Psych Incapacity

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30,
1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10,
1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at
the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).
2
Three children
were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),
3
Lyra, born on May 22,
1985
(Exh. C),
4
and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).
5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of
the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that,
because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a
sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible,
immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the
total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that
she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.
6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court issued
an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there
was collusion between the
parties.
7
Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the
prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.
8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:
9

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas,
Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of
teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two
consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer
private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees,
while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from
petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented
her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice
and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would
help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband
was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had
smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of
their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private
respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia.
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with
Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his
part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he
left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came
back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving
their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds
Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was
employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered
by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for
the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire
amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships
with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was
an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master
Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth
Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh.
E).
10
When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her
up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in
Dasmariñas, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).
11

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the
latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner.
They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite
from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).
12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest
child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he
was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)
13
with F & C Realty Corporation
whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I
in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987,
after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a
deed of absolute sale(Exh. K)
14
was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)
15
was
duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
letter
16
to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their
marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their
owner-type jeepney
17
and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner
also told private respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had
already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private
respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been
unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University,
testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she
was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed
private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November
1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding,
Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought
private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough,
although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter
that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro
corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on
relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed
that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the
first year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her
of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children
and that he had abandoned petitioner.
18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
19
dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
20

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the
petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated"
to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of
legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) — not as grounds for a declaration of
nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as
follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage,
has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such
incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal
separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner
under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no
dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred
sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was
celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law
should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a
careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this
ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of
petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in
the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,
21
the Court of
Appeals held:
22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of
the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment,
gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological
incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her
respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their
marriage her respondent-husband's character was on the "borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-
appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who,
herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-
appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a
normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the
marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred —
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF
THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE
THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY
PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private
respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She
argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
23

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
24
we held:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality,
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that
at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in
fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that
private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved
that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage,
private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's parents and
petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he
availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he
received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did
not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and
later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable,
causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As
pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v.
Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The
Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.
26
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
27

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even
finality.
28
Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can
these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions
on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the
declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.









epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and
ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.
Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita,
Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988.
Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity.
The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family
Code.
1
Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage
and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition.
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January
1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which
incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only
thereafter."
2
Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars
which the trial court granted.
3
Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that —
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that
she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession —
that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so
that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother,
whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill
of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment
of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be
inferred . . . ."
4
But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order
upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we referred her
petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition thus —
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salita’s alleged
psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars . . .
In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules’ requirement
that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of
action. To require more details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salita’s
particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place
and person’ indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for
information on evidentiary matters. To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail
herself of the different modes of discovery provided by the Rules of Court
(Rules 24 to 28).
Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of particulars constitute psychological
incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is a question that may be
resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the merits of the case, not in a motion
for bill of particulars. And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present
petition.
5

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita questioning the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals denying due course to her petition.
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an
averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not
able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s
cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or
behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for
information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and
intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute
the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as —
. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary
right and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to
principal, determinate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of action
rests.
6

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or
allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural
reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the
issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of
action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence
which will be required to prove the existence of those facts . . .
7

Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and evidentiary matters need not be
stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only to such
operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief against the
wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law, inferences
and arguments need not be stated."
8

In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent
is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial.
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of
action."
9
Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will
support."
10
As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established." It refers to
"the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the
complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action.
11
A motion
for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint
upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means.
12

We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by private
respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private
respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already
been adequately apprised of private respondent’s cause of action against her thus —
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the
demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine —
upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his
job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was
unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his time and efforts
. . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for
information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts.
13
For sure,
the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be
evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.
14

We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic
15
where we said —
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification
purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in
the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order
that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to
the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling involves alleged
"misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail,
bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of
power." The respondents therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages. There, the alleged illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other
hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each
and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have to prove his
case, but that will not come until trial begins.
Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the annulment
proceeding which have already been delayed for more than two years now, even before it could
reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately
determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging
the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed
blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.
A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code.
16
We do not see the need to define or limit the scope of the
provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so, the actual controversy
being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture would be to
give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that petitioner in her memorandum has
demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice
Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee
that drafted the Family code, explains —
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
17

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.







Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J .:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"),
brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo
1
and the Court of Appeal,
2
Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby
boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound
to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible
and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by
the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him,
for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated
to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A
wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of
five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however,
provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious
than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7)
be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack
of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance
of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.
Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa
added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there
are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and
there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological
or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one
does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground
for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood
the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in
consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately,
consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally
a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of
vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is
always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should
be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true
that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation
should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity,
there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground
of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.
5

xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with
respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can
also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity"
is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show
that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages,
it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry.
6

xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in
other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which
are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers
to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not
to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of
debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special
case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological
incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law.
On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio
were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within
which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion.
7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee,
has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:
8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
9
which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,
10
giving an account on how the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . .
. (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal
terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is
due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability
to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy
11
cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in
the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage
and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity."
Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare
marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and
lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in
the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
— exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case,
finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
3
Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church
4
in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986
the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals;
and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born
on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of
Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She
also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied
5
heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how
he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing
and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals
6
this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
7
Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it
is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
8

COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,
9
Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno,
10
a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family,
11
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code
12
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
thepermanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
13
nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law
on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.













Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should
be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the July 24, 1998 Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby
declared valid."
[2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant
to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of
the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their
custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City
where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the
Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their
marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under
the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from
the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she
as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would
leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she
was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to
put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted
him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in
her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit
in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."
[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations
of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or
as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to
show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was
not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the
appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was]
grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."
[4]

Hence, this Petition.
[5]

Issues

In her Memorandum,
[6]
petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."
[7]

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent
is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the
evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not
have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those
tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she
had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological
capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,
[8]
the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code
[9]
were laid down by this Court
as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
x x x x x x x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
x x x x x x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
[10]

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
[11]
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case --
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker
-- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
[12]
At
best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed
them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.






Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
MOISES R. AVERA,respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J .:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against
petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J
alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina
dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23
1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he
had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him
about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care
of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the
same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of
no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man
with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals,
145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the
second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first
marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the
second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit
terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316,
326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only
after trial on the merits.
1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS
2
and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September
11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals
3
dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
v. CA
4
cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent
distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of
the status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first
marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits,
the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition
and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held
that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it
noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss
is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with
the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
5

Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon
6
and People v. Mendoza,
7
contends that SP. No.
1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own
interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J
contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity
of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation
and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it
is from the beginning.
8
Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
9

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where
the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on
these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would
be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . .
10

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the
same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana,
11
the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of
the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration
of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,
12
however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during
the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
13
the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense.
14
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
15

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
16
which drafted what
is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne
out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but
also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as
follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself
whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,
however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments,
even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this
matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed
valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed.
Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand
since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they
are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well
as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that
there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members
affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral
attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on
the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of
the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability
is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same
proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice
Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be
invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve
the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters
into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of
a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.
18

Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration
of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case
of Terre v. Terre.
19
The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged
with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that
"for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits
that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this
purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely."
As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why
should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."
20
In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life."
21
So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ."
22
As a matter
of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts,
and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be
contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code
to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and
where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled."
23

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the
petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely"
was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of
"only," which the Committee approved.
24
(Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery
of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the
issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."
25
Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked
by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted
in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
(n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)
26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property
will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated
February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.












Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01
July 2003, reversing the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City,
dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at
civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that
they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they
named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel
filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita.
He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly
parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables,
chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard
at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she
would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give
him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage,
rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and
appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and
incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the
emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his
turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could
be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel
who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy
childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,
3
the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and
elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his
marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.
4
The early years of their
marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his
parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental
5
to him and his parents.
6
She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became
the common source of their quarrels.
7
He, however, characterized their union as happy during that
period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.
8
In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it
was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart.
9
He then narrated incidents during
their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife
quarreled with an elderly neighbor;
10
when she would visit him in his office and remark that the
curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a
ballpen from his table;
11
when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was
away;
12
when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair
with him;
13
and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.
14
Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not
able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack
of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish
priest.
15
Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer
16
or that he had a
mistress.
17
Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.
18

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom
went to respondent Manuel’s office.
19
But when she was there, she would call witness to complain
about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.
20
One time, witness remembered petitioner
Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his address book while the latter
was in Subic attending a conference.
21
When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she
called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondent’s hotel
room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the
town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer.
On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner
Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa
labas?"
22

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional
qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.
23
From her psychiatric
evaluation,
24
Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to
the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to
sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of
both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication
pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to
use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be
derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes
use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine
ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental
effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who
display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed
to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and
feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply
with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits,
which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with
code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will
tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.
25

In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations. She insisted that they
were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs
26
which he had admitted to her.
27
Petitioner
Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.
28
She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up
for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the
present case, she would still attend to his needs.
29
She remembered that after the pre-trial, while
they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.
30

DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel,
31
testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of
which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent
Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a
mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is
respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also
found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore
capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.
32

CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the
ideal couple, sweet to each other.
33
The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the
community.
34
Both were likewise leaders in their community.
35
Witness then stated that she would
often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel
there.
36

On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in
evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest
with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless
arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the early 90’s when the defendant-wife
started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
x x x x x x x x x
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs
of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have
succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her
husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a
mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.
37

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.
38

On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the
case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.
39
Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff
Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and
defendant. That is – a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it
is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
"amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no
less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to
have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of
defendant but also of himself.
40

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON
MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL
AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag
41
is apropos. There, we held that whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage
depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged
according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court
of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in
its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing
the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March
1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the
reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a
case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways,
who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is
wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case
against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals
42
where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
43
In Republic v. Court of Appeals
44
we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
45

With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition
of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
46
With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals
47
that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s
own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a
liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I
believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with
his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the
car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the
problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically
incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a
new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right.
Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."
48

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was
not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.
49
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
50
It must be shown
that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes
him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state
51
and not merely
due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel
has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular
point."
52

B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack
of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling
nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.
53
In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was
admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.
54

The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not
help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of
petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law
– but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted
their son to enter the priesthood,
55
her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him,
56
and her
inability to conceive.
57
Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier
and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by
respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.
58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into
the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a
way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
59
As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
60

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be
experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual problem.
61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.












Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision
1
dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals
2
affirming the decision
3
dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch
72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One
month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given
address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August
1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the
motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial
court granted respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED.
4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial
court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations
as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible
and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of
the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child
which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to
respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.
5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the
celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to
no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court
rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer
in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even
helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?
7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina
8
and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.
9
In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos
while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure
to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.
10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did
not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance
with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
11
Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
13
(emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."
14
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but
he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.
16
There was no showing
that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.
17
There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because
the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,
19
this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the
State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to
her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J .:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals
1
its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There
was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he
claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and
if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has
an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."
2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into
by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been
only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation
of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).
4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.
5
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988
to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]
NELLY LIM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as
Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for private respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship.
Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the resolution of public
respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to annul
the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an
expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the
merits ensued. Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand
himself to testify on his own behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondent's counsel announced
that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental
Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel
forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to
testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the
testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the
petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over
such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January 1989.
On 24 January 1989, petitioner's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and
suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent
motion. Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr.
Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient
relationship. Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to
the petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion
and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified by
counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to
her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the petitioner for
nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had prescribed.
Since petitioner's counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced to writing,
respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same date:
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to
prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and examined respondent Nelly Lim in
her professional capacity perforce her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic) communication
rule.
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and that she will not
testify on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in her professional capacity.
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the respondent's
motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel for
respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be
elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert in
psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets
applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain
behaviours of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never
revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her examination of
Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines she prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2 for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the aforesaid order
of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr.
Acampado's testimony. prcd
On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to the
petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the
testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989." Hence,
the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the respondent
Court discussed the conditions which would render as inadmissible testimonial evidence between a
physician and his patient under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
and made the following findings:
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose testimony is sought
to be stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who was summoned by the patient in
her professional capacity for curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is whether the
information given by the physician in her testimony in open court on January 25, 1989 was a
privileged communication. We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged
communication because the information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her
in her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the information necessary to enable the physician
to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information obtained
from the physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite
reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the
National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate
of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert witness and not
as an attending physician of petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado's testimony, We find no declaration that
touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during
the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she
examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of
her examination, interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a
hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the
fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever information or findings the doctor
obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert
concerning a patient's ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient
and make answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler vs. Role, 242 Pac.
436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical
question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the
physician does not give testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his
professional capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago vs. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354,
see Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the
fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their
origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It
might be implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the
ailment and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of
establishing in each instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential
nature of the information given."4
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took this recourse under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent Court of Appeals "seriously erred":
"I.
. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient privileged
communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at bar.
II.
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado 'was summoned as an expert witness and not as an attending
physician of petitioner.'
III.
. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made 'no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any
information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her
patient in a professional capacity.'
IV.
. . . in declaring that 'the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given
by or obtained from Dr. Acampado.'" 5
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda 6
after the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the petitioner submitted her reply 8 thereto.
The parties subsequently filed their separate Memoranda.
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its
challenged resolution.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient." Cdpr
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by him,"
and (b) substitution of the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a
reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification
consisting in the change of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken."
9 Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was
sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of
Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative that the information would blacken such
character. With the advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed
once more by the substitution of the word character with the word reputation. There is a distinction
between these two concepts. "'Character' is what a man is, and 'reputation' is what he is supposed
to be in what people say he is. 'Character' depends on attributes possessed, and 'reputation' on
attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what
is accepted to be reality at present." 10
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential
disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community. 12
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is
made to the physician's testimony. 13
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur:
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character) of the patient." 14
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of
a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of
the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the
patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered
by the privilege. 16 It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is
privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the
number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated." 17
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to agree
with the respondent Court's observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first
place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview
and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained
while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado's answers to the
questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information
obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or
knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient
relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot
then be excluded. The rule on this point is summarized as follows: Cdpr
"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient
privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion
testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental
condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon
the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he
may have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege
where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts
hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient
acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from
consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient's condition he should not be
permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." 19
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado's testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed
alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party, thus:
"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?
A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I interviewed the
patient, Nelly.
Q How many times did Juan Lim and Nelly Lim go to your office?
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the month of
April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it was
the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.
Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?
A Yes, I understand.
Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?
A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could not get
anything from Dr. Lim.
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor who was also
present during that interview?
A No, sir, I don't remember any." 20
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the
presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege:
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of
the communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such
circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21
Thirdly, except for the petitioner's sweeping claim — that "(T)he information given by Dr. Acampado
brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the
trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia
— which caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner
and her family," 22 — which is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered
to show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former's
"character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the
petitioner regarding the latter's ailment and the treatment recommended therefor. prcd
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance
of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the
said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her
pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it
elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court's advise that said counsel
may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to
be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the
stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner's Petition 23 and
Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondent's Memorandum, 25 do not at all show that any
objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be
covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.








Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This petition for review assails the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated
August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution
3
dated
January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan.
4
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.
5

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan.
6
Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
7
against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
8
on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.
9
Trial on the merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against
defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null
and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages
the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is
ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.
10

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch
44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
11

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising
the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE
NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED
MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
12

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment
to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her
grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that
the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite
overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.
13

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this issue
may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner
and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had
actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case,
14
there
are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based.
15

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were
naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after
a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the
testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization
and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence she
presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had this
citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing
in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil
Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by
their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x
16

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest
the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the
time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and
divorce.
17
We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.
18
It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
19

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
20
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.
21
However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
22

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute.
23
In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December
21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,
24
and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan
dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.
25

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor
should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s
subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent
marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x
26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest
27
and must be based on a cause of action.
28
Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog,
29
the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.
x x x x
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper
disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice