Persons

Published on December 2016 | Categories: Documents | Downloads: 35 | Comments: 0 | Views: 505
of 35
Download PDF   Embed   Report

persons and persons and persons and persons and persons

Comments

Content

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights arising from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3 Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and"Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."6 On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same. On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondent’s submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order. SO ORDERED.13 The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same. Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint. Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers’ "acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers’ violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable. The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? (2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action? (3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping? (4) May petitioner be held liable for damages? On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.15 An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.17 Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section

39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus – Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. xxxx Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of his superior. In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code. A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.19 A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.20 The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.21 Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court: Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines. The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from

negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.23 In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that: There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs. Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxxx (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; xxxx (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; xxxx The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows: "DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another person’s constitutional rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons: "The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the

main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. "Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one’s duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights."25 The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.26 Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.28 There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful.29 Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.30 The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties. In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors. On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned. Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the

Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights. The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the secretary’s certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the defect of respondent’s complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.33 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTEDto continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch. With costs. SO ORDERED. Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, JJ., concur. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney‟s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff‟s constitutional rights.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner in the following manner:[3] “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering them, jointly and severally the following: ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete payment thereof; 2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete payment thereof; 3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until complete payment thereof; 11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts. ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following: 1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); 2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); 3. To pay attorney‟s fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); 4. To pay the costs of suit. The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.” In a Resolution[4] dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioner‟s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The following is the Court of Appeals‟ undisputed narration of the facts: “Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms which are itemized as follows: Date Place Stake Horse Winner Racewinning 30% Due Training Net Amount Withheld by Grooms 03/25/86 1st 06/08/86 2nd 07/10/86 1st 02/01/87 1st 03/22/87 1st Hansuyen Stronghold Kahala Devil's Brew Time to Explode 200,000.00 40,000.00 200,000.00 100,000.00 200,000.00 57,000.00 12,000.00 57,300.00 30,000.00 60,000.00 143,000.00 28,000.00 142,700.00 70,000.00 140,000.00 PCSO

Prize Claims

04/26/87 3rd 05/17/87 1st 08/09/87 1st 12/13/87 2nd 09/18/88 1st

Stormy Petril Starring Role Star Studded Charade Hair Trigger TOTAL

40,000.00 20,000.00 200,000.00 250,000.00 200,000.00 1,450,000.00

12,000.00 6,000.00 60,000.00 75,000.00 60,000.00 429,300.00

28,000.00 14,000.00 140,000.00 174,000.00 140,000.00 1,020,700.00

[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits „A,‟ dated July 3, 1986; „B‟ dated August 18, 1986; and „C,‟ dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the collection of the prizes due him. And [herein private respondents] consistently replied (Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January 30, 1991, this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the summons on February 7, 1991, Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that „it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings‟ (Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by [Private Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.].”[5] As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioner‟s counsel, refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman, Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). It held that it was Carrascoso‟s unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previous longtime associate of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware that petitioner‟s winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family.[6] It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner‟s claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney‟s fees and costs of suit. While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appeal of the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed no objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court issued on February 14, 1992, an Order[7] for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount of P1,020,700. Accordingly, on May 20, 1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors:[8] “I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE[„S] PRIZE[S]; II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY‟S FEES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.”

In reversing the trial court‟s finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained:[9] “xxx Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.” The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner‟s demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGG‟s instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGG‟s subsequent advice to release petitioner‟s winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court finally disposed as follows:[10] “IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.” On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on March 7, 1995. Hence, this petition.[11]

Issues

Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues: “a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO); “b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief; “c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents; “d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law.”[12] Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

First and Second Issues: Effect of PCSO’s Appeal Brief

Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals should have been dismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of action: (1) a judgment againstboth PCSO and Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment against Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney‟s fees and costs. The PCSO, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second item: “the impropriety of the award of damages xxx.” This appealed portion, however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO. Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO could not have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled against Carrascoso only, and not against the government corporation.

Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his appeal should have been dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was no longer chairman of that office at the time the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the OGCC. On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholding of petitioner‟s racehorse winnings by Respondent Carrascoso occurred during the latter‟s incumbency as PCSO chairman. According to him, he had honestly believed that it was within the scope of his authority not to release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C. Aquino‟s Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), in which she decreed the following: “(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation; “(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation, under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law.” Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGG as to the nature of the subject racehorse winnings, and he was told that they were part of petitioner‟s sequestered properties. Under these circumstances and in his belief that said winnings were fruits of petitioner‟s ill-gotten properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The chairman of the PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to order the withholding of prize winnings. The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to “act as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset corporations and xxx [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be provided by law.”[13] The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the latter, under its charter,[14] is a government-owned corporation. The government counsel‟s representation extends to the concerned government functionary‟s officers when the issue involves the latter‟s official acts or duties.[15] Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to the legal services of the government corporate counsel, this development does not automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of appeal of the trial court‟s Decision. The filing of an appellant‟s brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[16] Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, at its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction.[17] The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[18] What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him on appeal,[19] had filed an appeal brief on his behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before the Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another counsel and to file his own brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of procedure. The former counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance with the client‟s consent, and the newly appointed attorney should formally enter his appearance before the appellate court with notice to the adverse party.[20] But other than Carrascoso‟s manifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a change of counsel were not fully complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an effective change of attorney will not abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the former counsel. All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not dismissing the appeal, since this matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such discretion was exercised reasonably in accordance with the doctrine that cases should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits.

Third Issue: Scope of the Appeal Before Respondent Court

Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment was not appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals. The errors assigned in the appellants‟ Brief, as quoted earlier, attacked only the trial court‟s (1) conclusion that “defendants-appellants acted in bad faith” and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only those parts relating to the second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.

Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its entirety and dismiss the original Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the Decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case.[21]The appellate court has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the court‟s jurisdiction over the subject matter and those that are plain or clerical errors.[22] Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively recognized the confines of the appeal, as it stated at the outset that “this appeal shall be limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other than the claims for race winning prizes.”[23] The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together with the aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Court‟s review. Consequently, what the assailed Decision “reversed and set aside” was only that part of the appealed judgment finding bad faith on the part of herein Private Respondent Carrascoso and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the trial court‟s order for Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order had never been assigned as an error sought to be corrected. On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the payment, as it so manifested before the trial court[24] in answer to Petitioner Cojuangco‟s Motion[25] for the partial execution of the judgment. In fact, on May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of P1,020,700 in accordance with the writ of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992.[26]Obviously and plainly, the RTC judgment, insofar as it related to the first cause of action, had become final and no longer subject to appeal. In any event, the Court of Appeals‟ discussion regarding the indispensability of the PCGG as a partylitigant to the instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial court Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-joinder of the PCGG made the Complaint vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very ground, or at least one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not have legally done so anyway, because the PCGG‟s role in the controversy, if any, had never been an issue before the trial court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court a quo.[27] The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the previous paragraphs relating to Respondent Carrascoso‟s good faith which, the appellate court surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGG‟s statements that the subject prize winnings of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other words, Respondent Court‟s view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint dismissible was a mere aside that did not prejudice petitioner.

Fourth Issue: Damages

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court‟s finding that Respondent Carrascoso acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.[28] We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court‟s conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval:[29] “A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga, then Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit „1‟) the first prize for the March 16, 1986 draw and the second prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being withheld to „avoid any possible violation of your sequestration order on the matter‟ because while he is aware of the sequestration order issued against the properties of defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and coverage thereof. It was for that reason that, in the same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a clarification whether the prizes are covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper disposal of the two (2) prizes taking into account the shares of the trainer and the groom. “Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz authorized the payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the amounts due plaintiff Eduardo Cojuangco. This piece of evidence should be understood and appreciated in the light of the circumstances

prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a newly born legal creation and „sequestration‟ was a novel remedy which even legal luminaries were not sure as to the actual procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers of the said newly created office should be exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly implemented without violating due process of law. To the mind of their newly installed power, the immediate concern is to take over and freeze all properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies. There is no denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President. Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on plaintiff but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him. xxx xxx xxx

“Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof, interposed no objection to the execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off all the winnings due the plaintiff. xxx” Carrascoso‟s decision to withhold petitioner‟s winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner.[30] He had acted upon the PCGG‟s statement that the subject prizes were part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction “to hold in a proper bank deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco.”[31] Besides, EO 2 had just been issued by then President Aquino, “freez[ing] all assets and properties in the Philippines [of] former President Marcos and/or his wife, xxx their close friends, subordinates, business associates, xxx”; and enjoining the “transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation [thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law.” It cannot, therefore, be said that Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith. The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.[32] Attorney‟s fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.[33] The trial court‟s award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial court that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; xxx xxx In Aberca v. Ver,
[34]

xxx

this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as follows:

“It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield -- borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee -- to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. „Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him

who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls.‟”[35] Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.[36] To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one‟s duties.[37] We hold that petitioner‟s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG‟s instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.[38] The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.[39] The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded.[40] The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken into account.[41] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Romero, J., on official business abroad. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney‟s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff‟s constitutional rights.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner in the following manner:[3] “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering them, jointly and severally the following: ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete payment thereof; 2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete payment thereof; 3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete payment thereof; 10. 11. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until complete payment thereof; All income derived from the foregoing amounts.

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following: 1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); 2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00); 3. To pay attorney‟s fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); 4. To pay the costs of suit. The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.” In a Resolution[4] dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioner‟s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The following is the Court of Appeals‟ undisputed narration of the facts: “Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms which are itemized as follows: Date Place Stake Horse Winner Racewinning 30% Due Training Net Amount Withheld by Grooms 03/25/86 1st 06/08/86 2nd 07/10/86 1st 02/01/87 1st 03/22/87 1st Hansuyen Stronghold Kahala Devil's Brew Time to Explode 200,000.00 40,000.00 200,000.00 100,000.00 200,000.00 57,000.00 12,000.00 57,300.00 30,000.00 60,000.00 143,000.00 28,000.00 142,700.00 70,000.00 140,000.00 PCSO

Prize Claims

04/26/87 3rd 05/17/87 1st 08/09/87 1st 12/13/87 2nd 09/18/88 1st

Stormy Petril Starring Role Star Studded Charade Hair Trigger TOTAL

40,000.00 20,000.00 200,000.00 250,000.00 200,000.00 1,450,000.00

12,000.00 6,000.00 60,000.00 75,000.00 60,000.00 429,300.00

28,000.00 14,000.00 140,000.00 174,000.00 140,000.00 1,020,700.00

[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits „A,‟ dated July 3, 1986; „B‟ dated August 18, 1986; and „C,‟ dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the collection of the prizes due him. And [herein private respondents] consistently replied (Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January 30, 1991, this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the summons on February 7, 1991, Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that „it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings‟ (Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by [Private Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.].”[5] As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioner‟s counsel, refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman, Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). It held that it was Carrascoso‟s unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previous longtime associate of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware that petitioner‟s winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family.[6] It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner‟s claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney‟s fees and costs of suit. While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appeal of the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed no objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court issued on February 14, 1992, an Order[7] for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount of P1,020,700. Accordingly, on May 20, 1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors:[8] “I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE[„S] PRIZE[S]; II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY‟S FEES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.”

In reversing the trial court‟s finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained:[9] “xxx Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.” The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner‟s demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGG‟s instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGG‟s subsequent advice to release petitioner‟s winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court finally disposed as follows:[10] “IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.” On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on March 7, 1995. Hence, this petition.[11]

Issues

Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues: “a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO); “b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief; “c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents; “d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law.”[12] Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

First and Second Issues: Effect of PCSO’s Appeal Brief

Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals should have been dismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of action: (1) a judgment againstboth PCSO and Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment against Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney‟s fees and costs. The PCSO, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second item: “the impropriety of the award of damages xxx.” This appealed portion, however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO. Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO could not have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled against Carrascoso only, and not against the government corporation.

Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his appeal should have been dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was no longer chairman of that office at the time the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the OGCC. On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholding of petitioner‟s racehorse winnings by Respondent Carrascoso occurred during the latter‟s incumbency as PCSO chairman. According to him, he had honestly believed that it was within the scope of his authority not to release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C. Aquino‟s Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), in which she decreed the following: “(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation; “(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation, under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law.” Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGG as to the nature of the subject racehorse winnings, and he was told that they were part of petitioner‟s sequestered properties. Under these circumstances and in his belief that said winnings were fruits of petitioner‟s ill-gotten properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The chairman of the PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to order the withholding of prize winnings. The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to “act as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset corporations and xxx [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be provided by law.”[13] The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the latter, under its charter,[14] is a government-owned corporation. The government counsel‟s representation extends to the concerned government functionary‟s officers when the issue involves the latter‟s official acts or duties.[15] Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to the legal services of the government corporate counsel, this development does not automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of appeal of the trial court‟s Decision. The filing of an appellant‟s brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[16] Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, at its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction.[17] The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[18] What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him on appeal,[19] had filed an appeal brief on his behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before the Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another counsel and to file his own brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of procedure. The former counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance with the client‟s consent, and the newly appointed attorney should formally enter his appearance before the appellate court with notice to the adverse party.[20] But other than Carrascoso‟s manifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a change of counsel were not fully complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an effective change of attorney will not abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the former counsel. All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not dismissing the appeal, since this matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such discretion was exercised reasonably in accordance with the doctrine that cases should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits.

Third Issue: Scope of the Appeal Before Respondent Court

Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment was not appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals. The errors assigned in the appellants‟ Brief, as quoted earlier, attacked only the trial court‟s (1) conclusion that “defendants-appellants acted in bad faith” and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only those parts relating to the second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.

Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its entirety and dismiss the original Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the Decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case.[21]The appellate court has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the court‟s jurisdiction over the subject matter and those that are plain or clerical errors.[22] Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively recognized the confines of the appeal, as it stated at the outset that “this appeal shall be limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other than the claims for race winning prizes.”[23] The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together with the aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Court‟s review. Consequently, what the assailed Decision “reversed and set aside” was only that part of the appealed judgment finding bad faith on the part of herein Private Respondent Carrascoso and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the trial court‟s order for Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order had never been assigned as an error sought to be corrected. On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the payment, as it so manifested before the trial court[24] in answer to Petitioner Cojuangco‟s Motion[25] for the partial execution of the judgment. In fact, on May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of P1,020,700 in accordance with the writ of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992.[26]Obviously and plainly, the RTC judgment, insofar as it related to the first cause of action, had become final and no longer subject to appeal. In any event, the Court of Appeals‟ discussion regarding the indispensability of the PCGG as a partylitigant to the instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial court Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-joinder of the PCGG made the Complaint vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very ground, or at least one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not have legally done so anyway, because the PCGG‟s role in the controversy, if any, had never been an issue before the trial court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court a quo.[27] The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the previous paragraphs relating to Respondent Carrascoso‟s good faith which, the appellate court surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGG‟s statements that the subject prize winnings of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other words, Respondent Court‟s view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint dismissible was a mere aside that did not prejudice petitioner.

Fourth Issue: Damages

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court‟s finding that Respondent Carrascoso acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.[28] We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court‟s conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval:[29] “A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga, then Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit „1‟) the first prize for the March 16, 1986 draw and the second prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being withheld to „avoid any possible violation of your sequestration order on the matter‟ because while he is aware of the sequestration order issued against the properties of defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and coverage thereof. It was for that reason that, in the same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a clarification whether the prizes are covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper disposal of the two (2) prizes taking into account the shares of the trainer and the groom. “Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz authorized the payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the amounts due plaintiff Eduardo Cojuangco. This piece of evidence should be understood and appreciated in the light of the circumstances

prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a newly born legal creation and „sequestration‟ was a novel remedy which even legal luminaries were not sure as to the actual procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers of the said newly created office should be exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly implemented without violating due process of law. To the mind of their newly installed power, the immediate concern is to take over and freeze all properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies. There is no denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President. Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on plaintiff but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him. xxx xxx xxx

“Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof, interposed no objection to the execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off all the winnings due the plaintiff. xxx” Carrascoso‟s decision to withhold petitioner‟s winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner.[30] He had acted upon the PCGG‟s statement that the subject prizes were part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction “to hold in a proper bank deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco.”[31] Besides, EO 2 had just been issued by then President Aquino, “freez[ing] all assets and properties in the Philippines [of] former President Marcos and/or his wife, xxx their close friends, subordinates, business associates, xxx”; and enjoining the “transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation [thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law.” It cannot, therefore, be said that Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith. The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.[32] Attorney‟s fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.[33] The trial court‟s award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial court that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; xxx xxx In Aberca v. Ver,
[34]

xxx

this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as follows:

“It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield -- borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee -- to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. „Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him

who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls.‟”[35] Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.[36] To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one‟s duties.[37] We hold that petitioner‟s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG‟s instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.[38] The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.[39] The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded.[40] The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken into account.[41] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Romero, J., on official business abroad.

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents. Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. Jose G. Advincula for respondents. BOCOBO, J.: This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo. At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found: ... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact

it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10: ... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law. The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus: ... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee. The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain. Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows: CIVIL CODE ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. xxx xxx xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book. xxx xxx xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with them. Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties. The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable. Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid. REVISED PENAL CODE ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. xxx xxx xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed." It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa." The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 19020910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana. Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito under the Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern. 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage. 3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.) Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says: El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta." The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor." Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513): Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion. Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian. Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o

falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles. Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada. As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should beres judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpasurrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity. Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences. Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to theobligation, before the civil courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the nonexistence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata. Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code: The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.) Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes: Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible. Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.

Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743: Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder." That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible." Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee. One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying: Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa. Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of

fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.) It will be noted, as to the case just cited: First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer. Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages. Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. (See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.) In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly andfraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying: Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases: Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda

en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa. Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles: Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.) The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court. In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held: It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer. This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads: "A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. "SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. xxx xxx xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties. xxx xxx xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage." As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject. An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right. Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines. The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of

pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part: If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred. It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-yearold child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part: Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one

could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said: As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear. The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus: Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says: "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage." From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability. This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that: The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.

Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held: The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.) In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526): The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability. It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code. Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying: With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence. xxx xxx xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy. Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court held: In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code. The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code. In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action. The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed. The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code. The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations. Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles. Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.

Sponsor Documents

Or use your account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Forgot your password?

Or register your new account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Lost your password? Please enter your email address. You will receive a link to create a new password.

Back to log-in

Close