Tañada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Issue: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. Held: Yes. Art. 2 of the New Civil Code states that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided”. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” does not mean that the publication requirement before laws take effect can be waived. It simply meant that the period it simply meant that the 15-day period may be reduced or extended. FACTS:
People of the Phils. vs. Que Po Lay 94 Phil 640 The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties. HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquits the appellant.
Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 FACTS: FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy.
D.M. Consunji vs. CA 357 SCRA 249 Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000. ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission.
Miciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil 867 FACTS: FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance contending that Turkish law should be applied in the administration of the estate of Joseph Brimo for he is a Turkish citizen. ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine law can be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estate. HELD: Though the the will of Joseph Brimo expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is the proper party to file an adultery case against the petitioner. HELD: No. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Thus, as the private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner he has no legal standing to commence the adultery case against the petitioner.
Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by a former Filipino in Australia can be recognized under the Philippine law. HELD: Yes. Art. 26 (2) of the Family Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who are both Filipinos at the time of the celebration of marriage but later on becomes naturalized citizens and obtains a divorce decree. However, the party pleading it, must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence.
Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes GR No. 154259 FACTS: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart and invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager. According to Mr. Reyes while he lined up at the buffet table Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to stepout the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms. Ruby Lim admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. And that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party. During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. HELD: No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Spouses Quisumbing vs. MERALCO GR No. 142943 FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages under Art. 20 of the Civil Code. HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present. Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon Lorna’s testimony.
UE vs. Jader 327 scra 804 FACTS: Petitioner was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law. He failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff’s name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies to which he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar examination because his academic requirements is not complete. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit. ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. HELD: The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals 219 scra 115 Facts: On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino, a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen, and is an exchange student. The latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change, he maltreated and threatened to kill her. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it. Cui vs. Arellano University 112 Phil 135 FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: Yes. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. The act in question, asking a student to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.
Pe vs. Pe 5 SCRA 200 FACTS: Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other. Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair. HELD: HELD: Yes. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Tenchavez vs. Escano 15 SCRA 355 FACTS: Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. Vicenta continued living with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband. ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta Escano is liable for damages under Art. 26 of the Civil Code. Yes. The Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA 133 SCRA 179 FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr. Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil under Art. 26 Par (1) of the Civil Code. HELD: Yes. St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification". When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgment for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.
Spouses Yu vs. PCIB GR No. 147902 FACTS: Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan. As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998. Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession. ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. HELD: Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.
Donato vs. Luna GR No. 53642 FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question. HELD: Petitioner cannot apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Quimiguing vs. Icao 34 SCRA 132 FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga Del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”. ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceived child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born. Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Geluz vs. CA 2 SCRA 801 FACTS: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion. ISSUE: Whether a husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same. HELD: Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
De Jesus vs. Syquia 58 Phil 866 FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor, he even wrote a letter to a reverend father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. ISSUE: Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status”.