law tort – WRONG, TORTIOUS ACT DEFINED AS THE
COMMISSION/OMISSION OF ACT BY ONE, WITHOUT RIGHT, WHEREBY ANOTHER RECEIVES
SOME INJURY IN PERSON, PROPERTY, OR REPUTATION
i.
Liab in tort not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent
D.
Aberca v. Ver – With NCC 32, principle of puboff acctability under Consti acquires added meaning,
assumes larger dimension
E.
Admin Code – bad faith, malice, negligence vital elements to make puboff liable for damages;
subject is general (“acts” done in performance of duties, without specifying action/omission that may give
rise to civil suit)
i.
IN CONTRAST TO NCC 32 which specifies clearly the acts that may give rise to axn for
damages (tort for impairment of rights, liberties)
WON VC may be held liable for damages. YES (no explicit / direct answer on this though)
A.
Complaint brought under NCC 32 which does not require bad faith and malice, so the failure to
allege it will not amount to failure to state cause of action

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