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Persons and Family Relations Case digest

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1. Republic vs Cagandahan, GR no. 166676, 12 September 2008
Facts: The respondent’s petition was granted by the RTC on January 12, 2005. The following facts were
presented by the respondent to the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH, which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate. Such document testified respondent’s
claim.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling had been filed.
Issue: The issue raised in this petition is:
(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition
knows as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held: (1) No. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent. The court considered the unique circumstance in this case where nature had taken its course.
“As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.”
2. Silverio vs Republic, GR no. 174689, 22 October 2007
Facts: On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:
(a) “Petitioner filed to present petition… solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex”;
(b) “Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
(c) Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him.
(d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition as it would only grant the petitioner his much awaited happiness and the realization
of their (his fiance’) dreams.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On February
23, 2006, the CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition.
Issue: The issue raised in this petition is:
(1) Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed under
Articles 4007 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
Held: (1) No. It is not allowed. A person’s name cannot be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment. No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Statutes control petitions for change of
name. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of
equity. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority. Article 412 provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
The petition is DENIED.
3. Republic vs Albios, GR no. 198780, 16 October 2013
FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and
to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for
citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
HELD: The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test
for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the

bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.This standard was
modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention
to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to
rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for
the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely
because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a
nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in
the presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely givenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
4. Cosca vs Palaypayon, Jr., 237 SCRA
FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are
Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All
work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage
license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias
& Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya
& Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any

marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code
thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because
Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It
was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated
by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of
Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties
to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it
was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by
judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They
already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the
photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of
the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin
and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with
considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that
Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years
already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than
13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been
aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a
false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable.
5. Navarro vs Domagtoy, AM no. MTJ-06-088, 19 July 1996

Facts: The complainant submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by the respondent
with the following facts:
(a) On September 27, 1994, respondent solemnized wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife;
(b) On October 27, 1994, the respondent allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction. Such
wedding was solemnized at the respondent’s residence in municipality of Dapa, which does not fall
within the respondent’s jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos.
Respondent, in his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA):
(a) Seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Tagadan and Borga by
stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming that
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7) years.
(b) Maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate
Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states that “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1)
Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”; and that Article 8 thereof applies
to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. In the foregoing the other facts are present in relation to
the first marriage solemnized by the respondent as stated herein:
(a) The affidavit was not issued by the judge of Basey, Samar. It was, however, merely acknowledged
before him;
(b) The affiants stated in their affidavit that they knew Tagadan who was left by his wife, Ida Penaranda
and she has not returned nor been heard for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption
that she is already dead.
Issues: The issues are:
(1) Whether or not the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Penaranda’s presumptive
death and ample reason for the respondent to proceed with the marriage ceremony of Tagadan and Borga;
(2) Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the
respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.
Held: (1) No. The joint affidavit is not a sufficient proof of Penaranda’s presumptive death. Article 41 of
the Family Code expressly provides as quoted, “…the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death or the absentee…” Even if
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage.

(2) No. The solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was not within the respondent’s
court’s jurisdiction. He was not clothed to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. As such, there are only three instances, which the law provides, wherein a judge may solemnize a
marriage as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code:
(2.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(2.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party,
Gemma del Rosario.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
(Re: Sumaylo and Del Rosario - Under the Family Code, even if the solemnizing officer is not authorized,
the marriage would be valid if either or both parties believe in good faith in his authority to solemnize the
marriage.)
Respondent was ordered a suspension for a period of six (6) months.
6. Aranes vs Judge Occiano, AM no. MTJ-02-1390, 11 April 2002, 380 SCRA 402
Will a marriage solemnized before the issuance of amarriage license be rendered valid by the subsequent
issuance of said license? What is the liability of the solemnizing officer? These are the questions
answered in this case of Marita.
Marita was being courted by Arsenio, a retired Navy Official and pensionado who was very much older.
Arsenio had vast properties in their province but he was already sickly apparently because of his age.
Despite the age gap, Marita decided to accept the marriage proposal of Arsenio. And so on January 5,
2000, they filed their application for marriage license in the local Civil Registrar of their town. It was
stamped in the application that the license shall be issued intwo weeks time or on January 17, 2000.
However neither Arsenio nor Marita came back to claim it.
They just asked their mutual friend, Jaime to arrange the wedding and look for a judge who could
solemnize their marriage. So on February 15, 2000, Jaime requested Judge Matulungin, the judge of the
municipal trial court in another town, to solemnize the marriage of Marita and Arsenio on February 17,
2000. Jaime assured the judge that all the marriage documents were complete. So the judge agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala.
However, on February 17, 2000, Jaime informed Judge Matulungin that Arsenio had a difficulty walking
and could not stand the rigors of traveling from his residence to the municipality of the judge which was

twenty five kilometers away. Jaime then requested if the judge could solemnize the marriage in Arsenio’s
town, to which the judge acceded.
On the wedding day, the judge carefully examined the documents submitted to him before starting the
ceremony. When he discovered that there was nomarriage license yet, he refused to solemnize
the marriage and suggested it’s resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the foods and other provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Arsenio who just suffered a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity of the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it
would render the marriage void. The parties assured him that they would give the license that same
afternoon. But they failed to comply. The judge then followed it up with Jaime who promised to deliver it
to his sala.
Meantime, Marita and Arsenio started living together as husband and wife.But not long after, Arsenio
passed away. Marita tried to claim her right to inherit the vast properties of Arsenio as the surviving
spouse. But no record of theirmarriage could be found in the Civil Registrar General’s Office ( National
Statistics) nor in the local civil registrar of the municipality. So Marita did not inherit anything. She was
even deprived of receiving the pension of Arsenio. Out of rage, Marita filed an administrative complaint
against the judge, although she subsequently withdrew it after realizing that everything was due to her
fault and shortcomings. But despite such desistance, the judge was still found guilty by the Court
Administrator(CA) of solemnizing the marriage without a duly issuedmarriage license and for doing so
outside his jurisdiction.
Was the CA correct?
Yes.
The territorial jurisdiction of the judge is limited to the municipality where his sala is located. His act of
solemnizing the marriage in another municipality is contrary to law and subjects him
to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriageout of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage.
The judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisitemarriage license.
A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriagelicense is void, and the subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided
by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize
the marriage. Judge Matulungin did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
Marita and Arsenio. In this respect, he acted in gross ignorance of the law. For his actions, he should be
fined P 5,000.00 with a stern warning against a repetition of similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely. (Atty. Jose C. Sison, A Law Each Day, Philippine Star, March 17, 2004)
7. Engrace Ninal vs Norma Bayadog, GR no. 133778, 14 March 2000, 328 SCRA 122

Fact: Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfa’s death.
Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage license because they lived together for 5 years and
thus exempt from marriage license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car accident.
The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only occurs after the death of
an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a ‘petition for declaration for nullity of marriage’ (a.k.a.
declaration of nullity of void marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence of a
marriage license as a legal basis.
Issues: The lower court dismissed the petition because:
(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a ’cause of action’. Can there be such a petition
when the heirs’ parent is deceased?
(2) Are the heirs a ‘proper party’?
(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the beginning) is a must but is a
different matter. Void marriages cannot be attacked collaterally.
(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has prescribed.
The lower court ruled:
(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their father’s marriage before the
latter’s death.
(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding were used as a basis to
dismiss petitioner’s case.
Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that:
(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family Code. (In
determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was
contracted.)
(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The
exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not
the one described by the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty
months whereas the law requires five years. If the respondent took into consideration the other years and
months before the second marriage, then the cohabitation would include the period of the first marriage.
This is in violation of the law.
(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count cohabitation.
“This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.”

(4) The judge’s ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made identical is erroneous.
Void and voidable marriages are not identical.
“A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place.”
“A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while a void
marriage can never be ratified.”
“A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally.”
“Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.”
“The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes.”
“Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.“
“Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.”
(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before determining
succession rights.
“Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage.”
“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.”

*8. Manzano vs Sanchez, AM no. MTJ 00-1329, 8 March 2001; 354 SCRA 1
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married
on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22,
1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge
ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage
of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as
manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated
with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of
Family Code.
HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that
they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
9. Rep. vs Jose Dayot, GR no. 175581, 28 March 2008
FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that
his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

10. Office of the Court Administrator vs Judge Anatalio Necesario, et. Al., AM no. MTJ-07-1691, 02
April 2013
11. Republic vs Obercido, GR no. 154380, 5 October 2005
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking
par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis
City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along
their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States
– that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for
authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the
petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the
issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held: Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing
his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not
apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The
Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving

parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning
of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.
12. Bayot vs CA, Gr no. 155635 and Bayot vs Bayot, GR no. 163979, November 7, 2008
FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an
American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California,
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel.
DECISION OF COURTS:
(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic - ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint
custody and guardianship over Alix. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before
the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's
alleged psychological incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismisson, inter alia, the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application
for supportpendente lite
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
(3) CA: issued the desired TRO.
ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
RULING: (1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case. When Divorce Was Granted
Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One. From the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as,
a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other.

As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry
after completing the legal requirements."
The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be
this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen on February 22, 1996.
In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner
lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage.
13. Gerbert Corpuz vs Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas, GR no. 186571, 11 August 2010
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who
married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other
professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was
already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by
Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another
Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian
divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of
National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law
until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view
of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party
who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a
Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz
the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken
to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
*14. Minoru Fujiki vs Maria Paz Galela Marinay, et. al., GR no. 196049, 26 June 2013
15. De Castro vs De Castro, GR no. 160172, 13 February 2008
FACTS: Reinel and Annabelle met became a couple in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in
September 1994. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the wedding despite of absence of marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. They got married on the same day. However, they did not live
together as husband and wife. In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a daughter, and supported the
child on her own. Annabelle then filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the RTC Pasig. In
her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has a responsibility
or obligation to financially support her as his wife and their child. Reinel denied that they are married and
claimed that the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he
was only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy without marriage
may bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to
give her support.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage

license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.
16. Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, GR no. 119190, 16 January 1997
FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in
a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair
at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination
to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was
disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the
country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage
annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is
not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.
HELD:The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
17. Edward Kenneth Ngo vs Rowena Ong-Gutierrez Yu-Te, GR no. 161793, 13 February 2009
FACTS: Petitioner first met respondent in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in
their college. Initially, the two were not interested with each other. But they eventually developed a
certain level of closeness because they share the same trouble with their families.
On January 1996, Edward Kenneth decided to court Rowena. The same month, Rowena asked Edward
Kenneth to elope with her, to which Edward Kenneth refused because he is still young and jobless.
Eventually, the two decided to elope because of Rowena’s persistence. Edward Kenneth brought with him
P80,000 and they both left Manila and sailed off to Cebu that month.

The money soon disappeared and the two were forced to return to their respective homes on April 1996.
Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought them before a court and had them married, but without a marriage
license. Edward Kenneth then stayed with Rowena in her uncle’s home where he was treated as a
prisoner. He was prohibited from leaving the house unaccompanied and was frequently threatened by
Rowena and her uncle.
On May 1996, Edward Kenneth managed to escape to his parent’s home and he was hidden from
Rowena’s family. Edward Kenneth later contacted Rowena asking her to live with his parents instead.
Rowena argued that he should get his inheritance instead so they could live together separately or just
stay with her uncle. However, Edward Kenneth was already disinherited and upon knowing this, Rowena
suggested that they should just live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years, on January 18, 2000, Edward Kenneth filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage
to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. Rowena did not file an answer.
After investigation, the City Prosecutor cannot determine if there was collusion between the two parties,
thus the need to try the merits of the case. Expert opinion was sought and the psychologist subsequently
ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Edward and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both
parties’ un-readiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and
fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself. Both petitioner and respondent
are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as
each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
It was found that the petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. The trial court ruled
that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert psychologist. The OSG appealed and the CA ruled
in favor of the OSG.
The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable and that the clinical psychologist failed to examine the respondent,
relying only on the petitioner’s testimonies. Furthermore, the psychological incapacity was not attended
by the requirements established in the case of Republic v Court of Appeals and Molina: gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code.
HELD: Article 36 of the Family Code provides that “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
The SC ruled that admittedly it may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining
Psychological Incapacity as established in the landmark case of Molina. According to Justice Teodoro
Padilla, the principle to be followed is that “each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.” It is the law’s clear

intention that “courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.”
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
There is no requirement that for a person to be declared psychologically incapacitated that he be
personally examined by the physician as this could be proven if the totality of evidence is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. The presentation of expert proof by the psychologist
provides an in-depth and thorough assessment of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he
is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity
as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume
the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void
The SC then ruled that the marriage between the parties as null and void due to their individual
psychological disorders as evidenced by the expert opinion of the clinical psychologist.
18. Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes vs Ramon Reyes, GR no. 185286, August 18, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in
1972 when they were both 19 years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included
dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university student’s budget. At that
time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression
of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery
that respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976, petitioner and respondent got married. They
lived with Ramon’s parents and they were supported by them. They had a child which made their
financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro became
the breadwinner of the family. To make things worse, despite the fact that Socorro would undergo an
operation for removal of a cyst, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the
newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into
the operating room. They tried to attend counseling sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996,

petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. RTC granted the petition. CA
reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ramon is psychologically incapacitated
HELD: Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent,
or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence. In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2)
extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6)
inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
19. Lester Benjamin Halili vs Chona Santos-Halili, GR no. 165424, Juner 9, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a “joke.”
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing
respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to
stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he
found out that the marriage was not “fake.” Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a
mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed
by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioner’s personality disorder
was serious and incurable. CA reversed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N he is psychologically incapacitated
HELD: The testimony of petitioner’s expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder. In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality
disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on
them for decisions. Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt
confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. Dr. Dayan
further observed that petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating
attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him. This could be seen in
the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots
and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father. When petitioner could no longer take
respondent’s domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her
outright that he wanted to end their marriage. It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause.
20. Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne Reyes, GR no. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS: Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on
December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take
her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He

attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997
Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING: Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological
and corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded
to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently
lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified
that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological
incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not
of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remains unchanged.
21. Dedel vs CA, GR no. 151867, 29 January 2004
*22. Valerio Kalaw vs Ma. Elena Fernandez, GR no. 166357, 14 January 2015
23. Azcueta vs Republic of the Philippines and CA, GR no. 180668, 26 May 2009
*24. Juan de Dios Carlos vs Felicidad Sandoval, GR no. 135830, 30 September 2005
25. Valdes vs RTC, 260 SCRA 221
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are
free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a
joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
*26. Apiag vs Cantero, 268 SCRA 61
27. Mercado vs Tan, GR no. 13711, 1 August 2000
FACTS: Vincent G. Mercado, while still being married to Thelma Oliva, contracted another marriage
with Ma. Consuelo Tan.
Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and one month after the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Oliva. The RTC decision declared the marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage.
RULING: Yes.

Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage, as follows: "Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous, , marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."
A declaration of nullity of marriage is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent
that declaration, one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. Such declaration is also necessary
even if the earlier marriage is characterized by statute "void."
In the case at bar, Mercado was already married to Tan but did not file a declaration of nullity of marriage
with Oliva until Tan filed bigamy case. The crime had already been consummated by then. To file a
petition to have his first marriage void after Tan charged him with bigamy is not a defense in a bigamy
charge.
*28. Te vs CA, GR no. 126746, 29 November 2000
29. Carino vs Carino, GR no. 132529, 2 February 2001
G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on Coownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships; Article
40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their
almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as
"death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She
however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING: No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased is
void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual
joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence,
they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no

right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence
of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not
contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share onehalf of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of
the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without
the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
30. Morigo vs People, GR no. 145226, 6 February 2004
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts
when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant
communication took place between them. They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed
with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before
his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage
contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted
his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
*31. Tenebro vs CA, GR no. 150758, 423 SCRA 272
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes
on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third

marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage
with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second
marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot
be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.
Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void,
constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of
psychological incapacity—void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity. The complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void
ab initio and legally inexistent can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy. Strong reservation
on the ruling that bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is
contracted before th judicial declaration of its nullity). Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of
marriage. Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being a
mental state may not be so readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void
*32. Abunado vs People of the Philippines, 30 March 2004
In 1967, Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for Japan to work there.
She returned in 1992 but Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left the family home. Arceño was able
to locate Abunado but when she did, Abunado was already cohabiting with somebody else.
Further, Arceño also discovered that in 1989, Abunado married a certain Zenaida Biñas.
In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. In May 1995, Arceño filed a bigamy
case against Abunado. Both cases proceeded simultaneously and independently in different courts.
In 1999, the marriage between Arceño and Abunado was annulled. In 2001, Abunado was convicted by
the trial court for bigamy.
Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that the annulment case he
filed against Arceño was a prejudicial question to the bigamy case filed against him by Arceño.

Hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the
annulment case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.
HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present – the nullity of
the prior marriage is immaterial.
33. Antone vs Beronilla, GR no. 183824, 08 December 2010
DOCTRINE: As reiterated in a long line of cases, Article 40 of the Family Code has been established as
a new provision expressly requiring judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage for purposes of
remarriage. Therefore, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of
nullity is guilty of bigamy.
FACTS: Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,filed in March 2007, that she and Leo were
married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The
prosecution filed the Information in the Regional Trial Court(RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash theInformation on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offensebecause his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void
as of April 2007 and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that since the marriage had
been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriageto speak of. Thus,
absent the first marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. The
prosecution argued that the marriage ofMyrna and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his
second marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the
firstmarriage null and void on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v. People. Similarly, theCourt of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after contracting the
subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD: Yes.

RULING: Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of People v. Mendoza(under
the Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initiomarriage will not prosper
because there is no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid; and (b)
a marriage declared void ab initiohas retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first
valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy complete.
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because,
by then the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a
subsequent marriageabsent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is guilty of
bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different. InMercado, the
first marriage was actually solemnized, although later declared voidab initio. While in Mendoza,
no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred
was a mere signing of amarriage contract through a private act. Thus, there is no need to secure a judicial
declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigo is not
applicable to this case.
34. Re: Complaint of Salvador against Noel and Serafico, AM no. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010

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