Republic of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152613 & No. 152628 June 23, 2006
APEX MINING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board, provincial mining regulatory board (PMRB-
DAVAO), MONKAYO INTEGRATED SMALL SCALE MINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ROSENDO VILLAFLOR, BALITE COMMUNAL
PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE, DAVAO UNITED MINERS COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO, PUTING-BATO GOLD
MINERS COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA, THELMA CATAPANG, LUIS GALANG, RENATO BASMILLO, FRANCISCO
YOBIDO, EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN ASION, MACARIO HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY
ESPORTONO, ROMEO CASTILLO, JOSE REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN, LETICIA ALQUEZA and joel brillantes
management mining corporation, Respondents
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
On 27 February 1931, Governor General Dwight F. Davis issued Proclamation No. 369, establishing the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve consisting of approximately 1,927,400 hectares.
1

The disputed area, a rich tract of mineral land, is inside the forest reserve located at Monkayo, Davao del Norte, and Cateel , Davao
Oriental, consisting of 4,941.6759 hectares.
2
This mineral land is encompassed by Mt. Diwata, which is situated in the municipalities of
Monkayo and Cateel. It later became known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area." It has since the early 1980’s been stormed by conflicts
brought about by the numerous mining claimants scrambling for gold that lies beneath its bosom.
On 21 November 1983, Camilo Banad and his group, who claimed to have first discovered traces of gold in Mount Diwata, filed a
Declaration of Location (DOL) for six mining claims in the area.
Camilo Banad and some other natives pooled their skills and resources and organized the Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
(Balite).
3

On 12 December 1983, Apex Mining Corporation (Apex) entered into operating agreements with Banad and his group.
From November 1983 to February 1984, several individual applications for mining locations over mineral land covering certain parts of
the Diwalwal gold rush area were filed with the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG).
On 2 February 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) filed 16 DOLs or mining claims for areas adjacent to the area covered by
the DOL of Banad and his group. After realizing that the area encompassed by its mining claims is a forest reserve within the coverage
of Proclamation No. 369 issued by Governor General Davis, MMC abandoned the same and instead applied for a prospecting permit
with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
On 1 July 1985, BFD issued a Prospecting Permit to MMC covering an area of 4,941.6759 hectares traversing the municipalities of
Monkayo and Cateel, an area within the forest reserve under Proclamation No. 369. The permit embraced the areas claimed by Apex
and the other individual mining claimants.
On 11 November 1985, MMC filed Exploration Permit Application No. 84-40 with the BMG. On 10 March 1986, the BMG issued to MCC
Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP 133).
Discovering the existence of several mining claims and the proliferation of small-scale miners in the area covered by EP 133, MMC thus
filed on 11 April 1986 before the BMG a Petition for the Cancellation of the Mining Claims of Apex and Small Scale Mining Permit Nos.
(x-1)-04 and (x-1)-05 which was docketed as MAC No. 1061. MMC alleged that the areas covered by its EP 133 and the mining claims
of Apex were within an established and existing forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) under Proclamation No.
369 and that pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 463,
4
acquisition of mining rights within a forest reserve is through the application for
a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through registration of a DOL with the BMG.
On 23 September 1986, Apex filed a motion to dismiss MMC’s petition alleging that its mining claims are not within any establ ished or
proclaimed forest reserve, and as such, the acquisition of mining rights thereto must be undertaken via registration of DOL with the
BMG and not through the filing of application for permit to prospect with the BFD.
On 9 December 1986, BMG dismissed MMC’s petition on the ground that the area covered by the Apex mining claims and MMC’s
permit to explore was not a forest reservation. It further declared null and void MMC’s EP 133 and sustained the validity of Apex mining
claims over the disputed area.
MMC appealed the adverse order of BMG to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On 15 April 1987, after due hearing, the DENR reversed the 9 December 1996 order of BMG and declared MMC’s EP 133 valid and
subsisting.
Apex filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the DENR which was subsequently denied. Apex then filed an appeal before the Office of
the President. On 27 July 1989, the Office of the President, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Cancio C.
Garcia,
5
dismissed Apex’s appeal and affirmed the DENR ruling.
Apex filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 92605 entitled, "Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia."
6
On 16 July 1991, this Court rendered a Decision against Apex holding that the disputed area is a forest reserve; hence, the
proper procedure in acquiring mining rights therein is by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through a
registration of DOL with the BMG.
On 27 December 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. issued Department Administrative Order No. 66 (DAO No. 66)
declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale
mining purposes.
As DAO No. 66 declared a portion of the contested area open to small scale miners, several mining entities filed applications for
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA).
On 25 August 1993, Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association (MISSMA) filed an MPSA application which was denied by the
BMG on the grounds that the area applied for is within the area covered by MMC EP 133 and that the MISSMA was not qualified to
apply for an MPSA under DAO No. 82,
7
Series of 1990.
On 5 January 1994, Rosendo Villaflor and his group filed before the BMG a Petition for Cancellation of EP 133 and for the admission of
their MPSA Application. The Petition was docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. Davao United Miners Cooperative (DUMC) and
Balite intervened and likewise sought the cancellation of EP 133.
On 16 February 1994, MMC assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is
alleged to be a 100% -owned subsidiary of MMC.
On 14 June 1994, Balite filed with the BMG an MPSA application within the contested area that was later on rejected.
On 23 June 1994, SEM filed an MPSA application for the entire 4,941.6759 hectares under EP 133, which was also denied by reason
of the pendency of RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. On 1 September 1995, SEM filed another MPSA application.
On 20 October 1995, BMG accepted and registered SEM’s MPSA application and the Deed of Assignment over EP 133 executed in its
favor by MMC. SEM’s application was designated MPSA Application No. 128 (MPSAA 128). After publication of SEM’s application, the
following filed before the BMG their adverse claims or oppositions:
a) MAC Case No. 004 (XI) – JB Management Mining Corporation;
b) MAC Case No. 005(XI) – Davao United Miners Cooperative;
c) MAC Case No. 006(XI) – Balite Integrated Small Scale Miner’s Cooperative;
d) MAC Case No. 007(XI) – Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miner’s Association, Inc. (MISSMA);
e) MAC Case No. 008(XI) – Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines;
f) MAC Case No. 009(XI) – Rosendo Villafor, et al.;
g) MAC Case No. 010(XI) – Antonio Dacudao;
h) MAC Case No. 011(XI) – Atty. Jose T. Amacio;
i) MAC Case No. 012(XI) – Puting-Bato Gold Miners Cooperative;
j) MAC Case No. 016(XI) – Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative;
k) MAC Case No. 97-01(XI) – Romeo Altamera, et al.
8

To address the matter, the DENR constituted a Panel of Arbitrators (PA) to resolve the following:
(a) The adverse claims on MPSAA No. 128; and
(b) The Petition to Cancel EP 133 filed by Rosendo Villaflor docketed as RED Case No. 8-8-94.
9

On 13 June 1997, the PA rendered a resolution in RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. As to the Petition for Cancellation of EP 133 issued to
MMC, the PA relied on the ruling in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia,
10
and opined that EP 133 was valid and subsisting. It also declared
that the BMG Director, under Section 99 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order implementing Presidential Decree No. 463,
was authorized to issue exploration permits and to renew the same without limit.
With respect to the adverse claims on SEM’s MPSAA No. 128, the PA ruled that adverse claimants’ petitions were not filed in
accordance with the existing rules and regulations governing adverse claims because the adverse claimants failed to submit the sketch
plan containing the technical description of their respective claims, which was a mandatory requirement for an adverse claim that would
allow the PA to determine if indeed there is an overlapping of the area occupied by them and the area applied for by SEM. It added that
the adverse claimants were not claim owners but mere occupants conducting illegal mining activities at the contested area since only
MMC or its assignee SEM had valid mining claims over the area as enunciated in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia.
11
Also, it maintained
that the adverse claimants were not qualified as small-scale miners under DENR Department Administrative Order No. 34 (DAO No.
34),
12
or the Implementing Rules and Regulation of Republic Act No. 7076 (otherwise known as the "People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991"), as they were not duly licensed by the DENR to engage in the extraction or removal of minerals from the ground, and that they
were large-scale miners. The decretal portion of the PA resolution pronounces:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the validity of Expoloration Permit No. 133 is hereby reiterated and all the adverse
claims against MPSAA No. 128 are DISMISSED.
13

Undaunted by the PA ruling, the adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). In a Decision dated 6 January
1998, the MAB considered erroneous the dismissal by the PA of the adverse claims filed against MMC and SEM over a mere
technicality of failure to submit a sketch plan. It argued that the rules of procedure are not meant to defeat substantial justice as the
former are merely secondary in importance to the latter. Dealing with the question on EP 133’s validity, the MAB opined that said issue
was not crucial and was irrelevant in adjudicating the appealed case because EP 133 has long expired due to its non-renewal and that
the holder of the same, MMC, was no longer a claimant of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve having relinquished its right to
SEM. After it brushed aside the issue of the validity of EP 133 for being irrelevant, the MAB proceeded to treat SEM’s MPSA application
over the disputed area as an entirely new and distinct application. It approved the MPSA application, excluding the area segregated by
DAO No. 66, which declared 729 hectares within the Diwalwal area as non-forest lands open for small-scale mining. The MAB resolved:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators dated 13 June 1997 is hereby VACATED and a
new one entered in the records of the case as follows:
1. SEM’s MPSA application is hereby given due course subject to the full and strict compliance of the provisions of the Mining
Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
2. The area covered by DAO 66, series of 1991, actually occupied and actively mined by the small-scale miners on or before
August 1, 1987 as determined by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB), is hereby excluded from the area applied
for by SEM;
3. A moratorium on all mining and mining-related activities, is hereby imposed until such time that all necessary procedures,
licenses, permits, and other requisites as provided for by RA 7076, the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
and all other pertinent laws, rules and regulations are complied with, and the appropriate environmental protection measures
and safeguards have been effectively put in place;
4. Consistent with the spirit of RA 7076, the Board encourages SEM and all small-scale miners to continue to negotiate in
good faith and arrive at an agreement beneficial to all. In the event of SEM’s strict and full compliance with all the requirements
of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and the concurrence of the small-scale miners actually
occupying and actively mining the area, SEM may apply for the inclusion of portions of the areas segregated under paragraph
2 hereof, to its MPSA application. In this light, subject to the preceding paragraph, the contract between JB [JB Management
Mining Corporation] and SEM is hereby recognized.
14

Dissatisfied, the Villaflor group and Balite appealed the decision to this Court. SEM, aggrieved by the exclusion of 729 hectares from its
MPSA application, likewise appealed. Apex filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Petition for Intervention predicated on its right to stake its
claim over the Diwalwal gold rush which was granted by the Court. These cases, however, were remanded to the Court of Appeals for
proper disposition pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals consolidated the remanded cases as
CA-G.R. SP No. 61215 and No. 61216.
In the assailed Decision
15
dated 13 March 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the PA and declared null and void
the MAB decision.
The Court of Appeals, banking on the premise that the SEM is the agent of MMC by virtue of its assignment of EP 133 in favor of SEM
and the purported fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC, ruled that the transfer of EP 133 was valid. It argued that since SEM is
an agent of MMC, the assignment of EP 133 did not violate the condition therein prohibiting its transfer except to MMC’s duly
designated agent. Thus, despite the non-renewal of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, the Court of Appeals deemed it relevant to declare EP 133
as valid since MMC’s mining rights were validly transferred to SEM prior to its expiration.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that MMC’s right to explore under EP 133 is a property right which the 1987 Constitution protects and
which cannot be divested without the holder’s consent. It stressed that MMC’s failure to proceed with the extraction and utilization of
minerals did not diminish its vested right to explore because its failure was not attributable to it.
Reading Proclamation No. 369, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act 137, and Sections 6, 7, and 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the issuance of DAO No. 66 was done by the DENR Secretary beyond his power for it is the President
who has the sole power to withdraw from the forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 as non-forest land for mining
purposes. Accordingly, the segregation of 729 hectares of mining areas from the coverage of EP 133 by the MAB was unfounded.
The Court of Appeals also faulted the DENR Secretary in implementing DAO No. 66 when he awarded the 729 hectares segregated
from the coverage area of EP 133 to other corporations who were not qualified as small-scale miners under Republic Act No. 7076.
As to the petitions of Villaflor and company, the Court of Appeals argued that their failure to submit the sketch plan to the PA, which is a
jurisdictional requirement, was fatal to their appeal. It likewise stated the Villaflor and company’s mining claims, which were based on
their alleged rights under DAO No. 66, cannot stand as DAO No. 66 was null and void. The dispositive portion of the Decision decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition of Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation is GRANTED while the Petition of
Rosendo Villaflor, et al., is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators dated 13 June 1997 is AFFIRMED in toto
and the assailed MAB Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and declared as NULL and VOID.
16

Hence, the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Apex, Balite and MAB.
During the pendency of these Petitions, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297 dated 25 November 2002.
This proclamation excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaimed the same as mineral
reservation and as environmentally critical area. Subsequently, DENR Administrative Order No. 2002-18 was issued declaring an
emergency situation in the Diwalwal gold rush area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein. Thereafter, Executive
Order No. 217 dated 17 June 2003 was issued by the President creating the National Task Force Diwalwal which is tasked to address
the situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
In G.R. No. 152613 and No. 152628, Apex raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING’S [SEM] E.P. 133 IS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE FAILURE OF
MARCOPPER TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED IN EP 133.
II
WHETHER OR NOT APEX HAS A SUPERIOR AND PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO STAKE IT’S CLAIM OVER THE ENTIRE 4,941
HECTARES AGAINST SEM AND THE OTHER CLAIMANTS PURSUANT TO THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE IN MINING LAW
THAT "PRIORITY IN TIME IS PRIORITY IN RIGHT."
17

In G.R. No. 152619-20, Balite anchors its petition on the following grounds:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE MPSA OF SEM WHICH WAS FILED NINE (9) DAYS LATE (JUNE 23, 1994) FROM THE FILING OF THE
MPSA OF BALITE WHICH WAS FILED ON JUNE 14, 1994 HAS A PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THAT OF BALITE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL BY THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM OF BALITE ON THE
GROUND THAT BALITE FAILED TO SUBMIT THE REQUIRED SKETCH PLAN DESPITE THE FACT THAT BALITE, HAD IN FACT
SUBMITTED ON TIME WAS A VALID DISMISSAL OF BALITE’S ADVERSE CLAIM.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTUAL OCCUPATION AND SMALL-MINING OPERATIONS OF BALITE PURSUANT TO DAO 66 IN THE
729 HECTARES WHICH WAS PART OF THE 4,941.6759 HECTARES COVERED BY ITS MPSA WHICH WAS REJECTED BY THE
BUREAU OF MINES AND GEOSCIENCES WAS ILLEGAL.
18

In G.R. No. 152870-71, the MAB submits two issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT EP NO. 133 IS STILL VALID AND SUBSISTING.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT SUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF DAO NO. 66,
PROCLAMATION NO. 297, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 217 CAN OUTWEIGH EP NO. 133 AS WELL AS OTHER ADVERSE CLAIMS
OVER THE DIWALWAL GOLD RUSH AREA.
19

The common issues raised by petitioners may be summarized as follows:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity and continuous existence of EP 133 as well as its transfer
to SEM;
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the DENR Secretary has no authority to issue DAO No. 66; and
III. Whether or not the subsequent acts of the executive department such as the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, and DAO
No. 2002-18 can outweigh Apex and Balite’s claims over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
On the first issue, Apex takes exception to the Court of Appeals’ ruling upholding the validity of MMC’s EP 133 and its subsequent
transfer to SEM asserting that MMC failed to comply with the terms and conditions in its exploration permit, thus, MMC and its
successor-in-interest SEM lost their rights in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Apex pointed out that MMC violated four conditions in its
permit. First, MMC failed to comply with the mandatory work program, to complete exploration work, and to declare a mining feasibility.
Second, it reneged on its duty to submit an Environmental Compliance Certificate. Third, it failed to comply with the reportorial
requirements. Fourth, it violated the terms of EP 133 when it assigned said permit to SEM despite the explicit proscription against its
transfer.
Apex likewise emphasizes that MMC failed to file its MPSA application required under DAO No. 82
20
which caused its exploration
permit to lapse because DAO No. 82 mandates holders of exploration permits to file a Letter of Intent and a MPSA application not later
than 17 July 1991. It said that because EP 133 expired prior to its assignment to SEM, SEM’s MPSA application should have been
evaluated on its own merit.
As regards the Court of Appeals recognition of SEM’s vested right over the disputed area, Apex bewails the same to be lacking in
statutory bases. According to Apex, Presidential Decree No. 463 and Republic Act No. 7942 impose upon the claimant the obligation of
actually undertaking exploration work within the reserved lands in order to acquire priority right over the area. MMC, Apex claims, failed
to conduct the necessary exploration work, thus, MMC and its successor-in-interest SEM lost any right over the area.
In its Memorandum, Balite maintains that EP 133 of MMC, predecessor-in-interest of SEM, is an expired and void permit which cannot
be made the basis of SEM’s MPSA application.
Similarly, the MAB underscores that SEM did not acquire any right from MMC by virtue of the transfer of EP 133 because the transfer
directly violates the express condition of the exploration permit stating that "it shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee
or his duly authorized agents." It added that while MMC is the permittee, SEM cannot be considered as MMC’s duly designated agent
as there is no proof on record authorizing SEM to represent MMC in its business dealings or undertakings, and neither did SEM pursue
its interest in the permit as an agent of MMC. According to the MAB, the assignment by MMC of EP 133 in favor of SEM did not make
the latter the duly authorized agent of MMC since the concept of an agent under EP 133 is not equivalent to the concept of assignee. It
finds fault in the assignment of EP 133 which lacked the approval of the DENR Secretary in contravention of Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7942
21
requiring his approval for a valid assignment or transfer of exploration permit to be valid.
SEM, on the other hand, counters that the errors raised by petitioners Apex, Balite and the MAB relate to factual and evidentiary
matters which this Court cannot inquire into in an appeal by certiorari.
The established rule is that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court not being a trier of facts, does not
normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.
22
This rule, however, admits of exceptions as
recognized by jurisprudence, to wit:
(1) [w]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the fi ndings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
23

Also, in the case of Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,
24
the Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, deemed it proper to look
deeper into the factual circumstances of the case since the Court of Appeal’s findings are at odds to those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Just like in the foregoing case, it is this Court’s considered view that a re-evaluation of the attendant
facts surrounding the present case is appropriate considering that the findings of the MAB are in conflict with that of the Court of
Appeals.
I
At the threshold, it is an undisputed fact that MMC assigned to SEM all its rights under EP 133 pursuant to a Deed of Assignment dated
16 February 1994.
25

EP 133 is subject to the following terms and conditions
26
:
1. That the permittee shall abide by the work program submitted with the application or statements made later in support
thereof, and which shall be considered as conditions and essential parts of this permit;
2. That permittee shall maintain a complete record of all activities and accounting of all expenditures incurred therein subject to
periodic inspection and verification at reasonable intervals by the Bureau of Mines at the expense of the applicant;
3. That the permittee shall submit to the Director of Mines within 15 days after the end of each calendar quarter a report under
oath of a full and complete statement of the work done in the area covered by the permit;
4. That the term of this permit shall be for two (2) years to be effective from this date, renewable for the same period at the
discretion of the Director of Mines and upon request of the applicant;
5. That the Director of Mines may at any time cancel this permit for violation of its provision or in case of trouble or breach of
peace arising in the area subject hereof by reason of conflicting interests without any responsibility on the part of the
government as to expenditures for exploration that might have been incurred, or as to other damages that might have been
suffered by the permittee; and
6. That this permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used
for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other purpose.
Under Section 90
27
of Presidential Decree No. 463, the applicable statute during the issuance of EP 133, the DENR Secretary, through
Director of BMG, is charged with carrying out the said law. Also, under Commonwealth Act No. 136, also known as "An Act Creating
The Bureau of Mines," which was approved on 7 November 1936, the Director of Mines has the direct charge of the administration of
the mineral lands and minerals, and of the survey, classification, lease or any other form of concession or disposition thereof under the
Mining Act.
28
This power of administration includes the power to prescribe terms and conditions in granting exploration permits to
qualified entities. Thus, in the grant of EP 133 in favor of the MMC, the Director of the BMG acted within his power in laying down the
terms and conditions attendant thereto.
Condition number 6 categorically states that the permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of MMC or its duly authori zed agents.
While it may be true that SEM, the assignee of EP 133, is a 100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, records are bereft of any evidence
showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. For a contract of agency to exist, it is essential that the principal
consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on its behalf, and the agent consents so as to act.
29
In the case of Yu Eng Cho v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.,
30
this Court had the occasion to set forth the elements of agency, viz:
(1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship;
(2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
(3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself;
(4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The existence of the elements of agency is a factual matter that needs to be established or proven by evidence. The burden of proving
that agency is extant in a certain case rests in the party who sets forth such allegation. This is based on the principle that he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
31
It must likewise be emphasized that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive
and convincing.
32

In the instant Petitions, it is incumbent upon either MMC or SEM to prove that a contract of agency actually exists between them so as
to allow SEM to use and benefit from EP 133 as the agent of MMC. SEM did not claim nor submit proof that it is the designated agent
of MMC to represent the latter in its business dealings or undertakings. SEM cannot, therefore, be considered as an agent of MMC
which can use EP 133 and benefit from it. Since SEM is not an authorized agent of MMC, it goes without saying that the assignment or
transfer of the permit in favor of SEM is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of EP 133.
Furthermore, the concept of agency is distinct from assignment. In agency, the agent acts not on his own behalf but on behalf of his
principal.
33
While in assignment, there is total transfer or relinquishment of right by the assignor to the assignee.
34
The assignee takes
the place of the assignor and is no longer bound to the latter. The deed of assignment clearly stipulates:
1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable consideration received by the ASSIGNOR from the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR
hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto the ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may have in the area
situated in Monkayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified as Exploration Permit No. 133 and Application for a Permit
to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur respectively.
35

Bearing in mind the just articulated distinctions and the language of the Deed of Assignment, it is readily obvious that the assignment by
MMC of EP 133 in favor of SEM did not make the latter the former’s agent. Such assignment involved actual transfer of all rights and
obligations MMC have under the permit in favor of SEM, thus, making SEM the permittee. It is not a mere grant of authority to SEM, as
an agent of MMC, to use the permit. It is a total abdication of MMC’s rights over the permit. Hence, the assignment in question did not
make SEM the authorized agent of MMC to make use and benefit from EP 133.
The condition stipulating that the permit is for the exclusive use of the permittee or its duly authorized agent is not without any reason.
Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining
operations. Without such a condition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict requirements under the law by the
simple expediency acquiring the permit from the original permittee.
We cannot lend recognition to the Court of Appeals’ theory that SEM, being a 100% subsidiary of MMC, is automatically an agent of
MMC.
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes, and properties
expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.
36
It is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related.
37
Resultantly, absent
any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is a separate and distinct entity from MMC.
The Court of Appeals pathetically invokes the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to legitimize the prohibited transfer or assignment of
EP 133. It stresses that SEM is just a business conduit of MMC, hence, the distinct legal personalities of the two entities should not be
recognized. True, the corporate mask may be removed when the corporation is just an alter ego or a mere conduit of a person or of
another corporation.
38
For reasons of public policy and in the interest of justice, the corporate veil will justifiably be impaled only when it
becomes a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity committed against a third person.
39
However, this Court has made a caveat in the
application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Courts should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be applied. Only in cases
where the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud or crime was committed against another, in di sregard of
its rights may the veil be pierced and removed. Thus, a subsidiary corporation may be made to answer for the liabilities and/or
illegalities done by the parent corporation if the former was organized for the purpose of evading obligations that the latter may have
entered into. In other words, this doctrine is in place in order to expose and hold liable a corporation which commits illegal acts and use
the corporate fiction to avoid liability from the said acts. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot therefore be used as a vehicle
to commit prohibited acts because these acts are the ones which the doctrine seeks to prevent.
To our mind, the application of the foregoing doctrine is unwarranted. The assignment of the permit in favor of SEM is utilized to
circumvent the condition of non-transferability of the exploration permit. To allow SEM to avail itself of this doctrine and to approve the
validity of the assignment is tantamount to sanctioning illegal act which is what the doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.
Quite apart from the above, a cursory consideration of the mining law pertinent to the case, will, indeed, demonstrate the infraction
committed by MMC in its assignment of EP 133 to SEM.
Presidential Decree No. 463, enacted on 17 May 1974, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree, which
governed the old system of exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources through "license, concession or lease"
prescribed:
SEC. 97. Assignment of Mining Rights. – A mining lease contract or any interest therein shall not be transferred, assigned, or
subleased without the prior approval of the Secretary: Provided, That such transfer, assignment or sublease may be made only to a
qualified person possessing the resources and capability to continue the mining operations of the lessee and that the assignor has
complied with all the obligations of the lease: Provided, further, That such transfer or assignment shall be duly registered with the office
of the mining recorder concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
The same provision is reflected in Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which is the new law
governing the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources, which provides:
SEC. 25. Transfer or Assignment. - An exploration permit may be transferred or assigned to a qualified person subject to the approval
of the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director.
The records are bereft of any indication that the assignment bears the imprimatur of the Secretary of the DENR. Presidential Decree
No. 463, which is the governing law when the assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining
rights, including the right to explore a mining area, must be with the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Quite conspicuously, SEM
did not dispute the allegation that the Deed of Assignment was made without the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Absent the
prior approval of the Secretary of DENR, the assignment of EP 133, was, therefore, without legal effect for violating the mandatory
provision of Presidential Decree No. 463.
An added significant omission proved fatal to MMC/SEM’s cause. While it is true that the case of Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia
40
settled the issue of which between Apex and MMC validly acquired mining rights over the disputed area, such rights, though,
had been extinguished by subsequent events. Records indicate that on 6 July 1993, EP 133 was extended for 12 months or until 6 July
1994.
41
MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its expiration. Thus, EP 133 expired by non-renewal.
With the expiration of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. SEM, on the other hand, has not
acquired any right to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have not acquired
any vested right over the 4,941.6759 hectares which used to be covered by EP 133.
II
The Court of Appeals theorizes that DAO No. 66 was issued beyond the power of the DENR Secretary since the power to withdraw
lands from forest reserves and to declare the same as an area open for mining operation resides in the President.
Under Proclamation No. 369 dated 27 February 1931, the power to convert forest reserves as non-forest reserves is vested with the
DENR Secretary. Proclamation No. 369 partly states:
From this reserve shall be considered automatically excluded all areas which had already been certified and which in the future may be
proclaimed as classified and certified lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
42

However, a subsequent law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, otherwise known as "The Mining Act" which was approved on 7 November
1936 provides:
Sec. 14. Lands within reservations for purposes other than mining, which, after such reservation is made, are found to be more valuable
for their mineral contents than for the purpose for which the reservation was made, may be withdrawn from such reservations by the
President with the concurrence of the National Assembly, and thereupon such lands shall revert to the public domain and be subject to
disposition under the provisions of this Act.
Unlike Proclamation No. 369, Commonwealth Act No. 137 vests solely in the President, with the concurrence of the National Assembly,
the power to withdraw forest reserves found to be more valuable for their mineral contents than for the purpose for which the
reservation was made and convert the same into non-forest reserves. A similar provision can also be found in Presidential Decree No.
463 dated 17 May 1974, with the modifications that (1) the declaration by the President no longer requires the concurrence of the
National Assembly and (2) the DENR Secretary merely exercises the power to recommend to the President which forest reservations
are to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reads:
SEC. 8. Exploration and Exploitation of Reserved Lands. – When lands within reservations, which have been established for purposes
other than mining, are found to be more valuable for their mineral contents, they may, upon recommendation of the Secretary be
withdrawn from such reservation by the President and established as a mineral reservation.
Against the backdrop of the applicable statutes which govern the issuance of DAO No. 66, this Court is constrained to rule that said
administrative order was issued not in accordance with the laws. Inescapably, DAO No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the areas
covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest land open to small-scale mining operations, is null and void as,
verily, the DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves.
III
It is the contention of Apex that its right over the Diwalwal gold rush area is superior to that of MMC or that of SEM because it was the
first one to occupy and take possession of the area and the first to record its mining claims over the area.
For its part, Balite argues that with the issuance of DAO No. 66, its occupation in the contested area, particularly in the 729 hectares
small-scale mining area, has entitled it to file its MPSA. Balite claims that its MPSA application should have been given preference over
that of SEM because it was filed ahead.
The MAB, on the other hand, insists that the issue on who has superior right over the disputed area has become moot and academic by
the supervening events. By virtue of Proclamation No. 297 dated 25 November 2002, the disputed area was declared a mineral
reservation.
Proclamation No. 297 excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaimed the same as
mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area, viz:
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 369, series of 1931, certain tracts of public land situated in the then provinces of Davao,
Agusan and Surigao, with an area of approximately 1,927,400 hectares, were withdrawn from settlement and disposition, excludi ng,
however, those portions which had been certified and/or shall be classified and certified as non-forest lands;
WHEREAS, gold deposits have been found within the area covered by Proclamation No. 369, in the Municipality of Monkayo,
Compostela Valley Province, and unregulated small to medium-scale mining operations have, since 1983, been undertaken therein,
causing in the process serious environmental, health, and peace and order problems in the area;
WHEREAS, it is in the national interest to prevent the further degradation of the environment and to resolve the health and peace and
order problems spawned by the unregulated mining operations in the said area;
WHEREAS, these problems may be effectively addressed by rationalizing mining operations in the area through the establishment of a
mineral reservation;
WHEREAS, after giving due notice, the Director of Mines and Geoxciences conducted public hearings on September 6, 9 and 11, 2002
to allow the concerned sectors and communities to air their views regarding the establishment of a mineral reservation in the place in
question;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the President may, upon the recommendation of the Director of
Mines and Geosciences, through the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and when the national interest so requires,
establish mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken by the Department directly or thru a contractor;
WHEREAS, as a measure to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental
protection, the President may, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, as amended, proclaim and declare certain areas in the
country as environmentally critical;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby exclude
certain parcel of land located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaim the same as mineral reservation and as environmentally
critical area, with metes and bound as defined by the following geographical coordinates;
x x x x
with an area of Eight Thousand One Hundred (8,100) hectares, more or less. Mining operations in the area may be undertaken either
by the DENR directly, subject to payment of just compensation that may be due to legitimate and existing claimants, or thru a qualified
contractor, subject to existing rights, if any.
The DENR shall formulate and issue the appropriate guidelines, including the establishment of an environmental and social fund, to
implement the intent and provisions of this Proclamation.
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization of
the natural resources of the country.
43
With this policy, the State may pursue full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or
by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.
44
Thus, Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically
states:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands,
all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. x x x
x x x x
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. x x x (Underscoring
supplied.)
Recognizing the importance of the country’s natural resources, not only for national economic development, but also for its security and
national defense, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 empowers the President, when the national interest so requires, to establish
mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor.
To implement the intent and provisions of Proclamation No. 297, the DENR Secretary issued DAO No. 2002-18 dated 12 August 2002
declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein.
The issue on who has priority right over the disputed area is deemed overtaken by the above subsequent developments particularly
with the issuance of Proclamation 297 and DAO No. 2002-18, both being constitutionally-sanctioned acts of the Executive Branch.
Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through the executive
branch. Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration, development and
utilization of the area or it can enter into agreements with qualified entities, viz:
SEC 5. Mineral Reservations. – When the national interest so requires, such as when there is a need to preserve strategic raw
materials for industries critical to national development, or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or ecological value, the President may
establish mineral reservations upon the recommendation of the Director through the Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral
reservations and such other reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the Department or through a
contractor x x x .
It is now up to the Executive Department whether to take the first option, i.e., to undertake directly the mining operations of the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area. As already ruled, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only
plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. The State need be guided only by the demands of
public interest in settling on this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
45
The State can also opt to award mining
operations in the mineral reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, if it wishes. The exercise of this
prerogative lies with the Executive Department over which courts will not interfere.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions of Apex, Balite and the MAB are PARTIALLY GRANTED, thus:
1. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 13 March 2002, and hereby declare that
EP 133 of MMC has EXPIRED on 7 July 1994 and that its subsequent transfer to SEM on 16 February 1994 is VOID.
2. We AFFIRM the finding of the Court of Appeals in the same Decision declaring DAO No. 66 illegal for having been issued in
excess of the DENR Secretary’s authority.
Consequently, the State, should it so desire, may now award mining operations in the disputed area to any qualified entity it may
determine. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 76931 May 29, 1991
ORIENT AIR SERVICES & HOTEL REPRESENTATIVES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN AIR-LINES INCORPORATED, respondents.
PADILLA, J .:p
This case is a consolidation of two (2) petitions for review on certiorari of a decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-04294,
entitled "American Airlines, Inc. vs. Orient Air Services and Hotel Representatives, Inc." which affirmed, with modification, the
decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IV, which dismissed the complaint and granted therein defendant's counterclaim
for agent's overriding commission and damages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 15 January 1977, American Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as American Air), an air carrier offering passenger and air cargo
transportation in the Philippines, and Orient Air Services and Hotel Representatives (hereinafter referred to as Orient Air), entered into a
General Sales Agency Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), whereby the former authorized the latter to act as its
exclusive general sales agent within the Philippines for the sale of air passenger transportation. Pertinent provisions of the agreement
are reproduced, to wit:
WITNESSETH
In consideration of the mutual convenants herein contained, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. Representation of American by Orient Air Services
Orient Air Services will act on American's behalf as its exclusive General Sales Agent within the Philippines, including
any United States military installation therein which are not serviced by an Air Carrier Representation Office (ACRO),
for the sale of air passenger transportation. The services to be performed by Orient Air Services shall include:
(a) soliciting and promoting passenger traffic for the services of American and, if necessary,
employing staff competent and sufficient to do so;
(b) providing and maintaining a suitable area in its place of business to be used exclusively for the
transaction of the business of American;
(c) arranging for distribution of American's timetables, tariffs and promotional material to sales
agents and the general public in the assigned territory;
(d) servicing and supervising of sales agents (including such sub-agents as may be appointed by
Orient Air Services with the prior written consent of American) in the assigned territory including if
required by American the control of remittances and commissions retained; and
(e) holding out a passenger reservation facility to sales agents and the general public in the
assigned territory.
In connection with scheduled or non-scheduled air passenger transportation within the United States, neither Orient
Air Services nor its sub-agents will perform services for any other air carrier similar to those to be performed
hereunder for American without the prior written consent of American. Subject to periodic instructions and continued
consent from American, Orient Air Services may sell air passenger transportation to be performed within the United
States by other scheduled air carriers provided American does not provide substantially equivalent schedules
between the points involved.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Remittances
Orient Air Services shall remit in United States dollars to American the ticket stock or exchange orders, less
commissions to which Orient Air Services is entitled hereunder, not less frequently than semi-monthly, on the 15th
and last days of each month for sales made during the preceding half month.
All monies collected by Orient Air Services for transportation sold hereunder on American's ticket stock or on
exchange orders, less applicable commissions to which Orient Air Services is entitled hereunder, are the property of
American and shall be held in trust by Orient Air Services until satisfactorily accounted for to American.
5. Commissions
American will pay Orient Air Services commission on transportation sold hereunder by Orient Air Services or its sub-
agents as follows:
(a) Sales agency commission
American will pay Orient Air Services a sales agency commission for all sales of transportation by Orient Air Services
or its sub-agents over American's services and any connecting through air transportation, when made on American's
ticket stock, equal to the following percentages of the tariff fares and charges:
(i) For transportation solely between points within the United States and between such points and
Canada: 7% or such other rate(s) as may be prescribed by the Air Traffic Conference of America.
(ii) For transportation included in a through ticket covering transportation between points other than
those described above: 8% or such other rate(s) as may be prescribed by the International Air
Transport Association.
(b) Overriding commission
In addition to the above commission American will pay Orient Air Services an overriding commission of 3% of the
tariff fares and charges for all sales of transportation over American's service by Orient Air Service or its sub-agents.
xxx xxx xxx
10. Default
If Orient Air Services shall at any time default in observing or performing any of the provisions of this Agreement or
shall become bankrupt or make any assignment for the benefit of or enter into any agreement or promise with its
creditors or go into liquidation, or suffer any of its goods to be taken in execution, or if it ceases to be in business, this
Agreement may, at the option of American, be terminated forthwith and American may, without prejudice to any of its
rights under this Agreement, take possession of any ticket forms, exchange orders, traffic material or other property
or funds belonging to American.
11. IATA and ATC Rules
The provisions of this Agreement are subject to any applicable rules or resolutions of the International Air Transport
Association and the Air Traffic Conference of America, and such rules or resolutions shall control in the event of any
conflict with the provisions hereof.
xxx xxx xxx
13. Termination
American may terminate the Agreement on two days' notice in the event Orient Air Services is unable to transfer to
the United States the funds payable by Orient Air Services to American under this Agreement. Either party may
terminate the Agreement without cause by giving the other 30 days' notice by letter, telegram or cable.
xxx xxx xxx
3

On 11 May 1981, alleging that Orient Air had reneged on its obligations under the Agreement by failing to promptly remit the net
proceeds of sales for the months of January to March 1981 in the amount of US $254,400.40, American Air by itself undertook the
collection of the proceeds of tickets sold originally by Orient Air and terminated forthwith the Agreement in accordance with Paragraph
13 thereof (Termination). Four (4) days later, or on 15 May 1981, American Air instituted suit against Orient Air with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch 24, for Accounting with Preliminary Attachment or Garnishment, Mandatory Injunction and Restraining
Order
4
averring the aforesaid basis for the termination of the Agreement as well as therein defendant's previous record of failures "to
promptly settle past outstanding refunds of which there were available funds in the possession of the defendant, . . . to the damage and
prejudice of plaintiff."
5

In its Answer
6
with counterclaim dated 9 July 1981, defendant Orient Air denied the material allegations of the complaint with respect to
plaintiff's entitlement to alleged unremitted amounts, contending that after application thereof to the commissions due it under the
Agreement, plaintiff in fact still owed Orient Air a balance in unpaid overriding commissions. Further, the defendant contended that the
actions taken by American Air in the course of terminating the Agreement as well as the termination itself were untenable, Orient Air
claiming that American Air's precipitous conduct had occasioned prejudice to its business interests.
Finding that the record and the evidence substantiated the allegations of the defendant, the trial court ruled in its favor, rendering a
decision dated 16 July 1984, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendant and against
plaintiff dismissing the complaint and holding the termination made by the latter as affecting the GSA agreement
illegal and improper and order the plaintiff to reinstate defendant as its general sales agent for passenger
tranportation in the Philippines in accordance with said GSA agreement; plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant the
balance of the overriding commission on total flown revenue covering the period from March 16, 1977 to December
31, 1980 in the amount of US$84,821.31 plus the additional amount of US$8,000.00 by way of proper 3% overriding
commission per month commencing from January 1, 1981 until such reinstatement or said amounts in its Philippine
peso equivalent legally prevailing at the time of payment plus legal interest to commence from the filing of the
counterclaim up to the time of payment. Further, plaintiff is directed to pay defendant the amount of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand (Pl,500,000.00) pesos as and for exemplary damages; and the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) pesos as and by way of attorney's fees.
Costs against plaintiff.
7

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in a decision promulgated on 27 January 1986, affirmed the
findings of the court a quo on their material points but with some modifications with respect to the monetary awards granted. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the following modifications —
1) American is ordered to pay Orient the sum of US$53,491.11 representing the balance of the latter's overriding
commission covering the period March 16, 1977 to December 31, 1980, or its Philippine peso equivalent in
accordance with the official rate of exchange legally prevailing on July 10, 1981, the date the counterclaim was filed;
2) American is ordered to pay Orient the sum of US$7,440.00 as the latter's overriding commission per month starting
January 1, 1981 until date of termination, May 9, 1981 or its Philippine peso equivalent in accordance with the official
rate of exchange legally prevailing on July 10, 1981, the date the counterclaim was filed
3) American is ordered to pay interest of 12% on said amounts from July 10, 1981 the date the answer with
counterclaim was filed, until full payment;
4) American is ordered to pay Orient exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
5) American is ordered to pay Orient the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.
the rest of the appealed decision is affirmed.
Costs against American.
8

American Air moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision, assailing the substance thereof and arguing for its reversal.
The appellate court's decision was also the subject of a Motion for Partial Reconsideration by Orient Air which prayed for the restoration
of the trial court's ruling with respect to the monetary awards. The Court of Appeals, by resolution promulgated on 17 December 1986,
denied American Air's motion and with respect to that of Orient Air, ruled thus:
Orient's motion for partial reconsideration is denied insofar as it prays for affirmance of the trial court's award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, but granted insofar as the rate of exchange is concerned. The decision of
January 27, 1986 is modified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive part so that the payment of the sums
mentioned therein shall be at their Philippine peso equivalent in accordance with the official rate of exchange legally
prevailing on the date of actual payment.
9

Both parties appealed the aforesaid resolution and decision of the respondent court, Orient Air as petitioner in G.R. No. 76931 and
American Air as petitioner in G.R. No. 76933. By resolution
10
of this Court dated 25 March 1987 both petitions were consolidated,
hence, the case at bar.
The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the extent of Orient Air's right to the 3% overriding commission. It is the stand of
American Air that such commission is based only on sales of its services actually negotiated or transacted by Orient Air, otherwise
referred to as "ticketed sales." As basis thereof, primary reliance is placed upon paragraph 5(b) of the Agreement which, in reiteration,
is quoted as follows:
5. Commissions
a) . . .
b) Overriding Commission
In addition to the above commission, American will pay Orient Air Services an overriding commission of 3% of the
tariff fees and charges for all sales of transportation over American's services by Orient Air Services or its sub-
agents. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Orient Air was allowed to carry only the ticket stocks of American Air, and the former not having opted to appoint any sub-agents,
it is American Air's contention that Orient Air can claim entitlement to the disputed overriding commission based only on ticketed sales.
This is supposed to be the clear meaning of the underscored portion of the above provision. Thus, to be entitled to the 3% overriding
commission, the sale must be made by Orient Air and the sale must be done with the use of American Air's ticket stocks.
On the other hand, Orient Air contends that the contractual stipulation of a 3% overriding commission covers the total revenue of
American Air and not merely that derived from ticketed sales undertaken by Orient Air. The latter, in justification of its submission,
invokes its designation as the exclusive General Sales Agent of American Air, with the corresponding obligations arising from such
agency, such as, the promotion and solicitation for the services of its principal. In effect, by virtue of such exclusivity, "all sales of
transportation over American Air's services are necessarily by Orient Air."
11

It is a well settled legal principle that in the interpretation of a contract, the entirety thereof must be taken into consideration to ascertain
the meaning of its provisions.
12
The various stipulations in the contract must be read together to give effect to all.
13
After a careful
examination of the records, the Court finds merit in the contention of Orient Air that the Agreement, when interpreted in accordance with
the foregoing principles, entitles it to the 3% overriding commission based on total revenue, or as referred to by the parties, "total flown
revenue."
As the designated exclusive General Sales Agent of American Air, Orient Air was responsible for the promotion and marketing of
American Air's services for air passenger transportation, and the solicitation of sales therefor. In return for such efforts and services,
Orient Air was to be paid commissions of two (2) kinds: first, a sales agency commission, ranging from 7-8% of tariff fares and charges
from sales by Orient Air when made on American Air ticket stock; and second, an overriding commission of 3% of tariff fares and
charges for all sales of passenger transportation over American Air services. It is immediately observed that the precondition attached
to the first type of commission does not obtain for the second type of commissions. The latter type of commissions would accrue for
sales of American Air services made not on its ticket stock but on the ticket stock of other air carriers sold by such carriers or other
authorized ticketing facilities or travel agents. To rule otherwise, i.e., to limit the basis of such overriding commissions to sales from
American Air ticket stock would erase any distinction between the two (2) types of commissions and would lead to the absurd
conclusion that the parties had entered into a contract with meaningless provisions. Such an interpretation must at all times be avoided
with every effort exerted to harmonize the entire Agreement.
An additional point before finally disposing of this issue. It is clear from the records that American Air was the party responsible for the
preparation of the Agreement. Consequently, any ambiguity in this "contract of adhesion" is to be taken "contra proferentem", i.e.,
construed against the party who caused the ambiguity and could have avoided it by the exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article 1377
of the Civil Code provides that the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity.
14
To put it differently, when several interpretations of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that interpretation or
construction is to be adopted which is most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made and who did not cause the
ambiguity.
15
We therefore agree with the respondent appellate court's declaration that:
Any ambiguity in a contract, whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations, must be read against the party
who drafted it.
16

We now turn to the propriety of American Air's termination of the Agreement. The respondent appellate court, on this issue, ruled thus:
It is not denied that Orient withheld remittances but such action finds justification from paragraph 4 of the Agreement,
Exh. F, which provides for remittances to American less commissions to which Orient is entitled, and from paragraph
5(d) which specifically allows Orient to retain the full amount of its commissions. Since, as stated ante, Orient is
entitled to the 3% override. American's premise, therefore, for the cancellation of the Agreement did not exist. . . ."
We agree with the findings of the respondent appellate court. As earlier established, Orient Air was entitled to an overriding commission
based on total flown revenue. American Air's perception that Orient Air was remiss or in default of its obligations under the Agreement
was, in fact, a situation where the latter acted in accordance with the Agreement—that of retaining from the sales proceeds its accrued
commissions before remitting the balance to American Air. Since the latter was still obligated to Orient Air by way of such commissions.
Orient Air was clearly justified in retaining and refusing to remit the sums claimed by American Air. The latter's termination of the
Agreement was, therefore, without cause and basis, for which it should be held liable to Orient Air.
On the matter of damages, the respondent appellate court modified by reduction the trial court's award of exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. This Court sees no error in such modification and, thus, affirms the same.
It is believed, however, that respondent appellate court erred in affirming the rest of the decision of the trial court. We refer particularly
to the lower court's decision ordering American Air to "reinstate defendant as its general sales agent for passenger transportation in the
Philippines in accordance with said GSA Agreement."
By affirming this ruling of the trial court, respondent appellate court, in effect, compels American Air to extend its personality to Orient
Air. Such would be violative of the principles and essence of agency, defined by law as a contract whereby "a person binds himself to
render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, WITH THE CONSENT OR AUTHORITY OF THE
LATTER .
17
(emphasis supplied) In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the
agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do.
Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any
court. The Agreement itself between the parties states that "either party may terminate the Agreement without cause by giving the other
30 days' notice by letter, telegram or cable." (emphasis supplied) We, therefore, set aside the portion of the ruling of the respondent
appellate court reinstating Orient Air as general sales agent of American Air.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modification, the Court AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals,
dated 27 January 1986 and 17 December 1986, respectively. Costs against petitioner American Air.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part. Son is a partner in one of the counsel.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.














DIGEST:
ORIENT AIR SERVICES & HOTEL REPRESENTATIVES v. COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN AIR-LINES INCORPORATED
Facts:
American Airlines, Inc. (American Air), an air carrier offering passenger and air cargo transportation in the Philippines, and Orient Air
Services and Hotel Representatives (Orient Air), entered into a General Sales Agency Agreement (Agreement), whereby the former
authorized the latter to act as its exclusive general sales agent within the Philippines for the sale of air passenger transportation.
In the agreement, Orient Air shall remit in United States dollars to American the ticket stock or exchange orders, less commissions to
which Orient Air Services is entitled, not less frequently than semi-monthly. On the other hand, American will pay Orient Air Services
commission on transportation sold by Orient Air Services or its sub-agents.
Thereafter, American alleged that Orient Air had reneged on its obligations under the Agreement by failing to promptly remit the net
proceeds of sales for the months of January to March 1981 in the amount of US $254,400.40, American Air by itself undertook the
collection of the proceeds of tickets sold originally by Orient Air and terminated forthwith the Agreement in accordance with paragraph
13 which authorize the termination of the thereof in case Orient Air is unable to transfer to the United States the funds payable by Orient
Air Services to American.
American Air instituted suit against Orient Air with the Court of First Instance of Manila ―for Accounting with Preliminary Attachment or
Garnishment, Mandatory Injunction and Restraining Order‖ averring the aforesaid basis for the termination of the Agreement as well as
therein defendant's previous record of failures "to promptly settle past outstanding refunds of which there were available funds in the
possession of the defendant, . . . to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff."
Orient Air denied the material allegations of the complaint with respect to plaintiff's entitlement to alleged unremitted amounts,
contending that after application thereof to the commissions due it under the Agreement, plaintiff in fact still owed Orient Air a balance
in unpaid overriding commissions.
Further, the defendant contended that the actions taken by American Air in the course of terminating the Agreement as well as the
termination itself were untenable. The trial court ruled in its favor which decision was affirmed with modification by Court of Appeals. It
held the termination made by the latter as affecting the GSA agreement illegal and improper and ordered the plaintiff to reinstate
defendant as its general sales agent for passenger transportation in the Philippines in accordance with said GSA agreement.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reinstatement of the defendant as its general sales agent for passenger transportation
in the Philippines in accordance with said GSA Agreement
Held:
Yes. By affirming this ruling of the trial court, respondent appellate court, in effect, compels American Air to extend its personality to
Orient Air. Such would be violative of the principles and essence of agency, defined by law as a contract whereby "a person binds
himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, WITH THE CONSENT OR AUTHORITY
OF THE LATTER.
In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by
legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him do. Such a relationship can only be
effected with the consent of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any court. The Agreement itself
between the parties states that "either party may terminate the Agreement without cause by giving the other 30 days' notice by letter,
telegram or cable." (emphasis supplied) We, therefore, set aside the portion of the ruling of the respondent appellate court reinstating
Orient Air as general sales agent of American Air.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-24332 January 31, 1978
RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J .:
This is a case of an attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos, who after of his death of his principal, Concepcion Rallos, sold the latter's
undivided share in a parcel of land pursuant to a power of attorney which the principal had executed in favor. The administrator of the
estate of the went to court to have the sale declared uneanforceable and to recover the disposed share. The trial court granted the relief
prayed for, but upon appeal the Court of Appeals uphold the validity of the sale and the complaint.
Hence, this Petition for Review on certiorari.
The following facts are not disputed. Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters and registered co-owners of a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry
of Cebu. On April 21, 1954, the sisters executed a special power of attorney in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to
sell for and in their behalf lot 5983. On March 3, 1955, Concepcion Rallos died. On September 12, 1955, Simeon Rallos sold the
undivided shares of his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia in lot 5983 to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation for the sum of
P10,686.90. The deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Cebu, TCT No. 11118 was cancelled, and a new transfer
certificate of Title No. 12989 was issued in the named of the vendee.
On May 18, 1956 Ramon Rallos as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Concepcion Rallos filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. R-4530 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, praying (1) that the sale of the undivided share of the deceased Concepcion Rallos
in lot 5983 be d unenforceable, and said share be reconveyed to her estate; (2) that the Certificate of 'title issued in the name of Felix
Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation be cancelled and another title be issued in the names of the corporation and the "Intestate estate
of Concepcion Rallos" in equal undivided and (3) that plaintiff be indemnified by way of attorney's fees and payment of costs of suit.
Named party defendants were Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, Simeon Rallos, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu, but
subsequently, the latter was dropped from the complaint. The complaint was amended twice; defendant Corporation's Answer
contained a crossclaim against its co-defendant, Simon Rallos while the latter filed third-party complaint against his sister, Gerundia
Rallos While the case was pending in the trial court, both Simon and his sister Gerundia died and they were substituted by the
respective administrators of their estates.
After trial the court a quo rendered judgment with the following dispositive portion:
A. On Plaintiffs Complaint —
(1) Declaring the deed of sale, Exh. "C", null and void insofar as the one-half pro-indiviso share of
Concepcion Rallos in the property in question, — Lot 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu — is
concerned;
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12989
covering Lot 5983 and to issue in lieu thereof another in the names of FELIX GO CHAN & SONS
REALTY CORPORATION and the Estate of Concepcion Rallos in the proportion of one-half (1/2)
share each pro-indiviso;
(3) Ordering Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation to deliver the possession of an undivided
one-half (1/2) share of Lot 5983 to the herein plaintiff;
(4) Sentencing the defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to
pay to plaintiff in concept of reasonable attorney's fees the sum of P1,000.00; and
(5) Ordering both defendants to pay the costs jointly and severally.
B. On GO CHANTS Cross-Claim:
(1) Sentencing the co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos,
to pay to defendant Felix Co Chan & Sons Realty Corporation the sum of P5,343.45, representing
the price of one-half (1/2) share of lot 5983;
(2) Ordering co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay
in concept of reasonable attorney's fees to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation the sum of
P500.00.
C. On Third-Party Complaint of defendant Juan T. Borromeo administrator of Estate of Simeon Rallos, against
Josefina Rallos special administratrix of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos:
(1) Dismissing the third-party complaint without prejudice to filing either a complaint against the regular administrator
of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos or a claim in the Intestate-Estate of Cerundia Rallos, covering the same subject-
matter of the third-party complaint, at bar. (pp. 98-100, Record on Appeal)
Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals from the foregoing judgment insofar as it set
aside the sale of the one-half (1/2) share of Concepcion Rallos. The appellate tribunal, as adverted to earlier, resolved the appeal on
November 20, 1964 in favor of the appellant corporation sustaining the sale in question.
1
The appellee administrator, Ramon Rallos,
moved for a reconsider of the decision but the same was denied in a resolution of March 4, 1965.
2

What is the legal effect of an act performed by an agent after the death of his principal? Applied more particularly to the instant case,
We have the query. is the sale of the undivided share of Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 valid although it was executed by the agent after
the death of his principal? What is the law in this jurisdiction as to the effect of the death of the principal on the authority of the agent to
act for and in behalf of the latter? Is the fact of knowledge of the death of the principal a material factor in determining the legal effect of
an act performed after such death?
Before proceedings to the issues, We shall briefly restate certain principles of law relevant to the matter tinder consideration.
1. It is a basic axiom in civil law embodied in our Civil Code that no one may contract in the name of another without being authorized
by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
3
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or the legal representation or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
4
Article 1403 (1) of
the same Code also provides:
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are justified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who hi - been given no authority or legal representation
or who has acted beyond his powers; ...
Out of the above given principles, sprung the creation and acceptance of the relationship of agency whereby one party, caged the
principal (mandante), authorizes another, called the agent (mandatario), to act for and in his behalf in transactions with third persons.
The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object
is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agents acts as a representative and not for himsel f, and (4) the
agent acts within the scope of his authority.
5

Agency is basically personal representative, and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers
granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium facit se. "He
who acts through another acts himself".
6

2. There are various ways of extinguishing agency,
7
but her We are concerned only with one cause — death of the principal Paragraph
3 of Art. 1919 of the Civil Code which was taken from Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code provides:
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished.
xxx xxx xxx
3. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent; ... (Emphasis supplied)
By reason of the very nature of the relationship between Principal and agent, agency is extinguished by the death of the principal or the
agent. This is the law in this jurisdiction.
8

Manresa commenting on Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code explains that the rationale for the law is found in thejuridical basis of
agency which is representation Them being an in. integration of the personality of the principal integration that of the agent it is not
possible for the representation to continue to exist once the death of either is establish. Pothier agrees with Manresa that by reason of
the nature of agency, death is a necessary cause for its extinction. Laurent says that the juridical tie between the principal and the
agent is severed ipso jure upon the death of either without necessity for the heirs of the fact to notify the agent of the fact of death of the
former.
9

The same rule prevails at common law — the death of the principal effects instantaneous and absolute revocation of the authority of the
agent unless the Power be coupled with an interest.
10
This is the prevalent rule in American Jurisprudence where it is well-settled that
a power without an interest confer. red upon an agent is dissolved by the principal's death, and any attempted execution of the power
afterward is not binding on the heirs or representatives of the deceased.
11

3. Is the general rule provided for in Article 1919 that the death of the principal or of the agent extinguishes the agency, subject to any
exception, and if so, is the instant case within that exception? That is the determinative point in issue in this litigation. It is the contention
of respondent corporation which was sustained by respondent court that notwithstanding the death of the principal Concepcion Rallos
the act of the attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos in selling the former's sham in the property is valid and enforceable inasmuch as the
corporation acted in good faith in buying the property in question.
Articles 1930 and 1931 of the Civil Code provide the exceptions to the general rule afore-mentioned.
ART. 1930. The agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of the principal, if it has been
constituted in the common interest of the latter and of the agent, or in the interest of a third person who has accepted
the stipulation in his favor.
ART. 1931. Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the principal or of any other cause which
extinguishes the agency, is valid and shall be fully effective with respect to third persons who may have contracted
with him in good. faith.
Article 1930 is not involved because admittedly the special power of attorney executed in favor of Simeon Rallos was not coupled with
an interest.
Article 1931 is the applicable law. Under this provision, an act done by the agent after the death of his principal is valid and effective
only under two conditions, viz: (1) that the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the principal and (2) that the third person who
contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith. Good faith here means that the third person was not aware of the death of the
principal at the time he contracted with said agent. These two requisites must concur the absence of one will render the act of the agent
invalid and unenforceable.
In the instant case, it cannot be questioned that the agent, Simeon Rallos, knew of the death of his principal at the time he sold the
latter's share in Lot No. 5983 to respondent corporation. The knowledge of the death is clearly to be inferred from the pleadings filed by
Simon Rallos before the trial court.
12
That Simeon Rallos knew of the death of his sister Concepcion is also a finding of fact of the court
a quo
13
and of respondent appellate court when the latter stated that Simon Rallos 'must have known of the death of his sister, and yet
he proceeded with the sale of the lot in the name of both his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos without informing appellant (the
realty corporation) of the death of the former.
14

On the basis of the established knowledge of Simon Rallos concerning the death of his principal Concepcion Rallos, Article 1931 of the
Civil Code is inapplicable. The law expressly requires for its application lack of knowledge on the part of the agent of the death of his
principal; it is not enough that the third person acted in good faith. Thus in Buason & Reyes v. Panuyas, the Court applying Article 1738
of the old Civil rode now Art. 1931 of the new Civil Code sustained the validity , of a sale made after the death of the principal because
it was not shown that the agent knew of his principal's demise.
15
To the same effect is the case of Herrera, et al., v. Luy Kim Guan, et
al., 1961, where in the words of Justice Jesus Barrera the Court stated:
... even granting arguemendo that Luis Herrera did die in 1936, plaintiffs presented no proof and there is no indication
in the record, that the agent Luy Kim Guan was aware of the death of his principal at the time he sold the property.
The death 6f the principal does not render the act of an agent unenforceable, where the latter had no knowledge of
such extinguishment of the agency. (1 SCRA 406, 412)
4. In sustaining the validity of the sale to respondent consideration the Court of Appeals reasoned out that there is no provision in the
Code which provides that whatever is done by an agent having knowledge of the death of his principal is void even with respect to third
persons who may have contracted with him in good faith and without knowledge of the death of the principal.
16

We cannot see the merits of the foregoing argument as it ignores the existence of the general rule enunciated in Article 1919 that the
death of the principal extinguishes the agency. That being the general rule it follows a fortiorithat any act of an agent after the death of
his principal is void ab initio unless the same fags under the exception provided for in the aforementioned Articles 1930 and 1931.
Article 1931, being an exception to the general rule, is to be strictly construed, it is not to be given an interpretation or application
beyond the clear import of its terms for otherwise the courts will be involved in a process of legislation outside of their judicial function.
5. Another argument advanced by respondent court is that the vendee acting in good faith relied on the power of attorney which was
duly registered on the original certificate of title recorded in the Register of Deeds of the province of Cebu, that no notice of the death
was aver annotated on said certificate of title by the heirs of the principal and accordingly they must suffer the consequences of such
omission.
17

To support such argument reference is made to a portion in Manresa's Commentaries which We quote:
If the agency has been granted for the purpose of contracting with certain persons, the revocation must be made
known to them. But if the agency is general iii nature, without reference to particular person with whom the agent is to
contract, it is sufficient that the principal exercise due diligence to make the revocation of the agency publicity known.
In case of a general power which does not specify the persons to whom represents' on should be made, it is the
general opinion that all acts, executed with third persons who contracted in good faith, Without knowledge of the
revocation, are valid. In such case, the principal may exercise his right against the agent, who, knowing of the
revocation, continued to assume a personality which he no longer had. (Manresa Vol. 11, pp. 561 and 575; pp. 15-16,
rollo)
The above discourse however, treats of revocation by an act of the principal as a mode of terminating an agency which is to be
distinguished from revocation by operation of law such as death of the principal which obtains in this case. On page six of this Opinion
We stressed that by reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent, agency is extinguished ipso jure upon
the death of either principal or agent. Although a revocation of a power of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties
concerned,
18
yet a revocation by operation of law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously effective inasmuch as
"by legal fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an execution of the principal's continuing will.
19
With death, the
principal's will ceases or is the of authority is extinguished.
The Civil Code does not impose a duty on the heirs to notify the agent of the death of the principal What the Code provides i n Article
1932 is that, if the agent die his heirs must notify the principal thereof, and in the meantime adopt such measures as the circumstances
may demand in the interest of the latter. Hence, the fact that no notice of the death of the principal was registered on the certificate of
title of the property in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is not fatal to the cause of the estate of the principal
6. Holding that the good faith of a third person in said with an agent affords the former sufficient protection, respondent court drew a
"parallel" between the instant case and that of an innocent purchaser for value of a land, stating that if a person purchases a registered
land from one who acquired it in bad faith — even to the extent of foregoing or falsifying the deed of sale in his favor — the registered
owner has no recourse against such innocent purchaser for value but only against the forger.
20

To support the correctness of this respondent corporation, in its brief, cites the case of Blondeau, et al., v. Nano and Vallejo, 61 Phil.
625. We quote from the brief:
In the case of Angel Blondeau et al. v. Agustin Nano et al., 61 Phil. 630, one Vallejo was a co-owner of lands with
Agustin Nano. The latter had a power of attorney supposedly executed by Vallejo Nano in his favor. Vallejo delivered
to Nano his land titles. The power was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. When the lawyer-husband of
Angela Blondeau went to that Office, he found all in order including the power of attorney. But Vallejo denied having
executed the power The lower court sustained Vallejo and the plaintiff Blondeau appealed. Reversing the decision of
the court a quo, the Supreme Court, quoting the ruling in the case of Eliason v. Wilborn, 261 U.S. 457, held:
But there is a narrower ground on which the defenses of the defendant- appellee must be
overruled. Agustin Nano had possession of Jose Vallejo's title papers. Without those title papers
handed over to Nano with the acquiescence of Vallejo, a fraud could not have been perpetuated.
When Fernando de la Canters, a member of the Philippine Bar and the husband of Angela
Blondeau, the principal plaintiff, searched the registration record, he found them in due form
including the power of attorney of Vallajo in favor of Nano. If this had not been so and if thereafter
the proper notation of the encumbrance could not have been made, Angela Blondeau would not
have sent P12,000.00 to the defendant Vallejo.' An executed transfer of registered lands placed by
the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party
that the holder of the transfer is authorized to deal with the land.
As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust,
the one who made it possible by his act of coincidence bear the loss. (pp. 19-21)
The Blondeau decision, however, is not on all fours with the case before Us because here We are confronted with one who admittedly
was an agent of his sister and who sold the property of the latter after her death with full knowledge of such death. The situation is
expressly covered by a provision of law on agency the terms of which are clear and unmistakable leaving no room for an interpretation
contrary to its tenor, in the same manner that the ruling in Blondeau and the cases cited therein found a basis in Section 55 of the Land
Registration Law which in part provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration
shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instruments, and the new certificate or memorandum Shall be
binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons claiming under him in favor of every purchaser for value and
in good faith: Provided however, That in all cases of registration provided by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal
and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the right, of any innocent
holder for value of a certificate of title. ... (Act No. 496 as amended)
7. One last point raised by respondent corporation in support of the appealed decision is an 1842 ruling of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Cassiday v. McKenzie wherein payments made to an agent after the death of the principal were held to be "good", "the
parties being ignorant of the death". Let us take note that the Opinion of Justice Rogers was premised on the statement that the parties
were ignorant of the death of the principal. We quote from that decision the following:
... Here the precise point is, whether a payment to an agent when the Parties are ignorant of the death is a good
payment. in addition to the case in Campbell before cited, the same judge Lord Ellenboruogh, has decided in 5 Esp.
117, the general question that a payment after the death of principal is not good. Thus, a payment of sailor's wages to
a person having a power of attorney to receive them, has been held void when the principal was dead at the time of
the payment. If, by this case, it is meant merely to decide the general proposition that by operation of law the death of
the principal is a revocation of the powers of the attorney, no objection can be taken to it. But if it intended to say that
his principle applies where there was 110 notice of death, or opportunity of twice I must be permitted to dissent from
it.
... That a payment may be good today, or bad tomorrow, from the accident circumstance of the death of the principal,
which he did not know, and which by no possibility could he know? It would be unjust to the agent and unjust to the
debtor. In the civil law, the acts of the agent, done bona fide in ignorance of the death of his principal are held valid
and binding upon the heirs of the latter. The same rule holds in the Scottish law, and I cannot believe the common
law is so unreasonable... (39 Am. Dec. 76, 80, 81; emphasis supplied)
To avoid any wrong impression which the Opinion in Cassiday v. McKenzie may evoke, mention may be made that the above
represents the minority view in American jurisprudence. Thus in Clayton v. Merrett, the Court said.—
There are several cases which seem to hold that although, as a general principle, death revokes an agency and
renders null every act of the agent thereafter performed, yet that where a payment has been made in ignorance of the
death, such payment will be good. The leading case so holding is that of Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & S. (Pa)
282, 39 Am. 76, where, in an elaborate opinion, this view ii broadly announced. It is referred to, and seems to have
been followed, in the case of Dick v. Page,17 Mo. 234, 57 AmD 267; but in this latter case it appeared that the estate
of the deceased principal had received the benefit of the money paid, and therefore the representative of the estate
might well have been held to be estopped from suing for it again. . . . These cases, in so far, at least, as they
announce the doctrine under discussion, are exceptional. The Pennsylvania Case, supra (Cassiday v. McKenzie 4
Watts & S. 282, 39 AmD 76), is believed to stand almost, if not quite, alone in announcing the principle in its broadest
scope. (52, Misc. 353, 357, cited in 2 C.J. 549)
So also in Travers v. Crane, speaking of Cassiday v. McKenzie, and pointing out that the opinion, except so far as it related to the
particular facts, was a mere dictum, Baldwin J. said:
The opinion, therefore, of the learned Judge may be regarded more as an extrajudicial indication of his views on the
general subject, than as the adjudication of the Court upon the point in question. But accordingly all power weight to
this opinion, as the judgment of a of great respectability, it stands alone among common law authorities and is
opposed by an array too formidable to permit us to following it. (15 Cal. 12,17, cited in 2 C.J. 549)
Whatever conflict of legal opinion was generated by Cassiday v. McKenzie in American jurisprudence, no such conflict exists in our own
for the simple reason that our statute, the Civil Code, expressly provides for two exceptions to the general rule that death of the
principal revokes ipso jure the agency, to wit: (1) that the agency is coupled with an interest (Art 1930), and (2) that the act of the agent
was executed without knowledge of the death of the principal and the third person who contracted with the agent acted also in good
faith (Art. 1931). Exception No. 2 is the doctrine followed in Cassiday, and again We stress the indispensable requirement that the
agent acted without knowledge or notice of the death of the principal In the case before Us the agent Ramon Rallos executed the sale
notwithstanding notice of the death of his principal Accordingly, the agent's act is unenforceable against the estate of his principal.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We set aside the ecision of respondent appellate court, and We affirm en toto the judgment
rendered by then Hon. Amador E. Gomez of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, quoted in pages 2 and 3 of this Opinion, with costs
against respondent realty corporation at all instances.
So Ordered. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
DIGEST:
RALLOS v GO CHAN
G.R. No. L-24332
January 31, 1978

Petitioner: RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS
Respodents: FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: MUÑOZ PALMA

FACTS:
BACKGROUND OF CASE
 This is a case of an attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos, who after of his death of his principal, Concepcion Rallos, sold the latter's
undivided share in a parcel of land pursuant to a power of attorney which the principal had executed in favor. The
administrator of the estate went to court to have the sale declared uneanforceable and to recover the disposed share.
 TC granted the relief prayed for, but upon appeal CA uphold the validity of the sale and the complaint. Hence, this Petition for
Review on certiorari.

FACTS OF THE CASE
 Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters and registered co-owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry of Cebu.
 April 21, 1954: the sisters executed a special power of attorney in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell
for and in their behalf lot 5983.
 March 3, 1955: Concepcion Rallos died.
 September 12, 1955, Simeon Rallos sold the undivided shares of his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia in lot 5983 to Felix Go
Chan & Sons Realty Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. The deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Cebu, TCT No. 11118 was cancelled, and a new transfer certificate of Title No. 12989 was issued in the named of the vendee.

FILING OF ACTION
 May 18, 1956: Ramon Rallos as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Concepcion Rallos filed a complaint praying that:
1. Sale of the undivided share of the deceased Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 be unenforceable, and said share be
reconveyed to her estate
2. Certificate of 'title issued in the name of Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation be cancelled and another title be
issued in the names of the corporation and the "Intestate estate of Concepcion Rallos" in equal undivided and
3. Plaintiff be indemnified by way of attorney's fees and payment of costs of suit.
 Named party defendants were Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, Simeon Rallos, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu,
but subsequently, the latter was dropped from the complaint.
 The complaint was amended twice; defendant Corporation's Answer contained a crossclaim against its co-defendant, Simon
Rallos while the latter filed third-party complaint against his sister, Gerundia Rallos.
 While the case was pending in the trial court, both Simon and his sister Gerundia died and they were substituted by the
respective administrators of their estates.

TC RULING (later on was affirmed by SC)
 On Plaintiffs Complaint —
1. Declaring the deed of sale null and void insofar as the one-half pro-indiviso share of Concepcion Rallos in the
property in question, — Lot 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu — is concerned;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.12989 covering Lot 5983 and to
issue in lieu thereof another in the names of FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and the Estate of
Concepcion Rallos in the proportion of one-half (1/2) share each pro-indiviso;
3. Ordering Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation to deliver the possession of an undivided one-half (1/2) share of
Lot 5983 to the herein plaintiff;
4. Sentencing the defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay to plaintiff in
concept of reasonable attorney's fees the sum of P1,000.00; and
5. Ordering both defendants to pay the costs jointly and severally.
 On GO CHANTS Cross-Claim:
1. Sentencing the co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay to defendant
Felix Co Chan & Sons Realty Corporation P5,343.45, representing the price of one-half (1/2) share of lot 5983;
2. Ordering co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, to pay in concept of
reasonable attorney's fees to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation P500.00
 On Third-Party Complaint of defendant Juan T. Borromeo administrator of Estate of Simeon Rallos, against Josefina Rallos
special administratrix of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos:
o Dismissing the third-party complaint without prejudice to filing either a complaint against the regular administrator of
the Estate of Gerundia Rallos or a claim in the Intestate-Estate of Cerundia Rallos, covering the same subject-matter
of the third-party complaint, at bar.

CA RULING
 Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation appealed to CA from the TC judgment insofar as it set aside the sale of the one-half
(1/2) share of Concepcion Rallos. The appellate tribunal, resolved the appeal in favor of the appellant corporation sustaining
the sale in question. The appellee administrator, Ramon Rallos, moved for a reconsider of the decision but the same was
denied

ISSUE:
Is the sale of the undivided share of Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 valid although it was executed by the agent after the death of his
principal? – NO

HELD:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We set aside the decision of respondent appellate court, and We affirm en toto the judgment
rendered by then Hon. Amador E. Gomez of the Court of First Instance of Cebu with costs against respondent realty corporation at all
instances.

RATIO:
CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELEVANT TO AGENCY
 It is a basic axiom in civil law embodied in our Civil Code that no one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
 A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or the legal representation or who has acted
beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has
been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
 Agency is basically personal representative, and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the
powers granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per
alium facit se. "He who acts through another acts himself".
 There are various ways of extinguishing agency, but here we are concerned only with one cause — death of the principal.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 1919 of the Civil Code which was taken from Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code provides:
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished.
3. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent; ...
 By reason of the very nature of the relationship between Principal and agent, agency is extinguished by the death of
the principal or the agent. This is the law in this jurisdiction.
 Manresa commenting on Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code explains that the rationale for the law is found in the juridical
basis of agency, which is representation, them being an integration of the personality of the principal and that of the agent.
It is not possible for the representation to continue to exist once the death of either is establish.
 Pothier agrees with Manresa that by reason of the nature of agency, death is a necessary cause for its extinction. Laurent
says that the juridical tie between the principal and the agent is severed ipso jure upon the death of either without necessity for
the heirs of the fact to notify the agent of the fact of death of the former
 The same rule prevails at common law — the death of the principal effects instantaneous and absolute revocation of the
authority of the agent unless the Power be coupled with an interest. This is the prevalent rule in American Jurisprudence
where it is well-settled that a power without an interest conferred upon an agent is dissolved by the principal's death, and any
attempted execution of the power afterward is not binding on the heirs or representatives of the deceased.

CASE AT BAR
 Is the general rule provided for in Article 1919 that the death of the principal or of the agent extinguishes the agency, subject to
any exception, and if so, is the instant case within that exception? That is the determinative point in issue in this litigation.
 It is the contention of respondent corporation which was sustained by respondent court that notwithstanding the death of the
principal Concepcion Rallos the act of the attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos in selling the former's sham in the property is valid
and enforceable inasmuch as the corporation acted in good faith in buying the property in question.
 Articles 1930 and 1931 of the Civil Code provide the exceptions to the general rule afore-mentioned. Article 1930 is not
involved because admittedly the special power of attorney executed in favor of Simeon Rallos was not coupled with an
interest.
 Article 1931 is the applicable law. Under this provision, an act done by the agent after the death of his principal is valid and
effective only under two conditions
1. That the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the principal and
2. That the third person who contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith.
 Good faith here means that the third person was not aware of the death of the principal at the time he contracted with said
agent.
 These two requisites must concur the absence of one will render the act of the agent invalid and unenforceable.
 Article 1931, being an exception to the general rule, is to be strictly construed, it is not to be given an interpretation or
application beyond the clear import of its terms for otherwise the courts will be involved in a process of legislation outside of
their judicial function.

On the basis of the established knowledge of Simon Rallos concerning the death of his principal Concepcion Rallos, Article
1931 of the Civil Code is inapplicable
 In the instant case, it cannot be questioned that the agent, Simeon Rallos, knew of the death of his principal at the time he sold
the latter's share in Lot No. 5983 to respondent corporation. The knowledge of the death is clearly to be inferred from the
pleadings filed by Simon Rallos before the trial court.
 That Simeon Rallos knew of the death of his sister Concepcion is also a finding of fact of the court a quo and of respondent
appellate court when the latter stated that Simon Rallos 'must have known of the death of his sister, and yet he proceeded wi th
the sale of the lot in the name of both his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos without informing appellant (the realty
corporation) of the death of the former.
 On the basis of the established knowledge concerning the death of principal, Article 1931 of CC is inapplicable. The law
expressly requires for its application lack of knowledge on the part of the agent of the death of his principal; it is not enough
that the third person acted in good faith.
 Buason & Reyes v. Panuyas: sustained the validity, of a sale made after the death of the principal because it was not shown
that the agent knew of his principal's demise.
 Herrera, et al., v. Luy Kim Guan, et al.: plaintiffs presented no proof and there is no indication in the record, that the agent Luy
Kim Guan was aware of the death of his principal at the time he sold the property. The death of the principal does not render
the act of an agent unenforceable, where the latter had no knowledge of such extinguishment of the agency.

The fact that no notice of the death of the principal was registered on the certificate of title of the property in the Office of the
Register of Deeds, is not fatal to the cause of the estate of the principal
 Another argument advanced by respondent court is that the vendee acting in good faith relied on the power of attorney which
was duly registered on the original certificate of title recorded in the Register of Deeds of the province of Cebu, that no notice
of the death was aver annotated on said certificate of title by the heirs of the principal and accordingly they must suffer t he
consequences of such omission.
 A revocation by an act of the principal as a mode of terminating an agency is distinctive from revocation by operation of law
such as death of the principal, which is similar to the case at bar.
 Revocation by an act of principal as mode of termination (quoting Manresa):
o If the agency has been granted for the purpose of contracting with certain persons, the revocation must be made
known to them. But if the agency is general in nature, without reference to particular person with whom the agent is to
contract, it is sufficient that the principal exercise due diligence to make the revocation of the agency publicity known.
In this case, all acts, executed with third persons who contracted in good faith, without knowledge of the revocation,
are valid.
 Revocation by operation of law (applicable to case):
o By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent, agency is extinguished ipso jure upon
the death of either principal or agent.
o Although a revocation of a power of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties concerned, yet a
revocation by operation of law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously effective inasmuch as
"by legal fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an execution of the principal's continuing will.
o With death, the principal's will ceases or is the of authority is extinguished.
o The Civil Code does not impose a duty on the heirs to notify the agent of the death of the principal. What the
Code provides in Article 1932 is that, if the agent die his heirs must notify the principal thereof, and in the
meantime adopt such measures as the circumstances may demand in the interest of the latter.

Whatever conflict of legal opinion was generated by Cassiday v. McKenzie in American jurisprudence, no such conflict exists
in our own
 One last point raised by respondent corporation in support of the appealed decision is an 1842 ruling of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Cassiday v. McKenzie wherein payments made to an agent after the death of the principal were held to be
"good", "the parties being ignorant of the death".
 Cassiday v McKenzie: that a payment may be good today, or bad tomorrow, from the accident circumstance of the death of
the principal, which he did not know, and which by no possibility could he know? It would be unjust to the agent and unjust to
the debtor. In the civil law, the acts of the agent, done bona fide in ignorance of the death of his principal are held valid and
binding upon the heirs of the latter. The same rule holds in the Scottish law, and I cannot believe the common law is so
unreasonable...
 The above-cited case represents the minority view in American jurisprudence and stands alone among common law
authorities as later on stated in Clayton v Merrett and Travers v Crane
 Our statute, the Civil Code, expressly provides for two exceptions to the general rule that death of the principal revokes ipso
jure the agency, to wit: (1) that the agency is coupled with an interest (Art 1930), and (2) that the act of the agent was
executed without knowledge of the death of the principal and the third person who contracted with the agent acted also in
good faith (Art. 1931).
 Exception No. 2 is the doctrine followed in Cassiday, and again we stress the indispensable requirement that the agent acted
without knowledge or notice of the death of the principal. In the case before Us, the agent Ramon Rallos executed the sale
notwithstanding notice of the death of his principal. Accordingly, the agent's act is unenforceable against the estate
of his principal.
The case is covered expressly by a provision of law on agency and cannot be interpreted contrary to its tenor or paralleled to
that of laws on land registration
 Holding that the good faith of a third person in said with an agent affords the former sufficient protection, respondent court
drew a "parallel" between the instant case and that of an innocent purchaser for value of a land, stating that if a person
purchases a registered land from one who acquired it in bad faith — even to the extent of foregoing or falsifying the deed of
sale in his favor — the registered owner has no recourse against such innocent purchaser for value but only against the forger.
 Respondent cites case of Blondeau, et al., v. Nano and Vallejo which stated that an executed transfer of registered lands
placed by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party that the holder of
the transfer is authorized to deal with the land. As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence
of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of coincidence bear the loss.
 The Blondeau decision, however, is not on all fours with the case before Us because here We are confronted with one who
admittedly was an agent of his sister and who sold the property of the latter after her death with full knowledge of such death.
The situation is expressly covered by a provision of law on agency the terms of which are clear and unmistakable leaving no
room for an interpretation contrary to its tenor, This is in the same manner that the ruling in Blondeau found a basis in Section
55 of the Land Registration Law.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 130148 December 15, 1997
JOSE BORDADOR and LYDIA BORDADOR, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGIDA D. LUZ, ERNESTO M. LUZ and NARCISO DEGANOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J .:
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioners assail the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49175 affirming the adjudication
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan which found private respondent Narciso Deganos liable to petitioners for actual
damages, but absolved respondent spouses Brigida D. Luz and Ernesto M. Luz of liability. Petitioners likewise belabor the subsequent
resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied their motion for reconsideration of its challenged decision.
Petitioners were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of jewelry and respondent Brigida D. Luz, also known as Aida D. Luz,
was their regular customer. On several occasions during the period from April 27, 1987 to September 4, 1987, respondent Narciso
Deganos, the brother to Brigida D. Luz, received several pieces of gold and jewelry from petitioner amounting to P382,816.00.
1
These
items and their prices were indicated in seventeen receipts covering the same. Eleven of the receipts stated that they were received for
a certain Evelyn Aquino, a niece of Deganos, and the remaining six indicated that they were received for Brigida D. Luz.
2

Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit the proceeds and return the unsold items to petitioners.
Deganos remitted only the sum of P53,207.00. He neither paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold item to
petitioners. By January 1990, the total of his unpaid account to petitioners, including interest, reached the sum of
P725,463.98.
3
Petitioners eventually filed a complaint in the barangay court against Deganos to recover said amount.
In the barangay proceedings, Brigida D. Luz, who was not impleaded in the case, appeared as a witness for Deganos and ultimately,
she and her husband, together with Deganos, signed a compromise agreement with petitioners. In that compromise agreement,
Deganos obligated himself to pay petitioners, on installment basis, the balance of his account plus interest thereon. However, he failed
to comply with his aforestated undertakings.
On June 25, 1990, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 412-M-90 in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan against Deganos and
Brigida, D. Luz for recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for preliminary attachment.
4
Ernesto Luz was
impleaded therein as the spouse of Brigida.
Four years later, or on March 29, 1994, Deganos and Brigida D. Luz were charged with estafa
5
in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 785-M-94. That criminal case appears to be still pending in said trial court.
During the trial of the civil case, petitioners claimed that Deganos acted as the agent of Brigida D. Luz when he received the subject
items of jewelry and, because he failed to pay for the same, Brigida, as principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable wi th him therefor.
On the other hand, while Deganos admitted that he had an unpaid obligation to petitioners, he claimed that the same was only in the
sum of P382,816.00 and not P725,463.98. He further asserted that it was he alone who was involved in the transaction with the
petitioners; that he neither acted as agent for nor was he authorized to act as an agent by Brigida D. Luz, notwithstanding the fact that
six of the receipts indicated that the items were received by him for the latter. He further claimed that he never delivered any of the
items he received from petitioners to Brigida.
Brigida, on her part, denied that she had anything to do with the transactions between petitioners and Dangerous. She claimed that she
never authorized Deganos to receive any item of jewelry in her behalf and, for that matter, neither did she actually receive any of the
articles in question.
After trial, the court below found that only Deganos was liable to petitioners for the amount and damages claimed. It held that while
Brigida D. Luz did have transactions with petitioners in the past, the items involved were already paid for and all that Brigida owed
petitioners was the sum of P21,483.00 representing interest on the principal account which she had previously paid for.
6

The trial court also found that it was petitioner Lydia Bordador who indicated in the receipts that the items were received by Deganos for
Evelyn Aquino and Brigida D. Luz.
7
Said court was "persuaded that Brigida D. Luz was behind Deganos," but because there was no
memorandum to this effect, the agreement between the parties was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
8
Absent the required
memorandum or any written document connecting the respondent Luz spouses with the subject receipts, or authorizing Deganos to act
on their behalf, the alleged agreement between petitioners and Brigida D. Luz was unenforceable.
Deganos was ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P725,463.98, plus legal interest thereon June 25, 1990, and attorney's fees.
Brigida D. Luz was ordered to pay P21,483.00 representing the interest on her own personal loan. She and her co-defendant spouse
were absolved from any other or further liability.
9

As stated at the outset, petitioners appealed the judgment of the court a quo to the Court Appeals which affirmed said judgment.
10
The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was subsequently dismissed,
11
hence the present recourse to this Court.
The primary issue in the instant petition is whether or not herein respondent spouses are liable to petitioners for the latter's claim for
money and damages in the sum of P725,463.98, plus interests and attorney's fees, despite the fact that the evidence does not show
that they signed any of the subject receipts or authorized Deganos to received the items of jewelry on their behalf.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the findings of the court a quo that respondent spouses are not liable to
them, as said conclusion of the trial court is contradicted by the finding of fact of the appellate court that "(Deganos) acted as agent of
his sister (Brigida Luz)."
12
In support of this contention, petitioners quoted several letters sent to them by Brigida D. Luz wherein the
latter acknowledged her obligation to petitioners and requested for more time to fulfill the same. They likewise aver that Brigida testified
in the trial court that Deganos took some gold articles from petitioners and delivered the same to her.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, however, found as a fact that the aforementioned letters concerned the previous
obligations of Brigida to petitioners, and had nothing to do with the money sought to be recovered in the instant case. Such concurrent
factual findings are entitled to great weight, hence, petitioners cannot plausibly claim in this appellate review that the letters were in the
nature of acknowledgments by Brigida that she was the principal of Deganos in the subject transactions.
On the other hand, with regard to the testimony of Brigida admitting delivery of the gold to her, there is no showing whatsoever that her
statement referred to the items which are the subject matter of this case. It cannot, therefore, be validly said that she admitted her
liability regarding the same.
Petitioners insist that Deganos was the agent of Brigida D. Luz as the latter clothed him with apparent authority as her agent and held
him out to the public as such, hence Brigida can not be permitted to deny said authority to innocent third parties who dealt with
Deganos under such belief.
13
Petitioners further represent that the Court of Appeals recognized in its decision that Deganos was an
agent of Brigida.
14

The evidence does not support the theory of petitioners that Deganos was an agent of Brigida D. Luz and that the latter should
consequently be held solidarily liable with Deganos in his obligation to petitioners. While the quoted statement in the findi ngs of fact of
the assailed appellate decision mentioned that Deganos ostensibly acted as an agent of Brigida, the actual conclusion and ruling of the
Court of Appeals categorically stated that, "(Brigida Luz) never authorized her brother (Deganos) to act for and in her behal f in any
transaction with Petitioners . . . .
15
It is clear, therefore, that even assuming arguendo that Deganos acted as an agent of Brigida, the
latter never authorized him to act on her behalf with regard to the transaction subject of this case.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1868. By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing that Brigida consented to the acts of Deganos or authorized
him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular transactions involved. Petitioners' attempt to foist liability on
respondent spouses through the supposed agency relation with Deganos is groundless and ill-advised.
Besides, it was grossly and inexcusably negligent of petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not once or twice but on at least six occasions as
evidenced by six receipts, several pieces of jewelry of substantial value without requiring a written authorization from his alleged
principal. A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.
16

The records show that neither an express nor an implied agency was proven to have existed between Deganos and Brigida D. Luz.
Evidently, petitioners, who were negligent in their transactions with Deganos, cannot seek relief from the effects of their negligence by
conjuring a supposed agency relation between the two respondents where no evidence supports such claim.
Petitioners next allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that the decision of the court below, which it affirmed, is "null
and void" as it contradicted its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 39445 holding that there is "sufficient evidence/proof" against Brigida D. Luz
and Deganos for estafa in the pending criminal case. They further aver that said appellate court erred in ruling against them in this civil
action since the same would result in an inevitable conflict of decisions should be trial court convict the accused in the criminal case.
By way of backdrop for this argument of petitioners, herein respondents Brigida D. Luz and Deganos had filed a demurrer to evidence
and a motion for reconsideration in the aforestated criminal case, both of which were denied by the trial court. They then filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the denial of their demurrer and motion for reconsideration but, as just stated, their
petition therefor was dismissed.
17

Petitioners now claim that the aforesaid dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 39445 with respect to the
criminal case is equivalent to a finding that there is sufficient evidence in the estafa case against Brigida D. Luz and Deganos. Hence,
as already stated, petitioners theorize that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals now being impugned in the case at bar
would result in a possible conflict with the prospective decision in the criminal case. Instead of promulgating the present decision and
resolution under review, so they suggest, the Court of Appeals should have awaited the decision in the criminal case, so as not to
render academic or preempt the same or, worse, create two conflicting rulings.
18

Petitioners have apparently lost sight of Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides that in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is worth noting that this civil case was instituted four years before the criminal case for estafa was filed, and that although there was a
move to consolidate both cases, the same was denied by the trial court. Consequently, it was the duty of the two branches of the
Regional Trial Court concerned to independently proceed with the civil and criminal cases. It will also be observed that a final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.
19

It is clear, therefore, that this civil case may proceed independently of the criminal case
20
especially because while both cases are
based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties liable therein differ. Thus, it is improvident of petitioners
to claim that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in the present case would be preemptive of the outcome of the criminal
case. Their fancied fear of possible conflict between the disposition of this civil case and the coutcome of the pending criminal case is
illusory.
Petitioners surprisingly postulate that the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction to issue the denial resolution dated August 18, 1997,
as the same was tainted with irregularities and badges of fraud perpetrated by its court officers.
21
They charge that said appellate
court, through conspiracy and fraud on the part of its officers, gravely abused its discretion in issuing that resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration. They claim that said resolution was drafted by the ponente, then signed and issued by the members of the
Eleventh Division of said court within one and a half days from the elevation thereof by the division clerk of court to the office of
the ponente.
It is the thesis of petitioners that there was undue haste in issuing the resolution as the same was made without waiting for the lapse of
the ten-day period for respondents to file their comment and for petitioners to file their reply. It was allegedly impossible for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the issue in just one and a half days, especially because its ponente, the late Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion, was
then recuperating from surgery and, that, additionally, "hundreds of more important cases were pending."
22

These lamentable allegation of irregularities in the Court of Appeals and in the conduct of its officers strikes us as a desperate attempt
of petitioners to induce this Court to give credence to their arguments which, as already found by both the trial and intermediate
appellate courts, are devoid of factual and legal substance. The regrettably irresponsible attempt to tarnish the image of the
intermediate appellate tribunal and its judicial officers through ad hominem imputations could well be contumacious, but we are inclined
to let that pass with a strict admonition that petitioners refrain from indulging in such conduct in litigations.
On July 9, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in this case affirming the trial court's decision.
23
Petitioners moved for
reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ordered respondents to file a comment. Respondents filed the same on August 5, 1997
24
and
petitioners filed their reply to said comment on August 15, 1997.
25
The Eleventh Division of said court issued the questioned resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on August 18, 1997.
26

It is ironic that while some litigants malign the judiciary for being supposedly slothful in disposing of cases, petitioners are making a
show of calling out for justice because the Court of Appeals issued a resolution disposing of a case sooner than expected of it. They
would even deny the exercise of discretion by the appellate court to prioritize its action on cases in line with the procedure it has
adopted in disposing thereof and in declogging its dockets. It is definitely not for the parties to determine and dictate when and how a
tribunal should act upon those cases since they are not even aware of the status of the dockets and the internal rules and policies for
acting thereon.
The fact that a resolution was issued by said court within a relatively short period of time after the records of the case were elevated to
the office of the ponente cannot, by itself, be deemed irregular. There is no showing whatsoever that the resolution was issued without
considering the reply filed by petitioners. In fact, that brief pleading filed by petitioners does not exhibit any esoteric or ponderous
argument which could not be analyzed within an hour. It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has
been regularly performed;
27
that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial acts and duties have been
and will be duly and properly performed.
28
The burden of proving irregularity in official conduct is on the part of petitioners and they
have utterly failed to do so. It is thus reprehensible for them to cast aspersions on a court of law on the bases of conjectures or
surmises, especially since one of the petitioners appears to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Lastly, petitioners fault the trial court's holding that whatever contract of agency was established between Brigida D. Luz and Narciso
Deganos is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as that aspect of this case allegedly is not covered thereby.
29
They proceed on
the premise that the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to executed or to partially executed ones. From there,
they move on to claim that the contract involved in this case was an executed contract as the items had already been delivered by
petitioners to Brigida D. Luz, hence, such delivery resulted in the execution of the contract and removed the same from the coverage of
the Statute of Frauds.
Petitioners' claim is speciously unmeritorious. It should be emphasized that neither the trial court nor the appellate court categorically
stated that there was such a contractual relation between these two respondents. The trial court merely said that if there was such an
agency existing between them, the same is unenforceable as the contract would fall under the Statute of Frauds which requires the
presentation of a note or memorandum thereof in order to be enforceable in court. That was merely a preparatory statement of a
principle of law. What was finally proven as a matter of fact is that there was no such contract between Brigida D. Luz and Narciso
Deganos, executed or partially executed, and no delivery of any of the items subject of this case was ever made to the former.
WHEREFORE, no error having been committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment of the court a quo, its challenged
decision and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED, with double costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.