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Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist. There are two versions of the story: Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Quisumbing vs MERALCO FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection. ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages. HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is

GASHEEM SHOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the trial court a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement of marriage. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. Petitioner then visited the respondent’s parents in Banaga, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime on August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him.A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her, and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as maybe just and equitable, which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry. Held: The Supreme Court held that when a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in the sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs NLRC, 163 SCRA 71; G.R. No. L-74156 Facts: Wage Order No. 6 increased the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) of non-agricultural workers in the private sector.

Petitioner Corporation complied with said Order by paying its monthly-paid employees the mandated P3.00 per day COLA. In its computation, Petitioner Corporation multiplied the P3.00 daily COLA by 22 days, which is the number of working days in the company. Respondent Union disagreed with the computation alleging that prior to the effectivity of the Wage Order, Petitioner Corporation had been computing and paying the COLA on the basis of 30 days per month and that this constituted an employer practice, which should not be unilaterally withdrawn. The Labor Arbiter sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that the monthly COLA should be computed on the basis of 22 days, since the evidence showed that there are only 22 days in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on appeal, holding that Petitioner Corporation was guilty of illegal deductions considering that COLA should be paid and computed on the basis of 30 days since workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled to COLA on days “unworked”; and the full allowance enjoyed by Petitioner Corporation’s monthly-paid employees before the CBA executed between the parties constituted voluntary employer practice, which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn.

Issue: WON the computation and payment of COLA on the basis of 30 days per month constitute an employer practice which should not be unilaterally withdrawn. Held: No. Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 provides that “all covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during the days that they are paid their basic wage, even if unworked.” The primordial consideration for entitlement of COLA is that basic wage is being paid. The payment of COLA is mandated only for the days that the employees are paid their basic wage, even if said days are unworked. On the days that employees are not paid their basic wage, the payment of COLA is not mandated. U.E vs Jader Petitioner was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law. He failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff’s name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies to which he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar examination because his academic requirements is not complete. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations

arising from the latter’s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit. ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. HELD: The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Pe vs Pe FACTS: Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in GasanMarinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonsoto his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single,daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext thathe wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each otherPlaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair. HELD Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilioand even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso isimmeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay theplaintiffs

the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations.Costs against appellee. Tenchavez v Escano (1965) Facts: Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu. Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act. Issues: 1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued. 2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband. Held: 1. YES At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation. For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy

citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils. Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. 2. YES The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages. It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited. But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum". St. Louis Realty Corp. vs CA FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil. HELD:

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasidelict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”. Spouses Yu vs PCIB FACTS: Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan. As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998. Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. HELD: Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a

special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other. A prejudicial question is “one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case”. Donato vs Luna FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question. HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs. Quimiguing vs. Icao 34 SCRA 132 Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, a student, and Felix Icao, married, were neighbors. They had carnal intercourse several times until Carmen became pregnant. Assisted by her parents, she filed a claim for support at P120/month plus damages. Icao filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the child is yet unborn. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint, Carmen amended it but the trial court disallowed it. Issue: Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen’s complaint. Held: Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. Geluz vs ca Facts: Nita Villanueva had 3 abortions done by the same doctor, Geluz. Husband Oscar Lazo sued Geluz on the 3rd abortion (2 mo.), seeking damages. CA sustained claim of Lazo for P3,000. Issue: Whether or not the husband can claim damages from the abortionist. Held: No, he cannot. Award for death of a person does not cover unborn fetus because it is still not vested with legal personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in utero. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unbord child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. Moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion.

De Jesus vs. Syquia Facts: This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1) breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children and pay maintenance for them. Cesar met Antonia at the barbership where she works as a cashier. Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant visitor at her home, and wrote a letter to the priest saying that if the child was a boy, it will be christened in his name. On his trip to China, he was writing letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition so that “junior” will be strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house where they lived together for 1 year as a family, with expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She became pregnant again, but soon Syquia left her to marry another woman. Issue: (1) Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable. (2) Whether the letters written by the defendant to the appellant proves paternity. Held: The SC upheld the decision of the trail court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by the production of more than 1 document of indubitable authenticity, containing, all together, the admission of the father recognizing a particular child as of his paternity, the admission of one writing being supplemented by those of another. Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install andmaintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizingsaid Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction,to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is acontravention of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”.

It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission. Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended,within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed” Dumlao vs Quality Plastics FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria’s death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate. ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity. HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a codefendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorney’s fees against the corporation. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines onor before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions,she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigrationto confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expirationof her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying aFilipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows thePhilippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through anaturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it shouldfollow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytimethe citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative

case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to suchcitizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to havebecome a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al asEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad. Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election. Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC Facts: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the

COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious. Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. Held: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. PT&T vs. NLRC272 SCRA 596 Facts:Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as areliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a “Supernumerary ProjectWorker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee who’s having amaternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was toimmediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods,this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. Thereliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the jobapplication form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein thatshe was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.Grace has also made the same representation on her two successivereliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered thediscrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the saiddiscrepancy and she was reminded about the company’s policy of notaccepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated thatshe wasn’t aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadn’tdeliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remainedunconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissedfrom the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegaldismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances.Issue:Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace’s

illegal dismissal dueto certain company policy.Ruling:Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted bydiscriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Where’s acompany policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contractsmarriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runsafoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on thefundamental policy of the State toward marriage. The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T isthat it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as aninviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace’s illegal dismissaland the latter shall claim for damages. Estrada vs. EscritorA.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Facts:In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wroteto Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors thatrespondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with aman not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, whostated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” andchallenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in theproper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritormove for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In theconference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for“disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Codeagainst Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñaslearned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she wasalready a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living withLuciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and thatthey have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sectknown as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation whohave been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugalarrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has theapproval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful andimmoral conduct.Issue:Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful andimmoral conduct.Ruling:Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to thebenevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that itdoes not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must thendemonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible sothat the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary toachieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to showthat the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor Generalutterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinctcircumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions incases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized forthere is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental rightto freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferredfreedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda35 Phil. 252 Facts:Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They establishedtheir residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together forabout a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, onemonth after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to performunchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter rejectthe said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated andprovoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce thedefendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreatingher, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge inthe home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband forsupport outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objectsthat the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.Issue:Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugaldomicile.Ruling:Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a newrelation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon theagreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines andprescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of amarriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of theparties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief insome way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support thewife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or bymaintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option givenby law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade orterminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leavethe conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separatemaintenance even outside of the conjugal home. Balogbog vs. CAG.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 Facts:Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito andGeneroso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting againstpetitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino byCatalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third shareof Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitionersdenied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brotherGavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tagamakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render anaccounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition theestate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilioand Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Courtof Appeals affirmed.Issue:Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valideven in the absence of marriage certificate.Ruling:Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and awoman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.

Inthis case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by privaterespondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost ordestroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitionersargue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the allegedmarriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit.Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Otherevidence may be presented to prove marriage.Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had threechildren, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondentsherein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as thelegitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino andCatalina is valid. Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez185 SCRA 425 Facts:Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, herfull blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petitionfor habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging thatVitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 andconfined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, MisamisOriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, itwas alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living withpetitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. Asher common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body.Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, whois not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their(Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code,the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they arethe legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchangeof pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplatedunder Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not beingpreceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification,he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers andsisters contend otherwise.Issue:Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.Ruling: There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and maliciousmischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Codearticle, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whosecohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who arehusband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unlessexpressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-visVitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legallycapacitated to marry her in her lifetime.Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to hersurviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

Cosca vs. Palaypayon237 SCRA 249 Facts:Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrativecomplaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge LucioPalaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses: 1.Illegal solemnization of marriage 2.Falsification of the monthly reports of cases3.Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court4.Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received5.Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and6.Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriageseven without the requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples wereable to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees torespondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As aconsequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage licensenumber. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriagecontracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason beingthat he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted bythe parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. ssue:Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.Ruling:On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Codepertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a validmarriage license except in the cases provided for therein.Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential orformal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio andthat, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect thevalidity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularityshall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage. Wassmer vs. Velez12 SCRA 648 Facts:Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiff-appellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married onSeptember 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note toBeatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due toopposition of defendant’s mother and that he will be leaving. But onSeptember 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will bereturning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appearnor was he heard from again.Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of thedefendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant topay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955defendant filed a “petition for relief from orders, judgments andproceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration.” Beatriz movedto strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys toappear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.Defendant wasn’t able to appear but instead on the following day hiscounsel filed

a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’spetition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failedto appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the courtbut this time defendant’s counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil.Issue:Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant topay plaintiff damages.Ruling:The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry becauseit is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple havealready filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, weddingapparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant topay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actualdamages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because thedefendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he willcome back and the wedding will push through. Navarro vs. Judge DomagtoyA.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 Facts:Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case againstMunicipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainantcontended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well asinefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized theweddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge thatthe groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano DadorSumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at therespondent’s residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area.Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of havingsolemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married manseparated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely reliedon the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen eachother for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, hemaintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and DelRosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code andthat article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.Issue:Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable forsolemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC.Ruling: The Court held that even if the spouse present has a wellfoundedbelief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceedingfor the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract asubsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present asummary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptivedeath thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death;(2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in asworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with thereforethere is an irregularity. Arañes vs. Judge OccianoA.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002 Facts:Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with GrossIgnorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing themarriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) CommodoreDominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others.Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’sdeath, to inherit the

“vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized.Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for hisillegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so muchhardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by theOffice of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, whichrequired the respondent to comment on the complaint.Respondent averred, among others, that before starting theceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitionerand he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriagelicense so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to theearnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of theprovisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated theneed for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failureto give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assuredthe respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as dueto her own fault and negligence.Issue:Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriagewithout a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.Ruling:Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriagewithout the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara , the SupremeCourt held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriagelicense, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannotrender or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in casesprovided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizingofficer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did notpossess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate inweddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judgesolemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultantirregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect thevalidity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official toadministrative liability. Vda. De Chua vs. CAG.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998 Facts:Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejoand had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chuadied intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianshipand administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the solesurviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was aresident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the saidcourt was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriagecontract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of saidmarriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of DavaoCity; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao Cityindicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income TaxReturns for 1990 and 1991 filed in

Davao City where the status of thedecedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying thathe was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled thatshe failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied herpetition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided infavor of herein respondents.Issue:Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on theirruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellatecourt are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish thetruth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. Thebest evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed toproduce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passportsand other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when thepetitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrarconcerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter fromthe judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has notsolemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregardedthe Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, thisbeing a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthlesspieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the bestevidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it asevidence would make the marriage dubious. Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and CastroG.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994 Facts:On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas weremarried in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to theprocessing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriagecontract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in thename of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wifesince the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only inMarch 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the coupledecided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four(4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971,Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with theconsent of Cardenas.Issue:Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidencespresented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that nomarriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to thecelebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without amarriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essentialrequisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate toprove its nonissuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular documentdoes not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenorwas not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civilregistrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter allapplications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants,the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant

data. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by thecivil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer chargedunder the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of amarriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion andpursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of duesearch and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issuemarriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being nomarriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio. Garcia vs. RecioG.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts:Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was marriedto Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They livedtogether as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian familycourt issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he marriedGrace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In theirapplication for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and“Filipino.” Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while inAustralia, their conjugal assets were divided.In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of therespondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand,respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993,before they were married. Respondent also contended that his firstmarriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trialcourt declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of thedivorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines.Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.Issue:Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry GraceGarcia.Ruling:In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage incase the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spousecapacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by twoaliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent withtheir respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreigndivorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact anddemonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent andSamson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court.Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules onevidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decreewas admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly becausehe objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registryof Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which wasvalidly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity tomarry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, thecourt may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage.Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreignlaw governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, theydon’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera174 SCRA 653

Facts:Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, aFilipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national,were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage startedauspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time inMalate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separationde facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage,private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner inGermany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that theyhad been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, SchonebergLocal Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted topetitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legalseparation, support and separation of property before the Regional TrialCourt of Manila on January 23, 1983.More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscalof Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yetanother man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987,petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with aprayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of theorder of the lower court denying her motion to quash.Issue:Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spousemay prosper.Ruling:Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adulterycannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by theoffended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to theoffended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that suchinitiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so atthe time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of theRevised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is stillsubsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained avalid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippinesinsofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationalityprinciple in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Privaterespondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legalstanding to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he wasthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.139 SCRA 139 Facts:Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, inHongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and hadtwo children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on theground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevadain 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking thatshe be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Uptonalleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with aright to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved todismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barredby a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he hadacknowledged that the couple had no “community property”.Issue:Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court,between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter.Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no

question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in anystates of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen.Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the UnitedStates. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy againstabsolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, thedivorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer thehusband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case aspetitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He isalso estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court fromasserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should notcontinue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. Republic vs. Orbecido472 SCRA 114 Facts:Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were marriedwith two children. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one sonand 1st became a naturalized American citizen, 2nd obtained a validdivorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry, and 3rd contracted amarriage with Innocent Stanley, an American.Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends thatthe invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law,they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation orAnnulment instead.Issue:Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).Ruling: YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenshipand remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be to sanctionabsurdity and injustice .For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) avalid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her toremarry.Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our owncourts, the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law,(3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the timeof the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse .Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remediesfor such would be in the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible,and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties. Niñal vs. Bayadog328 SCRA 122 Facts:Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resultingto her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 monthsthereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent NormaBayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepitoand Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating thatthey had lived together as

husband and wife for at least 5 years and werethus exempt from securing a marriage license.After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed apetition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Normaalleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the countingof the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing amarriage license.Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted backfrom the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal unionhad it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period shouldbe the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be aperiod of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third partywas involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of thefirst spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in casesof absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, itcannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wifefor at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s firstmarriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, onlyabout 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the timewhen he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that whenthey lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact fromhis lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actualseverance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot makeany cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as“husband and wife”.Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case isnot covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it isvoid ab initio because of the absence of such element. Manzano vs. SanchezA.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 Facts:Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late DavidManzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of thatmarriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with oneLuzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judgesolemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same wasvoid and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that bothcontracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when heofficiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know thatManzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had beenliving together as husband and wife for seven years already without thebenefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advisedthe latter not to marry again;

otherwise, he (Manzano) could be chargedwith bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the CourtAdministrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with awarning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt withmore severely.Issues:1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of therespondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.Ruling: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply,the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must haveno legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legalimpediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legalimpediment to their marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It issignificant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and LuzvimindaPayao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in theirmarriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a dirimentimpediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting ashusband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntarycohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tieof a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstratedgross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon237 SCRA 249 Facts: Same. Article 27-34; Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but heclaims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriagelicense was not required. The contracting parties here executed a jointaffidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife foralmost six (6) years already.Issue:Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriagewith the exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the FamilyCode is valid.Ruling:In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either whenit was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 monthsand 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband andwife for almost 6 years already before they got married as they stated intheir joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old whenhe started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. JudgePalaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized theirmarriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contractingparties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have aninstant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement. This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license alreadyonly gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized themarriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized underexceptional character as there was not marriage license and JudgePalaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. Mariategui vs. CAG.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 Facts:Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. Onhis first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begotfour children, Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With hissecond wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter namedCresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children,namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with which heacquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon hisdeath, descendants from his first and second marriages executed a deedof extrajudicial partition on Lot No. 163. However, the children on Lupo’sthird marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint claimingthat they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were ownedby their common father. The petitioners, children on first and secondmarriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial courtdenied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents,children on third marriage.Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trialcourt committed an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfullymarried and also in holding respondents are not legitimate children of theirsaid parents. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children anddescendants of Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to equalshares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a motion forreconsideration of said decision.Issue:Whether or not respondents were able to prove their successionrights over the said estate.Ruling:With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand forpartition of the estate of Lupo

Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly heldthat the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have beenlawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declarationcommunicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when hisfather was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and hismother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig,Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and wereknown in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate wasintroduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvertthese facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage existsdoes not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity arepresent.Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to havetaken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and awoman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into alawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there beingno divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that thingshave happened according to the ordinary course of nature and theordinary habits of life. Domingo vs. CA226 SCRA 572 Facts:Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of propertyagainst Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were marriedat Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriagelicense, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlinadela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the priormarriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that theirmarriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare thatshe is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during themarriage and to recover them from him.Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that themarriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity isunnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in hispossession.Issue:Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullityof marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and privaterespondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with oneEmerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from thebeginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of theirmarriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary toestablish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declarationof nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property accordingto the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reasonthat the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage isbrought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidentalquestions regarding the couple's properties Niñal vs. Bayadog328 SCRA 122 Facts:Same. Article 35Issue:Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased fatherwith defendant is null and void ab initio.Ruling:Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of thefirst spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in

casesof absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. Thesubsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make anycohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as“husband and wife”.Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case isnot covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it isvoid ab initio because of the absence of such element. Republic vs. CA and MolinaFebruary 13, 1997 Facts:On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married ReynaldoMolina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showedsigns of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as hepreferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on hisparents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife inregard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. TheRTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage whichwas affirmed by the CA.Issue:Whether or not irreconcilable differences and conflictingpersonalities constitute psychological incapacity.Ruling: The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of thebench and the bar:(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongsto the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence andcontinuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of thecelebration" of the marriage.(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinicallypermanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bringabout the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced byArticles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife aswell as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parentsand their children.(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling ordecisive, should be given great respect by our courts.(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal andthe Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. Leouel Santos vs. CAG.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 Facts:Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to bean eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20,1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. The ecstasy,however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the youngspouses’ family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a“quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple shouldstart living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia

wouldexpress resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents.On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nursedespite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after herdeparture, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised to returnhome upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouelgot a chance to visit the U.S., where he underwent a training programunder the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperatelytried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his effortswere of no avail.Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the veryleast to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstancesthat clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter intomarried life.Issue:Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article36 of the FC.Ruling: The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand inconjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated,psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (notphysical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basicmarital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged bythe parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of theFamily Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observelove, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly anydoubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaningand significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist atthe time the marriage is celebrated. Republic vs. Quintero-HamanoG.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Facts:Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint fordeclaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondentalleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio wentback to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987,she gave birth to their child On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge IsauroM. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown torespondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume hismarital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after themarriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan andpromised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped givingfinancial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visitedthe Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.Issue:Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount topsychological incapacity.Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume hismarital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlesslyirresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to

some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandonedhis family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior wascaused by a psychological disorder.Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was noshowing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment inthe context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defectfrom the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after thecelebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failedto meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential thathe must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disablingfactor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personalitystructure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting andcomplying with the obligations essential to marriage.In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinctionbetween an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in theapplication of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to bepsychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. Themedical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity wereformulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence,the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply toany person regardless of nationality. Choa vs. ChoaG.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002 Facts:Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were marriedon March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born. On October27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriageto petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullityof his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The casewent on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. However,petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied petitioner’sdemurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert theestablished quantum evidence of respondent. Petitioner elevated the caseto CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denialof the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defensemust present evidence.Issue:Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidencedespite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity.Ruling: The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence againstpetitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychologicalincapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’marriage.Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity tocomply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges includedComplaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not inany way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is theheight of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologicallyincapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filedcases against him. The evidence presented merely establishes theprosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficientto establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, butalso grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must becharacterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence and (c) incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wifecould not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problemsbesetting their marital union. Antonio vs. ReyesG.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 Facts:Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage toMarie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petitionfor nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential maritalobligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existedat the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to thepresent.As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity,petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, thepeople around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment andother events or things.In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, apsychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based onthe tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand,they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitionerwas abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship thatshould be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted thatrespondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the pointof paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect thatpetitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded basedon the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated toperform her essential marital obligations.After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidenceand held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−heroccupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, amongothers−had been duly established. According to the trial court,respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories andpersonalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made herpsychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of givingmeaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared themarriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.Issue:Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychologicalincapacity as to render the marriage null and void.Ruling: It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were notadopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. Moredisturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguishtruth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and thetrial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling liesand the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, wererevelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essentialobligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasyand reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of themarital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligationsattached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to realitycannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expertwitnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.From the totality of the evidence, however,

the court is sufficiently convincedthat the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CAG.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 Facts:Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Untiltheir separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact betweenthem. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy,normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent. The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closethomosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using hismother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that herhusband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain hisresidency status here in the country and to publicly maintain theappearance of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed thatit was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basicmarital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever hewants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wifefiled the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to returnthe pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate theirmarriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid becausethey are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome theirdifferences. The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed thedecision of the trial court.Issue:Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to havesexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife isequivalent to psychological incapacity.Ruling: Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexualcooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent topsychological incapacity.If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses toperform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal issenseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute thecauses to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husband’s senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations isequivalent to psychological incapacity.One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to“procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constantnonfulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity orwholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lackof merit. Morigo vs. People of the PhilippinesG. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 Facts:Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at thehouse of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. Afterschool year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete fromSingapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, theybecame sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but leftagain for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constantcommunication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposedto petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married.Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio

behind.On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petitionfor divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. AppellantLucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio fileda complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriageceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy ininformation filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with theRegional Trial Court of Bohol.Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on theground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Luciaposed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted,but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by theprosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guiltyto the charge.Issue:Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with hisdefense of good faith.Ruling:A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessarybefore a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into asubsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration isguilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union ischaracterized by statutes as "void."In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all wasperformed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and LuciaBarrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere privateact of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriageand thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, withoutmore, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage forwhich Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberallyconstrue a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh everycircumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, SupremeCourt held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need nottarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio43 SCRA 177 Facts:Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation againstEufemio, married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically onSeptember 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmendiscovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmenprayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Eufemioamended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative.Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicularaccident. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legalseparation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year period andthe death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation.Issue:Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separationbefore final decree abated the action.Ruling:An action for legal separation which involves nothing more thanthe bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The CivilCode of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing onlythe innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in itsArticle 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stopor abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation

already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. Gandionco vs. PeñarandaG.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987 Facts: Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco,filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner forlegal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for supportand payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinageagainst petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for theapplication for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendentelite.Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and theincidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case forconcubinage.Issue:Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall besuspended on the case of concubinage.Ruling:Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based onconcubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminalaction for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recovercivil liability arising from the offense.Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from theoffense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are relatedto the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge. Bugayong vs. GinezG.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956 Facts:Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married todefendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Aftermarriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband, before the latterleft to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonilawould stay with Benjamin’s sisters.Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informedher husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother inPangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sisterValeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity. Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in thehouse of Leonila’s godmother. They lived again as husband and wife andstayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. Onthe second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the informationhe received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him whichBenjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After hetried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filedin CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, whotimely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of thecomplaint.Issue:Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegationsof the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have beencondoned by the plaintiffhusband.Ruling:Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited bythe wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with himand the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husbandand wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action forlegal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comeswithin the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.

Pacete vs. Cariaga231 SCRA 321 Facts:Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for thedeclaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband EnricoPacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation(between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In hercomplaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacetesubsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de laConcepcion in North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast propertyconsisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles;that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in hisname and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other"dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; andthat reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since heevidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.Issue:Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretionin denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer onthe decree of legal separation.Ruling:Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that canput the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no lessthan the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intentionnot to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legalseparation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, havelikewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excusecompliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before sixmonths shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously inorder to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the courtshould take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. Macadangdang vs. CA108 SCRA 314 Facts:Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husbandbeing Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitionerAntonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges thatdue to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birthto a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites.Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and supportagainst petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, nowpetitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim andpraying for its dismissal. The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Orderformalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on whichboth parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, anamended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, thelower court dismissed the complaint. The decision invoked positiveprovisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities.Issue:Whether or not the wife may institute an action that wouldbastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumedfather, an opportunity to be heard.Ruling:SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioneddecision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly andclearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugalpartnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal

separation.It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguisedattempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her recklessbehavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all herown son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardizationof respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reachingconsequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming marriedwomen who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and thenexploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them tocollect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wreckingthe stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality. Potenciano vs. CAG.R. No. 139789, 139808 July 19, 2001 Facts:Erlinda Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparablefrom her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.However, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing thepetition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject,Potenciano Ilusorio.Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal viacertiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband PotencianoIlusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by PotencianoIlusorio and his children, Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio appealing fromthe order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he neverrefused to see her. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeascorpus for lack of merit, and granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda Ilusorio.Issue:Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 of FamilyCode to have custody of her husband in consortium.Ruling: The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound tolive together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69.However, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda andPotenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Only themoral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor formaking them observe the said duties and obligations which are highlypersonal. Therefore, they deny the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda35 Phil. 252 Facts: Same.Article 68Issue:Whether or not petitioner may claim support from her husbandoutside of the conjugal domicile.Ruling: The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support thewife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or bymaintaining her in his own home at his option. The law provides thatdefendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligationeither by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own homeat his option.However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will notpermit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support hiswife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewddesigns and physical assaults of the defendant, Article 68 emphasizemutual love, respect and fidelity among husband and wife.

Ty vs. CAG.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000 Facts:Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna MariaVillanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared theirmarriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of saidspouses, private respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. Out of their union boretwo daughters. Until private respondent petition that their marriage bedeclared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the timethey got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at thetime he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to AnnaMaria had not been issued.Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage isuntrue. She submitted the marriage license in court and privaterespondent did not question the evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmedtheir decision in favor of private respondent.Issue:Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to complywith marital obligations of the respondent.Ruling: There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should beawarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants hermarriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks fordamages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirchedreputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation wherethe husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. Todo so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not commonsense, militates against such incongruity. Ilusorio vs. BildnerG.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000 Facts:Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony andlived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, thespouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board forundisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila andin Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlindain Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged thattheir mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which thelatter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petitionfor guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to thelatter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in acondominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in BaguioCity. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to havecustody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refusedpetitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibitingPotenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.Issue:Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpusto compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is toinquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a persontherefrom if such restraint is illegal.

To justify the grant of the petition, therestraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual andeffective, not merely nominal or moral.No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husbandto live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man andwoman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus isdenied. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC248 SCRA 300 Facts:Article 69; Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. OnMarch 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate forthe same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner withCOMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutionalrequirement for residency.On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” initem no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was notreceived since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she alwaysmaintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The SecondDivision of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolutionfinding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious. Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos.Ruling:It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law. The presumption that the wife automaticallygains the husband's domicile by operation of law but never automaticallyloses her domicile of origin. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmonywith the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriagedifferent domiciles of origin. This difference could, for the sake of familyunity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. Ayala Investments vs. CAG.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 Facts:Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner AyalaInvestment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM,respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP, executed security agreements andmaking himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtednessto Ayala Investments.PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case forsum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued awrit of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajocaused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunctionagainst petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgmentagainst conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan didnot redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Uponapplication of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporaryrestraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with theenforcement of the

writ of execution and with the sale of the saidproperties at public auction.Issue:Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments asguaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.Ruling: The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise orprofession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consulteach other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has toget the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimateprofession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of alegitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always consideredto redound to the benefit of the family.But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor fora third person’s debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefitof the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugalpartnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolatedactivity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented. Agapay vs. Palang276 SCRA 341 Facts:Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to CarlinaVallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding,he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang,respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambaleswith his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, notwith his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife andchild.When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his secondmarriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidencedby deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land locatedat Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlindaas the sole vendee. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Corneliaexecuted a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. Theparties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then twoyears later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back thericeland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during hiscohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had alreadygiven her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house andlot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed infavor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. Issue:Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of landacquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property wasnot by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transactionwas properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which wasclearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it wasmade between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of thedonation.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De BatocaelG.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001 Facts:Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became theregistered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicialpartition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Havingno children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked hisniece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, totake care of his house and store.Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of therelationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previousparty was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimedthat Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand,Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrumentdenominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in thesame instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made inconsideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past tenyears.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaintagainst Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirilawas the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is voidunder Article 87 of the Family Code.Issue:Whether or not the deed of donationinter vivos executed by the lateFrancisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.Ruling:Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence thattwo persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of theother is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wifewithout a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null andvoid. Uy vs. CAG.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000 Facts: Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of theguardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. Thepetitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacityof Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administeringhis properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardeleza’s real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties.Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding thedeclaration of incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of solepowers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sellthe property. She alleged that her husband’s medical treatment andhospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one pieceof real property and its improvements. She prayed for authorization fromthe court to sell said property.RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it wasconvinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated toparticipate in the administration of the conjugal

properties. However, Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and notknowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case. He alsoquestioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvementsthereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations andhospitalization.Issue:Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property.Ruling: The CA, which the SC affirmed, ruled that in the condition of Dr.Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings inrelation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because hewas unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property dueto illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the properremedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964Revised Rules of Court. De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz130 Phil 324 Facts:Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz,defendant, at Bacolod City. During their coverture they acquire sevenparcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at SilayCadastre. They are also engaged in varied business ventures. The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionallyreturned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine TexboardFactory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City.Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon thedefendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. She also began tosuspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to acertain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting severalpieces of evidence on the defendant’s polo shirt and iron safe. The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that thereason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan,Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome andextremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wifetemporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. Thedefendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife andfamily, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to givethem financial support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued todraw allowances from his office and he financed the education of theirchildren, two of whom were studying in Manila.Issue:Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed tocomply with his obligations.Ruling: The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it isconsidered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of hiswife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugalpartnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be real abandonment , andnot mere separation The abandonment must notonly be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moraldesertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of theterm "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure fromthe society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugalpartnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that thedefendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negativesany intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume hismarital duties and rights.

Partosa-Jo vs. CA216 SCRA 692 Facts: Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fatheredfifteen children. The first woman, petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to behis legal wife by whom he begot a daughter.Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property and an action for support. The complaint for support wasgranted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal propertywas never entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA butretain its affirmation on trial court’s ruling. When their motions forreconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal property. The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds thatthe petitioner and respondent were legally married and that the propertiesmentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriagealthough they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy.Issue:Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property begranted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment.Ruling:SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent hadalready rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not accepted by Jodemonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming theirconjugal relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial supportto the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal bythe respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constituteabandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugalproperty. BA Finance Corporation vs. CA161 SCRA 608 Facts:Augusto Yulo, respondent, secured a loan from the petitioner, BAFinance Corp., as evidenced by his signature on a promissory note inbehalf of the A & L Industries. About two months prior to the loan,however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and hadabandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due anddemandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on thebasis of the promissory note. They also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment that the at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his familyand had left their conjugal home. Johnson & Johnson Inc. vs. CA262 SCRA 298 Facts:Delilah Vinluan, defendant and owner of Vinluan Enterprises,engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products incurred anobligation to the said company. She issued checks amounting to thepayment of the obligation but the checks bounced. Johnson & Johnson,petitioner, demands for the payment and even offered accommodations topay the obligation but failed. With these, respondent filed a complaintagainst defendant spouses Vinluan for collection of the principal obligationplus interest with damages. RTC granted the complaint and ordereddefendant to pay.However, after meticulously scrutinizing the evidence on recordthat there was no privity of contract between respondent and defendanthusband regarding the obligations incurred by the defendant-wife, theyheld that defendanthusband must not be legally held liable for the saidobligation. Thus, they issued a writ of execution against the properties of the defendant-wife but the two notices of levy on

execution covered alsothe real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership.Defendant-husband filed a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motionto fix the value of the levied properties. Defendant-husband moved toquash the levy on execution but as expected petitioner opposed themotion.Issue:Whether or not defendant-husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his consent.Ruling:SC denied petition based on the respondent Court’s originalfindings which had already become final and indisputable. The defendant-husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by thedefendant-wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugalpartnership, as well as the defendant-husband cannot be held liable. Onlythe defendant-wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. Theconjugal properties and the capital of the defendant-husband cannot belevied upon. Spouses Laperal vs. Spouses Katigbak 90 Phil 77 Facts: The plaintiffs, Roberto Laperal Jr. and his wife Purificacion M.Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak, who acted as an agent in the sale on thecommission of jewels, and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover the totalsum P113,500 plus interest and costs. The defendant Evelina moved todismiss, on the ground that the complaint failed to state sufficient facts toconstitute a cause of action against her. The plaintiff opposed the motionbut the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence thisappeal. Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. The firsttranscribed four promissory notes for various sums and the notes are notsigned by Evelina. The only allegations that may affect her liability if any,are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her",and that both defendants refused to pay the notes.Issue:Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of herhusband against the spouses Laperal.Ruling: The defendant Evelina is not personally liable. Ramon was not heragent, and he did not contract for her. For the repayment of the sumsborrowed by him, Ramon Katigbak was personally responsible with his own private funds, and at most the assets of the conjugal partnership. To reachboth kinds of property it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to implead the wifeEvelina Katigbak. "Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies againstthe wife, and she is not a necessary party defendant.” The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal propertyunless its administration has been transferred to him, which is not thecase. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debtsincurred by the husband. Villanueva vs. IAC192 SCRA 21 Facts:Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto andFederico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition.Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the CapizRegistry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but theyhad no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimatechildren named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from JesusBernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. Inthe loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative RaymundoAranas, signed the agreement as a witness.Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay

their loan. As a result, Bernascaused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the landat the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later, ConsolacionVillanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernaspraying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled andthey be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of actionupon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas andhis wife Victoria. Victoria’s will stated that her interests, rights andproperties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership bebequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modesto’s will, on the other hand, bequeathed tohis two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership withVictoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage.Issue:Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria.Ruling:Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by successionof the lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot wouldnonetheless be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him“during the marriage by lucrative title”.Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited fromhis parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law. BPI vs. Posadas56 Phil 215 Facts: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiarynamed in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun LifeAssurance Company of Canada. During the following five years the insuredpaid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. The deceasedAdolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano. The plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, wasappointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentaryestate by an order, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thesaid spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting thedebt. The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling thepetitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Private respondentLily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that Augusto hadalready abandoned her and their children five months before the filing of the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissorynote was executed. She also alleged that her signature was forged in thespecial power of attorney procured by Augusto.Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if the attached properties were her exclusive property, the same can bemade answerable to the obligation because the said properties form partof the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo.Issue:Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent formspart of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be made answerable tothe obligation.Ruling:SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property. Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during themarriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligationcontracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of theconjugal partnership.In the case at bar, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking toenforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondentwas undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because

Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal,Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila,the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on thelife of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same dateRosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of thePhilippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, which enteredit in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned themoney to said widow. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamentalprinciple that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiaryupon the death of the person insured.Issue:Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugalpartnership.Ruling:SC holds, (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable tothe insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugalpartnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to thehusband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; and (2) that if thepremiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, theproceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal inpart. That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to theinsured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentaryadministrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate underprobate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to thelaw on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it isimmaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside. Wong vs. IAC200 SCRA 792 Facts:Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. Theyhad been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in AngelesCity while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico boughtparcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed froman officemate.Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement withAnita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry forsale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-dayperiod agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrinaissued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed thecase on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil innature.Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina andher husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money.After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wong’s. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles allin the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filedan action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution,levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "notgiven his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel asAttys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. That he had nothingto do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize herto enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on executionand sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties.Issue:Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusiveproperties of Romarico.Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsistsin the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcomesaid presumption or to prove that the properties are

exclusively owned byRomarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties withmoney he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where heobtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, thenthe money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof onthis matter is of paramount importance considering that in thedetermination of the nature of a property acquired by a person duringcoverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in thepurchase. Ayala Investments vs. CAG.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 Facts:Same.Article 121-122Issue:Whether or not debts and obligations contracted by the husbandalone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.Ruling: The respondent directly received the money or services to be usedin or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls withinthe term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. Here, noactual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family isapparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan and services, the family stands to benefit from theloan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of thehusband. It is immaterial in the, his business or profession fails or does notsucceed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes and rightly so, that suchobligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Carlos vs. AbelardoG.R. No. 146504 April 4, 2002 Facts:Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October 1989,respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached himand requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for thepurchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conducttheir married life independently and on their own, petitioner issued a checkin the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, whoacknowledged receipt thereof. The amount was in full payment of theproperty.When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligationbut pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definitesettlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violentresistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of makingvarious death threats against petitioner.Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amountof US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money anddamages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. Asthey were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of thecomplaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria TheresaCarlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, frompetitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on astaggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demandedimmediate payment of the full amount.Issue:Whether or not the amount of US$25,000.00 was a loan obtainedby private respondent and his wife from petitioner.Ruling:Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debtscontracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shallnot be charged to the conjugal

partnership except insofar as theyredounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied thatthe check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house andlot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thusbenefiting the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of thecorporation and not as a loan. Defendant-husband does not appear to be astockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation, H. L. CarlosConstruction, Inc. Since he is not a stockholder, he has no right toparticipate in the income or profits thereof. Mallilin vs. CastilloG.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 Facts:Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partitionand/or Payment of CoOwnership Share, Accounting and Damages" againstrespondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner andrespondent, both married and with children, but separated from theirrespective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship while their respectivemarriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the SuperfreightCustoms Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairmanof the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real andpersonal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name.Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitionerdemanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, butrespondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solelyin her name.Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokeragebusiness with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight CustomsBrokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and dulyregistered with the SEC. She denied that she and petitioner lived ashusband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally marriedto their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of allreal personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on theground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money andregistered solely in her name.Issue:Whether or not the parties are considered as coowners of theproperties.Ruling:A co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who livetogether as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewiseprovides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion totheir contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, ispresumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the coupleare not capacitated to marry each other. Valdez vs. RTC260 SCRA 211 Facts:Same.Article 147; Emphasis to the RTC’s judgment on liquidationof properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/ounions of marriage. Issue:Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of theparties in the liquidation of their properties.

Ruling: The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the propertyregimes are those provided for in Article 147 or 148as, the case may be. The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with theprovisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflictwith Article 147 or 148. The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple andshall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules onco-ownership. However, the fruits of couple’s separate property are notincluded in the co-ownership. Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005 Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G.Francisco were married. Eduardo was then employed as the vice presidentin a private corporation. The Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to EduardoFrancisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house. TheRegister of Deeds made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles. Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement fromMIWCC but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against himin the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities, or thevalue thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC andagainst Eduardo. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in thetrial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submittedan indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The sale at public auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property. Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in theRTC of Parañaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminaryinjunction or temporary restraining order. She alleged then that she wasthe sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. Hence,the levy on execution of the property was null and void.Issue:Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco. Ruling: The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property withher personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she isthe sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that theImus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to thepetitioner and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latteras vendee after her marriage to Eduardo.It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23.At that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchasethe subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim.Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were providedby her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort toshield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgmentcreditor. Agapay vs. Palang276 SCRA 341 Facts:Same.Article 148.Issue:Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired bycohabitation between her and Miguel.Ruling: The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Codeproviding for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are notcapacitated to

marry each other live exclusively with each other ashusband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a voidmarriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union waspatently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was stillsubsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged inthe business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuadethe SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. Sincepetitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase priceof the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguelover the same. Juaniza vs. Jose89 SCRA 306 Facts:Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of thepassenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight trainof the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legallymarried to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin tothat of husband and wife.Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying thatthe decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied.Issue:Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC)is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-lawrelationship is incapacitated to marry.Ruling:It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownershipcontemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and thewoman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contractmarriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there isan impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under theaforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and hislegal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damagesarising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengersof the jeepney which figured in the collision. Tumlos vs. FernandezG.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000 Facts:Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitionerGuillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, thesaid spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartmentbuilding that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-privaterespondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years withoutthe payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months,Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendantspromised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement wasnot complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded severaltimes that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of theproperty for the construction of a new building.Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to thecomplaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no causeof action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises asevidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. Shethen asked for the dismissal of the complaint.Upon

appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendantsalleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had anamorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question astheir "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the saidapartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and thatGuillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lesseesof the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as tothe annulment of his marriage.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the propertyinlitis .Ruling:Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made anactual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchorsher claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondentMario. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during thecohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides thatthe administration of the property amounts to a contribution in itsacquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Docena vs. LapesuraG.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001 Facts:Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation sincetime immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. Thetrial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. TheCA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners tovacate the land they have leased fromCasiano. The Complaint inIntervention of Abuda was dismissed.A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitionerswith the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing theWrit of Demolition.Issue:Whether or not joint management or administration does requirethat the husband and the wife always act together.Ruling:Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone,subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. It is believed thateven under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone couldhave filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appealswithout being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf andthat of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to havepersonal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action orclaim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the noticesand legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property. Martinez vs. MartinezG.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005 Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as wellas the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. Hethen bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely,

Rodolfo,Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was designated as the administrator of theestate.Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father,where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila.Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC.RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the groundthat the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was noallegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. hadbeen admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wroteRodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored theletter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file acomplaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. Theyalleged that they were the owners of the property. The spouses Martinezalleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromisehad been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile No amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during thepreliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences.Issue:Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations inthe complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficientcompliance to prove that earnest efforts were made.Ruling: The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission,it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigationbetween members of the same family. It is necessary that every effortshould be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breedhate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between closerelatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the FamilyCode before filing a complaint against a family member would render suchcomplaint premature. Hontiveros vs. RTCG.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999 Facts: The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint fordamages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and TeodoraAyson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan, Capiz.Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the groundthat private respondents’ answer did not tender an issue or that itotherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Privaterespondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners’claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only beresolved after trial. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion. After an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, pleadings isinappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answerspecifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also becausethe party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof,however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to theamount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. The courtdismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of theorder of dismissal, but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition forreview on certiorari.Issue:Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allegeunder oath that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior tofiling thereof.Ruling:Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson asdefendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the

case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase"members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents andchildren, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whetherfull or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are notgiven any legal effect in this jurisdiction.Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in thecomplaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner MariaHontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family. Manalo vs. CAG.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001 Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He wassurvived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several realproperties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including abusiness under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo fileda petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother,Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set thisorder of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) whowere granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners,through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion.Issue:Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petitionfor judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward acompromise involving members of the same family have been made.Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. petitioners may notvalidly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clearenough. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by oneperson or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which theplaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of aninjury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. Albano vs. GapusanA.M. No. 1022-MJ May 7, 1976 Facts:Redentor Albano in a verified complaint charged Municipal JudgePatrocinio Gapusan of Ilocos Norte with incompetence and ignorance of thelaw for having prepared and notarized a document providing for tilepersonal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench,respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar, Ilocos Norteand for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It wasstipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery orconcubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filingan action against the other. Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. Heexplained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when theysigned the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten childrenwith her

paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreementthat the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violentincidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is ineffect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against JudgeGapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary.Issue:Whether or not respondent judge committed malpractice as anotary.Ruling: To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the lawconsiders as void "any contract for personal separation between husbandand wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for thedissolution of the conjugal partnership".A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage andthe family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicallydissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured bythis Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family Modequillo vs. Breva185 SCRA 766 Facts:On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.” The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgmenton the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential landlocated at Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and a parcelof agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filedby defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential landlocated at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt fromexecution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of theFamily Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and thatthe judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the FamilyCode. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.Issue:Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may besatisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under theFamily Code.Ruling:Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on ahouse and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There isno need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required inthe Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore,a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take thenecessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit tothe spouses or head of the family who owns the home.In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner wasnot constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially underthe Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only underArticle 153 of the Family Code. Manacop vs. CA277 SCRA 941

Facts:Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchasedresidential lot with a bungalow. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc.filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromiseagreement with private respondent. The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementionedcompromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with theagreement in good faith. Private respondent filed a motion for executionwhich the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment wasdelayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and otherpersonal properties of petitioner. These chattels were sold at public auctionfor which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writsof execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on theground that the judgment was not yet executory. Private respondentopposed the motion. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writof execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed bypetitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company hadnot paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables, thelower court held that the case had become final and executory. It alsoruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it wasnot duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.Issue:Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on ahouse and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of FamilyCode.Ruling: The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. It does not mean thatArticles 152 and 153 FC have a retroactive effect such that all existingfamily residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes atthe time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and areexempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before theeffectivity of the FC. Art. 162 simply means that all existing familyresidences at the time of the effectivity of the FC, are considered familyhomes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a familyhome under the FC. Andal vs. Macaraig89 Phil 165 Facts:Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem,brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in CamarinesSur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of theparcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother EduvigisMacaraig by virtue of a donationpropter nuptias executed by the latter infavor of the former. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a)declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and suchentitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal ownerof said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter,his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house tohelp him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he

became so weakthat he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueñas, his wife,eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felixand Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband andwife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not evenattend his funeral. Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given thename of Mariano Andal.Issue:Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.Ruling:Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen thatEmiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one tothe other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts noother presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is alsoseen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it wasphysically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse.And here there is no such proof. Benitez-Badua vs. CAG.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 Facts:Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties,upon their death the fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued.Vicente’s sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate. On the other hand, Marisa BenitezBadua opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of thedeceased spouses and is capable of administering the estate.In RTC, both parties submit their pieces of evidence. PetitionerMarissa, prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses bysubmitting documentary evidence and that the spouses continuouslytreated her as legitimate child. On the other hand, respondents proved bytestimonial evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during theirmarriage because the spouse Isabel was treated by an obstetriciangynecologist which prevented her to give birth. The older sister of Vicentealso declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the spouses,who were unable to procreate, as she was there at the time the spouseswere having this problem.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner was the biological child of thespouses and has the right to be the sole heir.Ruling:Petitioner was not the biological child based on facts. Live of BirthCertificate was repudiated by Notarized of Deed of Extra-JudicialSettlement of Estate. The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the biological oradopted child of deceased was denied, on the ground that Articles 164,166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situationwhere a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of acertain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where the husbandor his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife Concepcion vs. CAG.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005 Facts:Ma. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion, which theybegot a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo Concepcion found out that hiswife was still married to Mario Gopiao. Hence, he filed for annulment onthe ground of bigamy. Theresa averred that he married Mario but that wasonly a sham and she never lived with him at all. RTC ruled that Theresa’smarriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting thus the marriagewith Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was condemned illegitimate.Custody was then given to Theresa. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had theirmarriage annulled.

She argued that a putative father cannot havevisitation rights over the illegitimate child and the child’s surname bechanged to the mother’s maiden name. Gerardo opposed the motion andinsisted on the visitation rights and retention of the father’s surname tothe child.Issue:Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage isconsidered legitimate.Ruling: Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother mayhave declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as anadulteress. The fact that the child was conceived and born at the time thespouses had lived together. The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate orillegitimate children, for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever becompromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change hisstatus for the information contained therein is merely supplied by themother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and notwhat a parent says it is. Liyao vs. LiyaoG.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Facts:Corazon Garcia is legally married to but living separately fromRamon M. Yulo for more than 10 years at the time of the institution of thesaid civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 upto the time of William’s untimely demise. They lived together in thecompany of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage.Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. During her three day stayat the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new bornbaby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food andclothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao evenasked his confidential secretary to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate.He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with theConsolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to bedeposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introducehim as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.Issue:Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to beable to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao.Ruling:SC denied the petition. A child born and conceived during a validmarriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statutebut is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposedvirtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protectinnocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.SC finds no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidencepresented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation withthe late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent andpositive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father hadadmitted or recognized his paternity. Eceta vs. EcetaG.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004 Facts:Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Ecetasometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot ason, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties, among which is thedisputed property. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicenteas his compulsory heirs.In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, hiscompulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.In 1991,

Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon Cityfor "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging thatby virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property isparaphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.Issue:Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of thecertificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiationof the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged fatherVicente Eceta.Ruling:Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and theCourt of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa,was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed andadmitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter.Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established herfiliation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate.Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate therebyacknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente isdeemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. Constantino vs. Mendez209 SCRA 18 Facts:Amelita Constantino, petitioner and waitress at Tony’s Restaurant,met Ivan Mendez, respondent. On that first meeting, Ivan invited Amelitato dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he stayed. While dining, Ivanprofessed his love to Amelita through a promise of marriage and then theyhave had a sexual intercourse. But after the sexual contact, Ivan confessedthat he is a married man. However, they repeated their sexual contact inthe months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in Manila,which resulted to Amelita’s pregnancy.Amelita pleas for help and support to Ivan but failed. She then filedfor the recognition of the unborn child and payment for damages.However, Ivan rebutted by the petition of the dismissal of the complaint forlack of cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Amelita, respondent petitionthe complaint CA that RTC erred in its ruling. CA favored the respondentand dismissed the complaint of petitioner.Issue:Whether or not Amelita was able to prove the paternity of Ivan toher son Michael to warrant support.Ruling:SC dismissed the petition. She was inconsistent in her responsewhether they did or didn’t have any sex in Manila in the 1st and 2nd weekof November. At first, she said she remembered during cross-examination.Later in her response, she said she doesn’t remember. This is relevant because the child Michael is a FULL TERM baby. Hewas conceived approximately sometime in the 2nd week of November. Shewrote to Ivan asking for support around February stating that she was fourmonths pregnant. This means, she thinks she conceived the child onOctober. She wrote to Ivan’s wife where she revealed her attachment toIvan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend.Moreover, she confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend resultingto her leaving work. Bernabe vs. AlejoG.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Facts:Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary,Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscaldied as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the solesurviving heir.Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint

praying that Adrianbe declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given theshare of Bernabe’s estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the deathof the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian beallowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error due to RTC’s rulingbased on Article 175.Issue:Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a caseagainst petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after theputative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.Ruling:SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of anillegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor whenthe latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code achance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children areusually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate familybeing aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be giventhe opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or shecannot do if he or she is already dead.” Jison vs. CAG.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998 Facts:Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain LiliaLopez Jison. At the end of 1945, however, FRANCISCO impregnatedEsperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’sdaughter. As a result, Monina was born in Iloilo, and since childhood, hadenjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged thatFrancisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that sheobtained a Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bankexaminer. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Moninaprayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and thatFrancisco support and treat her as such.Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations withEsperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she hadceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of herwhereabouts since then. Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly orimpliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses,Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action againsthim and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damagesdue to the malicious filing of the complaint.Issue:Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughterof Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family.Ruling:SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimatedaughter of Francisco. All told, Monina's evidence hurdled "the highstandard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one'sillegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open andcontinuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Courtand special laws". Moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more thanmere preponderance of evidence. Conde vs. Abaya13 Phil 249 Facts:Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and SabinaLabadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the naturalchildren Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she

states she had by CasianoAbaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession.An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However,Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed saidappointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of thedeceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of CasianoAbaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate.Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that sheacknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that sheconsidered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on thematter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to theproperty left by Casiano Abaya.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in theacknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of apersonal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the childmay exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in threecases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he orshe died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action hadalready been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to thechild to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, heor she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or herheirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is nottransmitted to his ascendants or descendants. Marquino vs. IACG.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994 Facts:Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for JudicialDeclaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damagesagainst petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on the CIF of Negros Occidental. Alsoimpleaded as defendants, were the wife of Eutiquio Marquino and theirlegitimate children all surnamed Terenal-Marquino. The records show that Bibiana was born of Gregoria Romano andallegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. At that time, Eutiquio was still single.Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she washired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete City. She alwaysreceived financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that sheenjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. TheMarquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations.During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibianacould finish presenting her evidence, she died. Her heirs were orderedsubstituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners filed a Motion toDismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible tothe heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case.Respondents appealed to the respondent IAC. Eutiquio Marquino died whilethe case was pending appeal.Issue:Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition isintransmissible in character.Ruling: The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, notduring the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents.In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives.In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child.She was born out of wedlock of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of EutiquioMarquino who at that time was single. Bibiana sued for compulsoryrecognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died before she couldpresent

her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering itspersonal nature and intransmissibility. Abadilla vs. Tabiliran249 SCRA 447 Facts:Complainant Abadilla, contends that respondent had scandalouslyand publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during theexistence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Respondentallegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said PriscillaBaybayan. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to TeresitaBanzuela.In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claimsthat respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his threeillegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separateaffidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondentknew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of adispenser of justice. Respondent, in his comment, declared that hiscohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous norimmoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after hisfirst wife had already left and abandoned the family home and, since then,and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent hashad no news of her being alive.Issue:Whether or not respondent commited deceitful conduct inlegitimating his three illegitimate children born out of adulterousrelationship.Ruling:SC ruled that respondent commited deceitful conduct and ordershis dismissal from the service. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent oughtto know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these threechildren cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimatesince at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriagebetween respondent and his first wife. Legitimation is limited to naturalchildren and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. Teotico vs. Del Val13 SCRA 406 Facts:Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named JosefinaMortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to allthe remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and serviceto all parties concerned.Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of FranciscaMortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledgednatural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix,filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging thatthe oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court,allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of FranciscaMortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging theadditional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate courtrendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring thedisposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement thatthe portion to

be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix'sheirs by way of intestate succession.Issue:Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right tointervene in this proceeding.Ruling:Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest inthe estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have anyclaim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appearstherein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of anyportion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either asadministratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portionof the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she isan adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law therelationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and theadopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, norelationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of theadopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopterbut not of the relatives of the adopter. Republic vs. CA and Bobiles205 SCRA 356 Facts: Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed into the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting thepetition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six years old and who had been living with her family since he wasfour months old. The courta quo, finding the petition to be sufficient inform and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Theorder was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the otherplaces it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose thepetition. The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child, Jason Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience andmaintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents andpurposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and thesurname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of thepetitioner.Issue:Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision whichgranted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.Ruling: The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoptionwill be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly ingranting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb thesame. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in thelight of the foregoing doctrine, SC holds that the decree of adoption issuedby the courta quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happylife. Tamargo vs. CA209 SCRA 518 Facts:Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injurieswhich resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages wasfiled with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer'sadopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia

Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and ClaraBundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura hadfiled a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedingsbefore the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grantedthat is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spousesBundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoingpetition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adoptingparents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, wereindispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted tothe adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoptionwas filed.Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundocwas then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had notceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petitionfor adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling thatrespondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensableparties to the action.Issue:Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right toappeal, may still file the instant petition.Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case eventhrough petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time.Ruling:SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be givento the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential topermit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adoptedchild. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority hadbeen retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden themwith liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and whichthey could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Javier vs. Lucero94 Phil 634 Facts:Salud Arca, respondent and Alfredo Javier, defendant had theirmarriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. At the time of their marriage,they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Jr.Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy, for he was anenlisted man in the US Navy. Because of defendant’s departure,respondent chose to live with defendant’s parents but left due to frictionshaving occurred between them. She then stayed to her native place in Tanza, Cavite.With the events transpired, the relationship of the spouses becomestrained and with that Alfredo Javier filed an action for divorce againstSalud Arca at Alabama, USA. Having received the complaint, respondentaverred that defendant was not a resident of Alabama but a resident of Naic, Cavite. She also professed that the cause of their separation was notof desertion on her part but of the defendant. And that since his departureto US Navy, he had always supported his spouse and his son throughallotments by US Navy Department of US Government. Through these sheprayed that the complaint be dismissed.Issue:Whether or not the defendant is still obliged to support his soneven if he reaches the age of majority.Ruling:Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of petitioner Alfredo Javier, and if financial assistance is to be rendered only at the terminationof the appeal his education, or the completion thereof, would be undulydelayed. That is good reason for immediate execution.Support also includes the education of the person to be supported"until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade orvocation

even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this articlesupport was granted to Alfredo Javier Jr. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda35 Phil 252, 262 Facts:Same.Article 204. Emphasis on the options of support.Issue:Whether or not the wife can claim for support outside of theconjugal domicile.Ruling:It has been held that the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugalabode by her husband, without fault on her part, may maintain an actionagainst the husband for separate maintenance when she has no otherremedy, notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who isobliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixedpension or by receiving and maintaining in his home the one having theright to the same. De Asis vs. De Asis303 SCRA 176 Facts:Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of theminor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance andsupport against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging thatpetitioner is the father of subject minor, and the former refused and/orfailed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeateddemands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged andthat he cannot be required to provide support for him. The mother’s childsent in a manifestation stating that because of petitioner’s judicialdeclarations, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support fromhim. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subjectto the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. Byvirtue of the said manifestation, the parties mutually agreed to move forthe dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the trial court,which then dismissed the case with prejudice.Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support wasbrought against petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres deAsis, represented by her legal guardian, herein private respondent.Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is inapplicable inan action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of futuresupport is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’smotion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari. CA dismissed the same. Issue:Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave abuse of discretionafter the first complaint was dismissed and adjudged. Ruling: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nortransmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be thesubject of a compromise. The manifestation sent by private respondentamounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject minor, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner andprivate respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the natureof a compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It violated theprohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

Espiritu vs. CA242 SCRA 362 Facts:Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masaudingfirst met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National SteelCorporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo wassent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began tomaintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, theirdaughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacationin the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon theirreturn to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and giventhe name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided toseparate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedlypleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and wentback to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines,but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he wassent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children withhis sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filedthe petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners togain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings nowreaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeascorpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind andReginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over thembut with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to beapproved by the Court. Issue:Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gaincustody over the children be granted. Ruling:SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother andretain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoralactivities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances,personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against thechildren. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of theparent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From allindications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand theunfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in theiremotional growth by her behavior. Amadora vs. CA160 SCRA 274 Facts:Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was lookingforward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stageand in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high schooldiploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him thatawaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, theColegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gunthat mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civilaction for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegiode San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the

physics teacher, together with Daffon and two otherstudents, through their respective parents. The complaint against thestudents was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remainingdefendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court,however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants werecompletely absolved. Issue:Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts andtrades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora. Ruling:The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision inquestion (Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the schoolis academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attachto the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are theones directly involved with the students.Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only hewho shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Oldschools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the schoolpersonally and directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is notalso liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcingdiscipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rulesand regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, thefact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because hewasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased. Ylarde vs. Aquino163 SCRA 697 Facts:Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of theGabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located inPangasinan, private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. Aspart of work education, private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils tohelp Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered remnants of World War II.When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concreteblock, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole.Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the openhole while he went to see Banez to borrow some rope. Before leaving,private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch thestone."After private respondent Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde,playfully jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on top of theconcrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso andAlcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time butunfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him, pinning him to thewall in a standing position. Ylarde sustained injuries, three days later, hedied. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damagesagainst both private respondents Aquino and

Soriano.Issue:Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for thedeath of Ylarde.Ruling:SC close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautiousperson would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondentAquino did. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupilswould have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in hiscompany. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incidentwould not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alivetoday, a grownman of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessaryprecautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish allthese years. St. Mary’s Academy vs. CarpitanosG.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002 Facts:Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conductedan enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of theenrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospectiveenrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, SherwinCarpitanos was part of the campaigning group.Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other highschool students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendantVivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, DapitanCity. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and astudent of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in areckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanosdied as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parentsof Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, JamesDaniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed fordamages.Issue:Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable fordamages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.Ruling:GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of anyliability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable theremust be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was theproximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must havecausal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitionerand the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school,but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible fordamages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Tamargo vs. CA209 SCRA 518 Facts:Same.Articles 220-233. Emphasis on effects andsuspension/termination of parental authority.Issue:Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parentalauthority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make theadopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed againsttheir adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custodywas yet lodged with the biological parents.Ruling:GRANTED. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liablefor damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTEDNEGLIGENCE. The simple reason is that the child was still under their careand custody at the time of the incident. Parental liability is a consequenceof PARENTAL AUTHORITY.APPLICABLE PROVISIONS:Art. 2176: Quasi-delict – Whoever by act or

omission causes damage toanother, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for thedamage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existingcontractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence – The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 isdemandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for thosepersons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, areresponsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in theircompany. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when theperson herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of agood father of a family to prevent damage. Libi vs. IAC214 SCRA 16 Facts:Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong, 18 years old, and deceased WendellLibi, between 18 to 19 years old, were sweethearts for two years prior tothe incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guysadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed thatthey be together again this made the guy resort to threats. But, the girlhold steadfast to her decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived withher best friend. On the day of the incident, the two were found shot dead with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl instituted thiscase against the parents of the guy for damages.Issue:Whether or not the parents of the Wendell Libi is still liable for thedeath of Julie Ann Gotiong.Ruling:DENIED. The parents of the guy are held liable for not exercisingdue diligence, diligentissimi patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of theguy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. The father and themother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have beennegligently left lying around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of his mother. The said gun was missing. The parents were also unable toexplain the photograph of their son holding a gun. The said photographwas dedicated to the girl.Moreover, they were remiss in their duties as parents as not being able toknow that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agentinvolved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. Thedamages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesn’tapply since the guy is or above 18 years old already. Laperal vs. RepublicG.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962 Facts:Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads:1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the Cityof Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; shemarried Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decisionentered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamariavs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given adecree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision isnow final;3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, shenaturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R.Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many yearsnow;4. That in view of the fact that she has been legallyseparated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceasedto live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowedto change her name and/or be permitted to resume using hermaiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.Petitioner prayed she be allowed to

resume using her maidenname.Issue:Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maidenname of Elisea Laperal.Ruling: The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for thepetition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a changeof the name of herein petitioner. It is true that in the second decision whichreconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensivebusiness interests, the continued used of her husband surname may causeundue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of theconjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place,these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence,obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Llaneta vs. Agrava G.R. No. L-32504 May 15, 1974 Facts: Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married toSerafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relationswith another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita'sbirth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them livedwith Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raisedin the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all herdealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty yearsold, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon, where shewas born, as she was required to present it in connection with ascholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that shediscovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that sheis the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta,instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason,would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the courtfor change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.Issue:Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname basedon her alleged facts.Ruling: The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to TeresitaLlaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. The petitioner has established that shehas been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. Asudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta inorder to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result inconfusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entailendless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her newsurname. Lukban vs Republic FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry. HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”. She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted. HELD: Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.

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