Pale Notes

NOTES IN LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS

THE LAWYER’S OATH - I , ________________________, of ___________________________, do solemnly
swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor
consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man’s cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.
LEGAL ETHICS – Embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should govern conduct of every Bar
member; branch of moral science treating of lawyer’s duties to the Court, his client, his Colleagues, and the Public.
SOURCES OF LEGAL ETHICS – Canon of Professional Ethics; Supreme Court decisions; statutes; Constitution;
Treatises and publications; Code of Professional Responsibility; and the Rules of Court and other related laws.
PRACTICE OF LAW – Any activity in and out of court which requires application of laws, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991).
WHO ARE AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW? As a rule, any person admitted as a member of the Bar in good
and regular standing is entitled to practice of law.
SANTOS vs. ATTY. LLAMAS, AC#4749, 1/20/2000 – Supreme Court rejected Respondent’s claim that he honestly
thought that he was exempted from payment of IBP dues being a senior citizen and being engaged only in limited
law practice (claiming that farming was his principal occupation). Rule 139-A, Sec. 9 requires every member of the
IBP to pay annual dues, non-payment of which may warrant suspension from Attorney’s Roll. Respondent can
engage in law practice only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is “limited”. Further,
exemption from taxation of senior citizens does not include exemption from payment of membership or association
dues.
NON-LAWYERS WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW – (a) person representing himself or a friend in the MTC (Sec. 34,
Rule 138, RC; (b) in criminal proceedings before municipal court in a locality where licensed Bar member not
available (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court); (c) person representing himself in the RTC (Sec. 33, Rule 138, Rules
of Court); (d) persons authorized to represent the government in a case (Sec. 133, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (e)
complainant himself or union representatives in labor cases (Labor Code); (f) law students who have completed 3 rd
year law and enrolled in a recognized law school’s Supreme Court-approved legal education program to represent
indigent clients, provided that, such appearance if before the RTC should be accompanied at all times by a
supervising lawyer (Rule 138-A).
CRUZ vs. ATTY. CABRERA, AC#5737, 10/25/2004 – Supreme Court admonished Respondent for his remark,
“appear ka nang appear, pumasa ka muna”, directed toward Complainant, who was a 4 th year law student who
personally instituted and appeared in his own behalf in civil collection cases before municipal courts. Although his
comment was intended to point out to the trial court that Complainant was not a lawyer to correct the judge’s
impression of Complainant’s appearance as the judge in her order noted that Complainant was a lawyer, Supreme
Court reminded Respondent that Complainant is not precluded from personally litigating his cases pursuant to Sec.
34, Rue 138RC.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROHIBITED FROM LAW PRACTICE – a) Judges and other officials or employees of
Superior courts (Rule 138, Sec. 35, RC); (b) Officials and employees of Office of SOLGEN; (c) Government
Prosecutors; (d) President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants (Art. VII, Sec. 13,
Constitution); (e) Members of Constitutional Commissions (Art.IX-A, Sec. 2, Constitution); (f) Ombudsman and his
deputies (Art.XI, Sec. 8[2]); (g) Governors, city and municipal mayors (Ra. 7160, Sec. 90); and (h) those who by
special law are prohibited from engaging in the practice of law.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH RESTRICTED RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW – (a) personal appearance as counsel by
Members of Congress before any court, electoral tribunal or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies (Sec. 14,
Art. VI, Constitution); (b) Sanggunian members may practice their legal profession provided that they will not (i)
appear in court in any civil case where the local government or any governmental office, agency or instrumentality
is the adverse party; (ii) appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an national or local government
officer/employee is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; (iii) collect any fee for their
appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which they are officials; and (iv)
use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
government’s interest (RA7160); (c) a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the government cannot act as
counsel in any civil case in which the government or any of its subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or in a
criminal case wherein an officer/employee of the government is accused of an offense in relation to his office (RA
910, Sec. 1).
SUPREME COURT HAS POWER TO REGULATE LAW PRACTICE – Being so intimately affected with public
interest, law practice is both the State’s RIGHT and DUTY to control and regulate in order to protect public welfare.
Art. 8, Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court this power of control.
NATURE OF THE POWER TO ADMIT CANDIDATES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION – It is a judicial function
and involves exercise of discretion. In fact, a candidate has to file a petition with the Supreme Court (In re;
Cunanan 94 PHIL 534; In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562).
REQUIREMENTS FOR A BAR CANDIDATE – Under Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 138, RC: (i) Philippine citizen; (ii)
Philippine resident; (iii) at least 21 years of age; (iv) must be of good moral character; (v) must not have been
charged of a crime involving moral turpitude; (vi) must have met the required educational requirements (Secs. 2
and 5, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
RE: PETITION FOR READMISSION, BENJAMIN DACANAY, BM#1678, 12/17/2007 – A former Philippine citizen
previously admitted to the Philippine Bar was naturalized as a Canadian citizen but later reacquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003). Upon his petition, Supreme
Court readmitted him to law practice holding that, Philippine citizenship lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen
of another country but later reacquired pursuant to RA 9225, is deemed never to have been lost. However, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues, but he must first secure from the Supreme Court authority to do so,
conditioned on: (a) updating and payment in full of annual IBP membership; (b) payment of professional tax; (c)
completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; and (d) retaking of the lawyer’s oath.
VILLA vs. AMA, BM#674, 6/14/2005 – Respondent who was one of the members of Aquila Legis Fraternity
implicated and charged for the death of “Lenny” Villa, was admitted by the Supreme Court to law practice after his
conviction for homicide was set aside by the Court of Appeals finding him only liable for physical injuries. The crime
for which he was convicted was only slight physical injuries, a light offense which cannot be considered a grave
violation of the moral sentiment of the community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility or revenge – a crime
certainly not involving moral turpitude.

REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION INTO THE BAR – A bar candidate must - (1) meet all academic requirements; (2)
pass Bar exam; (3) take oath before SC; (4) sign Attorney’s Roll and issuance of certificate of membership from
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
AGUIRRE vs. RANA, BM#1036, 6/10/2003 – Supreme Court denied Respondent who passed the 2000 Bar exam
admission to the practice of law for appearing as counsel for a local candidate before the local canvassing board in
the 2000 election prior to even taking his oath. Sc held that, before one is admitted to the Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice
law even if he passes the bar examinations. Respondent was engaged in law practice when he appeared before
the canvassing board without being a member of the Bar. It is the signing in the Attorney’s Rolls that makes one a
full-fledged lawyer. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become a lawyer.

ATTY. LINCO V. ATTY. LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011 – A deed of donation conveying a real property to the
illegitimate child of Complainant’s deceased husband was notarized by Respondent after the donor had already
died. Supreme Court suspended Respondent reasoning that affiant’s previous personal appearance before
Respondent does not justify the notarization of the deed due to affiant’s absence n the day of notarization. The rule
requires Respondent not to notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to its contents and truthfulness.
NEVADA V. ATTY. CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012 – Respondent notarized a lease contract which he himself
signed as the supposed administrator of Complainant’s hotel. Supreme Court suspended Respondent holding that,
his act of affixing his signature without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the contract. Thus, his act of
notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of Rule 4, Sec. 3(a) of the notarial rules.

VDA. DE ESPINO vs. ATTY. PREQUITO, AC#4762, 6/28/2004 – Respondent suspended from law practice for
issuing worthless checks seemingly without regard to their deleterious effects to public interest and public order.
Issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious
doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. It not only sets himself liable for a
serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the CPR, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to
obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law.

JANDOQUILE V. ATTY. REVILLA, AC#9514, 4/10/2013 – Supreme Court reprimanded Respondent for notarizing
an affidavit-complaint signed by relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity without requiring them to present
valid identification cards. Supreme Court held that Respondent cannot be liable for not requiring affiants to present
valid identification. If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them their valid
identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a jurat, that affiant is personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through competent proof of identity.

PURPOSES OF THE NOTARIAL LAW – (a) promote, serve and protect public interest; (b) simplify, clarify and
modernize rules governing notaries public; and (c) foster ethical conduct among notaries public (Sec. 2, Rule 1 of
2004 Notarial Practice Rules.

PENA V. ATTY PATERNO, AC#4191, 6/10/2013 – A disbarment complaint charged that Respondent sold
Complainant’s property by forging her signature and notarizing said spurious instrument. No copy of the questioned
instrument could be presented because Respondent did not submit to the clerk of court her notarial report when the
deed of sale was executed. For her deceitful conduct, Supreme Court disbarred Respondent holding that, failure to
submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her notarial register/report, has far reaching implications and grave
consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of said deed of sale and showed the deceitful
conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. For such deceitful conduct, Respondent
DISBARRED from the practice of law.

ESPINOSA V. ATTY. OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011 – Supreme Court suspended Atty. Omana for preparing and
allegedly notarizing a “Kasunduan” extrajudicially allowing the spouses to live separately and dissolving their
marriage and conjugal partnership. Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void and a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of marriage and the family by encouraging
separation of spouses and extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership. In preparing a void document,
Respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1. Even granting arguendo that the document was notarized by
Respondent’s staff, it only showed Respondent’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary public is
personally responsible for entries in his notarial register.
TAN TIONG BIO vs. ATTY. GONZALES, AC#6634, 8/23/2007 – Respondent suspended for notarizing a document
in Pasig City when his commission was for Quezon City. While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident,
such act partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.
UY vs. ATTY. SAÑO, AC#6505, 9/11/2008 – For notarizing a document despite expiration of his notarial
commission, Respondent was suspended by the Supreme Court reasoning that, a lawyer’s act of notarizing without
the requisite commission is reprehensible constituting as it does not only malpractice but falsification of public
documents. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act but one invested with substantive public
interest converting a private document into a public document without further proof of authenticity.
DELA CRUZ vs. ATTY. DIMAANO, JR., AC#7781, 9/12/2008 – For notarizing a deed without the personal
appearance of certain parties thereto, Respondent was suspended by the Supreme Court. The latter gave no
credence to Respondent’s defense that he simply relied upon the representations of his long-time neighbour who
he believed would not lie to him. Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a
document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed it and personally appeared
before them to attest to the truth of what are stated therein, otherwise, notaries public would not be able to verify
the genuineness of the signatures and whether the document is the party’s free act and deed.

ALEJANDRO vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO, AC#4256, 2/13/2004 – For abandoning Complainant and their three sons
and living with his mistress, SC disbarred Respondent holding that, the Court has disciplined Bar members found
guilty of misconduct demonstrating lack of good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent
for admission to the Bar but, likewise, for continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. EALA, AC# 7136, 8/1/2007 – SC disbarred Respondent for cohabiting with Complainant’s
wife. Respondent, a married man cohabited with Irene, a married woman. The Rules of Court employs “grossly
immoral conduct” as a ground for disbarment and not “under scandalous circumstances” as used in Art. 334
(concubinage) of the Revised Penal Code. While the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is
not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behaviour, it is not so with respect to the betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is deemed disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
BAUTISTA VS. ATTY. GONZALES 182 SCRA 151 – Respondent accepted a civil case on 50% contingency based
from the litigated property’s value. After termination of the engagement, Respondent transferred to himself ½ of the
property subject of litigation. SC suspended Respondent citing that, in executing a document transferring ½ of the
subject properties to himself, Respondent violated the law (Art. 1491, CC) expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his

profession. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expense proceedings to enforce the client’s right is
CHAMPERTOUS.
NARAG, vs. ATTY. NARAG, AC#3405, 6/29/1998 – Supreme Court disbarred Respondent for abandoning his
family and cohabiting with his 17-year old student. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of
every member of the bar. Immoral conduct is conduct so wilful, flagrant or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Such conduct, must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.

EVILS OF AMBULANCE CHASING –– (a) fomenting of litigation with resulting burden on courts and the public; (b)
subornation of perjury; (c) mulcting of innocent persons by judgment upon manufactured causes of action; (d)
defrauding innocent persons with proper cause of action but ignorant of legal rights and court procedure by means
of contracts retaining exorbitant percentages of recovery and illegal charges for court costs and expenses and by
settlement for quick returns of fees against the just rights of the injured person.
ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC, INC. 223 SCRA 378 – SC held that the best advertising even for a young lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct.

ATTY. KHAN, JR. vs. ATTY. SIMBILLO, AC#5299, 8/19/2003 – SC suspended for posting two paid ads in national
newspapers advertising his services as an “annulment expert at P48,000.00 within 4 to 6 months. The practice of
law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture and law advocacy is not capital that necessarily
yields profits. Gaining of a livelihood should be secondary consideration as duty to public service and to
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers. Solicitation of legal business is not
ROA vs. ATTY. MORENO, AC#8382, 4/21/10 – Respondent sold a land and assured Complainant he could already altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the legal profession’s
occupy the same with the certificate of land occupancy issued by Respondent. It turns out that the property was not dignity. If made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to lawyers and to the Bar.
owned by Respondent and was even under litigation. SC suspended Respondent citing that, his credibility is highly
questionable – he even issued a bogus certificate of land occupancy to Complaint whose only fault what that he did not
know better. To the unlettered, said certificate could have easily passed as document evidencing title. Respondent LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. TOLENTINO, AC#6672, 9/4/09 – For soliciting clients from Complainant’s law firm of which
violated Rule 1.01CPR. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A he was a former lawyer, SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his is a profession and not a business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or whether it renders him either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice – a ground for
disbarment.
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
CHAM vs. ATTY. PAITA-MOYA, AC#7494, 6/27/2008 – Respondent leased an apartment owned by Complainant’s
company. Despite repeated demands, she failed to settle her unpaid account and vacated the leased premises
without notice. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, having incurred just debts, she had the moral and legal
responsibility to settle them when they became due. Her abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her
obligations for rent and electric bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of Canon1.

SAMANIEGO vs. ATTY. FERRER, AC#7022, 6/18/2008 – Respondent, a married man, developed a relationship
and lived with Complainant who was his client. Despite Respondent’s insistence of Complainant’s complacency
knowing him to be a married man, SC suspended Respondent citing that, while Respondent did not abandon
Complainant but simply returned to his family, still, the complacency of one in the affair complained of immorality
against her co-principal does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether complainant is in pari
delicto. The Court’s investigation is not about complainant’s acts but Respondent’s conduct as one of its officers
and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
VENTURA V. ATTY. SAMSON, AC#9608, 11/27/2012 – Respondent admitted to having sex with Complainant, a
13-year old girl, but insisted that such was not grossly immoral as it was mutually agreed upon with Complainant
who was allegedly reputed to having sex with other men for pay and that in fact, he pay her for sex. SC disbarred
Respondent holding that, his act of engaging in sex with a young lass, his former employee’s daughter constituted
gross immoral conduct that warranted sanction. He not only admitted having sexual intercourse with her but also
showed no remorse by asserting that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her
money.
BARRATRY – The offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits either at law or otherwise except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
AMBULANCE CHASING – Figuratively, a lawyer’s act of chasing the ambulance with the victim of an accident for
the purpose of talking to him or his relatives and offering his legal services to file a case against the person who
caused the accident.

VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012 – Respondent owned what purports to be a financial
and legal consultancy company which was in reality a vehicle for him to procure professional employment,
specifically for corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead proposed that should the prospective client agree to
the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank
proves that Respondent violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit. In suspending Respondent, SC held that, a lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or
other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises though when the business is of such nature or is conducted in such a
manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar – an inconsistency arising when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer, or that
can be used as a cloak for indirectly solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf.
ATTY. VITRIOLO VS. ATTY. DASIG, AC#4984, 4/1/2003 – In disbarring Respondent who was the Officer-in-charge
of the CHED Legal Affairs Service for soliciting money from various persons with applications pending before her
office, SC held that, generally, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a Bar member for
misconduct in the discharge of her official duties. However, if the misconduct as a government official also
constitutes violation of his lawyer’s oath, then he may be disciplined by the Court as a Bar member. Respondent’s
misconduct as a CHED lawyer is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a Bar member. As a lawyer,
she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as
consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
CATU VS. ATTY. RELLOSA, AC#5738, 2/19/2008 – Respondent, who, as barangay captain presided over lupon
conciliation over a land dispute later entered his appearance as counsel for defendants in the subsequent
ejectment case filed after the barangay conciliation proceedings. SC suspended Respondent holding that, while
Sec. 90 of the Local Government Code subjecting certain elective local officials to the proscription to practice their

profession, makes no such interdiction on the punong barangay and members of the sangguniang barangay,
however, Respondent should have procured prior permission or authorization from the Secretary of DILG before he
entered his appearance as counsel pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 18 of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Noncompliance therewith constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer to obey the laws.
SIERRA VS. LOPEZ, AC#7549, 8/29/2008 – In dismissing the complaint against Respondents who were all city
prosecutors charged with dereliction of duty for not requiring the parties in certain criminal cases filed by
Complainant to simultaneously appear during preliminary investigation, SC held that, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court does not require a confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted
through submission of affidavits and supporting documents through exchange of pleadings.
ALCANTARA VS. ATTY. PEFIANCO, 12/3/2002 – Respondent intervened and angrily shouted at a lawyer talking
to the wife of the murder when Complainant stepped in to pacify Respondent. The latter turned his ire at, and tried
to attack Complainant. Respondent shouted invectives at Complainant including, “Gago ka”. SC reprimanded
Respondent citing Canon 8CPR which admonishes lawyer to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They
must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all
times.
SABERON vs. ATTY. LARONG, AC#6567, 4/16/2008 – Respondent acting as counsel for a bank filed various
pleadings using abusive and offensive language hinting that Complainant was merely blackmailing/coercing the
bank for financial gain. SC fined Respondent reasoning that, the Code mandates for a lawyer to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel and, in his professional dealings, refrain from using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper. The adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in the
pursuit of their duty to advance their clients’ interests. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
CAMACHO VS. ATTY. PAGULAYAN, AC#4807, 3/22/2000 – Complainant represented expelled students in a civil
case against their school. Respondent as counsel for the school secured the dismissal of said complaint by
brokering a deal with the students allowing them readmission into the school without Complainant’s presence or
knowledge. In suspending Respondent, SC held that Canon 9 provides that, “a lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake
to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the
lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he
should not undertake to advise him as to the law”.
CAMBALIZA VS. ATTY. CRISTAL-TENORIO, AC#6290, 7/14/2004. – Charged with assisting in illegal law practice
for naming her husband as a senior partner of the law office, Respondent explained that such was because he had
substantial investments in the law office. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, it is the lawyer’s duty to
prevent, or at the very least not assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012 – SC warned Respondent that, an agreement like
the one supposedly forged between him and Complainant for the latter to receive 10% of the former’s attorney’s
fees for every judicially-approved corporate rehabilitation plan prepared by the Complainant, is violative of Rule

9.02. proscribing a lawyer from dividing or agreeing to divide fees for legal services rendered with a person not
licensed to practice law.
HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO VS. ATTY. FLORIDO, AC#5624, 1/20/2004 – Respondent went to the Complainant who
was his estranged wife to demand custody of their children supposedly based upon a resolution of the Court of
Appeals granting him temporary custody. Per certification from the Court of Appeals, no such resolution had been
issued. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden
cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could take at face value what is asserted by counsel.
HON. MACIAS VS. ATTY. SELDA, AC#6442, 10/21/2004 – Respondent withdrew as counsel for protestee in an
election protest assigned to Complainant citing heavy workload. Thereafter, Respondent executed an affidavit
citing Complainant’s pre-judgment of the case as the real reason for his withdrawal. This affidavit was used in a
motion for inhibition filed against Complainant. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, all members of the legal
profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, ‘do no falsehood’ and ‘conduct themselves as lawyers according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients’”. His affidavit
retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel is an admission under oath of his misrepresentation. He misled
the court in clear violation of his oath as a lawyer and failed to abide by the Code. Saying one thing in his motion
and another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of the cardinal requirement of candor and honesty which
necessitates appropriate punishment.
ATTY. ALONSO VS. ATTY. RELAMIDA, JR., AC#8481, 8/3/10 – For refiling a case of illegal dismissal after a
previous ruling by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case finding that there was voluntary resignation became final
and executory, SC suspended Respondent, reasoning that, all lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are
neither mere words nor an empty formality. A lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause but not at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice. Filing multiple petitions constitutes abuse of court processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice punishable as contempt of court.
AFURONG VS. ATTY. AQUINO, AC#1571, 9/23/1999 – To stay execution of a decision obtained by Complainant in
an ejectment case, Respondent filed multiple petitions and even a motion to postpone a scheduled hearing
supposedly due to his appearance in another case when there was actually none. SC suspended Respondent
citing that, it is an attorney’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just and such defences only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. The decision having reached
finality and execution being effected, Respondent should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that
there was no apparent purpose for it than to delay execution of judgment. Respondent also committed a falsehood
when he said in his motion for postponement that he had to attend another hearing. He himself admitted that he
only included such statement in order to give more “force” to his motion. Such act violates a lawyer’s duty to avoid
concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.
VDA. DE FAJARDO VS. ATTY. BUGARING, AC#5113, 10/7/2004 –Respondent who failed to agree with
Complainant as to his attorney’s fees in a partition case, not only refused the P100k tendered for his services but
later, filed a civil case for collection with attachment of Complainant’s property. SC suspended Respondent holding
that, the proper time to deal with the issue of professional fees is upon commencement of the lawyer-client
relationship. He should have determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees when he was first
retained. Such prudence would have spared the Court this controversy over a lawyer’s compensation, a suit that
should be avoided except to prevent imposition, injustice and fraud. While a lawyer is entitled to the Court’s
protection against any attempt on the client’s part to escape payment of legitimate fees, such protection however
must not be sought at the expense of truth.
SEARES, JR. VS. ATTY. GONZALES-ALZATE, AC#9058, 11/14/12 – Complainant charged Respondent who was
his lawyer in his 2007 election protest with misconduct for representing conflicting interests for serving as
Turqueza’s counsel in an administrative case filed against Complainant who was elected mayor in 2010 for
usurpation of authority. SC dismissed the complaint against Respondent reasoning that, representing conflicting

interests would occur only where the attorney’s new agreement would require her to use against a former client any
confidential information gained from the previous professional relation. The prohibition did not cover a situation
where the subject matter of the present engagement was totally unrelated to the attorney’s previous engagement.
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. vs. ATTY. FLORIDO, AC#5736, 6/18/10 – For forcibly taking over the bank with
his clients who were the bank’s minority stockholders aided by armed men, Respondent was suspended by the SC.
A lawyer’s first and foremost duty is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Likewise, it is his duty to promote respect for the law and legal
processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. It
is a lawyer’s duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing
an intentional wrong to their adversaries.
GONZALES VS. ATTY. SABACAJAN 249 SCRA 276 – Respondent held Complainants’ owner’s copies of land
titles purportedly because they owned his client a sum of money. SC suspended Respondent holding that, if
complainant did have alleged monetary obligations with his client, that did not warrant Respondent’s summarily
confiscating as collateral or any court order authorizing Respondent to take custody of said title. A lawyer shall
impress upon his cient the need for compliance with law and principles of fairness.

PARIÑAS vs. ATTY. PAGUINTO, AC#6297, 7/13/2004 – A month after Complainant paid Respondent for her case
for annulment of marriage, Respondent represented to Complainant that the case had already been filed.
Complainant demanded for the return of her money upon learning from the court that no such case had been filed.
SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, acceptance of money from a client establishes attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to client’s cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. When a lawyer
accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning,
skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense
of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of
the case.
BUENO VS. ATTY. RANESES, AC#8383, 12/11/2012 – Respondent, as Complainant’s counsel in a civil case
asked for money purportedly to be divided by him and the judge in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent
failed to comment on the adverse party’s offer of exhibits and also failed to submit his memorandum. An adverse
decision was rendered which Complainant only came to know about when the sheriff came to execute. Despite, a
certification showing prior receipt of the decision, Respondent claimed he had no knowledge of the decision. SC
disbarred Respondent holding that, lawyers should serve their clients with competence and diligence and not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith renders him liable. Respondent
further committed a fraudulent exaction and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. He
extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery
apparently took place as he in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was
the crime of bribery.
TRINIDAD VS. ATTY. VILLARIN, AC#9310, 2/27/2013 – Respondent, who was counsel for Purence Realty, was
charged of harassing Complainants by sending the demand letters threatening to file ejectment cases even after
Complainants had secured a final and executory judgment ordering Purence Realty to delivery titles to them upon
their full payment o the original purchase price. SC held that, the Code provides the limitations that lawyers shall
perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense only when they
believe it to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case, Respondent’s act of issuing demand letters, moved
by the understanding of a void HLURB decision due to non-service of summons upon his client, is legally
sanctioned because if his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for
ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code, just to maintain his client’s
disputed ownership over the subdivision lots. Respondent was however reprimanded for brazenly typifying one of
the complainants as an illegal occupant – a description the exact opposite of the truth, since he was well-aware of
the final and executory HLURB decision recognizing her as a lot buyer with a right to complete her payments in
order to occupy her property.
BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ALVERO, AC#8159, 4/23/10 – Respondent informed Complainant that he would deposit
the latter’s 300K with the court because the creditor refuse to accept it as redemption payment for Complainant
tenancy rights. Complainant later demand for the return of his money when he learned that Respondent was losing
a lot in cockfights and no judicial deposit had been made. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, when a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, he is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that purpose. If he does not use it for the intended purpose, he must
promptly return the money to his client.
SMALL VS. ATTY. BANARES, AC#7021, 2/21/2007 – Despite Complainant’s constant follow-up as to the status of
the case for which he already paid Respondent acceptance and filing fees, Respondent merely replied that he was
still preparing the documents. Months passed and still Respondent failed to present any document prompting
Complainant to demand for a full refund, which Respondent failed to comply. SC suspended Respondent reasoning
that, “every lawyer holds in trust moneys of his client that may come into his possession and he should account for
them and deliver them to the client upon demand. Respondent received money and since he failed to render any
legal service to Complainant, he should have promptly accounted for, and returned the money, but he failed to do
so.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY VS. ATTY. MIJARES III, AC#8380, 11/20/09– Respondent was disbarred for failing to
turn over certain papers which he supposedly secured for Complainant after the latter had paid him P500k to
Respondent as facilitation and processing expenses for the titling of a certain property. Supreme Court held that,
“every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance his client’s interest such that he must promptly account
for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him”. A lawyer’s conversion of funds entrusted to
him is a gross violation of professional ethics.
TAHAW vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS P. VITAN, AC#6441, 10/21/2004 – Almost a year lapsed since Complainant paid
Respondent 30K for a partition case, still there was no news from Respondent as to the case status. In response to
Complainant’s letter, Respondent assured her that he already filed the case. Upon her personal inquiry,
Complainant learned from the clerk of court that no such case was filed. SC suspended Respondent holding that,
when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its
final conclusion. Thus, when Respondent’s services were engaged by Complainant, the former took it upon himself
to perform the legal services required of him. In the instant case, however, Respondent seemed to have forgotten
his sworn duty after he received the money from his client.
BARBUCO VS. ATTY. BELTRAN, AC#5092, 8/11/2004 – Complainant learned that her appeal had been
dismissed by the Court of Appeals because Respondent failed to file the required appellant’s brief. Respondent
explained that he timely filed the appeal only that, despite receipt of the notice to file brief, he was late in fling the
required brief because he was physically incapacitated for several days due to a vehicular incident. In suspending
Respondent, SC explained that, an attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period constitutes inexcusable negligence. His
supposed involvement in an accident from which he suffered injuries cannot serve to excuse him from filing his
pleadings because he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. He could have asked any of
his partners in the office to file the appellant’s brief for him, or at least, a motion for extension of time to file said
pleading.
CUIZON VS. ATTY. MACALINO, AC#4334, 7/7/2004 – Complainant was forced to hire another lawyer after
Respondent whom she already paid to represent her husband convicted of a drug charge failed to attend to her
husband’s case. After she filed a disbarment case against Respondent, Complainant reported to the Supreme
Court that he again committed an infraction of the law by issuing a worthless check to her. SC disbarred
Respondent reasoning that, no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his client. However, once he agrees to take up the client’s cause, he owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.

OVERGAARD VS, ATTY. VALDEZ, AC#7902, 9/20/2008 – Complainant, a Dutch national, who paid Respondent
P900k to represent him in several cases filed by and against him claimed that Respondent not only failed to update
him of the status of the cases, but also failed to enter his appearance in some cases, and inform him that he was
entitled to prepare a counter-affidavit and that arraignment dates for the criminal cases against him had already
been set. Warrants for Complainants arrests were subsequently issued for his non-attendance. In disbarring
Respondent, SC held that, he had indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of Bar members. He
did not only neglect his client’s case, he abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire another
lawyer. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client’s cause. A lawyer is bound to serve his client with competence and diligence. A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

became final and executory. SC suspended Respondent not giving credence to his claim that he did not have Complainants’
contact number or address and that they were the ones remiss in making a follow up with him of the status of their case. It is
elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant
communication with each other. While communication is a shared responsibility between counsel and client, it is the
counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders issued by the court. He cannot simply
wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the development in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is
necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.
PENA VS. ATTY. APARICIO, AC#7298, 6/25/2007 – Respondent threatened Complainant with criminal charges for
tax evasion and falsification if the latter refused to pay Respondent’s claim of separation pay for his client. In
reprimanding Respondent, SC found no merit in Respondent’s claim that the disbarment case should be dismissed
for want of certification against forum-shopping because the filing of multiple suits and conflicting decisions rarely
happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio or by the IBP upon verified complaint of any person, thus, if complainant fails to attach a certification
against forum shopping the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be
ascertained with ease. A lawyer is duty-bound to represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law. His duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice – his client’s success is wholly subordinate and his conduct must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While the writing of demand letters is standard practice and
tradition in this jurisdiction, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay containing as it
did a threat to file retaliatory charges against Complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim.
ONG VS. ATTY. UNTO, AC#2417, 2/6/2002– Respondent filed criminal charges against Complainant for alleged
violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and Anti-Dummy Law plus administrative cases before the Bureau
of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and the Office of the Solicitor General after the latter failed to
heed the former’s demand letters seeking child support for his client. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and not to present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper advantage in any case or
proceeding. Respondent had not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling of his client’s legal
affairs. He tried to coerce Complainant to comply with his demand letter by threatening to file various charges
against the latter. After non-compliance, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative
cases – this act is malicious as the cases filed did not have any bearing or connection to his client’s cause.
INSTANCES WHEN COUNSEL CANNOT RECOVER FULL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES DESPITE
WRITTEN CONTRACT – (1) when stipulated attorney’s fees are in excess of what the law expressly provides; (2)
when the attorney is guilty of fraud or bad faith against the client; (3) when counsel’s services were worthless
because of his negligence; (4) when the contract of employment is illegal; (5) when counsel served adverse
interest, unless he acted with consent of both parties.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY’S FEES (Rule 20.01, CPR) – (a) time spent and extent and services
rendered and required; (b) novelty and difficulty of question involved; (c) importance of subject matter; (d) skill
demanded of lawyer; (e) customary charges for similar services and IBP schedule of fees; (f) probability of losing
other compensation; (g) amount involved in the controversy and benefits resulting from the service; (h) contingency
or certainty of compensation; (i) character of employment whether occasional or established; (j) the lawyer’s
professional standing.

INSTANCES OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ON QUANTUM MERUIT – (a) no express contract for attorney’s fees; (b)
court determines fees stipulated in the contract to be unconscionable or unreasonable; (c) contract for attorney’s
fees is void due to purely formal matters or defects in the execution; (d) counsel’s inability, for justifiable cause, to
finish the case to its conclusion; (e) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; (f) charging of
SPS. ARANDA VS. ATTY. ELAYDA, AC#7907, 12/15/10 – Respondent, as Complainants’ counsel in a civil case, failed
tobeyond what is fixed by law.
fees
notify them and even appear for the scheduled hearing which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Later,
Respondent took no steps, or at the very least, inform Complainants of the decision rendered adverse to them. This decision

CASTRO-JUSTO VS. ATTY. GALING, AC#6174, 11/16/2011 – Complainant charged that, after he wrote demand
letter regarding Ms. Koa’s dishonoured checks, Respondent appeared as Ms. Koa’s counsel in the criminal cases
for estafa and boucing checks which she subsequently filed. SC suspended Respondent holding that, a lawyerclient relationship can exist despite close friendship. This relationship was established the moment Complainant
sought Respondent’s legal advice regarding the dishonored checks. Respondent confirmed this relationship by
drafting the demand letter and referring to Complainant therein as “my client”. The fact that the demand letter was
not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that Complainant hired another lawyer is of no moment. Non-payment
of professional fee will not exculpate Respondent from liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not
exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests.
GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL – (a) client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in
connection with the matter he is handling; (b) client insists that lawyer pursue conduct violative of canons and rules;
(c) his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the client’s best interest; (d) lawyer’s mental and physical
condition renders it difficult for him to carry out employment effectively; (e) client’s deliberately failure to pay fees for
services or failure to comply with retainer agreement; (f) lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office; and (g)
other similar cases (Rule 22.01, CPR).
OBJECTIVES OF DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION – (a) Compel attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his
client; (b) remove from the profession, a person whose misconduct has proved him UNFIT to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney; (c) punish lawyer although not so much as to
safeguard the administration of justice; (d) set as an example or warning for other members of the Bar; (e)
safeguard the administration of justice from incompetence and dishonesty of lawyers; (f) protect the public.
CHARACTERISTICS OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AS SUI GENERIS – (a) neither civil or criminal; (b)
double jeopardy cannot be availed; (c) can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and can be
initiated without complainant; (d) can proceed regardless of interest or lack thereof, if facts proven warrant; (e)
imprescriptible (f) conducted confidentially until its final determination; (g) it is itself due process of law; (h)
whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be enforced in another
action like reconveyance or damages;
CALUB VS. ATTY. SULLER, AC#1474, 1/28/2000 – Having been acquitted due to reasonable doubt in the rape
case filed against him by Complainant, Respondent sought the dismissal of the disbarment case against him. SC
disbarred Respondent holding that, acquittal due to prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
not determinative of the administrative case. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and equally important, morally.
TIONG VS. ATTY. FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011 – In a conference held, after Complainant confirmed that
Respondent who was his lawyer was having an affair with his wife, an affidavit admitted the amorous affair seeking
forgiveness from their respective spouses was executed. This affidavit signed by Complainant, Respondent and
their spouses provided that no criminal or legal action would be taken against the offending parties. Despite such
stipulation, Complainant sought for Respondent’s disbarment who interposed the defense of pardon. SC
suspended Respondent holding that, his act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. A case for suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the
legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation
into the respondent’s acts as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a
member of the Bar. Hence, the affidavit, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating
the proceedings.
GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT – (a) Deceit; (b) Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (c) Grossly
immoral conduct; (d) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) Violation of the Oath of Office; (f) Wilful

disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (g) Corrupt or Wilful appearance as attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. (Rule 138, Sec. 27, Rules of Court)
BARRIOS VS. ATTY. MARTINEZ, AC# 4585, 11/12/2004 – Convicted by final judgment for violation of BP22, SC
disbarred Respondent reasoning that, moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals and involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Enumerating the
elements of the crime, the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of issuance that he or she does
not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude.
WILKIE VS. ATTY. LIMOS, AC#7505, 10/24/2008 – Respondent borrowed P250,000 from Complainant who was
her client. Later she issued two post-dated checks to cover for her loan which checks later “bounced”. SC
suspended Respondent holding that, the issuance of checks later dishonoured for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. It also shows
Respondent’s remorseless attitude, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public
order.
SORIANO VS. ATTY. DIZON, AC#6792, 1/25/2006 – Respondent, who was driving his car under the influence of
liquor, reacted violent when Complainant’s taxicab overtook him. He chased Complainant and confronted him.
When Respondent tried to physically assault him, Complainant subdued Respondent who was elderly. When
Complainant let go and returned to his car, Respondent got his gun and shot Complainant who was unarmed.
Respondent, who fled the scene, was convicted of frustrated homicide. SC disbarred Respondent for having been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. Respondent was definitely the aggressor, as he
pursued and shot Complainant when the latter least expected it. There was treachery as a further indication of
Respondent’s skewed morals – he shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact,
under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning
Respondent’s eyeglasses when he was shot. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun
with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment
for his crime.
GONZAGA VS. ATTY. VILLANUEVA, JR., AC#1954, 7/23/07 – Representing himself as a relative, Respondent
offered to handle pro bono the criminal case involving the murder of Complainants’ parents. After accepting his
offer, Respondent made Complainant sign a paper purportedly authorizing him to appear in said case. Later,
Complainants engaged another lawyer for the estate proceedings of their deceased parents’ estate, but
Respondent filed a similar intestate petition without Complainant’s knowledge and consent. So as not to embarrass
him, Complainants allowed him to assist their counsel in the intestate proceedings, but even after Complainants’
appointment as co-administrators and the formal termination of his appearance in the intestate case, Respondent
continued to appear. SC suspended Respondent holding that, Complainants never intended him to represent them
in the intestate proceedings. His obstinate refusal to withdraw from said proceedings was improper and since his
unauthorized appearance was wilful, he may be disciplined for professional misconduct.
VARGAS VS. ATTY. IGNES, AC#8096, 7/5/10 – Complainant charged that Respondents filed and continued to
appear in cases as counsel for Koronadal Water District (KWD), a gov’t-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC),
despite the legal retainer having been pre-terminated. SC sternly warned and fined Respondent holding that, their

continued unauthorized appearance is wilful and deliberate. They signed pleadings and presented themselves
voluntarily, on their own volition as counsel of KWD, even in the absence of authority therefor.
SUSPENSION FROM LAW PRACTICE IN GUAM OF ATTY. MAQUERA, BM#793, 7/30/2004 – Atty. Maquera, a
Philippine Bar member, was suspended from practicing law in Guam due to misconduct for acquiring his client’s
property as payment for his legal services. The Guam court transmitted certified copies of his suspension to the
Philippine Supreme Court. SC held that, disbarment/suspension of a Philippine Bar member by a competent court
or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action constitutes a ground for disbarment/suspension from law
practice in the Philippines. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment/suspension.
DUMADAG VS. ATTY. LUMAYA, AC#2614, 6/29/2000 – Suspended indefinitely from law practice, Respondent
filed various pleadings including a petition to lift his suspension seeking among others, clarification as to the exact
term of his suspension considering he was already 62 years of age and scarcity of law practitioners in their locality.
He later wrote the Chief Justice imploring but also chiding the Court for ‘slumbering’ on acting on his petition
although still insisting his innocence. Instead of lifting his suspension, SC fixed his period of suspension at 10 years
reasoning that, the insolence of Respondent’s remonstrations that the Court was sleeping on its job in acting on his
case not only underscores his callous disregard of the myriad administrative and judicial travails the Court has to
contend with as the Court of Last Resort, it also betrays his absolute lack of appreciation and disrespect for the
efforts and measures undertaken by the Court to cope with these concerns. Indefiniteness of Respondent’s
suspension, far from being cruel or degrading or inhuman has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to restoration
of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands – that sanction has the effect of giving Respondent the
chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct,
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting
standards of conduct rightly demanded from every Bar member and officer of the courts.
MANIAGO VS. ATTY. DE DIOS, AC#7472, 3/30/10 – Previously suspended for 6 months from law practice,
Respondent was charged of violating said suspension order for serving as counsel for a Japanese national. SC
dismissed the petition against Respondent noting that, Respondent had already served her prior 6-months
suspension and had written a manifestation to the Court of such fact. To be sure, SC laid the following guidelines in
relation to resumption of practice following full service of suspension, to wit: (a) suspended lawyer must first
present proof of his compliance by submitting certifications from IBP and Executive Judge that he has indeed
desisted from law practice during the suspension period; (b) thereafter, the Court, after evaluation and upon
favorable recommendation from Office of Bar Confidant, will issue a resolution lifting the suspension order and
allow him to resume his practice. It was only unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked with regards to
Respondent’s prior suspension.
REYES VS. ATTY. VITAN, AC#5835, 8/10/10 – Suspended for an aggregate period of 2 ½ years as a result of four
administrative cases, Respondent petitioned the Supreme Court for reinstatement as a member in good standing of
the Bar and to be allowed to practice law. SC granted Respondent’s application for reinstatement effective upon his
submission to the Court of a sworn statement that: (a) he has completely served the four suspension orders
imposed on him successively; (b) he desisted from the law practice during the period of suspension; (c) he has
returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the court in the previous administrative cases; (d)
he has furnished copies of his sworn statement to the IBP and the Executive Judge.
RICHARDS VS. ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10 – Disbarred in 1987 for grave professional misconduct, Respondent
was ordered to reimburse P16K to Complainant who later wrote the Court several times to report non-payment by
Respondent. In 1996, Respondent sought Bar readmission claiming that he already consigned the money with the
Court’s cashier. According to Respondent, his belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the reimbursement order
was due to his inability to locate Complainant. After SC denied his readmission, Respondent filed a later petition in

2010. In denying Respondent readmission, SC held that his justification was flimsy as it was, considering that
Complainant’s address was readily available with the Court what with the numerous letters reporting Respondent’s
non-compliance, glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities
that do not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by
displaying a lack of candor towards the Court. By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement of the P16,000.00 –
and through consignation with this Court at that - he sent out a strong message that the legal processes and orders
of this Court could be treated with disdain or impunity.
MACARRUBO VS. ATTY. MACARRUBO, AC#6148, 1/22/2013 – In 2004, SC disbarred Respondent who claimed
his previous marriage to be void, marrying Complainant with whom he had two children and latter abandoning her
to marry a third time. The Court reasoned that while his marriage to Complainant had been annulled by final
judgment, this did not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. Having lived with Complainant as husband
and wife while his first marriage was subsisting made him liable for concubinage – conduct inconsistent with the
good moral character required for continued right to practice law. Eight years after finality of his disbarment,
Respondent filed a petition (for extraordinary mercy) seeking reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. In reinstating
Respondent, SC declared that, to be reinstated to the practice of law, applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character. While the Court is ever mindful
of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those
who have reformed their ways, as in this case.
JUDICIAL ETHICS – branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to be observed by all
judges in trying and deciding controversies brought before them for adjudication which conduct must be
demonstrative of IMPARTIALITY, INTEGRITY, COMPETENCE, INDEPENDENCE& FREEDOM FOR
IMPROPRIETY.
SOURCES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS – (a) New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (effective June1,
2004); (b) Code of Judicial Conduct (effective October 20, 1989); (c) Constitutional provisions (Article 3, 8, and 11,
1987 Constitution); (d) provisions of the rules of court; (e) Revised Penal Code provisions; (f) RA 3019; (g) Canons
of Judicial Ethics; (h) Code of Professional Responsibility; (i) Judiciary Act of 1948; (j) BP 129 (Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980); and (k) SC decisions
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES – (a) Justices of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court –
natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 40 years of age, 15 years in the practice of law [Section 7(1) of Article VIII of
the Constitution]; (b) judges of lower courts – natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 35 (for RTC) and 30 (for MTC)
years of age, 10 years (for RTC) and 5 years (for MTC) in the practice of law [Section 7(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution].
ANONYMOUS VS. JUDGE RIO ACHAS, AM#MTJ-11-1801, 2/27/2013 – To an anonymous complaint charging
amongst, many things, gambling and having an affair with a young lady, Respondent only admitted to being
separated from his wife and merely breeding game cocks. SC held that, Sec. 1 of Rule 140RC provides that
anonymous complaints may be filed against judges but must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus,
for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rest with the
complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the
investigation. SC held that, while Respondent had been estranged from his wife for the last 26 years, the fact
remained that he was still legally married. It is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as
going out with a woman not his wife as was determined by the discreet investigation conducted. Such is a blemish
to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary. Also, while gamecocks are bred and kept primarily
for gambling, there is no proof that Respondent goes to cockpits and gambles. Rearing fighting cocks is not illegal,
however, Respondent should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly

impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly
DECENA VS. JUDGE MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-02-1669, 4/14/2004 – Respondent was accused of disrupting the
session of the municipal council which was deliberating on the revocation of the authority of his nephew-in-law to
operate a cockpit. Admitting to his presence during the session, Respondent claimed that he was not drunk and
that he was merely there in his private capacity as a taxpayer. SC fined Respondent holding that, his actuations
constitute palpable violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities – judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial
robes. Even when garbed in casual wear outside the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and moral
ascendancy that he/she wields inside the sala.
SALVADOR SISON VS. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., AM#RTJ-03-1771, 5/27/2004 – Respondent ordered
Complainant, an MMDA traffic enforcer, to appear and explain why the latter issued a traffic violation ticket against
the former’s son. For failure to appear, Respondent cited Complainant in contempt and ordered him arrested and
discharged only after he admitted before Respondent that he made a mistake and the traffic incident was all a
misunderstanding. In DISMISSING Respondent, SC held that, initially, Respondent appeared justified in holding
Complainant for contempt due to the latter’s refusal to comply with the order to appear. However, it is not lost upon
the Court that Complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending. What triggered the contempt charge was,
in fact, the traffic violation incident involving Respondent’s son. Since the incident involved his own son and the
matter was personal to him, Respondent should have refrained from ordering Complainant’s arrest and detention.
Such act of citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation, is appalling and violative
of the mandate that a judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
BESO VS. JUDGE DAGUMAN, AM#MTJ-99-1211, 1/28/2000 – Respondent, a municipal trial judge of Sta.
Margarita, Samar solemnized Complainant’s marriage in his residence in Calbayog City. SC fined Respondent
reasoning that, a person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it
and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to
apply the law, he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Respondent’s reasons to justify his hurried
solemnization of marriage only tend to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social
institutions in the country.
CASIMIRO VS. JUDGE FERNANDEZ, AM#MTJ-04-1525, 1/29/2004 – Respondent failed to return the P4,000cash bond posted by Complainant in a criminal case despite the dismissal of said case. Later, Respondent issued
his wife’s check in payment of said cash bond. In suspending him, SC held that, while there is no direct and hard
evidence that Respondent made personal use of the cash bond, his wife’s issuance of her personal check to
Complainant in the amount of said bond, indicates so. By his actuations then, Respondent placed his honesty and
integrity under serious doubt. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
TOBIAS VS. JUDGE LIMSIACO, AM#MTJ-09-1734, 1/19/11 – Complainant accused Respondent of corruption for
allegedly offering package deals to litigants claiming that the court stenographer informed her sister that
Respondent asked for P30,000 to provide counsel, prepare pleadings and ensure a favourable decision in her
ejectment case. Fined for gross misconduct, SC held that, although his alleged package deal offers to litigants was
unsubstantiated, it was improper for Respondent to talk to prospective litigants in his court and to recommend
lawyers to handle cases. Also, his admitted act of preparing the motion for counsel to withdraw is likewise improper
and unethical. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office.

RALLOS vs. JUDGE GAKO, JR., AM#RTJ-99-1484, 3/17/2000 – Complainants accused Respondent for
dishonesty for issuing an order stating that they (with their counsel) were supposedly present during the hearing of
a motion despite the fact that they were absent because said hearing was held, at movant’s instance, two days
before the originally scheduled date for hearing. SC fined Respondent holding that, judges should not only be
impartial but also appear impartial. Litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision is
rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must
do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
VERSOZA VS. JUDGE CONTRERAS, AM#MTJ-06-1636, 3/12/2007 – Respondent, who provided information to
the police regarding the looting of a PLDT tower implicated Complainant as accessory thereto, latter conducted the
preliminary investigation over the criminal case involving the alleged looting. SC reprimanded Respondent holding
that, the issue of whether a judge should inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion. However, as a judge,
Respondent must kept abreast with law. He should have known that it is well-entrenched in the Code of Judicial
Conduct, prevailing at that time, that personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings
disqualifies him from taking part therein as the same would necessarily spawn a perception that he is bias and
partial.
ATTY. DESCALLAR V. HON. RAMAS, AM#RTJ-06-2015, 12/15/10 – Respondent reported for work intermittently
or did not report at all after he issued an Order that he would temporarily stop working due to death threats he
received in relation to a decision made over an election protest. SC fined Respondent reasoning that, indeed, there
may be threats to his life as alleged in his order but such threats do not justify cessation from performing judicial
functions Threats are concomitant peril in public office especially in the judiciary, where magistrates decide and
determine sensitive issues that normally generate or provoke reprisals from losing litigants. This is a consequence
that a judge should be prepared for. Their exalted position entails a great responsibility unyielding to one’s personal
convenience. A judge is enjoined to perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
PANTILO III VS. JUDGE CANOY, AM#RTJ-11-2262, 2/9/11 – For verbally ordering the release of accused in a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide even when no information was yet filed and granting
accused’s motion to release impounded vehicle despite said motion being vilative of the 3-day notice rule, SC fined
Respondent despite his invocation of accused’s constitutional right to bail which supposedly did not require that a
person be charged in court before one could apply for it. While it is settled that an accused in a criminal case has
the constitutional right to bail, the complaint focused on the manner of accused’s release from detention. In sum,
there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit of bail, no written release order. While Respondent
insisted that such may be considered as “constructive bail,” there is no such species of bail under the Rules.
Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the
rights of another.
SEVILLA VS. JUDGE LINDO, AM#MTJ-08-1714, 2/9/11 – Complainant claimed that Respondent repeatedly reset
the hearing of the BP22 cases he filed. In imposing a fine upon Respondent, SC held that, a trial judge who allows,
or abets, or tolerates numerous unreasonable postponements of trial, whether out of inefficiency or indolence, or
out of bias toward a party is administratively liable. While postponement of a hearing in a criminal/civil case may at
times be unavoidable, the Court disallows undue/unnecessary postponement of hearings simply because they
cause unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, and thus, undermines the people’s faith in the Judiciary,
aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burden of litigants. The strict policy on postponements applies
with more force and greater reason to prosecution involving BP22 cases, the prompt resolution of which has been
ensured by their being now covered by Rules on Summary Procedure – a rule precisely adopted to promote a more

expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to speedy
disposition of cases.
TIGGANGAY VS. JUDGE WACAS, AM OCA IPI#09-3243-RTJ, 4/1/2013 – Respondent decided an election
protest case adverse to Complainant (and in favor of one Dagadag). Complainant later complained that
Respondent should have inhibited himself for being Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity as Respondent’s aunt was
supposedly married to Dagadag’s uncle. SC dismissed the charge against Respondent reasoning that, for all his
protestations against Respondent’s impartiality arising out of the perceived relationship by affinity, Complainant
never moved for the judge’s inhibition – a belated attempt to get back at Respondent for the latter’s adverse ruling
in the electoral protest. A litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and to raise
objections only after an unfavorable decision has already been rendered. Granting arguendo that Respondent’s
aunt is married to Dagadag’s uncle, such reality is not a ground for mandatory inhibition of a judge as required
under Section 1 of Rule 137, since there is actually no relation of affinity between Respondent and Dagadag
because affinity “the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse”. There is no affinity
between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. Respondent is related to his aunt by
consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage to Dagadag’s uncle that Respondent is the
nephew-in-aw of Dagadag’s uncle, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. However, Respondent is not
related by affinity to the blood relatives of Dagadag’s uncle as they are not his in-laws and thus are not related in
any way to Dagadag. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Respondent and Dagadag as they are not
in-laws of each other. Hence, Respondent is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear the election protest.
SPS. DECENA VS. JUDGE MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-10-2217, 4/8/2013 – Respondent appeared in the
administrative hearing of the case against his wife and entered his appearance therein as “counsel for counsel of
the respondent. In later explaining his actions, Respondent contended that he did so out of filial duty because their
daughter who was a recent barpasser and still inexperienced was representing his wife. During the pendency of the
case, Respondent’s wife moved for the dismissal claiming that Respondent’s right to due process would be violated
considering that he suffered a heart attack that left him with a permanent mental impairment and would be
incapacitated to understand the nature and object of the administrative proceedings. SC imposed a fine on
Respondent reasoning that, the issue of violation of due process was unfounded considering that he had not only
been given the opportunity to be heard but had been actually heard since prior to his massive stroke, he already
submitted his comment containing his explanations and refutations of the charge against him. His occupying a seat
beside his daughter reserved for the lawyers during the hearing displayed his presumptuousness and probably
even his clear intention to thereby exert his influence as an RTC judge on the hearing officer in order for the latter
to favor his wife’s. His excuse, seemingly grounded on a filial duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish
enough reason for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to have
restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that his sitting would have him cross the line
beyond which was the private practice of law.

RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 6 months with WARNING that repetition of same/similar act to be
dealt with more severely. Rule 2.00 of CJC demands that “a Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities”. One who occupies an exalted position in the administration of
justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official conduct
must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important as
reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Ceasar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but
beyond suspicion.
Posting advertisements for the restaurant personnel on the court bulletin board, using his court address to
receive the applications, and of screening applicants in his court constitute involvement in private
business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family business in violation of the
CJC. The restriction enshrined under Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of the Code of Judicial Ethics on judges with regard to
their own business interests is based on the possible interference which may be created by these business
involvements in the exercise of their judicial duties which may tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the courts
as the bastion of justice.
Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of their judicial tasks by other
lawful enterprises. It has been a time honored rule that judges and all court employees should endeavor to
maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice.
LIWANAG VS. JUDGE LUSTRE, AM#MTJ98-1168, 4/21/1999
FACTS: Respondent was charged administratively for gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his
profession for supposedly sexually molesting (demanding “fellatio”) from Complainant. The latter alleged that
Respondent took advantage of her as she desperately needed Respondent to fasttrack/expedite the
hearing/arraignment of the BP22 cases filed by her husband. Respondent’s defense is based on denial particularly
that, BEING 67 YEAR OF AGE, he is no longer capable of what ordinary men indulge in, lest he die in the attempt,
what with his heart condition.
RULING: Respondent guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, having already retired, he could no longer be
dismissed or suspended, FINED P40,000 and BARRED from employment in any branch of government.
Complainant may have had ill feelings towards Respondent due to the unjustifiable delays in the hearing of the B.P.
22 cases. But would she falsely accuse Respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him? This
goes against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her
sexual misadventures with Respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be
exposing herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise,
save the hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.
GALANG VS. JUDGE SANTOS, AM#MTJ-99-1197, 5/26/1999
FACTS: Respondent was charged with acts unbecoming a judge for allegedly engaging in the publication of The
Mirror, a gossip tabloid, as editor and legal adviser, and as a gossip-mongering columnist of SunStar Clark, a local
newspaper. Respondent supposedly used his newspaper column to ventilate his biases or personal anger at
people or institutions including Complainant, Governor Lapid and the Provincial Government.

DIONISIO VS. HON. ESCANO, AM#RTJ98-1400, 2/1/1999
FACTS: Respondent posted an advertisement for “attractive waitresses and personable waiters” for a restaurant in
the court bulletin board for more than a week, interviewed about five applicants, and made suggestions to said
applicants during the screening regarding wearing of dresses with short skirts and low necklines which screening
was in fact videotaped by the “Hoy Gising!” program. A news ad accepting applicants even listed the address of
Respondent’s court.

RULING: Respondent DISMISSED with FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits,
BARRED from any government position/ employment. A judge is the visible representation of law and justice
from whom the people draw their will and inclination to obey the law. His official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Rule 2.01 of the

Code of Judicial Conduct also provides that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
In this case, Respondent displayed a lack of respect toward the Provincial Prosecutor through the insults
he hurled in his articles and pleadings submitted to the Court. Respondent degraded Complainant’s
capabilities as legal adviser of the Provincial Government, and challenged the governor with
disqualification for allegedly practicing a different profession aside from public office. In his pleadings,
Respondent also belittled complainant as a public officer through unnecessary and injurious descriptions.
There is a difference between freedom of expression and compromising the dignity of the Court through
publications of emotional outbursts and destructive criticisms. Respondent’s writing of active and vicious
editorials compromises his duties as judge in the impartial administration of justice, for his views printed
on newspapers reflect on his office as well as on the public officers that he challenges.
In persistently attacking the Governor’s movie-making activities and repeatedly threatening to file an action against
a public officer, Respondent encourages litigation and causes dissension against the public officer concerned.
Respondent’s role is to maintain equanimity and not instigate litigation. This is not to say that one can not
question the improper activities of government officials if there are any. However, it is not proper for a
judge to write publications of carelessly-worded editorials in local newspapers.
SIMBAJON vs. JUDGE ESTEBAN, AM#MTJ-98-1162, 8/11/1999
FACTS: Charging Respondent with sexual harassment and grave misconduct, Complainant alleged that,
Respondent told her that she would become his girlfriend in exchange for his signature on her employment
application. Thereafter he went on to kiss her against her will. Later, after learning that her application had been
approved, Respondent called Complainant to his chambers and said that she was already his girlfriend, he
embraced her, kissed her and touched her right breast.
RULING: Respondent DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. By the nature of their work, judges are expected to possess the highest standard of
morality and decency. Canon 2 of the CJC provides that “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities”. Rule 2.01 of the same code further requires that, “a judge should so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and
humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood. Respondent’s lustful conduct was
aggravated by the fact that he was Complainant’s superior. Instead of acting in loco parentis toward his
subordinate employee, he took advantage of his position and preyed on her.
Respondent has violated the Code which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

At a time when the Courts are trying to disprove its ‘hoodlums-in-robes’ image, this despicable act of respondent
turning his august chambers into a bordello only further tainted the image of the judiciary. Having proven himself
unworthy to remain in office, Respondent should be weeded out from the service the soonest possible time lest he
further [erode] the faith of the people in Courts.”
NABHAN vs. JUDGE CALDERON, AM#MTJ98-1164, 2/4/2000
FACTS: Respondent asked Complainant to see him in his office at 5pm to discuss the BP22 case she filed.
Respondent then told Complainant to buy him drinks. Along the way, Respondent kept touching Complainant’s
breast and asking her personal questions. Inside the bar and even on the way home, Respondent repeatedly kept
touching her private parts. Complainant charged Respondent for acts of lasciviousness committed against her.
RULING: Respondent GUILTY. Respondent admitted having gone to a restaurant with Complainant, although
he denied he did anything malicious to complainant. If it were true, however, that Respondent was eager to
go to Pulilan to attend the memorial mass for his father, he would not have stayed with Complainant for
two hours just eating and drinking. He could have, after a short while, asked to be brought to Pulilan in time for
the mass. Apparently, Respondent was more inclined to be with Complainant than to attend the mass for his father.
Time and again we have admonished judges to conduct themselves in a manner that is free even from the
appearance of impropriety. For judicial officers to enjoy the trust and respect of the people, it is necessary
that they live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded by the profession and by the Code of
Judicial Conduct. This is especially true in the case of judges who, on a daily basis, interact with the public. Their
official conduct, as well as personal behavior, should always be beyond reproach.
Respondent having been ordered dismissed for misconduct and abandonment of office in another administrative
case. For obvious reasons, a dismissed officer cannot be removed again.
CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF RTC-DAGUPAN CITY vs. JUDGE FALLORAN-ALIPOSA, AM#RTJ-1446,
3/9/2000
FACTS: Five employees of Respondent’s court grave sworn testimonies in an investigation launched by the
Supreme Court prompted by a letter-complaint naming Respondent as one of the two most corrupt judges in
Dagupan City. The testimonies cited Respondent’s alleged corrupt practices, ranging from soliciting money from an
accused’s brother to facilitate the latter’s release from detention despite earlier grant of a motion for demurrer,
soliciting money from practicing lawyers to pay for the food for guests to the Judges’ dialogue with the Chief
Justice, to personal use of the court telephone and Respondent’s acting as commissioner in ex-parte proceedings
at times without the court stenographer and interpreter present.
RULING: Respondent DISMISSED, all retirement benefits and leave credits FORFEITED with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency. A judge is the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the
people's sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep away from any act of impropriety, not
only in the performance of his official duties but also his everyday actuations. No other position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge must
be the first to abide by the law and to weave an example for the others to follow." A judge should always be a

symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his
honesty.
Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat
with on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of
government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in contact
with the parties, their counsel and the communities in which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does
an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him.
Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear
the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating
the Bench from the unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like
Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds that exhortation that "[T]he
administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the
vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge
himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."
FISCAL RUIZ vs. JUDGE BRINGAS, AM#MTJ-00-1266, 4/6/2000
FACTS: Charging Respondent with serious misconduct and inefficiency, Complainant alleged that during the
hearing a criminal case before Respondent, a verbal exchange between him and Respondent. The exchange
occurred after accused pleaded guilty and Complainant requested for time to submit his recommendation. To this
request, Respondent made several remarks such as, Complainant would only prolong accused’s agony, he should
come to court prepared. Respondent even directed that it be put on record that Complainant does not know how to
compute the proper penalty and even took the bar three times (to which Complainant retorted that it be also made
on record that Respondent did not graduate from Ateneo). Complainant further alleged that, Respondent "is fond of
insulting and maligning both young lawyers and old (like saying, “you go to hell”) including the prosecutors who
appear before him in the presence of party litigants and lawyers.
RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 1 month without pay for conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary,
WARNED that repetition of the same/similar act will be dealt with more severely. As stated in Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities”.

REYES VS. JUDGE DUQUE, AM#RTJ-08-2136, 9/21/10
FACTS: A bank sought a writ of possession of a piece of land against its owners. Alleging that she had purchased
said land from its owners with the bank’s knowledge, Complainant entered the case as a party-in-intervention.
Complainant charged Respondent of demanding 100T (of which she supposedly paid 38T) in exchange for denial
of the bank’s motion for a writ of possession. Complainant further alleged that, on one occasion that she delivered
money to Respondent at his house, he embraced and kissed her, raised her skirt, opened her blouse and sucked
her breast, touch her private parts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with Complainant. Respondent
supposedly stopped only when Complainant said that if he wanted to she preferred going to a hotel.
RULING: Respondent GUILTY of impropriety and gross misconduct, FINED P40,000.00 deductible from his
retirement benefits. On the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found insufficient
evidence to sustain Reyes’ allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration
of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.
On the otherhand, substantial evidence pointed to Respondent’s impropriety and gross misconduct when
he sexually assaulted Complainant. Respondent even merely attempted to destroy Complainant’s
credibility when he insinuated that she could be a “woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute” or one
whose "moral value is at its lowest level." However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party
litigant even from a woman of loose morals.
Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.Judges should conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled
to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.
Respondent’s conduct fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary. He failed to behave in a
manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a judge is a visible representation of the
law and of justice,he is naturally expected to be the epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach.
Respondent’s conduct indubitably bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high
moral standards of the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge
Duque not retired, his misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.
LADIGON VS. JUDGE GARONG, AM#MTJ-08-1712, 8/20/2008

The duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court applies to members of the bar and bench alike. A
judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those appearing before
him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the public without
being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and
remember always that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives
no reason for reproach.

FACTS: Respondent wrote a letter-complaint to the Chairman of the Administrative Council of the First United
Methodist Church in Michigan, USA, complaining of the surreptitious manner of the incorporation of the Banard
Kelly Memorial United Methodist Church and singling out Complainant to be part of the deception. Complainant,
prompted by Respondent’s letter, complained to the Justices of this Court against the Respondent’s improper
conduct as an MTC Judge and his use in a private communication of his official court stationery and his title as a
judge. Respondent, admitting that he used his court’s letterhead and signed his letter using the word “judge”,
reasoned that he merely used an ordinary bond paper and typed thereon his court’s station “to indicate the return
or inside address”. He further alleged that he “did not see any harm or abuse in using the word ‘judge’ on the
honest belief that he is entitled to use such appellation.

RULING: Respondent ADMONISHED to be ever mindful of the standards he has to observe in his use of hi
letterhead and title; WARNED that a repetition of this transgression shall be dealt with more severely.
What is involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities”. Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct,
and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties as well as in their
personal behavior and everyday life. No position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness
on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
That Respondent used an ordinary bond paper and placed thereon his official station as return address is
not totally unmeritorious. This is not an unusual practice and it would be hypocritical to deny its
occurrence at all levels of the Judiciary, eg., some members of the Judiciary may use a social card with the
letterhead of their office to indicate their address as well as their station within the judicial hierarchy; some
also use notepads bearing their names, designation and station. A thin line, however, exists between what is
proper and what is improper in such use, and this was the line that the Respondent crossed when he used his
letterhead and title the way he did. Respondent’s transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead,
but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his
letterhead and his title.
The use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances of the
use – the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of “impropriety” or “appearance of
impropriety”. Respondent crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint
involving an alleged violation of churchrules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with
the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of official
recognition or notice of the reported violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of “Judge” or “Justice” in
the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While use of the title is an official designation as well as
an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use
thereof. While the title can be used for social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the
intent to use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary
interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of others,
or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.
PERFECTO VS. JUDGE CONSUELO ESIDERA, AM-RTJ-11-2270, 1/31/11
Respondent was charged with soliciting and receiving money from a fiscal and a private practitioner supposedly to
defray expenses for a religious celebration and barangay fiesta. In her answer, Respondent brushed off the affidavit
of Fiscal Ching who witnessed the solicitation, claiming that the fiscal who was a former law student to whom she
gave a grade of “3” because her ‘codigo’ was still inserted in the examination booklet, is of “dubious personality”
with a “narcissistic personality disorder”. FINED for impropriety and conduct unbecoming, the Supreme Court held
that, use of acerbic words was uncalled for considering Respondent’s status. Further, her act of soliciting
(under the guise of a religious cause) betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of
understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high esteem and respect by the
local community, which must be preserved at all times. It spawns the impression that she was using her
office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala, and
Prosecutor Diaz into donating money through her charismatic group for religious purposes. A judge must be

like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence
and discretion that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his
activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution Respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both
speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant
observation.
ATTY. CORREA VS. JUDGE BELEN, AM#RTJ-10-2242
FACTS: Complainant, a co-administrator in an intestate estate proceedings before Respondent, complained that
during a hearing, Respondent disagreed with various items in the administrator’s report including the financial
report, scolded the accountant with threat of suit before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public
accountants. Respondent also rebuked Complainant for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate,
adding that it is regrettable "because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar Topnotcher at that." Later,
despite his explanation, Respondent cited Complainant in indirect contempt for allegedly making unlawful
withdraws with a co-administrator from the estate’s account.
RULING: Respondent GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge, FINED P10,000, STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Indeed, the New CJC exhorts members of
the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Canon 4 mandates, “propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge”. Also Sections 1
and 6 thereof reads that, “judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”,
and “judges like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary”.
The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts. Section 3, Canon 5
on Equality provides that, “judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation
on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
Respondent should be more circumspect in his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the visible
representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge
are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system.
A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent insulting statements, tending to
project Complainant's ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his inconsiderate belief that the latter
mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of
power and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is one virtue that
members of the bench should practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always called for.
ATTY. JIMENEZ, JR. V. JUDGE AMDENGAN, 2/13/2013
Complainant, the lawyer and attorney-in-fact for plaintiff in an ejectment case before Respondent claimed that the
latter judge gross inefficiency and negligence and gross ignorance of law for failing to render decision in said civil
case within the 30-day period mandated under the Rules of Summary Procedure and for having subsequently

dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to comply with barangay conciliation procedure. SC FINED
Respondent for unde delay in rendering a decision. The charge of gross ignorance of the law was dismissed for
being judicial in nature. Complainant in charging Respondent with gross ignorance of the law was already assailing
the propriety of the decision rendered. The administrative complaint did not contain allegations that the dismissal of
the ejectment case was marred by unethical behaviour on his part. Thus, an administrative complaint against
Respondent is not the proper remedy to assail his judgment. Administrative complaints against judges cannot be
pursued simultaneously with judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by erroneous orders or judgments of
the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where
such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the case has not yet been resolved with finality. In the
instant case, Complainant had the available remedy of appeal when her ejectment complaint was dismissed.
NAVARRO V. JUDGE DEL ROSARIO, AM#MTJ-96-1091, 3/21/1997
Complainant filed a complaint for physical injuries when his son was side swept by a fast-m0ving passenger
jeepney. Trial was conducted for a year by Judge Bantolo who later was transferred to another municipal trial court.
Meanwhile, Respondent assumed the post of judge of the court where Complainant’s case was pending and was
notified upon manifestation by private prosecutor that since rebuttal witness could not be presented, they were
submitting the case for decision. Respondent failed to render a decision confiding to Complainant that he could not
decide the case since it was filed prior to his assumption. The case remained undecided for 3 years constraining
Complainant to write the Chief Justice to complain of such delay in violation of the constitutional mandate for
speedy dispensation of justice. Respondent explained that he could not decide the case because Judge Bantolo
should be the one to pen the decision having tried the case in its entirety, nonetheless, he would decide the case if
told to do so. Complainant’s letter was then docketed as an administrative matter. SC FINED Respondent P8,000
reasoning that his contention that it was Judge Bantolo who should write the decision having conducted the entire
trial is without basis he already assumed the post when the case was submitted for decision. Admin.Circ. No 3-94
required cases submitted for decision at the time of the appointment of a new judge to be decided by the judge to
whom they were submitted for decision. Respondent’s failure to decide the criminal case for an inordinate length of
time, that is, more than 4 years constitutes neglect of duty. The requirement of the law that cases be decided within
a specified period from their submission (Art. 8, Sec. 15, Constitution) is designed to prevent delay in the
administration of justice. For justice delayed is often justice denied, and delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standard and brings it into disrepute.
RAYMUNDO VS. JUDGE ANDOY, AM No. MTJ-09-1738, 10/6/2010
FACTS: Respondent, presiding over several BP22 cases filed by Complainant, ordered accused as having waived
the right to present evidence. He later recalled this order and kept resetting the schedule for the hearing of the
cases on account of accused’s absence. When Respondent finally issued an order striking accused’s testimony
from the records Complainant filed two motions (spanning two years from each other) for the resolution/decision of
the cases. Notwithstanding said motion, Respondent failed to render judgment thereon.
RULING: Respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision and violating Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) and FINEDP20,000. Respondent failed to observe the mandated period of
time to decide cases under Section 17 of the Rule on Summary Procedure (that is, within 30 days from
termination of trial). His failure to meet this deadline is a patent indication that he did not take into account
and had disregarded the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Judges are enjoined to dispose of the court’s business promptly and expeditiously and to decide cases
within the period fixed by law. Failure to comply with the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of
the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases – a lapse that undermines the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute . This
constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires a judge to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The requirement that
cases be decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay in the administration of
justice, for obviously, justice delayed is justice denied.
RALLOS, ET. AL. vs. JUDGE GAKO, JR., AM#RTJ-99-1484
FACTS: This relates to the resolution of the complaint filed by Executive Secretary Zamor against Respondent for
ordering the release of 25,000 sacks of rice which were pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings with the Bureau
of Customs
RULING: Respondent guilty of gross ignorance of law, SUSPENDED for 3 months without pay, STERNLY
WARNED that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. A judge may be held administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law when it is shown that -- motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption -- he ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence.
Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and
forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these
proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods .
The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Clearly, Respondent decided against a settled doctrine.
This act constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
TUGOT vs. JUDGE COLIFLORES, AM#MTJ-00-1332, 2/16/2004
FACTS: Respondent dismissed an ejectment case wherein Complainant was one of the plaintiffs who were later
advised to re-file their notice of appeal because the latter was not in the records transmitted to the appellate court.
As it turned out, the notice of appeal was not lost but was simply misplaced in Respondent’s office. Also,
Respondent waited for 900 days for defendants to submit their pre-trial brief, and conducted the preliminary
conference in violation of the requirements of the applicable rules on summary procedure.
RULING: Respondent FINED P20,000 for negligence and violation of a Supreme Court Rule and directive. Courts
exist to dispense and promote justice. The realization of this solemn purpose depends to a great extent on
the intellectual, moral and personal qualities of the men and women who are called to serve as judges.
Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that they possess the highest degree of competence,
integrity and independence.
Judicial competence demands that judges should be proficient in both procedural and substantive aspects
of the law. They have to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules
and be conversant, as well, with basic legal principles and well-settled authoritative doctrines. To the end
that they be the personification of justice and rule of law, they should strive for a level of excellence exceeded only
by their passion for truth. Anything less than this strict standard would subject them to administrative sanction.
Respondent failed to demonstrate the required competence in administering an ejectment case. Unlawful
detainer and forcible entry cases are covered by summary procedure because they involve the disturbance

of the social order which must be restored as promptly as possible. Respondent caused undue delay in
dispensing the civil suit by failing to observe the period within which to conduct the preliminary conference which,
according to Sec. 8 of Rule 70, shall be held “not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed.”
Respondent conducted the preliminary conference more than two years after the filing of the last answer. Note that
the adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the judiciary to enforce the
constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. Any member of the judiciary who causes the
delay sought to be prevented by the Rule is sanctionable.
The misplacement of the notice of appeal indicates gross negligence. Respondent should have been more
prudent in determining the cause of its temporary loss, which caused unnecessary inconvenience to
Complainant, whose right to appeal was affected. As administrative officers of the courts, judges should
organize and supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as
the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. He should adopt a system of
records management, so that files are kept intact despite the temporary absence of the person primarily
responsible for their custody.

ALCARAZ vs. JUDGE LINDO, AM#MTJ-04-1539, 4/14/2004
FACTS: Complainant impleaded as co-defendant in a civil collection suit before Respondent was declared in
default. After ex-parte presentation of evidence by plaintiff, judgment was rendered against Complainant and her
co-defendants from which they filed a motion to annul judgment. The latter motion however was denied.
Complainant alleged that she was not furnished various pleading and orders including plaintiff’s motion to declare
defendants in default and the order granting the same.
RULING: Respondent FINED P5,000 for violating Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; WARNED that
repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Rule 9, Section 3 (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that, “a party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall
not take part in the trial”. As such, even when a defendant is already declared in default, he is entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings. Complainant’s assertion that she was not furnished, not only with the
order of default, but the subsequent orders of Respondent and Respondent’s failure to controvert this
allegations, leaves us with no other conclusion other than that respondent judge was remiss in his duty to
observe the Rules.
Respondent’s failure to comply with the elementary dictates of procedural rules constitutes a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code is explicit in its mandate that, “a judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence”. Competence is the mark of a good judge. Having accepted the exalted
position of a judge, whereby he judges his own fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and
to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law.
We reiterate that judges are duty bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at
all times. Their role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law, lest public confidence in
the judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
SPS. CABICO vs. JUDGE EVELYN DIMACULANGAN-QUERIJERO, AM#RTJ-02-1735, 4/27/2007
FACTS: Complainants were the parents of a 17-year old rape victim in a criminal case pending before Respondent’s
sala. When Complainants’ counsel manifested in court that there would be no settlement in the rape case,
Respondent angrily shouted at Complainant (Silva) to right then and there return all the money already received as
partial payment for settlement of the civil aspect. Later, Respondent forced them to sign an affidavit of desistance,

and despite their refusal, issued an order dismissing the case against the three accused supposedly on the ground
of full payment of civil liability and disinterest to prosecute the criminal aspect. Respondent claimed that the charges
against her was a machination of Complainants’ counsel who had an axe to grind against her for losing a petition for
habeas corpus decided by Respondent. Respondent added that in disposing the criminal case, she applied Section
2(a), Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requiring courts to “consider the possibility of an amicable settlement or of a
submission to alternative modes of resolution.”
RULING: Respondent FINED P21,000for gross ignorance of the law; with STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act will merit more severe sanction. Respondent dismissed the criminal case after the
accused had paid their individual civil liability. This is in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of the law
because payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability.
The victim’s affidavit of desistance] (subsequently made) could not have justified the dismissal of the criminal
cases. Republic Act No. 8353, (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) having reclassified rape as a crime against persons, any
public prosecutor, even without the complaint of the victim or her parents, or guardian, can prosecute the offender.
Even further, the victim’s affidavit of desistance, would not justify the dismissal because said affidavit, by
itself, is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. When a
law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross
ignorance of the law.
As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to keep abreast with
and be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
Respondent owes the public and the court she sits in proficiency in the law.
Respondent also clearly violated Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct that, “a judge should
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”. Respondent
showed partiality in accused’s favor when she ordered the dismissal of the criminal case supposedly due to
payment of civil liability and private complainant’s disinterest in prosecuting the criminal aspect when the records
revealed that on that same day, Complainants had refused to sign the affidavit of desistance already prepared for
them.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence”. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, such incompetence erodes the public’s confidence in the
competence of our courts. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.
We cannot countenance Respondent’s discourtesy in insulting Complainant during the hearing and her statement
then was unbecoming a judge – a display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of a trial which is
incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge. Respondent’s actuations violated Rule 3.04 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that, “a judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers,
especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the
litigants”.

OCA vs. vs. JUDGE BAGUNDANG, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1937

FACTS: Following a judicial and physical inventory of cases, in March 2003, Respondent was ordered by the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) to explain his failure to decide and take action on various cases. About two years
later, Respondent submitted his compliance attaching copies of the decisions and orders issued by him in the
cases cited by the OCA memo in 2003. He however offered no explanation as to his failure to decide within the
mandatory period the cases cited in the same memo.
RULING: Respondent FINEDP20,000.00 for gross inefficiency. Sec. 15, Art. 8 of the Constitution requires lower
courts to decide or resolve all cases within three months from date of submission. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct states that, “a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods”. The 90-day period is mandatory. Any delay in the administration of
justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Respondent failed to decide five (5) cases and to resolve a pending motion within the mandatory period,
and offered no explanation for it. Worse, he submitted his compliance with the OCA directives only two (2) years
after they were issued against him. Failure to decide even a single case within the required period, absent
sufficient justification,constitutes gross inefficiency meriting administrative sanction.
Regarding directives from the OCA, judges should treat them as if issued directly by the Court and comply promptly
and conscientiously with them since it is through the OCA that this Court exercises its constitutionally mandated
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Failure to do so constitutes misconduct and
exacerbates administrative liability.
In the case at bar, suspension is not an option considering that Judge Bagundang retired compulsorily on
July 10, 2004. Hence, the imposition of a fine.

CAÑEDA vs. JUDGE MENCHAVEZ, AM# RTJ-06-2026, 3/4/2009
FACTS: Complainant was counsel for one of the defendants in a civil case for partition before Respondent’s sala.
During the hearing, Respondent asked Complainant if his clients were amenable to segregate only a share of one
of the plaintiffs. Complainant then advanced the idea that the parties go to mediation. Respondent then blurted out,
“never mind mediation, walayhinungdanna (it's useless).” When Respondent checked on the progress of the case,
Complainant remarked that it was being delayed because no proper summons (by publication) had been served on
defendants residing outside the country. Respondent reacted by angrily banging his gavel and shouting, “I said no
publication period.” He banged the gavel so hard, it broke and its head flew into the air almost hitting Complainant.
Respondent then slammed the table with his hand, went inside his chambers and later returned with a holstered
handgun which he smashed on the table. Angrily Respondent shouted at Complainant, “Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa!
Gahigulo!” (What do you want? Devil! Hardheaded!).
RULING: Respondent FINED for vulgar and unbecoming conduct a judge; WARNED that repetition of the same or
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely; Complainant ADMONISHED to be mindful of the respect due to
the court and avoid actions bordering on disrespect in representing his clients.
There were basic disagreements on approaches and issues in the partition case. In the courtroom, a lawyer
makes submissions before a judge whose role is to hear and consider the submissions, and subsequently
rule on the matter. It is not a situation where two equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against
each other. Respondent apparently had a misplaced concept of what a courtroom situation should ideally
be, so that he was effectively arguing with counsel as shown by his clearly contentious stance when he
made his ruling. This was Respondent’s first error; he should have coolly ruled and allowed counsel to
respond to his ruling, instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments.

Complainant also erred since he continued to argue despite Respondent’s ruling. Respondent judge’s
response, under this situation, should have been to direct Complainant to wind up his arguments under
pain of direct contempt if this warning would be disregarded. Thereafter, he could have declared Complainant
in direct contempt if he persisted in his arguments. A direct contempt, of course, is not enforced by a
judge’s act of bringing out his weapon and asking counsel the direct question “What do you want?” This
confrontational manner – shown usually in the western genre of movies – has no place in our present
justice system. There are agents of the law, specifically, officers of the court and the police who can be called
upon to implement contempt orders and restore order as needed.
Respondent overreacted in his handling of the situation before his court. Bringing out a gun for everyone
present in the court to see, even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in the court, is
inexcusable in the absence of overt acts of physical aggression by a party before the court. The New Code
of Judicial Conduct requires “`(Judges) shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer,” and their “behavior and conduct x xx must
reaffirm the peoples' faith in the integrity of the judiciary”.
The Code itself sets limits on how a judge should do this. Section 6, Canon 6 of the Code provides: “Judges shall
maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation
to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

JUSON vs. JUDGE MONDRAGON, AM#MTJ-07-1685, 10/3/2007
FACTS: Complainant charged that Respondent unduly delayed resolving (for over three years), the motion to
intervene which Complainant filed in a civil case for recovery of possession of a land. The pendency of
Complainant’s motion caused numerous postponements and resetting of the main case. Respondent admitted the
delays but cited, failing health due to a stroke and his load of supervising three courts at a time, as causes of delay.
RULING: Respondent FINED P10,000 for undue delay in the disposition of Complainant’s motion for intervention;
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Rules prescribing time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. Judicial office
exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official
duties. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts
must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to “dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.” Strict adherence to this rule is intended to
preserve the integrity, competence, and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of
justice more efficient and in order not to negate the Court’s efforts minimize, if not totally eradicate, the
twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued Philippine courts. Canons 6 and 7 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics also exhort judges “to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied” and “to be punctual in the performance of his judicial
duties x xx”.

His failing health, as an excuse for the delay hardly merits serious consideration. Even if he was stricken
by an illness hampering his due performance of his duties, it was incumbent upon him to inform this Court
of his inability to seasonably decide the cases assigned to him. As to his additional work in supervising
three courts at a time, such will not exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on time cannot be
ignored. Respondent should have know that if his caseload, additional assignments or designations,
health reasons or other facts prevented the timely disposition of his pending cases, all he had to do was
simply ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of his cases.

that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them. As frontline
officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not
only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence must be
their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public
reposed on them and the institution they represent.

As frontline of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not
only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence to sustain the trust and confidence
which the public reposed in them and the institution they represent. The judge is the visible representation of the
law and, more importantly, of justice. Thus, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid committing even the slightest infraction of the Rules.

In the review of the monthly report of cases from MTCC Malaybalay, Bukidnon, the OCA noted that
Respondent issued orders dismissing certain cases even when he was no longer the judge of said court
having been promoted to the RTC. Likewise the RTC Executive Judge (Bacal) issued similar orders
affecting certain MTCC cases. Both judges admitted the acts claiming that they did not intend to violate the
law, acting as they did out of their desire to uphold the accused’s right to liberty in the cases they took
cognizance of. Supreme Court FINED both judges. Their shared intention to uphold the accused’s right to
liberty cannot justify their action in excess of their authority in violation of existing regulations. The
vacuum in a first level court (MTC) due to the absence of a presiding judge is not remedied by a take-over
of the duties of the still-to-be appointed or designated judge for that court, which is what they did. Instead
of allowing Respondent and herself to act on pending MTCC cases, the RTC Executive Judge should have
designated a municipal judge within her area of supervision to act on the pending cases.

MONTICALBO V. JUDGE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197, 4/13/11
In admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA
G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his order, the Supreme Court held that, a search of
available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Further, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA G.R.” and, it cannot be considered a
CA case because the respondent was the “Court of Appeals.” This was counter to the standard of
competence and integrity expected of those occupying Respondent’s judicial position. A judge must be
“the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.” While a judge may not be disciplined for
error of judgment without proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is
required to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official duties.
TAN VS. JUDGE USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11
Complainant and her co-party litigants filed a motion to inhibit Respondent. During the hearing for said motion,
Respondent became emotional, forced Complainant to testify without counsel, demanding a public apology,
relentlessly interrogating her and finally ordering her detained for direct contempt finding her in direct contempt until
she divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the court but not exceeding 30 days. Supreme Court fined
Respondent. No amount of rationalization can reconcile the limit of the 10-day period of imprisonment for
direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court with the 30-day maximum period of
imprisonment fixed by Respondent. By virtue of his office, Respondent knows or should have known this
so basic a rule. The glaringly clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to commit a glaring error which was made
even more flagrant by the fact that Respondent was actually detained for 19 days. Failure to follow basic legal
commands as prescribed by law and the rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law.
OCA VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONIDA, AM#RTJ-09-2198, 1/18/11
Per judicial audit and inventory conducted when Respondent availed of optional retirement, the Office of the Court
Administrator determined that Respondent failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases as well as to
resolved motions in 10 civil cases. Supreme Court FINED Respondent. A judge’s failure to decide a case
within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost
rigor for delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary lowering its standards and bringing it to disrepute. The administration of justice demands

OCA VS. JUDGE ESTRADA, AM#RTJ-09-2173, 1/18/11

MARCOS VS. JUDGE PAMINTUAN, AM#RTJ-07-2062, 1/18/11
In 1996, then Judge Reyes issued an order which later became final and executor releasing the Golden Buddha
statue in custodial legis to the heirs of Rogelio Roxas. In implementing said order, Respondent in his May 2006
Order added a statement to the effect that the Golden Buddha in the court’s custody was a “fake or mere replica”.
Having been previously warned and punished for various infraction, Respondent was dismissed from the service by
the Supreme Court. While judges like any other citizen are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary. It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by the Supreme
Court. It is inexcusable for Respondent to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter how noble
his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed, thus, they are expected to
be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or
to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
CONQUILLA VS. JUDGE BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737, 2/9/11
Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and ignorance of the law for conducting a
preliminary investigation and finding probable cause therein to charged Complainant with direct assault. Supreme
Court SUSPENDED Respondent, reasoning that, Respondent’s conduct of such preliminary investigation
directly contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective October 5, 2005), amending Rules 112 and 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first
level courts and making it incumbent upon them to forward records of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for
preliminary investigation). Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites (Canon 3) to the due
performance of judicial office. Hence, when a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply
apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory

acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in
law and jurisprudence.
DIALO, JR. vs. JUDGE MACIAS, AM#RTJ-04-1859, 7/13/2004
FACTS: A prior administrative complaint was filed by Respondent’s wife for immorality. Complainant, upon request
by Respondent’s wife to help catch and gather evidence to prove her husband’s philandering, witnessed
Respondent retreat to the house of his suspected mistress. On their way to Manila for the hearing of the complaint
filed by Respondent’s wife, Complainant and another witness RuelMutia (who were on-board the same boat as
Respondent) were arrested and detained by police officers following Respondent’s report that they (Complainant
and Mutia) were would-be assassins. Hence, this administrative complaint against Respondent for oppression,
abuse of authority, incriminating an innocent person, grave misconduct and obstruction of justice. Complainant
latter wrote that he was withdrawing his complaint the contents of which he claimed he did not read and was merely
prepared for him and instigated by Respondent’s wife.
RULING: Respondent FINED p20,000 for oppression. The withdrawal or disavowal by a complainant of the
contents of his administrative complaint does not necessarily warrant its dismissal. Administrative actions
cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what
may be detestable. The Court does not dismiss administrative cases against members of the Bench merely
on the basis of withdrawal of the charges. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
investigate and decide the complaint against the respondent because public interest is at stake in the
conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary.
Having purportedly not seen the list of witness against him in the immorality complaint, Respondent may not indeed
have known that Complainant was going to testify against him, yet, Respondent was well aware that Mutia, who
was in Complainant’s company in the same boat ride taken by Respondent (and who was also arrested and
detained by the Pasay City Police), was in the said list of witnesses. Respondent’s disclaimer then that he could
not have committed “obstruction of justice” does not readily persuade.

interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that knows no bounds. Hence, instead of
dismissing the charge as recommended, the Court, in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision, resolves to reprimand respondent judge for his failure to exercise greater circumspection in
dealing with the complainant.
Upon his assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice.
The tenor of Respondent’s statement can easily instill in the minds of those who heard them that as a
judge he is above the law. Such a remark creates an impression on the public that whatever administrative
case they will file against respondent or against any judge will only be a futile exercise . Statements such
as those made by respondent judge erode the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
Respondent’s unwarranted statement is a clear derogation of his duty to be faithful to the law which he
swore to uphold as a member of the judiciary.
Respondent’s unfounded act of insulting Complainant in open court and cutting her off in mid-sentence
while she was still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard by respondent of his duty to be
patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct proceedings in court with fitting
dignity and decorum.
A judge’s duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not limited to lawyers. The said duty also
includes being courteous to litigants and witnesses. Respondent’s conduct towards Consuelo Aznar leaves a lot to
be desired. Respondent’s act in this instance smacks of judicial tyranny. A judge anywhere should be the last
person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Thus, the role of a judge in
relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy.

By respondent’s act of requesting for complainant’s and his companion’s warrantless arrest, he violated
complainant’s constitutional right, an act which partakes of the nature of oppression, defined as an “act of
cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of authority.”

Judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and existing administrative policies
in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice. Any act which falls short of the exacting
standard for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not
be countenanced.

LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU vs. JUDGE YRASTORZA, AM#RTJ-03-1793, 2/5/2004

HECK vs. JUDGE SANTOS, AM#RTJ-01-1657, 2/23/2004

FACTS: Complainant appeared before Respondent’s court and asked for a resetting but Respondent cut her off by
saying that, “Do not give me so many excuses, Atty. Dalawampu! I don’t care who you are!”. As she was leaving the
courtroom, Respondent said, “I don’t care who you are”. “You can file one thousand administrative cases against
me. I don’t care”. In another case, Complainant appeared as private prosecutor, Respondent scolded her for failure
to file pre-trial brief. Subsequently, when pre-trial was conducted and Complainant was absent due to another
engagement, Respondent ordered Complainant’s client to produce the original documents in five minutes, or the
case would be dismissed – this, despite the fact that, Complainant’s submitted pre-trial brief indicating that
documentary exhibits would be marked in the course of trial.

FACTS: “MAY A RETIRED JUDGE CHARGED WITH NOTARIZING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT THE NECESSARY
COMMISSION MORE THAN 20 YEARS AGO BE DISCIPLINE THEREFOR? Complainant charged that, prior to
appointment as RTC Judge, Respondent violated the notarial law for notarizing documents in 1980 to 1984
without being duly commissioned as notary public. Respondent countered that Complainant was neither privy
to, nor prejudiced by the documents in question and that further, Complainant had an axe to grind being one of the
defendants in a civil suit which he decided in favor of the plaintiff therein.

RULING: Respondent REPRIMANDEDfor discourtesy against Complainant; WARNED that repetition of this or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Mere desistance on Complainant’s part does not warrant
dismissal of an administrative complaint against any member of the bench and the judiciary . The Court’s

RULING: Respondent FINED P5,000.00 for notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission. It is
settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. This is
recognized by the new Rule itself which provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed
prior to their appointment to the judiciary.

Good moral character is a requirement that is not dispensed with upon admission to the Bar. It is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession – its continued possession is essential to
maintain one’s good standing in the profession. Thus, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to
the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. Even then, though Respondent has
already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the
disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality.
The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as
“reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents.”
Pursuant to Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases.
However, this case was filed prior to the effectivity of said resolution, hence, the latter will not apply in this case.
To protect members of the judiciary from harassing complaint, an administrative complaint against a retiring or
retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright requires the concurrence of the following: (1) the complaint must
have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action
must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass
the respondent. In this case, the complaint was filed more than one year after Respondent retired compulsorily
from the service. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by
Respondent did not occur a year before Respondent’s separation from the service. Furthermore, and most
importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to harass the
respondent.

CAÑADA vs. SUERTE, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1884, 2/22/2008
FACTS: Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, he refused Respondent who was trying to sell him a
dilapidated cargo truck and Daewoo car. Later, Respondent allegedly offered to act as broker for the sale of
Complainant’s real property, to which Complainant agreed. When he had a prospective buyer, Respondent
demanded that of the P1.6M purchase price he would get a P1M-commission. Complainant refused, and the sale
did not push through, thereupon Respondent became angry and threatened Complainant that, as a judge, he could
deprive Complainant of his property, even have him arrested and executed. Later, despite the deal being botched,
Respondent demanded a P200T-commission, Complainant allegedly paid P100T. In his defense, Respondent
denied forcing Complainant to purchase certain vehicles but made no mentioned about receiving P100T from
Complainant.
RULING: RULING: Respondent FINED p40,000 for dishonesty; DISBARRED for violating Canons 1 and 11 and
Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR; his name ORDERED STRICKEN from Attorney’s Roll. While this case was
pending, respondent was dismissed from the service in another administrative case for gross misconduct,
gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

In administrative proceedings, complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. If a judge should be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. Here, Complainant failed to present concrete
evidence to substantiate his charges against Respondent. He did not appear before the investigating justice to
prove his allegations. While he attached to his complaint two affidavits to corroborate his story, the affiants—a
prospective business partner and an AFP comrade—were not disinterested witnesses whose statements could be
given credence. Mere allegations will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on.
However, Respondent should be held for dishonesty. Respondent claimed he never owned a dilapidated
cargo pick-up truck and could not recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998. But his Statements of Assets and
Liabilities for the years 1998 to 2001 on file in the Court prove otherwise . They show that among his personal
properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998.
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. This is a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service, even for the first offense. Respondent showed his capacity to lie and evade the
truth. His dishonesty not only tended to mislead the Court but also tarnished the image of the judiciary. It
will warrant the maximum penalty of dismissal, if not for the fact that he has already been dismissed from
the service in another administrative case.
LYDELLE CONQUILLA V. JUDGE LAURO BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737, 2/9/11
Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and ignorance of the law for conducting a
preliminary investigation and finding probable cause therein to charged Complainant with direct assault. Supreme
Court SUSPENDED Respondent, reasoning that, Respondent’s conduct of such preliminary investigation directly
contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective October 5, 2005), amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The latter removed the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level
courts and making it incumbent upon them to forward the records of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for
preliminary investigation. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites (Canon 3) to the due performance of
judicial office. Hence, when a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less
is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.
JESSIE DE LEON V. ATTY. EDUARDO CASTEL AC#8620, 1/12/11
Complainant complained that Respondent committed dishonesty and falsification in pleadings filed in behalf of
defendants in a civil case who were already dead at the time of the filing of such pleadings. In DISMISSING the
complaint Supreme Court held that, being officers of the court, attorneys enjoy not only presumption of regularity in
the discharge of their duties, but also immunity from liability to others so long as performance of their obligations to
their clients does not depart from their character as servants of the law and officers of the court. In particular,
statements made in their client’s behalf relevant, pertinent or material to the subject of the inquiry are absolutely
privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the
unhindered service to their clients’ causes and in freely and courageously speaking for their clients, verbally or in
writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal
prosecution or actions for damages. Respondent did not misrepresent that defendants (Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu) were still living. On the contrary, he directly stated in the responsive pleading that said spouses were
already deceased. Granting arguendo that any of Respondent’s pleadings might have created any impression that
defendant spouses were still alive, still Respondent cannot be guilty of any dishonesty or falsification as he was

acting in the interest of the actual owners (children of the deceased spouses) of the properties when he filed the
answer with counterclaim and cross-claim. “The fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of
the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost,
is not easily restored.” A lawyer’s reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer
is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by
quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith
from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment
is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper
administration of justice.
RODOLFO ESPINOSA V. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011
Respondent is charged with violation of the lawyer’s oath, malpractice and gross misconduct in office for advising
Complainant and his wife that they could live separately and dissolve their marriage, preparing for that purpose, a
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. Respondent claimed that, it was not her but a part-time office staff who notarized the
document. In suspending Respondent from law practice and being a notary public, the Supreme Court held that,
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void and a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.In preparing
and notarizing a void document, Respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 (duty not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful). Respondent knew fully that the Kasunduan has no legal effect and is against
public policy. Even granting arguendo that, it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed
Respondent’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in
his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or
any member of his staff.
ATTY. FLORITA LINCO V. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011
Respondent is charged with dishonesty and violation of the Notarial Law for notarizing a deed of donation allegedly
executed by Complainant’s husband (Atty. Alfredo Linco) in favor of his illegitimate minor child, despite
Respondent’s knowledge that affiant died a day prior to notarization. Respondent claimed affiant, whom he meet
prior to his demise, asked him to notarize the deed of donation which affiant signed in Respondent’s presence.
Since Respondent did not have his notarial register, he told affiant to bring the deed to his office anytime for
notarization. Hence, despite knowledge of death, Respondent notarized the deed to accommodate a colleague.
The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice and being a notary public finding that, affiant’s
previous personal appearance before Respondent does not justify the notarization of the deed due to affiant’s
absence on the day of notarization. The rule requires Respondent not to notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to its
contents and truthfulness. Further, in the notarial acknowledgment, Respondent attested to affiant’s personal
appearance before him on the day of notarization, yet, affiant clearly could not have appeared as he already died a
day before. Clearly, Respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
CORAZON NEVADA V. ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012
Complainant is the principal stockholder of a hotel where One in Jesus Christ Church holds its services in one of its
function rooms. Respondent and Complainant being both church members, became friends. Respondent took
advantage of their friendship by failing to deliver the P90,000 rental deposit paid, after Respondent represented
himself as hotel administrator and entered into a lease contract with Jung Chul for office space in the hotel.
Complainant also entrusted to Respondent several jewelries intended for sale. Respondent however, failed to
return the proceeds of the sale or the unsold articles to Complainant. In suspending Respondent from law practice

and being a notary public, the Supreme Court held that, he was guilty of misrepresentation, when he made it
appear that he was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of Nevada when, in fact, he was not. For
failing to return or remitting proceeds of the sale, upon demand, he also breached his duty to hold in trust property
belonging to his client (Canon 16, Rule 16.03). Moreover, Respondent’s act of affixing his signature above the
printed name “Edwin Nevada”, without any qualification, veritably made him a party to the lease contract. Thus, his
act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of the Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules.
ELPIDIO TIONG V. ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011
Complainant confirmed that Respondent who was his lawyer was having an affair with his wife when he overheard,
through the extension phone, Respondent say “I Love You” to Complainant’s wife. Later, and in the presence of
their spouses, Respondent and Complainant’s wife admitted their amorous affair and then and there, executed an
affidavit before a notary public attesting to their illicit and seeking their respective spouses’ forgiveness. This
affidavit signed by Complainant, Respondent and their spouses provided that no criminal or legal action would be
taken against the offending parties. Despite such stipulation, Complainant sought for the disbarment of Respondent
who interposed the defense of pardon. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law holding that
his act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and
his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession.
Undeniably, this illicit relationship amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary
action from the Court. A case for suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a
complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the respondent’s acts as a
husband but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence,
the affidavit, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the proceedings.
LORENZO BRENNISEN V. ATTY. RAMON CONTAWI, AC#7481, 4/24/2012
Being a US resident, Complainant entrusted the administration of land together with its owner’s duplicate title to
Respondent. Via a spurious Special Power of Attorney, Respondent mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject
property to Roberto Ho. Supreme Court found that Respondent breached Canon 1 in disposing his Complainant’s
property without his knowledge or consent and partaking of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit.
Respondent’s contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financially-incapacitated office
assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature
reflected thereon was forged.
ANTONINO MONTICALBO V. JUDGE CRESENTE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197, 4/13/11
In admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA
G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his order, the Supreme Court held that, a search of
available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. Further,
Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA G.R.” and, it cannot be considered a CA case
because the respondent was the “Court of Appeals.” This was counter to the standard of competence and integrity
expected of those occupying Respondent’s judicial position. A judge must be “the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.” While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it was
made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to observe propriety, discreetness and due
care in the performance of his official duties.
SPS. VIRGILO & ANGELINA ARANDA V. ATTY. EMMANUEL ELAYDA, AC#7907, 12/15/10
Respondent who was Complainants’ counsel in a civil case filed against them, failed to notify them and appear of
the scheduled hearing which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Later, Respondent took no steps,
or at the very least, informed Complainants of decision subsequently rendered adverse to them. The decision

became final and executory. Respondent claimed that he did not have Complainants’ contact number or address
and that they were the ones remiss in making a follow up with him of the status of their case. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent from the practice of law citing amongst others, his duty of fidelity to his client’s cause
(Canon 17) and his duty to serve his client with competence (Canon 18), mindful not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him (Rule 18.03). It is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at
the initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other. While communication is a shared
responsibility between counsel and client, it is the counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status of their
case and the orders issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the
development in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately
prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON V. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, AC#6116, 8/1/2012
After failing to pay Complainant the agreed commission for a case referral, Respondent wrote to inform
Complainant that the client would shoulder payment of the commission because he agreed to reduce his attorney’s
fees. Respondent was suspended from law practice. The Supreme Court held that, practice of law is a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for
the profession. Respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or
stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which
do not obtain in the case at bar.
GRACE M. ANACTA V. ATTY. EDUARDO RESURRECCION, AC#9074, 8/14/2012
Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had already filed a petition for
annulment of marriage on Complainant’s behalf after receipt of P42,000.00. He went to the extent of presenting to
Complainant a supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court. Later, Complainant found out from the court
that no such petition was filed. Finding Respondent guilty of deceit and gross misconduct, the Supreme Court
suspended him from law practice reasoning that, there is no ironclad rule that disbarment must immediately follow
upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not mandated to automatically impose the extreme
penalty of disbarment where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Anent the issue of whether Respondent should be directed to return the money he received from Complainant, this
case is the opportune time to harmonize the Court’s ruling on this matter. When the matter subject of the inquiry
pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of
whether respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s
disciplinary authority. In this case, it is clear that Respondent violated his lawyer’s oath and code of conduct when
he withheld the amount of P42,000.00 despite his failure to render the necessary legal services and after
complainant demanded its return. He must be therefore directed to return the same.

Absent convincing evidence, still the Supreme Court warned that, an agreement like the one supposedly forged
between Respondent and Complainant for the latter to receive 10% of the former’s attorney’s fees for every
judicially-approved corporate rehabilitation plan prepared by the Complainant, is violative of Rule 9.02. proscribing
a lawyer from dividing or agreeing to divide fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice
law.
Respondent owned what purports to be a financial and legal consultancy company which was in reality a vehicle for
Respondent to procure professional employment, specifically for corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead
proposing that should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal services
related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank proves that Respondent violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. In suspending Respondent, Supreme Court held
that, a lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises though
when the business is of such nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties
as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer, or that can be used as a cloak for indirectly solicitation on
the lawyer’s behalf; or is of such a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as practice of law.
FIDELA AND TERESITA BENGCO V. ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO, AC#6368, 6/13/2012
Complainants charged that Respondent with a certain “Magat” enticed them to pay money supposedly to expedite
titling of their property without having performed the task for which he was engaged. The Supreme Court found
untenable Respondent’s defense of prescription – that the complaint was filed two years after the supposed deceit
was committed. Administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer.
RODRIGO MOLINA V. ATTY. CEFERINO MAGAT, AC#1900, 6/13/2012
Respondent was counsel for an accused against whom Complainant filed a case for assault upon an agent of a
person in authority and breach of peace and resisting arrest. Respondent move for quashal of said cases alleging
double jeopardy as supposedly a similar case for slight physical injuries had been filed against his client. The
records revealed however that no such case was filed by Molina. The latter claimed that the filing of the motion to
quash was in bad faith to mislead the court. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law finding
that, there was deliberate intent on his part to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal
charges on the basis of double jeopardy. He should not make any false and untruthful statement in his pleadings. If
it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do
was secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed.
LEONARD RICHARDS V. PATRICIO ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10

HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V. ATTY. RICHARD FUNK, AC#9094, 8/15/2012
Hocorma Foundation hired Respodent’s legal services in connection with, among others, the transfer of one of the
properties subject of several suits and over which same property he later instituted a suit in behalf of Mabalacat
Institute without the foundation’s written consent. The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the practice of
law reasoning that a lawyer owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging
inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and
honest intention on the erring lawyer’s part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer
acquires knowledge of his former client’s doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have
acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship.
MANUEL VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. BEBE TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012

In 1987, Respondent was disbarred for grave professional misconduct and ordered to reimburse P16,000 to
Complainant. The latter wrote the Court several times to report non-payment by Respondent. Respondent then
sought readmission to the Bar in 1996, claiming that he had consigned the money with the Court’s cashier.
According to Respondent, his belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the order to reimburse was due to his
inability to locate complainant. Supreme Court denied Respondent’s petition and the a later petition in 2010
reasoning that, Respondent’s justification flimsy as it is, considering that Complainant’s address was readily
available with the Court what with the numerous letters reporting Respondent’s non-compliance, glaringly speaks of
his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities that do not endear him to the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor
towards the Court. By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement of the P16,000.00 – and through consignation
with this Court at that - he sent out a strong message that the legal processes and orders of this Court could be
treated with disdain or impunity.

new new new new new new new new
ORCINO VS. ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, AC#3773, 9/24/1997
Respondent entered into a written contract with Complainant to serve as her counsel in the murder case she filed
against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. When Respondent failed to attend the hearing where bail
was granted to all the accused, allegedly due to non-receipt of notice of hearing, Complainant confronted
Respondent and accused him of deliberately jeopardizing the case. She became belligerent and said that she
would refer her case to another lawyer. She demanded for the case records and left with them. Respondent never
heard or saw her again. Respondent then filed a motion to withdraw as counsel without Complainant’s consent.
The court ordered that his appearance as private prosecutor would continue until he secured his client’s consent.
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to Respondent’s withdrawal and the hearings of the criminal case
continued. Respondent did not appear at the haring nor did he contact Complainant who was constrained to
engage another lawyer.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time
with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its adjudication arises only from the
client’s written consent or from a good cause.
Sec. 26, Rule 138RC, a lawyer may retire from any action or special proceeding with written consent of his client
filed in court and copy thereof served upon adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer
must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party will determine whether
he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on good cause.
In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent’s withdrawal. The court thus ordered
respondent to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant had become hostile
and refused to sign his motion. He, however, did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he
should be allowed to withdraw. Granting that his motion without client’s consent was an application for withdrawal,
still his reason for withdrawal was not justified. Respondent’s withdrawal was made on grounds that “there no
longer existed confidence between them and that “there had been serious differences between them relating to the
manner of private prosecution. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22CPR provides for the valid grounds for withdrawal to include
(a) client insists upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his action, (b) client insists that lawyer pursue conduct
violative of CPR, (c) client has two or more lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the
case; (d) mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) client
deliberately fails to pay attorney’s fees agreed upon; (f) lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other
similar cases.

The instance case does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned. Neither can this be considered analogous to
the grounds enumerated. This case arose from a simple misunderstanding between complainant and respondent.
She was upset by respondent’s absence at the hearing where bail was granted. She vehemently opposed the grant
of bail. Thus, it was a spontaneous and natural reaction for her to confront respondent with his absence. Her
belligerence arose from her overzealousness, nothing more.
Assuming nevertheless that Respondent was justified in terminating his services, he however, cannot just do so
and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal
would be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal is approved, he remains counsel of record who is expected by
his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on hearing dates

for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. Respondent is
admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his client and ordered to return a portion
of his attorney’s fees.

FERNANDO COLLANTES VS. ATTY. VICENTE RENOMERON, AC#3056, 8/16/1991
Complainant, as counsel for V&G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. complained that Respondent, the Register of
Deeds of Tacloban committed several irregular actuations including extortion (asking for roundtrip tickets for
Tacloban and Manila plus P2,000 pocket money for his trips) and inaction upon the subdivision’s application for
registration of 163 deeds of sale. After being found administratively guilty and dismissed from government service.
A disbarment case against Respondent was instituted.
Respondent DISBARRED. The issue in disbarment proceedings is whether respondent registrar of deeds, as a
lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his malfeasance as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon
every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. Membership in the Bar is in the
category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement
of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.
The CPR applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6) just as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process document
and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5) and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest
in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of the office (Sec. 7, a & d),
the CPR forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct or delay any man’s cause
for any motive or interest.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The act of dishonesty and oppression which Respondent committed as a public official have demonstrated his
unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.

JUDGE RENE BACULI VS. ATTY. MELCHOR BATTUNG, AC#8920, 9/28/2011
During the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of a civil case, Respondent shouted while arguing his motion.
Complainant advised Respondent to tone down his voice but instead, Respondent shouted at the top of his voice.
When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, Respondent shouted, “then cite me!” Complainant cited
him in direct contempt and fined him P1,000.00. Respondent then left only to re-enter the courtroom when other
cases were being heard and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you”. At
which, Complainant ordered the sheriff to escort Respondent out of the courtroom and cited him in direct contempt
again. After his hearings, Complainant went out and saw Respondent at the hall of the courthouse, apparently
waiting for him. Respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I
am not afraid of you!” He kept shouting “I am not afraid of you!” and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and
lawyers escorted Respondent out of the building.
Respondent SUSPENDED for one year for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11, CPR. Respondent’s violations are no
less serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings where he was acting as

an officer of the court, and before the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to
the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself. A lawyer who
insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system.
When Respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Complainant that he would file a case for gross
ignorance against the latter, Respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in
Complainant’s competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be
handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer
cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
Litigants and counsels, particulary the latter because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be
allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. Canon 11 (A lawyer
shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.03 (a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
courts.
ERNESTO ORBE VS. JUDGE MANOLITO GUMARANG, AM#MTJ-11-1792, 9/26/2011
Complainant was the plaintiff of a small claims case which was assigned to Respondent for continuation of trial
following failure to reach amicable settlement. Hearings were reset on multiple occasions at Respondent’s instance
(for reasons including power outage and his supposed schedule for medical check-up). In his administrative
complaint, Complainant alleged that Respondent violated the Rule on Small Claims cases for failing to decide the
civil case within 5 days from receipt of the order of reassignment. While admitting that he failed to decide the case
within five working days from receipt of the order, he pointed out that the Rule needed clarification since, as in his
case, the five working days should be construed to mean five calendared trial dates falling on Thursdays only,
considering that he allotted only one day, that is Thursday to hear and try small claims cases as he was merely an
assisting judge to the municipal trial court where Complainant’s case was assigned.
RESPONDENT FINED p5,000 for UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING A DECISION AND VIOLATION OF THE RULE
FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES. Sec. 22 of the Rule on Small Claims cases clearly provides for the period within
which judgment should be rendered, that is, “the new judge shall hear and decide the case within 5 days from
receipt of the order of reassignment.
In this case, it is undisputed that it took more than 2 months for Respondent to render a decision on the subject
case as he himself admitted the series of postponements which occurred during the pendency of the case. His lone
argument was that he hears small claims cases on Thursdays only, hence, he claimed that, in his case, the period
of five working days being referred to by Section 22, should pertain only to Thursdays.
Respondent must have missed the very purpose and essence of the creation of the Rule for Small Claims cases,
as his interpretation of the rule is rather misplaced. This system will enhance access to justice especially by those
who cannot afford the high costs of litigation even in cases of relatively small value. The theory behind the small
claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim is small,
because the time and expense required by ordinary litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved
that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute. The small claims process is designed to function quickly and
informally. There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence.
Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling under the Rule on Small Claims
cases, which is within 5 days from receipt of the order of assignment is very clear. The exigency of prompt rendition
of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public policy. There is no room for further interpretation; it does not
requires respondent’s exercise of discretion. He is duty-bound to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases
without undue delay.
ATTY. FRANKLIN GACAL VS. JUDGE JAIME INFANTE, AM#RTJ-04-1845, 10/5/2011

Complainant is the private prosecutor in a criminal case for murder assigned to Respondent Judge. The latter
acting upon the recommendation of the fiscal in the information for a P4000,000-bail, issued two orders granting
the accused bail and releasing same accused from custody. Complainant charged Respondent with gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and evident partiality for failing to set a hearing before granting bail to the
accused and for releasing him immediately after allowing bail.
The offense of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum to death (Art. 248, RPC). By reason of
the penalty prescribed by law, murder is considered a capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion
which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the
application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s
evidence is weak or strong. It becomes, therefore, a ministerial duty of a judge to conduct hearing the moment an
application for bail is filed if the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall
be recommended. On the other hand, if the evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall be granted.
Respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting accused’s bail application based merely on the order
issued by the fiscal recommending bail for the provisional liberty of the accused without even bothering to read the
affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right and authority to
determine whether the evidence against accused who is charged with capital offense is strong or not. Respondent
judge’s errors are basic such that his acts constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting that the hearing was no longer
necessary considering that accused had not filed a petition for bail, inasmuch as no application for bail had been
filed, his orders were not orders granting an application for bail but were instead his approval of the bail bond
posted. The willingness of Respondent to rely on the mere representation of the public prosecutor that his grant of
bail upon the public prosecutor’s recommendation had been proper, and that his (public prosecutor)
recommendation of bail had in effect waived the need for a bail hearing perplexes the Court. He thereby betrayed
an uncommon readiness to trust more in the public prosecutor’s judgment than in his own judicious discretion as a
trial judge. He should not do so.

TERESITA SANTECO VS. ATTY LUNA AVANCE, AC#5834, 2/22/2011
Complainant filed an administrative complaint against Respondent for mishandling her civil case for declaration of
nullity of a deed of sale. Supreme Court had found Respondent guilty of gross misconduct and suspended her for
five years from law practice. While Respondent’s five-year suspension was still in effect, RTC Judge Consuelo
Amog-Bocar sent a letter-report to the SC Court administrator informing the latter that Respondent had appeared
and actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as “Attty. Liezel Tanglao”. When her
opposing counsels confronted her and showed the court a certification regarding Respondent’s suspension, she
admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna Avance but qualified that she was only suspended for 3 years and
that her suspension had already been lifted.
RESPONDENT DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. SC
finds Respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold
the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s
obedience to court orders and processes. Respondent’s conduct fell short of what is expected of her as an officer
of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Court’s order. She willfully disobeyed this Court
when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented
herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Failure to comply with Court directives constitute gross
misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment. In repeatedly
disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse,
she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharged the duties of an officer of the
court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

JOHNNY PESTO VS. MARCELITO MILLO, AC#9612, 3/13/2013
An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his client regarding
the matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. He
thereby violates his lawyer’s oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18,
CPR, by which he is called upon to serve his client with competence and diligence.
IN 1990, Complainant’s wife engaged Respondent to handle the transfer of title over a lot to her name and the
adoption of her niece, paying him a total of P24,00.00. Respondent thereafter repeatedly gave them false
information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer of title, making them believe that
the capital gains tax had already been paid but they found out later that such were not yet paid despite, his inability
to produce any receipt for such payment, Respondent insisted that he already paid the same. Later Respondent
returned his legal fees for the transfer of title and promised in writing to assume the liability for accrued penalties.
Complainant charged that Respondent let the adoption case be considered closed due to two years inaction. One
time, they were made to believe that an interview with the DSWD was scheduled but were dismayed to be told that
no such interview was scheduled.
Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the client’s interests commences from his
engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every
reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients’ interests may require.
Respondent’s acceptance of the sums of money from Complainant and his wife to enable him to attend to the
transfer of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that
moment on, Respondent assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional service to them as his
clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional
service he had assumed required him to do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to
his clients about having already paid the taxes, In reality, he did not pay such taxes, rendering the client liable for a
substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.

SC SUSPENDED Respondent or two years. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyering in neglecting his
client’s case, misappropriating her funds and disobeying the Committee on Bar Discipline’s lawful orders requiring
submission of his pleadings and his attendance at hearings. Undeniably, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him
by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society.
Moreover, money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title,
but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
PERLA BURIAS VS. JUDGE MIRAFE VALENCIA, GR#176464, 2/4/2010
Respondent borrowed P7,500 from Complainant evidenced by promissory notes. A civil case for ejectment filed by
Complainant was then assigned to Respondent. After the parties in the civil case filed their position papers,
Respondent again borrowed money from Complainant evidenced by two handwritten notes. Complainant filed an
administrative complaint against Respondent after the latter demanded for P50,000 and the writing off of her
previous debts in exchange for a favorable decision in the ejectment case.
With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment, Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to
reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or increase
involvement with lawyers or person likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and
other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification.
Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such loan. However, the law prohibits a
judge from engaging in financial transactions with a party-litigant. Respondent admitted borrowing money from
complainant during the pendency o the case. This act alone is patently inappropriate. The impression that
Respondent would rule in favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks
to avoid. A judge’s conduct should always be beyond reproach.

It seems very likely that Respondent purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer the charges granted to him
out of a desire to delay the investigation of the complaint until both Complainant and his wife, being residents in
Canada, would have already have lost interest in prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already
departed this world and be no longer able to rebut whatever refutations he would ultimately make, whether true or
not. An attorney who is made a respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an explanation and should
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. The obvious reason for this requirement is that an attorney
thus charged must thereby prove that he still maintained that degree of morality and integrity expected of him at all
times.

Since Respondent retired in 2008, the penalty of P20,000.00 is imposed.

RESPONDENT SUSPENDED from law practice for six months and ordered to return to the heirs of Johnny and
Abella Pesto the sum of P10,000.00 plus legal interest at 6 per cent per annum.

When Complainant appeared before Respondent, the latter asked him if he had a lawyer and despite replying in
the negative, Respondent still further questioned him. Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend
to park in Respondent’s space and that he did not know that such space was reserved for Respondent. The latter
refused to accept Complainant’s apology and instead, found him guilty of direct contempt of court for using the
former’s parking space sentencing him to five days imprisonment with a P1,000 fine. In his comment, Respondent
alleged that judges were assigned their respective parking spaces in the basement of city hall, that he had placed a
marker with his name at his allotted space to facilitating the orderly parking, considering that he already
programmed his activities to maintain and/or improve his present position as the third ranking judge for 2004
among RTC judges of Makati. He cited that Complainant’s improper and inconsiderate parking disturbed his train of
thought as to the intended disposition of his cases. Citing similar incident in the past, he admitted having cited
erring city hall employees in contempt for disrupting his performance of official duties.

GLORIA P. JINON VS. ATTY. LEONARDO JIZ, AC#9615, 3/5/2013
Complainant, seeking to recover the title of a property which she disputed with a sister-in-law engaged
Respondent’s services. After paying a total of P61,000, Complainant inquired about the status of the case and was
surprised to learn from Respondent that a certain Atty. Caras was handling the same. Also, Complainant learned
that had been collecting rentals from her property. Upon demand for these rentals, Respondent merely gave her
P7,000.00 claiming that the balance of P,000 would be added to the expenses for the transfer of the title to her
name.

VALERIANO NUNEZ VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO IBAY, AM#RTJ-06-1984, 6/30/2009
Complainant, a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall, parked the government vehicle he
was driving at the basement of Makati City Hall and left the key in their office because drivers were not allowed to
bring such vehicles home. He then received an order from Respondent directing him to appear before the latter to
explain why he occupied the parking space allotted for Respondent.

Having opted to avail of optional retirement, SC imposed a P40,000 fine upon Respondent deductible from his
retirement benefits.
Respondent wrongly argues that complainant delayed the administration of justice when he improperly parked the
van on respondent’s assigned slot which disrupted his scheduled disposition of cases. Respondent’s reaction to
complainant’s mistake is exaggerated. The complainant’s act may have caused inconvenience to the respondent
but it could not delay the administration of justice. There is no evidence to show that complainant parked the van at
respondent’s slot purposely to anoy him or he was aware of the previous similar incidents. In fact, complainant
explained that his mistake was not deliberate and he asked for respondent’s forgiveness.
The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly with due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised strictly for the preservation of the dignity of the court
and its proceedings. In the instant complaint, respondent exercised the said power in an arbitrary and oppressive
manner and for purposes that are purely personal. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
FOODSPHERE, INC. VS. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., AC#7199, 7/22/2009
Complainant is a corporation engaged in meat processing and manufacturing and distribution of canned goods and
grocery products under the brand “CDO”.
Respondent is a writer/columnist of tabloids and a host of a tv and radio program.
One Alberto Cordero purportedly bought from a grocery canned goods including a can of CDO liver spread. When
he and his relatives were eating bread with said liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered
a colony of worms inside the can. Cordero filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration as
laboratory results confirmed the presence of parasites in the liver spread.

Cordero demanded for P150,000 damages, Complainant merely offered to return actual medical and incidental
expenses incurred by the Corderos. Respondent sent Complainant an advance issue of the tabloid which
Complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the
Corderos. Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 for the Corderos and P35,000 to
his BATAS Foundation and directed Complainant to place paid ads in the tabloids and television program.
Thereafter, an agreement was written, leading to the dismissal of the complaint. However, when Respondent did
not find Complainant’s compliance with the ad requirement sufficient, he proceeded to announcement a contest on
his radio program for phone-in callers to name which liver spread had parasites. Respondent also wrote columns in
his tabloid articles which put complainant in a bad light (KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD). Even after civil and
criminal cases against him, Respondent continued to write derogatory articles against Complainant.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which confidence may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
Respondent violated Rule 1.01, CPR which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage
of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek
sponsorships and ads for the tabloids and his television program. He also violated Rule 13.02,CPR that a lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party. For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO,
respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, Respondent violated
Canon 1,CPR which mandates lawyers to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities for he defied the status quo order issued by the court.
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. On reading the articles
respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be
gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent have affected the sales of complainant. RESPONDENT
suspended for three years.