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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152613 & No. 152628 June 23, 2006
APEX MINING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board, provincial mining regulatory board (PMRB-
DAVAO), MONKAYO INTEGRATED SMALL SCALE MINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ROSENDO VILLAFLOR, BALITE COMMUNAL
PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE, DAVAO UNITED MINERS COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO, PUTING-BATO GOLD
MINERS COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA, THELMA CATAPANG, LUIS GALANG, RENATO BASMILLO, FRANCISCO
YOBIDO, EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN ASION, MACARIO HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY
ESPORTONO, ROMEO CASTILLO, JOSE REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN, LETICIA ALQUEZA and joel brillantes
management mining corporation, Respondents
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
On 27 February 1931, Governor General Dwight F. Davis issued Proclamation No. 369, establishing the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve consisting of approximately 1,927,400 hectares.
1

The disputed area, a rich tract of mineral land, is inside the forest reserve located at Monkayo, Davao del Norte, and Cateel , Davao
Oriental, consisting of 4,941.6759 hectares.
2
This mineral land is encompassed by Mt. Diwata, which is situated in the municipalities of
Monkayo and Cateel. It later became known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area." It has since the early 1980‘s been stormed by conflicts
brought about by the numerous mining claimants scrambling for gold that lies beneath its bosom.
On 21 November 1983, Camilo Banad and his group, who claimed to have first discovered traces of gold in Mount Diwata, filed a
Declaration of Location (DOL) for six mining claims in the area.
Camilo Banad and some other natives pooled their skills and resources and organized the Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
(Balite).
3

On 12 December 1983, Apex Mining Corporation (Apex) entered into operating agreements with Banad and his group.
From November 1983 to February 1984, several individual applications for mining locations over mineral land covering certain parts of
the Diwalwal gold rush area were filed with the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG).
On 2 February 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) filed 16 DOLs or mining claims for areas adjacent to the area covered by
the DOL of Banad and his group. After realizing that the area encompassed by its mining claims is a forest reserve within the coverage
of Proclamation No. 369 issued by Governor General Davis, MMC abandoned the same and instead applied for a prospecting permit
with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
On 1 July 1985, BFD issued a Prospecting Permit to MMC covering an area of 4,941.6759 hectares traversing the municipalities of
Monkayo and Cateel, an area within the forest reserve under Proclamation No. 369. The permit embraced the areas claimed by Apex
and the other individual mining claimants.
On 11 November 1985, MMC filed Exploration Permit Application No. 84-40 with the BMG. On 10 March 1986, the BMG issued to MCC
Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP 133).
Discovering the existence of several mining claims and the proliferation of small-scale miners in the area covered by EP 133, MMC thus
filed on 11 April 1986 before the BMG a Petition for the Cancellation of the Mining Claims of Apex and Small Scale Mining Permit Nos.
(x-1)-04 and (x-1)-05 which was docketed as MAC No. 1061. MMC alleged that the areas covered by its EP 133 and the mining claims
of Apex were within an established and existing forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) under Proclamation No.
369 and that pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 463,
4
acquisition of mining rights within a forest reserve is through the application for
a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through registration of a DOL with the BMG.
On 23 September 1986, Apex filed a motion to dismiss MMC‘s petition alleging that its mining claims are not within any establ ished or
proclaimed forest reserve, and as such, the acquisition of mining rights thereto must be undertaken via registration of DOL with the
BMG and not through the filing of application for permit to prospect with the BFD.
On 9 December 1986, BMG dismissed MMC‘s petition on the ground that the area covered by the Apex mining claims and MMC‘s
permit to explore was not a forest reservation. It further declared null and void MMC‘s EP 133 and sustained the validity of Apex mining
claims over the disputed area.
MMC appealed the adverse order of BMG to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On 15 April 1987, after due hearing, the DENR reversed the 9 December 1996 order of BMG and declared MMC‘s EP 133 valid and
subsisting.
Apex filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the DENR which was subsequently denied. Apex then filed an appeal before the Office of
the President. On 27 July 1989, the Office of the President, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Cancio C.
Garcia,
5
dismissed Apex‘s appeal and affirmed the DENR ruling.
Apex filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 92605 entitled, "Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia."
6
On 16 July 1991, this Court rendered a Decision against Apex holding that the disputed area is a forest reserve; hence, the
proper procedure in acquiring mining rights therein is by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through a
registration of DOL with the BMG.
On 27 December 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. issued Department Administrative Order No. 66 (DAO No. 66)
declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale
mining purposes.
As DAO No. 66 declared a portion of the contested area open to small scale miners, several mining entities filed applications for
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA).
On 25 August 1993, Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association (MISSMA) filed an MPSA application which was denied by the
BMG on the grounds that the area applied for is within the area covered by MMC EP 133 and that the MISSMA was not qualified to
apply for an MPSA under DAO No. 82,
7
Series of 1990.
On 5 January 1994, Rosendo Villaflor and his group filed before the BMG a Petition for Cancellation of EP 133 and for the admission of
their MPSA Application. The Petition was docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. Davao United Miners Cooperative (DUMC) and
Balite intervened and likewise sought the cancellation of EP 133.
On 16 February 1994, MMC assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is
alleged to be a 100% -owned subsidiary of MMC.
On 14 June 1994, Balite filed with the BMG an MPSA application within the contested area that was later on rejected.
On 23 June 1994, SEM filed an MPSA application for the entire 4,941.6759 hectares under EP 133, which was also denied by reason
of the pendency of RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. On 1 September 1995, SEM filed another MPSA application.
On 20 October 1995, BMG accepted and registered SEM‘s MPSA application and the Deed of Assignment over EP 133 executed in its
favor by MMC. SEM‘s application was designated MPSA Application No. 128 (MPSAA 128). After publication of SEM‘s application, the
following filed before the BMG their adverse claims or oppositions:
a) MAC Case No. 004 (XI) – JB Management Mining Corporation;
b) MAC Case No. 005(XI) – Davao United Miners Cooperative;
c) MAC Case No. 006(XI) – Balite Integrated Small Scale Miner‘s Cooperative;
d) MAC Case No. 007(XI) – Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miner‘s Association, Inc. (MISSMA);
e) MAC Case No. 008(XI) – Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines;
f) MAC Case No. 009(XI) – Rosendo Villafor, et al.;
g) MAC Case No. 010(XI) – Antonio Dacudao;
h) MAC Case No. 011(XI) – Atty. Jose T. Amacio;
i) MAC Case No. 012(XI) – Puting-Bato Gold Miners Cooperative;
j) MAC Case No. 016(XI) – Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative;
k) MAC Case No. 97-01(XI) – Romeo Altamera, et al.
8

To address the matter, the DENR constituted a Panel of Arbitrators (PA) to resolve the following:
(a) The adverse claims on MPSAA No. 128; and
(b) The Petition to Cancel EP 133 filed by Rosendo Villaflor docketed as RED Case No. 8-8-94.
9

On 13 June 1997, the PA rendered a resolution in RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. As to the Petition for Cancellation of EP 133 issued to
MMC, the PA relied on the ruling in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia,
10
and opined that EP 133 was valid and subsisting. It also declared
that the BMG Director, under Section 99 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order implementing Presidential Decree No. 463,
was authorized to issue exploration permits and to renew the same without limit.
With respect to the adverse claims on SEM‘s MPSAA No. 128, the PA ruled that adverse claimants‘ petitions were not filed in
accordance with the existing rules and regulations governing adverse claims because the adverse claimants failed to submit the sketch
plan containing the technical description of their respective claims, which was a mandatory requirement for an adverse claim that would
allow the PA to determine if indeed there is an overlapping of the area occupied by them and the area applied for by SEM. It added that
the adverse claimants were not claim owners but mere occupants conducting illegal mining activities at the contested area since only
MMC or its assignee SEM had valid mining claims over the area as enunciated in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia.
11
Also, it maintained
that the adverse claimants were not qualified as small-scale miners under DENR Department Administrative Order No. 34 (DAO No.
34),
12
or the Implementing Rules and Regulation of Republic Act No. 7076 (otherwise known as the "People‘s Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991"), as they were not duly licensed by the DENR to engage in the extraction or removal of minerals from the ground, and that they
were large-scale miners. The decretal portion of the PA resolution pronounces:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the validity of Expoloration Permit No. 133 is hereby reiterated and all the adverse
claims against MPSAA No. 128 are DISMISSED.
13

Undaunted by the PA ruling, the adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). In a Decision dated 6 January
1998, the MAB considered erroneous the dismissal by the PA of the adverse claims filed against MMC and SEM over a mere
technicality of failure to submit a sketch plan. It argued that the rules of procedure are not meant to defeat substantial justice as the
former are merely secondary in importance to the latter. Dealing with the question on EP 133‘s validity, the MAB opined that said issue
was not crucial and was irrelevant in adjudicating the appealed case because EP 133 has long expired due to its non-renewal and that
the holder of the same, MMC, was no longer a claimant of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve having relinquished its right to
SEM. After it brushed aside the issue of the validity of EP 133 for being irrelevant, the MAB proceeded to treat SEM‘s MPSA application
over the disputed area as an entirely new and distinct application. It approved the MPSA application, excluding the area segregated by
DAO No. 66, which declared 729 hectares within the Diwalwal area as non-forest lands open for small-scale mining. The MAB resolved:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators dated 13 June 1997 is hereby VACATED and a
new one entered in the records of the case as follows:
1. SEM‘s MPSA application is hereby given due course subject to the full and strict compliance of the provisions of the Mining
Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
2. The area covered by DAO 66, series of 1991, actually occupied and actively mined by the small-scale miners on or before
August 1, 1987 as determined by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB), is hereby excluded from the area applied
for by SEM;
3. A moratorium on all mining and mining-related activities, is hereby imposed until such time that all necessary procedures,
licenses, permits, and other requisites as provided for by RA 7076, the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
and all other pertinent laws, rules and regulations are complied with, and the appropriate environmental protection measures
and safeguards have been effectively put in place;
4. Consistent with the spirit of RA 7076, the Board encourages SEM and all small-scale miners to continue to negotiate in
good faith and arrive at an agreement beneficial to all. In the event of SEM‘s strict and full compliance with all the requirements
of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and the concurrence of the small-scale miners actually
occupying and actively mining the area, SEM may apply for the inclusion of portions of the areas segregated under paragraph
2 hereof, to its MPSA application. In this light, subject to the preceding paragraph, the contract between JB [JB Management
Mining Corporation] and SEM is hereby recognized.
14

Dissatisfied, the Villaflor group and Balite appealed the decision to this Court. SEM, aggrieved by the exclusion of 729 hectares from its
MPSA application, likewise appealed. Apex filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Petition for Intervention predicated on its right to stake its
claim over the Diwalwal gold rush which was granted by the Court. These cases, however, were remanded to the Court of Appeals for
proper disposition pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals consolidated the remanded cases as
CA-G.R. SP No. 61215 and No. 61216.
In the assailed Decision
15
dated 13 March 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the PA and declared null and void
the MAB decision.
The Court of Appeals, banking on the premise that the SEM is the agent of MMC by virtue of its assignment of EP 133 in favor of SEM
and the purported fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC, ruled that the transfer of EP 133 was valid. It argued that since SEM is
an agent of MMC, the assignment of EP 133 did not violate the condition therein prohibiting its transfer except to MMC‘s duly
designated agent. Thus, despite the non-renewal of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, the Court of Appeals deemed it relevant to declare EP 133
as valid since MMC‘s mining rights were validly transferred to SEM prior to its expiration.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that MMC‘s right to explore under EP 133 is a property right which the 1987 Constitution protects and
which cannot be divested without the holder‘s consent. It stressed that MMC‘s failure to proceed with the extraction and utilization of
minerals did not diminish its vested right to explore because its failure was not attributable to it.
Reading Proclamation No. 369, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act 137, and Sections 6, 7, and 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the issuance of DAO No. 66 was done by the DENR Secretary beyond his power for it is the President
who has the sole power to withdraw from the forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 as non-forest land for mining
purposes. Accordingly, the segregation of 729 hectares of mining areas from the coverage of EP 133 by the MAB was unfounded.
The Court of Appeals also faulted the DENR Secretary in implementing DAO No. 66 when he awarded the 729 hectares segregated
from the coverage area of EP 133 to other corporations who were not qualified as small-scale miners under Republic Act No. 7076.
As to the petitions of Villaflor and company, the Court of Appeals argued that their failure to submit the sketch plan to the PA, which is a
jurisdictional requirement, was fatal to their appeal. It likewise stated the Villaflor and company‘s mining claims, which were based on
their alleged rights under DAO No. 66, cannot stand as DAO No. 66 was null and void. The dispositive portion of the Decision decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition of Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation is GRANTED while the Petition of
Rosendo Villaflor, et al., is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators dated 13 June 1997 is AFFIRMED in toto
and the assailed MAB Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and declared as NULL and VOID.
16

Hence, the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Apex, Balite and MAB.
During the pendency of these Petitions, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297 dated 25 November 2002.
This proclamation excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaimed the same as mineral
reservation and as environmentally critical area. Subsequently, DENR Administrative Order No. 2002-18 was issued declaring an
emergency situation in the Diwalwal gold rush area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein. Thereafter, Executive
Order No. 217 dated 17 June 2003 was issued by the President creating the National Task Force Diwalwal which is tasked to address
the situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
In G.R. No. 152613 and No. 152628, Apex raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING‘S [SEM] E.P. 133 IS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE FAILURE OF
MARCOPPER TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED IN EP 133.
II
WHETHER OR NOT APEX HAS A SUPERIOR AND PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO STAKE IT‘S CLAIM OVER THE ENTIRE 4,941
HECTARES AGAINST SEM AND THE OTHER CLAIMANTS PURSUANT TO THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE IN MINING LAW
THAT "PRIORITY IN TIME IS PRIORITY IN RIGHT."
17

In G.R. No. 152619-20, Balite anchors its petition on the following grounds:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE MPSA OF SEM WHICH WAS FILED NINE (9) DAYS LATE (JUNE 23, 1994) FROM THE FILING OF THE
MPSA OF BALITE WHICH WAS FILED ON JUNE 14, 1994 HAS A PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THAT OF BALITE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL BY THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM OF BALITE ON THE
GROUND THAT BALITE FAILED TO SUBMIT THE REQUIRED SKETCH PLAN DESPITE THE FACT THAT BALITE, HAD IN FACT
SUBMITTED ON TIME WAS A VALID DISMISSAL OF BALITE‘S ADVERSE CLAIM.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTUAL OCCUPATION AND SMALL-MINING OPERATIONS OF BALITE PURSUANT TO DAO 66 IN THE
729 HECTARES WHICH WAS PART OF THE 4,941.6759 HECTARES COVERED BY ITS MPSA WHICH WAS REJECTED BY THE
BUREAU OF MINES AND GEOSCIENCES WAS ILLEGAL.
18

In G.R. No. 152870-71, the MAB submits two issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT EP NO. 133 IS STILL VALID AND SUBSISTING.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT SUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF DAO NO. 66,
PROCLAMATION NO. 297, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 217 CAN OUTWEIGH EP NO. 133 AS WELL AS OTHER ADVERSE CLAIMS
OVER THE DIWALWAL GOLD RUSH AREA.
19

The common issues raised by petitioners may be summarized as follows:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity and continuous existence of EP 133 as well as its transfer
to SEM;
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the DENR Secretary has no authority to issue DAO No. 66; and
III. Whether or not the subsequent acts of the executive department such as the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, and DAO
No. 2002-18 can outweigh Apex and Balite‘s claims over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
On the first issue, Apex takes exception to the Court of Appeals‘ ruling upholding the validity of MMC‘s EP 133 and its subsequent
transfer to SEM asserting that MMC failed to comply with the terms and conditions in its exploration permit, thus, MMC and its
successor-in-interest SEM lost their rights in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Apex pointed out that MMC violated four conditions in its
permit. First, MMC failed to comply with the mandatory work program, to complete exploration work, and to declare a mining feasibility.
Second, it reneged on its duty to submit an Environmental Compliance Certificate. Third, it failed to comply with the reportorial
requirements. Fourth, it violated the terms of EP 133 when it assigned said permit to SEM despite the explicit proscription against its
transfer.
Apex likewise emphasizes that MMC failed to file its MPSA application required under DAO No. 82
20
which caused its exploration
permit to lapse because DAO No. 82 mandates holders of exploration permits to file a Letter of Intent and a MPSA application not later
than 17 July 1991. It said that because EP 133 expired prior to its assignment to SEM, SEM‘s MPSA application should have been
evaluated on its own merit.
As regards the Court of Appeals recognition of SEM‘s vested right over the disputed area, Apex bewails the same to be lacking in
statutory bases. According to Apex, Presidential Decree No. 463 and Republic Act No. 7942 impose upon the claimant the obligation of
actually undertaking exploration work within the reserved lands in order to acquire priority right over the area. MMC, Apex claims, failed
to conduct the necessary exploration work, thus, MMC and its successor-in-interest SEM lost any right over the area.
In its Memorandum, Balite maintains that EP 133 of MMC, predecessor-in-interest of SEM, is an expired and void permit which cannot
be made the basis of SEM‘s MPSA application.
Similarly, the MAB underscores that SEM did not acquire any right from MMC by virtue of the transfer of EP 133 because the transfer
directly violates the express condition of the exploration permit stating that "it shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee
or his duly authorized agents." It added that while MMC is the permittee, SEM cannot be considered as MMC‘s duly designated agent
as there is no proof on record authorizing SEM to represent MMC in its business dealings or undertakings, and neither did SEM pursue
its interest in the permit as an agent of MMC. According to the MAB, the assignment by MMC of EP 133 in favor of SEM did not make
the latter the duly authorized agent of MMC since the concept of an agent under EP 133 is not equivalent to the concept of assignee. It
finds fault in the assignment of EP 133 which lacked the approval of the DENR Secretary in contravention of Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7942
21
requiring his approval for a valid assignment or transfer of exploration permit to be valid.
SEM, on the other hand, counters that the errors raised by petitioners Apex, Balite and the MAB relate to factual and evidentiary
matters which this Court cannot inquire into in an appeal by certiorari.
The established rule is that in the exercise of the Supreme Court‘s power of review, the Court not being a trier of facts, does not
normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.
22
This rule, however, admits of exceptions as
recognized by jurisprudence, to wit:
(1) [w]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the fi ndings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
23

Also, in the case of Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,
24
the Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, deemed it proper to look
deeper into the factual circumstances of the case since the Court of Appeal‘s findings are at odds to those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Just like in the foregoing case, it is this Court‘s considered view that a re-evaluation of the attendant
facts surrounding the present case is appropriate considering that the findings of the MAB are in conflict with that of the Court of
Appeals.
I
At the threshold, it is an undisputed fact that MMC assigned to SEM all its rights under EP 133 pursuant to a Deed of Assignment dated
16 February 1994.
25

EP 133 is subject to the following terms and conditions
26
:
1. That the permittee shall abide by the work program submitted with the application or statements made later in support
thereof, and which shall be considered as conditions and essential parts of this permit;
2. That permittee shall maintain a complete record of all activities and accounting of all expenditures incurred therein subject to
periodic inspection and verification at reasonable intervals by the Bureau of Mines at the expense of the applicant;
3. That the permittee shall submit to the Director of Mines within 15 days after the end of each calendar quarter a report under
oath of a full and complete statement of the work done in the area covered by the permit;
4. That the term of this permit shall be for two (2) years to be effective from this date, renewable for the same period at the
discretion of the Director of Mines and upon request of the applicant;
5. That the Director of Mines may at any time cancel this permit for violation of its provision or in case of trouble or breach of
peace arising in the area subject hereof by reason of conflicting interests without any responsibility on the part of the
government as to expenditures for exploration that might have been incurred, or as to other damages that might have been
suffered by the permittee; and
6. That this permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used
for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other purpose.
Under Section 90
27
of Presidential Decree No. 463, the applicable statute during the issuance of EP 133, the DENR Secretary, through
Director of BMG, is charged with carrying out the said law. Also, under Commonwealth Act No. 136, also known as "An Act Creating
The Bureau of Mines," which was approved on 7 November 1936, the Director of Mines has the direct charge of the administration of
the mineral lands and minerals, and of the survey, classification, lease or any other form of concession or disposition thereof under the
Mining Act.
28
This power of administration includes the power to prescribe terms and conditions in granting exploration permits to
qualified entities. Thus, in the grant of EP 133 in favor of the MMC, the Director of the BMG acted within his power in laying down the
terms and conditions attendant thereto.
Condition number 6 categorically states that the permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of MMC or its duly authori zed agents.
While it may be true that SEM, the assignee of EP 133, is a 100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, records are bereft of any evidence
showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. For a contract of agency to exist, it is essential that the principal
consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on its behalf, and the agent consents so as to act.
29
In the case of Yu Eng Cho v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.,
30
this Court had the occasion to set forth the elements of agency, viz:
(1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship;
(2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
(3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself;
(4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The existence of the elements of agency is a factual matter that needs to be established or proven by evidence. The burden of proving
that agency is extant in a certain case rests in the party who sets forth such allegation. This is based on the principle that he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
31
It must likewise be emphasized that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive
and convincing.
32

In the instant Petitions, it is incumbent upon either MMC or SEM to prove that a contract of agency actually exists between them so as
to allow SEM to use and benefit from EP 133 as the agent of MMC. SEM did not claim nor submit proof that it is the designated agent
of MMC to represent the latter in its business dealings or undertakings. SEM cannot, therefore, be considered as an agent of MMC
which can use EP 133 and benefit from it. Since SEM is not an authorized agent of MMC, it goes without saying that the assignment or
transfer of the permit in favor of SEM is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of EP 133.
Furthermore, the concept of agency is distinct from assignment. In agency, the agent acts not on his own behalf but on behalf of his
principal.
33
While in assignment, there is total transfer or relinquishment of right by the assignor to the assignee.
34
The assignee takes
the place of the assignor and is no longer bound to the latter. The deed of assignment clearly stipulates:
1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable consideration received by the ASSIGNOR from the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR
hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto the ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may have in the area
situated in Monkayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified as Exploration Permit No. 133 and Application for a Permit
to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur respectively.
35

Bearing in mind the just articulated distinctions and the language of the Deed of Assignment, it is readily obvious that the assignment by
MMC of EP 133 in favor of SEM did not make the latter the former‘s agent. Such assignment involved actual transfer of all rights and
obligations MMC have under the permit in favor of SEM, thus, making SEM the permittee. It is not a mere grant of authority to SEM, as
an agent of MMC, to use the permit. It is a total abdication of MMC‘s rights over the permit. Hence, the assignment in question did not
make SEM the authorized agent of MMC to make use and benefit from EP 133.
The condition stipulating that the permit is for the exclusive use of the permittee or its duly authorized agent is not without any reason.
Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining
operations. Without such a condition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict requirements under the law by the
simple expediency acquiring the permit from the original permittee.
We cannot lend recognition to the Court of Appeals‘ theory that SEM, being a 100% subsidiary of MMC, is automatically an agent of
MMC.
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes, and properties
expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.
36
It is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related.
37
Resultantly, absent
any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is a separate and distinct entity from MMC.
The Court of Appeals pathetically invokes the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to legitimize the prohibited transfer or assignment of
EP 133. It stresses that SEM is just a business conduit of MMC, hence, the distinct legal personalities of the two entities should not be
recognized. True, the corporate mask may be removed when the corporation is just an alter ego or a mere conduit of a person or of
another corporation.
38
For reasons of public policy and in the interest of justice, the corporate veil will justifiably be impaled only when it
becomes a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity committed against a third person.
39
However, this Court has made a caveat in the
application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Courts should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be applied. Only in cases
where the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud or crime was committed against another, in di sregard of
its rights may the veil be pierced and removed. Thus, a subsidiary corporation may be made to answer for the liabilities and/or
illegalities done by the parent corporation if the former was organized for the purpose of evading obligations that the latter may have
entered into. In other words, this doctrine is in place in order to expose and hold liable a corporation which commits illegal acts and use
the corporate fiction to avoid liability from the said acts. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot therefore be used as a vehicle
to commit prohibited acts because these acts are the ones which the doctrine seeks to prevent.
To our mind, the application of the foregoing doctrine is unwarranted. The assignment of the permit in favor of SEM is utilized to
circumvent the condition of non-transferability of the exploration permit. To allow SEM to avail itself of this doctrine and to approve the
validity of the assignment is tantamount to sanctioning illegal act which is what the doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.
Quite apart from the above, a cursory consideration of the mining law pertinent to the case, will, indeed, demonstrate the infraction
committed by MMC in its assignment of EP 133 to SEM.
Presidential Decree No. 463, enacted on 17 May 1974, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree, which
governed the old system of exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources through "license, concession or lease"
prescribed:
SEC. 97. Assignment of Mining Rights. – A mining lease contract or any interest therein shall not be transferred, assigned, or
subleased without the prior approval of the Secretary: Provided, That such transfer, assignment or sublease may be made only to a
qualified person possessing the resources and capability to continue the mining operations of the lessee and that the assignor has
complied with all the obligations of the lease: Provided, further, That such transfer or assignment shall be duly registered with the office
of the mining recorder concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
The same provision is reflected in Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which is the new law
governing the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources, which provides:
SEC. 25. Transfer or Assignment. - An exploration permit may be transferred or assigned to a qualified person subject to the approval
of the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director.
The records are bereft of any indication that the assignment bears the imprimatur of the Secretary of the DENR. Presidential Decree
No. 463, which is the governing law when the assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining
rights, including the right to explore a mining area, must be with the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Quite conspicuously, SEM
did not dispute the allegation that the Deed of Assignment was made without the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Absent the
prior approval of the Secretary of DENR, the assignment of EP 133, was, therefore, without legal effect for violating the mandatory
provision of Presidential Decree No. 463.
An added significant omission proved fatal to MMC/SEM‘s cause. While it is true that the case of Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia
40
settled the issue of which between Apex and MMC validly acquired mining rights over the disputed area, such rights, though,
had been extinguished by subsequent events. Records indicate that on 6 July 1993, EP 133 was extended for 12 months or until 6 July
1994.
41
MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its expiration. Thus, EP 133 expired by non-renewal.
With the expiration of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. SEM, on the other hand, has not
acquired any right to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have not acquired
any vested right over the 4,941.6759 hectares which used to be covered by EP 133.
II
The Court of Appeals theorizes that DAO No. 66 was issued beyond the power of the DENR Secretary since the power to withdraw
lands from forest reserves and to declare the same as an area open for mining operation resides in the President.
Under Proclamation No. 369 dated 27 February 1931, the power to convert forest reserves as non-forest reserves is vested with the
DENR Secretary. Proclamation No. 369 partly states:
From this reserve shall be considered automatically excluded all areas which had already been certified and which in the future may be
proclaimed as classified and certified lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
42

However, a subsequent law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, otherwise known as "The Mining Act" which was approved on 7 November
1936 provides:
Sec. 14. Lands within reservations for purposes other than mining, which, after such reservation is made, are found to be more valuable
for their mineral contents than for the purpose for which the reservation was made, may be withdrawn from such reservations by the
President with the concurrence of the National Assembly, and thereupon such lands shall revert to the public domain and be subject to
disposition under the provisions of this Act.
Unlike Proclamation No. 369, Commonwealth Act No. 137 vests solely in the President, with the concurrence of the National Assembly,
the power to withdraw forest reserves found to be more valuable for their mineral contents than for the purpose for which the
reservation was made and convert the same into non-forest reserves. A similar provision can also be found in Presidential Decree No.
463 dated 17 May 1974, with the modifications that (1) the declaration by the President no longer requires the concurrence of the
National Assembly and (2) the DENR Secretary merely exercises the power to recommend to the President which forest reservations
are to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reads:
SEC. 8. Exploration and Exploitation of Reserved Lands. – When lands within reservations, which have been established for purposes
other than mining, are found to be more valuable for their mineral contents, they may, upon recommendation of the Secretary be
withdrawn from such reservation by the President and established as a mineral reservation.
Against the backdrop of the applicable statutes which govern the issuance of DAO No. 66, this Court is constrained to rule that said
administrative order was issued not in accordance with the laws. Inescapably, DAO No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the areas
covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest land open to small-scale mining operations, is null and void as,
verily, the DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves.
III
It is the contention of Apex that its right over the Diwalwal gold rush area is superior to that of MMC or that of SEM because it was the
first one to occupy and take possession of the area and the first to record its mining claims over the area.
For its part, Balite argues that with the issuance of DAO No. 66, its occupation in the contested area, particularly in the 729 hectares
small-scale mining area, has entitled it to file its MPSA. Balite claims that its MPSA application should have been given preference over
that of SEM because it was filed ahead.
The MAB, on the other hand, insists that the issue on who has superior right over the disputed area has become moot and academic by
the supervening events. By virtue of Proclamation No. 297 dated 25 November 2002, the disputed area was declared a mineral
reservation.
Proclamation No. 297 excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaimed the same as
mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area, viz:
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 369, series of 1931, certain tracts of public land situated in the then provinces of Davao,
Agusan and Surigao, with an area of approximately 1,927,400 hectares, were withdrawn from settlement and disposition, excludi ng,
however, those portions which had been certified and/or shall be classified and certified as non-forest lands;
WHEREAS, gold deposits have been found within the area covered by Proclamation No. 369, in the Municipality of Monkayo,
Compostela Valley Province, and unregulated small to medium-scale mining operations have, since 1983, been undertaken therein,
causing in the process serious environmental, health, and peace and order problems in the area;
WHEREAS, it is in the national interest to prevent the further degradation of the environment and to resolve the health and peace and
order problems spawned by the unregulated mining operations in the said area;
WHEREAS, these problems may be effectively addressed by rationalizing mining operations in the area through the establishment of a
mineral reservation;
WHEREAS, after giving due notice, the Director of Mines and Geoxciences conducted public hearings on September 6, 9 and 11, 2002
to allow the concerned sectors and communities to air their views regarding the establishment of a mineral reservation in the place in
question;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the President may, upon the recommendation of the Director of
Mines and Geosciences, through the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and when the national interest so requires,
establish mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken by the Department directly or thru a contractor;
WHEREAS, as a measure to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental
protection, the President may, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, as amended, proclaim and declare certain areas in the
country as environmentally critical;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby exclude
certain parcel of land located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaim the same as mineral reservation and as environmentally
critical area, with metes and bound as defined by the following geographical coordinates;
x x x x
with an area of Eight Thousand One Hundred (8,100) hectares, more or less. Mining operations in the area may be undertaken either
by the DENR directly, subject to payment of just compensation that may be due to legitimate and existing claimants, or thru a qualified
contractor, subject to existing rights, if any.
The DENR shall formulate and issue the appropriate guidelines, including the establishment of an environmental and social fund, to
implement the intent and provisions of this Proclamation.
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization of
the natural resources of the country.
43
With this policy, the State may pursue full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the country‘s natural mineral resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or
by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.
44
Thus, Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically
states:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands,
all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. x x x
x x x x
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. x x x (Underscoring
supplied.)
Recognizing the importance of the country‘s natural resources, not only for national economic development, but also for its security and
national defense, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 empowers the President, when the national interest so requires, to establish
mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor.
To implement the intent and provisions of Proclamation No. 297, the DENR Secretary issued DAO No. 2002-18 dated 12 August 2002
declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein.
The issue on who has priority right over the disputed area is deemed overtaken by the above subsequent developments particularly
with the issuance of Proclamation 297 and DAO No. 2002-18, both being constitutionally-sanctioned acts of the Executive Branch.
Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through the executive
branch. Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration, development and
utilization of the area or it can enter into agreements with qualified entities, viz:
SEC 5. Mineral Reservations. – When the national interest so requires, such as when there is a need to preserve strategic raw
materials for industries critical to national development, or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or ecological value, the President may
establish mineral reservations upon the recommendation of the Director through the Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral
reservations and such other reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the Department or through a
contractor x x x .
It is now up to the Executive Department whether to take the first option, i.e., to undertake directly the mining operations of the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area. As already ruled, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only
plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. The State need be guided only by the demands of
public interest in settling on this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
45
The State can also opt to award mining
operations in the mineral reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, if it wishes. The exercise of this
prerogative lies with the Executive Department over which courts will not interfere.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions of Apex, Balite and the MAB are PARTIALLY GRANTED, thus:
1. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 13 March 2002, and hereby declare that
EP 133 of MMC has EXPIRED on 7 July 1994 and that its subsequent transfer to SEM on 16 February 1994 is VOID.
2. We AFFIRM the finding of the Court of Appeals in the same Decision declaring DAO No. 66 illegal for having been issued in
excess of the DENR Secretary‘s authority.
Consequently, the State, should it so desire, may now award mining operations in the disputed area to any qualified entity it may
determine. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

DIGEST:
ORIENT AIR SERVICES & HOTEL REPRESENTATIVES v. COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN AIR-LINES INCORPORATED
Facts:
American Airlines, Inc. (American Air), an air carrier offering passenger and air cargo transportation in the Philippines, and Orient Air
Services and Hotel Representatives (Orient Air), entered into a General Sales Agency Agreement (Agreement), whereby the former
authorized the latter to act as its exclusive general sales agent within the Philippines for the sale of air passenger transportation.
In the agreement, Orient Air shall remit in United States dollars to American the ticket stock or exchange orders, less commissions to
which Orient Air Services is entitled, not less frequently than semi-monthly. On the other hand, American will pay Orient Air Services
commission on transportation sold by Orient Air Services or its sub-agents.
Thereafter, American alleged that Orient Air had reneged on its obligations under the Agreement by failing to promptly remit the net
proceeds of sales for the months of January to March 1981 in the amount of US $254,400.40, American Air by itself undertook the
collection of the proceeds of tickets sold originally by Orient Air and terminated forthwith the Agreement in accordance with paragraph
13 which authorize the termination of the thereof in case Orient Air is unable to transfer to the United States the funds payable by Orient
Air Services to American.
American Air instituted suit against Orient Air with the Court of First Instance of Manila ―for Accounting with Preliminary Attachment or
Garnishment, Mandatory Injunction and Restraining Order‖ averring the aforesaid basis for the termination of the Agreement as well as
therein defendant's previous record of failures "to promptly settle past outstanding refunds of which there were available funds in the
possession of the defendant, . . . to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff."
Orient Air denied the material allegations of the complaint with respect to plaintiff's entitlement to alleged unremitted amounts,
contending that after application thereof to the commissions due it under the Agreement, plaintiff in fact still owed Orient Air a balance
in unpaid overriding commissions.
Further, the defendant contended that the actions taken by American Air in the course of terminating the Agreement as well as the
termination itself were untenable. The trial court ruled in its favor which decision was affirmed with modification by Court of Appeals. It
held the termination made by the latter as affecting the GSA agreement illegal and improper and ordered the plaintiff to reinstate
defendant as its general sales agent for passenger transportation in the Philippines in accordance with said GSA agreement.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reinstatement of the defendant as its general sales agent for passenger transportation
in the Philippines in accordance with said GSA Agreement
Held:
Yes. By affirming this ruling of the trial court, respondent appellate court, in effect, compels American Air to extend its personality to
Orient Air. Such would be violative of the principles and essence of agency, defined by law as a contract whereby "a person binds
himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, WITH THE CONSENT OR AUTHORITY
OF THE LATTER.
In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by
legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be
effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any court. The Agreement itself
between the parties states that "either party may terminate the Agreement without cause by giving the other 30 days' notice by letter,
telegram or cable." (emphasis supplied) We, therefore, set aside the portion of the ruling of the respondent appellate court reinstating
Orient Air as general sales agent of American Air.









DIGEST:
RALLOS v GO CHAN
G.R. No. L-24332
January 31, 1978

Petitioner: RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS
Respodents: FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: MUÑOZ PALMA

FACTS:
BACKGROUND OF CASE
 This is a case of an attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos, who after of his death of his principal, Concepcion Rallos, sold the latter's
undivided share in a parcel of land pursuant to a power of attorney which the principal had executed in favor. The
administrator of the estate went to court to have the sale declared uneanforceable and to recover the disposed share.
 TC granted the relief prayed for, but upon appeal CA uphold the validity of the sale and the complaint. Hence, this Petition for
Review on certiorari.

FACTS OF THE CASE
 Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters and registered co-owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry of Cebu.
 April 21, 1954: the sisters executed a special power of attorney in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell
for and in their behalf lot 5983.
 March 3, 1955: Concepcion Rallos died.
 September 12, 1955, Simeon Rallos sold the undivided shares of his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia in lot 5983 to Felix Go
Chan & Sons Realty Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. The deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Cebu, TCT No. 11118 was cancelled, and a new transfer certificate of Title No. 12989 was issued in the named of the vendee.

FILING OF ACTION
 May 18, 1956: Ramon Rallos as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Concepcion Rallos filed a complaint praying that:
1. Sale of the undivided share of the deceased Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 be unenforceable, and said share be
reconveyed to her estate
2. Certificate of 'title issued in the name of Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation be cancelled and another title be
issued in the names of the corporation and the "Intestate estate of Concepcion Rallos" in equal undivided and
3. Plaintiff be indemnified by way of attorney's fees and payment of costs of suit.
 Named party defendants were Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, Simeon Rallos, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu,
but subsequently, the latter was dropped from the complaint.
 The complaint was amended twice; defendant Corporation's Answer contained a crossclaim against its co-defendant, Simon
Rallos while the latter filed third-party complaint against his sister, Gerundia Rallos.
 While the case was pending in the trial court, both Simon and his sister Gerundia died and they were substituted by the
respective administrators of their estates.

TC RULING (later on was affirmed by SC)
 On Plaintiffs Complaint —
1. Declaring the deed of sale null and void insofar as the one-half pro-indiviso share of Concepcion Rallos in the
property in question, — Lot 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu — is concerned;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.12989 covering Lot 5983 and to
issue in lieu thereof another in the names of FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and the Estate of
Concepcion Rallos in the proportion of one-half (1/2) share each pro-indiviso;
3. Ordering Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation to deliver the possession of an undivided one-half (1/2) share of
Lot 5983 to the herein plaintiff;
4. Sentencing the defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay to plaintiff in
concept of reasonable attorney's fees the sum of P1,000.00; and
5. Ordering both defendants to pay the costs jointly and severally.
 On GO CHANTS Cross-Claim:
1. Sentencing the co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay to defendant
Felix Co Chan & Sons Realty Corporation P5,343.45, representing the price of one-half (1/2) share of lot 5983;
2. Ordering co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay in concept of
reasonable attorney's fees to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation P500.00
 On Third-Party Complaint of defendant Juan T. Borromeo administrator of Estate of Simeon Rallos, against Josefina Rallos
special administratrix of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos:
o Dismissing the third-party complaint without prejudice to filing either a complaint against the regular administrator of
the Estate of Gerundia Rallos or a claim in the Intestate-Estate of Cerundia Rallos, covering the same subject-matter
of the third-party complaint, at bar.

CA RULING
 Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation appealed to CA from the TC judgment insofar as it set aside the sale of the one-half
(1/2) share of Concepcion Rallos. The appellate tribunal, resolved the appeal in favor of the appellant corporation sustaining
the sale in question. The appellee administrator, Ramon Rallos, moved for a reconsider of the decision but the same was
denied

ISSUE:
Is the sale of the undivided share of Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 valid although it was executed by the agent after the death of his
principal? – NO

HELD:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We set aside the decision of respondent appellate court, and We affirm en toto the judgment
rendered by then Hon. Amador E. Gomez of the Court of First Instance of Cebu with costs against respondent realty corporation at all
instances.

RATIO:
CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELEVANT TO AGENCY
 It is a basic axiom in civil law embodied in our Civil Code that no one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
 A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or the legal representation or who has acted
beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has
been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
 Agency is basically personal representative, and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the
powers granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per
alium facit se. "He who acts through another acts himself".
 There are various ways of extinguishing agency, but here we are concerned only with one cause — death of the principal.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 1919 of the Civil Code which was taken from Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code provides:
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished.
3. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent; ...
 By reason of the very nature of the relationship between Principal and agent, agency is extinguished by the death of
the principal or the agent. This is the law in this jurisdiction.
 Manresa commenting on Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code explains that the rationale for the law is found in the juridical
basis of agency, which is representation, them being an integration of the personality of the principal and that of the agent.
It is not possible for the representation to continue to exist once the death of either is establish.
 Pothier agrees with Manresa that by reason of the nature of agency, death is a necessary cause for its extinction. Laurent
says that the juridical tie between the principal and the agent is severed ipso jure upon the death of either without necessi ty for
the heirs of the fact to notify the agent of the fact of death of the former
 The same rule prevails at common law — the death of the principal effects instantaneous and absolute revocation of the
authority of the agent unless the Power be coupled with an interest. This is the prevalent rule in American Jurisprudence
where it is well-settled that a power without an interest conferred upon an agent is dissolved by the principal's death, and any
attempted execution of the power afterward is not binding on the heirs or representatives of the deceased.

CASE AT BAR
 Is the general rule provided for in Article 1919 that the death of the principal or of the agent extinguishes the agency, subject to
any exception, and if so, is the instant case within that exception? That is the determinative point in issue in this liti gation.
 It is the contention of respondent corporation which was sustained by respondent court that notwithstanding the death of the
principal Concepcion Rallos the act of the attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos in selling the former's sham in the property is valid
and enforceable inasmuch as the corporation acted in good faith in buying the property in question.
 Articles 1930 and 1931 of the Civil Code provide the exceptions to the general rule afore-mentioned. Article 1930 is not
involved because admittedly the special power of attorney executed in favor of Simeon Rallos was not coupled with an
interest.
 Article 1931 is the applicable law. Under this provision, an act done by the agent after the death of his principal is valid and
effective only under two conditions
1. That the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the principal and
2. That the third person who contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith.
 Good faith here means that the third person was not aware of the death of the principal at the time he contracted with said
agent.
 These two requisites must concur the absence of one will render the act of the agent invalid and unenforceable.
 Article 1931, being an exception to the general rule, is to be strictly construed, it is not to be given an interpretation or
application beyond the clear import of its terms for otherwise the courts will be involved in a process of legislation outside of
their judicial function.

On the basis of the established knowledge of Simon Rallos concerning the death of his principal Concepcion Rallos, Article
1931 of the Civil Code is inapplicable
 In the instant case, it cannot be questioned that the agent, Simeon Rallos, knew of the death of his principal at the time he sold
the latter's share in Lot No. 5983 to respondent corporation. The knowledge of the death is clearly to be inferred from the
pleadings filed by Simon Rallos before the trial court.
 That Simeon Rallos knew of the death of his sister Concepcion is also a finding of fact of the court a quo and of respondent
appellate court when the latter stated that Simon Rallos 'must have known of the death of his sister, and yet he proceeded wi th
the sale of the lot in the name of both his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos without informing appellant (the realty
corporation) of the death of the former.
 On the basis of the established knowledge concerning the death of principal, Article 1931 of CC is inapplicable. The law
expressly requires for its application lack of knowledge on the part of the agent of the death of his principal; it is not enough
that the third person acted in good faith.
 Buason & Reyes v. Panuyas: sustained the validity, of a sale made after the death of the principal because it was not shown
that the agent knew of his principal's demise.
 Herrera, et al., v. Luy Kim Guan, et al.: plaintiffs presented no proof and there is no indication in the record, that the agent Luy
Kim Guan was aware of the death of his principal at the time he sold the property. The death of the principal does not render
the act of an agent unenforceable, where the latter had no knowledge of such extinguishment of the agency.

The fact that no notice of the death of the principal was registered on the certificate of title of the property in the Office of the
Register of Deeds, is not fatal to the cause of the estate of the principal
 Another argument advanced by respondent court is that the vendee acting in good faith relied on the power of attorney which
was duly registered on the original certificate of title recorded in the Register of Deeds of the province of Cebu, that no notice
of the death was aver annotated on said certificate of title by the heirs of the principal and accordingly they must suffer the
consequences of such omission.
 A revocation by an act of the principal as a mode of terminating an agency is distinctive from revocation by operation of law
such as death of the principal, which is similar to the case at bar.
 Revocation by an act of principal as mode of termination (quoting Manresa):
o If the agency has been granted for the purpose of contracting with certain persons, the revocation must be made
known to them. But if the agency is general in nature, without reference to particular person with whom the agent is to
contract, it is sufficient that the principal exercise due diligence to make the revocation of the agency publicity known.
In this case, all acts, executed with third persons who contracted in good faith, without knowledge of the revocation,
are valid.
 Revocation by operation of law (applicable to case):
o By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent, agency is extinguished ipso jure upon
the death of either principal or agent.
o Although a revocation of a power of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties concerned, yet a
revocation by operation of law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously effective inasmuch as
"by legal fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an execution of the principal's continuing will.
o With death, the principal's will ceases or is the of authority is extinguished.
o The Civil Code does not impose a duty on the heirs to notify the agent of the death of the principal. What the
Code provides in Article 1932 is that, if the agent die his heirs must notify the principal thereof, and in the
meantime adopt such measures as the circumstances may demand in the interest of the latter.

Whatever conflict of legal opinion was generated by Cassiday v. McKenzie in American jurisprudence, no such conflict exists
in our own
 One last point raised by respondent corporation in support of the appealed decision is an 1842 ruling of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Cassiday v. McKenzie wherein payments made to an agent after the death of the principal were held to be
"good", "the parties being ignorant of the death".
 Cassiday v McKenzie: that a payment may be good today, or bad tomorrow, from the accident circumstance of the death of
the principal, which he did not know, and which by no possibility could he know? It would be unjust to the agent and unjust to
the debtor. In the civil law, the acts of the agent, done bona fide in ignorance of the death of his principal are held valid and
binding upon the heirs of the latter. The same rule holds in the Scottish law, and I cannot believe the common law is so
unreasonable...
 The above-cited case represents the minority view in American jurisprudence and stands alone among common law
authorities as later on stated in Clayton v Merrett and Travers v Crane
 Our statute, the Civil Code, expressly provides for two exceptions to the general rule that death of the pri ncipal revokes ipso
jure the agency, to wit: (1) that the agency is coupled with an interest (Art 1930), and (2) that the act of the agent was
executed without knowledge of the death of the principal and the third person who contracted with the agent acted also in
good faith (Art. 1931).
 Exception No. 2 is the doctrine followed in Cassiday, and again we stress the indispensable requirement that the agent acted
without knowledge or notice of the death of the principal. In the case before Us, the agent Ramon Rallos executed the sale
notwithstanding notice of the death of his principal. Accordingly, the agent's act is unenforceable against the estate
of his principal.
The case is covered expressly by a provision of law on agency and cannot be interpreted contrary to its tenor or paralleled to
that of laws on land registration
 Holding that the good faith of a third person in said with an agent affords the former sufficient protection, respondent court
drew a "parallel" between the instant case and that of an innocent purchaser for value of a land, stating that if a person
purchases a registered land from one who acquired it in bad faith — even to the extent of foregoing or falsifying the deed of
sale in his favor — the registered owner has no recourse against such innocent purchaser for value but only against the forger.
 Respondent cites case of Blondeau, et al., v. Nano and Vallejo which stated that an executed transfer of registered lands
placed by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party that the holder of
the transfer is authorized to deal with the land. As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence
of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of coincidence bear the loss.
 The Blondeau decision, however, is not on all fours with the case before Us because here We are confronted with one who
admittedly was an agent of his sister and who sold the property of the latter after her death with full knowledge of such death.
The situation is expressly covered by a provision of law on agency the terms of which are clear and unmistakable leaving no
room for an interpretation contrary to its tenor, This is in the same manner that the ruling in Blondeau found a basis in Section
55 of the Land Registration Law.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167552 April 23, 2007
EUROTECH INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EDWIN CUIZON and ERWIN CUIZON, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before Us is a petition for review by certiorari assailing the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated 10 August 2004 and its
Resolution
2
dated 17 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71397 entitled, "Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Hon. Antonio T.
Echavez." The assailed Decision and Resolution affirmed the Order
3
dated 29 January 2002 rendered by Judge Antonio T. Echavez
ordering the dropping of respondent EDWIN Cuizon (EDWIN) as a party defendant in Civil Case No. CEB-19672.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importation and distribution of various European industrial equipment for customers here in the
Philippines. It has as one of its customers Impact Systems Sales ("Impact Systems") which is a sole proprietorship owned by
respondent ERWIN Cuizon (ERWIN). Respondent EDWIN is the sales manager of Impact Systems and was impleaded in the court a
quo in said capacity.
From January to April 1995, petitioner sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly amounting to ninety-one thousand three
hundred thirty-eight (P91,338.00) pesos. Subsequently, respondents sought to buy from petitioner one unit of sludge pump valued
at P250,000.00 with respondents making a down payment of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
4
When the sludge pump arrived from
the United Kingdom, petitioner refused to deliver the same to respondents without their having fully settled their indebtedness to
petitioner. Thus, on 28 June 1995, respondent EDWIN and Alberto de Jesus, general manager of petitioner, executed a Deed of
Assignment of receivables in favor of petitioner, the pertinent part of which states:
1.) That ASSIGNOR
5
has an outstanding receivables from Toledo Power Corporation in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND (P365,000.00) PESOS as payment for the purchase of one unit of Selwood Spate 100D Sludge
Pump;
2.) That said ASSIGNOR does hereby ASSIGN, TRANSFER, and CONVEY unto the ASSIGNEE
6
the said receivables from
Toledo Power Corporation in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND (P365,000.00) PESOS which
receivables the ASSIGNOR is the lawful recipient;
3.) That the ASSIGNEE does hereby accept this assignment.
7

Following the execution of the Deed of Assignment, petitioner delivered to respondents the sludge pump as shown by Invoice No.
12034 dated 30 June 1995.
8

Allegedly unbeknownst to petitioner, respondents, despite the existence of the Deed of Assignment, proceeded to collect from Toledo
Power Company the amount of P365,135.29 as evidenced by Check Voucher No. 0933
9
prepared by said power company and an
official receipt dated 15 August 1995 issued by Impact Systems.
10
Alarmed by this development, petitioner made several demands upon
respondents to pay their obligations. As a result, respondents were able to make partial payments to petitioner. On 7 October 1996,
petitioner‘s counsel sent respondents a final demand letter wherein it was stated that as of 11 June 1996, respondents‘ total obligations
stood at P295,000.00 excluding interests and attorney‘s fees.
11
Because of respondents‘ failure to abide by said final demand letter,
petitioner instituted a complaint for sum of money, damages, with application for preliminary attachment against herein respondents
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
12

On 8 January 1997, the trial court granted petitioner‘s prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment.
13

On 25 June 1997, respondent EDWIN filed his Answer
14
wherein he admitted petitioner‘s allegations with respect to the sale
transactions entered into by Impact Systems and petitioner between January and April 1995.
15
He, however, disputed the total amount
of Impact Systems‘ indebtedness to petitioner which, according to him, amounted to only P220,000.00.
16

By way of special and affirmative defenses, respondent EDWIN alleged that he is not a real party in interest in this case. According to
him, he was acting as mere agent of his principal, which was the Impact Systems, in his transaction with petitioner and the l atter was
very much aware of this fact. In support of this argument, petitioner points to paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of petitioner‘s Complaint stating –
1.2. Defendant Erwin H. Cuizon, is of legal age, married, a resident of Cebu City. He is the proprietor of a single proprietorship
business known as Impact Systems Sales ("Impact Systems" for brevity), with office located at 46-A del Rosario Street, Cebu
City, where he may be served summons and other processes of the Honorable Court.
1.3. Defendant Edwin B. Cuizon is of legal age, Filipino, married, a resident of Cebu City. He is the Sales Manager of Impact
Systems and is sued in this action in such capacity.
17

On 26 June 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant ERWIN in Default with Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court
granted petitioner‘s motion to declare respondent ERWIN in default "for his failure to answer within the prescribed period despite the
opportunity granted"
18
but it denied petitioner‘s motion for summary judgment in its Order of 31 August 2001 and scheduled the pre-trial
of the case on 16 October 2001.
19
However, the conduct of the pre-trial conference was deferred pending the resolution by the trial court
of the special and affirmative defenses raised by respondent EDWIN.
20

After the filing of respondent EDWIN‘s Memorandum
21
in support of his special and affirmative defenses and petitioner‘s
opposition
22
thereto, the trial court rendered its assailed Order dated 29 January 2002 dropping respondent EDWIN as a party
defendant in this case. According to the trial court –
A study of Annex "G" to the complaint shows that in the Deed of Assignment, defendant Edwin B. Cuizon acted in behalf of or
represented [Impact] Systems Sales; that [Impact] Systems Sale is a single proprietorship entity and the complaint shows that
defendant Erwin H. Cuizon is the proprietor; that plaintiff corporation is represented by its general manager Alberto de Jesus in the
contract which is dated June 28, 1995. A study of Annex "H" to the complaint reveals that [Impact] Systems Sales which is owned
solely by defendant Erwin H. Cuizon, made a down payment of P50,000.00 that Annex "H" is dated June 30, 1995 or two days after the
execution of Annex "G", thereby showing that [Impact] Systems Sales ratified the act of Edwin B. Cuizon; the records further show that
plaintiff knew that [Impact] Systems Sales, the principal, ratified the act of Edwin B. Cuizon, the agent, when it accepted the down
payment of P50,000.00. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot say that it was deceived by defendant Edwin B. Cuizon, since in the instant case the
principal has ratified the act of its agent and plaintiff knew about said ratification. Plaintiff could not say that the subj ect contract was
entered into by Edwin B. Cuizon in excess of his powers since [Impact] Systems Sales made a down payment of P50,000.00 two days
later.
In view of the Foregoing, the Court directs that defendant Edwin B. Cuizon be dropped as party defendant.
23

Aggrieved by the adverse ruling of the trial court, petitioner brought the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the 29
January 2002 Order of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the now assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, finding no viable legal ground to reverse or modify the conclusions reached by the public respondent in his Order dated
January 29, 2002, it is hereby AFFIRMED.
24

Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution promulgated on 17 March 2005. Hence, the
present petition raising, as sole ground for its allowance, the following:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT EDWIN CUIZON, AS
AGENT OF IMPACT SYSTEMS SALES/ERWIN CUIZON, IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE, BECAUSE HE HAS NEITHER ACTED
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AGENCY NOR DID HE PARTICIPATE IN THE PERPETUATION OF A FRAUD.
25

To support its argument, petitioner points to Article 1897 of the New Civil Code which states:
Art. 1897. The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or
exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the effect of ERWIN‘s act of collecting the receivables from the Toledo
Power Corporation notwithstanding the existence of the Deed of Assignment signed by EDWIN on behalf of Impact Systems. While
said collection did not revoke the agency relations of respondents, petitioner insists that ERWIN‘s action repudiated EDWIN‘s power to
sign the Deed of Assignment. As EDWIN did not sufficiently notify it of the extent of his powers as an agent, petitioner claims that he
should be made personally liable for the obligations of his principal.
26

Petitioner also contends that it fell victim to the fraudulent scheme of respondents who induced it into selling the one unit of sludge
pump to Impact Systems and signing the Deed of Assignment. Petitioner directs the attention of this Court to the fact that respondents
are bound not only by their principal and agent relationship but are in fact full-blooded brothers whose successive contravening acts
bore the obvious signs of conspiracy to defraud petitioner.
27

In his Comment,
28
respondent EDWIN again posits the argument that he is not a real party in interest in this case and it was proper for
the trial court to have him dropped as a defendant. He insists that he was a mere agent of Impact Systems which is owned by ERWIN
and that his status as such is known even to petitioner as it is alleged in the Complaint that he is being sued in his capaci ty as the sales
manager of the said business venture. Likewise, respondent EDWIN points to the Deed of Assignment which clearly states that he was
acting as a representative of Impact Systems in said transaction.
We do not find merit in the petition.
In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another with
the latter‘s consent.
29
The underlying principle of the contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the services of others – to do
a great variety of things like selling, buying, manufacturing, and transporting.
30
Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or
the party for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act.
31
It is said that the basis of agency is
representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have
the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal.
32
By this legal fiction, the actual or real absence of the
principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence – qui facit per alium facit per se.
33

The elements of the contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is
the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts
within the scope of his authority.
34

In this case, the parties do not dispute the existence of the agency relationship between respondents ERWIN as principal and EDWIN
as agent. The only cause of the present dispute is whether respondent EDWIN exceeded his authority when he signed the Deed of
Assignment thereby binding himself personally to pay the obligations to petitioner. Petitioner firmly believes that respondent EDWIN
acted beyond the authority granted by his principal and he should therefore bear the effect of his deed pursuant to Article 1897 of the
New Civil Code.
We disagree.
Article 1897 reinforces the familiar doctrine that an agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts.
The same provision, however, presents two instances when an agent becomes personally liable to a third person. The first is when he
expressly binds himself to the obligation and the second is when he exceeds his authority. In the last instance, the agent can be held
liable if he does not give the third party sufficient notice of his powers. We hold that respondent EDWIN does not fall within any of the
exceptions contained in this provision.
The Deed of Assignment clearly states that respondent EDWIN signed thereon as the sales manager of Impact Systems. As discussed
elsewhere, the position of manager is unique in that it presupposes the grant of broad powers with which to conduct the business of the
principal, thus:
The powers of an agent are particularly broad in the case of one acting as a general agent or manager; such a position presupposes a
degree of confidence reposed and investiture with liberal powers for the exercise of judgment and discretion in transactions and
concerns which are incidental or appurtenant to the business entrusted to his care and management. In the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, a managing agent may enter into any contracts that he deems reasonably necessary or requisite for the protection of
the interests of his principal entrusted to his management. x x x.
35

Applying the foregoing to the present case, we hold that Edwin Cuizon acted well-within his authority when he signed the Deed of
Assignment. To recall, petitioner refused to deliver the one unit of sludge pump unless it received, in full, the payment for Impact
Systems‘ indebtedness.
36
We may very well assume that Impact Systems desperately needed the sludge pump for its business since
after it paid the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as down payment on 3 March 1995,
37
it still persisted in negotiating with
petitioner which culminated in the execution of the Deed of Assignment of its receivables from Toledo Power Company on 28 June
1995.
38
The significant amount of time spent on the negotiation for the sale of the sludge pump underscores Impact Systems‘
perseverance to get hold of the said equipment. There is, therefore, no doubt in our mind that respondent EDWIN‘s participati on in the
Deed of Assignment was "reasonably necessary" or was required in order for him to protect the business of his principal. Had he not
acted in the way he did, the business of his principal would have been adversely affected and he would have violated his fiduciary
relation with his principal.
We likewise take note of the fact that in this case, petitioner is seeking to recover both from respondents ERWIN, the principal, and
EDWIN, the agent. It is well to state here that Article 1897 of the New Civil Code upon which petitioner anchors its claim against
respondent EDWIN "does not hold that in case of excess of authority, both the agent and the principal are liable to the other contracting
party."
39
To reiterate, the first part of Article 1897 declares that the principal is liable in cases when the agent acted within the bounds of
his authority. Under this, the agent is completely absolved of any liability. The second part of the said provision presents the situations
when the agent himself becomes liable to a third party when he expressly binds himself or he exceeds the limits of his authority without
giving notice of his powers to the third person. However, it must be pointed out that in case of excess of authority by the agent, like
what petitioner claims exists here, the law does not say that a third person can recover from both the principal and the agent.
40

As we declare that respondent EDWIN acted within his authority as an agent, who did not acquire any right nor incur any liabi lity arising
from the Deed of Assignment, it follows that he is not a real party in interest who should be impleaded in this case. A real party in
interest is one who "stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
41
In this
respect, we sustain his exclusion as a defendant in the suit before the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2004 and Resolution dated 17
March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71397, affirming the Order dated 29 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, for the continuation of the proceedings
against respondent Erwin Cuizon.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice



























DIGEST:
Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Edwin Cuizon and Erwin Cuizon
G.R. No. 167552 April 23, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:
 Eurotech is engaged in the business of importation and distribution of various European industrial equipment. It has as one of its
customers Impact Systems Sales which is a sole proprietorship owned by Erwin Cuizon.

 Eurotech sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly amounting to P91,338.00. Cuizons sought to buy from Eurotech 1 unit of
sludge pump valued at P250,000.00 with Cuizons making a down payment of P50,000.00. When the sludge pump arrived from the
United Kingdom, Eurotech refused to deliver the same to Cuizons without their having fully settled their indebtedness to Eurotech.
Thus, Edwin Cuizon and Alberto de Jesus, general manager of Eurotech, executed a Deed of Assignment of receivables in favor of
Eurotech.


 Cuizons, despite the existence of the Deed of Assignment, proceeded to collect from Toledo Power Company the amount of
P365,135.29. Eurotech made several demands upon Cuizons to pay their obligations. As a result, Cuizons were able to make parti al
payments to Eurotech. Cuizons‘ total obligations stood at P295,000.00 excluding interests and attorney‘s fees.

 Edwin Cuizon alleged that he is not a real party in interest in this case. According to him, he was acting as mere agent of his
principal, which was the Impact Systems, in his transaction with Eurotech and the latter was very much aware of this fact.

ISSUE: WON Edwin exceeded his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment thereby binding himself personally to pay the
obligations to Eurotech

HELD: No.
 Edwin insists that he was a mere agent of Impact Systems which is owned by Erwin and that his status as such is known even to
Eurotech as it is alleged in the Complaint that he is being sued in his capacity as the sales manager of the said business venture.
Likewise, Edwin points to the Deed of Assignment which clearly states that he was acting as a representative of Impact Systems in
said transaction.

 Art. 1897. The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds himself
or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers.

 In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another
with the latter‘s consent. Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or the party for whom another acts and from whom he
or she derives the authority to act. The basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on
matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal.

 elements of the contract of agency: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) t he agent acts
within the scope of his authority

 An agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts. There are 2 instances when an agent
becomes personally liable to a third person. The first is when he expressly binds himself to the obligation and the second is when he
exceeds his authority. In the last instance, the agent can be held liable if he does not give the third party sufficient notice of his
powers. Edwin does not fall within any of the exceptions contained in Art. 1897.

 In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a managing agent may enter into any contracts that he deems reasonably necessary
or requisite for the protection of the interests of his principal entrusted to his management.

 Edwin Cuizon acted well-within his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment. Eurotech refused to deliver the 1 unit of sludge
pump unless it received, in full, the payment for Impact Systems‘ indebtedness. Impact Systems desperately needed the sludge
pump for its business since after it paid the amount of P50,000.00 as downpayment it still persisted in negotiating with Eurotech
which culminated in the execution of the Deed of Assignment of its receivables from Toledo Power Company. The significant amount
of time spent on the negotiation for the sale of the sludge pump underscores Impact Systems‘ perseverance to get hold of the said
equipment. Edwin‘s participation in the Deed of Assignment was ―reasonably necessary‖ or was required in order for him to protect
the business of his principal.





Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28740 February 24, 1981
FERMIN Z. CARAM, JR., petitioner,
vs.
CLARO L. LAURETA, respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 29, 1968 in CA-G. R. NO. 35721-
R entitled "Claro L. Laureta, plaintiff-appellee versus Marcos Mata, Codidi Mata and Fermin Caram, Jr., defendants- appellants;
Tampino (Mansaca), et al. Intervenors-appellants," affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No.
3083.
1

On June 25, 1959, Claro L. Laureta filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao an action for nullity, recovery of ownership and/or
reconveyance with damages and attorney's fees against Marcos Mata, Codidi Mata, Fermin Z. Caram, Jr. and the Register of Deeds of
Davao City.
2

On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3019 i n favor of
Claro Laureta, plaintiff, the respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in favor of the plaintiff was not registered because it was not
acknowledged before a notary public or any other authorized officer. At the time the sale was executed, there was no authorized officer
before whom the sale could be acknowledged inasmuch as the civil government in Tagum, Davao was not as yet organized. However,
the defendant Marcos Mata delivered to Laureta the peaceful and lawful possession of the premises of the land together with the
pertinent papers thereof such as the Owner's Duplicate Original Certificate of Title No. 3019, sketch plan, tax declaration, tax receipts
and other papers related thereto.
3
Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is stin in continuous, adverse and notorious
occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or stopped by any of the defendants or their representatives. In fact, Laureta
had been paying realty taxes due thereon and had introduced improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
4

On May 5, 1947, the same land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3019 was sold by Marcos Mata to defendant Fermin Z.
Caram, Jr., petitioner herein. The deed of sale in favor of Caram was acknowledged before Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. On May 22,
1947, Marcos Mata, through Attys. Abelardo Aportadera and Gumercindo Arcilla, filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a
petition for the issuance of a new Owner's Duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 3019, alleging as ground therefor the loss of said
title in the evacuation place of defendant Marcos Mata in Magugpo, Tagum, Davao. On June 5, 1947, the Court of First Instance of
Davao issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title No. 3019 in favor
of Marcos Mata and declaring the lost title as null and void. On December 9, 1947, the second sale between Marcos Mata and Fermin
Caram, Jr. was registered with the Register of Deeds. On the same date, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in favor of
Fermin Caram Jr.
5

On August 29, 1959, the defendants Marcos Mata and Codidi Mata filed their answer with counterclaim admitting the existence of a
private absolute deed of sale of his only property in favor of Claro L. Laureta but alleging that he signed the same as he was subjected
to duress, threat and intimidation for the plaintiff was the commanding officer of the 10th division USFIP operating in the unoccupied
areas of Northern Davao with its headquarters at Project No. 7 (Km. 60, Davao Agusan Highways), in the Municipality of Tagum,
Province of Davao; that Laureta's words and requests were laws; that although the defendant Mata did not like to sell his property or
sign the document without even understanding the same, he was ordered to accept P650.00 Mindanao Emergency notes; and that due
to his fear of harm or danger that will happen to him or to his family, if he refused he had no other alternative but to sign the document.
6

The defendants Marcos Mata and Codidi Mata also admit the existence of a record in the Registry of Deeds regarding a document
allegedly signed by him in favor of his co-defendant Fermin Caram, Jr. but denies that he ever signed the document for he knew before
hand that he had signed a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was in possession of the certificate of title; that if ever
his thumb mark appeared in the document purportedly alienating the property to Fermin Caram, did his consent was obtained through
fraud and misrepresentation for the defendant Mata is illiterate and ignorant and did not know what he was signing; and that he did not
receive a consideration for the said sale.
7

The defendant Fermin Caram Jr. filed his answer on October 23, 1959 alleging that he has no knowledge or information about the
previous encumbrances, transactions, and alienations in favor of plaintiff until the filing of the complaints.
8

The trial court rendered a decision dated February 29, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads:
9

1. Declaring that the deed of sale, Exhibit A, executed by Marcos Mata in favor of Claro L. Laureta stands and
prevails over the deed of sale, Exhibit F, in favor of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
2. Declaring as null and void the deed of sale Exhibit F, in favor of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
3. Directing Marcos Mata to acknowledge the deed of sale, Exhibit A, in favor of Claro L. Laureta;
4. Directing Claro L. Laureta to secure the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the
deed, Exhibit A, after Marcos Mata shall have acknowledged the same before a notary public;
5. Directing Claro L. Laureta to surrender to the Register of Deeds for the City and Province of Davao the Owner's
Duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 3019 and the latter to cancel the same;
6. Ordering the Register of Deeds for the City and Province of Davao to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-140
in the name of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
7. Directing the Register of Deeds for the City and Province of Davao to issue a title in favor of Claro L. Laureta,
Filipino, resident of Quezon City, upon presentation of the deed executed by Marcos Mata in his favor, Exhibit A, duly
acknowledged by him and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
8. Dismissing the counterclaim and cross claim of Marcos Mata and Codidi Mata, the counterclaim of Caram, Jr., the
answer in intervention, counterclaim and cross-claim of the Mansacas.
The Court makes no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The defendants appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals.
10
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. NO. 35721- R.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on January 29, 1968 affirming the judgment of the trial court.
In his brief, the petitioner assigns the following errors:
11

I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IRESPE AND APORTADERA WERE
ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT OF PETITIONER CARAM FOR THE PURPOSE OF BUYING THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN THE
TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTE LEGAL EVIDENCE OF FRAUD ON THE PART OF IRESPE AND APORTADERA AT
TRIBUTABLE TO PETITIONER.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT
KNOWLEDGE OF IRESPE AND APORTADERA OF A PRIOR UNREGISTERED SALE OF A TITLED PROPERTY
ATTRIBUTABLE TO PETITIONER AND EQUIVALENT IN LAW OF REGISTRATION OF SAID SALE.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD PRESCRIBES WITHIN FOUR (4) YEARS.
The petitioner assails the finding of the trial court that the second sale of the property was made through his representatives, Pedro
Irespe and Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. He argues that Pedro Irespe was acting merely as a broker or intermediary with the specific task
and duty to pay Marcos Mata the sum of P1,000.00 for the latter's property and to see to it that the requisite deed of sale covering the
purchase was properly executed by Marcos Mata; that the Identity of the property to be bought and the price of the purchase had
already been agreed upon by the parties; and that the other alleged representative, Atty. Aportadera, merely acted as a notary public in
the execution of the deed of sale.
The contention of the petitioner has no merit. The facts of record show that Mata, the vendor, and Caram, the second vendee had
never met. During the trial, Marcos Mata testified that he knows Atty. Aportadera but did not know Caram.
12
Thus, the sale of the
property could have only been through Caram's representatives, Irespe and Aportadera. The petitioner, in his answer, admitted that
Atty. Aportadera acted as his notary public and attorney-in-fact at the same time in the purchase of the property.
13

The petitioner contends that he cannot be considered to have acted in bad faith because there is no direct proof showing that Irespe
and Aportadera, his alleged agents, had knowledge of the first sale to Laureta. This contention is also without merit.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, said:
14

The trial court, in holding that appellant Caram. Jr. was not a purchaser in good faith, at the time he bought the same
property from appellant Mata, on May 5, 1947, entirely discredited the testimony of Aportadera. Thus it stated in its
decision:
The testimony of Atty. Aportadera quoted elsewhere in this decision is hollow. There is every reason to believe that
Irespe and he had known of the sale of the property in question to Laureta on the day Mata and Irespe, accompanied
by Leaning Mansaca, went to the office of Atty. Aportadera for the sale of the same property to Caram, Jr.,
represented by Irespe as attorney-in-fact. Ining Mansaca was with the two — Irespe and Mata — to engage the
services 6f Atty. Aportadera in the annulment of the sale of his land to Laureta. When Leaning Mansaca narrated to
Atty. Aportadera the circumstances under which his property had been sold to Laureta, he must have included in the
narration the sale of the land of Mata, for the two properties had been sold on the same occassion and under the
same circumstances. Even as early as immediately after liberation, Irespe, who was the witness in most of the cases
filed by Atty. Aportadera in his capacity as Provincial Fiscal of Davao against Laureta, must have known of the
purchases of lands made by Laureta when he was regimental commander, one of which was the sale made by Mata.
It was not a mere coincidence that Irespe was made guardian ad litem of Leaning Mansaca, at the suggestion of Atty.
Aportadera and attorney-in-fact of Caram, Jr.
The Court cannot help being convinced that Irespe, attorney-in-fact of Caram, Jr. had knowledge of the prior existing
transaction, Exhibit A, between Mata and Laureta over the land, subject matter of this litigation, when the deed,
Exhibit F, was executed by Mata in favor of Caram, Jr. And this knowledge has the effect of registration as to Caram,
Jr. RA pp. 123-124)
We agree with His Honor's conclusion on this particular point, on two grounds — the first, the same concerns matters
affecting the credibility of a witness of which the findings of the trial court command great weight, and second, the
same is borne out by the testimony of Atty. Aportadera himself. (t.s.n., pp. 187-190, 213-215, Restauro).
Even if Irespe and Aportadera did not have actual knowledge of the first sale, still their actions have not satisfied the requirement of
good faith. Bad faith is not based solely on the fact that a vendee had knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor. In the case
of Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson, this Court held:
15

One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor can not claim that he has
acquired title thereto in good faith, as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein, and the same rule
must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as
might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
In the instant case, Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put them an inquiry. Both of them
knew that Mata's certificate of title together with other papers pertaining to the land was taken by soldiers under the command of Col.
Claro L. Laureta.
16
Added to this is the fact that at the time of the second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land. Irespe
and Aportadera should have investigated the nature of Laureta's possession. If they failed to exercise the ordinary care expected of a
buyer of real estate they must suffer the consequences. The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed
title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
17

The principle that a person dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate and inquire into
transactions the existence of which is not there intimated
18
should not apply in this case. It was of common knowledge that at the time
the soldiers of Laureta took the documents from Mata, the civil government of Tagum was not yet established and that there were no
officials to ratify contracts of sale and make them registerable. Obviously, Aportadera and Irespe knew that even if Mata previously had
sold t he Disputed such sale could not have been registered.
There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram, purchased the property of Mata in bad faith. Applying
the principle of agency, Caram as principal, should also be deemed to have acted in bad faith.
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recordered it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shag pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (1473)
Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no registration at all.
19

The question to be determined now is, who was first in possession in good faith? A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
20
Laureta was first in possession of the property. He is also a
possessor in good faith. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of sale in favor of Laureta was procured by force.
21
Such defect,
however, was cured when, after the lapse of four years from the time the intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an
action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the same.
Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioner contends that the second deed of sale, Exhibit "F", is a voidable contract. Being a
voidable contract, the action for annulment of the same on the ground of fraud must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery
of the fraud. In the case at bar, Laureta is deemed to have discovered that the land in question has been sold to Caram to his prejudice
on December 9, 1947, when the Deed of Sale, Exhibit "F" was recorded and entered in the Original Certificate of Title by the Register of
Deeds and a new Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in the name of Caram. Therefore, when the present case was filed on June 29,
1959, plaintiff's cause of action had long prescribed.
The petitioner's conclusion that the second deed of sale, "Exhibit F", is a voidable contract is not correct. I n order that fraud can be a
ground for the annulment of a contract, it must be employed prior to or simultaneous to the, consent or creation of the contract. The
fraud or dolo causante must be that which determines or is the essential cause of the contract. Dolo causante as a ground for the
annulment of contract is specifically described in Article 1338 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines as "insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties" which induced the other to enter into a contract, and "without them, he would not have
agreed to".
The second deed of sale in favor of Caram is not a voidable contract. No evidence whatsoever was shown that through insidious words
or machinations, the representatives of Caram, Irespe and Aportadera had induced Mata to enter into the contract.
Since the second deed of sale is not a voidable contract, Article 1391, Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that the action for
annulment shall be brought within four (4) years from the time of the discovery of fraud does not apply. Moreover, Laureta has been in
continuous possession of the land since he bought it in June 1945.
A more important reason why Laureta's action could not have prescribed is that the second contract of sale, having been registered in
bad faith, is null and void. Article 1410 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that any action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
In a Memorandum of Authorities
22
submitted to this Court on March 13, 1978, the petitioner insists that the action of Laureta against
Caram has prescribed because the second contract of sale is not void under Article 1409
23
of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
enumerates the kinds of contracts which are considered void. Moreover, Article 1544 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines does not
declare void a second sale of immovable registered in bad faith.
The fact that the second contract is not considered void under Article 1409 and that Article 1544 does not declare void a deed of sale
registered in bad faith does not mean that said contract is not void. Article 1544 specifically provides who shall be the owner in case of
a double sale of an immovable property. To give full effect to this provision, the status of the two contracts must be declared valid so
that one vendee may contract must be declared void to cut off all rights which may arise from said contract. Otherwise, Article 1544 win
be meaningless.
The first sale in favor of Laureta prevails over the sale in favor of Caram.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


DIGEST:
Caram vs. Laureta
G.R. No. L-28740 February 24, 1981
FERNANDEZ, J .:
FACTS:
On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land covered by OCT No. 3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, plaintiff,
the respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in favor of the plaintiff was not registered because it was not acknowledged before a
notary public or any other authorized officer. Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is in continuous, adverse and
notorious occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or stopped by any of the defendants or their representatives.
In fact, Laureta had been paying realty taxes due thereon and had introduced improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at t he time
of the filing of the complaint. On May 5, 1947, the same land covered by OCT No. 3019 was sold by Marcos Mata to defendant Fermin
Z. Caram, Jr., petitioner herein.
The deed of sale in favor of Caram was acknowledged before Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. On December 9, 1947, the second sale
between Marcos Mata and Fermin Caram, Jr. was registered with the Register of Deeds. On the same date, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 140 was issued in favor of Fermin Caram Jr.The defendant Fermin Caram Jr. claimed that he has no knowledge or information
about the previous encumbrances, transactions, and alienations in favor of plaintiff until the filing of the complaints.
ISSUE: Whether or not the knowledge petitioner of a prior unregistered sale of a titled property attributable to petitioner and equi valent
in law of registration of sale.
HELD: Yes. There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram, purchased the property of Mata in bad faith.
Applying the principle of agency, Caram as principal, should also be deemed to have acted in bad faith.Since Caram was a registrant in
bad faith, the situation is as if there was no registration at all.
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invali dates it.
Laureta was first in possession of the property. He is also a possessor in good faith. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of
sale in favor of Laureta was procured by force. Such defect, however, was cured when, after the lapse of four years from the time the
intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an action for annulment or to set up nullity of the contract as a defense in an
action to enforce the same.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57339 December 29, 1983
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE G. GANA (Deceased), CLARA A. GANA, RAMON GANA, MANUEL GANA, MARIA
TERESA GANA, ROBERTO GANA, JAIME JAVIER GANA, CLOTILDE VDA. DE AREVALO, and EMILY SAN JUAN, respondents.
Benjamin S. Valte for petitioner.
Napoleon Garcia for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner AIR FRANCE assails the Decision of then respondent Court of Appeals
1
promulgated
on 15 December 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 58164-R, entitled "Jose G. Gana, et al. vs. Sociedad Nacionale Air France", which reversed the
Trial Court's judgment dismissing the Complaint of private respondents for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage, and
awarding instead P90,000.00 as moral damages.
Sometime in February, 1970, the late Jose G. Gana and his family, numbering nine (the GANAS), purchased from AIR FRANCE
through Imperial Travels, Incorporated, a duly authorized travel agent, nine (9) "open-dated" air passage tickets for the
Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila route. The GANAS paid a total of US$2,528.85 for their economy and first class fares. Said tickets were
bought at the then prevailing exchange rate of P3.90 per US$1.00. The GANAS also paid travel taxes of P100.00 for each passenger.
On 24 April 1970, AIR FRANCE exchanged or substituted the aforementioned tickets with other tickets for the same route. At this time,
the GANAS were booked for the Manila/Osaka segment on AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for 8 May 1970, and for the Tokyo/Manila return
trip on AIR FRANCE Flight 187 on 22 May 1970. The aforesaid tickets were valid until 8 May 1971, the date written under the printed
words "Non valuable apres de (meaning, "not valid after the").
The GANAS did not depart on 8 May 1970.
Sometime in January, 1971, Jose Gana sought the assistance of Teresita Manucdoc, a Secretary of the Sta. Clara Lumber Company
where Jose Gana was the Director and Treasurer, for the extension of the validity of their tickets, which were due to expire on 8 May
1971. Teresita enlisted the help of Lee Ella Manager of the Philippine Travel Bureau, who used to handle travel arrangements for the
personnel of the Sta. Clara Lumber Company. Ella sent the tickets to Cesar Rillo, Office Manager of AIR FRANCE. The tickets were
returned to Ella who was informed that extension was not possible unless the fare differentials resulting from the increase i n fares
triggered by an increase of the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Philippine peso and the increased travel tax were first paid. Ella
then returned the tickets to Teresita and informed her of the impossibility of extension.
In the meantime, the GANAS had scheduled their departure on 7 May 1971 or one day before the expiry date. In the morning of the
very day of their scheduled departure on the first leg of their trip, Teresita requested travel agent Ella to arrange the revalidation of the
tickets. Ella gave the same negative answer and warned her that although the tickets could be used by the GANAS if they left on 7 May
1971, the tickets would no longer be valid for the rest of their trip because the tickets would then have expired on 8 May 1971. Teresita
replied that it will be up to the GANAS to make the arrangements. With that assurance, Ella on his own, attached to the tickets
validating stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, one a JAL. sticker and the other an SAS (Scandinavian Airways System) sticker. The SAS
sticker indicates thereon that it was "Reevaluated by: the Philippine Travel Bureau, Branch No. 2" (as shown by a circular rubber
stamp) and signed "Ador", and the date is handwritten in the center of the circle. Then appear under printed headings the notations: JL.
108 (Flight), 16 May (Date), 1040 (Time), OK (status). Apparently, Ella made no more attempt to contact AIR FRANCE as there was no
more time.
Notwithstanding the warnings, the GANAS departed from Manila in the afternoon of 7 May 1971 on board AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for
Osaka, Japan. There is no question with respect to this leg of the trip.
However, for the Osaka/Tokyo flight on 17 May 1971, Japan Airlines refused to honor the tickets because of their expiration, and the
GANAS had to purchase new tickets. They encountered the same difficulty with respect to their return trip to Manila as AIR FRANCE
also refused to honor their tickets. They were able to return only after pre-payment in Manila, through their relatives, of the readjusted
rates. They finally flew back to Manila on separate Air France Frights on 19 May 1971 for Jose Gana and 26 May 1971 for the rest of
the family.
On 25 August 1971, the GANAS commenced before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, Civil Case No. 84111 for
damages arising from breach of contract of carriage.
AIR FRANCE traversed the material allegations of the Complaint and alleged that the GANAS brought upon themselves the
predicament they found themselves in and assumed the consequential risks; that travel agent Ella's affixing of validating sti ckers on the
tickets without the knowledge and consent of AIR FRANCE, violated airline tariff rules and regulations and was beyond the scope of his
authority as a travel agent; and that AIR FRANCE was not guilty of any fraudulent conduct or bad faith.
On 29 May 1975, the Trial Court dismissed the Complaint based on Partial and Additional Stipulations of Fact as wen as on the
documentary and testimonial evidence.
The GANAS appealed to respondent Appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Jose Gana, the principal plaintiff, died.
On 15 December 1980, respondent Appellate Court set aside and reversed the Trial Court's judgment in a Decision, which decreed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside. Air France is hereby ordered to pay appellants moral
damages in the total sum of NINETY THOUSAND PESOS (P90,000.00) plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
2

Reconsideration sought by AIR FRANCE was denied, hence, petitioner's recourse before this instance, to which we gave due course.
The crucial issue is whether or not, under the environmental milieu the GANAS have made out a case for breach of contract of carriage
entitling them to an award of damages.
We are constrained to reverse respondent Appellate Court's affirmative ruling thereon.
Pursuant to tariff rules and regulations of the International Air Transportation Association (IATA), included in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11
of the Stipulations of Fact between the parties in the Trial Court, dated 31 March 1973, an airplane ticket is valid for one year. "The
passenger must undertake the final portion of his journey by departing from the last point at which he has made a voluntary stop before
the expiry of this limit (parag. 3.1.2. ) ... That is the time allowed a passenger to begin and to complete his trip (parags. 3.2 and 3.3.). ...
A ticket can no longer be used for travel if its validity has expired before the passenger completes his trip (parag. 3.5.1.) ... To complete
the trip, the passenger must purchase a new ticket for the remaining portion of the journey" (ibid.)
3

From the foregoing rules, it is clear that AIR FRANCE cannot be faulted for breach of contract when it dishonored the tickets of the
GANAS after 8 May 1971 since those tickets expired on said date; nor when it required the GANAS to buy new tickets or have their
tickets re-issued for the Tokyo/Manila segment of their trip. Neither can it be said that, when upon sale of the new tickets, it imposed
additional charges representing fare differentials, it was motivated by self-interest or unjust enrichment considering that an increase of
fares took effect, as authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in April, 1971. This procedure is well in accord with the IATA tariff
rules which provide:
6. TARIFF RULES
7. APPLICABLE FARE ON THE DATE OF DEPARTURE
3.1 General Rule.
All journeys must be charged for at the fare (or charge) in effect on the date on which transportation commences from
the point of origin. Any ticket sold prior to a change of fare or charge (increase or decrease) occurring between the
date of commencement of the journey, is subject to the above general rule and must be adjusted accordingly. A new
ticket must be issued and the difference is to be collected or refunded as the case may be. No adjustment is
necessary if the increase or decrease in fare (or charge) occurs when the journey is already commenced.
4

The GANAS cannot defend by contending lack of knowledge of those rules since the evidence bears out that Teresita, who handled
travel arrangements for the GANAS, was duly informed by travel agent Ella of the advice of Reno, the Office Manager of Air France,
that the tickets in question could not be extended beyond the period of their validity without paying the fare differentials and additional
travel taxes brought about by the increased fare rate and travel taxes.
ATTY. VALTE
Q What did you tell Mrs. Manucdoc, in turn after being told this by Mr. Rillo?
A I told her, because that is the reason why they accepted again the tickets when we returned the
tickets spin, that they could not be extended. They could be extended by paying the additional fare,
additional tax and additional exchange during that time.
Q You said so to Mrs. Manucdoc?
A Yes, sir." ...
5

The ruling relied on by respondent Appellate Court, therefore, in KLM. vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 237 (1975), holding that it would
be unfair to charge respondents therein with automatic knowledge or notice of conditions in contracts of adhesion, is inapplicable. To all
legal intents and purposes, Teresita was the agent of the GANAS and notice to her of the rejection of the request for extension of the
validity of the tickets was notice to the GANAS, her principals.
The SAS validating sticker for the Osaka/Tokyo flight affixed by Era showing reservations for JAL. Flight 108 for 16 May 1971, without
clearing the same with AIR FRANCE allegedly because of the imminent departure of the GANAS on the same day so that he could not
get in touch with Air France
6
was certainly in contravention of IATA rules although as he had explained, he did so upon Teresita's
assurance that for the onward flight from Osaka and return, the GANAS would make other arrangements.
Q Referring you to page 33 of the transcript of the last session, I had this question which reads as
follows: 'But did she say anything to you when you said that the tickets were about to expire?' Your
answer was: 'I am the one who asked her. At that time I told her if the tickets being used ... I was
telling her what about their bookings on the return. What about their travel on the return? She told
me it is up for the Ganas to make the arrangement.' May I know from you what did you mean by
this testimony of yours?
A That was on the day when they were asking me on May 7, 1971 when they were checking the
tickets. I told Mrs. Manucdoc that I was going to get the tickets. I asked her what about the tickets
onward from the return from Tokyo, and her answer was it is up for the Ganas to make the
arrangement, because I told her that they could leave on the seventh, but they could take care of
that when they arrived in Osaka.
Q What do you mean?
A The Ganas will make the arrangement from Osaka, Tokyo and Manila.
Q What arrangement?
A The arrangement for the airline because the tickets would expire on May 7, and they insisted on
leaving. I asked Mrs. Manucdoc what about the return onward portion because they would be
travelling to Osaka, and her answer was, it is up to for the Ganas to make the arrangement.
Q Exactly what were the words of Mrs. Manucdoc when you told her that? If you can remember,
what were her exact words?
A Her words only, it is up for the Ganas to make the arrangement.
Q This was in Tagalog or in English?
A I think it was in English. ...
7

The circumstances that AIR FRANCE personnel at the ticket counter in the airport allowed the GANAS to leave is not tantamount to an
implied ratification of travel agent Ella's irregular actuations. It should be recalled that the GANAS left in Manila the day before the
expiry date of their tickets and that "other arrangements" were to be made with respect to the remaining segments. Besides, the
validating stickers that Ella affixed on his own merely reflect the status of reservations on the specified flight and could not legally serve
to extend the validity of a ticket or revive an expired one.
The conclusion is inevitable that the GANAS brought upon themselves the predicament they were in for having insisted on using tickets
that were due to expire in an effort, perhaps, to beat the deadline and in the thought that by commencing the trip the day before the
expiry date, they could complete the trip even thereafter. It should be recalled that AIR FRANCE was even unaware of the validating
SAS and JAL. stickers that Ella had affixed spuriously. Consequently, Japan Air Lines and AIR FRANCE merely acted within their
contractual rights when they dishonored the tickets on the remaining segments of the trip and when AIR FRANCE demanded payment
of the adjusted fare rates and travel taxes for the Tokyo/Manila flight.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby reversed and set aside, and the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents
hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
DIGEST:
AIR FRANCE VS CA
Facts:
In February, 1970, the late Jose G. Gana and his family, (the GANAS), purchased from AIR FRANCE through Imperial Travels,
Incorporated, a duly authorized travel agent, nine "open-dated" air passage tickets for the Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila route.
On April 24, 1970, AIR FRANCE exchanged or substituted the aforementioned tickets with other tickets for the same route. At this time,
the GANAS were booked for the Manila/Osaka segment on AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for May 8, 1970, and for the Tokyo/Manila return
trip on AIR FRANCE Flight 187 on May 22, 1970. The aforesaid tickets were valid until May 8, 1971.The GANAS did not depart on 8
May 1970.
Jose Gana sought the assistance of Teresita Manucdoc, a Secretary of the Sta. Clara Lumber Company where Jose Gana was the
Director and Treasurer, for the extension of the validity of their tickets, which were due to expire on May 8, 1971. Teresita enlisted the
help of Lee Ella Manager of the Philippine Travel Bureau, who used to handle travel arrangements for the personnel of the Sta. Clara
Lumber Company. Ella sent the tickets to Cesar Rillo, Office Manager of AIR FRANCE.
The tickets were returned to Ella who was informed that extension was not possible. Ella then returned the tickets to Teresita and
informed her of the impossibility of extension.
In the meantime, the GANAS had scheduled their departure on May 7, 1971 or one day before the expiry date. In the morning of the
very day of their scheduled departure on the first leg of their trip, Teresita requested travel agent Ella to arrange the revalidation of the
tickets. Ella gave the same negative answer and warned her that although the tickets could be used by the GANAS if they left onMay 7,
1971, the tickets would no longer be valid for the rest of their trip because the tickets would then have expired on May 8,1971. Teresita
replied that it will be up to the GANAS to make the arrangements. Notwithstanding the warnings, the GANAS departed from Manil a in
the afternoon of May 7, 1971 on board AIR FRANCE Flight 184 for Osaka, Japan.
However, for the Osaka/Tokyo flight on May 17, 1971, Japan Airlines refused to honor the tickets because of their expiration, and the
GANAS had to purchase new tickets. They encountered the same difficulty with respect to their return trip to Manila as AIR FRANCE
also refused to honor their tickets. They were able to return only after pre-payment in Manila, through their relatives, of the readjusted
rates. They finally flew back to Manila on separate Air France Frights.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita was the agent of the GANAS and notice to of the rejection of the request of the validity of the tickets was notice
to the GANAS, her principals.
Held:
The GANAS cannot defend by contending lack of knowledge of those rules since the evidence bears out that Teresita, who handled
travel arrangements for the GANAS, was duly informed by travel agent Ella of the advice of Reno, the Office Manager of Air France,
that the tickets in question could not be extended beyond the period of their validity without paying the fare differentials and additional
travel taxes brought about by the increased fare rate and travel taxes.
To all legal intents and purposes, Teresita was the agent of the GANAS and notice to her of the rejection of the request for extension of
the validity of the tickets was notice to the GANAS, her principals.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby reversed and set aside, and the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents
hereby dismissed.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156262 July 14, 2005
MARIA TUAZON, ALEJANDRO P. TUAZON, MELECIO P. TUAZON, Spouses ANASTACIO and MARY T.
BUENAVENTURA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF BARTOLOME RAMOS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Stripped of nonessentials, the present case involves the collection of a sum of money. Specifically, this case arose from the failure of
petitioners to pay respondents‘ predecessor-in-interest. This fact was shown by the non-encashment of checks issued by a third
person, but indorsed by herein Petitioner Maria Tuazon in favor of the said predecessor. Under these circumstances, to enable
respondents to collect on the indebtedness, the check drawer need not be impleaded in the Complaint. Thus, the suit is directed, not
against the drawer, but against the debtor who indorsed the checks in payment of the obligation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the July 31, 2002 Decision
2
of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 46535. The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED."
On the other hand, the affirmed Decision
3
of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the defendants spouses
Leonilo Tuazon and Maria Tuazon to pay the plaintiffs, as follows:
"1. The sum of P1,750,050.00, with interests from the filing of the second amended complaint;
"2. The sum of P50,000.00, as attorney‘s fees;
"3. The sum of P20,000.00, as moral damages
"4. And to pay the costs of suit.
x x x x x x x x x"
4

The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:
"[Respondents] alleged that between the period of May 2, 1988 and June 5, 1988, spouses Leonilo and Maria Tuazon purchased a
total of 8,326 cavans of rice from [the deceased Bartolome] Ramos [predecessor-in-interest of respondents]. That of this [quantity,] x x
x only 4,437 cavans [have been paid for so far], leaving unpaid 3,889 cavans valued at P1,211,919.00. In payment therefor, the
spouses Tuazon issued x x x [several] Traders Royal Bank checks.
x x x x x x x x x
[B]ut when these [checks] were encashed, all of the checks bounced due to insufficiency of funds. [Respondents] advanced that before
issuing said checks[,] spouses Tuazon already knew that they had no available fund to support the checks, and they failed to provide
for the payment of these despite repeated demands made on them.
"[Respondents] averred that because spouses Tuazon anticipated that they would be sued, they conspired with the other [defendants]
to defraud them as creditors by executing x x x fictitious sales of their properties. They executed x x x simulated sale[s] [of three lots] in
favor of the x x x spouses Buenaventura x x x[,] as well as their residential lot and the house thereon[,] all located at Nueva Ecija, and
another simulated deed of sale dated July 12, 1988 of a Stake Toyota registered with the Land Transportation Office of Cabanatuan
City on September 7, 1988. [Co-petitioner] Melecio Tuazon, a son of spouses Tuazon, registered a fictitious Deed of Sale on July 19,
1988 x x x over a residential lot located at Nueva Ecija. Another simulated sale of a Toyota Willys was executed on January 25, 1988 in
favor of their other son, [co-petitioner] Alejandro Tuazon x x x. As a result of the said sales, the titles of these properties issued in the
names of spouses Tuazon were cancelled and new ones were issued in favor of the [co-]defendants spouses Buenaventura, Alejandro
Tuazon and Melecio Tuazon. Resultantly, by the said ante-dated and simulated sales and the corresponding transfers there was no
more property left registered in the names of spouses Tuazon answerable to creditors, to the damage and prejudice of [respondents].
"For their part, defendants denied having purchased x x x rice from [Bartolome] Ramos. They alleged that it was Magdalena Ramos,
wife of said deceased, who owned and traded the merchandise and Maria Tuazon was merely her agent. They argued that it was
Evangeline Santos who was the buyer of the rice and issued the checks to Maria Tuazon as payments therefor. In good faith[,] the
checks were received [by petitioner] from Evangeline Santos and turned over to Ramos without knowing that these were not funded.
And it is for this reason that [petitioners] have been insisting on the inclusion of Evangeline Santos as an indispensable party, and her
non-inclusion was a fatal error. Refuting that the sale of several properties were fictitious or simulated, spouses Tuazon contended that
these were sold because they were then meeting financial difficulties but the disposals were made for value and in good faith and done
before the filing of the instant suit. To dispute the contention of plaintiffs that they were the buyers of the rice, they argued that there
was no sales invoice, official receipts or like evidence to prove this. They assert that they were merely agents and should not be held
answerable."
5

The corresponding civil and criminal cases were filed by respondents against Spouses Tuazon. Those cases were later consolidated
and amended to include Spouses Anastacio and Mary Buenaventura, with Alejandro Tuazon and Melecio Tuazon as additional
defendants. Having passed away before the pretrial, Bartolome Ramos was substituted by his heirs, herein respondents.
Contending that Evangeline Santos was an indispensable party in the case, petitioners moved to file a third-party complaint against her.
Allegedly, she was primarily liable to respondents, because she was the one who had purchased the merchandise from their
predecessor, as evidenced by the fact that the checks had been drawn in her name. The RTC, however, denied petitioners‘ Motion.
Since the trial court acquitted petitioners in all three of the consolidated criminal cases, they appealed only its decision finding them
civilly liable to respondents.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioners had failed to prove the existence of an agency between respondents and Spouses
Tuazon. The appellate court disbelieved petitioners‘ contention that Evangeline Santos should have been impleaded as an
indispensable party. Inasmuch as all the checks had been indorsed by Maria Tuazon, who thereby became liable to subsequent
holders for the amounts stated in those checks, there was no need to implead Santos.
Hence, this Petition.
6

Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners are not agents of the respondents.
"2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in rendering judgment against the petitioners despite x x x the failure of the
respondents to include in their action Evangeline Santos, an indispensable party to the suit."
7

The Court‘s Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Agency
Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme Court‘s role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing errors of law allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals. Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the parties
and this Court.
8
Petitioners have not given us sufficient reasons to deviate from this rule.
In a contract of agency, one binds oneself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
latter‘s consent or authority.
9
The following are the elements of agency: (1) the parties‘consent, express or implied, to establish the
relationship; (2) the object, which is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the representation, by which the one
who acts as an agent does so, not for oneself, but as a representative; (4) the limitation that the agent acts within the scope of his or
her authority.
10
As the basis of agency is representation, there must be, on the part of the principal, an actual intention to appoint, an
intention naturally inferable from the principal‘s words or actions. In the same manner, there must be an intention on the part of the
agent to accept the appointment and act upon it. Absent such mutual intent, there is generally no agency.
11

This Court finds no reversible error in the findings of the courts a quo that petitioners were the rice buyers themselves; they were not
mere agents of respondents in their rice dealership. The question of whether a contract is one of sale or of agency depends on the
intention of the parties.
12

The declarations of agents alone are generally insufficient to establish the fact or extent of their authority.
13
The law makes no
presumption of agency; proving its existence, nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it.
14
In the present case,
petitioners raise the fact of agency as an affirmative defense, yet fail to prove its existence.
The Court notes that petitioners, on their own behalf, sued Evangeline Santos for collection of the amounts represented by the bounced
checks, in a separate civil case that they sought to be consolidated with the current one. If, as they claim, they were mere agents of
respondents, petitioners should have brought the suit against Santos for and on behalf of their alleged principal, in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
15
Their filing a suit against her in their own names negates their claim that they
acted as mere agents in selling the rice obtained from Bartolome Ramos.
Second Issue:
Indispensable Party
Petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in not allowing Evangeline Santos to be impleaded as an indispensable party. They insist
that respondents‘ Complaint against them is based on the bouncing checks she issued; hence, they point to her as the person primarily
liable for the obligation.
We hold that respondents‘ cause of action is clearly founded on petitioners‘ failure to pay the purchase price of the rice. The trial court
held that Petitioner Maria Tuazon had indorsed the questioned checks in favor of respondents, in accordance with Sections 31 and 63
of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
16
That Santos was the drawer of the checks is thus immaterial to the respondents‘ cause of action.
As indorser, Petitioner Maria Tuazon warranted that upon due presentment, the checks were to be accepted or paid, or both, according
to their tenor; and that in case they were dishonored, she would pay the corresponding amount.
17
After an instrument is dishonored by
nonpayment, indorsers cease to be merely secondarily liable; they become principal debtors whose liability becomes identical to that of
the original obligor. The holder of a negotiable instrument need not even proceed against the maker before suing the
indorser.
18
Clearly, Evangeline Santos -- as the drawer of the checks -- is not an indispensable party in an action against Maria Tuazon,
the indorser of the checks.
Indispensable parties are defined as "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had."
19
The instant case was
originally one for the collection of the purchase price of the rice bought by Maria Tuazon from respondents‘ predecessor. In this case, it
is clear that there is no privity of contract between respondents and Santos. Hence, a final determination of the rights and interest of the
parties may be made without any need to implead her.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN








Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150128 August 31, 2006
LAUREANO T. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS (PNR) AND RODOLFO FLORES,
1
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J .:
Under consideration is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing and seeking to set aside the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54062, to wit:
1. Decision
2
dated June 4, 2001, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 79, which
dismissed the complaint for specific performance and damages thereat commenced by the petitioner against the herein respondents;
and
2. Resolution
3
dated September 17, 2001, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts:
On May 5, 1980, the respondent Philippine National Railways (PNR) informed a certain Gaudencio Romualdez (Romualdez,
hereinafter) that it has accepted the latter‘s offer to buy, on an "AS IS, WHERE IS" basis, the PNR‘s scrap/unserviceable rails located in
Del Carmen and Lubao, Pampanga at P1,300.00 and P2,100.00 per metric ton, respectively, for the total amount of P96,600.00. After
paying the stated purchase price, Romualdez addressed a letter to Atty. Cipriano Dizon, PNR‘s Acting Purchasing Agent. Bearing date
May 26, 1980, the letter reads:
Dear Atty. Dizon:
This is to inform you as President of San Juanico Enterprises, that I have authorized the bearer, LIZETTE R. WIJANCO of No. 1606
Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, to be my lawful representative in the withdrawal of the scrap/unserviceable rails awarded to me.
For this reason, I have given her the original copy of the award, dated May 5, 1980 and O.R. No. 8706855 dated May 20, 1980 which
will indicate my waiver of rights, interests and participation in favor of LIZETTE R. WIJANCO.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Gaudencio Romualdez
The Lizette R. Wijanco mentioned in the letter was Lizette Wijanco- Angeles, petitioner's now deceased wife. That very same day –
May 26, 1980 – Lizette requested the PNR to transfer the location of withdrawal for the reason that the scrap/unserviceable rails
located in Del Carmen and Lubao, Pampanga were not ready for hauling. The PNR granted said request and allowed Lizette to
withdraw scrap/unserviceable rails in Murcia, Capas and San Miguel, Tarlac instead. However, the PNR subsequently suspended the
withdrawal in view of what it considered as documentary discrepancies coupled by reported pilferages of over P500,000.00 worth of
PNR scrap properties in Tarlac.
Consequently, the spouses Angeles demanded the refund of the amount of P96,000.00. The PNR, however, refused to pay, alleging
that as per delivery receipt duly signed by Lizette, 54.658 metric tons of unserviceable rails had already been withdrawn whi ch,
at P2,100.00 per metric ton, were worth P114,781.80, an amount that exceeds the claim for refund.
On August 10, 1988, the spouses Angeles filed suit against the PNR and its corporate secretary, Rodolfo Flores, among others, for
specific performance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In it, they prayed that PNR be directed to deliver 46
metric tons of scrap/unserviceable rails and to pay them damages and attorney's fees.
Issues having been joined following the filing by PNR, et al., of their answer, trial ensued. Meanwhile, Lizette W. Angeles passed away
and was substituted by her heirs, among whom is her husband, herein petitioner Laureno T. Angeles.
On April 16, 1996, the trial court, on the postulate that the spouses Angeles are not the real parties-in-interest, rendered judgment
dismissing their complaint for lack of cause of action. As held by the court, Lizette was merely a representative of Romualdez in the
withdrawal of scrap or unserviceable rails awarded to him and not an assignee to the latter's rights with respect to the award.
Aggrieved, the petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA, which, as stated at the threshold hereof, in its decision of June 4, 2001,
dismissed the appeal and affirmed that of the trial court. The affirmatory decision was reiterated by the CA in its resolution of
September 17, 2001, denying the petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petitioner‘s present recourse on the submission that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's holding that petitioner and his
spouse, as plaintiffs a quo, had no cause of action as they were not the real parties-in-interest in this case.
We DENY the petition.
At the crux of the issue is the matter of how the aforequoted May 26, 1980 letter of Romualdez to Atty. Dizon of the PNR should be
taken: was it meant to designate, or has it the effect of designating, Lizette W. Angeles as a mere agent or as an assignee of his
(Romualdez's) interest in the scrap rails awarded to San Juanico Enterprises? The CA‘s conclusion, affirmatory of that of the trial court,
is that Lizette was not an assignee, but merely an agent whose authority was limited to the withdrawal of the scrap rails, hence, without
personality to sue.
Where agency exists, the third party's (in this case, PNR's) liability on a contract is to the principal and not to the agent and the
relationship of the third party to the principal is the same as that in a contract in which there is no agent. Normally, the agent has neither
rights nor liabilities as against the third party. He cannot thus sue or be sued on the contract. Since a contract may be violated only by
the parties thereto as against each other, the real party-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant in an action upon that contract must,
generally, be a contracting party.
The legal situation is, however, different where an agent is constituted as an assignee. In such a case, the agent may, in hi s own
behalf, sue on a contract made for his principal, as an assignee of such contract. The rule
requiring every action to be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest recognizes the assignment of rights of action and also
recognizes
that when one has a right assigned to him, he is then the real party-in-interest and may maintain an action upon such claim or right.
4

Upon scrutiny of the subject Romualdez's letter to Atty. Cipriano Dizon dated May 26, 1980, it is at once apparent that Lizette was to
act just as a "representative" of Romualdez in the "withdrawal of rails," and not an assignee. For perspective, we reproduce the
contents of said letter:
This is to inform you as President of San Juanico Enterprises, that I have authorized the bearer, LIZETTE R. WIJANCO x x x to be my
lawful representative in the withdrawal of the scrap/unserviceable rails awarded to me.
For this reason, I have given her the original copy of the award, dated May 5, 1980 and O.R. No. 8706855 dated May 20, 1980 which
will indicate my waiver of rights, interests and participation in favor of LIZETTE R. WIJANCO. (Emphasis added)
If Lizette was without legal standing to sue and appear in this case, there is more reason to hold that her petitioner husband, either as
her conjugal partner or her heir, is also without such standing.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the terms "agent" or "attorney-in-fact" were not used in the Romualdez letter aforestated. It bears
to stress, however, that the words "principal" and "agent," are not the only terms used to designate the parties in an agency relation.
The agent may also be called an attorney, proxy, delegate or, as here, representative.
It cannot be over emphasized that Romualdez's use of the active verb "authorized," instead of "assigned," indicated an intent on his
part to keep and retain his interest in the subject matter. Stated a bit differently, he intended to limit Lizette‘s role in the scrap
transaction to being the representative of his interest therein.
Petitioner submits that the second paragraph of the Romualdez letter, stating - "I have given [Lizette] the original copy of the award x x
x which will indicate my waiver of rights, interests and participation in favor of Lizette R. Wijanco" - clarifies that Lizette was intended to
be an assignee, and not a mere agent.
We are not persuaded. As it were, the petitioner conveniently omitted an important phrase preceding the paragraph which would have
put the whole matter in context. The phrase is "For this reason," and the antecedent thereof is his (Romualdez) having appointed
Lizette as his representative in the matter of the withdrawal of the scrap items. In fine, the key phrase clearly conveys the idea that
Lizette was given the original copy of the contract award to enable her to withdraw the rails as Romualdez‘s authorized representative.
Article 1374 of the Civil Code provides that the various stipulations of a contract shall be read and interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. In fine, the real intention of the parties is primarily to be
determined from the language used and gathered from the whole instrument. When put into the context of the letter as a whole, it is
abundantly clear that the rights which Romualdez waived or ceded in favor of Lizette were those in furtherance of the agency relation
that he had established for the withdrawal of the rails.
At any rate, any doubt as to the intent of Romualdez generated by the way his letter was couched could be clarified by the acts of the
main players themselves. Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that to judge the intention of the contracting parties, thei r
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. In other words, in case of doubt, resort may be made to the
situation, surroundings, and relations of the parties.
The fact of agency was, as the trial court aptly observed,
5
confirmed in subsequent letters from the Angeles spouses in which they
themselves refer to Lizette as "authorized representative" of San Juanico Enterprises. Mention may also be made that the withdrawal
receipt which Lizette had signed indicated that she was doing so in a representative capacity. One professing to act as agent for
another is estopped to deny his agency both as against his asserted principal and third persons interested in the transaction which he
engaged in.
Whether or not an agency has been created is a question to be determined by the fact that one represents and is acting for another.
The appellate court, and before it, the trial court, had peremptorily determined that Lizette, with respect to the withdrawal of the scrap in
question, was acting for Romualdez. And with the view we take of this case, there were substantial pieces of evidence adduced to
support this determination. The desired reversal urged by the petitioner cannot, accordingly, be granted. For, factual findings of the trial
court, adopted and confirmed by the CA, are, as a rule, final and conclusive and may not be disturbed on appeal.
6
So it must be here.
Petitioner maintains that the Romualdez letter in question was not in the form of a special power of attorney, implying that the latter had
not intended to merely authorize his wife, Lizette, to perform an act for him (Romualdez). The contention is specious. In the absence of
statute, no form or method of execution is required for a valid power of attorney; it may be in any form clearly showing on its face the
agent‘s authority.
7

A power of attorney is only but an instrument in writing by which a person, as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon
him the authority to perform certain specified acts on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of attorney, and
this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been called a "letter of attorney." Its primary purpose is not to define the authority of
the agent as between himself and his principal but to evidence the authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agent
deals.
8
The letter under consideration is sufficient to constitute a power of attorney. Except as may be required by statute, a power of
attorney is valid although no notary public intervened in its execution.
9

A power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified
therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney.
10
Contextually, all that Lizette was authorized to
do was to withdraw the unserviceable/scrap railings. Allowing her authority to sue therefor, especially in her own name, would be to
read something not intended, let alone written in the Romualdez letter.
Finally, the petitioner's claim that Lizette paid the amount of P96,000.00 to the PNR appears to be a mere afterthought; it ought to be
dismissed outright under the estoppel principle. In earlier proceedings, petitioner himself admitted in his complaint that it was
Romualdez who paid this amount.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice





Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 120465 September 9, 1999
WILLIAM UY and RODEL ROXAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERT BALAO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J .:
Petitioners William Uy and Rodel Roxas are agents authorized to sell eight parcels of land by the owners thereof. By virtue of such
authority, petitioners offered to sell the lands, located in Tuba, Tadiangan, Benguet to respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) to
be utilized and developed as a housing project.
On February 14, 1989, the NHA Board passed Resolution No. 1632 approving the acquisition of said lands, with an area of 31.8231
hectares, at the cost of P23.867 million, pursuant to which the parties executed a series of Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the subject
lands. Of the eight parcels of land, however, only five were paid for by the NHA because of the report
1
it received from the Land
Geosciences Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that the remaining area is located at an active
landslide area and therefore, not suitable for development into a housing project.
On 22 November 1991, the NHA issued Resolution No. 2352 cancelling the sale over the three parcels of land. The NHA, through
Resolution No. 2394, subsecguently offered the amount of P1.225 million to the landowners asdaños perjuicios.
On 9 March 1992, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Complaint for Damages against NHA and its
General Manager Robert Balao.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the cancellation of the contract to be justified. The trial court nevertheless awarded
damages to plaintiffs in the sum of P1.255 million, the same amount initially offered by NHA to petitioners as damages.1âwphi1.nêt
Upon appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and entered a new one dismissing the
complaint. It held that since there was "sufficient justifiable basis" in cancelling the sale, "it saw no reason" for the award of damages.
The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioners were mere attorneys-in-fact and, therefore, not the real parties-in-interest in the action
before the trial court.
. . . In paragraph 4 of the complaint, plaintiffs alleged themselves to be "sellers' agents" for the several
owners of the 8 lots subject matter of the case. Obsviously, William Uy and Rodel Roxas in filing this case
acted as attorneys-in-fact of the lot owners who are the real parties in interest but who were omitted to be
pleaded as party-plaintiffs in the case. This omission is fatal. Where the action is brought by an attorney-in-
fact of a land owner in his name, (as in our present action) and not in the name of his principal, the action
was properly dismissed (Ferrer vs. Villamor, 60 SCRA 406 [1974]; Marcelo vs. de Leon, 105 Phil. 1175)
because the rule is that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real parties-in-interest (Section
2, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
When plaintiffs UY and Roxas sought payment of damages in their favor in view of the partial rescission of
Resolution No. 1632 and the Deed of Absolute Sale covering TCT Nos. 10998, 10999 and 11292 (Prayer
complaint, page 5, RTC records), it becomes obviously indispensable that the lot owners be included,
mentioned and named as party-plaintiffs, being the real party-in-interest. UY and Roxas, as attorneys-in-fact
or apoderados, cannot by themselves lawfully commence this action, more so, when the supposed special
power of attorney, in their favor, was never presented as an evidence in this case. Besides, even if herein
plaintiffs Uy and Roxas were authorized by the lot owners to commence this action, the same must still be
filed in the name of the principal, (Filipino Industrial Corporation vs. San Diego, 23 SCRA 706 [1968]). As
such indispensable party, their joinder in the action is mandatory and the complaint may be dismissed if not
so impleaded (NDC vs. CA, 211 SCRA 422 [1992]).
2

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners seek relief from this Court contending that:
I. THE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT NHA HAD ANY LEGAL BASIS
FOR RESCINDING THE SALE INVOLVING THE LAST THREE (3) PARCELS COVERED BY NHA
RESOLUTION NO. 1632.
II. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT NHA HAD LEGAL BASIS TO RESCIND THE
SUBJECT SALE, THE RESPONDENT CA NONETHELESS ERRED IN DENYING HEREIN PETITIONERS'
CLAIM TO DAMAGES, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 1191 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III. THE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS FAILED TO JOIN AS INDISPENSABLE PARTY PLAINTIFF THE SELLING LOT-
OWNERS.
3

We first resolve the issue raised in the the third assignment of error.
Petitioners claim that they lodged the complaint not in behalf of their principals but in their own name as agents directly damaged by the
termination of the contract. The damages prayed for were intended not for the benefit of their principals but to indemnify petitioners for
the losses they themselves allegedly incurred as a result of such termination. These damages consist mainly of "unearned income" and
advances.
4
Petitioners, thus, attempt to distinguish the case at bar from those involving agents or apoderedos instituting actions in their
own name but in behalf of their principals.
5
Petitioners in this case purportedly brought the action for damages in their own name and in
their own behalf.
We find this contention unmeritorious.
Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest. The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. "Interest, within the meaning of the rule, means material interest, an interest in the issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
6
Cases construing the real party-in-interest
provision can be more easily understood if it is borne in mind that the true meaning of real party-in-interest may be summarized as
follows: An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
7

Do petitioners, under substantive law, possess the right they seek to enforce? We rule in the negative.
The applicable substantive law in this case is Article 1311 of the Civil Code, which states:
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation, or by provision of
law. . . .
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its
fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon a third person. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners are not parties to the contract of sale between their principals and NHA. They are mere agents of the owners of the land
subject of the sale. As agents, they only render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of their principals.
8
The
rendering of such service did not make them parties to the contracts of sale executed in behalf of the latter. Since a contract may be
violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon
that contract must, generally, either be parties to said contract.
9

Neither has there been any allegation, much less proof, that petitioners are the heirs of their principals.
Are petitioners assignees to the rights under the contract of sale? In McMicking vs. Banco Español-Filipino,
10
we held that the rule
requiring every action to be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.
. . . recognizes the assignments of rights of action and also recognizes that when one has a right of action
assigned to him he is then the real party in interest and may maintain an action upon such claim or right.
The purpose of [this rule] is to require the plaintiff to be the real party in interest, or, in other words, he must
be the person to whom the proceeds of the action shall belong, and to prevent actions by persons who have
no interest in the result of the same. . . .
Thus, an agent, in his own behalf, may bring an action founded on a contract made for his principal, as an assignee of such contract.
We find the following declaration in Section 372 (1) of the Restatement of the Law on Agency (Second):
11

Sec. 372. Agent as Owner of Contract Right
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who has or who acquires an interest in a contract which he makes on
behalf of his principal can, although not a promisee, maintain such action thereon maintain such action
thereon as might a transferee having a similar interest.
The Comment on subsection (1) states:
a. Agent a transferee. One who has made a contract on behalf of another may become an assignee of the
contract and bring suit against the other party to it, as any other transferee. The customs of business or the
course of conduct between the principal and the agent may indicate that an agent who ordinarily has merely
a security interest is a transferee of the principals rights under the contract and as such is permitted to bring
suit. If the agent has settled with his principal with the understanding that he is to collect the claim against
the obligor by way of reimbursing himself for his advances and commissions, the agent is in the position of
an assignee who is the beneficial owner of the chose in action. He has an irrevocable power to sue in his
principal's name. . . . And, under the statutes which permit the real party in interest to sue, he can maintain
an action in his own name. This power to sue is not affected by a settlement between the principal and the
obligor if the latter has notice of the agent's interest. . . . Even though the agent has not settled with his
principal, he may, by agreement with the principal, have a right to receive payment and out of the proceeds
to reimburse himself for advances and commissions before turning the balance over to the principal. In such
a case, although there is no formal assignment, the agent is in the position of a transferee of the whole claim
for security; he has an irrevocable power to sue in his principal's name and, under statutes which permit the
real party in interest to sue, he can maintain an action in his own name.
Petitioners, however, have not shown that they are assignees of their principals to the subject contracts. While they alleged that they
made advances and that they suffered loss of commissions, they have not established any agreement granting them "the right to
receive payment and out of the proceeds to reimburse [themselves] for advances and commissions before turning the balance over to
the principal[s]."
Finally, it does not appear that petitioners are beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui under the second paragraph of Article 1311 of the
Civil Code. Indeed, there is no stipulation in any of the Deeds of Absolute Sale "clearly and deliberately" conferring a favor to any third
person.
That petitioners did not obtain their commissions or recoup their advances because of the non-performance of the contract did not
entitle them to file the action below against respondent NHA. Section 372 (2) of the Restatement of the Law on Agency (Second)
states:
(2) An agent does not have such an interest in a contract as to entitle him to maintain an action at law upon it in his
own name merely because he is entitled to a portion of the proceeds as compensation for making it or because he is
liable for its breach.
The following Comment on the above subsection is illuminating:
The fact that an agent who makes a contract for his principal will gain or suffer loss by the performance or
nonperformance of the contract by the principal or by the other party thereto does not entitle him to maintain an action
on his own behalf against the other party for its breach. An agent entitled to receive a commission from his principal
upon the performance of a contract which he has made on his principal's account does not, from this fact alone, have
any claim against the other party for breach of the contract, either in an action on the contract or otherwise. An agent
who is not a promisee cannot maintain an action at law against a purchaser merely because he is entitled to have his
compensation or advances paid out of the purchase price before payment to the principal. . . .
Thus, in Hopkins vs. Ives,
12
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, citing Section 372 (2) above, denied the claim of a real estate broker to
recover his alleged commission against the purchaser in an agreement to purchase property.
In Goduco vs. Court of appeals,
13
this Court held that:
. . . granting that appellant had the authority to sell the property, the same did not make the buyer liable for
the commission she claimed. At most, the owner of the property and the one who promised to give her a
commission should be the one liable to pay the same and to whom the claim should have been directed. . . .
As petitioners are not parties, heirs, assignees, or beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui under the contracts of sale, they do not,
under substantive law, possess the right they seek to enforce. Therefore, they are not the real parties-in-interest in this case.
Petitioners not being the real parties-in-interest, any decision rendered herein would be pointless since the same would not bind the
real parties-in-
interest.
14

Nevertheless, to forestall further litigation on the substantive aspects of this case, we shall proceed to rule on me merits.
15

Petitioners submit that respondent NHA had no legal basis to "rescind" the sale of the subject three parcels of land. The existence of
such legal basis, notwithstanding, petitioners argue that they are still entitled to an award of damages.
Petitioners confuse the cancellation of the contract by the NHA as a rescission of the contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. The
right of rescission or, more accurately, resolution, of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 is predicated on a breach of faith by the
other party that violates the reciprocity between them.
16
The power to rescind, therefore, is given to the injured party.
17
Article 1191
states:
The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what
is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible.
In this case, the NHA did not rescind the contract. Indeed, it did not have the right to do so for the other parties to the contract, the
vendors, did not commit any breach, much less a substantial breach,
18
of their obligation. Their obligation was merely to deliver the
parcels of land to the NHA, an obligation that they fulfilled. The NHA did not suffer any injury by the performance thereof.
The cancellation, therefore, was not a rescission under Article 1191. Rather, the cancellation was based on the negation of the cause
arising from the realization that the lands, which were the object of the sale, were not suitable for housing.1âwphi1.nêt
Cause is the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into it.
19
In other words, the cause is the immediate, direct
and proximate reason which justifies the creation of an obligation through the will of the contracting parties.
20
Cause, which is the
essential reason for the contract, should be distinguished from motive, which is the particular reason of a contracting party which does
not affect the other party.
21

For example, in a contract of sale of a piece of land, such as in this case, the cause of the vendor (petitioners' principals) in entering
into the contract is to obtain the price. For the vendee, NHA, it is the acquisition of the land.
22
The motive of the NHA, on the other
hand, is to use said lands for housing. This is apparent from the portion of the Deeds of Absolute Sale
23
stating:
WHEREAS, under the Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the VENDEE is mandated to focus and
concentrate its efforts and resources in providing housing assistance to the lowest thirty percent (30%) of urban
income earners, thru slum upgrading and development of sites and services projects;
WHEREAS, Letters of Instructions Nos. 555 and 557 [as] amended by Letter of Instruction No. 630, prescribed slum
improvement and upgrading, as well as the development of sites and services as the principal housing strategy for
dealing with slum, squatter and other blighted communities;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the VENDEE, in pursuit of and in compliance with the above-stated purposes offers to buy and the
VENDORS, in a gesture of their willing to cooperate with the above policy and commitments, agree to sell the
aforesaid property together with all the existing improvements there or belonging to the VENDORS;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the terms and conditions hereinbelow
stipulated, the VENDORS hereby, sell, transfer, cede and convey unto the VENDEE, its assigns, or successors-in-
interest, a parcel of land located at Bo. Tadiangan, Tuba, Benguet containing a total area of FIFTY SIX THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED NINETEEN (56,819) SQUARE METERS, more or less . . . .
Ordinarily, a party's motives for entering into the contract do not affect the contract. However, when the motive predetermines the
cause, the motive may be regarded as the cause. In Liguez vs. Court of Appeals,
24
this Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. REYES,
HELD:
. . . it is well to note, however, that Manresa himself (Vol. 8, pp. 641-642), while maintaining the distinction
and upholding the inoperativeness of the motives of the parties to determine the validity of the contract,
expressly excepts from the rule those contracts that are conditioned upon the attainment of the motives of
either party.
The same view is held by the Supreme Court of Spain, in its decisions of February 4, 1941, and December
4, 1946, holding that the motive may be regarded as causa when it predetermines the purpose of the
contract.
In this case, it is clear, and petitioners do not dispute, that NHA would not have entered into the contract were the lands not suitable for
housing. In other words, the quality of the land was an implied condition for the NHA to enter into the contract. On the part of the NHA,
therefore, the motive was the cause for its being a party to the sale.
Were the lands indeed unsuitable for housing as NHA claimed?
We deem the findings contained in the report of the Land Geosciences Bureau dated 15 July 1991 sufficient basis for the cancellation
of the sale, thus:
In Tadiangan, Tuba, the housing site is situated in an area of moderate topography. There [are] more areas
of less sloping ground apparently habitable. The site is underlain by . . . thick slide deposits (4-45m)
consisting of huge conglomerate boulders (see Photo No. 2) mix[ed] with silty clay materials. These clay
particles when saturated have some swelling characteristics which is dangerous for any civil structures
especially mass housing development.
25

Petitioners contend that the report was merely "preliminary," and not conclusive, as indicated in its title:
MEMORANDUM
TO: EDWIN G. DOMINGO
Chief, Lands Geology Division
FROM: ARISTOTLE A. RILLON
Geologist II
SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of
Tadiangan Housing Project in Tuba, Benguet
26

Thus, page 2 of the report states in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Actually there is a need to conduct further geottechnical [sic] studies in the NHA property. Standard
Penetration Test (SPT) must be carried out to give an estimate of the degree of compaction (the relative
density) of the slide deposit and also the bearing capacity of the soil materials. Another thing to consider is
the vulnerability of the area to landslides and other mass movements due to thick soil cover. Preventive
physical mitigation methods such as surface and subsurface drainage and regrading of the slope must be
done in the area.
27

We read the quoted portion, however, to mean only that further tests are required to determine the "degree of compaction," "the bearing
capacity of the soil materials," and the "vulnerability of the area to landslides," since the tests already conducted were inadequate to
ascertain such geological attributes. It is only in this sense that the assessment was "preliminary."
Accordingly, we hold that the NHA was justified in canceling the contract. The realization of the mistake as regards the quality of the
land resulted in the negation of the motive/cause thus rendering the contract inexistent.
28
Article 1318 of the Civil Code states that:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, assuming that petitioners are parties, assignees or beneficiaries to the contract of sale, they would not be entitled to any
award of damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
DIGEST:
UY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120465, 09 September 1999

FACTS:
Petitioners Uy and Roxas are agents authorized to sell eight parcels of land by the owners thereof. By virtue of such authority,
petitioners offered to sell the lands located in Benguet to respondent NHA to be utilized and developed as a housing project. On
February 14, 1989, the NHA Board approved the acquisition of said lands, at the cost of P23.87M, pursuant to which the parties
executed a series of Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the subject lands. Of the eight parcels, however, only five were paid for by the
NHA because of the report it received from the Land Geosciences Bureau of the DENR that the remaining area is located at an active
landslide area and therefore, not suitable for development into a housing project.

In 1991, the NHA cancelled the sale of the 3 parcels of land and subsequently offered the amount of P1.225 million to the landowners
as daños perjuicios. On 9 March 1992, petitioners filed before the QC RTC a Complaint for Damages.

The RTC rendered a decision declaring the cancellation of the contract to be justified. The trial court nevertheless awarded damages to
plaintiffs in the same amount offered by NHA to petitioners as damages. Upon appeal by petitioners, the CA held that since there was
"sufficient justifiable basis" in cancelling the sale, "it saw no reason" for the award of damages. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Was there a legal basis for the rescission of the sale of the 3 parcels of land? And granting arguendo that NHA has legal basis to
rescind, does the petitioner have the right to claim for damages?
(2) [Irrelevant] Were the petitioners allowed to lodge a complaint as agents?

HELD:
(1) There was no ―rescission‖ per se. What is involved is a cancellation based on the negation of the cause of the contract.
(2) [Irrelevant] No. Petitioners are not parties, heirs, assignees, or beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui under the contracts of sale,
they do not, under substantive law, possess the right they seek to enforce.

RATIO:
(1) Petitioners confuse the cancellation of the contract by the NHA as a rescission of the contract under Art. 1191. The right of
rescission or, more accurately, resolution, is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party.

NHA did not have the right to rescind for the other parties to the contract, the vendors, did not commit any breach of their obligati on.
The cancellation was based on the negation of the cause arising from the realization that the lands, which were the object of the sale,
were not suitable for housing. Cause, which is the essential reason for the contract, should be distinguished from motive, which is the
particular reason of a party which does not affect the other party.

In a contract of sale of a piece of land, such as in this case, the cause of the vendor (petitioners' principals) in entering into the contract
is to obtain the price. For the vendee, NHA, it is the acquisition of the land. The motive of the NHA, on the other hand, is to use said
lands for housing.

Ordinarily, a party's motives for entering into the contract do not affect the contract. However, when the motive predetermines the
cause, the motive may be regarded as the cause. In this case, it is clear, and petitioners do not dispute, that NHA would not have
entered into the contract were the lands not suitable for housing. In other words, the quality of the land was an implied condition
for the NHA to enter into the contract. On NHA‘s part, therefore, the motive was the cause for its being a party to the sale. The
findings of the Land Geosciences Bureau were sufficient for the cancellation of the sale

NHA was justified in canceling the contract. The realization of the mistake as regards the quality of the land resulted in the negation of
the motive/cause thus rendering the contract inexistent. Article 1318 of the Civil Code enumerates the essential requisites of a
contract: (1) Consent of the parties; (2) Subject matter; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is established. Therefore, assuming that
petitioners are parties, assignees or beneficiaries to the contract of sale, they would not be entitled to any award of damages.

(2) [Irrelevant, but again, this is worth knowing ] Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the
substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.

Do petitioners, under substantive law, possess such right? No. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipul ation, or by
provision of law. . . Article 1311 of the Civil Code.

If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not
sufficient.

Petitioners are mere agents of the owners of the land subject of the sale. As agents, they only render some service or do something in
representation or on behalf of their principals. The rendering of such service did not make them parties to the contracts of sale
executed in behalf of the latter.

An agent, in his own behalf, may bring as an assignee of such contract. Section 372 (1) of the Restatement of the Law on Agency.
Petitioners, however, were not able to show that they were assignees of their principal. They were not able to establish any
agreement granting them "the right to receive payment and out of the proceeds to reimburse [themselves] for advances and
commissions before turning the balance over to the principal[s]."

Finally, it did not appear that petitioners were beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui under the second paragraph of Article
1311 of the Civil Code. That petitioners did not obtain their commissions or recoup their advances because of the non-performance of
the contract did not entitle them to file the action against respondent NHA. Section 372 (2) of the Restatement of the Law on Agency
(Second).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.




























PNB vs. RITRATTO GROUP, INC.
Facts:
1. Petitioner PNB is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the Philippine law. Respondents Ritratto Group, Inc.,
Riatto International, Inc. and Dadasan General Merchandise are domestic corporations organized and existing under
Philippine law.
2. May 29, 1996 – PNB International Finance Ltd. (PNB-IFL), a subsidiary company of PNB, organized and doing business in
Hongkong, extended a letter of credit in favor of the respondents in the amount of US$300,000 secured by real estate
mortgages constituted over four parcels of land in Makati City. This credit facility was later increased successively to
US$1,290,000 in November 1996; to US$1,425,000 in February 1997; and decreased to US$1,421,316.18 in April 1998.
Respondents made repayments of the loan incurred by remitting those amounts to their loan account with PNB-IFL in
Hongkong. As of April 30,1998, their outstanding obligations stood at US$1,497,274.70.
3. PNB-IFL, through its attorney-in-fact PNB, notified the respondents of the foreclosure of all the real estate mortgages and that
the properties subject thereof were to be sold at a public auction.
4. Respondents filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO before
the RTC of Makati.
5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and the absence of any privity between
the petitioner and respondents.
6. TC issued an order for the issuance of writ of prelim injunction. Motion to Dismiss denied.
7. CA dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON PNB is privy to the loan contracts entered into by the respondent. WON PNB is an alter ego of PNB-IFL.

HELD:
1. The contract is one entered into between respondent and PNB-IFL, not PNB. Respondents admit that petitioner is a mere
attorney-in-fact for the PNB IFL with full power and authority to, inter alia, foreclose on the properties mortgaged to secure
their loan obligations with PNB-IFL. Petitioner is an agent with limited authority and specific duties under a special
power of attorney incorporated in the real estate mortgage. It is not privy to the loan contracts entered into by
respondents and PNB-IFL.
2. The mere fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken alone is not sufficient to justify their being
treated as one entity. If used to perform legitimate functions, a subsidiary‘s separate existence may be respected, and the
liability of the parent corporation as well as the subsidiary will be confined to those arising in their respective business. The
courts may, in the exercise of judicial discretion, step in to prevent the abuses of separate entity privilege and pierce the veil of
corporate entity.
3. Doctrine of Piercing the corporate evil is an equitable doctrine developed to address situations where the separate
corporate personality of a corporation is abused or used for wrongful purposes. It applies when the corporate fiction is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or when it is made a shield to confuse the legitimate
issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized
and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation.
4. Test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil:
1. Control, not mere majority or complete control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
business practice.
2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong
3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
*The absence of any one of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil. In applying the ―instrumentality‖
or ―alter ego‖ doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality and not form, with how the corporation operated and
the individual defendant‘s relationship to the operation.
Doctrine of piercing the veil based on alter ego or instrumentality finds no application in this case.
 PNB-IFL is a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner PNB.
 There is no showing of the indicative factors that the former corporation is a mere instrumentality of the latter.
 There is no demonstration that any of the evils sought to be prevented by the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil exists.





DIGEST:
PNB V. RITRATTO – G.R. NO. 142616 – 362 SCRA 216

Facts:

PNB-IFL, a subsidiary company of PNB extended credit to Ritratto and secured by the real estate mortgages on four parcels of land.
Since there was default, PNB-IFL thru PNB, foreclosed the property and were subject to public auction. Ritratto Group filed a complaint
for injunction. PNB filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and the absence of any privity between
respondents and petitioner.

Issue:

Is PNB privy to the loan contracts entered into by respondent & PNB-IFL being that PNB-IFL is owned by PNB?

Held:

No. The contract questioned is one entered into between Ritratto and PNB-IFL. PNB was admittedly an agent of the latter who acted as
an agent with limited authority and specific duties under a special power of attorney incorporated in the real estate mortgage.
The mere fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken alone is not sufficient to justify their being treated
as one entity.

If used to perform legitimate functions, a subsidiary‘s separate existence may be respected, and the liability of the parent corporation as
well as the subsidiary will be confined to those arising in their respective business. The courts may, in the exercise of judicial discretion,
step in to prevent the abuses of separate entity privilege and pierce the veil of corporate entity.


































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20136 June 23, 1965
IN RE: PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF SEPARATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.
JOSE A. SANTOS Y Diaz, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANATOLIO BUENCONSEJO, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Segundo C. Mastrili for petitioner-appellant.
Manuel Calleja Rafael S. Lucila and Jose T. Rubio for respondents-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J .:
Petitioner Jose A. Santos y Diaz seeks the reversal of an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay, denying his petition, filed in
Cadastral Case No. M-2197, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1035, for the cancellation of original certificate of title No. RO-3848 (25322), issued in
the name of Anatolio Buenconsejo, Lorenzo Bon and Santiago Bon, and covering Lot No. 1917 of the Cadastral Survey of Tabaco,
Albay, and the issuance in lieu thereof, of a separate transfer certificate of title in his name, covering part of said Lot No. 1917, namely
Lot No. 1917-A of Subdivision Plan PSD-63379.
The main facts are not disputed. They are set forth in the order appealed from, from which we quote:
It appears that the aforementioned Lot No. 1917 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3848 (25322) was originally
owned in common by Anatolio Buenconsejo to the extent of ½ undivided portion and Lorenzo Bon and Santiago Bon to the
extent of the other ½ (Exh. B); that Anatolio Buenconsejo's rights, interests and participation over the portion abovementioned
were on January 3, 1961 and by a Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Albay, transferred and conveyed to
Atty. Tecla San Andres Ziga, awardee in the corresponding auction sale conducted by said Sheriff in connection with the
execution of the decision of the Juvenile Delinquency and Domestic Relations Court in Civil Case No. 25267, entitled "Yolanda
Buenconsejo, et al. vs. Anatolio Buenconsejo"; that on December 26, 1961 and by a certificate of redemption issued by the
Provincial Sheriff of Albay, the rights, interest, claim and/or or participation which Atty. Tecla San Andres Ziga may have
acquired over the property in question by reason of the aforementioned auction sale award, were transferred and conveyed to
the herein petitioner in his capacity as Attorney-in-fact of the children of Anatolio Buenconsejo, namely, Anastacio
Buenconsejo, Elena Buenconsejo and Azucena Buenconsejo (Exh. C).
It would appear, also, that petitioner Santos had redeemed the aforementioned share of Anatolio Buenconsejo, upon the authori ty of a
special power of attorney executed in his favor by the children of Anatolio Buenconsejo; that relying upon this power of attorney and
redemption made by him, Santos now claims to have acquired the share of Anatolio Buenconsejo in the aforementioned Lot No. 1917;
that as the alleged present owner of said share, Santos caused a subdivision plan of said Lot No. 1917 to be made, in which the portion
he claims as his share thereof has been marked as Lot No. 1917-A; and that he wants said subdivision at No. 1917-A to be segregated
from Lot No. 1917 and a certificate of title issued in his name exclusively for said subdivision Lot No. 1917-A.
As correctly held by the lower court, petitioner's claim is clearly untenable, for: (1) said special power of attorney authorized him to act
on behalf of the children of Anatolio Buenconsejo, and, hence, it could not have possibly vested in him any property right in
his own name; (2) the children of Anatolio Buenconsejo had no authority to execute said power of attorney, because their father is still
alive and, in fact, he and his wife opposed the petition of Santos; (3) in consequence of said power of attorney (if valid) and redemption,
Santos could have acquired no more than the share pro indiviso of Anatolio Buenconsejo in Lot No. 1917, so that petitioner cannot —
without the conformity of the other co-owners (Lorenzo and Santiago Bon), or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 69 of the new Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the old Rules of Court) which have not been followed By Santos —
adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of said Lot No. 1917, as his share therein, to the exclusion of the other co-
owners.
Inasmuch as the appeal is patently devoid of merit, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with treble cost against petitioner-
appellant Jose A. Santos y Diaz. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, Barrera and Paredes, JJ., took no part.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15568 November 8, 1919
W. G. PHILPOTTS, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY and F. N. BERRY, respondents.
Lawrence and Ross for petitioner.
Crossfield and O'Brien for defendants.

STREET, J .:
The petitioner, W. G. Philpotts, a stockholder in the Philippine Manufacturing Company, one of the respondents herein, seeks by this
proceeding to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to permit the plaintiff, in person or by some authorized agent or
attorney, to inspect and examine the records of the business transacted by said company since January 1, 1918. The petition i s filed
originally in this court under the authority of section 515 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which gives to this tribunal concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance in cases, among others, where any corporation or person unlawfully excludes the plaintiff
from the use and enjoyment of some right to which he is entitled. The respondents interposed a demurrer, and the controversy is now
before us for the determination of the questions thus presented.
The first point made has reference to a supposed defect of parties, and it is said that the action can not be maintained jointly against the
corporation and its secretary without the addition of the allegation that the latter is the custodian of the business records of the
respondent company.
By the plain language of sections 515 and 222 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the right of action in such a proceeding as this is given
against the corporation; and the respondent corporation in this case was the only absolutely necessary party. In the Ohio case of
Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. vs. Hoffmister (61 Ohio St., 432; 48 L. R. A., 735), only the corporation was named as defendant, while the
complaint, in language almost identical with that in the case at bar, alleged a demand upon and refusal by the corporation.
Nevertheless the propriety of naming the secretary of the corporation as a codefendant cannot be questioned, since such official is
customarily charged with the custody of all documents, correspondence, and records of a corporation, and he is presumably the person
against whom the personal orders of the court would be made effective in case the relief sought should be granted. Certainly there is
nothing in the complaint to indicate that the secretary is an improper person to be joined. The petitioner might have named the
president of the corporation as a respondent also; and this official might be brought in later, even after judgment rendered, if necessary
to the effectuation of the order of the court.
Section 222 of our Code of Civil Procedure is taken from the California Code, and a decision of the California Supreme Court —
Barber vs. Mulford (117 Cal., 356) — is quite clear upon the point that both the corporation and its officers may be joined as
defendants.
The real controversy which has brought these litigants into court is upon the question argued in connection with the second ground of
demurrer, namely, whether the right which the law concedes to a stockholder to inspect the records can be exercised by a proper agent
or attorney of the stockholder as well as by the stockholder in person. There is no pretense that the respondent corporation or any of its
officials has refused to allow the petitioner himself to examine anything relating to the affairs of the company, and the petition prays for
a peremptory order commanding the respondents to place the records of all business transactions of the company, during a specified
period, at the disposal of the plaintiff or his duly authorized agent or attorney, it being evident that the petitioner desires to exercise said
right through an agent or attorney. In the argument in support of the demurrer it is conceded by counsel for the respondents that there
is a right of examination in the stockholder granted under section 51 of the Corporation Law, but it is insisted that this ri ght must be
exercised in person.
The pertinent provision of our law is found in the second paragraph of section 51 of Act No. 1459, which reads as follows: "The record
of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, member
or stockholder of the corporation at reasonable hours."
This provision is to be read of course in connecting with the related provisions of sections 51 and 52, defining the duty of the
corporation in respect to the keeping of its records.
Now it is our opinion, and we accordingly hold, that the right of inspection given to a stockholder in the provision above quoted can be
exercised either by himself or by any proper representative or attorney in fact, and either with or without the attendance of the
stockholder. This is in conformity with the general rule that what a man may do in person he may do through another; and we find
nothing in the statute that would justify us in qualifying the right in the manner suggested by the respondents.
This conclusion is supported by the undoubted weight of authority in the United States, where it is generally held that the provisions of
law conceding the right of inspection to stockholders of corporations are to be liberally construed and that said right may be exercised
through any other properly authorized person. As was said in Foster vs. White (86 Ala., 467), "The right may be regarded as personal,
in the sense that only a stockholder may enjoy it; but the inspection and examination may be made by another. Otherwise it would be
unavailing in many instances." An observation to the same effect is contained in Martin vs. Bienville Oil Works Co. (28 La., 204), where
it is said: "The possession of the right in question would be futile if the possessor of it, through lack of knowledge necessary to exercise
it, were debarred the right of procuring in his behalf the services of one who could exercise it." In Deadreck vs. Wilson (8 Baxt. [Tenn.],
108), the court said: "That stockholders have the right to inspect the books of the corporation, taking minutes from the same, at all
reasonable times, and may be aided in this by experts and counsel, so as to make the inspection valuable to them, is a principle too
well settled to need discussion." Authorities on this point could be accumulated in great abundance, but as they may be found cited in
any legal encyclopedia or treaties devoted to the subject of corporations, it is unnecessary here to refer to other cases announcing the
same rule.
In order that the rule above stated may not be taken in too sweeping a sense, we deem it advisable to say that there are some things
which a corporation may undoubtedly keep secret, notwithstanding the right of inspection given by law to the stockholder; as for
instance, where a corporation, engaged in the business of manufacture, has acquired a formula or process, not generally known, which
has proved of utility to it in the manufacture of its products. It is not our intention to declare that the authorities of the corporation, and
more particularly the Board of Directors, might not adopt measures for the protection of such process form publicity. There is, however,
nothing in the petition which would indicate that the petitioner in this case is seeking to discover anything which the corporation is
entitled to keep secret; and if anything of the sort is involved in the case it may be brought out at a more advanced stage of the
proceedings.lawphil.net
The demurrer is overruled; and it is ordered that the writ of mandamus shall issue as prayed, unless within 5 days from notification
hereof the respondents answer to the merits. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.


































ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M. MARIANO, JOSE D. JIMENEZ, JR., TORIBIO E. ILAO,
JR. and ERNESTO R. SALENGA 510 SCRA 74 December 6, 2006 (How subject matter or nature of the action determined)
FACTS:
Paciencia Regala owns a seven (7)-hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan, Pampanga. Her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino R. Mercado
leased the fishpond to Eduardo Lapid for a three (3)-year period. Lessee Eduardo Lapid in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael
Lopez during the last seven (7) months of the original lease. Ernesto Salenga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as fishpond watchman
(bante-encargado). In the sub-lease, Rafael Lopez rehired respondent Salenga. Ernesto Salenga Salenga, sent the demand letter to
Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the 10% share in the harvest. Salenga was promted to file a
Complaint

before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga docketed as
DARAB Case No. 552-P‘93 entitled Ernesto R. Salenga v. Rafael L. Lopez and Lourdes L. Lapid for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession, Collection of Sum of Money and Supervision of Harvest.
Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino
Mercado, through a Complaint-Affidavit

against private respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman which was docketed as OMB-
1-94-3425 entitled Antonio B. Baltazar v. Eulogio Mariano, Jose Jimenez, Jr., Toribio Ilao, Jr. and Ernesto Salenga for violation of RA
3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P‘93 filed by
respondent Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was
dismissible on its face.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition?
Whether or not the Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution where it was resolved that accused as
Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator has no jurisdiction over a complaint where there exist no tenancy relationship?
HELD:
The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. The Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no question on his authority and legal
standing. The Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaints and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official acts or omissions
from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper.
Faustino Mercado, is an agent himself and as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot delegate to another
the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimental to the principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with
the former. In the instant case, petitioner has no privity of contract with Paciencia Regala, owner of the fishpond and princi pal of
Faustino Mercado.
The facts clearly show that it was not the Ombudsman through the OSP who allowed respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-
Affidavit. It was the Sandiganbayan who granted the prayed for re-investigation and ordered the OSP to conduct the re-investigation .
The OSP simply followed the graft court‘s directive to conduct the re-investigation after the Counter-Affidavit of respondent Ilao, Jr. was
filed. Indeed, petitioner did not contest nor question the August 29, 1997 Order of the graft court. Moreover, petitioner did not file any
reply-affidavit in the re-investigation despite notice.
The nature of the case is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.
Respondent Salenga’s complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural
tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in
assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. Besides, whatever defense asserted in an
answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent
upon the allegations of the defendant.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Order and the October 30, 1998 Memorandum of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 23661 (OMB-1-94-3425) are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with costs against petitioner.






EDWARD C. ONG, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents., G.R. No.
119858. April 29, 2003
Case Digest
Facts:

Assistant City Prosecutor Dina P. Teves of the City of Manila charged petitioner and Benito Ong with two counts of estafa under
separate Informations dated 11 October 1991.

In Criminal Case No. 92-101989, the Information indicts petitioner and Benito Ong of the crime of estafa committed as follows:
That on or about July 23, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation,
conspiring and confederating together did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the SOLIDBANK Corporation
represented by its Accountant, DEMETRIO LAZARO, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
located at Juan Luna Street, Binondo, this City, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused received in trust from said
SOLIDBANK Corporation the following, to wit: 10,000 bags of urea valued at P2,050,000.00 specified in a Trust Receipt Agreement
and covered by a Letter of Credit No. DOM GD 90-009 in favor of the Fertiphil Corporation.

In Criminal Case No. 92-101990, the Information likewise charges petitioner of the crime of estafa committed as follows:
That on or about July 6, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation,
defraud the SOLIDBANK Corporation represented by its Accountant, DEMETRIO LAZARO. The said accused received in trust from
said SOLIDBANK Corporation the following goods, to wit: 125 pcs. Rear diff. assy RNZO 49‖ 50 pcs. Front & Rear diff assy. Isuzu Elof,
85 units 1-Beam assy. Isuzu Spz all valued at P2,532,500.00 specified in a Trust Receipt Agreement and covered by a Domestic Letter
of Credit No. DOM GD 90-006 in favor of the Metropole Industrial Sales with address at P.O. Box AC 219, Quezon City.

Issue: WON PETITIONER WAS NECESSARILY THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSE, BY THE MERE CIRCUMSTANCE
THAT PETITIONER ACTED AS AGENT AND SIGNED FOR THE ENTRUSTEE CORPORATION.

Held: Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law which provides: x x x. If the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, association
or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other
officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the offense. We hold that
petitioner is a person responsible for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.

The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, or (2) return the
goods covered by the trust receipts if the goods are not sold.[18] The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the crime which is
malum prohibitum.[19] There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud.[20]

The Trust Receipts Law recognizes the impossibility of imposing the penalty of imprisonment on a corporation. Hence, if the entrustee
is a corporation, the law makes the officers or employees or other persons responsible for the offense liable to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment. The reason is obvious: corporations, partnerships, associations and other juridical entities cannot be put to j ail. Hence,
the criminal liability falls on the human agent responsible for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law.






























G.R. No. L-42847 April 29, 1977 & G.R. No. L-42902 April 29, 1977
People vs Yabut
 This is two consolidated cases on petitions for review on certiorari
 Based on Two novel questions of law the quashal orders of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, first, the rule on venue or
jurisdiction in a case of estafa for postdating or issuing a check without insufficient funds, and
second, whether the new law on checks punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

Facts: Respondent Yabut accused of estafa by means of false pretenses: Yabut, as treasurer of the Yabut Transit Line located and
doing business in Caloocan City, prepared issued and make out Check, drawn against the Merchants Banking Corporation, payable to
Freeway Tires Supply, in payment of articles and merchandise, and upon presentation of the said checks to the bank, the checks were
dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by the owner of the Freeway Tires Supply to deposit the necessary funds to cover the
checks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alicia P. Andan,
owner and operator of the Freeway Tires Supply,
Instead of entering a plea, Yabut filed a motion to quash, contending that the acts charged do not constitute the offense as there is no
allegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the
merchandise, the crime of estafa not being indictable ,when checks are postdated or issued in payment of pre-existing obligation; and
the venue was improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered to, and received by, the
complainant in the City of Caloocan, where she (respondent Que Yabut) holds office.
The trial court Quashed the information as prayed for and peoples motion for reconsideration was denied, the same course happened
with the other case hence the two petitions
Court found both petitions impressed with merits:
1. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or
continuing of Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were
dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan
court. fense.
1
Its basic elements of deceit and damage
2
may independently arise in separate places-
And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee
or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."
6
Delivery of the check signifies transfer of
possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto.
7
Thus, the
penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2 (d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a check inpayment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount
of the check." Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the worthless checks to the
complainant took place in Malolos, Bulcan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case.

2. The next point of inquiry is whether or not the postdating or issuing of a worthless check in payment of a pre-
existing obligation constitutes estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code- The Court said that the
charges in the information is sufficient to constitute estafa
―. In considering a motion to quash based on the ground "(t)hat the facts charged do not constitute an offense,"
19
the
point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the
offense as defined in the law.
20
The facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as they are.
21
An analysis of the
two informations involved in the present case convinces Us that the facts charged therein substantially constitute the
integral elements of the offense as defined in the law. And the averments in the two informations sufficiently inform the
two private respondents of the nature and cause of the accusations against them, thereby defeating any constitutional
objection of lack of notice.‖
COURT Decision: arraignment of the private respondents in the criminal cases below be set at the earliest date and,
thereafter, the trial on the merits to proceed immediately. No costs.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 107898 December 19, 1995
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J .:
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, spouses, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon with estafa on three (3) counts
under Art. 315, par. 2 (d), of The Revised Penal Code, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1696-MN to 1698-MN. The Informations
substantially alleged that Manuel and Rosita, conspiring together, purchased goods from Linton Commercial Company, Inc. (LINTON),
and with deceit issued seven Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (SOLIDBANK) checks simultaneously with the delivery as
payment therefor. When presented to the drawee bank for payment the checks were dishonored as payment on the checks had been
stopped and/or for insufficiency of funds to cover the amounts. Despite repeated notice and demand the Lim spouses failed and
refused to pay the checks or the value of the goods.
On the basis of the same checks, Manuel and Rosita Lim were also charged with seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1699-MN to 1705-MN. In substance, the Informations
alleged that the Lims issued the checks with knowledge that they did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for
payment in full of such checks upon presentment. When presented for payment within ninety (90) days from date thereof the checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Despite receipt of notices of such dishonor the Lims failed to pay the
amounts of the checks or to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days.
Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim are the president and treasurer, respectively, of Rigi Bilt Industries, Inc. (RIGI). RIGI had been transacting
business with LINTON for years, the latter supplying the former with steel plates, steel bars, flat bars and purlin sticks which it uses in
the fabrication, installation and building of steel structures. As officers of RIGI the Lim spouses were allowed 30, 60 and sometimes
even up to 90 days credit.
On 27 May 1983 the Lims ordered 100 pieces of mild steel plates worth P51,815.00 from LINTON which were delivered on the same
day at their place of business at 666 7th Avenue, 8th Street, Kalookan City. To pay LINTON for the delivery the Lims issued
SOLIDBANK Check No. 027700 postdated 3 September 1983 in the amount of P51,800.00.
1

On 30 May 1983 the Lims ordered another 65 pieces of mild steel plates worth P63,455.00 from LINTON which were delivered at their
place of business on the same day. They issued as payment SOLIDBANK Check No. 027699 in the amount of P63,455.00 postdated
20 August 1983.
2

The Lim spouses also ordered 2,600 "Z" purlins worth P241,800.00 which were delivered to them on various dates, to wit: 15 and 22
April 1983; 11, 14, 20, 23, 25, 28 and 30 May 1983; and, 2 and 9 June 1983. To pay for the deliveries, they issued seven SOLIDBANK
checks, five of which were —
Check No. Date of Issue Amount
027683 16 July 1983 P27,900.00
3

027684 23 July 1983 P27,900.00
4

027719 6 Aug. 1983 P32,550.00
5

027720 13 Aug. 1983 P27,900.00
6

027721 27 Aug. 1983 P37,200.00
7

William Yu Bin, Vice President and Sales Manager of LINTON, testified that when those seven (7) checks were deposited with the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation they were dishonored for "insufficiency of funds" with the additional notation "payment stopped"
stamped thereon. Despite demand Manuel and Rosita refused to make good the checks or pay the value of the deliveries.
Salvador Alfonso, signature verifier of SOLIDBANK, Grace Park Branch, Kalookan City, where the Lim spouses maintained an account,
testified on the following transactions with respect to the seven (7) checks:
CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR
027683 22 July 1983 Payment Stopped (PS)
8

027684 23 July 1983 PS and Drawn Against
Insufficient Fund (DAIF)
9

027699 24 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF
10

027700 5 Sept. 1983 PS and DAIF
11

027719 9 Aug. 1983 DAIF
12

027720 16 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF
13

027721 30 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF
14

Manuel Lim admitted having issued the seven (7) checks in question to pay for deliveries made by LINTON but denied that his
company's account had insufficient funds to cover the amounts of the checks. He presented the bank ledger showing a balance of
P65,752.75. Also, he claimed that he ordered SOLIDBANK to stop payment because the supplies delivered by LINTON were not in
accordance with the specifications in the purchase orders.
Rosita Lim was not presented to testify because her statements would only be corroborative.
On the basis of the evidence thus presented the trial court held both accused guilty of estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in its decision
dated 25 January 1989. In Crim. Case No. 1696-MN they were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum plus one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00 with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs. They were also ordered to i ndemnify
LINTON in the amount of P241,800.00. Similarly sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1697-MN and 1698-MN except as to the
indemnities awarded, which were P63,455.00 and P51,800.00, respectively.
In Crim. Case No. 1699-MN the trial court sentenced both accused to a straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs. In addition, they were ordered to indemnify LINTON in the amount of
P27,900.00. Again, similar sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1700-MN to 1705-MN except for the indemnities awarded,
which were P32,550.00, P27,900.00, P27,900.00, P63,455.00, P51,800.00 and P37,200.00 respectively.
15

On appeal, the accused assailed the decision as they imputed error to the trial court as follows: (a) the regional Trial Court of malabon
had no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged ere committed outside its territory; (b) they could not be held liable for
estafa because the seven (7) checks were issued by them several weeks after the deliveries of the goods; and, (c) neither could they
be held liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 as they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were not
those specified by them, besides they had sufficient funds to pay the checks.
In the decision of 18 September 1992
16
respondent Court of Appeals acquitted accused-appellants of estafa on the ground that indeed
the checks were not made in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of their issuance. However it affirmed the finding of the
trial court that they were guilty of having violated B.P. Blg. 22.
17
On 6 November 1992 their motion for reconsideration was denied.
18

In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential elements of the crime punishable
under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. They claim that what was proved was
that all the elements of the offense were committed in Kalookan City. The checks were issued at their place of business, received by a
collector of LINTON, and dishonored by the drawee bank, all in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever supports the
proposition that they knew that their checks were insufficiently funded. In fact, some of the checks were funded at the time of
presentment but dishonored nonetheless upon their instruction to the bank to stop payment. In fine, considering that the checks were all
issued, delivered, and dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon exceeded its jurisdiction when it tried the case and
rendered judgment thereon.
The petition has no merit. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment . . ." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly issuing a worthless check.
19
Thus, a fundamental element
is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in
20
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
21

It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of jurisdiction.
22
Section 14, par. (a), Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of
Court, which has been carried over in Sec. 15, par. (a), Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically provi des:
Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or anyone of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
If all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court
therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.
23
There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and
requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has
jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other.
24
These are the
so-called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized. In other words, a person charged with a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
25

In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to each crime and requisite to its consummation
must be considered: (a) the seven (7) checks were issued to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; b) they were delivered
to LINTON at the same place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City; and, (d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of their
funds in SOLIDBANK at the time the checks were issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were dishonored in Kalookan City, it
is no longer necessary to discuss where the checks were dishonored.
Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a
person who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in
possession of it or the bearer thereof. In People v. Yabut
26
this Court explained —
. . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where
they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final
act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the
contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as
a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."
Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with
intent to transfer titlethereto . . .
Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place of business in Kalookan City, they were
actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON
is not the issuance and delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector was not the person who could take the checks as a
holder, i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of
LINTON with respect to the checks because he was a mere employee. As this Court further explained in People v. Yabut
27

Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano Yabut, Jr., in Caloocan City
cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant
Alicia P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as
"payee" or "indorsee." And there appears to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the
latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that
Yambao is but her "messenger" or "part-time employee." There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated
their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential. The principal consents that
the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so as to act. It must exist as a fact. The law
makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its
existence, but also its nature and extent . . .
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds as follows —
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the bank because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitioners in the cases before us because they did not pay LINTON the amounts
due on the checks; neither did they make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after
receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. InPeople v. Grospe
28
citing People v. Manzanilla
29
we held
that ". . . knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality,
whether the accused be within one territory or another."
Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled i n the
same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated in Lim v. Rodrigo
30
that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
Information. The Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses were committed in the Municipality of Navotas
which is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Malabon.
31

We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 thus —
Accused-appellants claim that they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were
not those specified by them. They maintain that they had sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks. The
records of the bank, however, reveal otherwise. The two letters (Exhs. 21 and 22) dated July 23, and August 10,
1983 which they claim they sent to Linton Commercial, complaining against the quality of the goods delivered by the
latter, did not refer to the delivery of mild steel plates (6mm x 4 x 8) and "Z" purlins (16 x 7 x 2-1/2 mts) for which the
checks in question were issued. Rather, the letters referred to B.1. Lally columns (Sch. #20), which were the subject
of other purchase orders.
It is true, as accused-appellants point out, that in a case brought by them against the complainant in the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-10921) the complainant was held liable for actual damages because of
the delivery of goods of inferior quality (Exh. 23). But the supplies involved in that case were those of B.I. pipes, while
the purchases made by accused-appellants, for which they issued the checks in question, were purchases of mild
steel plates and "Z" purlins.
Indeed, the only question here is whether accused-appellants maintained funds sufficient to cover the amounts of
their checks at the time of issuance and presentment of such checks. Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that
"notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee bank shall state in the notice of dishonor that there
were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of the check, if such be the fact."
The purpose of this provision is precisely to preclude the maker or drawer of a worthless check from ordering the
payment of the check to be stopped as a pretext for the lack of sufficient funds to cover the check.
In the case at bar, the notice of dishonor issued by the drawee bank, indicates not only that payment of the check
was stopped but also that the reason for such order was that the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds with
which to cover the checks. . . . Moreover, the bank ledger of accused-appellants' account in Consolidated Bank
shows that at the time the checks were presented for encashment, the balance of accused-appellants' account was
inadequate to cover the amounts of the checks.
32
. . .
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 September 1992 affirming the conviction of petitioners Manuel Lim and
Rosita Lim —
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN);
CA-G.R. CR No. 07279 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN);
CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN); CA-G.R. CA No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1704-MN);
and CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim Case No. 1705-MN), the Court finds the accused-appellants
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and are
hereby sentenced to suffer a STRAIGHT PENALTY OF ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT in each case, together with
all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN), both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P32,550.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN) both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P63,455.00.
In CA-G.R CR No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1704-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P51,800.00, and
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1705-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P37,200.00
33

as well as its resolution of 6 November 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129919 February 6, 2002
DOMINION INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO S. GUEVARRA, and FERNANDO AUSTRIA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
The Case
This is an appeal via certiorari
1
from the decision of the Court of Appeals
2
affirming the decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44,
San Fernando, Pampanga, which ordered petitioner Dominion Insurance Corporation (Dominion) to pay Rodolfo S. Guevarra
(Guevarra) the sum of P156,473.90 representing the total amount advanced by Guevarra in the payment of the claims of Dominion‘s
clients.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On January 25, 1991, plaintiff Rodolfo S. Guevarra instituted Civil Case No. 8855 for sum of money against defendant Dominion
Insurance Corporation. Plaintiff sought to recover thereunder the sum of P156,473.90 which he claimed to have advanced in his
capacity as manager of defendant to satisfy certain claims filed by defendant‘s clients.
"In its traverse, defendant denied any liability to plaintiff and asserted a counterclaim for P249,672.53, representing premi ums that
plaintiff allegedly failed to remit.
"On August 8, 1991, defendant filed a third-party complaint against Fernando Austria, who, at the time relevant to the case, was its
Regional Manager for Central Luzon area.
"In due time, third-party defendant Austria filed his answer.
"Thereafter the pre-trial conference was set on the following dates: October 18, 1991, November 12, 1991, March 29, 1991, December
12, 1991, January 17, 1992, January 29, 1992, February 28, 1992, March 17, 1992 and April 6, 1992, in all of which dates no pre-trial
conference was held. The record shows that except for the settings on October 18, 1991, January 17, 1992 and March 17, 1992 which
were cancelled at the instance of defendant, third-party defendant and plaintiff, respectively, the rest were postponed upon joint request
of the parties.
"On May 22, 1992 the case was again called for pre-trial conference. Only plaintiff and counsel were present. Despite due notice,
defendant and counsel did not appear, although a messenger, Roy Gamboa, submitted to the trial court a handwritten note sent to him
by defendant‘s counsel which instructed him to request for postponement. Plaintiff‘s counsel objected to the desired postponement and
moved to have defendant declared as in default. This was granted by the trial court in the following order:
"ORDER
"When this case was called for pre-trial this afternoon only plaintiff and his counsel Atty. Romeo Maglalang appeared. When shown a
note dated May 21, 1992 addressed to a certain Roy who was requested to ask for postponement, Atty. Maglalang vigorously objected
to any postponement on the ground that the note is but a mere scrap of paper and moved that the defendant corporation be declared
as in default for its failure to appear in court despite due notice.
"Finding the verbal motion of plaintiff‘s counsel to be meritorious and considering that the pre-trial conference has been repeatedly
postponed on motion of the defendant Corporation, the defendant Dominion Insurance Corporation is hereby declared (as) in default
and plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence on June 16, 1992 at 9:00 o‘clock in the morning.
"The plaintiff and his counsel are notified of this order in open court.
"SO ORDERED.
"Plaintiff presented his evidence on June 16, 1992. This was followed by a written offer of documentary exhibits on July 8 and a
supplemental offer of additional exhibits on July 13, 1992. The exhibits were admitted in evidence in an order dated July 17, 1992.
"On August 7, 1992 defendant corporation filed a ‗MOTION TO LIFT ORDER OF DEFAULT.‘ It alleged therein that the failure of
counsel to attend the pre-trial conference was ‗due to an unavoidable circumstance‘ and that counsel had sent his representative on
that date to inform the trial court of his inability to appear. The Motion was vehemently opposed by plaintiff.
"On August 25, 1992 the trial court denied defendant‘s motion for reasons, among others, that it was neither verified nor supported by
an affidavit of merit and that it further failed to allege or specify the facts constituting his meritorious defense.
"On September 28, 1992 defendant moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. For the first time counsel revealed to the trial
court that the reason for his nonappearance at the pre-trial conference was his illness. An Affidavit of Merit executed by its Executive
Vice-President purporting to explain its meritorious defense was attached to the said Motion. Just the same, in an Order dated
November 13, 1992, the trial court denied said Motion.
"On November 18, 1992, the court a quo rendered judgment as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
"1. The defendant Dominion Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff the sum of P156,473.90 representing the total amount
advanced by plaintiff in the payment of the claims of defendant‘s clients;
"2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney‘s fees;
"3. The dismissal of the counter-claim of the defendant and the third-party complaint;
"4. The defendant to pay the costs of suit."
4

On December 14, 1992, Dominion appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
5

On July 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming that of the trial court.
6
On September 3, 1996, Dominion filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration.
7
On July 16, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
8

Hence, this appeal.
9

The Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether respondent Guevarra acted within his authority as agent for petitioner, and (2) whether respondent
Guevarra is entitled to reimbursement of amounts he paid out of his personal money in settling the claims of several insured.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another,
with the consent or authority of the latter.
10
The basis for agency is representation.
11
On the part of the principal, there must be an
actual intention to appoint
12
or an intention naturally inferrable from his words or actions;
13
and on the part of the agent, there must be
an intention to accept the appointment and act on it,
14
and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency.
15

A perusal of the Special Power of Attorney
16
would show that petitioner (represented by third-party defendant Austria) and respondent
Guevarra intended to enter into a principal-agent relationship. Despite the word "special" in the title of the document, the contents
reveal that what was constituted was actually a general agency. The terms of the agreement read:
"That we, FIRST CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
17
a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, xxx represented by the undersigned as Regional Manager, xxx do hereby appoint RSG
Guevarra Insurance Services represented by Mr. Rodolfo Guevarra xxx to be our Agency Manager in San Fdo., for our place and
stead, to do and perform the following acts and things:
"1. To conduct, sign, manager (sic), carry on and transact Bonding and Insurance business as usually pertain to a Agency
Office, or FIRE, MARINE, MOTOR CAR, PERSONAL ACCIDENT, and BONDING with the right, upon our prior written
consent, to appoint agents and sub-agents.
"2. To accept, underwrite and subscribed (sic) cover notes or Policies of Insurance and Bonds for and on our behalf.
"3. To demand, sue, for (sic) collect, deposit, enforce payment, deliver and transfer for and receive and give effectual receipts
and discharge for all money to which the FIRST CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
18
may hereafter become
due, owing payable or transferable to said Corporation by reason of or in connection with the above-mentioned appointment.
"4. To receive notices, summons, and legal processes for and in behalf of the FIRST CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., in connection with actions and all legal proceedings against the said Corporation."
19
[Emphasis supplied]
The agency comprises all the business of the principal,
20
but, couched in general terms, it is limited only to acts of administration.
21

A general power permits the agent to do all acts for which the law does not require a special power.
22
Thus, the acts enumerated in or
similar to those enumerated in the Special Power of Attorney do not require a special power of attorney.
Article 1878, Civil Code, enumerates the instances when a special power of attorney is required. The pertinent portion that applies to
this case provides that:
"Article 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
"(1) To make such payments as are not usually considered as acts of administration;
"x x x x x x x x x
"(15) Any other act of strict dominion."
The payment of claims is not an act of administration. The settlement of claims is not included among the acts enumerated in the
Special Power of Attorney, neither is it of a character similar to the acts enumerated therein. A special power of attorney i s required
before respondent Guevarra could settle the insurance claims of the insured.
Respondent Guevarra‘s authority to settle claims is embodied in the Memorandum of Management Agreement
23
dated February 18,
1987 which enumerates the scope of respondent Guevarra‘s duties and responsibilities as agency manager for San Fernando,
Pampanga, as follows:
"x x x x x x x x x
"1. You are hereby given authority to settle and dispose of all motor car claims in the amount of P5,000.00 with prior approval
of the Regional Office.
"2. Full authority is given you on TPPI claims settlement.
" x x x x x x x x x "
24

In settling the claims mentioned above, respondent Guevarra‘s authority is further limited by the written standard authority to
pay,
25
which states that the payment shall come from respondent Guevarra‘s revolving fund or collection. The authority to pay is worded
as follows:
"This is to authorize you to withdraw from your revolving fund/collection the amount of PESOS __________________ (P ) representing
the payment on the _________________ claim of assured _______________ under Policy No. ______ in that accident of
___________ at ____________.
"It is further expected, release papers will be signed and authorized by the concerned and attached to the corresponding claim folder
after effecting payment of the claim.
"(sgd.) FERNANDO C. AUSTRIA
Regional Manager"
26

[Emphasis supplied]
The instruction of petitioner as the principal could not be any clearer.1âwphi1 Respondent Guevarra was authorized to pay the claim of
the insured, but the payment shall come from the revolving fund or collection in his possession.
Having deviated from the instructions of the principal, the expenses that respondent Guevarra incurred in the settlement of the claims of
the insured may not be reimbursed from petitioner Dominion. This conclusion is in accord with Article 1918, Civil Code, which states
that:
"The principal is not liable for the expenses incurred by the agent in the following cases:
"(1) If the agent acted in contravention of the principal’s instructions, unless the latter should wish to avail himself of the
benefits derived from the contract;
" x x x x x x x x x "
However, while the law on agency prohibits respondent Guevarra from obtaining reimbursement, his right to recover may still be
justified under the general law on obligations and contracts.
Article 1236, second paragraph, Civil Code, provides:
"Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the
will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor."
In this case, when the risk insured against occurred, petitioner‘s liability as insurer arose.1âwphi1 This obligation was extinguished
when respondent Guevarra paid the claims and obtained Release of Claim Loss and Subrogation Receipts from the insured who were
paid.
Thus, to the extent that the obligation of the petitioner has been extinguished, respondent Guevarra may demand for reimbursement
from his principal. To rule otherwise would result in unjust enrichment of petitioner.
The extent to which petitioner was benefited by the settlement of the insurance claims could best be proven by the Release of Claim
Loss and Subrogation Receipts
27
which were attached to the original complaint as Annexes C-2, D-1, E-1, F-1, G-1, H-1, I-1 and J-l, in
the total amount of P116,276.95.
However, the amount of the revolving fund/collection that was then in the possession of respondent Guevarra as reflected in the
statement of account dated July 11, 1990 would be deducted from the above amount.
The outstanding balance and the production/remittance for the period corresponding to the claims was P3,604.84. Deducting thi s from
P116,276.95, we get P112,672.11. This is the amount that may be reimbursed to respondent Guevarra.
The Fallo
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY the Petition. However, we MODIFY the decision of the Court of Appeals
28
and that of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, San Fernando, Pampanga,
29
in that petitioner is ordered to pay respondent Guevarra the amount of P112,672.11
representing the total amount advanced by the latter in the payment of the claims of petitioner‘s clients.
No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.












DIGEST:
DOMINION VS CA
FACTS:

Private Respondent, Rodolfo Guevarra filed a complaint for sum of money against the petitioner Dominion Insurance Corporation (DIC),
seeking to recover the sum of P 156,473.90, which he claimed to have advanced in his capacity as manager of the petitioner to satisfy
the claims filed by their clients.

DIC however stated that they are not liable to pay respondent because he had not acted within his authority as an agent for Dominion.
They have instructed the respondent that the payment for the claims of the insured should be taken from the revolving fund, not from
respondents‘ personal money.

ISSUES:

Whether respondent have acted within his duties as the agent of petitioner

Whether petitioner is liable to reimburse respondent.

RULING:

The court held that by contract of agency, a person a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation
or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The basis for agency is representation. On the part of the principal,
there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferrable from his words or actions; and on the part of the agent,
there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it, and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency.

In the case at bar, the respondent Guevarra was only given a general power in the acts of administration, the payment of clai ms is not
part of the general power granted to him by DIC, hence under Article 1878 a Special Power of Attorney is required to make such
payments.

Also, respondents actions is limited by the written standard authority to pay, where such payment must be taken from the revolving
fund, which the respondent failed to do so. Hence the petitioner is not liable for the expenses incurred by the agent.

However, while the law on agency prohibits respondent Guevarra from obtaining reimbursement, his right to recover may still be
justified under the general law on obligations and contracts.
Article 1236, second paragraph, Civil Code, provides:

"Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the
will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor."

In this case, when the risk insured against occurred, petitioner's liability as insurer arose. This obligation was extinguished when
respondent Guevarra paid the claims and obtained Release of Claim Loss and Subrogation Receipts from the insured who were paid.

Thus, to the extent that the obligation of the petitioner has been extinguished, respondent Guevarra may demand for reimbursement
from his principal. To rule otherwise would result in unjust enrichment of petitioner.

























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149353 June 26, 2006
JOCELYN B. DOLES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. AURA TINA ANGELES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
This refers to the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision
1
dated April 30, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 66985, which reversed the Decision dated July 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 21, City of Manila; and the CA Resolution
2
dated August 6, 2001 which denied petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents of the case follow:
On April 1, 1997, Ma. Aura Tina Angeles (respondent) filed with the RTC a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against
Jocelyn B. Doles (petitioner), docketed as Civil Case No. 97-82716. Respondent alleged that petitioner was indebted to the former in
the concept of a personal loan amounting to P405,430.00 representing the principal amount and interest; that on October 5, 1996, by
virtue of a "Deed of Absolute Sale",
3
petitioner, as seller, ceded to respondent, as buyer, a parcel of land, as well as the improvements
thereon, with an area of 42 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 382532,
4
and located at a subdivision project
known as Camella Townhomes Sorrente in Bacoor, Cavite, in order to satisfy her personal loan with respondent; that this property was
mortgaged to National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to secure petitioner‘s loan in the sum of P337,050.00 with that
entity; that as a condition for the foregoing sale, respondent shall assume the undue balance of the mortgage and pay the monthly
amortization of P4,748.11 for the remainder of the 25 years which began on September 3, 1994; that the property was at that time
being occupied by a tenant paying a monthly rent of P3,000.00; that upon verification with the NHMFC, respondent learned that
petitioner had incurred arrearages amounting to P26,744.09, inclusive of penalties and interest; that upon informing the petitioner of her
arrears, petitioner denied that she incurred them and refused to pay the same; that despite repeated demand, petitioner refused to
cooperate with respondent to execute the necessary documents and other formalities required by the NHMFC to effect the transfer of
the title over the property; that petitioner collected rent over the property for the month of January 1997 and refused to remit the
proceeds to respondent; and that respondent suffered damages as a result and was forced to litigate.
Petitioner, then defendant, while admitting some allegations in the Complaint, denied that she borrowed money from respondent, and
averred that from June to September 1995, she referred her friends to respondent whom she knew to be engaged in the business of
lending money in exchange for personal checks through her capitalist Arsenio Pua. She alleged that her friends, namely, Zenaida
Romulo, Theresa Moratin, Julia Inocencio, Virginia Jacob, and Elizabeth Tomelden, borrowed money from respondent and issued
personal checks in payment of the loan; that the checks bounced for insufficiency of funds; that despite her efforts to assist respondent
to collect from the borrowers, she could no longer locate them; that, because of this, respondent became furious and threatened
petitioner that if the accounts were not settled, a criminal case will be filed against her; that she was forced to issue eight checks
amounting to P350,000 to answer for the bounced checks of the borrowers she referred; that prior to the issuance of the checks she
informed respondent that they were not sufficiently funded but the latter nonetheless deposited the checks and for which reason they
were subsequently dishonored; that respondent then threatened to initiate a criminal case against her for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22; that she was forced by respondent to execute an "Absolute Deed of Sale" over her property in Bacoor, Cavite, to avoid cri minal
prosecution; that the said deed had no valid consideration; that she did not appear before a notary public; that the Community Tax
Certificate number on the deed was not hers and for which respondent may be prosecuted for falsification and perjury; and that she
suffered damages and lost rental as a result.
The RTC identified the issues as follows: first, whether the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid; second; if valid, whether petiti oner is obliged
to sign and execute the necessary documents to effect the transfer of her rights over the property to the respondent; and third, whether
petitioner is liable for damages.
On July 29, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. With costs
against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC held that the sale was void for lack of cause or consideration:
5

Plaintiff Angeles‘ admission that the borrowers are the friends of defendant Doles and further admission that the checks issued by these
borrowers in payment of the loan obligation negates [sic] the cause or consideration of the contract of sale executed by and between
plaintiff and defendant. Moreover, the property is not solely owned by defendant as appearing in Entry No. 9055 of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 382532 (Annex A, Complaint), thus:
"Entry No. 9055. Special Power of Attorney in favor of Jocelyn Doles covering the share of Teodorico Doles on the parcel of land
described in this certificate of title by virtue of the special power of attorney to mortgage, executed before the notary public, etc."
The rule under the Civil Code is that contracts without a cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever. (Art. 1352, Civil Code).
Respondent appealed to the CA. In her appeal brief, respondent interposed her sole assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AT BAR ON THE GROUND OF [sic] THE DEED OF SALE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES HAS NO CONSIDERATION OR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
6

On April 30, 2001, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the lower court dated July 29, 1998
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is entered ordering defendant-appellee to execute all necessary documents to effect
transfer of subject property to plaintiff-appellant with the arrearages of the former‘s loan with the NHMFC, at the latter‘s expense. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA concluded that petitioner was the borrower and, in turn, would "re-lend" the amount borrowed from the respondent to her
friends. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale was supported by a valid consideration, which is the sum of money petitioner owed
respondent amounting to P405,430.00, representing both principal and interest.
The CA took into account the following circumstances in their entirety: the supposed friends of petitioner never presented themselves to
respondent and that all transactions were made by and between petitioner and respondent;
7
that the money borrowed was deposited
with the bank account of the petitioner, while payments made for the loan were deposited by the latter to respondent‘s bank
account;
8
that petitioner herself admitted in open court that she was "re-lending" the money loaned from respondent to other individuals
for profit;
9
and that the documentary evidence shows that the actual borrowers, the friends of petitioner, consider her as their creditor
and not the respondent.
10

Furthermore, the CA held that the alleged threat or intimidation by respondent did not vitiate consent, since the same is considered just
or legal if made to enforce one‘s claim through competent authority under Article 1335
11
of the Civil Code;
12
that with respect to the
arrearages of petitioner on her monthly amortization with the NHMFC in the sum of P26,744.09, the same shall be deemed part of the
balance of petitioner‘s loan with the NHMFC which respondent agreed to assume; and that the amount of P3,000.00 representing the
rental for January 1997 supposedly collected by petitioner, as well as the claim for damages and attorney‘s fees, is denied for
insufficiency of evidence.
13

On May 29, 2001, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration with the CA, arguing that respondent categorically admitted in open
court that she acted only as agent or representative of Arsenio Pua, the principal financier and, hence, she had no legal capacity to sue
petitioner; and that the CA failed to consider the fact that petitioner‘s father, who co-owned the subject property, was not impleaded as
a defendant nor was he indebted to the respondent and, hence, she cannot be made to sign the documents to effect the transfer of
ownership over the entire property.
On August 6, 2001, the CA issued its Resolution denying the motion on the ground that the foregoing matters had already been passed
upon.
On August 13, 2001, petitioner received a copy of the CA Resolution. On August 28, 2001, petitioner filed the present Petition and
raised the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A DEBTOR OF THE RESPONDENT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT AN AGENT WHO WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE PRINCIPAL TO COLLECT DEBT IN HIS BEHALF
COULD DIRECTLY COLLECT PAYMENT FROM THE DEBTOR.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS EXECUTED FOR A CAUSE.
14

Although, as a rule, it is not the business of this Court to review the findings of fact made by the lower courts, jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions, at least three of which are present in the instant case, namely: when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; when the findings of facts of the courts a quo are conflicting; and when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a different conclusion.
15
To arrive at a proper
judgment, therefore, the Court finds it necessary to re-examine the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case.
The Petition is meritorious.
The principal issue is whether the Deed of Absolute Sale is supported by a valid consideration.
1. Petitioner argues that since she is merely the agent or representative of the alleged debtors, then she is not a party to the loan; and
that the Deed of Sale executed between her and the respondent in their own names, which was predicated on that pre-existing debt, is
void for lack of consideration.
Indeed, the Deed of Absolute Sale purports to be supported by a consideration in the form of a price certain in money
16
and that this
sum indisputably pertains to the debt in issue. This Court has consistently held that a contract of sale is null and void and produces no
effect whatsoever where the same is without cause or consideration.
17
The question that has to be resolved for the moment is whether
this debt can be considered as a valid cause or consideration for the sale.
To restate, the CA cited four instances in the record to support its holding that petitioner "re-lends" the amount borrowed from
respondent to her friends: first, the friends of petitioner never presented themselves to respondent and that all transactions were made
by and between petitioner and respondent;
18
second; the money passed through the bank accounts of petitioner and
respondent;
19
third, petitioner herself admitted that she was "re-lending" the money loaned to other individuals for profit;
20
and fourth,
the documentary evidence shows that the actual borrowers, the friends of petitioner, consider her as their creditor and not the
respondent.
21

On the first, third, and fourth points, the CA cites the testimony of the petitioner, then defendant, during her cross-examination:
22

Atty. Diza:
q. You also mentioned that you were not the one indebted to the plaintiff?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. And you mentioned the persons[,] namely, Elizabeth Tomelden, Teresa Moraquin, Maria Luisa Inocencio, Zenaida Romulo,
they are your friends?
witness:
a. Inocencio and Moraquin are my friends while [as to] Jacob and Tomelden[,] they were just referred.
Atty. Diza:
q. And you have transact[ed] with the plaintiff?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. What is that transaction?
witness:
a. To refer those persons to Aura and to refer again to Arsenio Pua, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. Did the plaintiff personally see the transactions with your friends?
witness:
a. No, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. Your friends and the plaintiff did not meet personally?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. You are intermediaries?
witness:
a. We are both intermediaries. As evidenced by the checks of the debtors they were deposited to the name of Arsenio Pua
because the money came from Arsenio Pua.
x x x x
Atty. Diza:
q. Did the plaintiff knew [sic] that you will lend the money to your friends specifically the one you mentioned [a] while ago?
witness:
a. Yes, she knows the money will go to those persons.
Atty. Diza:
q. You are re-lending the money?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. What profit do you have, do you have commission?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Diza:
q. How much?
witness:
a. Two percent to Tomelden, one percent to Jacob and then Inocencio and my friends none, sir.
Based on the foregoing, the CA concluded that petitioner is the real borrower, while the respondent, the real lender.
But as correctly noted by the RTC, respondent, then plaintiff, made the following admission during her cross examination:
23

Atty. Villacorta:
q. Who is this Arsenio Pua?
witness:
a. Principal financier, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. So the money came from Arsenio Pua?
witness:
a. Yes, because I am only representing him, sir.
Other portions of the testimony of respondent must likewise be considered:
24

Atty. Villacorta:
q. So it is not actually your money but the money of Arsenio Pua?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Court:
q. It is not your money?
witness:
a. Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. Is it not a fact Ms. Witness that the defendant borrowed from you to accommodate somebody, are you aware of that?
witness:
a. I am aware of that.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. More or less she [accommodated] several friends of the defendant?
witness:
a. Yes, sir, I am aware of that.
x x x x
Atty. Villacorta:
q. And these friends of the defendant borrowed money from you with the assurance of the defendant?
witness:
a. They go direct to Jocelyn because I don‘t know them.
x x x x
Atty. Villacorta:
q. And is it not also a fact Madam witness that everytime that the defendant borrowed money from you her friends who [are] in
need of money issued check[s] to you? There were checks issued to you?
witness:
a. Yes, there were checks issued.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. By the friends of the defendant, am I correct?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. And because of your assistance, the friends of the defendant who are in need of money were able to obtain loan to [sic]
Arsenio Pua through your assistance?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. So that occasion lasted for more than a year?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. And some of the checks that were issued by the friends of the defendant bounced, am I correct?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Atty. Villacorta:
q. And because of that Arsenio Pua got mad with you?
witness:
a. Yes, sir.
Respondent is estopped to deny that she herself acted as agent of a certain Arsenio Pua, her disclosed principal. She is also estopped
to deny that petitioner acted as agent for the alleged debtors, the friends whom she (petitioner) referred.
This Court has affirmed that, under Article 1868 of the Civil Code, the basis of agency is representation.
25
The question of whether an
agency has been created is ordinarily a question which may be established in the same way as any other fact, either by direct or
circumstantial evidence. The question is ultimately one of intention.
26
Agency may even be implied from the words and conduct of the
parties and the circumstances of the particular case.
27
Though the fact or extent of authority of the agents may not, as a general rule,
be established from the declarations of the agents alone, if one professes to act as agent for another, she may be estopped to deny her
agency both as against the asserted principal and the third persons interested in the transaction in which he or she is engaged.
28

In this case, petitioner knew that the financier of respondent is Pua; and respondent knew that the borrowers are friends of petitioner.
The CA is incorrect when it considered the fact that the "supposed friends of [petitioner], the actual borrowers, did not present
themselves to [respondent]" as evidence that negates the agency relationship—it is sufficient that petitioner disclosed to respondent
that the former was acting in behalf of her principals, her friends whom she referred to respondent. For an agency to arise, it is not
necessary that the principal personally encounter the third person with whom the agent interacts. The law in fact contemplates, and to a
great degree, impersonal dealings where the principal need not personally know or meet the third person with whom her agent
transacts: precisely, the purpose of agency is to extend the personality of the principal through the facility of the agent.
29

In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondent have undeniably disclosed to each other that they are representing someone else,
and so both of them are estopped to deny the same. It is evident from the record that petitioner merely refers actual borrowers and then
collects and disburses the amounts of the loan upon which she received a commission; and that respondent transacts on behalf of her
"principal financier", a certain Arsenio Pua. If their respective principals do not actually and personally know each other, such i gnorance
does not affect their juridical standing as agents, especially since the very purpose of agency is to extend the personali ty of the principal
through the facility of the agent.
With respect to the admission of petitioner that she is "re-lending" the money loaned from respondent to other individuals for profit, it
must be stressed that the manner in which the parties designate the relationship is not controlling. If an act done by one person in
behalf of another is in its essential nature one of agency, the former is the agent of the latter notwithstanding he or she i s not so
called.
30
The question is to be determined by the fact that one represents and is acting for another, and if relations exist which will
constitute an agency, it will be an agency whether the parties understood the exact nature of the relation or not.
31

That both parties acted as mere agents is shown by the undisputed fact that the friends of petitioner issued checks in payment of the
loan in the name of Pua. If it is true that petitioner was "re-lending", then the checks should have been drawn in her name and not
directly paid to Pua.
With respect to the second point, particularly, the finding of the CA that the disbursements and payments for the loan were made
through the bank accounts of petitioner and respondent,
suffice it to say that in the normal course of commercial dealings and for reasons of convenience and practical utility it can be
reasonably expected that the facilities of the agent, such as a bank account, may be employed, and that a sub-agent be appointed,
such as the bank itself, to carry out the task, especially where there is no stipulation to the contrary.
32

In view of the two agency relationships, petitioner and respondent are not privy to the contract of loan between their principals. Since
the sale is predicated on that loan, then the sale is void for lack of consideration.
2. A further scrutiny of the record shows, however, that the sale might have been backed up by another consideration that is separate
and distinct from the debt: respondent averred in her complaint and testified that the parties had agreed that as a condition for the
conveyance of the property the respondent shall assume the balance of the mortgage loan which petitioner allegedly owed to the
NHMFC.
33
This Court in the recent past has declared that an assumption of a mortgage debt may constitute a valid consideration for a
sale.
34

Although the record shows that petitioner admitted at the time of trial that she owned the property described in the TCT,
35
the Court
must stress that the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 382532
36
on its face shows that the owner of the property which admittedly forms
the subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale refers neither to the petitioner nor to her father, Teodorico Doles, the alleged co-owner.
Rather, it states that the property is registered in the name of "Household Development Corporation." Although there is an entry to the
effect that the petitioner had been granted a special power of attorney "covering the shares of Teodorico Doles on the parcel of land
described in this certificate,"
37
it cannot be inferred from this bare notation, nor from any other evidence on the record, that the petitioner
or her father held any direct interest on the property in question so as to validly constitute a mortgage thereon
38
and, with more reason,
to effect the delivery of the object of the sale at the consummation stage.
39
What is worse, there is a notation that the TCT itself has
been "cancelled."
40

In view of these anomalies, the Court cannot entertain the
possibility that respondent agreed to assume the balance of the mortgage loan which petitioner allegedly owed to the NHMFC,
especially since the record is bereft of any factual finding that petitioner was, in the first place, endowed with any ownership rights to
validly mortgage and convey the property. As the complainant who initiated the case, respondent bears the burden of proving the basis
of her complaint. Having failed to discharge such burden, the Court has no choice but to declare the sale void for lack of cause. And
since the sale is void, the Court finds it unnecessary to dwell on the issue of whether duress or intimidation had been foisted upon
petitioner upon the execution of the sale.
Moreover, even assuming the mortgage validly exists, the Court notes respondent‘s allegation that the mortgage with the NHMFC was
for 25 years which began September 3, 1994. Respondent filed her Complaint for Specific Performance in 1997. Since the 25 years
had not lapsed, the prayer of respondent to compel petitioner to execute necessary documents to effect the transfer of title is
premature.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The
complaint of respondent in Civil Case No. 97-82716 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice








































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 117356 June 19, 2000
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSOLIDATED SUGAR CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 24, 1994, in CA-G.R. CV No. 31717, as well as the respondent court's resolution of September 30, 1994 modifying said
decision. Both decision and resolution amended the judgment dated February 13, 1991, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati Ci ty,
Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 90-118.
The facts of this case as found by both the trial and appellate courts are as follows:
St. Therese Merchandising (hereafter STM) regularly bought sugar from petitioner Victorias Milling Co., Inc., (VMC). In the course of
their dealings, petitioner issued several Shipping List/Delivery Receipts (SLDRs) to STM as proof of purchases. Among these was
SLDR No. 1214M, which gave rise to the instant case. Dated October 16, 1989, SLDR No. 1214M covers 25,000 bags of sugar. Each
bag contained 50 kilograms and priced at P638.00 per bag as "per sales order VMC Marketing No. 042 dated October 16, 1989."
1
The
transaction it covered was a "direct sale."
2
The SLDR also contains an additional note which reads: "subject for (sic) availability of a
(sic) stock at NAWACO (warehouse)."
3

On October 25, 1989, STM sold to private respondent Consolidated Sugar Corporation (CSC) its rights in SLDR No. 1214M for P
14,750,000.00. CSC issued one check dated October 25, 1989 and three checks postdated November 13, 1989 in payment. That same
day, CSC wrote petitioner that it had been authorized by STM to withdraw the sugar covered by SLDR No. 1214M. Enclosed in the
letter were a copy of SLDR No. 1214M and a letter of authority from STM authorizing CSC "to withdraw for and in our behalf the refined
sugar covered by Shipping List/Delivery Receipt-Refined Sugar (SDR) No. 1214 dated October 16, 1989 in the total quantity of 25,000
bags."
4

On October 27, 1989, STM issued 16 checks in the total amount of P31,900,000.00 with petitioner as payee. The latter, in turn, issued
Official Receipt No. 33743 dated October 27, 1989 acknowledging receipt of the said checks in payment of 50,000 bags. Aside from
SLDR No. 1214M, said checks also covered SLDR No. 1213.
Private respondent CSC surrendered SLDR No. 1214M to the petitioner's NAWACO warehouse and was allowed to withdraw sugar.
However, after 2,000 bags had been released, petitioner refused to allow further withdrawals of sugar against SLDR No. 1214M. CSC
then sent petitioner a letter dated January 23, 1990 informing it that SLDR No. 1214M had been "sold and endorsed" to it but that it had
been refused further withdrawals of sugar from petitioner's warehouse despite the fact that only 2,000 bags had been withdrawn.
5
CSC
thus inquired when it would be allowed to withdraw the remaining 23,000 bags.
On January 31, 1990, petitioner replied that it could not allow any further withdrawals of sugar against SLDR No. 1214M because STM
had already dwithdrawn all the sugar covered by the cleared checks.
6

On March 2, 1990, CSC sent petitioner a letter demanding the release of the balance of 23,000 bags.
Seven days later, petitioner reiterated that all the sugar corresponding to the amount of STM's cleared checks had been fully withdrawn
and hence, there would be no more deliveries of the commodity to STM's account. Petitioner also noted that CSC had represented
itself to be STM's agent as it had withdrawn the 2,000 bags against SLDR No. 1214M "for and in behalf" of STM.
On April 27, 1990, CSC filed a complaint for specific performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1118. Defendants were Teresita Ng
Sy (doing business under the name of St. Therese Merchandising) and herein petitioner. Since the former could not be served with
summons, the case proceeded only against the latter. During the trial, it was discovered that Teresita Ng Go who testified for CSC was
the same Teresita Ng Sy who could not be reached through summons.
7
CSC, however, did not bother to pursue its case against her,
but instead used her as its witness.
CSC's complaint alleged that STM had fully paid petitioner for the sugar covered by SLDR No. 1214M. Therefore, the latter had no
justification for refusing delivery of the sugar. CSC prayed that petitioner be ordered to deliver the 23,000 bags covered by SLDR No.
1214M and sought the award of P1,104,000.00 in unrealized profits, P3,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, P2,200,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioner's primary defense a quo was that it was an unpaid seller for the 23,000 bags.
8
Since STM had already drawn in full all the
sugar corresponding to the amount of its cleared checks, it could no longer authorize further delivery of sugar to CSC. Petitioner also
contended that it had no privity of contract with CSC.
Petitioner explained that the SLDRs, which it had issued, were not documents of title, but mere delivery receipts issued pursuant to a
series of transactions entered into between it and STM. The SLDRs prescribed delivery of the sugar to the party specified therein and
did not authorize the transfer of said party's rights and interests.
Petitioner also alleged that CSC did not pay for the SLDR and was actually STM's co-conspirator to defraud it through a
misrepresentation that CSC was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. Petitioner then prayed that CSC be ordered to pay it
the following sums: P10,000,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P1,500,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Petitioner also prayed that cross-defendant STM be ordered to pay it P10,000,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P1,500,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Since no settlement was reached at pre-trial, the trial court heard the case on the merits.
As earlier stated, the trial court rendered its judgment favoring private respondent CSC, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Victorias
Milling Company:
"1) Ordering defendant Victorias Milling Company to deliver to the plaintiff 23,000 bags of refined sugar due under SLDR No.
1214;
"2) Ordering defendant Victorias Milling Company to pay the amount of P920,000.00 as unrealized profits, the amount of
P800,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of P1,357,000.00, which is 10% of the acquisition value of the
undelivered bags of refined sugar in the amount of P13,570,000.00, as attorney's fees, plus the costs.
"SO ORDERED."
9

It made the following observations:
"[T]he testimony of plaintiff's witness Teresita Ng Go, that she had fully paid the purchase price of P15,950,000.00 of the 25,000 bags
of sugar bought by her covered by SLDR No. 1214 as well as the purchase price of P15,950,000.00 for the 25,000 bags of sugar
bought by her covered by SLDR No. 1213 on the same date, October 16, 1989 (date of the two SLDRs) is duly supported by Exhibits C
to C-15 inclusive which are post-dated checks dated October 27, 1989 issued by St. Therese Merchandising in favor of Victorias Milling
Company at the time it purchased the 50,000 bags of sugar covered by SLDR No. 1213 and 1214. Said checks appear to have been
honored and duly credited to the account of Victorias Milling Company because on October 27, 1989 Victorias Milling Company issued
official receipt no. 34734 in favor of St. Therese Merchandising for the amount of P31,900,000.00 (Exhibits B and B-1). The testimony
of Teresita Ng Go is further supported by Exhibit F, which is a computer printout of defendant Victorias Milling Company showing the
quantity and value of the purchases made by St. Therese Merchandising, the SLDR no. issued to cover the purchase, the official
reciept no. and the status of payment. It is clear in Exhibit 'F' that with respect to the sugar covered by SLDR No. 1214 the same has
been fully paid as indicated by the word 'cleared' appearing under the column of 'status of payment.'
"On the other hand, the claim of defendant Victorias Milling Company that the purchase price of the 25,000 bags of sugar purchased by
St. Therese Merchandising covered by SLDR No. 1214 has not been fully paid is supported only by the testimony of Arnulfo Caintic,
witness for defendant Victorias Milling Company. The Court notes that the testimony of Arnulfo Caintic is merely a sweeping barren
assertion that the purchase price has not been fully paid and is not corroborated by any positive evidence. There is an insinuation by
Arnulfo Caintic in his testimony that the postdated checks issued by the buyer in payment of the purchased price were dishonored.
However, said witness failed to present in Court any dishonored check or any replacement check. Said witness likewise failed to
present any bank record showing that the checks issued by the buyer, Teresita Ng Go, in payment of the purchase price of the sugar
covered by SLDR No. 1214 were dishonored."
10

Petitioner appealed the trial court‘s decision to the Court of Appeals.
On appeal, petitioner averred that the dealings between it and STM were part of a series of transactions involving only one account or
one general contract of sale. Pursuant to this contract, STM or any of its authorized agents could withdraw bags of sugar onl y against
cleared checks of STM. SLDR No. 21214M was only one of 22 SLDRs issued to STM and since the latter had already withdrawn its full
quota of sugar under the said SLDR, CSC was already precluded from seeking delivery of the 23,000 bags of sugar.
Private respondent CSC countered that the sugar purchases involving SLDR No. 1214M were separate and independent transactions
and that the details of the series of purchases were contained in a single statement with a consolidated summary of cleared check
payments and sugar stock withdrawals because this a more convenient system than issuing separate statements for each purchase.
The appellate court considered the following issues: (a) Whether or not the transaction between petitioner and STM involving SLDR No.
1214M was a separate, independent, and single transaction; (b) Whether or not CSC had the capacity to sue on its own on SLDR No.
1214M; and (c) Whether or not CSC as buyer from STM of the rights to 25,000 bags of sugar covered by SLDR No. 1214M could
compel petitioner to deliver 23,000 bagsallegedly unwithdrawn.
On February 24, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the trial court's judgment, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby MODIFIES the assailed judgment and orders defendant-appellant to:
"1) Deliver to plaintiff-appellee 12,586 bags of sugar covered by SLDR No. 1214M;
"2) Pay to plaintiff-appellee P792,918.00 which is 10% of the value of the undelivered bags of refined sugar, as attorneys fees;
"3) Pay the costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED."
11

Both parties then seasonably filed separate motions for reconsideration.
In its resolution dated September 30, 1994, the appellate court modified its decision to read:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby modifies the assailed judgment and orders defendant-appellant to:
"(1) Deliver to plaintiff-appellee 23,000 bags of refined sugar under SLDR No. 1214M;
"(2) Pay costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED."
12

The appellate court explained the rationale for the modification as follows:
"There is merit in plaintiff-appellee's position.
"Exhibit ‗F' We relied upon in fixing the number of bags of sugar which remained undelivered as 12,586 cannot be made the basis for
such a finding. The rule is explicit that courts should consider the evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered. (People v.
Abalos, et al, 1 CA Rep 783). The rationale for this is to afford the party against whom the evidence is presented to object thereto if he
deems it necessary. Plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, correct in its argument that Exhibit ‗F' which was offered to prove that checks in the
total amount of P15,950,000.00 had been cleared. (Formal Offer of Evidence for Plaintiff, Records p. 58) cannot be used to prove the
proposition that 12,586 bags of sugar remained undelivered.
"Testimonial evidence (Testimonies of Teresita Ng [TSN, 10 October 1990, p. 33] and Marianito L. Santos [TSN, 17 October 1990, pp.
16, 18, and 36]) presented by plaintiff-appellee was to the effect that it had withdrawn only 2,000 bags of sugar from SLDR after which it
was not allowed to withdraw anymore. Documentary evidence (Exhibit I, Id., p. 78, Exhibit K, Id., p. 80) show that plaintiff-appellee had
sent demand letters to defendant-appellant asking the latter to allow it to withdraw the remaining 23,000 bags of sugar from SLDR
1214M. Defendant-appellant, on the other hand, alleged that sugar delivery to the STM corresponded only to the value of cleared
checks; and that all sugar corresponded to cleared checks had been withdrawn. Defendant-appellant did not rebut plaintiff-appellee's
assertions. It did not present evidence to show how many bags of sugar had been withdrawn against SLDR No. 1214M, precisely
because of its theory that all sales in question were a series of one single transaction and withdrawal of sugar depended on the clearing
of checks paid therefor.
"After a second look at the evidence, We see no reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on this point."
13

Hence, the instant petition, positing the following errors as grounds for review:
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that STM's and private respondent's specially informing petitioner that
respondent was authorized by buyer STM to withdraw sugar against SLDR No. 1214M "for and in our (STM) behalf,"
(emphasis in the original) private respondent's withdrawing 2,000 bags of sugar for STM, and STM's empowering other
persons as its agents to withdraw sugar against the same SLDR No. 1214M, rendered respondent like the other persons, an
agent of STM as held in Rallos v. Felix Go Chan & Realty Corp., 81 SCRA 252, and precluded it from subsequently claiming
and proving being an assignee of SLDR No. 1214M and from suing by itself for its enforcement because it was conclusively
presumed to be an agent (Sec. 2, Rule 131, Rules of Court) and estopped from doing so. (Art. 1431, Civil Code).
"2. The Court of Appeals erred in manifestly and arbitrarily ignoring and disregarding certain relevant and undisputed facts
which, had they been considered, would have shown that petitioner was not liable, except for 69 bags of sugar, and which
would justify review of its conclusion of facts by this Honorable Court.
"3. The Court of Appeals misapplied the law on compensation under Arts. 1279, 1285 and 1626 of the Civil Code when it ruled
that compensation applied only to credits from one SLDR or contract and not to those from two or more distinct
contracts between the same parties; and erred in denying petitioner's right to setoff all its credits arising prior to notice of
assignment from other sales or SLDRs against private respondent's claim as assignee under SLDR No. 1214M, so as to
extinguish or reduce its liability to 69 bags, because the law on compensation applies precisely to two or more distinct
contracts between the same parties (emphasis in the original).
"4. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the settlement or liquidation of accounts in Exh. ‗F‘ between petitioner and
STM, respondent's admission of its balance, and STM's acquiescence thereto by silence for almost one year did not render
Exh. `F' an account stated and its balance binding.
"5. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the conditions of the assigned SLDR No. 1214, namely, (a) its subject matter
being generic, and (b) the sale of sugar being subject to its availability at the Nawaco warehouse, made the sale conditional
and prevented STM or private respondent from acquiring title to the sugar; and the non-availability of sugar freed petitioner
from further obligation.
"6. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the "clean hands" doctrine precluded respondent from seeking judicial reliefs
(sic) from petitioner, its only remedy being against its assignor."
14

Simply stated, the issues now to be resolved are:
(1)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that CSC was an agent of STM and hence, estopped to sue upon
SLDR No. 1214M as an assignee.
(2)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the law on compensation to the transaction under SLDR No.
1214M so as to preclude petitioner from offsetting its credits on the other SLDRs.
(3)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the sale of sugar under SLDR No. 1214M was a conditional
sale or a contract to sell and hence freed petitioner from further obligations.
(4)....Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in not applying the "clean hands doctrine" to preclude
CSC from seeking judicial relief.
The issues will be discussed in seriatim.
Anent the first issue, we find from the records that petitioner raised this issue for the first time on appeal.1avvphi1 It is settled that an
issue which was not raised during the trial in the court below could not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
15
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals opted to address this issue,
hence, now a matter for our consideration.
Petitioner heavily relies upon STM's letter of authority allowing CSC to withdraw sugar against SLDR No. 1214M to show that the latter
was STM's agent. The pertinent portion of said letter reads:
"This is to authorize Consolidated Sugar Corporation or its representative to withdraw for and in our behalf (stress supplied) the refined
sugar covered by Shipping List/Delivery Receipt = Refined Sugar (SDR) No. 1214 dated October 16, 1989 in the total quantity of 25,
000 bags."
16

The Civil Code defines a contract of agency as follows:
"Art. 1868. By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter."
It is clear from Article 1868 that the basis of agency is representation.
17
On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to
appoint
18
or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions;
19
and on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to
accept the appointment and act on it,
20
and in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency.
21
One factor which most clearly
distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is control; one person - the agent - agrees to act under the control or direction of
another - the principal. Indeed, the very word "agency" has come to connote control by the principal.
22
The control factor, more than any
other, has caused the courts to put contracts between principal and agent in a separate category.
23
The Court of Appeals, in finding that
CSC, was not an agent of STM, opined:
"This Court has ruled that where the relation of agency is dependent upon the acts of the parties, the law makes no presumption of
agency, and it is always a fact to be proved, with the burden of proof resting upon the persons alleging the agency, to show not only the
fact of its existence, but also its nature and extent (Antonio vs. Enriquez[CA], 51 O.G. 3536]. Here, defendant-appellant failed to
sufficiently establish the existence of an agency relation between plaintiff-appellee and STM. The fact alone that it (STM) had
authorized withdrawal of sugar by plaintiff-appellee "for and in our (STM's) behalf" should not be eyed as pointing to the existence of an
agency relation ...It should be viewed in the context of all the circumstances obtaining. Although it would seem STM represented
plaintiff-appellee as being its agent by the use of the phrase "for and in our (STM's) behalf" the matter was cleared when on 23 January
1990, plaintiff-appellee informed defendant-appellant that SLDFR No. 1214M had been "sold and endorsed" to it by STM (Exhibit I,
Records, p. 78). Further, plaintiff-appellee has shown that the 25, 000 bags of sugar covered by the SLDR No. 1214M were sold and
transferred by STM to it ...A conclusion that there was a valid sale and transfer to plaintiff-appellee may, therefore, be made thus
capacitating plaintiff-appellee to sue in its own name, without need of joining its imputed principal STM as co-plaintiff."
24

In the instant case, it appears plain to us that private respondent CSC was a buyer of the SLDFR form, and not an agent of STM.
Private respondent CSC was not subject to STM's control. The question of whether a contract is one of sale or agency depends on the
intention of the parties as gathered from the whole scope and effect of the language employed.
25
That the authorization given to CSC
contained the phrase "for and in our (STM's) behalf" did not establish an agency. Ultimately, what is decisive is the intention of the
parties.
26
That no agency was meant to be established by the CSC and STM is clearly shown by CSC's communication to petitioner
that SLDR No. 1214M had been "sold and endorsed" to it.
27
The use of the words "sold and endorsed" means that STM and CSC
intended a contract of sale, and not an agency. Hence, on this score, no error was committed by the respondent appellate court when it
held that CSC was not STM's agent and could independently sue petitioner.
On the second issue, proceeding from the theory that the transactions entered into between petitioner and STM are but serial parts of
one account, petitioner insists that its debt has been offset by its claim for STM's unpaid purchases, pursuant to Article 1279 of the Civil
Code.
28
However, the trial court found, and the Court of Appeals concurred, that the purchase of sugar covered by SLDR No. 1214M
was a separate and independent transaction; it was not a serial part of a single transaction or of one account contrary to petitioner's
insistence. Evidence on record shows, without being rebutted, that petitioner had been paid for the sugar purchased under SLDR No.
1214M. Petitioner clearly had the obligation to deliver said commodity to STM or its assignee. Since said sugar had been fully paid for,
petitioner and CSC, as assignee of STM, were not mutually creditors and debtors of each other. No reversible error could thereby be
imputed to respondent appellate court when, it refused to apply Article 1279 of the Civil Code to the present case.
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contends that the sale of sugar under SLDR No. 1214M is a conditional sale or a contract to sell,
with title to the sugar still remaining with the vendor. Noteworthy, SLDR No. 1214M contains the following terms and conditions:
"It is understood and agreed that by payment by buyer/trader of refined sugar and/or receipt of this document by the buyer/trader
personally or through a representative, title to refined sugar is transferred to buyer/trader and delivery to him/it is deemed effected and
completed (stress supplied) and buyer/trader assumes full responsibility therefore…"
29

The aforequoted terms and conditions clearly show that petitioner transferred title to the sugar to the buyer or his assignee upon
payment of the purchase price. Said terms clearly establish a contract of sale, not a contract to sell. Petitioner is now estopped from
alleging the contrary. The contract is the law between the contracting parties.
30
And where the terms and conditions so stipulated are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, the contract is valid and must be upheld.
31
Having transferred
title to the sugar in question, petitioner is now obliged to deliver it to the purchaser or its assignee.
As to the fourth issue, petitioner submits that STM and private respondent CSC have entered into a conspiracy to defraud it of its sugar.
This conspiracy is allegedly evidenced by: (a) the fact that STM's selling price to CSC was below its purchasing price; (b) CSC's refusal
to pursue its case against Teresita Ng Go; and (c) the authority given by the latter to other persons to withdraw sugar against SLDR No.
1214M after she had sold her rights under said SLDR to CSC. Petitioner prays that the doctrine of "clean hands" should be applied to
preclude CSC from seeking judicial relief. However, despite careful scrutiny, we find here the records bare of convincing evi dence
whatsoever to support the petitioner's allegations of fraud. We are now constrained to deem this matter purely speculative, bereft of
concrete proof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur



Victoria Milling Co., Inc. v. CA and Consolidated Sugar Corporation
G.R. No. 117356 June 19, 2000
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:
 St. Therese Merchandising regularly bought sugar from Victorias Milling Co., Inc. In the course of their dealings, Victorias Milling
issued several Shipping List/Delivery Receipts (SLDRs) to St. Therese Merchandising as proof of purchases. Among these was
SLDR No. 1214M which covers 25,000 bags of sugar. Each bag contained 50 kilograms and priced at P638.00 per bag. The
transaction it covered was a direct sale.

 On October 25, 1989, St. Therese Merchandising sold to Consolidated Sugar Corp. its rights in SLDR No. 1214M for
P14,750,000.00. Consolidated Sugar Corp. issued checks in payment. That same day, Consolidated Sugar Corp. wrote Victorias
Milling that it had been authorized by St. Therese Merchandising to withdraw the sugar covered by SLDR No. 1214M.

 Consolidated Sugar Corp. surrendered SLDR No. 1214M to Victorias Milling‘s NAWACO warehouse and was allowed to withdraw
sugar. However, after 2,000 bags had been released, Victorias Milling refused to allow further withdrawals of sugar against SLDR No.
1214M because, according to it, St. Therese Merchandising had already withdrawn all the sugar covered by the cleared checks.

ISSUE: WON the contract was one of agency or sale

HELD: Sale.
 Victorias Milling heavily relies upon St. Therese Merchandising‘s letter of authority allowing Consolidated Sugar Corp. to wi thdraw sugar
against SLDR No. 1214M to show that the latter was St. Therese Merchandising‘s agent. The pertinent portion of said letter reads:
―This is to authorize Consolidated Sugar Corporation or its representative to withdraw for and in our behalf (stress supplied) the refined
sugar covered by Shipping List/Delivery Receipt = Refined Sugar (SDR) No. 1214 dated October 16, 1989 in the total quantity of 25,
000 bags.‖

 Art. 1868. By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter.

 The basis of agency is representation. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally
inferable from his words or actions; and on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it, and
in the absence of such intent, there is generally no agency. One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal
concepts is control; one person - the agent - agrees to act under the control or direction of another - the principal.

 Victorias Milling failed to sufficiently establish the existence of an agency relation between Consolidated Sugar Corp. and St. Therese
Merchandising. The fact alone that it (St. Therese Merchandising) had authorized withdrawal of sugar by Consolidated Sugar Corp. ―for
and in our (St. Therese Merchandising‘s) behalf‖ should not be eyed as pointing to the existence of an agency relation. Further,
Consolidated Sugar Corp. has shown that the 25,000 bags of sugar covered by the SLDR No. 1214M were sold and transferred by St.
Therese Merchandising to it. A conclusion that there was a valid sale and transfer to Consolidated Sugar Corp. may, therefore, be
made thus capacitating Consolidated Sugar Corp. to sue in its own name, without need of joining its imputed principal St. Therese
Merchandising as co-plaintiff.

 Consolidated Sugar Corp. was a buyer of the SLDFR form, and not an agent of STM. Consolidated Sugar Corp. was not subject to St.
Therese Merchandising‘s control. That no agency was meant to be established by the Consolidated Sugar Corp. and STM is clearl y
shown by Consolidated Sugar Corp.‘s communication to petitioner that SLDR No. 1214M had been ―sold and endorsed‖ to it.27 The
use of the words ―sold and endorsed‖ means that St. Therese Merchandising and Consolidated Sugar Corp. intended a contract of sale,
and not an agency.




















THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148775. January 13, 2004]
SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EFREN P. ROQUE, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
On 23 December 1993, petitioner Shopper‘s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its president, Veredigno
Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land, with an area of two
thousand and thirty six (2,036) square meters, situated at Plaza Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by Transfer of Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 30591 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Dr. Roque. Petitioner issued to Dr. Roque a check for
P250,000.00 by way of ―reservation payment.‖ Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of
agreement for the construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property. Conformably with the
agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00 ―downpayment‖ to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized, were to be annotated on TCT No. 30591 within sixty
(60) days from 23 December 1993 or until 23 February 1994. The annotations, however, were never made because of the untimely
demise of Dr. Felipe C. Roque. The death of Dr. Roque on 10 February 1994 constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P.
Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. In a letter,
dated 3 November 1994, respondent advised petitioner ―to desist from any attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and
memorandum of agreement‖. On 15 February 1995, respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the
memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, before Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Efren P. Roque alleged that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of
donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, on 26 December 1978, and that the late
Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter into the assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument
duly acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day by respondent before the notary
public in the same instrument of donation. The title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was
only transferred to and in the name of respondent sixteen years later, or on 11 May 1994, under TCT No. 109754 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere administration
of the property. Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the Philippines upon the death
of his father.
On 9 August 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent; it explained:
―Ordinarily, a deed of donation need not be registered in order to be valid between the parties. Registration, however, is important in
binding third persons. Thus, when Felipe Roque entered into a leased contract with defendant corporation, plaintiff Efren Roque (could)
no longer assert the unregistered deed of donation and say that his father, Felipe, was no longer the owner of the subject property at
the time the lease on the subject property was agreed upon.
―The registration of the Deed of Donation after the execution of the lease contract did not affect the latter unless he had knowledge
thereof at the time of the registration which plaintiff had not been able to establish. Plaintiff knew very well of the existence of the
lease. He, in fact, met with the officers of the defendant corporation at least once before he caused the registration of the deed of
donation in his favor and although the lease itself was not registered, it remains valid considering that no third person is
involved. Plaintiff cannot be the third person because he is the successor-in-interest of his father, Felipe Roque, the lessor, and it is a
rule that contracts take effect not only between the parties themselves but also between their assigns and heirs (Article 1311, Civil
Code) and therefore, the lease contract together with the memorandum of agreement would be conclusive on plaintiff Efren Roque. He
is bound by the contract even if he did not participate therein. Moreover, the agreements have been perfected and partially executed
by the receipt of his father of the downpayment and deposit totaling to P500,000.00.‖
[1]

The Trial court ordered respondent to surrender TCT No. 109754 to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the annotation of the
questioned Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and
Memorandum of Agreement. While it shared the view expressed by the trial court that a deed of donation would have to be registered
in order to bind third persons, the appellate court, however, concluded that petitioner was not a lessee in good faith having had prior
knowledge of the donation in favor of respondent, and that such actual knowledge had the effect of registration insofar as petitioner was
concerned. The appellate court based its findings largely on the testimony of Veredigno Atienza during cross-examination, viz;
―Q. Aside from these two lots, the first in the name of Ruben Roque and the second, the subject of the construction involved
in this case, you said there is another lot which was part of development project?
―A. Yes, this was the main concept of Dr. Roque so that the adjoining properties of his two sons, Ruben and Cesar, will
comprise one whole. The other whole property belongs to Cesar.
―Q. You were informed by Dr. Roque that this property was given to his three (3) sons; one to Ruben Roque, the other to
Efren, and the other to Cesar Roque?
―A. Yes.
―Q. You did the inquiry from him, how was this property given to them?
―A. By inheritance.
―Q. Inheritance in the form of donation?
―A. I mean inheritance.
―Q. What I am only asking you is, were you told by Dr. Felipe C. Roque at the time of your transaction with him that all these
three properties were given to his children by way of donation?
―A. What Architect Biglang-awa told us in his exact word: ―Yang mga yan pupunta sa mga anak. Yong kay Ruben pupunta
kay Ruben. Yong kay Efren palibhasa nasa America sya, nasa pangalan pa ni Dr. Felipe C. Roque.”
―x x x x x x x x x
―Q. When was the information supplied to you by Biglang-awa? Before the execution of the Contract of Lease and
Memorandum of Agreement?
―A. Yes.
―Q. That being the case, at the time of the execution of the agreement or soon before, did you have such information
confirmed by Dr. Felipe C. Roque himself?
―A. Biglang-awa did it for us.
―Q. But you yourself did not?
―A. No, because I was doing certain things. We were a team and so Biglang-awa did it for us.
―Q. So in effect, any information gathered by Biglang-awa was of the same effect as if received by you because you were
members of the same team?
―A. Yes.‖
[2]

In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the reinstatement of the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court; it argues that the presumption of good faith it so enjoys as a party dealing in registered land has not
been overturned by the aforequoted testimonial evidence, and that, in any event, respondent is barred by laches and estoppel from
denying the contracts.
The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is undisputed. The trial court and the appellate court
have not erred in holding that the non-registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of acquiring
ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee.
[3]
In donations of immovable
property, the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
[4]
The Civil Code provides, however, that ―titles of ownership, or other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall
not prejudice third persons.‖
[5]
It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be made in a
public document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of Property (Registry of Land Titles
and Deeds).
[6]
Consistently, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as so amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree), states:
―SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease,
charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to
convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
“The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases
under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.‖
(emphasis supplied)
A person dealing with registered land may thus safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore, and he is
not required to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property
[7]
but, where such party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right thereto, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest would
have the effect of registration as regards to him.
[8]

The appellate court was not without substantial basis when it found petitioner to have had knowledge of the donation at the time it
entered into the two agreements with Dr. Roque. During their negotiation, petitioner, through its representatives, was apprised of the
fact that the subject property actually belonged to respondent.
It was not shown that Dr. Felipe C. Roque had been an authorized agent of respondent.
In a contract of agency, the agent acts in representation or in behalf of another with the consent of the latter.
[9]
Article 1878 of the
Civil Code expresses that a special power of attorney is necessary to lease any real property to another person for more than one
year. The lease of real property for more than one year is considered not merely an act of administration but an act of strict dominion or
of ownership. A special power of attorney is thus necessary for its execution through an agent.
The Court cannot accept petitioner‘s argument that respondent is guilty of laches. Laches, in its real sense, is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
[10]

Respondent learned of the contracts only in February 1994 after the death of his father, and in the same year, during November,
he assailed the validity of the agreements. Hardly, could respondent then be said to have neglected to assert his case for unreasonable
length of time.
Neither is respondent estopped from repudiating the contracts. The essential elements of estoppel in pais, in relation to the party
sought to be estopped, are: 1) a clear conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or, at least, calculated
to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to
assert; 2) an intent or, at least, an expectation, that this conduct shall influence, or be acted upon by, the other party; and 3) the
knowledge, actual or constructive, by him of the real facts.
[11]
With respect to the party claiming the estoppel, the conditions he must
satisfy are: 1) lack of knowledge or of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; 2) reliance, in good faith, upon the
conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change his position
or status calculated to cause him injury or prejudice.
[12]
It has not been shown that respondent intended to conceal the actual facts
concerning the property; more importantly, petitioner has been shown not to be totally unaware of the real ownership of the subject
property.
Altogether, there is no cogent reason to reverse the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring the contract of lease and memorandum
of agreement entered into between Dr. Felipe C. Roque and Shopper‘s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation not to be bindi ng
on respondent is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

DIGEST:
SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs ROQUE

G.R. No. 148775. January 13, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Shopper‘s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its president, Veredigno Atienza, entered
into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land in the name of Roque. Petitioner issued to
Dr. Roque a check for P250,000.00 by way of ―reservation payment.‖ Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a
memorandum of agreement for the construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property.
Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00 ―downpayment‖ to Dr. Roque.

The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized,were never notarized because of the untimely demise of
Roque. Roque‘s death constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr.
Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. In a letter, respondent advised petitioner ―to desist from any
attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and memorandum of agreement‖. On 15 February 1995, respondent filed a
case for annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction before the RTC alleging that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter
vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to
enter into the assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument duly acknowledged by the donor-
spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day by respondent before the notary public in the same instrument of
donation. The title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the
name of respondent sixteen years later.

Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere administration of the property.
Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father.

The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement.

ISSUE: W/N there was valid donation to respondent?

HELD: YES. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is undisputed. The trial court and the appellate
court have not erred in holding that the non-registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of
acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. In donations of
immovable property, the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code provides, however, that ―titles of ownership, or other
rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and
Deeds) shall not prejudice third persons.‖ It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be
made in a public document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of Property (Registry of
Land Titles and Deeds).






AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION SERVICES PHILS., INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Simple negligence of counsel binds the client. This is especially true in this case in which the client was as negligent as its
lawyer. Hence, petitioner must bear the consequences and accept its defeat. After all, the winning party did not take advantage of
petitioner‘s fault, but merely complied with the law in prosecuting its valid and proven claims.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the September 28, 2001 Decision
[2]
and the
January 25, 2002 Resolution
[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 64283. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision
reads:
“IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of the [petitioner] is partially GRANTED in that the Decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award for a broker‘s fee in favor of the [respondent] is deleted.‖
[4]

The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration of the Decision.
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:
―The Air Philippines, Inc., API for brevity, was in need of the services of a business establishment to ferry its B-737 airplane, with
Registry Number RP C1938, from the United States of America to the Philippines, via Subic Bay International Airport, at Olongapo
City. API, through Captain Alex Villacampa, its Vice-President for Operations, engaged the services of International Business
Aviation Services Phils., Inc., IBASPI for brevity, as its agent to look for and engage, for API, a business enterprise to ferry the
airplane. IBASPI did engage the services of Universal Weather [&] Aviation, Inc.,UWAI for brevity, to ferry the airplane x x x to the
Philippines, via the International Airport at Subic Bay, Olongapo City, where API took delivery of the plane.
―UWAI sent its ‗Billings’ to API, through IBASPI, in the total amount of US$65,131.55 for its services for the ferry of the airplane. API
failed to pay its account. On December 2, 1996, the [respondent] wrote a letter to the [petitioner] urging the payment of the bills of
UWAI. The [petitioner] refused. Exasperated, UWAI blamed IBASPI for the intransigence of API. IBASPI was impelled to write a letter
to UWAI ‗to clarify‘ critical points of API‘s account. Unable to bear the pressure of UWAI and to avoid corporate embarrassment for
API‘s intransigence, IBASPI was impelled to advance and pay to UWAI the said amount of US$65,131.55 for the account of API. The
latter was informed by UWAI of the payment of said account by IBASPI via its letter dated May 12, 1997.
―IBASPI forthwith wrote a letter to API demanding refund to IBASPI the amount it advanced to UWAI for the account of API. IBASPI
received, via an informant, a copy of a ‗Memorandum’ of Rodolfo Estrellado, the President and Chief Executive Officer of API, dated
July 29, 1997, to the President of API, recommending that the latter pay only the amount of US$27,730.60, with a recommendation that
IBASPI be required to submit documentations/billings in support of the difference of US$37,400.00. However, no payment was effected
by API.
―On November 6, 1997, IBASPI, through counsel, sent another letter to API demanding the payment of the said amount of
US$65,131.55 and 10% commission. API ignored the letter. Another letter of demand was sent to API by IBASPI, on December 1,
1997, to no avail. On January 6, 1998, IBASPI wrote another letter of demand to API enclosing therein a ‗Summary Statement of
Account of Air Philippines, Inc.‘ on the disputed amount of US $37,400.00, appending thereto the documentations/billings in support
of said claim and 10% commission. On February 26, 1998, API drew Check No. 0521300 against its account, with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, in the amount of P200,000.00, payable to the order of IBASPI, and offered the same in partial first payment of its
account with IBASPI for the amount of US$65,131.55 as stated in the letter of the [petitioner]. The [respondent] accepted the said
check with a simultaneous ‗Receipt/Agreement‘ executed by IBASPI and API, the latter, through Atty. Manolito A. Manalo, the Officer-
in-Charge of the Legal Department of the API, obliging itself to pay the balance of its account. API in the said Agreement waived
demand by IBASPI. Despite demands of IBASPI, via its letter, dated April 22, 1998, API refused to pay the balance of its account with
IBASPI.
―On June 24, 1998, IBASPI filed a complaint against API, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, for the collection of its account,
including a 10% broker‘s fee, praying that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in its favor as follows:
‗WHEREFORE, [respondent] respectfully prays of this Honorable Court to render judgment:
1) Ordering the [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] the sum of US$59,798.22 x x x or its equivalent in legal tender with interest at the
legal rate from May 1997 until full payment;
2) Ordering the [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] further sum of US$6,513.00 or its equivalent in legal tender as intermediary‘s
commission;
3) Ordering the [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] another sum of US$13,026.00 or its equivalent in legal tender as actual damages
in the form of attorney‘s fees;
4) Ordering the [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] expenses of litigation as can be proved;
5) Ordering the [petitioner] to pay the costs of the suit; and,
6) [Respondent] prays for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or equitable.‘
―The [respondent] appended to its complaint the ‗Receipt/Agreement‘ executed by the [petitioner], on March 20, 1998. In its
‗Unverified Answer‘, API alleged, inter alia, by way of ‗Affirmative Allegations‘, that:
In support of the foregoing denials and by way of affirmative allegations, [petitioner] states:
On 6 November 1997, we received a letter from [respondent] demanding payment of $65,131.00 allegedly for the ferry flight services
rendered by Universal and brokered by [respondent].
‗10. On 1 December 1997 and 12 January 1998, we sent letters to [respondent] acknowledging receipt of their demand letter[.] However,
we mentioned in the letters that we needed time to process the documents submitted by [respondent] to support their claim.
‗11. APC made it very clear that if an obligation on the part of [petitioner] is proven to exist, [petitioner] would be more than willing
to settle the obligation.
‗12. In fact, as mentioned in the complaint, [petitioner] made a payment of P200,000.00 to cover claims which [petitioner] did not
contest; [petitioner] opted not to settle the balance of the claim pending verification of the submitted supporting documents.
‗13. [Petitioner] verbally requested [respondent] to further substantiate its claim by sending their accountants to the offices of
APC[.]
‗14. [Respondent] did not heed this request; thus, APC could not release any other amounts to cover the claim of [respondent.]
‗15. The documents sent by [respondent] were not accompanied by any explanation and were merely a loose collection of
statements from various companies[.]
‗16. Thus, [petitioner] was surprised when [respondent] filed the instant complaint[,] for[,] as far as the former [was] concerned[,]
the accounting of the claim was nowhere near definite nor clear[.]‘
―On November 17, 1998, the Court issued a ‗Pre-Trial Notice‘ setting the pre-trial conference on December 7, 1998, at 8:30 x x x in the
morning, requiring the parties to file their respective ‗Pre-Trial Brief‘ at least two (2) days before the scheduled pre-trial. The
[respondent] did file its ‗Pre-Trial Brief‘[,] but the [petitioner] did not. During the pre-trial, on December 7, 1998, Atty. Manolito Manalo,
counsel of the [petitioner], appeared[,] but without any ‗Special Power of Attorney‘ from the [petitioner]. The Court granted the
[petitioner] a period of ten (10) days, from said date, within which to file its ‗Pre-Trial Brief‘ and ‗Special Power of Attorney‘ executed
by the [petitioner] in favor of its counsel. In the meantime, the pre-trial was reset to January 11, 1999 at the same time. However, the
[petitioner] failed to file its ‗Pre-Trial Brief‘. On January 11, 1999, at 9:20 x x x in the morning, the [petitioner] filed an ‗Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Extension of Time to File Pre-Trial Brief and For Resetting of Pre-Trial Conference‘, with a plea to the Branch Clerk of
Court to submit the said motion for consideration of the Court immediately upon receipt thereof. When the case was called for pre-trial,
there was no appearance for the [petitioner] and its counsel. The Court issued an Order denying the motion of the [petitioner] and
allowing the [respondent] to adduce its evidence, ex parte, before the Branch Clerk of Court, who was designated, as Commissioner, to
receive the evidence of the [respondent], ex parte. On January 13, 1999, the [petitioner] filed with the Court another ‗Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Extension of Time to File Pre-Trial Brief and for Resetting of Pre-Trial Conference‘. On January 15, 1999, the
[petitioner] filed a ‗Motion for Reconsideration‘ of the Order of the Court, dated January 11, 1999. The [petitioner] appended to its
motion the ‗Affidavit’ of Atty. Manolito Manalo, its counsel, stating the reason for his failure to appear at the pre-trial conference on
January 11, 1999. On January 22, 1999, the Court issued an Order denying the ‗Motion for Reconsideration‘ of the [petitioner]. On
January 25, 1999, the [respondent] did adduce testimonial and documentary evidence in support of its complaint.
―Among the documentary evidence adduced by the [respondent] were the xerox copy of the ‗Certification’ of Captain Alex Villacampa,
and the ‗Memorandum’ of Rodolfo Estrellado.
―On April 7, 1999, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioner], the decretal portion of which
reads as follows:
‗WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING uncontroverted and substantiated evidences of the [respondent], judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay the former the following:
1. the amount of US59,798.22 dollars or its equivalent in legal tender plus interest at the legal rate from May, 1997 until fully paid;
2. the amount of US6,513.00 or its equivalent as intermediary‘s commission;
3. [P]50,000.00 as and for attorney‘s fees; and,
Costs of suit.
‗SO ORDERED.‘
―The [petitioner] filed a ‗Motion for New Trial‘ on the grounds that: (a) it was deprived of its day in court due to the gross negligence of
its former counsel, Atty. Manolito A. Manalo; (b) the ‗Receipt/Agreement‘ executed by Atty. Manolito A. Manalo, in behalf of the
[petitioner], was unauthorized as there was no ‗Resolution’ of the Board of Directors authorizing him to execute
said‘Receipt/Agreement‘ and, hence, said counsel acted beyond the scope of his authority; (c) the claim of IBASPI was excessive and
unjustified; [and] (d) the [petitioner] never agreed to pay the [respondent] a commission of 10% of the billings of UWAI.
―On July 26, 1999, the Court issued a ‗Resolution’ denying the ‗Motion for New Trial‘ of the [petitioner]. The latter forthwith
interposed its appeal, from said Decision and Resolution of the Court a quo.‖
[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the Decision of the lower court with some modification, the CA ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner
could not avail itself of a new trial, because its former counsel was guilty of only simple -- not gross -- negligence. In addition,
petitioner, being equally negligent as its counsel, could not be relieved from the effects of its negligence. Thus, it was held liable for
US$59,798.22 and attorney‘s fees, but not for the 10 percent commission or broker‘s fee, for which the requisite quantum of evidence in
its favor had not been mustered by respondent.
Hence this Petition.
[6]

The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
―1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it upheld
the ruling of the Honorable Trial Court denying the Motion for New Trial dated April 27, 1999 despite the fact that the gross negligence,
incompetence and dishonesty of Petitioner APC‘s former counsel, Atty. Manolito A. Manalo, have effectively denied Petitioner APC of
its day in court.
―2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it took
cognizance of and/or gave credence to the ‗Memorandum‘ of Rodolfo Estrellado, and the ‗Billings‘ of Universal Weather as well as the
documents/receipts in support thereof despite the fact that they are clearly hearsay and have no probative value considering that Luisito
Nazareno, the lone witness of Respondent IBAS, had no personal knowledge of the contents and/or factual bases thereof and failed to
properly authenticate and/or identify the same.
―3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it took
cognizance of and/or gave credence to the Receipt/Agreement dated March 20, 1998 despite the fact that Atty. Manolito A. Manalo was
not authorized to execute [the] same for and [in] behalf of Petitioner APC.
―4. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it upheld
the ruling of the Honorable Trial Court that Petitioner APC is liable to pay and/or reimburse Respondent IBAS for the payments
allegedly made by the latter to Universal Weather despite the fact that the claims submitted by Universal Weather and/or Respondent
IBAS were patently baseless and/or unsubstantiated.
―5. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it upheld
the ruling of the Honorable Trial Court that Respondent IBAS is entitled to legal interest and attorney‘s fees despite the fact that it has
failed to establish its claims against Petitioner APC.‖
[7]

These issues all boil down into two: first, whether the Motion for New Trial should be denied; and second, in the event of such
denial, whether the monetary awards were duly proven.
The Court’s Ruling The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
New Trial Not Warranted by
Simple Negligence of Counsel
Axiomatic is the rule that ―negligence of counsel binds the client.‖
[8]
The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel within
the scope of a ―general or implied authority‖
[9]
is regarded as an act of the client.
[10]
―Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client.‖
[11]

While the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case,
[12]
there are
exceptions recognized by this Court: ―(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
[13]
(2)
when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client‘s liberty or property;
[14]
or (3) where the interests of justice
[15]
so
require.‖
[16]
Woefully none of these exceptions apply herein. Thus, the Court cannot ―step in and accord relief‖
[17]
to petitioner, even if it
may have suffered
[18]
by reason of its own arrant fatuity.
First, as aptly determined by the appellate court, petitioner‘s counsel is guilty of simple, not gross, negligence. We cannot
consider as gross negligence his resort to dilatory schemes, such as (1) the filing of at least three motions to extend the f iling of
petitioner‘s Answer; (2) his nonappearance during the scheduled pretrials; and (3) the failure to file petitioner‘s pretrial Brief, even after
the filing of several Motions to extend the date for filing.
[19]
There was only a plain ―disregard of some duty imposed by law,‖
[20]
a slight
want of care that ―circumstances reasonably impose,‖
[21]
and a mere failure to exercise that degree of care
[22]
that an ordinarily prudent
person would take under the circumstances. There was neither a total abandonment or disregard of petitioner‘s case nor a showing of
conscious indifference to or utter disregard of consequences.
[23]

Because ―pre-trial is essential in the simplification and the speedy disposition of disputes,‖
[24]
nonobservance of its rules ―may
result in prejudice to a party‘s substantive rights.‖
[25]
Such rules are ―not technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with.‖
[26]
The
Rules of Court cannot be ―ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and
their just resolution.‖
[27]

Counsel‘s patent carelessness in citing conflicting reasons in his Motions for Reconsideration verily displays his lack of
competence,
[28]
diligence
[29]
and candor,
[30]
but not his recklessness or total want of care.
Indeed, the lawyer‘s failure to live up to the dictates of the canons of the legal profession makes him answerable to both his
profession and his employer.
[31]

Second, the negligence of petitioner and that of its counsel are concurrent.
[32]
As an artificial being whose juridical personality is
created by fiction of law,
[33]
petitioner ―can only exercise its powers and transact its business through the instrumentalities of its board of
directors, and through its officers and agents, when authorized by resolution or its by-laws.‖
[34]
Atty. Manalo is an employee, not an
outsider hired by petitioner on a retainer basis. In fact, he is the officer-in-charge of its Legal Department.
There is no showing that he was not authorized to exercise the powers of the corporation or to transact its business, particularly
the handling of its legal affairs. Besides, it is presumed that the ordinary course of business has been followed.
[35]
Therefore, counsel‘s
corporate acts are supposed to be known and assented to by petitioner.
For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an important litigation i s to unmask a
penchant for the ludicrous. Although it expects counsel to amply protect its interest, it cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome
of its case.
[36]
In keeping with the normal course of events, it should have taken the initiative ―of making the proper inquiries from its
counsel and the trial court as to the status of its case‖
[37]
and of extending to him the ―necessary assistance.‖
[38]
For its failure to do so, it
has only itself to blame. Indeed, from lethargy is misfortune born.
It is of no consequence that its Human Resources and Personnel Departments were not aware of the progress of its case. Of
judicial notice is the fact that a corporation has much leeway in determining which of its units, singly or in consonance with others, is
responsible for specific functions. Yet, it is unusual that these departments were tasked with monitoring the progress of legal matters
involving petitioner. Nonetheless, having assigned these matters to them, it should have undertaken prompt and proper monitoring and
reporting thereof. Again, for its failure to do so, it has only itself to blame. These departments do get involved in finance and
accounting, especially in budget preparation and payroll computation, but billing and collection are hardly tangential to their concerns.
Third, there was no denial of due process
[39]
to petitioner. Under the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may ask for a new trial on
the ground of excusable negligence,
[40]
but this was not proved in this case.
[41]
―Negligence, to be ‗excusable,‘ must be one which
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against‖
[42]
and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have
probably been impaired.
[43]

The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted ―with ordinary prudence while x x x transacting important
business.‖
[44]
The reasons raised by petitioner in urging for a new trial do not meet this test; they are flimsy. As we mentioned nearly
thirty years ago, ―[p]arties and counsel would be well advised to avoid such attempts to befuddle the issues as invariably they will be
exposed for what they are, certainly unethical and degrading to the dignity of the law profession.‖
[45]

―The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evi dence one may have in
support of one‘s defense.‖
[46]
Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the
party can ―present its side‖
[47]
or defend its ―interest in due course,‖
[48]
―there is no denial of procedural due process.‖
[49]
Petitioner has
been given its chance, and after being declared in default, judgment has not been automatically ―rendered in favor of the non-defaulting
party.‖
[50]
Rather, judgment was made only after carefully weighing the evidence presented. Substantive and adjective laws do
complement each other
[51]
―in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.‖
[52]

Petitioner was not deprived of its day in court. Actually, it never even complained against the manner in which its counsel had
handled the case,
[53]
until late in the day. It must therefore ―bear the consequences‖
[54]
of its faulty choice of counsel whom it hired itself
and whom it had ―full authority to fire at any time and replace with another.‖
[55]
Moreover, in all the pertinent cases cited by petitioner,
the denial of due process was attributable to the gross negligence of retained counsels, who had either been single practitioners or law
firms; none had referred to counsels who, like Atty. Manalo, were employees of the aggrieved party.
Fourth, the negligence of petitioner‘s counsel did not result in the outright deprivation of its property. In fact, it intractably refused
to comply with its obligation to reimburse respondent, after having already generated profits from operating the ferried unit. When sued,
it simply relied upon its own dillydallying counsel without even monitoring the progress of his work. Now it tries to pass the buck entirely
to him, after he has been relieved and replaced by another. Throughout the course of litigation, none of its assets was reduced; on the
contrary, its fleet of aircraft even increased. While it has incurred legal expenses, it has also earned interest on money that should have
been reimbursed to respondent.
Fifth, the interests of justice require that positive law be equally observed. Petitioner has not sufficiently proved the injustice of
holding it liable for the negligence of its counsel. On the contrary, there is a preponderance of evidence
[56]
to demonstrate that both law
and justice demand otherwise. Much leniency has already been shown by the lower court to petitioner, but ―aequetas nunquam
contravenit legis.‖
[57]
Equity never contravenes the law.
[58]

For these reasons, the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against petitioner by reason of its counsel‘s simple negligence is
therefore apropos. To hold otherwise and grant a new trial will never put an end to any litigation,
[59]
―as there is a new counsel to be
hired every time it is shown that the prior one had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.‖
[60]

Second Issue:
Monetary Awards Sufficiently Established
by a Preponderance of Evidence
As correctly put by the appellate court, the Receipt/Agreement executed by the parties validated the inter-office Memorandum that
petitioner issued on July 29, 1997, and the set of Billings it had received from respondent in 1996.
Liability per Receipt/Agreement
and Interest Thereon
First, the Receipt/Agreement was entered into by respondent and petitioner, which was represented by its agent Atty. Manalo. As
an agent, he rendered service to, and did something in representation
[61]
or on behalf of, his principal
[62]
and with its consent
[63]
and
authority. It cannot be denied that, on its part, there was an actual intent to appoint its counsel;
[64]
and, on the latter‘s part,
[65]
to accept
the appointment and ―act on it.‖
[66]

A corporation, as ―a juridical person separate and distinct from its stockholders,‖
[67]
may act ―through its officers or agents in the
normal course of business.‖
[68]
Thus, the general principles of agency govern its relationship with its officers or agents, subject to the
articles of incorporation, bylaws and other relevant provisions of law.
[69]

Second, even assuming that Atty. Manalo exceeded his authority, petitioner is solidarily liable with him if it allowed him ―to act as
though he had full powers.‖
[70]
Moreover, as for any obligation wherein the agent has exceeded his power, the principal is not bound
except when there is ratification,
[71]
express or tacit.
[72]

Estoppel likewise applies. For one, respondent lacked ―knowledge and x x x the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in
question‖;
[73]
namely, whether petitioner‘s counsel had any authority to bind his principal. Moreover, respondent relied ―in good
faith‖
[74]
upon petitioner‘s conduct and statements; and its action ―based thereon [was] of such character as to change the position or
status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.‖
[75]
If it was also true that petitioner‘s counsel exceeded his
authority in entering into the Receipt/Agreement, the negligence or omission of petitioner to assert its right within a reasonable time only
warranted a presumption that it either abandoned or declined to assert it.
[76]

Third, while it is true that a special power of attorney (SPA) is necessary to a compromise, it is equally true that the herein
Receipt/Agreement was not a compromise.
[77]
The payment was made in the ordinary course of business. Whether total or partial, the
payment of an ordinary obligation
[78]
is neither included among nor of a character similar to the instances enumerated in Article 1878 of
the Civil Code.
[79]
All that the law requires is a general power,
[80]
not an SPA.
Moreover, the Receipt/Agreement is not a promise to pay that ―amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of
attorney or the express consent of petitioner.‖
[81]
A compromise agreement is ―a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.‖
[82]
No such reciprocal concessions
[83]
were made in this
case. Thus, the Receipt/Agreement is but an outright admission of petitioner of its obligation, after making partial payment, to pay the
balance of its account. And even if we were to consider the same as a compromise, from its nature as a contract, the absence of an
SPA does not render it void, but merely unenforceable.
[84]

Fourth, in its Answer,
[85]
petitioner failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the Receipt/Agreement, which
is thus deemed admitted.
[86]
Indeed, before a private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved. However, after it has been offered, failure to deny it under oath
[87]
amounts to its admissibility.
[88]
The
―party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority;
[89]
that at the time it
was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
and that any formal requisites required by law, x x x which it lacks, are waived by him.‖
[90]
The Receipt/Agreement is thus an instrument
that is admittedly not ―spurious, counterfeit or of different import on its face from the one executed.‖
[91]

Fifth, what respondent has paid, it may demand from petitioner; and even if the payment was made without the knowledge or
against the will of the latter, respondent can still recover insofar as such payment was beneficial to petitioner.
[92]
Such payment cannot
be considered as one that is neither due under the provisions of solutio indebiti
[93]
nor recoverable from the creditor by
respondent;
[94]
the latter‘s right is against petitioner whose obligation it has paid in advance.
[95]

Sixth, the Memorandum and the Billings have probative value. While it is true that Nazareno
[96]
did not have any personal
knowledge of the contents thereof, nevertheless, these two documents were validated by the Receipt/Agreement. Petitioner‘s
Memorandum contained a recommendation to pay respondent the amount of US$27,730.60 and to require additional documentation in
support of the balance. In compliance, a Summary of Statement of Account dated January 6, 1998
[97]
was sent to and received by
petitioner, substantiating it to the extent of US$37,400.95. Not only did these amounts sum up to a total of US$65,131.55, the unsettled
account indicated in the Billings, but these are also unrefuted by petitioner. In fact, the Receipt/Agreement executed two months later
did not contest this balance, although unvalued therein. When a party fails to object to hearsay evidence,
[98]
such party is deemed to
have waived its right to do so; thus, ―the evidence offered may be admitted,‖
[99]
though its weight must still be measured by the court.
Seventh, the accounting required by petitioner was not a legal impediment to the obligation. There was in fact no indication that
the obligation was subject to such a condition. A pure obligation is demandable at once,
[100]
and there is nothing to exempt petitioner
from compliance therewith.
[101]
In addition, it would be preposterous for it to issue a corporate check
[102]
-- without any condition or
reservation -- and even waive a demand for payment of the balance, if it did not recognize its obligation in the first place.
Eighth, the obligation consisted in the payment of a sum of money, and petitioner incurred in delay; hence, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, the indemnity for damages shall be the payment of legal interest, which is six percent (6%) per
annum.
[103]
Such interest may be allowed upon damages awarded for a clear breach of contract.
[104]

Commission or Broker’s Fee
Indeed, ―only questions of law
[105]
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.‖
[106]
Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this mode of appeal,
[107]
for this Court -- we have repeatedly emphasized -- is ―not
a trier of facts.‖
[108]
One of the exceptions to this rule, however, is when the factual findings of the CA and the trial court are
contradictory.
[109]

The lower court held petitioner liable for the 10 percent broker‘s fee, but the appellate court found otherwise. It is true that
respondent -- on commission basis -- engaged itself as a broker to negotiate ―contracts relative to property,‖
[110]
the custody of which it
had no concern over; to never act ―in its own name but in the name of those who employed‖
[111]
it; and ―to bring parties together x x x in
matters of trade, commerce or navigation.‖
[112]
However, we agree with the CA that respondent‘s entitlement to a broker‘s fee should
have been adequately proven.
The March 19, 1997 Certification issued by Captain Villacampa is inadmissible in evidence. It was a mere reproduction of an
original that had never been produced or offered in evidence.
[113]
Under the best evidence rule
[114]
as applied to documentary evidence,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original itself when the subject of inqui ry is its contents.
[115]
Since none of the exceptions
to this rule has been proven,
[116]
―secondary or substitutionary evidence‖
[117]
is not permitted.
[118]

It is of no moment that Nazareno testified as to the intermediary‘s commission in open court. Whether the Certification has
actually been executed cannot be proved by his mere testimony, because he was not a signatory to the document. His assertion was
bare and untested. Without substantiation, ―such testimony is considered hearsay.‖
[119]
Witnesses can testify only to those facts that
they know of their personal knowledge or are derived from their own perception.
[120]
Unlike the unvalued balance in the
Receipt/Agreement, the broker‘s fee herein has not been supported by any admissible evidence other than the demand letters sent by
respondent‘s counsel.
Attorney’s Fees
Attorney‘s fees may be recovered, since petitioner has compelled respondent to incur expenses to protect the latter‘s
interest
[121]
in reimbursement. Besides, it is clear from the Receipt/Agreement that petitioner is obliged to pay 10 percent of the
principal, as attorney‘s fees.
In sum, petitioner is liable for the unpaid balance of respondent‘s claim amounting to US$59,798.22 or its equivalent in legal
tender under the Receipt/Agreement, including legal interest from May 12, 1997 unti l f ul l y pai d; and f or at torney‘ s fees
of 10 percent of this unpaid balance, excluding interest. No broker‘s fee can be charged, as it has not been proven by
respondent. Since the counsel of petitioner is guilty of simple negligence only, and since it was equally negligent as he, no new trial
can be allowed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on official leave.




















































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 140667 August 12, 2004
WOODCHILD HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS ELECTRIC AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., respondent.


D E C I S I O N


CALLEJO, SR., J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56125 reversing the Decision
2
of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, which ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The Antecedents
The respondent Roxas Electric and Construction Company, Inc. (RECCI), formerly the Roxas Electric and Construction Company, was
the
owner of two parcels of land, identified as Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 78085 and Lot No.
491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086. A portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 which abutted Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 was a dirt road accessing
to the Sumulong Highway, Antipolo, Rizal.
At a special meeting on May 17, 1991, the respondent's Board of Directors approved a resolution authorizing the corporation, through
its president, Roberto B. Roxas, to sell Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086, with an area of 7,213 square meters, at a price
and under such terms and conditions which he deemed most reasonable and advantageous to the corporation; and to execute, sign
and deliver the pertinent sales documents and receive the proceeds of the sale for and on behalf of the company.
3

Petitioner Woodchild Holdings, Inc. (WHI) wanted to buy Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086 on which it planned to
construct its warehouse building, and a portion of the adjoining lot, Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, so that its 45-foot container van would be able
to readily enter or leave the property. In a Letter to Roxas dated June 21, 1991, WHI President Jonathan Y. Dy offered to buy Lot No.
491-A-3-B-2 under stated terms and conditions for P1,000 per square meter or at the price of P7,213,000.
4
One of the terms
incorporated in Dy's offer was the following provision:
5. This Offer to Purchase is made on the representation and warranty of the OWNER/SELLER, that he holds a good and
registrable title to the property, which shall be conveyed CLEAR and FREE of all liens and encumbrances, and that the area of
7,213 square meters of the subject property already includes the area on which the right of way traverses from the main lot
(area) towards the exit to the Sumulong Highway as shown in the location plan furnished by the Owner/Seller to the buyer.
Furthermore, in the event that the right of way is insufficient for the buyer's purposes (example: entry of a 45-foot container),
the seller agrees to sell additional square meter from his current adjacent property to allow the buyer to full access and full use
of the property.
5

Roxas indicated his acceptance of the offer on page 2 of the deed. Less than a month later or on July 1, 1991, Roxas, as President of
RECCI, as vendor, and Dy, as President of WHI, as vendee, executed a contract to sell in which RECCI bound and obliged itself to sell
to Dy Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086 for P7,213,000.
6
On September 5, 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale
7
in favor of
WHI was issued, under which Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086 was sold for P5,000,000, receipt of which was
acknowledged by Roxas under the following terms and conditions:
The Vendor agree (sic), as it hereby agrees and binds itself to give Vendee the beneficial use of and a right of way from
Sumulong Highway to the property herein conveyed consists of 25 square meters wide to be used as the latter's egress from
and ingress to and an additional 25 square meters in the corner of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, as turning and/or maneuvering area
for Vendee's vehicles.
The Vendor agrees that in the event that the right of way is insufficient for the Vendee's use (ex entry of a 45-foot container)
the Vendor agrees to sell additional square meters from its current adjacent property to allow the Vendee full access and full
use of the property.

The Vendor hereby undertakes and agrees, at its account, to defend the title of the Vendee to the parcel of land and
improvements herein conveyed, against all claims of any and all persons or entities, and that the Vendor hereby warrants the
right of the Vendee to possess and own the said parcel of land and improvements thereon and will defend the Vendee against
all present and future claims and/or action in relation thereto, judicial and/or administrative. In particular, the Vendor shall eject
all existing squatters and occupants of the premises within two (2) weeks from the signing hereof. In case of failure on the part
of the Vendor to eject all occupants and squatters within the two-week period or breach of any of the stipulations, covenants
and terms and conditions herein provided and that of contract to sell dated 1 July 1991, the Vendee shall have the right to
cancel the sale and demand reimbursement for all payments made to the Vendor with interest thereon at 36% per annum.
8

On September 10, 1991, the Wimbeco Builder's, Inc. (WBI) submitted its quotation for P8,649,000 to WHI for the construction of the
warehouse building on a portion of the property with an area of 5,088 square meters.
9
WBI proposed to start the project on October 1,
1991 and to turn over the building to WHI on February 29, 1992.
10

In a Letter dated September 16, 1991, Ponderosa Leather Goods Company, Inc. confirmed its lease agreement with WHI of a 5,000-
square-meter portion of the warehouse yet to be constructed at the rental rate of P65 per square meter. Ponderosa emphasized the
need for the warehouse to be ready for occupancy before April 1, 1992.
11
WHI accepted the offer. However, WBI failed to commence
the construction of the warehouse in October 1, 1991 as planned because of the presence of squatters in the property and suggested a
renegotiation of the contract after the squatters shall have been evicted.
12
Subsequently, the squatters were evicted from the property.
On March 31, 1992, WHI and WBI executed a Letter-Contract for the construction of the warehouse building for P11,804,160.
13
The
contractor started construction in April 1992 even before the building officials of Antipolo City issued a building permit on May 28, 1992.
After the warehouse was finished, WHI issued on March 21, 1993 a certificate of occupancy by the building official. Earlier, or on March
18, 1993, WHI, as lessor, and Ponderosa, as lessee, executed a contract of lease over a portion of the property for a monthly rental of
P300,000 for a period of three years from March 1, 1993 up to February 28, 1996.
14

In the meantime, WHI complained to Roberto Roxas that the vehicles of RECCI were parked on a portion of the property over which
WHI had been granted a right of way. Roxas promised to look into the matter. Dy and Roxas discussed the need of the WHI to buy a
500-square-meter portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by TCT No. 78085 as provided for in the deed of absolute sale. However,
Roxas died soon thereafter. On April 15, 1992, the WHI wrote the RECCI, reiterating its verbal requests to purchase a portion of the
said lot as provided for in the deed of absolute sale, and complained about the latter's failure to eject the squatters within the three-
month period agreed upon in the said deed.
The WHI demanded that the RECCI sell a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by TCT No. 78085 for its beneficial use within 72
hours from notice thereof, otherwise the appropriate action would be filed against it. RECCI rejected the demand of WHI. WHI reiterated
its demand in a Letter dated May 29, 1992. There was no response from RECCI.
On June 17, 1992, the WHI filed a complaint against the RECCI with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for specific performance and
damages, and alleged, inter alia, the following in its complaint:
5. The "current adjacent property" referred to in the aforequoted paragraph of the Deed of Absolute Sale pertains to the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-78085 of the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo, Rizal, registered in the
name of herein defendant Roxas Electric.
6. Defendant Roxas Electric in patent violation of the express and valid terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale unjustifiably
refused to deliver to Woodchild Holdings the stipulated beneficial use and right of way consisting of 25 square meters and 55
square meters to the prejudice of the plaintiff.
7. Similarly, in as much as the 25 square meters and 55 square meters alloted to Woodchild Holdings for its beneficial use is
inadequate as turning and/or maneuvering area of its 45-foot container van, Woodchild Holdings manifested its intention
pursuant to para. 5 of the Deed of Sale to purchase additional square meters from Roxas Electric to allow it full access and
use of the purchased property, however, Roxas Electric refused and failed to merit Woodchild Holdings' request contrary to
defendant Roxas Electric's obligation under the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "A").
8. Moreover, defendant, likewise, failed to eject all existing squatters and occupants of the premises within the stipulated time
frame and as a consequence thereof, plaintiff's planned construction has been considerably delayed for seven (7) months due
to the squatters who continue to trespass and obstruct the subject property, thereby Woodchild Holdings incurred substantial
losses amounting to P3,560,000.00 occasioned by the increased cost of construction materials and labor.
9. Owing further to Roxas Electric's deliberate refusal to comply with its obligation under Annex "A," Woodchild Holdings
suffered unrealized income of P300,000.00 a month or P2,100,000.00 supposed income from rentals of the subject property
for seven (7) months.
10. On April 15, 1992, Woodchild Holdings made a final demand to Roxas Electric to comply with its obligations and
warranties under the Deed of Absolute Sale but notwithstanding such demand, defendant Roxas Electric refused and failed
and continue to refuse and fail to heed plaintiff's demand for compliance.
Copy of the demand letter dated April 15, 1992 is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof.
11. Finally, on 29 May 1991, Woodchild Holdings made a letter request addressed to Roxas Electric to particularly annotate on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-78085 the agreement under Annex "A" with respect to the beneficial use and right of way,
however, Roxas Electric unjustifiably ignored and disregarded the same.
Copy of the letter request dated 29 May 1992 is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.
12. By reason of Roxas Electric's continuous refusal and failure to comply with Woodchild Holdings' valid demand for
compliance under Annex "A," the latter was constrained to litigate, thereby incurring damages as and by way of attorney's fees
in the amount of P100,000.00 plus costs of suit and expenses of litigation.
15

The WHI prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in its favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of Woodchild Holdings and ordering Roxas Electric
the following:
a) to deliver to Woodchild Holdings the beneficial use of the stipulated 25 square meters and 55 square meters;
b) to sell to Woodchild Holdings additional 25 and 100 square meters to allow it full access and use of the purchased property
pursuant to para. 5 of the Deed of Absolute Sale;
c) to cause annotation on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-78085 the beneficial use and right of way granted to Woodchild
Holdings under the Deed of Absolute Sale;
d) to pay Woodchild Holdings the amount of P5,660,000.00, representing actual damages and unrealized income;
e) to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00; and
f) to pay the costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable are prayed for.
16

In its answer to the complaint, the RECCI alleged that it never authorized its former president, Roberto Roxas, to grant the beneficial
use of any portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, nor agreed to sell any portion thereof or create a lien or burden thereon. It alleged that, under
the Resolution approved on May 17, 1991, it merely authorized Roxas to sell Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086. As such,
the grant of a right of way and the agreement to sell a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by TCT No. 78085 in the said deed
are ultra vires. The RECCI further alleged that the provision therein that it would sell a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 to the WHI lacked
the essential elements of a binding contract.
17

In its amended answer to the complaint, the RECCI alleged that the delay in the construction of its warehouse building was due to the
failure of the WHI's contractor to secure a building permit thereon.
18

During the trial, Dy testified that he told Roxas that the petitioner was buying a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 consisting of an area of
500 square meters, for the price of P1,000 per square meter.
On November 11, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the WHI, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing defendant:
(1) To allow plaintiff the beneficial use of the existing right of way plus the stipulated 25 sq. m. and 55 sq. m.;
(2) To sell to plaintiff an additional area of 500 sq. m. priced at P1,000 per sq. m. to allow said plaintiff full access and use of
the purchased property pursuant to Par. 5 of their Deed of Absolute Sale;
(3) To cause annotation on TCT No. N-78085 the beneficial use and right of way granted by their Deed of Absolute Sale;
(4) To pay plaintiff the amount of P5,568,000 representing actual damages and plaintiff's unrealized income;
(5) To pay plaintiff P100,000 representing attorney's fees; and
To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
19

The trial court ruled that the RECCI was estopped from disowning the apparent authority of Roxas under the May 17, 1991 Resolution
of its Board of Directors. The court reasoned that to do so would prejudice the WHI which transacted with Roxas in good faith, believing
that he had the authority to bind the WHI relating to the easement of right of way, as well as the right to purchase a portion of Lot No.
491-A-3-B-1 covered by TCT No. 78085.
The RECCI appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered a decision on November 9, 1999 reversing that of the trial court, and
ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The CA ruled that, under the resolution of the Board of Directors of the RECCI, Roxas was
merely authorized to sell Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086, but not to grant right of way in favor of the WHI over a portion
of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, or to grant an option to the petitioner to buy a portion thereof. The appellate court also ruled that the grant of a
right of way and an option to the respondent were so lopsided in favor of the respondent because the latter was authorized to fix the
location as well as the price of the portion of its property to be sold to the respondent. Hence, such provisions contained i n the deed of
absolute sale were not binding on the RECCI. The appellate court ruled that the delay in the construction of WHI's warehouse was due
to its fault.
The Present Petition
The petitioner now comes to this Court asserting that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXH. "C") IS ULTRA VIRES.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE COURT A QUO ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE THE BENEFICIAL USE OF THE EXISTING RIGHT OF WAY PLUS THE STIPULATED 25 SQUARE
METERS AND 55 SQUARE METERS BECAUSE THESE ARE VALID STIPULATIONS AGREED BY BOTH PARTIES TO
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXH. "C").
III.
THERE IS NO FACTUAL PROOF OR EVIDENCE FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO RULE THAT THE STIPULATIONS
OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXH. "C") WERE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE APPELLEE, NOR WAS APPELLEE
DEPRIVED OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.
IV.
IN FACT, IT WAS WOODCHILD WHO WAS DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS BY THE ASSAILED
DECISION.
V.
THE DELAY IN THE CONSTRUCTION WAS DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE APPELLANT TO EVICT THE SQUATTERS
ON THE LAND AS AGREED IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXH. "C").
VI.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE COURT A QUO DIRECTING THE
DEFENDANT TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF THE AMOUNT OF P5,568,000.00 REPRESENTING ACTUAL DAMAGES AND
PLAINTIFF'S UNREALIZED INCOME AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.
20

The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the respondent is bound by the provisions in the deed of absolute sale
granting to the petitioner beneficial use and a right of way over a portion of Lot
No. 491-A-3-B-1 accessing to the Sumulong Highway and granting the option to the petitioner to buy a portion thereof, and, if so,
whether such agreement is enforceable against the respondent; (b) whether the respondent failed to eject the squatters on its property
within two weeks from the execution of the deed of absolute sale; and, (c) whether the respondent is liable to the petitioner for
damages.
On the first issue, the petitioner avers that, under its Resolution of May 17, 1991, the respondent authorized Roxas, then its president,
to grant a right of way over a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 in favor of the petitioner, and an option for the respondent to buy a portion
of the said property. The petitioner contends that when the respondent sold Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086, it
(respondent) was well aware of its obligation to provide the petitioner with a means of ingress to or egress from the property to the
Sumulong Highway, since the latter had no adequate outlet to the public highway. The petitioner asserts that it agreed to buy the
property covered by TCT No. 78085 because of the grant by the respondent of a right of way and an option in its favor to buy a portion
of the property covered by TCT No. 78085. It contends that the respondent never objected to Roxas' acceptance of its offer to purchase
the property and the terms and conditions therein; the respondent even allowed Roxas to execute the deed of absolute sale in its
behalf. The petitioner asserts that the respondent even received the purchase price of the property without any objection to the terms
and conditions of the said deed of sale. The petitioner claims that it acted in good faith, and contends that after having been benefited
by the said sale, the respondent is estopped from assailing its terms and conditions. The petitioner notes that the respondent's Board of
Directors never approved any resolution rejecting the deed of absolute sale executed by Roxas for and in its behalf. As such, the
respondent is obliged to sell a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by TCT No. 78085 with an area of 500 square meters at the price
of P1,000 per square meter, based on its evidence and Articles 649 and 651 of the New Civil Code.
For its part, the respondent posits that Roxas was not so authorized under the May 17, 1991 Resolution of its Board of Directors to
impose a burden or to grant a right of way in favor of the petitioner on Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, much less convey a portion thereof to the
petitioner. Hence, the respondent was not bound by such provisions contained in the deed of absolute sale. Besides, the respondent
contends, the petitioner cannot enforce its right to buy a portion of the said property since there was no agreement in the deed of
absolute sale on the price thereof as well as the specific portion and area to be purchased by the petitioner.
We agree with the respondent.
In San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
21
we held that:
A corporation is a juridical person separate and distinct from its stockholders or members. Accordingly, the property of the
corporation is not the property of its stockholders or members and may not be sold by the stockholders or members without
express authorization from the corporation's board of directors. Section 23 of BP 68, otherwise known as the Corporation
Code of the Philippines, provides:
"SEC. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. – Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all
corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such corporations
controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where
there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their
successors are elected and qualified."
Indubitably, a corporation may act only through its board of directors or, when authorized either by its by-laws or by its board
resolution, through its officers or agents in the normal course of business. The general principles of agency govern the relation
between the corporation and its officers or agents, subject to the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or relevant provisions of
law. …
22

Generally, the acts of the corporate officers within the scope of their authority are binding on the corporation. However, under Article
1910 of the New Civil Code, acts done by such officers beyond the scope of their authority cannot bind the corporation unless it has
ratified such acts expressly or tacitly, or is estopped from denying them:
Art. 1910. The principal must comply with all the obligations which the agent may have contracted within the scope of his
authority.
As for any obligation wherein the agent has exceeded his power, the principal is not bound except when he ratifies it expressly
or tacitly.
Thus, contracts entered into by corporate officers beyond the scope of authority are unenforceable against the corporation
unless ratified by the corporation.
23

In BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
24
we also ruled that persons dealing with an assumed agency, whether the assumed
agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril, if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of
agency but also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.
In this case, the respondent denied authorizing its then president Roberto B. Roxas to sell a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by
TCT No. 78085, and to create a lien or burden thereon. The petitioner was thus burdened to prove that the respondent so authorized
Roxas to sell the same and to create a lien thereon.
Central to the issue at hand is the May 17, 1991 Resolution of the Board of Directors of the respondent, which is worded as follows:
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the corporation, thru the President, sell to any interested buyer, its 7,213-sq.-meter
property at the Sumulong Highway, Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-78086, at a price and on
terms and conditions which he deems most reasonable and advantageous to the corporation;
FURTHER RESOLVED, that Mr. ROBERTO B. ROXAS, President of the corporation, be, as he is hereby authorized to
execute, sign and deliver the pertinent sales documents and receive the proceeds of sale for and on behalf of the company.
25

Evidently, Roxas was not specifically authorized under the said resolution to grant a right of way in favor of the petitioner on a portion of
Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 or to agree to sell to the petitioner a portion thereof. The authority of Roxas, under the resolution, to sell Lot No.
491-A-3-B-2 covered by TCT No. 78086 did not include the authority to sell a portion of the adjacent lot, Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, or to
create or convey real rights thereon. Neither may such authority be implied from the authority granted to Roxas to sell Lot No. 491-A-3-
B-2 to the petitioner "on such terms and conditions which he deems most reasonable and advantageous." Under paragraph 12, Article
1878 of the New Civil Code, a special power of attorney is required to convey real rights over immovable property.
26
Article 1358 of the
New Civil Code requires that contracts which have for their object the creation of real rights over immovable property must appear in a
public document.
27
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for Roxas to have been specifically authorized in writing by the
Board of Directors to be able to validly grant a right of way and agree to sell a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1. The rule is that if the act
of the agent is one which requires authority in writing, those dealing with him are charged with notice of that fact.
28

Powers of attorney are generally construed strictly and courts will not infer or presume broad powers from deeds which do not
sufficiently include property or subject under which the agent is to deal.
29
The general rule is that the power of attorney must be pursued
within legal strictures, and the agent can neither go beyond it; nor beside it. The act done must be legally identical with that authorized
to be done.
30
In sum, then, the consent of the respondent to the assailed provisions in the deed of absolute sale was not obtained;
hence, the assailed provisions are not binding on it.
We reject the petitioner's submission that, in allowing Roxas to execute the contract to sell and the deed of absolute sale and failing to
reject or disapprove the same, the respondent thereby gave him apparent authority to grant a right of way over Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 and
to grant an option for the respondent to sell a portion thereof to the petitioner. Absent estoppel or ratification, apparent authority cannot
remedy the lack of the written power required under the statement of frauds.
31
In addition, the petitioner's fallacy is its wrong
assumption of the unproved premise that the respondent had full knowledge of all the terms and conditions contained in the deed of
absolute sale when Roxas executed it.
It bears stressing that apparent authority is based on estoppel and can arise from two instances: first, the principal may knowingly
permit the agent to so hold himself out as having such authority, and in this way, the principal becomes estopped to claim that the agent
does not have such authority; second, the principal may so clothe the agent with the indicia of authority as to lead a reasonably prudent
person to believe that he actually has such authority.
32
There can be no apparent authority of an agent without acts or conduct on the
part of the principal and such acts or conduct of the principal must have been known and relied upon in good faith and as a result of the
exercise of reasonable prudence by a third person as claimant and such must have produced a change of position to its detriment. The
apparent power of an agent is to be determined by the acts of the principal and not by the acts of the agent.
33

For the principle of apparent authority to apply, the petitioner was burdened to prove the following: (a) the acts of the respondent
justifying belief in the agency by the petitioner; (b) knowledge thereof by the respondent which is sought to be held; and, (c) reliance
thereon by the petitioner consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
34
In this case, there is no evidence on record of specific acts
made by the respondent
35
showing or indicating that it had full knowledge of any representations made by Roxas to the petitioner that
the respondent had authorized him to grant to the respondent an option to buy a portion of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1 covered by TCT No.
78085, or to create a burden or lien thereon, or that the respondent allowed him to do so.
The petitioner's contention that by receiving and retaining the P5,000,000 purchase price of Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2, the respondent
effectively and impliedly ratified the grant of a right of way on the adjacent lot, Lot No. 491-A-3-B-1, and to grant to the petitioner an
option to sell a portion thereof, is barren of merit. It bears stressing that the respondent sold Lot No. 491-A-3-B-2 to the petitioner, and
the latter had taken possession of the property. As such, the respondent had the right to retain the P5,000,000, the purchase price of
the property it had sold to the petitioner. For an act of the principal to be considered as an implied ratification of an unauthorized act of
an agent, such act must be inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that he approved and intended to adopt what had been done in
his name.
36
Ratification is based on waiver – the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Ratification cannot be inferred from acts
that a principal has a right to do independently of the unauthorized act of the agent. Moreover, if a writing is required to grant an
authority to do a particular act, ratification of that act must also be in writing.
37
Since the respondent had not ratified the unauthorized
acts of Roxas, the same are unenforceable.
38
Hence, by the respondent's retention of the amount, it cannot thereby be implied that it
had ratified the unauthorized acts of its agent, Roberto Roxas.
On the last issue, the petitioner contends that the CA erred in dismissing its complaint for damages against the respondent on its
finding that the delay in the construction of its warehouse was due to its (petitioner's) fault. The petitioner asserts that the CA should
have affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the respondent failed to cause the eviction of the squatters from the property on or before
September 29, 1991; hence, was liable for P5,660,000. The respondent, for its part, asserts that the delay in the construction of the
petitioner's warehouse was due to its late filing of an application for a building permit, only on May 28, 1992.
The petitioner's contention is meritorious. The respondent does not deny that it failed to cause the eviction of the squatters on or before
September 29, 1991. Indeed, the respondent does not deny the fact that when the petitioner wrote the respondent demanding that the
latter cause the eviction of the squatters on April 15, 1992, the latter were still in the premises. It was only after receiving the said letter
in April 1992 that the respondent caused the eviction of the squatters, which thus cleared the way for the petitioner's contractor to
commence the construction of its warehouse and secure the appropriate building permit therefor.
The petitioner could not be expected to file its application for a building permit before April 1992 because the squatters were still
occupying the property. Because of the respondent's failure to cause their eviction as agreed upon, the petitioner's contractor failed to
commence the construction of the warehouse in October 1991 for the agreed price of P8,649,000. In the meantime, costs of
construction materials spiraled. Under the construction contract entered into between the petitioner and the contractor, the petitioner
was obliged to pay P11,804,160,
39
including the additional work costing P1,441,500, or a net increase of P1,712,980.
40
The respondent
is liable for the difference between the original cost of construction and the increase thereon, conformably to Article 1170 of the New
Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The petitioner, likewise, lost the amount of P3,900,000 by way of unearned income from the lease of the property to the Ponderosa
Leather Goods Company. The respondent is, thus, liable to the petitioner for the said amount, under Articles 2200 and 2201 of the New
Civil Code:
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits
which the obligee failed to obtain.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could
have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's award of damages and attorney's fees to the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals WITH
MODIFICATION. The respondent is ordered to pay to the petitioner the amount of P5,612,980 by way of actual damages and P100,000
by way of attorney's fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairman, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.














Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171460 July 24, 2007
LILLIAN N. MERCADO, CYNTHIA M. FEKARIS, and JULIAN MERCADO, JR., represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, ALFREDO
M. PEREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioners Lillian N.
Mercado, Cynthia M. Fekaris and Julian Mercado, Jr., represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, Alfredo M. Perez, seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated 12 October 2005, and its Resolution
2
dated 15 February 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
82636. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, reversed the Decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 220 dated 23 September 2003, declaring the deeds of real estate mortgage constituted on TCT No. RT-18206
(106338) null and void. The dispositive portion of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is hereby entered dismissing the
[petitioners] complaint.
4

Petitioners are heirs of Perla N. Mercado (Perla). Perla, during her lifetime, owned several pieces of real property situated in different
provinces of the Philippines.
Respondent, on the other hand, is a banking institution duly authorized as such under the Philippine laws.
On 28 May 1992, Perla executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of her husband, Julian D. Mercado (Julian) over several
pieces of real property registered under her name, authorizing the latter to perform the following acts:
1. To act in my behalf, to sell, alienate, mortgage, lease and deal otherwise over the different parcels of land described
hereinafter, to wit:
a) Calapan, Oriental Mindoro Properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-53618 - 3,522 Square
Meters, T-46810 – 3,953 Square Meters, T-53140 – 177 Square Meters, T-21403 – 263 square Meters, T- 46807 –
39 Square Meters of the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro;
b) Susana Heights, Muntinlupa covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-108954 – 600 Square Meters and RT-
106338 – 805 Square Meters of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now Makati);
c) Personal property – 1983 Car with Vehicle Registration No. R-16381; Model 1983; Make – Toyota; Engine No. T-
2464
2. To sign for and in my behalf any act of strict dominion or ownership any sale, disposition, mortgage, lease or any other
transactions including quit-claims, waiver and relinquishment of rights in and over the parcels of land situated in General Trias,
Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-112254 and T-112255 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, in
conjunction with his co-owner and in the person ATTY. AUGUSTO F. DEL ROSARIO;
3. To exercise any or all acts of strict dominion or ownership over the above-mentioned properties, rights and interest therein.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the strength of the aforesaid SPA, Julian, on 12 December 1996, obtained a loan from the respondent in the amount
of P3,000,000.00, secured by real estate mortgage constituted on TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) which covers a parcel of land with an
area of 805 square meters, registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (subject property).
5

Still using the subject property as security, Julian obtained an additional loan from the respondent in the sum ofP5,000,000.00,
evidenced by a Promissory Note
6
he executed on 5 February 1997 as another real estate mortgage (REM).
It appears, however, that there was no property identified in the SPA as TCT No. RT – 18206 (106338) and registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City. What was identified in the SPA instead was the property covered by TCT No. RT-106338 registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig.
Subsequently, Julian defaulted on the payment of his loan obligations. Thus, respondent initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
over the subject property which was subsequently sold at public auction wherein the respondent was declared as the highest bidder as
shown in the Sheriff‘s Certificate of Sale dated 15 January 1998.
7

On 23 March 1999, petitioners initiated with the RTC an action for the annulment of REM constituted over the subject property on the
ground that the same was not covered by the SPA and that the said SPA, at the time the loan obligations were contracted, no longer
had force and effect since it was previously revoked by Perla on 10 March 1993, as evidenced by the Revocation of SPA signed by the
latter.
8

Petitioners likewise alleged that together with the copy of the Revocation of SPA, Perla, in a Letter dated 23 January 1996, notified the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City that any attempt to mortgage or sell the subject property must be with her full consent documented in
the form of an SPA duly authenticated before the Philippine Consulate General in New York.
9

In the absence of authority to do so, the REM constituted by Julian over the subject property was null and void; thus, petitioners
likewise prayed that the subsequent extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and the auction sale of the subject property be also nullified.
In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,
10
respondent averred that, contrary to petitioner‘s allegations, the SPA in favor of Julian
included the subject property, covered by one of the titles specified in paragraph 1(b) thereof, TCT No. RT- 106338 registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now Makati). The subject property was purportedly registered previously under TCT No. T-106338, and
was only subsequently reconstituted as TCT RT-18206 (106338). Moreover, TCT No. T-106338 was actually registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and not before the Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now Makati). Respondent explained that the
discrepancy in the designation of the Registry of Deeds in the SPA was merely an error that must not prevail over the clear intention of
Perla to include the subject property in the said SPA. In sum, the property referred to in the SPA Perla executed in favor of Julian as
covered by TCT No. 106338 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now Makati) and the subject property in the case at bar, covered by RT
– 18206 (106338) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, are one and the same.
On 23 September 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the REM constituted over the subject property null and void, for Julian
was not authorized by the terms of the SPA to mortgage the same. The court a quo likewise ordered that the foreclosure proceedings
and the auction sale conducted pursuant to the void REM, be nullified. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [herein petitioners] and against the [herein
respondent] Bank:
1. Declaring the Real Estate Mortgages constituted and registered under Entry Nos. PE-4543/RT-18206 and 2012/RT-18206
annotated on TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City as NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Sheriff‘s Sale and Certificate of Sale under FRE No. 2217 dated January 15, 1998 over the property covered
by TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City as NULL and VOID;
3. Ordering the defendant Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the annotation of Real Estate Mortgages appearing on
Entry Nos. PE-4543/RT-18206 and 2012/RT-18206 on TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
4. Ordering the [respondent] Bank to deliver/return to the [petitioners] represented by their attorney-in-fact Alfredo M. Perez,
the original Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) free from the encumbrances referred to above; and
5. Ordering the [respondent] Bank to pay the [petitioners] the amount of P100,000.00 as for attorney‘s fees plus cost of the
suit.
The other claim for damages and counterclaim are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
11

Aggrieved, respondent appealed the adverse Decision before the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 12 October 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and upheld the validity of the REM constituted
over the subject property on the strength of the SPA. The appellate court declared that Perla intended the subject property to be
included in the SPA she executed in favor of Julian, and that her subsequent revocation of the said SPA, not being contained in a public
instrument, cannot bind third persons.
The Motion for Reconsideration interposed by the petitioners was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 February
2006.
Petitioners are now before us assailing the Decision and Resolution rendered by the Court of Appeals raising several issues, which are
summarized as follows:
I WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID REVOCATION OF THE SPA.
III WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT WAS A MORTGAGEE-IN- GOOD FAITH.
For a mortgage to be valid, Article 2085 of the Civil Code enumerates the following essential requisites:
Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage:
(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof,
that they be legally authorized for the purpose.
Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property.
In the case at bar, it was Julian who obtained the loan obligations from respondent which he secured with the mortgage of the subject
property. The property mortgaged was owned by his wife, Perla, considered a third party to the loan obligations between Julian and
respondent. It was, thus, a situation recognized by the last paragraph of Article 2085 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. However, since it
was not Perla who personally mortgaged her own property to secure Julian‘s loan obligations with respondent, we proceed to
determining if she duly authorized Julian to do so on her behalf.
Under Article 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary in cases where real rights over immovable property are
created or conveyed.
12
In the SPA executed by Perla in favor of Julian on 28 May 1992, the latter was conferred with the authority to
"sell, alienate, mortgage, lease and deal otherwise" the different pieces of real and personal property registered in Perla‘s name. The
SPA likewise authorized Julian "[t]o exercise any or all acts of strict dominion or ownership" over the identified properties, and rights
and interest therein. The existence and due execution of this SPA by Perla was not denied or challenged by petitioners.
There is no question therefore that Julian was vested with the power to mortgage the pieces of property identified in the SPA. However,
as to whether the subject property was among those identified in the SPA, so as to render Julian‘s mortgage of the same valid, is a
question we still must resolve.
Petitioners insist that the subject property was not included in the SPA, considering that it contained an exclusive enumeration of the
pieces of property over which Julian had authority, and these include only: (1) TCT No. T-53618, with an area of 3,522 square meters,
located at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro; (2) TCT No. T-46810, with an area
of 3,953 square meters, located at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro; (3) TCT
No. T-53140, with an area of 177 square meters, located at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, and registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Oriental Mindoro; (4) TCT No. T-21403, with an area of 263 square meters, located at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, and registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro; (5) TCT No. T- 46807, with an area of 39 square meters, located at Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro; (6) TCT No. T-108954, with an area of 690 square meters and
located at Susana Heights, Muntinlupa; (7) RT-106338 – 805 Square Meters registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now
Makati); and (8) Personal Property consisting of a 1983 Car with Vehicle Registration No. R-16381, Model – 1983, Make – Toyota, and
Engine No. T- 2464. Nowhere is it stated in the SPA that Julian‘s authority extends to the subject property covered by TCT No. RT –
18206 (106338) registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Consequently, the act of Julian of constituting a mortgage over
the subject property is unenforceable for having been done without authority.
Respondent, on the other hand, mainly hinges its argument on the declarations made by the Court of Appeals that there was no
property covered by TCT No. 106338 registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now Makati); but there exists a property, the
subject property herein, covered by TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Further
verification would reveal that TCT No. RT-18206 is merely a reconstitution of TCT No. 106338, and the property covered by both
certificates of title is actually situated in Quezon City and not Pasig. From the foregoing circumstances, respondent argues that Perla
intended to include the subject property in the SPA, and the failure of the instrument to reflect the recent TCT Number or the exact
designation of the Registry of Deeds, should not defeat Perla‘s clear intention.
After an examination of the literal terms of the SPA, we find that the subject property was not among those enumerated therei n. There
is no obvious reference to the subject property covered by TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City.
There was also nothing in the language of the SPA from which we could deduce the intention of Perla to include the subject property
therein. We cannot attribute such alleged intention to Perla who executed the SPA when the language of the instrument is bare of any
indication suggestive of such intention. Contrariwise, to adopt the intent theory advanced by the respondent, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to that effect, would run afoul of the express tenor of the SPA and thus defeat Perla‘s true intention.
In cases where the terms of the contract are clear as to leave no room for interpretation, resort to circumstantial evidence to ascertain
the true intent of the parties, is not countenanced. As aptly stated in the case of JMA House, Incorporated v. Sta. Monica Industrial and
Development Corporation,
13
thus:
[T]he law is that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulation shall control. When the language of the contract is explicit, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters, the
courts may not read into it [in] any other intention that would contradict its main import. The clear terms of the contract should never be
the subject matter of interpretation. Neither abstract justice nor the rule on liberal interpretation justifies the creation of a contract for the
parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation not assumed simply or merely
to avoid seeming hardships. The true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be presumed that the contracting parties know their scope
and effects.
14

Equally relevant is the rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only
those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney.
15
Where
powers and duties are specified and defined in an instrument, all such powers and duties are limited and are confined to those which
are specified and defined, and all other powers and duties are excluded.
16
This is but in accord with the disinclination of courts to
enlarge the authority granted beyond the powers expressly given and those which incidentally flow or derive therefrom as being usual
and reasonably necessary and proper for the performance of such express powers.
17

Even the commentaries of renowned Civilist Manresa
18
supports a strict and limited construction of the terms of a power of attorney:
The law, which must look after the interests of all, cannot permit a man to express himself in a vague and general way with reference to
the right he confers upon another for the purpose of alienation or hypothecation, whereby he might be despoiled of all he possessed
and be brought to ruin, such excessive authority must be set down in the most formal and explicit terms, and when this is not done, the
law reasonably presumes that the principal did not mean to confer it.
In this case, we are not convinced that the property covered by TCT No. 106338 registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now
Makati) is the same as the subject property covered by TCT No. RT-18206 (106338) registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. The records of the case are stripped of supporting proofs to verify the respondent‘s claim that the two titles cover the same
property. It failed to present any certification from the Registries of Deeds concerned to support its assertion. Neither did respondent
take the effort of submitting and making part of the records of this case copies of TCTs No. RT-106338 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pasig (now Makati) and RT-18206 (106338) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, and closely comparing the technical descriptions
of the properties covered by the said TCTs. The bare and sweeping statement of respondent that the properties covered by the two
certificates of title are one and the same contains nothing but empty imputation of a fact that could hardly be given any evidentiary
weight by this Court.
Having arrived at the conclusion that Julian was not conferred by Perla with the authority to mortgage the subject property under the
terms of the SPA, the real estate mortgages Julian executed over the said property are therefore unenforceable.
Assuming arguendo that the subject property was indeed included in the SPA executed by Perla in favor of Julian, the said SPA was
revoked by virtue of a public instrument executed by Perla on 10 March 1993. To address respondent‘s assertion that the said
revocation was unenforceable against it as a third party to the SPA and as one who relied on the same in good faith, we quote with
approval the following ruling of the RTC on this matter:
Moreover, an agency is extinguished, among others, by its revocation (Article 1999, New Civil Code of the Philippines). The principal
may revoke the agency at will, and compel the agent to return the document evidencing the agency. Such revocation may be express
or implied (Article 1920, supra).
In this case, the revocation of the agency or Special Power of Attorney is expressed and by a public document executed on March 10,
1993.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City was even notified that any attempt to mortgage or sell the property covered by TCT No. [RT-
18206] 106338 located at No. 21 Hillside Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City must have the full consent documented in the form of a
special power of attorney duly authenticated at the Philippine Consulate General, New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.
The non-annotation of the revocation of the Special Power of Attorney on TCT No. RT-18206 is of no consequence as far as the
revocation‘s existence and legal effect is concerned since actual notice is always superior to constructive notice. The actual notice of
the revocation relayed to defendant Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is not denied by either the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City or
the defendant Bank. In which case, there appears no reason why Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529)
should not apply to the situation. Said Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
"Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration. – Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument
or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where
the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. (Pres. Decree
No. 1529, Section 53) (emphasis ours)
It thus developed that at the time the first loan transaction with defendant Bank was effected on December 12, 1996, there was on
record at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that the special power of attorney granted Julian, Sr. by Perla had been
revoked. That notice, works as constructive notice to third parties of its being filed, effectively rendering Julian, Sr. without authority to
act for and in behalf of Perla as of the date the revocation letter was received by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on February 7,
1996.
19

Given that Perla revoked the SPA as early as 10 March 1993, and that she informed the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City of such
revocation in a letter dated 23 January 1996 and received by the latter on 7 February 1996, then third parties to the SPA are
constructively notified that the same had been revoked and Julian no longer had any authority to mortgage the subject property.
Although the revocation may not be annotated on TCT No. RT-18206 (106338), as the RTC pointed out, neither the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City nor respondent denied that Perla‘s 23 January 1996 letter was received by and filed with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City. Respondent would have undoubtedly come across said letter if it indeed diligently investigated the subject property and
the circumstances surrounding its mortgage.
The final issue to be threshed out by this Court is whether the respondent is a mortgagee-in-good faith. Respondent fervently asserts
that it exercised reasonable diligence required of a prudent man in dealing with the subject property.
Elaborating, respondent claims to have carefully verified Julian‘s authority over the subject property which was validly contained in the
SPA. It stresses that the SPA was annotated at the back of the TCT of the subject property. Finally, after conducting an investigation, it
found that the property covered by TCT No. 106338, registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig (now Makati) referred to in the SPA,
and the subject property, covered by TCT No. 18206 (106338) registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, are one and the
same property. From the foregoing, respondent concluded that Julian was indeed authorized to constitute a mortgage over the subject
property.
We are unconvinced. The property listed in the real estate mortgages Julian executed in favor of PNB is the one covered by "TCT#RT-
18206(106338)." On the other hand, the Special Power of Attorney referred to TCT No. "RT-106338 – 805 Square Meters of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig now Makati." The palpable difference between the TCT numbers referred to in the real estate mortgages
and Julian‘s SPA, coupled with the fact that the said TCTs are registered in the Registries of Deeds of different cities, should have put
respondent on guard. Respondent‘s claim of prudence is debunked by the fact that it had conveniently or otherwise overlooked the
inconsistent details appearing on the face of the documents, which it was relying on for its rights as mortgagee, and which significantly
affected the identification of the property being mortgaged. In Arrofo v. Quiño,
20
we have elucidated that:
[Settled is the rule that] a person dealing with registered lands [is not required] to inquire further than what the Torrens title on its face
indicates. This rule, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions. Thus, while its is true, x x x that a person dealing with
registered lands need not go beyond the certificate of title, it is likewise a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee
cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to face up the fact that such
defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor‘s or mortgagor‘s title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be required of a prudent
man in a like situation.
By putting blinders on its eyes, and by refusing to see the patent defect in the scope of Julian‘s authority, easily discernable from the
plain terms of the SPA, respondent cannot now claim to be an innocent mortgagee.
Further, in the case of Abad v. Guimba,
21
we laid down the principle that where the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered
owner of real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised by the mortgagee, thus:
While [the] one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from [the] one
who is not [the] registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for [one]
to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in [the] capacity to transfer the land. Although the i nstant case does
not involve a sale but only a mortgage, the same rule applies inasmuch as the law itself includes a mortgagee in the term "purchaser."
22

This principle is applied more strenuously when the mortgagee is a bank or a banking institution. Thus, in the case of Cruz v. Bancom
Finance Corporation,
23
we ruled:
Respondent, however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private individuals, it is expected to
exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to
exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it
as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.
24

Hence, considering that the property being mortgaged by Julian was not his, and there are additional doubts or suspicions as to the real
identity of the same, the respondent bank should have proceeded with its transactions with Julian only with utmost caution. As a bank,
respondent must subject all its transactions to the most rigid scrutiny, since its business is impressed with public interest and its
fiduciary character requires high standards of integrity and performance.
25
Where respondent acted in undue haste in granting the
mortgage loans in favor of Julian and disregarding the apparent defects in the latter‘s authority as agent, it failed to discharge the
degree of diligence required of it as a banking corporation.1awphil
Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that the subject property and the one identified in the SPA are one and the same, it would
not elevate respondent‘s status to that of an innocent mortgagee. As a banking institution, jurisprudence stringently requires that
respondent should take more precautions than an ordinary prudent man should, to ascertain the status and condition of the properties
offered as collateral and to verify the scope of the authority of the agents dealing with these. Had respondent acted with the required
degree of diligence, it could have acquired knowledge of the letter dated 23 January 1996 sent by Perla to the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City which recorded the same. The failure of the respondent to investigate into the circumstances surrounding the mortgage of
the subject property belies its contention of good faith.
On a last note, we find that the real estate mortgages constituted over the subject property are unenforceable and not null and void, as
ruled by the RTC. It is best to reiterate that the said mortgage was entered into by Julian on behalf of Perla without the latter‘s authority
and consequently, unenforceable under Article 1403(1) of the Civil Code. Unenforceable contracts are those which cannot be enforced
by a proper action in court, unless they are ratified, because either they are entered into without or in excess of authority or they do not
comply with the statute of frauds or both of the contracting parties do not possess the required legal capacity.
26
An unenforceable
contract may be ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person in whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
27
Without Perla‘s ratification of the same, the real estate mortgages constituted by Julian over the subject property
cannot be enforced by any action in court against Perla and/or her successors in interest.
In sum, we rule that the contracts of real estate mortgage constituted over the subject property covered by TCT No. RT – 18206
(106338) registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City are unenforceable. Consequently, the foreclosure proceedings and the
auction sale of the subject property conducted in pursuance of these unenforceable contracts are null and void. This, however, is
without prejudice to the right of the respondent to proceed against Julian, in his personal capacity, for the amount of the l oans.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 October 2005 and its
Resolution dated 15 February 2006 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82636, are hereby REVERSED. The Decision
dated 23 September 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, in Civil Case No. Q-99-37145, is
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with modification that the real estate mortgages constituted over TCT No. RT – 18206 (106338)
are not null and void but UNENFORCEABLE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice












DIGEST:
LILLIAN N. MERCADO, CYNTHIA M. FEKARIS, and JULIAN MERCADO, JR., represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, ALFREDO
M. PEREZ, Petitioners, vs. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171460 July 24, 2007

Facts: Perla executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of her husband, Julian D. Mercado (Julian) over several
pieces of real property registered under her name, authorizing the latter to perform the following acts: 1. To act in my behalf, to sell,
alienate, mortgage, lease and deal otherwise over the different parcels of land described hereinafter x x x 2. To sign for and i n my
behalf any act of strict dominion or ownership any sale, disposition, mortgage, lease or any other transactions including qui t-claims,
waiver and relinquishment of rights x x x 3. To exercise any or all acts of strict dominion or ownership over the above-mentioned
properties, rights and interest therein.

On the strength of the aforesaid SPA, Julian obtained a loan from the respondent. Still using the subject property as security,
Julian obtained an additional loan from the respondent.
It appears, however, that there was no property identified in the SPA and registered with the Registry of Deeds. What was identified in
the SPA instead was the property different from the one used as security for loan.

Julian defaulted on the payment of his loan obligations. Thus, respondent initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings over
the subject property which was subsequently sold at public auction wherein the respondent was declared as the highest bidder.
Petitioners initiated an action for the annulment of REM constituted over the subject property on the ground that the same was not
covered by the SPA and that the said SPA, at the time the loan obligations were contracted, no longer had force and effect since it was
previously revoked by Perla. In the absence of authority to do so, the REM constituted by Julian over the subject property was null and
void; thus, petitioners likewise prayed that the subsequent extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and the auction sale of the subject
property be also nullified.

Issues: (1) Whether or not there was a valid mortgage constituted over subject property.
(2) Whether or not there was a valid revovation of SPA.
(3) Construction of powers of attorney.

Rulings: (1) In the case at bar, it was Julian who obtained the loan obligations from respondent which he secured with the
mortgage of the subject property. The property mortgaged was owned by his wife, Perla, considered a third party to the loan obligations
between Julian and respondent. It was, thus, a situation recognized by the last paragraph of Article 2085 of the Civil Code that t hird
persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. There is no
question therefore that Julian was vested with the power to mortgage the pieces of property identified in the SPA, however, t he subject
property was not among those enumerated therein. Julian was not conferred by Perla with the authority to mortgage the subject
property under the terms of the SPA, the real estate mortgages Julian executed over the said property are therefore unenforceable.

(2) The said SPA was revoked by virtue of a public instrument executed by Perla. To address respondent‘s assertion that the
said revocation was unenforceable against it as a third party to the SPA and as one who relied on the same in good faith, the rule is
that an agency is extinguished, among others, by its revocation (Article 1999, New Civil Code of the Philippines). The principal may
revoke the agency at will, and compel the agent to return the document evidencing the agency. Such revocation may be express or
implied (Article 1920, supra).

(3) Rule of strict construction- where the terms of the contract are clear as to leave no room for interpretation, resort to
circumstantial evidence to ascertain the true intent of the parties, is not countenanced. The law is that if the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. The clear terms of the
contract should never be the subject matter of interpretation. Equally relevant is the rule that a power of attorney must be strictly
construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither
go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney. Where powers and duties are specified and defined in an instrument, all such
powers and duties are limited and are confined to those which are specified and defined, and all other powers and duties are excluded.

Qualification of the rule- this is but in accord with the disinclination of courts to enlarge the authority granted beyond the
powers expressly given and those which incidentally flow or derive therefrom as being usual and reasonably necessary and proper for
the performance of such express powers.
















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82040 August 27, 1991
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, MANUEL CUADY and LILIA
CUADY, respondents.
Valera, Urmeneta & Associates for petitioner.
Pompeyo L. Bautista for private respondents.

PARAS, J .:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21,
1987 in CA-G.R. No. CV-06522 entitled "B.A. Finance Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Manuel Cuady and Lilia Cuady, Defendants-
Appellees," affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, which dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 82-
10478, and (2) the resolution dated February 9, 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the facts are as follows:
On July 15, 1977, private respondents Manuel Cuady and Lilia Cuady obtained from Supercars, Inc. a credit of P39,574.80, which
amount covered the cost of one unit of Ford Escort 1300, four-door sedan. Said obligation was evidenced by a promissory note
executed by private respondents in favor of Supercars, Inc., obligating themselves to pay the latter or order the sum of P39,574.80,
inclusive of interest at 14% per annum, payable on monthly installments of P1,098.00 starting August 16, 1977, and on the 16th day of
the next 35 months from September 16, 1977 until full payment thereof. There was also stipulated a penalty of P10.00 for every month
of late installment payment. To secure the faithful and prompt compliance of the obligation under the said promissory note, the Cuady
spouses constituted a chattel mortage on the aforementioned motor vehicle. On July 25, 1977, Supercars, Inc. assigned the promissory
note, together with the chattel mortgage, to B.A. Finance Corporation. The Cuadys paid a total of P36,730.15 to the B.A. Finance
Corporation, thus leaving an unpaid balance of P2,344.65 as of July 18, 1980. In addition thereto, the Cuadys owe B.A. Finance
Corporation P460.00 representing penalties or surcharges for tardy monthly installments (Rollo, pp. 27-29).
Parenthetically, the B.A. Finance Corporation, as the assignee of the mortgage lien obtained the renewal of the insurance coverage
over the aforementioned motor vehicle for the year 1980 with Zenith Insurance Corporation, when the Cuadys failed to renew said
insurance coverage themselves. Under the terms and conditions of the said insurance coverage, any loss under the policy shall be
payable to the B.A. Finance Corporation (Memorandum for Private Respondents, pp. 3-4).
On April 18, 1980, the aforementioned motor vehicle figured in an accident and was badly damaged. The unfortunate happening was
reported to the B.A. Finance Corporation and to the insurer, Zenith Insurance Corporation. The Cuadys asked the B.A. Finance
Corporation to consider the same as a total loss, and to claim from the insurer the face value of the car insurance policy and apply the
same to the payment of their remaining account and give them the surplus thereof, if any. But instead of heeding the request of the
Cuadys, B.A. Finance Corporation prevailed upon the former to just have the car repaired. Not long thereafter, however, the car bogged
down. The Cuadys wrote B.A. Finance Corporation requesting the latter to pursue their prior instruction of enforcing the total loss
provision in the insurance coverage. When B.A. Finance Corporation did not respond favorably to their request, the Cuadys stopped
paying their monthly installments on the promissory note (Ibid., pp. 45).
On June 29, 1982, in view of the failure of the Cuadys to pay the remaining installments on the note, B.A. Finance Corporation sued
them in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, for the recovery of the said remaining installments (Memorandum for the
Petitioner, p. 1).
After the termination of the pre-trial conference, the case was set for trial on the merits on April 25, 1984. B.A. Finance Corporation's
evidence was presented on even date and the presentation of Cuady's evidence was set on August 15, 1984. On August 7,1984, Atty.
Noel Ebarle, counsel for the petitioner, filed a motion for postponement, the reason being that the "handling" counsel, Atty. Ferdinand
Macibay was temporarily assigned in Cebu City and would not be back until after August 15, 1984. Said motion was, however, denied
by the trial court on August 10, 1984. On August 15, 1984, the date of hearing, the trial court allowed private respondents to adduce
evidence ex-parte in the form of an affidavit to be sworn to before any authorized officer. B.A. Finance Corporation filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the trial court denying its motion for postponement. Said motion was granted in an order dated
September 26, 1984, thus:
The Court grants plaintiff's motion for reconsideration dated August 22, 1984, in the sense that plaintiff is allowed to
adduce evidence in the form of counter-affidavits of its witnesses, to be sworn to before any person authorized to
administer oaths, within ten days from notice hereof. (Ibid., pp. 1-2).
B.A. Finance Corporation, however, never complied with the above-mentioned order, paving the way for the trial court to render its
decision on January 18, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court DISMISSES the complaint without costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 143)
On appeal, the respondent appellate court * affirmed the decision of the trial court. The decretal portion of the said decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, after consultation among the undersigned members of this Division, in compliance with the provision
of Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution; and finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same
is hereby AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as to costs. (Ibid., p. 33)
B.A. Finance Corporation moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the motion was denied by the respondent appellate
court in a resolution dated February 9, 1988 (Ibid., p. 38).
Hence, this present recourse.
On July 11, 1990, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties
having complied with the submission of their memoranda, the case was submitted for decision.
The real issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not B.A. Finance Corporation has waived its right to collect the unpaid
balance of the Cuady spouses on the promissory note for failure of the former to enforce the total loss provision in the insurance
coverage of the motor vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage.
It is the contention of B.A. Finance Corporation that even if it failed to enforce the total loss provision in the insurance policy of the
motor vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage, said failure does not operate to extinguish the unpaid balance on the promissory note,
considering that the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar do not fall under Article 1231 of the Civil Code relative to the modes of
extinguishment of obligations (Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 11).
On the other hand, the Cuadys insist that owing to its failure to enforce the total loss provision in the insurance policy, B.A. Finance
Corporation lost not only its opportunity to collect the insurance proceeds on the mortgaged motor vehicle in its capacity as the
assignee of the said insurance proceeds pursuant to the memorandum in the insurance policy which states that the "LOSS: IF ANY,
under this policy shall be payable to BA FINANCE CORP., as their respective rights and interest may appear" (Rollo, p. 91) but also the
remaining balance on the promissory note (Memorandum for the Respondents, pp. 16-17).
The petition is devoid of merit.
B.A. Finance Corporation was deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of Supercars, Inc. when the latter assigned the
promissory note, together with the chattel mortgage constituted on the motor vehicle in question in favor of the former. Consequently,
B.A. Finance Corporation is bound by the terms and conditions of the chattel mortgage executed between the Cuadys and Supercars,
Inc. Under the deed of chattel mortgage, B.A. Finance Corporation was constituted attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to file,
follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle insurance claims; to sign execute and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts and
documents to the Insurance Company as may be necessary to prove the claim, and to collect from the latter the proceeds of insurance
to the extent of its interests, in the event that the mortgaged car suffers any loss or damage (Rollo, p. 89). In granting B.A. Finance
Corporation the aforementioned powers and prerogatives, the Cuady spouses created in the former's favor an agency. Thus, under
Article 1884 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, B.A. Finance Corporation is bound by its acceptance to carry out the agency, and is
liable for damages which, through its non-performance, the Cuadys, the principal in the case at bar, may suffer.
Unquestionably, the Cuadys suffered pecuniary loss in the form of salvage value of the motor vehicle in question, not to mention the
amount equivalent to the unpaid balance on the promissory note, when B.A. Finance Corporation steadfastly refused and refrained
from proceeding against the insurer for the payment of a clearly valid insurance claim, and continued to ignore the yearning of the
Cuadys to enforce the total loss provision in the insurance policy, despite the undeniable fact that Rea Auto Center, the auto repair
shop chosen by the insurer itself to repair the aforementioned motor vehicle, misrepaired and rendered it completely useless and
unserviceable (Ibid., p. 31).
Accordingly, there is no reason to depart from the ruling set down by the respondent appellate court. In this connection, the Court of
Appeals said:
... Under the established facts and circumstances, it is unjust, unfair and inequitable to require the chattel mortgagors,
appellees herein, to still pay the unpaid balance of their mortgage debt on the said car, the non-payment of which
account was due to the stubborn refusal and failure of appellant mortgagee to avail of the insurance money which
became due and demandable after the insured motor vehicle was badly damaged in a vehicular accident covered by
the insurance risk. ... (Ibid.)
On the allegation that the respondent court's findings that B.A. Finance Corporation failed to claim for the damage to the car was not
supported by evidence, the records show that instead of acting on the instruction of the Cuadys to enforce the total loss provision in the
insurance policy, the petitioner insisted on just having the motor vehicle repaired, to which private respondents reluctantly acceded. As
heretofore mentioned, the repair shop chosen was not able to restore the aforementioned motor vehicle to its condition prior to the
accident. Thus, the said vehicle bogged down shortly thereafter. The subsequent request of the Cuadys for the B.A. Finance
Corporation to file a claim for total loss with the insurer fell on deaf ears, prompting the Cuadys to stop paying the remaining balance on
the promissory note (Memorandum for the Respondents, pp. 4-5).
Moreover, B.A. Finance Corporation would have this Court review and reverse the factual findings of the respondent appellate court.
This, of course, the Court cannot and will not generally do. It is axiomatic that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to
the facts and may not ordinarily be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The doctrine is, to be sure, subject to certain specific exceptions
none of which, however, obtains in the instant case (Luzon Brokerage Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 483 [1989]).
Finally, B.A. Finance Corporation contends that respondent trial court committed grave abuses of discretion in two instances: First,
when it denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration praying that the counsel be allowed to cross-examine the affiant, and; second,
when it seriously considered the evidence adduced ex-parte by the Cuadys, and heavily relied thereon, when in truth and in fact, the
same was not formally admitted as part of the evidence for the private respondents (Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 10). This Court
does not have to unduly dwell on this issue which was only raised by B.A. Finance Corporation for the first time on appeal. A review of
the records of the case shows that B.A. Finance Corporation failed to directly raise or ventilate in the trial court nor in the respondent
appellate court the validity of the evidence adduced ex-parte by private respondents. It was only when the petitioner filed the instant
petition with this Court that it later raised the aforementioned issue. As ruled by this Court in a long line of cases, issues not raised
and/or ventilated in the trial court, let alone in the Court of Appeals, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive
to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process (Galicia v. Polo, 179 SCRA 375 [1989]; Ramos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
175 SCRA 70 [1989]; Dulos Realty & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 425 [1988]; Dihiansan, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 153 SCRA 712 [1987]; De la Santa v. Court of Appeals, et al., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.






















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151319 November 22, 2004
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, respondent.


D E C I S I O N


TINGA, J .:
For resolution in this case is a classic and interesting texbook question in the law on agency.
This is a petition for review assailing the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated 22 June 2001, and its Resolution
2
dated 12 December
2001 in CA G.R. CV No. 49802 entitled "Pedro L. Linsangan v. Manila Memorial Cemetery, Inc. et al.," finding Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. (MMPCI) jointly and severally liable with Florencia C. Baluyot to respondent Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1984, Florencia Baluyot offered Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan a lot called Garden State at the Holy Cross Memorial Park
owned by petitioner (MMPCI). According to Baluyot, a former owner of a memorial lot under Contract No. 25012 was no longer
interested in acquiring the lot and had opted to sell his rights subject to reimbursement of the amounts he already paid. The contract
was for P95,000.00. Baluyot reassured Atty. Linsangan that once reimbursement is made to the former buyer, the contract would be
transferred to him. Atty. Linsangan agreed and gave Baluyot P35,295.00 representing the amount to be reimbursed to the original
buyer and to complete the down payment to MMPCI.
3
Baluyot issued handwritten and typewritten receipts for these payments.
4

Sometime in March 1985, Baluyot informed Atty. Linsangan that he would be issued Contract No. 28660, a new contract covering the
subject lot in the name of the latter instead of old Contract No. 25012. Atty. Linsangan protested, but Baluyot assured him that he would
still be paying the old price of P95,000.00 with P19,838.00 credited as full down payment leaving a balance of about P75,000.00.
5

Subsequently, on 8 April 1985, Baluyot brought an Offer to Purchase Lot No. A11 (15), Block 83, Garden Estate I denominated as
Contract No. 28660 and the Official Receipt No. 118912 dated 6 April 1985 for the amount of P19,838.00. Contract No. 28660 has a
listed price of P132,250.00. Atty. Linsangan objected to the new contract price, as the same was not the amount previously agreed
upon. To convince Atty. Linsangan, Baluyot executed a document
6
confirming that while the contract price is P132,250.00, Atty.
Linsangan would pay only the original price of P95,000.00.
The document reads in part:
The monthly installment will start April 6, 1985; the amount of P1,800.00 and the difference will be issued as discounted to
conform to the previous price as previously agreed upon. --- P95,000.00
Prepared by:
(Signed)
(MRS.) FLORENCIA C. BALUYOT
Agency Manager
Holy Cross Memorial Park
4/18/85
Dear Atty. Linsangan:
This will confirm our agreement that while the offer to purchase under Contract No. 28660 states that the total price of
P132,250.00 your undertaking is to pay only the total sum of P95,000.00 under the old price. Further the total sum of
P19,838.00 already paid by you under O.R. # 118912 dated April 6, 1985 has been credited in the total purchase price thereby
leaving a balance of P75,162.00 on a monthly installment of P1,800.00 including interests (sic) charges for a period of five (5)
years.
(Signed)
FLORENCIA C. BALUYOT
By virtue of this letter, Atty. Linsangan signed Contract No. 28660 and accepted Official Receipt No. 118912. As requested by Baluyot,
Atty. Linsangan issued twelve (12) postdated checks of P1,800.00 each in favor of MMPCI. The next year, or on 29 April 1986, Atty.
Linsangan again issued twelve (12) postdated checks in favor of MMPCI.
On 25 May 1987, Baluyot verbally advised Atty. Linsangan that Contract No. 28660 was cancelled for reasons the latter could not
explain, and presented to him another proposal for the purchase of an equivalent property. He refused the new proposal and insisted
that Baluyot and MMPCI honor their undertaking.
For the alleged failure of MMPCI and Baluyot to conform to their agreement, Atty. Linsangan filed a Complaint
7
for Breach of Contract
and Damages against the former.
Baluyot did not present any evidence. For its part, MMPCI alleged that Contract No. 28660 was cancelled conformably with the terms of
the contract
8
because of non-payment of arrearages.
9
MMPCI stated that Baluyot was not an agent but an independent contractor, and
as such was not authorized to represent MMPCI or to use its name except as to the extent expressly stated in the Agency Manager
Agreement.
10
Moreover, MMPCI was not aware of the arrangements entered into by Atty. Linsangan and Baluyot, as it in fact received
a down payment and monthly installments as indicated in the contract.
11
Official receipts showing the application of payment were
turned over to Baluyot whom Atty. Linsangan had from the beginning allowed to receive the same in his behalf. Furthermore, whatever
misimpression that Atty. Linsangan may have had must have been rectified by the Account Updating Arrangement signed by Atty.
Linsangan which states that he "expressly admits that Contract No. 28660 'on account of serious delinquency…is now due for
cancellation under its terms and conditions.'''
12

The trial court held MMPCI and Baluyot jointly and severally liable.
13
It found that Baluyot was an agent of MMPCI and that the latter
was estopped from denying this agency, having received and enchased the checks issued by Atty. Linsangan and given to it by
Baluyot. While MMPCI insisted that Baluyot was authorized to receive only the down payment, it allowed her to continue to receive
postdated checks from Atty. Linsangan, which it in turn consistently encashed.
14

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment by preponderance of evidence is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff declaring Contract No. 28660
as valid and subsisting and ordering defendants to perform their undertakings thereof which covers burial lot No. A11 (15),
Block 83, Section Garden I, Holy Cross Memorial Park located at Novaliches, Quezon City. All payments made by plaintiff to
defendants should be credited for his accounts. NO DAMAGES, NO ATTORNEY'S FEES but with costs against the
defendants.
The cross claim of defendant Manila Memorial Cemetery Incorporated as against defendant Baluyot is GRANTED up to the
extent of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
15

MMPCI appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals.
16
It claimed that Atty. Linsangan is bound by the written contract with
MMPCI, the terms of which were clearly set forth therein and read, understood, and signed by the former.
17
It also alleged that Atty.
Linsangan, a practicing lawyer for over thirteen (13) years at the time he entered into the contract, is presumed to know his contractual
obligations and is fully aware that he cannot belatedly and unilaterally change the terms of the contract without the consent, much less
the knowledge of the other contracting party, which was MMPCI. And in this case, MMPCI did not agree to a change in the contract and
in fact implemented the same pursuant to its clear terms. In view thereof, because of Atty. Linsangan's delinquency, MMPCI validly
cancelled the contract.
MMPCI further alleged that it cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with Baluyot as the latter exceeded the terms of her agency,
neither did MMPCI ratify Baluyot's acts. It added that it cannot be charged with making any misrepresentation, nor of having allowed
Baluyot to act as though she had full powers as the written contract expressly stated the terms and conditions which Atty. Li nsangan
accepted and understood. In canceling the contract, MMPCI merely enforced the terms and conditions imposed therein.
18

Imputing negligence on the part of Atty. Linsangan, MMPCI claimed that it was the former's obligation, as a party knowingly dealing with
an alleged agent, to determine the limitations of such agent's authority, particularly when such alleged agent's actions were patently
questionable. According to MMPCI, Atty. Linsangan did not even bother to verify Baluyot's authority or ask copies of official receipts for
his payments.
19

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It upheld the trial court's finding that Baluyot was an agent of MMPCI at the
time the disputed contract was entered into, having represented MMPCI's interest and acting on its behalf in the dealings with clients
and customers. Hence, MMPCI is considered estopped when it allowed Baluyot to act and represent MMPCI even beyond her
authority.
20
The appellate court likewise found that the acts of Baluyot bound MMPCI when the latter allowed the former to act for and in
its behalf and stead. While Baluyot's authority "may not have been expressly conferred upon her, the same may have been derived
impliedly by habit or custom, which may have been an accepted practice in the company for a long period of time."
21
Thus, the Court of
Appeals noted, innocent third persons such as Atty. Linsangan should not be prejudiced where the principal failed to adopt the needed
measures to prevent misrepresentation. Furthermore, if an agent misrepresents to a purchaser and the principal accepts the benefits of
such misrepresentation, he cannot at the same time deny responsibility for such misrepresentation.
22
Finally, the Court of Appeals
declared:
There being absolutely nothing on the record that would show that the court a quo overlooked, disregarded, or misinterpreted facts of
weight and significance, its factual findings and conclusions must be given great weight and should not be disturbed by this Court on
appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the appealed decision in Civil Case No. 88-1253 of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 57 of Makati, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
23

MMPCI filed its Motion for Reconsideration,
24
but the same was denied for lack of merit.
25

In the instant Petition for Review, MMPCI claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in disregarding the plain terms of the written
contract and Atty. Linsangan's failure to abide by the terms thereof, which justified its cancellation. In addition, even assuming that
Baluyot was an agent of MMPCI, she clearly exceeded her authority and Atty. Linsangan knew or should have known about this
considering his status as a long-practicing lawyer. MMPCI likewise claims that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that the
facts and the applicable law do not support a judgment against Baluyot only "up to the extent of costs."
26

Atty. Linsangan argues that he did not violate the terms and conditions of the contract, and in fact faithfully performed his contractual
obligations and complied with them in good faith for at least two years.
27
He claims that contrary to MMPCI's position, his profession as
a lawyer is immaterial to the validity of the subject contract and the case at bar.
28
According to him, MMPCI had practically admitted in
its Petition that Baluyot was its agent, and thus, the only issue left to be resolved is whether MMPCI allowed Baluyot to act as though
she had full powers to be held solidarily liable with the latter.
29

We find for the petitioner MMPCI.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of
law, not fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts.
30
In BPI Investment Corporation v. D.G. Carreon Commercial Corporation,
31
this Court ruled:
There are instances when the findings of fact of the trial court and/or Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
32

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals committed several errors in the apprehension of the facts of the case, as well as made
conclusions devoid of evidentiary support, hence we review its findings of fact.
By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another,
with the consent or authority of the latter.
33
Thus, the elements of agency are (i) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish
the relationship; (ii) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (iii) the agent acts as a representative and
not for himself; and (iv) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
34

In an attempt to prove that Baluyot was not its agent, MMPCI pointed out that under its Agency Manager Agreement; an agency
manager such as Baluyot is considered an independent contractor and not an agent.
35
However, in the same contract, Baluyot as
agency manager was authorized to solicit and remit to MMPCI offers to purchase interment spaces belonging to and sold by the
latter.
36
Notwithstanding the claim of MMPCI that Baluyot was an independent contractor, the fact remains that she was authorized to
solicit solely for and in behalf of MMPCI. As properly found both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Baluyot was an agent of
MMPCI, having represented the interest of the latter, and having been allowed by MMPCI to represent it in her dealings with its
clients/prospective buyers.
Nevertheless, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, MMPCI cannot be bound by the contract procured by Atty. Linsangan
and solicited by Baluyot.
Baluyot was authorized to solicit and remit to MMPCI offers to purchase interment spaces obtained on forms provided by MMPCI. The
terms of the offer to purchase, therefore, are contained in such forms and, when signed by the buyer and an authorized officer of
MMPCI, becomes binding on both parties.
The Offer to Purchase duly signed by Atty. Linsangan, and accepted and validated by MMPCI showed a total list price of P132,250.00.
Likewise, it was clearly stated therein that "Purchaser agrees that he has read or has had read to him this agreement, that he
understands its terms and conditions, and that there are no covenants, conditions, warranties or representations other than those
contained herein."
37
By signing the Offer to Purchase, Atty. Linsangan signified that he understood its contents. That he and Baluyot
had an agreement different from that contained in the Offer to Purchase is of no moment, and should not affect MMPCI, as it was
obviously made outside Baluyot's authority. To repeat, Baluyot's authority was limited only to soliciting purchasers. She had no authority
to alter the terms of the written contract provided by MMPCI. The document/letter "confirming" the agreement that Atty. Linsangan
would have to pay the old price was executed by Baluyot alone. Nowhere is there any indication that the same came from MMPCI or
any of its officers.
It is a settled rule that persons dealing with an agent are bound at their peril, if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only
the fact of agency but also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to
establish it.
38
The basis for agency is representation and a person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his
peril the authority of the agent.
39
If he does not make such an inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the agent's authority and his
ignorance of that authority will not be any excuse.
40

As noted by one author, the ignorance of a person dealing with an agent as to the scope of the latter's authority is no excuse to such
person and the fault cannot be thrown upon the principal.
41
A person dealing with an agent assumes the risk of lack of authority in the
agent. He cannot charge the principal by relying upon the agent's assumption of authority that proves to be unfounded. The principal,
on the other hand, may act on the presumption that third persons dealing with his agent will not be negligent in failing to ascertain the
extent of his authority as well as the existence of his agency.
42

In the instant case, it has not been established that Atty. Linsangan even bothered to inquire whether Baluyot was authorized to agree
to terms contrary to those indicated in the written contract, much less bind MMPCI by her commitment with respect to such agreements.
Even if Baluyot was Atty. Linsangan's friend and known to be an agent of MMPCI, her declarations and actions alone are not sufficient
to establish the fact or extent of her authority.
43
Atty. Linsangan as a practicing lawyer for a relatively long period of time when he
signed the contract should have been put on guard when their agreement was not reflected in the contract. More importantly, Atty.
Linsangan should have been alerted by the fact that Baluyot failed to effect the transfer of rights earlier promised, and was unable to
make good her written commitment, nor convince MMPCI to assent thereto, as evidenced by several attempts to induce him to enter
into other contracts for a higher consideration. As properly pointed out by MMPCI, as a lawyer, a greater degree of caution should be
expected of Atty. Linsangan especially in dealings involving legal documents. He did not even bother to ask for official receipts of his
payments, nor inquire from MMPCI directly to ascertain the real status of the contract, blindly relying on the representations of Baluyot.
A lawyer by profession, he knew what he was doing when he signed the written contract, knew the meaning and value of every word or
phrase used in the contract, and more importantly, knew the legal effects which said document produced. He is bound to accept
responsibility for his negligence.
The trial and appellate courts found MMPCI liable based on ratification and estoppel. For the trial court, MMPCI's acts of accepting and
encashing the checks issued by Atty. Linsangan as well as allowing Baluyot to receive checks drawn in the name of MMPCI confi rm
and ratify the contract of agency. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals faulted MMPCI in failing to adopt measures to prevent
misrepresentation, and declared that in view of MMPCI's acceptance of the benefits of Baluyot's misrepresentation, it can no longer
deny responsibility therefor.
The Court does not agree. Pertinent to this case are the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 1898. If the agent contracts in the name of the principal, exceeding the scope of his authority, and the principal does not
ratify the contract, it shall be void if the party with whom the agent contracted is aware of the limits of the powers granted by
the principal. In this case, however, the agent is liable if he undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
Art. 1910. The principal must comply with all the obligations that the agent may have contracted within the scope of his
authority.
As for any obligation wherein the agent has exceeded his power, the principal is not bound except when he ratifies it expressly
or tacitly.
Art. 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed
the latter to act as though he had full powers.
Thus, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless he ratifies them, expressly or impliedly.
Only the principal can ratify; the agent cannot ratify his own unauthorized acts. Moreover, the principal must have knowledge of the acts
he is to ratify.
44

Ratification in agency is the adoption or confirmation by one person of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority. The
substance of the doctrine is confirmation after conduct, amounting to a substitute for a prior authority. Ordinarily, the principal must
have full knowledge at the time of ratification of all the material facts and circumstances relating to the unauthorized act of the person
who assumed to act as agent. Thus, if material facts were suppressed or unknown, there can be no valid ratification and this regardless
of the purpose or lack thereof in concealing such facts and regardless of the parties between whom the question of ratificati on may
arise.
45
Nevertheless, this principle does not apply if the principal's ignorance of the material facts and circumstances was willful, or that
the principal chooses to act in ignorance of the facts.
46
However, in the absence of circumstances putting a reasonably prudent man on
inquiry, ratification cannot be implied as against the principal who is ignorant of the facts.
47

No ratification can be implied in the instant case.
A perusal of Baluyot's Answer
48
reveals that the real arrangement between her and Atty. Linsangan was for the latter to pay a monthly
installment of P1,800.00 whereas Baluyot was to shoulder the counterpart amount of P1,455.00 to meet the P3,255.00 monthly
installments as indicated in the contract. Thus, every time an installment falls due, payment was to be made through a check from Atty.
Linsangan for P1,800.00 and a cash component of P1,455.00 from Baluyot.
49
However, it appears that while Atty. Linsangan issued the
post-dated checks, Baluyot failed to come up with her part of the bargain. This was supported by Baluyot's statements in her letter
50
to
Mr. Clyde Williams, Jr., Sales Manager of MMPCI, two days after she received the copy of the Complaint. In the letter, she admitted
that she was remiss in her duties when she consented to Atty. Linsangan's proposal that he will pay the old price while the difference
will be shouldered by her. She likewise admitted that the contract suffered arrearages because while Atty. Linsangan issued the agreed
checks, she was unable to give her share of P1,455.00 due to her own financial difficulties. Baluyot even asked for compassion from
MMPCI for the error she committed.
Atty. Linsangan failed to show that MMPCI had knowledge of the arrangement. As far as MMPCI is concerned, the contract price was
P132,250.00, as stated in the Offer to Purchase signed by Atty. Linsangan and MMPCI's authorized officer. The down payment of
P19,838.00 given by Atty. Linsangan was in accordance with the contract as well. Payments of P3,235.00 for at least two installments
were likewise in accord with the contract, albeit made through a check and partly in cash. In view of Baluyot's failure to give her share in
the payment, MMPCI received only P1,800.00 checks, which were clearly insufficient payment. In fact, Atty. Linsangan would have
incurred arrearages that could have caused the earlier cancellation of the contract, if not for MMPCI's application of some of the checks
to his account. However, the checks alone were not sufficient to cover his obligations.
If MMPCI was aware of the arrangement, it would have refused the latter's check payments for being insufficient. It would not have
applied to his account the P1,800.00 checks. Moreover, the fact that Baluyot had to practically explain to MMPCI's Sales Manager the
details of her "arrangement" with Atty. Linsangan and admit to having made an error in entering such arrangement confirm that MMCPI
had no knowledge of the said agreement. It was only when Baluyot filed her Answer that she claimed that MMCPI was fully aware of
the agreement.
Neither is there estoppel in the instant case. The essential elements of estoppel are (i) conduct of a party amounting to false
representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and
inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (ii) intent, or at least expectation, that this conduct shall be
acted upon by, or at least influence, the other party; and (iii) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.
51

While there is no more question as to the agency relationship between Baluyot and MMPCI, there is no indication that MMPCI let the
public, or specifically, Atty. Linsangan to believe that Baluyot had the authority to alter the standard contracts of the company. Neither is
there any showing that prior to signing Contract No. 28660, MMPCI had any knowledge of Baluyot's commitment to Atty. Linsangan.
One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the representations of another must not have been
misled through his own want of reasonable care and circumspection.
52
Even assuming that Atty. Linsangan was misled by MMPCI's
actuations, he still cannot invoke the principle of estoppel, as he was clearly negligent in his dealings with Baluyot, and could have
easily determined, had he only been cautious and prudent, whether said agent was clothed with the authority to change the terms of the
principal's written contract. Estoppel must be intentional and unequivocal, for when misapplied, it can easily become a most convenient
and effective means of injustice.
53
In view of the lack of sufficient proof showing estoppel, we refuse to hold MMPCI liable on this score.
Likewise, this Court does not find favor in the Court of Appeals' findings that "the authority of defendant Baluyot may not have been
expressly conferred upon her; however, the same may have been derived impliedly by habit or custom which may have been an
accepted practice in their company in a long period of time." A perusal of the records of the case fails to show any indication that there
was such a habit or custom in MMPCI that allows its agents to enter into agreements for lower prices of its interment spaces, nor to
assume a portion of the purchase price of the interment spaces sold at such lower price. No evidence was ever presented to this effect.
As the Court sees it, there are two obligations in the instant case. One is the Contract No. 28660 between MMPCI and by Atty.
Linsangan for the purchase of an interment space in the former's cemetery. The other is the agreement between Baluyot and Atty.
Linsangan for the former to shoulder the amount P1,455.00, or the difference between P95,000.00, the original price, and P132,250.00,
the actual contract price.
To repeat, the acts of the agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal unless the latter ratifies the same. It also
bears emphasis that when the third person knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held
liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person was aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame and is not entitled to recover
damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
54

This Court finds that Contract No. 28660 was validly entered into both by MMPCI and Atty. Linsangan. By affixing his signature in the
contract, Atty. Linsangan assented to the terms and conditions thereof. When Atty. Linsangan incurred delinquencies in payment,
MMCPI merely enforced its rights under the said contract by canceling the same.
Being aware of the limits of Baluyot's authority, Atty. Linsangan cannot insist on what he claims to be the terms of Contract No. 28660.
The agreement, insofar as the P95,000.00 contract price is concerned, is void and cannot be enforced as against MMPCI. Neither can
he hold Baluyot liable for damages under the same contract, since there is no evidence showing that Baluyot undertook to secure
MMPCI's ratification. At best, the "agreement" between Baluyot and Atty. Linsangan bound only the two of them. As far as MMPCI is
concerned, it bound itself to sell its interment space to Atty. Linsangan for P132,250.00 under Contract No. 28660, and had in fact
received several payments in accordance with the same contract. If the contract was cancelled due to arrearages, Atty. Linsangan's
recourse should only be against Baluyot who personally undertook to pay the difference between the true contract price of P132,250.00
and the original proposed price of P95,000.00. To surmise that Baluyot was acting on behalf of MMPCI when she promised to shoulder
the said difference would be to conclude that MMPCI undertook to pay itself the difference, a conclusion that is very illogical, if not
antithetical to its business interests.
However, this does not preclude Atty. Linsangan from instituting a separate action to recover damages from Baluyot, not as an agent of
MMPCI, but in view of the latter's breach of their separate agreement. To review, Baluyot obligated herself to pay P1,455.00 in addition
to Atty. Linsangan's P1,800.00 to complete the monthly installment payment under the contract, which, by her own admission, she was
unable to do due to personal financial difficulties. It is undisputed that Atty. Linsangan issued the P1,800.00 as agreed upon, and were
it not for Baluyot's failure to provide the balance, Contract No. 28660 would not have been cancelled. Thus, Atty. Linsangan has a
cause of action against Baluyot, which he can pursue in another case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 June 2001 and its Resolution dated 12
December 2001 in CA- G.R. CV No. 49802, as well as the Decision in Civil Case No. 88-1253 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City
Branch 57, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-1253 is DISMISSED for lack of cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

























Manila Memorial Park Inc. vs Linsangan (November 22, 2004)

Facts: Florencia Baluyot is authorized by the Manila Memorial ParkInc. (MMPI) to sell burial lots to those interested in purchasing.
Herein respondent Atty. Linsangan was approached by Florencia with an offer to sell to the former a lot that she alleges to have already
been previously sold but the owner thereof has cancelled and thus, Atty. Linsangan shall only continue the payment thereof amounting
to P95,000, Atty. Linsangan agreed and payed an initial P35, 000.

Thereafter, Florencia advised Atty. Linsangan that there were changes in the contract and that she needed him to sign a
newcontract stipulating the total price of P132, 000 but Florencia assured Atty. Linsangan that he would only pay the agreed P95, 000.
In the new contract, Atty. Linsangan acceded that he has read and understood all the stipulations therein. The payment was made in
installments for two years which Atty. Linsangan completed, however, after two years, Florencia informed Linsangan that their
contract was cancelled and offered a different lot, Atty. Linsangan refused the offer and filed a suit for breach of contract against MMPI
and Florencia.

MMPI avers that Florencia acted beyond the scope of her authority as MMPI‘s agent since the latter did not allow her to renegotiate
existing contracts but only to sell new contracts. Atty. Lnsangan on the other hand argues that MMPI should be liable for the acts of its
agents.

Issue: Whether or not MMPI is liable for the acts of Florencia

Held: NO. The SC ruled that Florencia acted outside the scope of her authority as agent of MMPI and Atty. Linsangan failed to
ascertain the authority given to Florencia especially that their agreement on the second contract had a different stipulation than what he
and Florencia agreed upon.

Moreover, Atty. Linsangan‘s signature over the new contract signifies his agreement thereto and serves as a form of ratification for the
acts of Florencia which were outside the authority given her. As such, the SC ruled that the principal cannot be held liable for actions of
agents outside the scope of their authority when such acts are ratified by the principal himself. On the part of MMPI, they did not ratify
Florencia‘s acts, nor did they know of such actions.









































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126751 March 28, 2001
SAFIC ALCAN & CIE, petitioner,
vs.
IMPERIAL VEGETABLE OIL CO., INC., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Petitioner Safic Alcan & Cie (hereinafter, "Safic") is a French corporation engaged in the international purchase, sale and trading of
coconut oil. It filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXV, a complaint dated February 26, 1987 against private
respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc. (hereinafter, "IVO"), docketed as Civil Case No. 87- 39597. Petitioner Safic alleged that on
July 1, 1986 and September 25, 1986, it placed purchase orders with IVO for 2,000 long tons of crude coconut oil, valued at US$222.50
per ton, covered by Purchase Contract Nos. A601446 and A601655, respectively, to be delivered within the month of January 1987.
Private respondent, however, failed to deliver the said coconut oil and, instead, offered a "wash out" settlement, whereby the coconut
oil subject of the purchase contracts were to be "sold back" to IVO at the prevailing price in the international market at the time of wash
out. Thus, IVO bound itself to pay to Safic the difference between the said prevailing price and the contract price of the 2,000 long tons
of crude coconut oil, which amounted to US$293,500.00. IVO failed to pay this amount despite repeated oral and written demands.
Under its second cause of action, Safic alleged that on eight occasions between April 24, 1986 and October 31, 1986, it placed
purchase orders with IVO for a total of 4,750 tons of crude coconut oil, covered by Purchase Contract Nos. A601297A/B, A601384,
A601385, A601391, A601415, A601681, A601683 and A601770A/B/C/. When IVO failed to honor its obligation under the wash out
settlement narrated above, Safic demanded that IVO make marginal deposits within forty-eight hours on the eight purchase contracts in
amounts equivalent to the difference between the contract price and the market price of the coconut oil, to compensate it for the
damages it suffered when it was forced to acquire coconut oil at a higher price. IVO failed to make the prescribed marginal deposits on
the eight contracts, in the aggregate amount of US$391,593.62, despite written demand therefor.
The demand for marginal deposits was based on the customs of the trade, as governed by the provisions of the standard N.I.O.P.
Contract arid the FOSFA Contract, to wit:
N.I.O.P. Contract, Rule 54 - If the financial condition of either party to a contract subject to these rules becomes so impaired as
to create a reasonable doubt as to the ability of such party to perform its obligations under the contract, the other party may
from time to time demand marginal deposits to be made within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of such demand, such
deposits not to exceed the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods covered by the contract on
the day upon which such demand is made, such deposit to bear interest at the prime rate plus one percent (1%) per annum.
Failure to make such deposit within the time specified shall constitute a breach of contract by the party upon whom demand for
deposit is made, and all losses and expenses resulting from such breach shall be for the account of the party upon whom such
demand is made. (Underscoring ours.)
1

FOSFA Contract, Rule 54 - BANKRUPTCY/INSOLVENCY: If before the fulfillment of this contract either party shall suspend
payment, commit an act of bankruptcy, notify any of his creditors that he is unable to meet his debts or that he has suspended
payment or that he is about to suspend payment of his debts, convene, call or hold a meeting either of his creditors or to pass
a resolution to go into liquidation (except for a voluntary winding up of a solvent company for the purpose of reconstruction or
amalgamation) or shall apply for an official moratorium, have a petition presented for winding up or shal1i have a Receiver
appointed, the contract shall forthwith be closed either at the market price then current for similar goods or, at the option of the
other party at a price to be ascertained by repurchase or resale and the difference between the contract price and such
closing-out price shall be the amount which the other party shall be entitled to claim shall be liable to account for under this
contract (sic). Should either party be dissatisfied with the price, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. Where no such
resale or repurchase takes place, the closing-out price shall be fixed by a Price Settlement Committee appointed by the
Federation. (Underscoring ours.)
2

Hence, Safic prayed that IVO be ordered to pay the sums of US$293,500.00 and US$391,593.62, plus attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. The complaint also included an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of IVO.
Upon Safic's posting of the requisite bond, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequently, the trial court ordered
that the assets of IVO be placed under receivership, in order to ensure the preservation of the same.
In its answer, IVO raised the following special affirmative defenses: Safic had no legal capacity to sue because it was doing business in
the Philippines without the requisite license or authority; the subject contracts were speculative contracts entered into by IVO's then
President, Dominador Monteverde, in contravention of the prohibition by the Board of Directors against engaging in speculative paper
trading, and despite IVO's lack of the necessary license from Central Bank to engage in such kind of trading activity; and that under
Article 2018 of the Civil Code, if a contract which purports to be for the delivery of goods, securities or shares of stock is entered into
with the intention that the difference between the price stipulated and the exchange or market price at the time of the pretended delivery
shall be paid by the loser to the winner, the transaction is null and void.1âwphi1.nêt
IVO set up counterclaims anchored on harassment, paralyzation of business, financial losses, rumor-mongering and oppressive action.
Later, IVO filed a supplemental counterclaim alleging that it was unable to operate its business normally because of the arrest of most
of its physical assets; that its suppliers were driven away; and that its major creditors have inundated it with claims for immediate
payment of its debts, and China Banking Corporation had foreclosed its chattel and real estate mortgages.
During the trial, the lower court found that in 1985, prior to the date of the contracts sued upon, the parties had entered i nto and
consummated a number of contracts for the sale of crude coconut oil. In those transactions, Safic placed several orders and IVO
faithfully filled up those orders by shipping out the required crude coconut oil to Safic, totaling 3,500 metric tons. Anent the 1986
contracts being sued upon, the trial court refused to declare the same as gambling transactions, as defined in Article 2018 of the Civil
Code, although they involved some degree of speculation. After all, the court noted, every business enterprise carries with i t a certain
measure of speculation or risk. However, the contracts performed in 1985, on one hand, and the 1986 contracts subject of this case, on
the other hand, differed in that under the 1985 contracts, deliveries were to be made within two months. This, as alleged by Safic, was
the time needed for milling and building up oil inventory. Meanwhile, the 1986 contracts stipulated that the coconut oil were to be
delivered within period ranging from eight months to eleven to twelve months after the placing of orders. The coconuts that were
supposed to be milled were in all likelihood not yet growing when Dominador Monteverde sold the crude coconut oil. As such, the 1986
contracts constituted trading in futures or in mere expectations.
The lower court further held that the subject contracts were ultra vires and were entered into by Dominador Monteverde without
authority from the Board of Directors. It distinguished between the 1985 contracts, where Safic likewise dealt with Dominador
Monteverde, who was presumably authorized to bind IVO, and the 1986 contracts, which were highly speculative in character.
Moreover, the 1985 contracts were covered by letters of credit, while the 1986 contracts were payable by telegraphic transfers, which
were nothing more than mere promises to pay once the shipments became ready. For these reasons, the lower court held that Safic
cannot invoke the 1985 contracts as an implied corporate sanction for the high-risk 1986 contracts, which were evidently entered into
by Monteverde for his personal benefit.
The trial court ruled that Safic failed to substantiate its claim for actual damages. Likewise, it rejected IVO's counterclaim and
supplemental counterclaim.
Thus, on August 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint of plaintiff Safic Alcan & Cie, without prejudice to any
action it might subsequently institute against Dominador Monteverde, the former President of Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc.,
arising from the subject matter of this case. The counterclaim and supplemental counterclaim of the latter defendant are
likewise hereby dismissed for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
The writ of preliminary attachment issued in this case as well as the order placing Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc. under
receivership are hereby dissolved and set aside.
3

Both IVO and Safic appealed to the Court of Appeals, jointly docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.40820.
IVO raised only one assignment of error, viz:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 'I'HAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT WAS
NOT THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND IN NOT AWARDING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT SUCH DAMAGES.
For its part, Safic argued that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IVO'S PRESIDENT, DOMINADOR MONTEVERDE, ENTERED INTO
CONTRACTS WHICH WERE ULTRA VIRES AND WHICH DID NOT BIND OR MAKE IVO LIABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THA SAFIC WAS UNABLE TO PROVE THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY IT AND
IN NOT AWARDING SUCH DAMAGES.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT IVO IS LIABLE UNDER THE WASH OUT CONTRACTS.
On September 12, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the, appeals and affirming the judgment
appealed from in toto.
4

Hence, Safic filed the instant petition for review with this Court, substantially reiterating the errors it raised before the Court of Appeals
and maintaining that the Court of Appeals grievously erred when:
a. it declared that the 1986 forward contracts (i.e., Contracts Nos. A601446 and A60155 (sic) involving 2,000 long tons of
crude coconut oil, and Contracts Nos. A60l297A/B, A601385, A60l39l, A60l4l5, A601681. A601683 and A60l770A/B/C
involving 4,500 tons of crude coconut oil) were unauthorized acts of Dominador Monteverde which do not bind IVO in whose
name they were entered into. In this connection, the Court of Appeals erred when (i) it ignored its own finding that (a)
Dominador Monteverde, as IVO's President, had "an implied authority to make any contract necessary or appropriate to the
contract of the ordinary business of the company"; and (b) Dominador Monteverde had validly entered into similar forward
contracts for and on behalf of IVO in 1985; (ii) it distinguished between the 1986 forward contracts despite the fact that the
Manila RTC has struck down IVO's objection to the 1986 forward contracts (i.e. that they were highly speculative paper trading
which the IVO Board of Directors had prohibited Dominador Monteverde from engaging in because it is a form of gambling
where the parties do not intend actual delivery of the coconut oil sold) and instead found that the 1986 forward contracts were
not gambling; (iii) it relied on the testimony of Mr. Rodrigo Monteverde in concluding that the IVO Board of Directors did not
authorize its President, Dominador Monteverde, to enter into the 1986 forward contracts; and (iv) it did not find IVO, in any
case, estopped from denying responsibility for, and liability under, the 1986 forward contracts because IVO had recognized
itself bound to similar forward contracts which Dominador Monteverde entered into (for and on behalf of IVO) with Safic in
1985 notwithstanding that Dominador Monteverde was (like in the 1986 forward contracts) not expressly authorized by the IVO
Board of Directors to enter into such forward contracts;
b. it declared that Safic was not able, to prove damages suffered by it, despite the fact that Safic had presented not only
testimonial, but also documentary, evidence which proved the higher amount it had to pay for crude coconut oil (vis-à-vis the
contract price it was to pay to IVO) when IVO refused to deliver the crude coconut oil bought by Safic under the 1986 forward
contracts; and
c. it failed to resolve the issue of whether or not IVO is liable to Safic under the wash out contracts involving Contracts Nos.
A601446 and A60155 (sic), despite the fact that Safic had properly raised the issue on its appeal, and the evidence and the
law support Safic's position that IVO is so liable to Safic.
In fine, Safic insists that the appellate court grievously erred when it did not declare that IVO's President, Dominador Monteverde,
validly entered into the 1986 contracts for and on behalf of IVO.
We disagree.
Article III, Section 3 [g] of the By-Laws
5
of IVO provides, among others, that –
Section 3. Powers and Duties of the President. - The President shall be elected by the Board of Directors from their own
number .
He shall have the following duties:
x x x x x x x x x
[g] Have direct and active management of the business and operation of the corporation, conducting the same according to,
the orders, resolutions and instruction of the Board of Directors and according to his own discretion whenever and wherever
the same is not expressly limited by such orders, resolutions and instructions.
It can be clearly seen from the foregoing provision of IVO's By-laws that Monteverde had no blanket authority to bind IVO to any
contract. He must act according to the instructions of the Board of Directors. Even in instances when he was authorized to act
according to his discretion, that discretion must not conflict with prior Board orders, resolutions and instructions. The evidence shows
that the IVO Board knew nothing of the 1986 contracts
6
and that it did not authorize Monteverde to enter into speculative contracts.
7
In
fact, Monteverde had earlier proposed that the company engage in such transactions but the IVO Board rejected his proposal.
8
Since
the 1986 contracts marked a sharp departure from past IVO transactions, Safic should have obtained from Monteverde the prior
authorization of the IVO Board. Safic can not rely on the doctrine of implied agency because before the controversial 1986 contracts,
IVO did not enter into identical contracts with Safic. The basis for agency is representation and a person dealing with an agent is put
upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.
9
In the case of Bacaltos Coal Mines v. Court of Appeals,
10
we
elucidated the rule on dealing with an agent thus:
Every person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. If he does
not make such inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the agent's authority, and his ignorance of that authority will not be
any excuse. Persons dealing with an assumed agent, whether the assumed agency be a general or special one, are bound at
their peril, if they would hold the principal, to ascertain not only the fact of the agency but also the nature and extent of the
authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.
11

The most prudent thing petitioner should have done was to ascertain the extent of the authority of Dominador Monteverde. Being
remiss in this regard, petitioner can not seek relief on the basis of a supposed agency.
Under Article 1898
12
of the Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal unless the latter
ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. It also bears emphasizing that when the third person knows that the agent was acting beyond
his power or authority, the principal can not be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such li mits of
authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's
ratification.
13

There was no such ratification in this case. When Monteverde entered into the speculative contracts with Safic, he did not secure the
Board's approval.
14
He also did not submit the contracts to the Board after their consummation so there was, in fact, no occasion at all
for ratification. The contracts were not reported in IVO's export sales book and turn-out book.
15
Neither were they reflected in other
books and records of the corporation.
16
It must be pointed out that the Board of Directors, not Monteverde, exercises corporate
power.
17
Clearly, Monteverde's speculative contracts with Safic never bound IVO and Safic can not therefore enforce those contracts
against IVO.
To bolster its cause, Safic raises the novel point that the IVO Board of Directors did not set limitations on the extent of Monteverde's
authority to sell coconut oil. It must be borne in mind in this regard that a question that was never raised in the courts below can not be
allowed to be raised for the first time on appeal without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
18
Such an issue was
not brought to the fore either in the trial court or the appellate court, and would have been disregarded by the latter tribunal for the
reasons previously stated. With more reason, the same does not deserve consideration by this Court.
Be that as it may, Safic's belated contention that the IVO Board of Directors did not set limitations on Monteverde's authority to sell
coconut oil is belied by what appears on the record. Rodrigo Monteverde, who succeeded Dominador Monteverde as IVO President,
testified that the IVO Board had set down the policy of engaging in purely physical trading thus:
Q. Now you said that IVO is engaged in trading. With whom does, it usually trade its oil?
A. I am not too familiar with trading because as of March 1987, I was not yet an officer of the corporation, although I was at the
time already a stockholder, I think IVO is engaged in trading oil.
Q. As far as you know, what kind of trading was IVO engaged with?
A. It was purely on physical trading.
Q. How did you know this?
A. As a stockholder, rather as member of [the] Board of Directors, I frequently visited the plant and from my observation, as I
have to supervise and monitor purchases of copras and also the sale of the same, I observed that the policy of the corporation
is for the company to engaged (sic) or to purely engaged (sic) in physical trading.
Q. What do you mean by physical trading?
A. Physical Trading means - we buy and sell copras that are only available to us. We only have to sell the available stocks in
our inventory.
Q. And what is the other form of trading?
Atty. Fernando
No basis, your Honor.
Atty. Abad
Well, the witness said they are engaged in physical trading and what I am saying [is] if there are any other kind or
form of trading.
Court
Witness may answer if he knows.
Witness
A. Trading future[s] contracts wherein the trader commits a price and to deliver coconut oil in the future in which he is
yet to acquire the stocks in the future.
Atty. Abad
Q. Who established the so-called physical trading in IVO?
A. The Board of Directors, sir.
Atty. Abad.
Q. How did you know that?
A. There was a meeting held in the office at the factory and it was brought out and suggested by our former president,
Dominador Monteverde, that the company should engaged (sic) in future[s] contract[s] but it was rejected by the Board of
Directors. It was only Ador Monteverde who then wanted to engaged (sic) in this future[s] contract[s].
Q. Do you know where this meeting took place?
A. As far as I know it was sometime in 1985.
Q. Do you know why the Board of Directors rejected the proposal of Dominador Monteverde that the company should engaged
(sic) in future[s] contracts?
Atty. Fernando
Objection, your Honor, no basis.
Court
Why don't you lay the basis?
Atty. Abad
Q. Were you a member of the board at the time?
A. In 1975, I am already a stockholder and a member.
Q. Then would [you] now answer my question?
Atty. Fernando
No basis, your Honor. What we are talking is about 1985.
Atty. Abad
Q. When you mentioned about the meeting in 1985 wherein the Board of Directors rejected the future[s] contract[s], were you
already a member of the Board of Directors at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the reason why the said proposal of Mr. Dominador Monteverde to engage in future[s] contract[s] was
rejected by the Board of Directors?
A. Because this future[s] contract is too risky and it partakes of gambling.
Q. Do you keep records of the Board meetings of the company?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have a copy of the minutes of your meeting in 1985?
A. Incidentally our Secretary of the Board of Directors, Mr. Elfren Sarte, died in 1987 or 1988, and despite [the] request of our
office for us to be furnished a copy he was not able to furnish us a copy.
19

x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Abad
Q. You said the Board of Directors were against the company engaging in future[s] contracts. As far as you know, has this
policy of the Board of Directors been observed or followed?
Witness
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far has this Dominador Monteverde been using the name of I.V.0. in selling future contracts without the proper
authority and consent of the company's Board of Directors?
A. Dominador Monteverde never records those transactions he entered into in connection with these future[s] contracts in the
company's books of accounts.
Atty. Abad
Q. What do you mean by that the future[s] contracts were not entered into the books of accounts of the company?
Witness
A. Those were not recorded at all in the books of accounts of the company, sir.
20

x x x x x x x x x
Q. What did you do when you discovered these transactions?
A. There was again a meeting by the Board of Directors of the corporation and that we agreed to remove the president and
then I was made to replace him as president.
Q. What else?
A. And a resolution was passed disowning the illegal activities of the former president.
21

Petitioner next argues that there was actually no difference between the 1985 physical contracts and the 1986 futures contracts.
The contention is unpersuasive for, as aptly pointed out by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court –
Rejecting IVO's position, SAFIC claims that there is no distinction between the 1985 and 1986 contracts, both of which groups
of contracts were signed or authorized by IVO's President, Dominador Monteverde. The 1986 contracts, SAFIC would bewail,
were similarly with their 1985 predecessors, forward sales contracts in which IVO had undertaken to deliver the crude coconut
oil months after such contracts were entered into. The lead time between the closing of the deal and the delivery of the oil
supposedly allowed the seller to accumulate enough copra to mill and to build up its inventory and so meet its delivery
commitment to its foreign buyers. SAFIC concludes that the 1986 contracts were equally binding, as the 1985 contracts were,
on IVO.
Subjecting the evidence on both sides to close scrutiny, the Court has found some remarkable distinctions between the 1985
and 1986 contracts. x x x
1. The 1985 contracts were performed within an average of two months from the date of the sale. On the other hand, the 1986
contracts were to be performed within an average of eight and a half months from the dates of the sale. All the supposed
performances fell in 1987. Indeed, the contract covered by Exhibit J was to be performed 11 to 12 months from the execution
of the contract. These pattern (sic) belies plaintiffs contention that the lead time merely allowed for milling and building up of oil
inventory. It is evident that the 1986 contracts constituted trading in futures or in mere expectations. In all likelihood, the
coconuts that were supposed to be milled for oil were not yet on their trees when Dominador Monteverde sold the crude oil to
SAFIC.
2. The mode of payment agreed on by the parties in their 1985 contracts was uniformly thru the opening of a letter of credit LC
by SAFIC in favor of IVO. Since the buyer's letter of credit guarantees payment to the seller as soon as the latter is able to
present the shipping documents covering the cargo, its opening usually mark[s] the fact that the transaction would be
consummated. On the other hand, seven out of the ten 1986 contracts were to be paid by telegraphic transfer upon
presentation of the shipping documents. Unlike the letter of credit, a mere promise to pay by telegraphic transfer gives no
assurance of [the] buyer's compliance with its contracts. This fact lends an uncertain element in the 1986
contracts.1âwphi1.nêt
3. Apart from the above, it is not disputed that with respect to the 1985 contracts, IVO faithfully complied with Central Bank
Circular No. 151 dated April 1, 1963, requiring a coconut oil exporter to submit a Report of Foreign Sales within twenty-four
(24) hours "after the closing of the relative sales contract" with a foreign buyer of coconut oil. But with respect to the disputed
1986 contracts, the parties stipulated during the hearing that none of these contracts were ever reported to the Central Bank,
in violation of its above requirement. (See Stipulation of Facts dated June 13, 1990). The 1986 sales were, therefore suspect.
4. It is not disputed that, unlike the 1985 contacts, the 1986 contracts were never recorded either in the 1986 accounting books
of IVO or in its annual financial statement for 1986, a document that was prepared prior to the controversy. (Exhibits 6 to 6-0
and 7 to 7-1). Emelita Ortega, formerly an assistant of Dominador Monteverde, testified that they were strange goings-on
about the 1986 contract. They were neither recorded in the books nor reported to the Central Bank. What is more, in those
unreported cases where profits were made, such profits were ordered remitted to unknown accounts in California, U.S.A., by
Dominador Monteverde.
x x x x x x x x x
Evidently, Dominador Monteverde made business or himself, using the name of IVO but concealing from it his speculative
transactions.
Petitioner further contends that both the trial and appellate courts erred in concluding that Safic was not able to prove its claim for
damages. Petitioner first points out that its wash out agreements with Monteverde where IVO allegedly agreed to pay US$293,500.00
for some of the failed contracts was proof enough and, second, that it presented purchases of coconut oil it made from others during
the period of IVO's default.
We remain unconvinced. The so-called "wash out" agreements are clearly ultra vires and not binding on IVO. Furthermore, such
agreements did not prove Safic's actual losses in the transactions in question. The fact is that Safic did not pay for the coconut oil that it
supposedly ordered from IVO through Monteverede. Safic only claims that, since it was ready to pay when IVO was not ready to
deliver, Safic suffered damages to the extent that they had to buy the same commodity from others at higher prices.
The foregoing claim of petitioner is not, however, substantiated by the evidence and only raises several questions, to wit: 1.] Did Safic
commit to deliver the quantity of oil covered by the 1986 contracts to its own buyers? Who were these buyers? What were the terms of
those contracts with respect to quantity, price and date of delivery? 2.] Did Safic pay damages to its buyers? Where were the receipts?
Did Safic have to procure the equivalent oil from other sources? If so, who were these sources? Where were their contracts and what
were the terms of these contracts as to quantity, price and date of delivery?
The records disclose that during the course of the proceedings in the trial court, IVO filed an amended motion
22
for production and
inspection of the following documents: a.] contracts of resale of coconut oil that Safic bought from IVO; b.] the records of the pooling
and sales contracts covering the oil from such pooling, if the coconut oil has been pooled and sold as general oil; c.] the contracts of the
purchase of oil that, according to Safic, it had to resort to in order to fill up alleged undelivered commitments of IVO; d.] all other
contracts, confirmations, invoices, wash out agreements and other documents of sale related to (a), (b) and (c). This amended motion
was opposed by Safic.
23
The trial court, however, in its September 16, 1988 Order ,24 ruled that:
From the analysis of the parties' respective positions, conclusion can easily be drawn therefrom that there is materiality in the
defendant's move: firstly, plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the defendant and these are intimately related to plaintiffs
alleged losses which it attributes to the default of the defendant in its contractual commitments; secondly, the documents are
specified in the amended motion. As such, plaintiff would entertain no confusion as to what, which documents to locate and
produce considering plaintiff to be (without doubt) a reputable going concern in the management of the affairs which is
serviced by competent, industrious, hardworking and diligent personnel; thirdly, the desired production and inspection of the
documents was precipitated by the testimony of plaintiffs witness (Donald O'Meara) who admitted, in open court, that they are
available. If the said witness represented that the documents, as generally described, are available, reason there would be
none for the same witness to say later that they could not be produced, even after they have been clearly described.
Besides, if the Court may additionally dwell on the issue of damages, the production and inspection of the desired documents
would be of tremendous help in the ultimate resolution thereof. Plaintiff claims for the award of liquidated or actual damages to
the tune of US$391,593.62 which, certainly, is a huge amount in terms of pesos, and which defendant disputes. As the
defendant cannot be precluded in taking exceptions to the correctness and validity of such claim which plaintiffs witness
(Donald O'Meara) testified to, and as, by this nature of the plaintiffs claim for damages, proof thereof is a must which can be
better served, if not amply ascertained by examining the records of the related sales admitted to be in plaintiffs possession, the
amended motion for production and inspection of the defendant is in order.
The interest of justice will be served best, if there would be a full disclosure by the parties on both sides of all documents
related to the transactions in litigation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing ruling of the trial court, Safic did not produce the required documents, prompting the court a quo to
assume that if produced, the documents would have been adverse to Safic's cause. In its efforts to bolster its claim for damages it
purportedly sustained, Safic suggests a substitute mode of computing its damages by getting the average price it paid for certain
quantities of coconut oil that it allegedly bought in 1987 and deducting this from the average price of the 1986 contracts. But this mode
of computation if flawed .because: 1.] it is conjectural since it rests on average prices not on actual prices multiplied by the actual
volume of coconut oil per contract; and 2.] it is based on the unproven assumption that the 1987 contracts of purchase provided the
coconut oil needed to make up for the failed 1986 contracts. There is also no evidence that Safic had contracted to supply third parties
with coconut oil from the 1986 contracts and that Safic had to buy such oil from others to meet the requirement.
Along the same vein, it is worthy to note that the quantities of oil covered by its 1987 contracts with third parties do not match the
quantities of oil provided under the 1986 contracts. Had Safic produced the documents that the trial court required, a substantially
correct determination of its actual damages would have been possible. This, unfortunately, was not the case. Suffice it to state in this
regard that "[T]he power of the courts to grant damages and attorney's fees demands factual, legal and equitable justification; its basis
cannot be left to speculation and conjecture."
25

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno*, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.






































DIGEST
Safic Alcan vs Imperial Vegetable Oil

Business Organization – Corporation Law – Ultra Vires Acts of Corporate Officers
In 1985, Safic Alcan & Cie (SAC), a corporation, entered into an agreement with Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc. (IVO) whereby the
latter shall deliver tones of coconut oil to SAC. Both parties complied. IVO was represented by its president, Dominador Mont everde. In
1986, SAC again entered into an several agreements with IVO but this time it was agreed that IVO shall deli ver the coconut oil 8
months from the agreement or sometime in 1987. This time, IVO failed to deliver and SAC sued IVO.

IVO in its defense aver that Monteverde was acting beyond his power as president when he made the 1986 agreement with SAC; that
Monteverde is acting beyond his power because the 1986 contracts were speculative in nature and speculative contracts are
prohibited by the by-laws of IVO.

SAC insists that there is an implied agency between IVO and Monteverde because SAC and Monteverde has been transacting since
1985 and that IVO benefited from said transactions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monteverde‘s act in entering into the 1986 contracts is ultra vires.

HELD: Yes. It was proven by IVO, when they presented a copy of their by-laws, that Monteverde acted beyond his authority when he
entered into speculative contracts with SAC in 1986. The 1986 contracts are speculative because at the time of the contracts, the
coconuts are not even growing at that time and are yet to be harvested. Hence, the 1986 contracts are sales of mere expectations –
and this is something prohibited by the by-laws and the Board of Directors of IVO.

There can be no implied agency too simply because there has been a previous transaction between SAC and IVO where IVO was
represented by Monteverde. This is because the 1985 contract and the 1986 contracts are very different. The 1985 contract is not
speculative while the 1986 contracts are speculative hence, SAC should have secured the confirmation by IVO‘s Board that
Monteverde is indeed authorized to enter into such agreements.

Further, Monteverde did not even present the said 1986 agreements before the Board of Directors so there was, in fact, no occasion at
all for ratification. The contracts were not even reported in IVO‘s export sales book and turn-out book. Neither were they reflected in
other books and records of the corporation. It must be pointed out that the Board of Directors, not Monteverde, exercises corporate
power. Clearly, Monteverde‘s speculative contracts with Safic never bound IVO and Safic cannot therefore enforce those contracts
against IVO.



























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159489 February 4, 2008
FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY (now AYALA LIFE ASSURANCE, INC.), petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE N. PEDROSO, TERESITA O. PEDROSO and JENNIFER N. PALACIO thru her Attorney-in-Fact PONCIANO C.
MARQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision
1
and Resolution,
2
dated November 29, 2002 and August 5, 2003,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33568. The appellate court had affirmed the Decision
3
dated October 10, 1989
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 3, finding petitioner as defendant and the co-defendants below jointly and severally
liable to the plaintiffs, now herein respondents.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Teresita O. Pedroso is a policyholder of a 20-year endowment life insurance issued by petitioner Filipinas Life Assurance
Company (Filipinas Life). Pedroso claims Renato Valle was her insurance agent since 1972 and Valle collected her monthly premiums.
In the first week of January 1977, Valle told her that the Filipinas Life Escolta Office was holding a promotional investment program for
policyholders. It was offering 8% prepaid interest a month for certain amounts deposited on a monthly basis. Enticed, she ini tially
invested and issued a post-dated check dated January 7, 1977 for P10,000.
4
In return, Valle issued Pedroso his personal check
forP800 for the 8%
5
prepaid interest and a Filipinas Life "Agent‘s Receipt" No. 807838.
6

Subsequently, she called the Escolta office and talked to Francisco Alcantara, the administrative assistant, who referred her to the
branch manager, Angel Apetrior. Pedroso inquired about the promotional investment and Apetrior confirmed that there was such a
promotion. She was even told she could "push through with the check" she issued. From the records, the check, with the endorsement
of Alcantara at the back, was deposited in the account of Filipinas Life with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company (CBTC), Escolta
Branch.
Relying on the representations made by the petitioner‘s duly authorized representatives Apetrior and Alcantara, as well as having
known agent Valle for quite some time, Pedroso waited for the maturity of her initial investment. A month after, her investment
of P10,000 was returned to her after she made a written request for its refund. The formal written request, dated February 3, 1977, was
written on an inter-office memorandum form of Filipinas Life prepared by Alcantara.
7
To collect the amount, Pedroso personally went to
the Escolta branch where Alcantara gave her the P10,000 in cash. After a second investment, she made 7 to 8 more investments in
varying amounts, totaling P37,000 but at a lower rate of 5%
8
prepaid interest a month. Upon maturity of Pedroso‘s subsequent
investments, Valle would take back from Pedroso the corresponding yellow-colored agent‘s receipt he issued to the latter.
Pedroso told respondent Jennifer N. Palacio, also a Filipinas Life insurance policyholder, about the investment plan. Palacio made a
total investment of P49,550
9
but at only 5% prepaid interest. However, when Pedroso tried to withdraw her investment, Valle did not
want to return some P17,000 worth of it. Palacio also tried to withdraw hers, but Filipinas Life, despite demands, refused to return her
money. With the assistance of their lawyer, they went to Filipinas Life Escolta Office to collect their respective investments, and to
inquire why they had not seen Valle for quite some time. But their attempts were futile. Hence, respondents filed an action for the
recovery of a sum of money.
After trial, the RTC, Branch 3, Manila, held Filipinas Life and its co-defendants Valle, Apetrior and Alcantara jointly and solidarily liable
to the respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s ruling and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now comes before us raising a single issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING FLAC [FILIPINAS LIFE] TO BE JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH ITS CO-DEFENDANTS ON THE CLAIM OF RESPONDENTS INSTEAD OF HOLDING ITS
AGENT, RENATO VALLE, SOLELY LIABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS.
10

Simply put, did the Court of Appeals err in holding petitioner and its co-defendants jointly and severally liable to the herein
respondents?
Filipinas Life does not dispute that Valle was its agent, but claims that it was only a life insurance company and was not engaged in the
business of collecting investment money. It contends that the investment scheme offered to respondents by Valle, Apetrior and
Alcantara was outside the scope of their authority as agents of Filipinas Life such that, it cannot be held liable to the respondents.
11

On the other hand, respondents contend that Filipinas Life authorized Valle to solicit investments from them. In fact, Filipinas Life‘s
official documents and facilities were used in consummating the transactions. These transactions, according to respondents, were
confirmed by its officers Apetrior and Alcantara. Respondents assert they exercised all the diligence required of them in ascertaining
the authority of petitioner‘s agents; and it is Filipinas Life that failed in its duty to ensure that its agents act within the scope of their
authority.
Considering the issue raised in the light of the submissions of the parties, we find that the petition lacks merit. The Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error nor abused gravely its discretion in rendering the assailed decision and resolution.
It appears indisputable that respondents Pedroso and Palacio had invested P47,000 and P49,550, respectively. These were received
by Valle and remitted to Filipinas Life, using Filipinas Life‘s official receipts, whose authenticity were not disputed. Valle‘s authority to
solicit and receive investments was also established by the parties. When respondents sought confirmation, Alcantara, holding a
supervisory position, and Apetrior, the branch manager, confirmed that Valle had authority. While it is true that a person dealing with an
agent is put upon inquiry and must discover at his own peril the agent‘s authority, in this case, respondents did exercise due diligence in
removing all doubts and in confirming the validity of the representations made by Valle.
Filipinas Life, as the principal, is liable for obligations contracted by its agent Valle. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to
render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
12
The
general rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of its agent done within the scope of its authority, and should bear the
damage caused to third persons.
13
When the agent exceeds his authority, the agent becomes personally liable for the damage.
14
But
even when the agent exceeds his authority, the principal is still solidarily liable together with the agent if the principal allowed the agent
to act as though the agent had full powers.
15
In other words, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the
principal, unless the principal ratifies them, expressly or impliedly.
16
Ratification in agency is the adoption or confirmation by one person
of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority.
17

Filipinas Life cannot profess ignorance of Valle‘s acts. Even if Valle‘s representations were beyond his authority as a debit/insurance
agent, Filipinas Life thru Alcantara and Apetrior expressly and knowingly ratified Valle‘s acts. It cannot even be denied that Filipinas Life
benefited from the investments deposited by Valle in the account of Filipinas Life. In our considered view, Filipinas Life had clothed
Valle with apparent authority; hence, it is now estopped to deny said authority. Innocent third persons should not be prejudiced if the
principal failed to adopt the needed measures to prevent misrepresentation, much more so if the principal ratified his agent‘s acts
beyond the latter‘s authority. The act of the agent is considered that of the principal itself. Qui per alium facit per seipsum facere videtur.
"He who does a thing by an agent is considered as doing it himself."
18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution, dated November 29, 2002 and August 5, 2003,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33568 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice















Filipinas Life Assurance Co. (now Ayala Life Assurance, Inc.) v. Clemente Pedrosa, Teresita Pedrosa and Jennifer Palacio
G.R. No. 159489, February 04, 2008
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:
 Teresita Pedroso is a policyholder of a 20-year endowment life insurance issued by Filipinas Life Assurance Co. Pedroso claims
Renato Valle was her insurance agent since 1972 and Valle collected her monthly premiums. In the first week of January 1977, Valle
told her that the Filipinas Life Escolta Office was holding a promotional investment program for policyholders. It was offeri ng 8%
prepaid interest a month for certain amounts deposited on a monthly basis. Enticed, she initially invested and issued a post-dated
check for P10,000. In return, Valle issued Pedroso his personal check for P800 for the 8% prepaid interest and a Filipinas Life Agent
receipt.

 Pedroso called the Escolta office and talked to Francisco Alcantara, the administrative assistant, who referred her to the branch
manager, Angel Apetrior. Pedroso inquired about the promotional investment and Apetrior confirmed that there was such a
promotion. She was even told she could push through with the check she issued. From the records, the check, wi th the endorsement
of Alcantara at the back, was deposited in the account of Filipinas Life with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, Escolta
Branch.

 Relying on the representations made by Filipinas Life‘s duly authorized representatives Apetrior and Al cantara, as well as having
known agent Valle for quite some time, Pedroso waited for the maturity of her initial investment. A month after, her investment of
P10,000 was returned to her after she made a written request for its refund. To collect the amount, Pedroso personally went to the
Escolta branch where Alcantara gave her the P10,000 in cash. After a second investment, she made 7 to 8 more investments in
varying amounts, totaling P37,000 but at a lower rate of 5% prepaid interest a month. Upon maturity of Pedroso‘s subsequent
investments, Valle would take back from Pedroso the corresponding agent‘s receipt he issued to the latter.

 Pedroso told respondent Jennifer Palacio, also a Filipinas Life insurance policyholder, about the investment plan. Palacio made a
total investment of P49,550 but at only 5% prepaid interest. However, when Pedroso tried to withdraw her investment, Valle did not
want to return some P17,000 worth of it. Palacio also tried to withdraw hers, but Filipinas Life, despite demands, refused to return her
money.

ISSUE: WON Filipinas Life is jointly and severally liable with Apetrior and Alcantara on the claim of Pedroso and Palacio or WON its
agent Renato Valle is solely liable to Pedroso and Palacio

HELD:
 Pedroso and Palacio had invested P47,000 and P49,550, respectively. These were received by Valle and remitted to Filipinas Life,
using Filipinas Life‘s official receipts. Valle‘s authority to solicit and receive investments was also established by the parties. When
Pedroso and Palacio sought confirmation, Alcantara, holding a supervisory position, and Apetrior, the branch manager, confirmed
that Valle had authority. While it is true that a person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover at his own peril the
agent‘s authority, in this case, Pedroso and Palacio did exercise due diligence in removing all doubts and in confirming the validity of
the representations made by Valle.

 Filipinas Life, as the principal, is liable for obligations contracted by its agent Valle. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself
to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The
general rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of its agent done within the scope of its authority, and shoul d bear the
damage caused to third persons. When the agent exceeds his authority, the agent becomes personall y liable for the damage. But
even when the agent exceeds his authority, the principal is still solidarily liable together with the agent if the principal allowed the
agent to act as though the agent had full powers. The acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal,
unless the principal ratifies them, expressly or impliedly.

 Ratification – adoption or confirmation by one person of an act performed on his behalf by another without authority

 Even if Valle‘s representations were beyond his authority as a debit/insurance agent, Filipinas Life thru Alcantara and Apetrior
expressly and knowingly ratified Valle‘s acts. Filipinas Life benefited from the investments deposited by Valle in the account of
Filipinas Life.

















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18058 January 16, 1923
FABIOLA SEVERINO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GUILLERMO SEVERINO, defendant-appellant.
FELICITAS VILLANUEVA, intervenor-appellee.
Serafin P. Hilado and A. P. Seva for appellant.
Jose Ma. Arroyo, Jose Lopez Vito, and Fisher and DeWitt for appellees.
OSTRAND, J .:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff as the alleged natural daughter and sole heir of one Melecio Severino, deceased, to compel the
defendant Guillermo Severino to convey to her four parcels of land described in the complaint, or in default thereof to pay her the sum
of P800,000 in damages for wrongfully causing said land to be registered in his own name. Felicitas Villanueva, in her capaci ty as
administratrix of the estate of Melecio Severino, has filed a complaint in intervention claiming in the same relief as the original plaintiff,
except in so far as she prays that the conveyance be made, or damages paid, to the estate instead of to the plaintiff Fabiola Severino.
The defendant answered both complaints with a general denial.
The lower court rendered a judgment recognizing the plaintiff Fabiola Severino as the acknowledged natural child of the said Melecio
Severino and ordering the defendant to convey 428 hectares of the land in question to the intervenor as administratrix of the estate of
the said Melecio Severino, to deliver to her the proceeds in his possession of a certain mortgage placed thereon by him and to pay the
costs. From this judgment only the defendant appeals.
The land described in the complaint forms one continuous tract and consists of lots Nos. 827, 828, 834, and 874 of the cadaster of
Silay, Province of Occidental Negros, which measure, respectively, 61 hectares, 74 ares, and 79 centiares; 76 hectares, 34 ares, and
79 centiares; 52 hectares, 86 ares, and 60 centiares and 608 hectares, 77 ares and 28 centiares, or a total of 799 hectares, 75 ares,
and 46 centiares.
The evidence shows that Melecio Severino died on the 25th day of May, 1915; that some 428 hectares of the land were recorded in the
Mortgage Law Register in his name in the year 1901 by virtue of possessory information proceedings instituted on the 9th day of May of
that year by his brother Agapito Severino in his behalf; that during the lifetime of Melecio Severino the land was worked by the
defendant, Guillermo Severino, his brother, as administrator for and on behalf of the said Melecio Severino; that after Melecio's death,
the defendant Guillermo Severino continued to occupy the land; that in 1916 a parcel survey was made of the lands in the municipality
of Silay, including the land here in question, and cadastral proceedings were instituted for the registration of the lands ti tles within the
surveyed area; that in the cadastral proceedings the land here in question was described as four separate lots numbered as above
stated; that Roque Hofileña, as lawyer for Guillermo Severino, filed answers in behalf of the latter in said proceedings claiming the lots
mentioned as the property of his client; that no opposition was presented in the proceedings to the claims of Guillermo Severino and the
court therefore decreed the title in his favor, in pursuance of which decree certificates of title were issued to him in the month of March,
1917.
It may be further observed that at the time of the cadastral proceedings the plaintiff Fabiola Severino was a minor; that Gui llermo
Severino did not appear personally in the proceedings and did not there testify; that the only testimony in support of his claims was that
of his attorney Hofileña, who swore that he knew the land and that he also knew that Guillermo Severino inherited the land from his
father and that he, by himself, and through his predecessors in interest, had possessed the land for thirty years.
The appellant presents the following nine assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in admitting the evidence that was offered by plaintiff in order to establish the fact that said plaintiff was
the legally acknowledged natural child of the deceased Melecio Severino.
2. The trial court erred in finding that, under the evidence presented, plaintiff was the legally acknowledged natural child of
Melecio Severino.
3. The trial court erred in rejecting the evidence offered by defendant to establish the absence of fraud on his part in securing
title to the lands in Nacayao.
4. The trial court erred in concluding that the evidence adduced by plaintiff and intervenor established that defendant was
guilty of fraud in procuring title to the lands in question in his name.
5. The trial court erred in declaring that the land that was formerly placed in the name of Melecio Severino had an extent of
either 434 or 428 hectares at the time of his death.
6. The trial court erred in declaring that the value of the land in litigation is P500 per hectare.
7. The trial court erred in granting the petition of the plaintiff for an attachment without first giving the defendant an opportunity
to be heard.
8. The trial court erred in ordering the conveyance of 428 hectares of land by defendant to the administratrix.
9. The trial court erred in failing or refusing to make any finding as to the defendant's contention that the petition for attachment
was utterly devoid of any reasonable ground.
In regard to the first two assignments of error, we agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in making a declaration in the
present case as to the recognition of Fabiola Severino as the natural child of Melecio Severino. We have held in the case of Briz vs.
Briz and Remigio (43 Phil., 763), that "The legitimate heirs or kin of a deceased person who would be prejudiced by a declaration that
another person is entitled to recognition as the natural child of such decedent, are necessary and indispensable parties to any action in
which a judgment declaring the right to recognition is sought." In the present action only the widow, the alleged natural chi ld, and one of
the brothers of the deceased are parties; the other potential heirs have not been included. But, inasmuch as the judgment appealed
from is in favor of the intervenor and not of the plaintiff, except to the extent of holding that the latter is a recognized natural child of the
deceased, this question is, from the view we take of the case, of no importance in its final disposition. We may say, however, in this
connection, that the point urged in appellant's brief that it does not appear affirmatively from the evidence that, at the time of the
conception of Fabiola, her mother was a single woman, may be sufficiently disposed of by a reference to article 130 of the Civil Code
and subsection 1 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure which create the presumption that a child born out of wedlock is natural
rather than illegitimate. The question of the status of the plaintiff Fabiola Severino and her right to share in the inheritance may, upon
notice to all the interested parties, be determined in the probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
The fifth assignment of error relates to the finding of the trial court that the land belonging to Melecio Severino had an area of 428
hectares. The appellant contends that the court should have found that there were only 324 hectares inasmuch as one hundred
hectares of the original area were given to Melecio's brother Donato during the lifetime of the father Ramon Severino. As it appears that
Ramon Severino died in 1896 and that the possessory information proceedings, upon which the finding of the trial court as to the area
of the land is principally based, were not instituted until the year 1901, we are not disposed to disturb the conclusions of the trial court
on this point. Moreover, in the year 1913, the defendant Guillermo Severino testified under oath, in the case of Montelibano vs.
Severino, that the area of the land owned by Melecio Severino and of which he (Guillermo) was the administrator, embraced an area of
424 hectares. The fact that Melecio Severino, in declaring the land for taxation in 1906, stated that the area was only 324 hectares and
60 ares while entitled to some weight is not conclusive and is not sufficient to overcome the positive statement of the defendant and the
recitals in the record of the possessory information proceedings.
The sixth assignment of error is also of minor importance in view of the fact that in the dispositive part of the decision of the trial court,
the only relief given is an order requiring the appellant to convey to the administratrix the land in question, together with such parts of
the proceeds of the mortgage thereon as remain in his hands. We may say further that the court's estimate of the value of the land does
not appear unreasonable and that, upon the evidence before us, it will not be disturbed.
The seventh and within assignments of error relate to the ex parte granting by the trial court of a preliminary attachment in the case and
the refusal of the court to dissolve the same. We find no merit whatever in these assignments and a detailed discussion of them is
unnecessary.
The third, fourth, and eight assignments of error involve the vital points in the case, are inter-related and may be conveniently
considered together.
The defendant argues that the gist of the instant action is the alleged fraud on his part in causing the land in question to be registered in
his name; that the trial court therefore erred in rejecting his offer of evidence to the effect that the land was owned in common by all the
heirs of Ramon Severino and did not belong to Melecio Severino exclusively; that such evidence, if admitted, would have shown that he
did not act with fraudulent intent in taking title to the land; that the trial court erred in holding him estopped from denyi ng Melecio's title;
that more than a year having elapsed since the entry of the final decree adjudicating the land to the defendant, said decree cannot now
be reopened; that the ordering of the defendant to convey the decreed land to the administratrix is, for all practical purposes, equivalent
to the reopening of the decree of registration; that under section 38 of the Land Registration Act the defendant has an indefeasible title
to the land; and that the question of ownership of the land being thus judicially settled, the question as to the previous relations between
the parties cannot now be inquired into.
Upon no point can the defendant's contentions be sustained. It may first be observed that this is not an action under section 38 of the
Land Registration Act to reopen or set aside a decree; it is an action in personam against an agent to compel him to return, or
retransfer, to the heirs or the estate of its principal, the property committed to his custody as such agent, to execute the necessary
documents of conveyance to effect such retransfer or, in default thereof, to pay damages.
That the defendant came into the possession of the property here in question as the agent of the deceased Melecio Severino in the
administration of the property, cannot be successfully disputed. His testimony in the case of Montelibano vs. Severino (civil case No.
902 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros and which forms a part of the evidence in the present case) is, in fact,
conclusive in this respect. He there stated under oath that from the year 1902 up to the time the testimony was given, in the year 1913,
he had been continuously in charge and occupation of the land as the encargado or administrator of Melecio Severino; that he had
always known the land as the property of Melecio Severino; and that the possession of the latter had been peaceful, continuous, and
exclusive. In his answer filed in the same case, the same defendant, through his attorney, disclaimed all personal interest i n the land
and averred that it was wholly the property of his brother Melecio.
Neither is it disputed that the possession enjoyed by the defendant at the time of obtaining his decree was of the same character as
that held during the lifetime of his brother, except in so far as shortly before the trial of the cadastral case the defendant had secured
from his brothers and sisters a relinguishment in his favor of such rights as they might have in the land.
The relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and it is an elementary and very old rule that in regard to property forming the
subject-matter of the agency, he is estopped from acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that of the principal. His position is analogous
to that of a trustee and he cannot consistently, with the principles of good faith, be allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition
to that of his principal or cestui que trust. Upon this ground, and substantially in harmony with the principles of the Civil Law
(see sentence of the supreme court of Spain of May 1, 1900), the English Chancellors held that in general whatever a trustee does for
the advantage of the trust estate inures to the benefit of the cestui que trust. (Greenlaw vs. King, 5 Jur., 18; Ex parte Burnell, 7 Jur.,
116; Ex parte Hughes, 6 Ves., 617; Ex parte James, 8 Ves., 337; Oliver vs. Court, 8 Price, 127.) The same principle has been
consistently adhered to in so many American cases and is so well established that exhaustive citations of authorities are superfluous
and we shall therefore limit ourselves to quoting a few of the numerous judicial expressions upon the subject. The princi ple is well
stated in the case of Gilbert vs. Hewetson (79 Minn., 326):
A receiver, trustee, attorney, agent, or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons, is utterly
disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management. This rule is entirely
independent of the fact whether any fraud has intervened. No fraud in fact need be shown, and no excuse will be heard from
the trustee. It is to avoid the necessity of any such inquiry that the rule takes so general a form. The rule stands on the moral
obligation to refrain from placing one's self in positions which ordinarily excite conflicts between self-interest and integrity. It
seeks to remove the temptation that might arise out of such a relation to serve one's self-interest at the expense of one's
integrity and duty to another, by making it impossible to profit by yielding to temptation. It applies universally to all who come
within its principle.
In the case of Massie vs. Watts (6 Cranch, 148), the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, said:
But Massie, the agent of Oneale, has entered and surveyed a portion of that land for himself and obtained a patent for it in his
own name. According to the clearest and best established principles of equity, the agent who so acts becomes a trustee for his
principal. He cannot hold the land under an entry for himself otherwise than as trustee for his principal.
In the case of Felix vs. Patrick (145 U. S., 317), the United States Supreme Court, after examining the authorities, said:
The substance of these authorities is that, wherever a person obtains the legal title to land by any artifice or concealment, or
by making use of facilities intended for the benefit of another, a court of equity will impress upon the land so held by him a trust
in favor of the party who is justly entitled to them, and will order the trust executed by decreeing their conveyance to the party
in whose favor the trust was created. (Citing Bank of Metropolis vs. Guttschlick, 14 Pet., 19, 31; Moses vs. Murgatroyd, 1
Johns. Ch., 119; Cumberland vs.Codrington, 3 Johns. Ch., 229, 261; Neilson vs. Blight, 1 Johns. Cas., 205;
Weston vs. Barker, 12 Johns., 276.)
The same doctrine has also been adopted in the Philippines. In the case of Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan Ling (19 Phil., 202), the facts are
stated by the court as follows:
From the facts proven at the trial it appears that a number of Chinese merchants raised a fund by voluntary subscription with
which they purchased a valuable tract of land and erected a large building to be used as a sort of club house for the mutual
benefit of the subscribers to the fund. The subscribers organized themselves into an irregular association, which had no
regular articles of association, and was not incorporated or registered in the commercial registry or elsewhere. The association
not having any existence as a legal entity, it was agreed to have the title to the property placed in the name of one of the
members, the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, who on his part accepted the trust, and agreed to hold the property as the agent of the
members of the association. After the club building was completed with the funds of the members of the association, Cho Jan
Ling collected some P25,000 in rents for which he failed and refused to account, and upon proceedings being instituted to
compel him to do so, he set up title in himself to the club property as well as to the rents accruing therefrom, falsely alleging
that he had bought the real estate and constructed the building with his own funds, and denying the claims of the members of
the association that it was their funds which had been used for that purpose.
The decree of the court provided, among other things, for the conveyance of the club house and the land on which it stood from the
defendant, Cho Jan Ling, in whose name it was registered, to the members of the association. In affirming the decree, this court said:
In the case at bar the legal title of the holder of the registered title is not questioned; it is admitted that the members of the
association voluntarily obtained the inscription in the name of Cho Jan Ling, and that they had no right to have that inscription
cancelled; they do not seek such cancellation, and on the contrary they allege and prove that the duly registered legal title to
the property is in Cho Jan Ling, but they maintain, and we think that they rightly maintain, that he holds it under an obligation,
both express and implied, to deal with it exclusively for the benefit of the members of the association, and subject to their will.
In the case of Camacho vs. Municipality of Baliuag (28 Phil., 466), the plaintiff, Camacho, took title to the land in his own name, while
acting as agent for the municipality. The court said:
There have been a number of cases before this court in which a title to real property was acquired by a person in his own
name, while acting under a fiduciary capacity, and who afterwards sought to take advantage of the confidence reposed in him
by claiming the ownership of the property for himself. This court has invariably held such evidence competent as between the
fiduciary and the cestui que trust.
x x x x x x x x x
What judgment ought to be entered in this case? The court below simply absolved the defendant from the complaint. The
defendant municipality does not ask for a cancellation of the deed. On the contrary, the deed is relied upon the supplement the
oral evidence showing that the title to the land is in the defendant. As we have indicated in Consunji vs. Tison, 15 Phil., 81,
and Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan Ling, 19 Phil., 202, the proper procedure in such a case, so long as the rights of innocent third
persons have not intervened, is to compel a conveyance to the rightful owner. This ought and can be done under the issues
raised and the proof presented in the case at bar.
The case of Sy-Juco and Viardo vs. Sy-Juco (40 Phil., 634) is also in point.
As will be seen from the authorities quoted, and agent is not only estopped from denying his principal's title to the property, but he is
also disable from acquiring interests therein adverse to those of his principal during the term of the agency. But the defendant argues
that his title has become res adjudicata through the decree of registration and cannot now be disturbed.
This contention may, at first sight, appear to possess some force, but on closer examination it proves untenable. The decree of
registration determined the legal title to the land as the date of the decree; as to that there is no question. That, under section 38 of the
Land Registration Act, this decree became conclusive after one year from the date of the entry is not disputed and no one attempts to
disturb the decree or the proceedings upon which it is based; the plaintiff in intervention merely contends that in equity the legal title so
acquired inured to the benefit of the estate of Melecio Severino, the defendant's principal and cestui que trust and asks that this
superior equitable right be made effective by compelling the defendant, as the holder of the legal title, to transfer it to the estate.
We have already shown that before the issuance of the decree of registration it was the undoubted duty of the defendant to restore the
property committed to his custody to his principal, or to the latter's estate, and that the principal had a right of action in personam to
enforce the performance of this duty and to compel the defendant to execute the necessary conveyance to that effect. The only
question remaining for consideration is, therefore, whether the decree of registration extinguishing this personal right of action.
In Australia and New Zealand, under statutes in this respect similar to ours, courts of equity exercise general jurisdiction in matters of
fraud and error with reference to Torrens registered lands, and giving attention to the special provisions of the Torrens acts, will issue
such orders and direction to all the parties to the proceedings as may seem just and proper under the circumstances. They may order
parties to make deeds of conveyance and if the order is disobeyed, they may cause proper conveyances to be made by a Master i n
Chancery or Commissioner in accordance with the practice in equity (Hogg, Australian Torrens System, p. 847).
In the Untied States courts have even gone so far in the exercise of their equity jurisdiction as to set aside final decrees after the
expiration of the statutory period of limitation for the reopening of such decrees (Baart vs. Martin, 99 Minn., 197). But, considering that
equity follows the law and that our statutes expressly prohibit the reopening of a decree after one year from the date of its entry, this
practice would probably be out of question here, especially so as the ends of justice may be attained by other equally effective, and less
objectionable means.
Turning to our own Land Registration Act, we find no indication there of an intention to cut off, through the issuance of a decree of
registration, equitable rights or remedies such as those here in question. On the contrary, section 70 of the Act provides:
Registered lands and ownership therein, shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens and incidents attached by law to
unregistered land. Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way be construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof
from any rights incident to the relation of husband and wife, or from liability to attachment on mesne process or levy on
execution, or from liability to any lien of any description established by law on land and the buildings thereon, or the interest of
the owner in such land or buildings, or to change the laws of descent, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint
tenants and other cotenants, or the right to take the same by eminent domain, or to relieve such land from liability to be
appropriated in any lawful manner for the payment of debts, or to change or affect in any other way any other rights or
liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in the
amendments hereof.
Section 102 of the Act, after providing for actions for damages in which the Insular Treasurer, as the Custodian of the Assurance Fund
is a party, contains the following proviso:
Provided, however, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any action which he may have against
any person for such loss or damage or deprivation of land or of any estate or interest therein without joining the Treasurer of
the Philippine Archipelago as a defendant therein.
That an action such as the present one is covered by this proviso can hardly admit of doubt. Such was also the view taken by this court
in the case of Medina Ong-Quingco vs. Imaz and Warner, Barnes & Co. (27 Phil., 314), in which the plaintiff was seeking to take
advantage of his possession of a certificate of title to deprive the defendant of land included in that certificate and sold to him by the
former owner before the land was registered. The court decided adversely to plaintiff and in so doing said:
As between them no question as to the indefeasibility of a Torrens title could arise. Such an action could have been
maintained at any time while the property remained in the hands of the purchaser. The peculiar force of a Torrens title would
have been brought into play only when the purchaser had sold to an innocent third person for value the lands described in his
conveyance. . . . Generally speaking, as between the vendor and the purchaser the same rights and remedies exist with
reference to land registered under Act No. 496, as exist in relation to land not so registered.
In Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna and Obiñana (40 Phil., 620), it was held that, while a purchaser of land under a pacto de
retro cannot institute a real action for the recovery thereof where the vendor under said sale has caused such lands to be registered in
his name without said vendee's consent, yet he may have his personal action based on the contract of sale to compel the execution of
an unconditional deed for the said lands when the period for repurchase has passed.
Torrens titles being on judicial decrees there is, of course, a strong presumption in favor of their regularity or validity, and in order to
maintain an action such as the present the proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties and of the breach of trust must be clear and
convincing. Such proof is, as we have seen, not lacking in this case.
But once the relation and the breach of trust on the part of the fiduciary in thus established, there is no reason, neither practical nor
legal, why he should not be compelled to make such reparation as may lie within his power for the injury caused by his wrong, and as
long as the land stands registered in the name of the party who is guilty of the breach of trust and no rights of innocent third parties are
adversely affected, there can be no reason why such reparation should not, in the proper case, take the form of a conveyance or
transfer of the title to the cestui que trust. No reasons of public policy demand that a person guilty of fraud or breach of trust be
permitted to use his certificate of title as a shield against the consequences of his own wrong.
The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law. In order to prevent unnecessary delay and further litigation it
may, however, be well to attach some additional directions to its dipositive clauses. It will be observed that lots Nos. 827, 828, and 834
of a total area of approximately 191 hectares, lie wholly within the area to be conveyed to the plaintiff in intervention and these lots may,
therefore, be so conveyed without subdivision. The remaining 237 hectares to be conveyed lie within the western part of lot No. 874
and before a conveyance of this portion can be effected a subdivision of that lot must be made and a technical description of the portion
to be conveyed, as well as of the remaining portion of the lot, must be prepared. The subdivision shall be made by an authori zed
surveyor and in accordance with the provisions of Circular No. 31 of the General Land Registration Office, and the subdivision and
technical descriptions shall be submitted to the Chief of that office for his approval. Within thirty days after being notifi ed of the approval
of said subdivision and technical descriptions, the defendant Guillermo Severino shall execute good and sufficient deed or deeds of
conveyance in favor of the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Melecio Severino for said lots Nos. 827, 828, 834, and the 237
hectares segregated from the western part of lot No. 874 and shall deliver to the register of deeds his duplicate certificates of title for all
of the four lots in order that said certificates may be cancelled and new certificates issued. The cost of the subdivision and the fees of
the register of deeds will be paid by the plaintiff in intervention. It is so ordered
With these additional directions the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. The right of the plaintiff
Fabiola Severino to establish in the probate proceedings of the estate of Melecio Severino her status as his recognized natural child i s
reserved.
Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.






Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2411 June 28, 1951
DAVID (DAVE) THOMAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HERMOGENES S. PINEDA, defendant-appellant.
Matias E. Vergara and Perkins, Ponce Enrile, Contreras and Gomez for plaintiff-appellant.
Laurel, Sabido, Almario and Laurel for defendant-appellant.
TUASON, J .:
For a first cause of action the plaintiff sought to compel an accounting of the defendant's operation of a saloon and restaurant of which
the plaintiff claims to have been the sole owner. For a second cause of action the court was asked to enjoin the defendant from using
the name of that business, Silver Dollar Cafe. The court below found for the defendant on the suit for accounting and for the plaintiff on
the suit for injunction.
On the first cause of action it is alleged that the defendant managed the business as plaintiff's employee or trustee during the Japanese
occupation of the City of Manila and on a share of the profits basis after liberation. Grounded on different relationships between the
parties before and after the occupation, this cause of action evolves two different acts of evidence, which it may be well to take up
separately for the sake of clarity. We will set out the material facts in so far as they are uncontroverted, leaving for later discussion
those about which the parties are in disagreement.
It appears that in 1931, the plaintiff bought the bar and restaurant known as Silver Dollar Cafe located at Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila,
from one Dell Clark, paying P20,000 for its physical assets and good will. Thereafter he employed the defendant, Clark's former
employee, as a bartender with a salary of P60. In the course of time, the defendant became successively cashier and manager of the
business. The outbreak of war found him holding the latter position with a monthly compensation of P250.
To prevent the business and its property from falling into enemy hands, the plaintiff being a citizen of the United States, David Thomas
on or about December 28, 1941, made a fictitious sale thereof to the defendant; and to clothe the sale with a semblance of reality, the
bill of sale was antedated November 29, 1941.
Though this document was said to have been destroyed and no copy thereof was available, the fictitiousness and lack of consideration
of the conveyance was expressly admitted in the answer. Besides this admission, it is agreed that simultaneously with or soon after the
execution of the simulated sale, the plaintiff and the defendant signed a private or secret document, identified as Exhibit "F", which was
kept by the plaintiff. Because of its important bearing on the case, it is convenient to copy this instrument in full.
PRIVATE AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT:
On November 29, 1941, a document which purported to be a deed of sale of the bar and restaurant business known as the
SILVER DOLLAR CAFE entered into by and between David (Dave) Thomas and Hermogenes Pineda and acknowledged
before Julian Lim, a notary public for and in the City of Manila and entered in his notarial register as Document No. 127, Page
No. 27, Book I and Series of 1941, witnessed by the Misses Florence Thomas and Esther Thomas.
The said document was prepared and executed only for the purpose of avoiding the seizure of the said establishment if and
when the enemy forces entered the City of Manila.
Upon the restoration of peace and order and the absence of the danger abovementioned, the said document automatically
becomes null and void and of no effect, the consideration of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000), Philippine Currency, mentioned
therein, being fictitious and not paid to the Vendor.
In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 29th day of November, 1941.
(Sgd.) DAVID THOMAS
Vendor
(Sgd.) H. PINEDA
Vendee
In the presence of:
(Sgd.) ESTHER THOMAS (Sgd.) FLORENCE THOMAS
Thomas was interred at Santo Tomas during the greater part of the war, and his business was operated by the defendant exclusi vely
throughout that period in accordance with the aforequoted stipulation. On February 3, 1945, the building was destroyed by fire but the
defendant had been able to remove some of its furniture, the cash register, the piano, the safe, and a considerable quantity of stocks to
a place of safety. According to the defendant, all of these goods were accounted for and turned over to the plaintiff after the City of
Manila had been retaken by the American Forces.
On May 8, 1945, a bar was opened on Calle Bambang, district of Sta. Cruz, under the old name of Silver Dollar Cafe. Housed in a
makeshift structure, which was erected on a lot belonging to the defendant, the Bambang shop was conducted for about four months,
i.e., until September of the same year, when it was transferred to the original location of the Silver Dollar Cafe at No. 15 Plaza Sta.
Cruz.
It is asserted and denied that the plaintiff as well as the defendant took a more or less active part in the management of the post-
liberation business until about the middle of September of the following year, when, it is also alleged, the plaintiff brought a certified
public accountant to the establishment in Sta. Cruz for the purpose of examining the books of the business and the defendant
threatened the plaintiff and his companion with a gun if they persisted in their purpose. As a result of that incident, the plaintiff forthwith
filed the present action, and set up a separate business under the same trade-name, Silver Dollar Cafe, on Echague Street. The
defendant remained with the Silver Dollar Cafe at Plaza Sta. Cruz, which was burn down on December 15, 1946. In the face of Exhibit
"F" before transcribed, there is no denying that throughout the Japanese military regime the Silver Dollar Cafe belonged excl usively to
the plaintiff and that the defendant had charge of it merely as plaintiff's employee, trustee, or manager. There is no pretense that the
defendant invested in the business within that period any capital of his own in the form of cash or merchandise.
The controversy lies in nature and scope of the defendant's obligation toward the plaintiff in relation to the business. It will be noticed
that Exhibit "F" is silent on this point. The defendant endeavored to prove that there was a third, verbal, agreement, the import of which
was that he was to operate the business with no liability other than to turn it over to the plaintiff as the plaintiff would find it after the war.
Little or no weight can be attached to this assertion if by it the defendant means, as he apparently does, that he was relieved of any
duty to make an accounting. Such understanding as the defendant says existed would be at war with the care and precaution whi ch the
plaintiff took to insure his rights in the business and its assets, which had an inventory value of P60,000, according to the plaintiff. As
the property consisted mostly of perishable and expendable goods to be constantly disposed of and replenished as long as the
business lasted, the plaintiff could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have agreed to be content with what the defendant would
deign to give him when normalcy was restored. For that was what the defendant's version of the alleged verbal agreement would
amount to and what the court below found. As sole manager with full power to do as his fancies dictated, the defendant could strip the
business naked of all its stocks, leaving the plaintiff holding the bag, as it were, when the defendant's management was terminated.
Unless Thomas was willing to give away his property and its profits, no man in his right senses would have given his manager an
outright license such as the defendant claims to have gotten from his employer. Not only did the plaintiff see to the execution of a
counter agreement but he stated that his elder daughter "had it (Exhibit "F") kept in her possession;" that "there were many efforts by
Mr. Pineda to get hold of this document during the first two weeks of the Japanese occupation," and he was "surprised;" that he "did not
know what was in the future" and he "wanted my children to have something more than an empty possession." Referring to the
defendant's attempts to take Exhibit "F" away from him, Thomas said that the defendant sent to the hospital where he (plainti ff) was
confined, defendant's friend, an attorney by the name of Swartzcoff of whom he had heard "things", "to recover that document", and he,
plaintiff, became more determined not to part with it; that as Swartzcoff kept on coming, he gave the document to his children to keep
up to the end of the war. This testimony has all the stamps of veracity and vehemence and refutes the defendant's allegation. The
conclusion thus seems clear that the defendant owes the plaintiff an accounting of his management of the plaintiff's business during the
occupation. The exact legal character of the defendant's relation to the plaintiff matters not a bit. It was enough to show, and it had
been shown, that he had been entrusted with the possession and management of the plaintiff's business and property for the owner's
benefit and had not made an accounting.
Neither did the defendant's sweeping statement at the trial — that all the proceeds from the business had been used to support the
plaintiff and his daughters an to entertain or bribe Japanese officers and civilians — dispense with defendant's duty to account. It was a
clear error for the court below to declare at this stage of the proceeding, on the basis of defendant's incomplete and indefinite evidence,
that there were no surplus profits, and to call matters even. Under the pleadings and the evidence the court's inquiry ought to have
been confined to the determination of the plaintiff's right to secure an accounting; and that right having been established, the
appropriate judgment should have been a preliminary or interlocutory one — that the defendant do account. The court was not called
upon to decide, and should not have decided, anything beyond that.
Monies and foodstuffs which the defendant said he had supplied the plaintiff and his daughters during the war are appropri ate items to
be considered on taking account. Receipts and expenses involving thousands of pesos, covering a great length of time, and consisting
of complicated items are, on their face, so complex and in as to necessitate being threshed out in an appropri ations by the defendants
substantiated. By the defendant's admission, the business made good profits during the war, and there are charges that he amassed a
fortune out of the trusteeship. True or false, those allegations and many others which it was the plaintiff's right to prove, if he could,
should not have been dismissed summarily. Not technicalities but substantial rights, equity, and justice clearly demanded adherence to
the normal course of practice and procedure. The employment of auditors might be necessary.
The defendant denied that the plaintiff had any proprietary interest in the saloon in Bambang and at Plaza Sta. Cruz after li beration.
Thomas' evidence on this phase of the litigation is to the effect that, upon his release from the internment camp, he immediately took
steps to rehabilitate his business. He declared that he borrowed P2.000 from a friend by the name of Bill Drummond, and with that
amount he constructed a temporary building in Bambang and with the stocks saved by the defendant opened the business there. He
said that, as before, the defendant now worked as manager, with the difference that under the new arrangement he was to get one-half
the net profits.
The defendant, on the other hand, undertook to show that he himself put up the Bambang business, furnishing the construction
materials, paying for the labor, and purchasing the needed merchandise. And when the business was to be moved to Plaza Sta. Cruz,
he said, he called on Mrs. Angela Butte, was able to rent the Plaza Sta. Cruz premises from her for Pl,200, and told the lessor when he
handed her the rent, "This is my money." He went on to say that Thomas told him to do whatever he pleased with the premises, only
requesting him to negotiate the sale of or a loan on plaintiff's mining shares so that the plaintiff could join him as partner or "buy him
out" by December. But, according to the defendant, the plaintiff was not able to raise funds, so his desire to acquire interest in or buy
the business did not materialize. The plaintiff did not invest a centavo in the new business because he had no money to invest, the
defendant concluded. Leaving aside the evidence which depends entirely on the credibility of the Witnesses, the following undisputed
or well-established circumstances are, in our judgment, decisive:
1. The defendant corroborated the plaintiff when he practically declared that upon the plaintiff's release from the internment camp,
Thomas lost no time in looking a site to open a saloon. That the plaintiff then had the means to do that, was a fact brought out by the
defendant's own evidence as well as by the plaintiff's testimony. There were several cases of whiskey, rum, gin and other kinds of liquor
which the defendant admitted he had carted away and delivered to the plaintiff after liberation. What the latter did or could have done
with those goods, if not to start a business with, there was no plausible explanation. Granting that ten cases of the liquor were
confiscated by the MP — the plaintiff said they were soon returned — the confiscation could not have stopped the plaintiff from
continuing with the business, which was riding in the crest of a boom. Significantly, the defendant said that the day followi ng the alleged
confiscation he handed the plaintiff P2,000 in cash. If he had nothing else, this was an amount which ought to have been enough to
enable the plaintiff to keep the business going, which needed no large capital. That this payment was "in full and complete l iquidation of
the Silver Dollar Cafe," as the defendant asserted, was, under the circumstances, highly improbable, to put it mildly.
2. It is also an admitted fact that the bar in Bambang was called Silver Dollar Cafe, Branch No. 1. The use of the old name suggested
that the business was in fact an extension and continuation of the Silver Dollar Cafe which the defendant had operated for the plaintiff
during the enemy occupation, and precluded any thought of the business having been established by the defendants as his own. It
should be remembered that the defendant had not yet appropriated the trade-name Silver Dollar Cafe for himself. This — the subject of
the second cause of action — he did on September 27, 1945.
3. Despite statements to the contrary, it was the plaintiff who, in September, 1945, before the reopening of the bar at Plaza Sta. Cruz,
entered into a written contract of lease (Exhibit A) with Mrs. Angela Butte for the Sta. Cruz location; Thomas was named in the contract
as the lessee. The contract also reveals that it was the plaintiff who personally paid Mrs. Butte the advanced rent (P1,200) for the
period August 31-September 30, 1945, the first month of the lease. And thereafter, all the rental receipts were made out in Thomas'
name, except those for the months of October, November and December, which were put in the name of the defendant. A propose of
this temporary substitution, Jose V. Ramirez, owner of the land and administrator of the building, testified that the Bureau of Internal
Revenue had licensed and taxed the business in the name of Hermogenes Pineda and so thought it necessary that for those three
months the defendant's name should be put in the receipts. Ramirez added that Mrs. Butte agreed to the Internal Revenue Bureau's
requirement on the assurance that beginning January, 1946, the receipts would be issued again in favor of Thomas. Mrs. Butte testified
to the same effect.
At any rate, the issuance of three of the receipts in defendant's name was far from implying that he was the proprietor or part owner of
the Silver Dollar Cafe. Appropriately, as manager he could make disbursement and get receipts therefor in his name. What would have
been strange was the issuance of receipts, let alone the execution of the lease contract, in the name of David Thomas if Thomas had
nothing to do with the business, as the defendant would have the court believe.
The defendant testified, and the lower court believed, that he consented to the issuance of the three receipts and the execution of the
contract of lease in the plaintiff's name because it was expected that the plaintiff would buy the business or "chip in" as partner. How the
mere possibility, by no means certain, of the plaintiff becoming the owner of the saloon or defendant's partner on some future date
could have induced the defendant to let the plaintiff figure unqualifiedly as owner of the business in receipts and leases that had nothing
to do with the contemplated deal, and why the plaintiff would want to pose as owner while he was yet a complete stranger to the
enterprise, is utterly beyond comprehension.
For the rest, the plaintiff's testimony is as convincing and as well supported by the natural course of things as the defendant's
explanation is unreasonable. It can not be disputed that Thomas had accumulated money from the business in Bambang which, it has
also been proved to the point of certainty, he operated with the goods retrieved by the defendant from the pre-war Silver Dollar Cafe.
Conducting saloons having been the plaintiffs only means of support before the war, and the calling in which he had acquired plenty of
experience, it is inconceivable that he would have remained idle at a time when the trade was most lucrative and he had been
impoverished by the war. That the plaintiff, established a bar behind the Great Eastern Hotel on Echague Street, a hidden place,
immediately or very soon after he and the defendant had a falling out, is mute testimony to his eagerness to take advantage of the
current boom.
4. That the defendant was only a manager is also made evident by two sets of business cards of the Silver Dollar Cafe which he himself
caused to be printed. On the first set, of which 500 prints were made, David Thomas was held out as the proprietor and Hermogenes
Pineda, the defendant, as manager. On the second set, which were ordered later, the defendant was not even mentioned as manager,
but one Bill Magner, while David Thomas' name was retained as the proprietor.
Customers of the place testified that copies of these cards were handed to them for distribution to their friends by the defendant himself.
The defendant swore that he put away the cards in a small drawer under some books and denied they had been distributed. He gave to
understand that he was at a loss to know how the plaintiff and his witnesses got hold of some of said cards, though, he said, he
suspected that Thomas went upstairs and grabbed some copies while the witnesses found other copies scattered after the fire which
burned the establishment for the second time in 1946.
However the case may be, whether the defendant distributed the cards or not, the important point is why he, in the first place, ordered
the cards in the form in which they were printed. He did not give cogent reasons. His explanation was that Hugo Santiago, the printer's
agent, "gave me a hint that Mr. Thomas was going to open the Silver Dollar Cafe in Plaza Sta. Cruz." This explanation fails to forge any
sensible link between the printing of Thomas' name in the cards and Thomas' plan to join him in the business. Incidentally, the
defendant did not tell the truth when he declared that the cards were ordered when the shop was still in Bambang; the cards gave the
location of the Silver Dollar Cafe as No. 15 Plaza Sta. Cruz, and, besides, Santiago, who testified for both sides, was positive that the
cards were delivered to the defendant in September, 1945.
5. At different times from May 8 to December 15, 1945, the defendant handed the plaintiff averse amounts totalling P24,100 wi thout so
much as asking Thomas to sign a receipts for any of them.
The defendant testified that these amounts were simple loans secured by plaintiff's mining shares of stock. The plaintiff countered that
they were advances chargeable to his share of the net profits. While he admitted that he owned some Baguio Consolidated and Baguio
Gold shares, he denied that he had given them to the defendant as collateral or in any other concept. He swore that he kept those
securities in his own safe and removed them in plain sight of Pineda when he became suspicious of the latter.
It is difficult to understand how the payment of the amounts in question to the plaintiff could have been for any purpose other than that
affirmed by him. The lack of any receipt is incompatible with the hypothesis of loans. The defendant's possession of the plai ntiff's
mining shares, granting that the defendant held them, was no reason for dispensing with the necessity of getting from the plainti ff some
form of acknowledgment that the said amounts were personal debts, if that was the case. Without such acknowledgment, which could
have been made in a matter of minutes and required no expert to make, the shares of stock did not afford the creditor much if any
protection, as an experienced and intelligent man that the defendant is must have realized.
These amounts were the subject of a counterclaim and the court sustained the defendant's theory and gave him judgment for them. In
the light of the what has just been said and of the evidence previously discussed, there is no escaping the conclusion that the plaintiff
was the sole owner of the post-war Silver Dollar bar and restaurant, that the defendant was only an industrial partner, and that the said
amounts were withdrawals on account of the profits, which appear from portions of the defendant's entries in the books to have been
considerable.
On the second cause of action, which relates to the ownership of the Silver Dollar Cafe trade-name, it appears that the defendant on
September 27, 1945, registered the business and its name as his own.
The defendant contends that in 1940, the plaintiff's right to use this trade-name expired and by abandonment or non-use the plaintiff
ceased to have any title thereto. The alleged abandonment or non-use is predicated on the testimony that the plaintiff expressly allowed
the defendant to appropriate the trade-name in dispute.
The parties' actions negative all motions of abandonment by the plaintiff. In the fictitious bill of sale executed on December 29, 1941,
the plaintiff asserted and the defendant acknowledged Thomas' ownership of the business. It is manifest from Exhibit "C" and "D,
samples of the business cards which were printed at the instance of the defendant himself, that the plaintiff continued to di splay the
name Silver Dollar Cafe after liberation. And when the plaintiff set up a new saloon on Echague Street after he broke with the
defendant, he gave the establishment the same appellation — Silver Dollar Cafe.
The most that can be said in favor of the defendant, which is the view taken by the trial Judge, is that the plaintiff instructed Pineda to
renew the registration of the trade-name and the defendant understood the instruction as permission to make the registration in his
favor. It is to be doubted to whether even honest mistakes were possible under the circumstance of the case. It is an understatement to
say that indications pointed to bad faith in the registration. The application for registration contained brazen untruths.
The plaintiff non-use of his trade name in 1945, granting that to have been the case, did not work as a forfeiture of his exclusive right to
the name, name which he and the man from whom he bought the business had used for over forty years without interruption. Under the
provision of Commerce Administrative Order No. 1, issued on January 11, 1946, by the Secretary of Commerce and Agriculture, the
rights registrant of business names, the records of which had been destroyed or lost during the war, were expressly protected. This
administrative Order No. 1-1, dated October 29, 1946, but the amendment referred only to the procedure for authentication of the
documents to be submitted. On the other hand, the amendatory order extended the filing of application for reconstitution up to as late
as December 31, 1946, that is ninety days after plaintiff commenced the present action.
As legal proposition and in good conscience, the defendants registration of the trade name Silver Dollar Cafe must be deemed to have
been affected for the benefit of its owner of whom he was a mere trustee or employee. "The relations of an agent to his principal are
fiduciary and it is an elementary and very old rule that in regard to property forming the subject matter of the agency, he i s estopped
from acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that of principal. His position is analogous to that of a trustee and he cannot consistently,
with the principles of good faith, be allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his principal or cestui que trust. A
receiver, trustee, attorney, agent or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons utterly disabled from
acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management. This rule is entirely independent of the fact
whether any fraud has intervened. No fraud in fact need be shown, and no excuse will be heard from any such inquiry that the rule
takes so general form. The rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing one's self in position which ordinaril y excite
conflicts between self-interest at the expense of one's integrity and duty to another, by making it possible to profit by yielding to
temptation". (Barretovs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343.)
To recapitulate, we find from what we believed is conclusive evidence, both direct and circumstance, that the plaintiff was the owner of
the Silver Dollar Cafe at Plaza Sta. Cruz during the enemy occupation and is of right entitled to have an accounting of its administration
by the defendant. Exhibit "F" does not state the remuneration the defendant was to be paid for managing the plaintiff's business. The
natural presumption under normal circumstances would be that his prewar compensation was to continue. But conditions during the
occupation being different from what they were before the war, the defendants remuneration may and should be increased if so
warranted by the changed circumstances. This matter should be left for consideration in the accounting, having in mind the nature and
extent of the services rendered, the volumes of business transacted, the profits obtained and the losses incurred, the personal risk run
by the defendant, and other factors related to the success or failure of the defendant's management.
We have it from the plaintiff that he promised to give the defendant one-half of the net profits of the business established in Bambang
and later at Plaza Sta. Cruz after liberation. This offer was reasonable, even liberal, and no unforeseen circumstances having
supervened to warrants its alteration, the same will not be disturbed and will serve as basis of liquidation. The other basis of liquidation
of the post-war business are that the plaintiff was the exclusive owner of its stocks and other assets from May 8, 1945, when it was
reestablished in Bambang, to December 15 1946, when the business was levelled to the ground at Plaza Sta. Cruz.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the various sums of money aggregating P24,100 and received or taken by the plaintiff were, and
they hereby are declared to be, accounting from the defendants share of said profits if there be any.
We also find that the trade-name Silver Dollar Cafe belongs to the plaintiff and that the defendant should be and he is perpetually
enjoined from using it or any essential part thereof.
In all other respects, especially in connection with the demand for accounting, this case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law and the tenor of this decision and for a final judgment on the balance that may be found due from
either party.
The defendant will pay the costs of this appeal.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49219 December 11, 1946
PABLO D. PALMA, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO REYES CRISTOBAL, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco and Guillermo B. Guevara for petitioner.
Antonio Gonzales for respondent.

PERFECTO, J .:
A parcel of a land located in Quesada Street, Tondo, Manila, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 31073 of the Register of Deeds
of Manila, issued in favor of petitioner Pablo D. Palma, is the subject of contention between the parties.
Petitioner sought, at first, to eject respondent Eduardo Cristobal Reyes from the land in question in a complaint filed with the Municipal
Court of Manila. As respondent raised the question of ownership, the complaint was dismissed, and petitioner filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila the complaint which initiated this case, petitioner praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that
respondent be ordered to restore its possession and to remove his house therefrom.
The complaint was dismissed and petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, where he again failed, the appealed judgment
having been affirmed by a decision penned by Mr. Justice Padilla, concurred in by Mr. Justice Jose G. Generoso and Mr. Justice Pedro
Tuason.
The case is now before us on appeal by certiorari.
In 1909, after registration proceedings under the provisions of Act No. 496, original certificate of title No. 1627 was issued in the names
of petitioner and his wife Luisa Cristobal. In 1923, said certificate was cancelled and substituted by certificate of title No. 20968 by virtue
of a decree issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in connection with Manila cadastre. It was later substituted by certificate of
title No. 26704, also in the name of petitioner and his wife. After the latter's death in 1922,a new certificate of title was issued in 1923
only in the name of the name of the petitioner, substituted in 1928 by certificate of title No. 31073.
The Court of Appeals, upon the evidence, concluded with the Court of First Instance of Manila that the parcel of land in question is a
community property held by petitioner in trust for the real owners (the respondent being an heir of one of them), the registration having
been made in accordance with an understanding between the co-owners, by reason of the confidence they had in petitioner and his
wife. This confidence, close relationship, and the fact that the co-owners were receiving their shares in the rentals, were the reasons
why no step had been taken to partition the property.
The Court of Appeals explains that it was only after the death of Luisa Cristobal and petitioner had taken a second wife that trouble on
religious matters arose between petitioner and respondent, and it gives credence to the testimony of Apolonia Reyes and respondent to
the effect that Luisa, before her death, called her husband, the petitioner, and enjoined him to give her co-owners their shares in the
parcel of land; but respondent told her then not to worry about it, for it was more important to them to have her cured of the malady that
affected her. Petitioner answered his wife that she should not worry because he would take care of the matter by giving the co-owners
their respective shares.
Petitioner assigns as first error of the Court of Appeals the fact that it considered the oral testimony adduced in behalf of respondent
sufficient to rebut the legal presumption that petitioner is the owner of the land in controversy. .
In Severino vs. Severino (43 Phil., 343), this court declared that "the relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and it is an
elementary and very old rule that in regard to property forming the subject-matter of the agency, he is estopped from acquiring or
asserting a title adverse to that of the principal. His position is analogous to that of a trustee and he cannot consistently, with the
principles of good faith, be allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his principal or cestui que trust." Affirming the
said doctrine in Barretto vs. Tuason(50 Phil., 888), the Supreme Court declared that the registration of the property in the name of the
trustees in possession thereof, must be deemed to have been effected for the benefit of the cestui que trust. In Palet vs. Tejedor (55
Phil., 790), it was declared that whether or not there is bad faith or fraud in obtaining a decree with respect to a registered property, the
same does not belong to the person in whose favor it was issued, and the real owners be entitled to recover the ownership of the
property so long as the same has not been transferred to a third person who has acquired it in good faith and for a valuable
consideration. This right to recover is sanctioned by section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322.
There is no showing why the conclusions of facts of the Court of Appeals should be disturbed, and upon said facts petitioner's first
assignment of errors appears to be untenable in the light of law and of the decision of this court.
Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding the respondent estopped from claiming that petitioner is not the
absolute owner of the property in question because, after Luisa Cristobal, petitioner's wife, died in 1922, instead of moving for the
partition of the property, considering specially that petitioner had promised such a partition at the deathbed of the deceased, respondent
appeared as attorney for petitioner and prayed that a new certificate of title be issued in the name of said petitioner as the sole owner of
the property.
Petitioner insisted with energy that respondent himself was a party to the fraud upon the court, as guilty as petitioner himself, and that
estops him from asserting that he is the co-owner of the land involved herein.lawphil.net
There is no merit in petitioner's contention. The fact that respondent has been a party to the deception which resulted in petitioner's
securing in his name the title to a property not belonging to him, is not valid reason for changing the legal relationship between the latter
and its true owners to such an extent as to let them lose their ownership to a person trying to usurp it.
Whether petitioner and respondent are or are not jointly responsible for any fraud upon a court of justice, cannot affect the substantial
rights of the real owners of the title of a real property.
Respondent is not barred because his appearance as attorney for petitioner was not a misrepresentation which would induce petitioner
to believe that respondent recognized the former as the sole owner of the property in controversy. The misrepresentation could deceive
the court and outsiders, because they were not aware of the understanding between the co-owners that the property be registered in
the name of petitioner. The Court of Appeals found, and the finding is not now in issue, that petitioner was a party to the understanding
and assumed the role of an instrument to make it effective. Respondent's appearance, as attorney for petitioner in 1923, was a
consequence of the understanding, and petitioner could not legitimately assume that it had the effect of breaking or reversing said
understanding.
Lastly, it is contended by petitioner that, even conceding that the controverted property was owned in common by several co-owners,
yet the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, as against respondent, petitioner had acquired absolute ownership of the same
through prescription.
Upon the premise that the registration in 1909 in the name of petitioner and his wife, Luisa Cristobal, was in accordance with an
agreement among the co-owners, petitioner advances the theory that when he, upon the death of his wife in 1922, caused the trust
property to be registered in his sole name in 1923, and subsequently partitioned between himself and his daughter, Ildefonsa Cristobal
Ditangco, as heirs of the decedent, "he openly breached the agreement of 1909 as well as the promise made to his dying wife of giving
the co-owners their respective shares," concluding that "that breach was an assumption of ownership, and could be the basis of title by
prescription."
This theory holds no water because, according to the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals, upon the evidence, petitioner held the
property and secured its registration in his name in a fiduciary capacity, and it is elementary that a trustee cannot acquire by
prescription the ownership of the property entrusted to him. The position of a trustee is of representative nature. His position is the
position of a cestui que trust. It is logical that all benefits derived by the possession and acts of the agent, as such agent, should accrue
to the benefit of his principal.
Petitioner's pretension of building his right to claim ownership by prescription upon his own breach of a trust cannot be countenanced
by any court, being subversive of generally accepted ethical principles.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No costs.
Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones, JJ., concur.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28050 March 13, 1928
FEDERICO VALERA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL VELASCO, defendant-appellee.
Jose Martinez San Agustin for appellant.
Vicente O. Romualdez, Crispulo T. Manubay and Placido P. Reyes for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J .:
This is an appeal taken by Federico Valera from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing his complaint against
Miguel Velasco, on the ground that he has not satisfactorily proven his right of action.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit: (1) The lower
court erred in holding that one of the ways of terminating an agency is by the express or tacit renunciation of the agent; (2) the lower
court erred in holding that the institution of a civil action and the execution of the judgment obtained by the agent against his principal is
but renunciation of the powers conferred on the agent; (3) the lower erred in holding that, even if the sale by Eduardo Hernandez to the
plaintiff Federico Valera be declared void, such a declaration could not prevail over the rights of the defendant Miguel Velasco
inasmuch as the right redemption was exercised by neither Eduardo Hernandez nor the plaintiff Federico Valera; (4) the lower court
erred in not finding that the defendant Miguel Velasco was, and at present is, an authorized representative of the plaintiff Federico
Valera; (5) the lower court erred in not annulling the sale made by the sheriff at public auction to defendant Miguel Velasco, Exhibit K;
(6) the lower court erred in failing to annul the sale executed by Eduardo Hernandez to the plaintiff Federico Valera, Exhibi t C; (7) the
lower court erred in not annulling Exhibit L, that is, the sale at public auction of the right to repurchase the land in question to Salvador
Vallejo; (8) the lower court erred in not declaring Exhibit M null and void, which is the sale by Salvador Vallejo to defendant Miguel
Velasco; (9) the lower court erred in not ordering the defendant Miguel Velasco to liquidate his accounts as agent of the plaintiff
Federico Valera; (10) the lower court erred in not awarding plaintiff the P5,000 damages prayed for.
The pertinent facts necessary for the solution of the questions raised by the above quoted assignments of error are contained in the
decision appealed from and are as follows:
By virtue of the powers of attorney, Exhibits X and Z, executed by the plaintiff on April 11, 1919, and on August 8, 1922, the
defendant was appointed attorney-in-fact of the said plaintiff with authority to manage his property in the Philippines, consisting
of the usufruct of a real property located of Echague Street, City of Manila.
The defendant accepted both powers of attorney, managed plaintiff's property, reported his operations, and rendered accounts
of his administration; and on March 31, 1923 presented exhibit F to plaintiff, which is the final account of his administration for
said month, wherein it appears that there is a balance of P3,058.33 in favor of the plaintiff.
The liquidation of accounts revealed that the plaintiff owed the defendant P1,100, and as misunderstanding arose between
them, the defendant brought suit against the plaintiff, civil case No. 23447 of this court. Judgment was rendered in his favor on
March 28, 1923, and after the writ of execution was issued, the sheriff levied upon the plaintiff's right of usufruct, sold it at
public auction and adjudicated it to the defendant in payment of all of his claim.
Subsequently, on May 11, 1923, the plaintiff sold his right of redemption to one Eduardo Hernandez, for the sum of P200
(Exhibit A). On September 4, 1923, this purchaser conveyed the same right of redemption, for the sum of P200, to the plaintiff
himself, Federico Valera (Exhibit C).
After the plaintiff had recovered his right of redemption, one Salvador Vallejo, who had an execution upon a judgment against
the plaintiff rendered in a civil case against the latter, levied upon said right of redemption, which was sold by the sheriff at
public auction to Salvador Vallejo for P250 and was definitely adjudicated to him. Later, he transferred said right of redemption
to the defendant Velasco. This is how the title to the right of usufruct to the aforementioned property later came to vest the said
defendant.
As the first two assignments of error are very closely related to each other, we will consider them jointly.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
Art. 1732. Agency is terminated:
1. By revocation;
2. By the withdrawal of the agent;
3. By the death, interdiction, bankruptcy, or insolvency of the principal or of the agent.
And article 1736 of the same Code provides that:
Art. 1736. An agent may withdraw from the agency by giving notice to the principal. Should the latter suffer any damage
through the withdrawal, the agent must indemnify him therefore, unless the agent's reason for his withdrawal should be the
impossibility of continuing to act as such without serious detriment to himself.
In the case of De la Peña vs. Hidalgo (16 Phil., 450), this court said laid down the following rule:
1. AGENCY; ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY; IMPLIED AGENCY. — When the agent and administrator of property
informs his principal by letter that for reasons of health and medical treatment he is about to depart from the place where he is
executing his trust and wherein the said property is situated, and abandons the property, turns it over to a third party, renders
accounts of its revenues up to the date on which he ceases to hold his position and transmits to his principal statement which
summarizes and embraces all the balances of his accounts since he began the administration to the date of the termination of
his trust, and, without stating when he may return to take charge of the administration of the said property, asks his principal to
execute a power of attorney in due form in favor of a transmit the same to another person who took charge of the
administration of the said property, it is but reasonable and just to conclude that the said agent had expressly and definitely
renounced his agency and that such agency duly terminated, in accordance with the provisions of article 1732 of the Civil
Code, and, although the agent in his aforementioned letter did not use the words "renouncing the agency," yet such words,
were undoubtedly so understood and accepted by the principal, because of the lapse of nearly nine years up to the time of the
latter's death, without his having interrogated either the renouncing agent, disapproving what he had done, or the person who
substituted the latter.
The misunderstanding between the plaintiff and the defendant over the payment of the balance of P1,000 due the latter, as a result of
the liquidation of the accounts between them arising from the collections by virtue of the former's usufructuary right, who was the
principal, made by the latter as his agent, and the fact that the said defendant brought suit against the said principal on March 28, 1928
for the payment of said balance, more than prove the breach of the juridical relation between them; for, although the agent has not
expressly told his principal that he renounced the agency, yet neither dignity nor decorum permits the latter to continue representing a
person who has adopted such an antagonistic attitude towards him. When the agent filed a complaint against his principal for recovery
of a sum of money arising from the liquidation of the accounts between them in connection with the agency, Federico Valera could not
have understood otherwise than that Miguel Velasco renounced the agency; because his act was more expressive than words and
could not have caused any doubt. (2 C. J., 543.) In order to terminate their relations by virtue of the agency the defendant, as agent,
rendered his final account on March 31, 1923 to the plaintiff, as principal.
Briefly, then, the fact that an agent institutes an action against his principal for the recovery of the balance in his favor resulting from the
liquidation of the accounts between them arising from the agency, and renders and final account of his operations, is equivalent to an
express renunciation of the agency, and terminates the juridical relation between them.
If, as we have found, the defendant-appellee Miguel Velasco, in adopting a hostile attitude towards his principal, suing him for the
collection of the balance in his favor, resulting from the liquidation of the agency accounts, ceased ipso facto to be the agent of the
plaintiff-appellant, said agent's purchase of the aforesaid principal's right of usufruct at public auction held by virtue of an execution
issued upon the judgment rendered in favor of the former and against the latter, is valid and legal, and the lower court did not commit
the fourth and fifth assignments of error attributed to it by the plaintiff-appellant.
In regard to the third assignment of error, it is deemed unnecessary to discuss the validity of the sale made by Federico Val era to
Eduardo Hernandez of his right of redemption in the sale of his usufructuary right made by the sheriff by virtue of the execution of the
judgment in favor of Miguel Velasco and against the said Federico Valera; and the same thing is true as to the validity of the resale of
the same right of redemption made by Eduardo Hernandez to Federico Valera; inasmuch as Miguel Velasco's purchase at public
auction held by virtue of an execution of Federico Valera's usufructuary right is valid and legal, and as neither the latter nor Eduardo
Hernandez exercised his right of redemption within the legal period, the purchaser's title became absolute.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee, Miguel Velasco, having acquired Federico Valera's right of redemption from Salvador Vallejo, who
had acquired it at public auction by virtue of a writ of execution issued upon the judgment obtained by the said Vallejo against the said
Valera, the latter lost all right to said usufruct.
And even supposing that Eduardo Hernandez had been tricked by Miguel Velasco into selling Federico Valera's right of repurchase to
the latter so that Salvador Vallejo might levy an execution on it, and even supposing that said resale was null for lack of consideration,
yet, inasmuch as Eduardo Hernandez did not present a third party claim when the right was levied upon for the execution of the
judgment obtained by Vallejo against Federico Vallera, nor did he file a complaint to recover said right before the period of redemption
expired, said Eduardo Hernandez, and much less Federico Valera, cannot now contest the validity of said resale, for the reason that the
one-year period of redemption has already elapsed.
Neither did the trial court err in not ordering Miguel Velasco to render a liquidation of accounts from March 31, 1923, inasmuch as he
had acquired the rights of the plaintiff by purchase at the execution sale, and as purchaser, he was entitled to receive the rents from the
date of the sale until the date of the repurchase, considering them as part of the redemption price; but not having exercised the right
repurchase during the legal period, and the title of the repurchaser having become absolute, the latter did not have to account for said
rents.
Summarizing, the conclusion is reached that the disagreements between an agent and his principal with respect to the agency, and the
filing of a civil action by the former against the latter for the collection of the balance in favor of the agent, resulting from a liquidation of
the agency accounts, are facts showing a rupture of relations, and the complaint is equivalent to an express renunciation of the agency,
and is more expressive than if the agent had merely said, "I renounce the agency."
By virtue of the foregoing, and finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.











































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7144 May 31, 1955
FAR EASTERN EXPORT & IMPORT CO., petitioner,
vs.
LIM TECK SUAN, respondent.
Juan Nabong and Crisolito Pascual for petitioner.
Jose P. Laurel, Marciano Almario and Jose T. Lojom for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 25, 1953, reversing the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and sentencing the defendant-petitioner Far Eastern Export & Import Co. later referred to as export
company, to pay the plaintiff-respondent Lim Teck Suan later to be referred to as Suan, the sum of P11,4476.60, with legal interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint and to pay the costs.
As to the facts and the issue in the case we are reproducing the findings of the Court of Appeals, which findings are binding on this
Tribunal in case of similar appeals:
Sometime in November, 1948, Ignacio Delizalde, an agent of the Far Eastern Export & Import Company, went to the store of
Lim Teck Suan situated at 267 San Vicente Street, Manila, and offered to sell textile, showing samples thereof, and having
arrived at an agreement with Bernardo Lim, the General Manager of Lim Teck Suan, Delizalde returned on November 17 with
the buyer's order, Exhibit A, already prepared which reads:
FAR EASTERN EXPORT & IMPORT COMPANY
75 Escolta 2nd Floor Brias Roxas Bldg., Manila
Ship to LIM TECK SUAN Date Written 11/17/48
475 Nueva St., Manila Your No.
Our No. 276
I hereby commission you to procure for me the following merchandise, subject to the terms and conditions listed below:
======================================================
Quantity Unit Particulars Amount
10,000 yds Ashtone Acetate & Rayon-No. 13472
Width: 41/42 inches; Weight:
Approximately 8 oz. per yd; Ten (10)
colors, buyers choice, as per attached
samples, equally assorted; at $1.13
per yard F.A.S. New York U. S. $11,500.00
Item herein sold are FOB-FAS X C. & F
CIF
======================================================
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Acceptance
This Buyer's Order is subject to confirmation by the exporter. Shipment
Period of Shipment is to be within December. Bank Documents should be for a line of 45 days to allow for presentation and
payment against "ON BOARD" bills of lading. Partial shipments permitted.
Payment
Payment will be by "Confirmed Irrevocable Letter of Credit" to be opened in favor of Frenkel International Corporation, 52
Broadway, New York, 4, N. Y. for the full amount of the above cost of merchandise plus (approximately) for export packing:
insurance, freight, documentation, forwarding, etc. which are for the buyers accounts, IMMEDIATELY upon written
Confirmation. Our Guarantee In case shipment is not affected, seller agrees to reimburse buyer for all banking expenses.
Confirmed Accepted
Signed Nov. 17, 1948
Authorized official
Confirmed
Accepted (Sgd.) Illegible Date Nov. 1948 to be signed by our representative upon confirmation.
In accordance with said Exhibit A, plaintiff established a letter of credit No. 6390 (Exhibit B) in favor of Frenkel International
Corporation through the Hongkong and Shanghai Bangking Corporation, attached to the agreed statement of facts. On
February 11, 1949, the textile arrived at Manila on board the vessel M. S. Arnold Maersk, covered by bill of lading No. 125
(Exhibit C), Invoice No. 1684-M (Exhibit D) issued by Frenkel International Corporation direct to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
complained to the defendant of the inferior quality of the textile received by him and had them examined by Marine Surveyor
Del Pan & Company. Said surveyor took swatches of the textile and had the same analyzed by the Institute of Science (Exhibit
E-1) and submitted a report or survey under date of April 9, 1949 (Exhibit E). Upon instructions of the defendants plaintiff
deposited the goods with the United Warehouse Corporation (Exhibits H, H-1 to H-6. As per suggestion of the Far Eastern
Export and Import Company contained in its letter dated June 16, 1949, plaintiff withdrew from the United Bonded Warehouse,
Port Area, Manila, the fifteen cases of Ashtone Acetate and Rayon Suiting for the purpose of offering them for sale which
netted P11,907.30. Deducting this amount from the sum of P23,686.96 which included the amount paid by plaintiff for said
textile and the warehouse expenses, a difference of P11,476.66 is left, representing the net direct loss.
The defense set up is that the Far Eastern Export and Import Company only acted as a broker in this transaction; that after
placing the order the defendants took no further action and the cargo was taken directly by the buyer Lim Teck Suan, the
shipment having been made to him and all the documents were also handled by him directly without any intervention on the
part of the defendants; that upon receipt of Lim Teck Suan's complaint the defendants passed it to its principal, Frenkel
International Corporation, for comment, and the latter maintained that the merchandise was up to standard called for.
The lower court acquitted the defendants from the complaint asking for damages in the sum of P19,500.00 representing the
difference in price between the textile ordered and those received, plus profits unrealized and the cost of this suit, and
dismissed the counterclaim filed by the defendants without pronouncement as to costs.
As already stated, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, basing its decision of
reversal on the case of Jose Velasco, vs. Universal Trading Co., Inc., 45 Off. Gaz. 4504 where the transaction therein involved was
found by the court to be one of purchase and sale and not of brokerage or agency. We have carefully examined the Velasco case and
we agree with the Court of Appeals that the facts in that case are very similar to those in the present case. In the case of Velasco, we
have the following statement by the court itself which we reproduced below:
Prior to November 8, 1945 a salesman or agent of the Universal Trading Co., Inc. informed Jose Velasco, Jr. that his company
was in a position to accept and fill in orders for Panamanian Agewood Bourbon Whisky because there were several thousand
cases of this article ready for shipment to the company by its principal office in America. Acting upon this offer and
representative Velasco went to the Universal Trading Co., Inc., and after a conversation with the latter's official entered into an
agreement couched in the following terms:
"Agreement is hereby made between Messrs. Jose Velasco, Jr., 340 Echaque, Manila, and the Universal Trading Company,
Manila, for order as follows and under the following terms:
Quantity Merchan
dise and Unit Unit Amount
Price
Description
100 Panamanian Agewood Bourbon
Whisky ..........................Case $17.00 $1,700
_______
Total amount of order ........... $1,700
Terms of Agreement:
"1. That the Universal Trading Company agrees to order the above merchandise from their Los Angeles Office at the price
quoted above, C.I.F. Manila, for December shipment;
"2. That Messrs. Jose Velasco, Jr., 340 Echaque, Manila, obligates myself/themselves to take the above merchandise when
advised of its arrival from the United States and to pay in cash the full amount of the order in the Philippine Currency at the
office of the Universal Trading Company;
"3. This order may be subject to delay because of uncertain shipping conditions. War risk insurance, transhipping charges, if
any, port charges, and any storage that may be incurred due to your not taking delivery of the order upon being notified by us
that the order is ready for delivery, and government taxes, are all for your account;
"4. The terms of this agreement will be either of the following:
"a. To open up irrevocable letter of credit for the value of the order with any of the local banks, or thru bills of lading payable to
A. J. Wilson Company, 1263 South North Avenue, Los Angeles, California;
"b. To put up a cash deposit equivalent to 50 % of the order;
"5. Reasonable substitute, whenever possible, will be shipped in lieu of items called for, if order is not available."
Accordingly, Velasco deposited with the defendant the sum of $1,700 which is 50% of the price of the whisky pursuant to
agreement made, instead of 'to open up irrevocable letter of credit for the value of the order with any of the local banks, or
through bills of lading payable to A. J. Wilson Company.' On November 6, 1945, the same date that the contract or agreement,
Exhibit A, was signed an invoice under the name of the Universal Trading Co., Inc. was issued to Velasco for the 100 cases of
Panamanian Agewood Bourbon Whisky for the price of $1,700 which invoice manifested that the article was sold to Jose
Velasco, Jr. On January 15, 1946 another invoice was issued containing besides the list price of $1,700 or P3,400, a
statement of bank charges, customs duties, internal revenue taxes, etc., giving a total amount of P5,690.10 which after
deducting the deposit of $1,700, gives a balance of P3,990.01.
On January 25, 1946 the Universal Trading Co., Inc. wrote Exhibit 4 to Mr. Velasco advising him that the S. S. Manoeran had
docked and that they would appreciate it if he would pay the amount of P3,990.10 direct to them. It turned out, however, that
after the ship arrived, what the Universal Trading Co., Inc. tried to deliver to Velasco was not Panamanian Agewood Bourbon
Whisky but Panamanian Agewood Blended Whisky. Velasco refused to receive the shipment and in turn filed action against
the defendant for the return of his deposit of $ 1,700 with interest. For its defense, defendant contends that it merely acted as
agent for Velasco and could not be held responsible for the substitution of Blended Whisky for Bourbon Whisky and that
furthermore the Blended Whisky was a reasonable substitute for Bourbon. After due hearing the Court of First Instance of
Manila held that the transaction was purchase and sale and ordered the defendant to refund to the plaintiff his deposit of
P1,700 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the suit with costs, which decision on appeal was affirmed by this Court.
We notice the following similarities. In the present case, the export company acted as agent for Frenkel International Corporation,
presumably the supplier of the textile sold. In the Velasco case, the Universal Trading Co., was acting as agent for A. J. Wilson
Company, also the supplier of the whisky sold. In the present case, Suan according to the first part of the agreement is said merely to
be commissioning the Export Company to procure for him the merchandise in question, just as in the other case, Velasco was
supposed to be ordering the whisky thru the Universal Trading Co. In the present case, the price of the merchandise bought was paid
for by Suan by means of an irrevocable letter of credit opened in favor of the supplier, Frenkel International Corporation. In the Velasco
case, Velasco was given the choice of either opening a similar irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the supplier A. J. Wilson Company
or making a cash deposit. It is true that in the Velasco case, upon the arrival of the whisky and because it did not conform to
specifications, Velasco refused to received it; but in the present case although Suan received the merchandise he immediately
protested its poor quality and it was deposited in the warehouse and later withdrawn and sold for the best price possible, all at the
suggestion of the Export company. The present case is in our opinion a stronger one than that of Velasco for holding the transaction as
one of purchase and sale because as may be noticed from the agreement (Exhibit "A"), the same speaks of the items (merchandise)
therein involved as sold, and the sale was even confirmed by the Export company. In both cases, the agents Universal Trading Co. and
the export company dealt directly with the local merchants Velasco and Suan without expressly indicating or revealing their principals.
In both cases there was no privity of contract between the buyers — Suan and Velasco and the suppliers Frenkel International
Corporation and A. J. Wilson Company, respectively. In both cases no commission or monetary consideration was paid or agreed to be
paid by the buyers to the Export company and the Universal Trading Co., proof that there was no agency or brokerage, and that the
profit of the latter was undoubtedly the difference between the price listed to the buyers and the net or special price quoted to the
sellers, by the suppliers. As already stated, it was held in the Velasco case that the transaction therein entered into was one of
purchase and sale, and for the same reasons given there, we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the transaction entered into here is
one of purchase and sale.
As was held by this Tribunal in the case of Gonzalo Puyat & Sons Incorporated vs. Arco Amusement, 72 Phil., 402, where a foreign
company has an agent here selling its goods and merchandise, that same agent could not very well act as agent for local buyers,
because the interests of his foreign principal and those of the buyer would be in direct conflict. He could not serve two masters at the
same time. In the present case, the Export company being an agent of the Frenkel International Corporation could not, as it claims,
have acted as an agent or broker for Suan.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

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