Persons Cases
Content
Tanada vs. Tuvera
146 scra 446
Publication – Presidential Proclamations etc – What “unless otherwise provided”
means in Article 2 of the Civil Code
With the Supreme Court’s decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the
Official Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect,
Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or
modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the
function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared
that all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless otherwise
provided” pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of
publication.
De Roy vs. CA
157 scra 766
Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents
resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the
last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of
Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs
Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied
non-publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
Consunji vs. CA
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.
M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of
the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of
negligence.
2.
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue
of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
1.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks
for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the
following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of
res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner
does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption
of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or
to establish any defense relating to the incident.
2.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of
their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s
Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other
laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the
Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have
waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The
Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under
exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to
avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.
OZAETA ROMULO
In the matter of the Petition for Authority To Continue use of the firm name “Ozaeta,
Romulo, etc.
F: 2 separate petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and the surviving
partners of HerminianoOzaeta, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the name of their
firms, the names of partners who passed away.
Arguments:
1 Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of the deceased partner.( Art. 1840 of the Civil Code )
2
In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
of the deceased partner.
3
The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed because as adopted by American Bar
Association: “the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.”
4
The deaths of the partners were well-publicized.
5
No local custom prohibits the continued use of the partner’s name in a professional firm’s
name.
6
The continued use of the deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships has
been consistently allowed by US Courts. *
I: W/N the names of the deceased partners should be allowed to continue in use in the firm name.
H:
“Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.” “Those who, not being members of the
partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability of a
partner.” (partners should be living persons who can be subjected to liability)
Art. 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a
professional partnership, with no sealable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members.
The partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. The practice of law is also a special privilege, highly personal
and partaking of the nature of a public trust.
Firm names, under local customs, identify the more active and more senior members or
partners of the law firm.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real, or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out.
NB: Rule 3.02 of the CPR approved and promulgated by the SC on June 21,1988 in effect abandoned
the ruling in the Sycip case. (see Art. 1815 Civil Code)
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO
Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly
registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to
be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor
are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as
suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the
said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.
Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and
when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved
and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.
She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine
courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of
the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor
of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The
adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is
enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In
the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed
is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the
divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion
and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled
the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiffappellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and
attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Vandorn vs. Romillo Jr
Van Dorn vs Romillo
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979.
They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner
and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines
where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her
marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality
laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if
the end of justice is to be served.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)
Bellis vs. Bellis
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He
had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate
children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate
children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate
to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of
the illegitimate children’s successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does
not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.
AZNAR VS. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to
HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier
case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California
law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of
the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions
of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the
renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to
the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary
law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the
national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law
of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The “national law”
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly
mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.
146 scra 446
Publication – Presidential Proclamations etc – What “unless otherwise provided”
means in Article 2 of the Civil Code
With the Supreme Court’s decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the
Official Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect,
Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or
modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the
function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared
that all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless otherwise
provided” pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of
publication.
De Roy vs. CA
157 scra 766
Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents
resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the
last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of
Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs
Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied
non-publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
Consunji vs. CA
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.
M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of
the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of
negligence.
2.
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue
of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
1.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks
for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the
following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of
res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner
does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption
of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or
to establish any defense relating to the incident.
2.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of
their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s
Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other
laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the
Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have
waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The
Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under
exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to
avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.
OZAETA ROMULO
In the matter of the Petition for Authority To Continue use of the firm name “Ozaeta,
Romulo, etc.
F: 2 separate petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and the surviving
partners of HerminianoOzaeta, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the name of their
firms, the names of partners who passed away.
Arguments:
1 Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of the deceased partner.( Art. 1840 of the Civil Code )
2
In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
of the deceased partner.
3
The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed because as adopted by American Bar
Association: “the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.”
4
The deaths of the partners were well-publicized.
5
No local custom prohibits the continued use of the partner’s name in a professional firm’s
name.
6
The continued use of the deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships has
been consistently allowed by US Courts. *
I: W/N the names of the deceased partners should be allowed to continue in use in the firm name.
H:
“Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.” “Those who, not being members of the
partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability of a
partner.” (partners should be living persons who can be subjected to liability)
Art. 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a
professional partnership, with no sealable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members.
The partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. The practice of law is also a special privilege, highly personal
and partaking of the nature of a public trust.
Firm names, under local customs, identify the more active and more senior members or
partners of the law firm.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real, or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out.
NB: Rule 3.02 of the CPR approved and promulgated by the SC on June 21,1988 in effect abandoned
the ruling in the Sycip case. (see Art. 1815 Civil Code)
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO
Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly
registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to
be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor
are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as
suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the
said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.
Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and
when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved
and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.
She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine
courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of
the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor
of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The
adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is
enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In
the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed
is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the
divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion
and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled
the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiffappellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and
attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Vandorn vs. Romillo Jr
Van Dorn vs Romillo
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979.
They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner
and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines
where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her
marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality
laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if
the end of justice is to be served.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)
Bellis vs. Bellis
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He
had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate
children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate
children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate
to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of
the illegitimate children’s successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does
not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.
AZNAR VS. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to
HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier
case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California
law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of
the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions
of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the
renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to
the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary
law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the
national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law
of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The “national law”
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly
mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.
