Psychological Incapacity Jurisprudence

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Psychological Incapacity Jurisprudence

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David Dedel v. Court of Appeals and Sharon Corpuz-Dedel 2
Leonilo Antonio v. Marie Ivonne Reyes 3
Carino v. Carino 4
Kenneth Ngo Te v Rowena Yu Te 5
Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos 8
Ma. Armida “Amy” Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris 10









































David Dedel v. Court of Appeals and Sharon Corpuz-Dedel
G.R. No. 151867 | January 29, 2004

Art 46 compared with Psychological Incapactiy

FACTS: In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. They’ve had four children since then.
David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during
the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one
Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim.
David averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the
findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr.
Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited
by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no
capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live
with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Psychological Incapacity has been proven.

HELD: Psychological Incapacity is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not
sufficient. PI is intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one
be incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharon’s sexual infidelity does
not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in law.
Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be
appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.








Leonilo Antonio v. Marie Ivonne Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 | March 10, 2006

Art 45 (3) distinguished from Psychological Incapacity

FACTS: In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to
annul the marriage due to Marie’s Psychological Incapacity. Leo claimed that Marie
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a psychologist but she is
not. She’d claim she is a singer with the company Blackgold and that she is the latter’s
number 1 money maker but she’s not. She’d also spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly
income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make believe world. Leo
presented an expert that proved Marie’s Psychological Incapacity. Marie denied all Leo’s
allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against Marie and
annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also annulled the marriage
and was affirmed by the Vatican’s Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision hence the
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Psychological Incapacity is attendant to the case.

HELD: Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina
case is properly established in the case at bar.
The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis
Art 46 of the FC. In Psychological Incapacity, the misrepresentation done by Marie points to
her inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In
Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.” These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the
case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but
rather such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes
PI. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leo’s consent to marry her. Her
misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from
reality which is so grave and it falls under thse fourth guideline laid down in the Molina
case.










Carino v. Carino
G.R. No. 132529 | February 2, 2001

FACTS: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In
1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his
second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13
days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4.
Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In
1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of
the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the
marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due
to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that
she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage
license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4.
Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to
him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop
even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other
for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in
their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that
everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by
each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the
other may not have contributed at all.






Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Yu Te
G.R. No. 161793 | February 13, 2009

FACTS: Kenneth met Rowena in a Filipino-Chinese gathering on campus. They did not have
interest with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the
fact that they share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena
proposed that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he is young
and jobless but due to Rowena’s persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The
money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their
respective home. Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought the two before a court and had had
them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s house where
Kenneth was treated like a prisoner. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home
otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was
hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live with his
parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live together separately or just stay with her uncle. Kenneth however was already
disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they live separate lives from
then on. Four years later, Kenneth filed for an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not
file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine
if there is collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to try the merits of the case. The
opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both
parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Kenneth and
Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties’ unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the
state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved
with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert
psychologist. The OSG appealed and the CA ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed
that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the Molina case to be followed as
guidelines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of
the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina.

HELD: The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of
rigid rules in ascertaining PI. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled
accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the law’s clear
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.” The SC however is not
abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both
parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both
parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the
essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.

Set of [Strict] Standards in the Interpretation of Art 36 of the FC Established in the Molina
Case (RP vs Molina)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be “protected” by the state. The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides: “The following are incapable of
contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.” Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—
subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is
to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.







Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
G.R. No. 112019 | January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their
marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parent as averred by
Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should
they start living independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as
a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she
promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the
chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to
locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed
to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to
Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort
constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is
Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between
the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the
term “psychological incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing
it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted
with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its
application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological
incapacity” defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because
the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual
settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.










































Ma. Armida “Amy” Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris
GR 162368 | July 17, 2006

FACTS: Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the
marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life
in the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving
husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It was only
when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his
shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not
understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her
suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida
presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a
dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix’s “leaving-the-house” attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with
his band mates than his family.

ISSUE: Whether or not Psychological Incapacity is attendant in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality
disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was not
able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She
replied that such disorder “can be part of his family upbringing” She stated that there was a
history of Brix’s parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course
inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.

What is psychological incapacity?

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
must be fully explained in court.

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