Right to Privacy

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and
social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to
achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the
following:

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

Sec. 1.Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A
decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social
security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2.Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the
implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary,
with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff

PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of
the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:
Administrator, National Statistics Office
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities;

Sec. 3.Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as
secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support
to the IACC.

Sec. 4.Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated
by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social
Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics
Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5.Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press
Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as
lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media
information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the
importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.

USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;

Sec. 6.Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be
sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING
ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;

Sec. 7.Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular
reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of
implementation of this undertaking.

C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;

Sec. 8.Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN
PRIVACY. 3

DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue
of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner
has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment
of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as
infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal
defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the

publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent
Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show
their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to
pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on
standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional
principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but
a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino
citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws
and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be
allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a
stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the
will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress
of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution,
either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The executive
power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. 18 He
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively. 20

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3.Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject
the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of
1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative
structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and
General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of
Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V
on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on
Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the
organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch,
the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by
administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the
internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment,
supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials
on private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987.
It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the
dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the
State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established
approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many
regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted
in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to
respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make
laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional
muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of
privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States
Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional
foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from
these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando,
we held:
xxx xxx xxx

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married
persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to
privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of
its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and
organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.

A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print, signature
and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN) for
initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or
entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48

xxx xxx xxx

A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and
turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is
stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This
technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another
method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary
pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another
biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique
combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of biometric
achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red
cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood
vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons"
and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an
officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to dwelling. 40Invasion of privacy is
an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the
Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the
privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant
the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of
technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a
relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features.

In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now
science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is
a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an
individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its
coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that
it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor
General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation
of population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely
for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No.
308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the
dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the computer or in the documentary
file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax
returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more
frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through
the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes;
but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other
basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No.
308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how
these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data,
under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and
guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government
agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information.
When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder,
without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate
the data stored within the system. 59

technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection
granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the
file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely
drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.

It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way
for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent. 63

Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to
the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS
employment records and reports. 74These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the
SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part
of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its
enactment should be given to Congress.

The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an
individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data
and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a
privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the
subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its
danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a
laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it
would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that
could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The
reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable.67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular
activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer
technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As

The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely
implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered
discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.

Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using
the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and
speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of
services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that these purposes
justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of
income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices
were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No.
308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not
narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will
give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough
for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not
defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence
of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This
approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights

and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will
not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized
computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a
doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to
identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized
medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded
in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and
doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the
computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may
stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally
protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy,
the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the
statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous
drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision
made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the
matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against
indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage
and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited
public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we
discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use
of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy.
Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek.
Many information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social
objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of
credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making accurate
and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The
benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed the
internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the
individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of
information from libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper

safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or
order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this
stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats
emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at
bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures
the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent
fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr.,
"the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his
limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign
capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy
was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

These character stories have been woven through the real events to help our huge
international audience understand this ordinary period inFilipino history.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM
PRODUCTIONS, petitioners,
vs.
HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988
HAL MCELROY petitioner,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Petitioner Ayer
Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and
for Philippine and international release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V. Juban who
suggested th they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos
and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television
Review and Classification Board as wel as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos
also signified his approval of the intended film production.
In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce
Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out below:
The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People Power—a unique
event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution in the Philippines
in 1986.
Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble events, screenwriter David
Williamson and history Prof Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style and created
[four] fictitious characters to trace the revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to
the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the country.

First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television journalist working for major
network. Tony reflects the average American attitude to the Phihppinence —once a
colony, now the home of crucially important military bases. Although Tony is aware of
the corruption and of Marcos' megalomania, for him, there appears to be no alternative
to Marcos except the Communists.
Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist. A 'new girl in town,' she is quickly
caught up in the events as it becomes dear that the time has come for a change.
Through Angle and her relationship with one of the Reform Army Movement Colonels
(a fictitious character), we follow the developing discontent in the armed forces. Their
dislike for General Ver, their strong loyalty to Defense Minister Enrile, and ultimately
their defection from Marcos.
The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a middle-aged editor of a Manila
newspaper who despises the Marcos regime and is a supporter an promoter of Cory
Aquino. Ben has two daughters, Cehea left wing lawyer who is a secret member of the
New People's Army, and Eva--a -P.R. girl, politically moderate and very much in love
with Tony. Ultimately, she must choose between her love and the revolution.
Through the interviews and experiences of these central characters, we show the
complex nature of Filipino society, and thintertwining series of events and characters
that triggered these remarkable changes. Through them also, we meet all of the
principal characters and experience directly dramatic recreation of the revolution. The
story incorporates actual documentary footage filmed during the period which we
hope will capture the unique atmosphere and forces that combined to overthrow
President Marcos.
David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright with some 14 hugely successful
plays to his credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,' Travelling North) and 11 feature films (The
Year of Living Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap').
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian with a
deep understanding of the Philippines, who has worked on the research for this project
for some 18 months. Together with Davi Wilhamgon they have developed a script we
believe accurately depicts the complex issues and events that occurred during th
period .
The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy co-production with Home Box Office
in American, the Australian Broadcast Corporation in Australia and Zenith Productions
in the United Kingdom
The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of the events that made possible the
EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a
"docu-drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background.

On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the
use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his
family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or
exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not
be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted
from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-151 in
Branch 134 thereof, seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution".
The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent
and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. On 24 February 1988, the
trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for
preliminary injunction.
On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary
Injunction contending that the mini-series fim would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor
that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free
expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of
action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
In an Order 2 dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering defendants,
and all persons and entities employed or under contract with them, including actors,
actresses and members of the production staff and crew as well as all persons and
entities acting on defendants' behalf, to cease and desist from producing and filming
the mini-series entitled 'The Four Day Revolution" and from making any reference
whatsoever to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu
of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears rent substantial or marked
resemblance or similarity to, or is otherwise Identifiable with, plaintiff in the
production and any similar film or photoplay, until further orders from this Court,
upon plaintiff's filing of a bond in the amount of P 2,000,000.00, to answer for
whatever damages defendants may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court
should finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a Petition for certiorari dated 21
March 1988 with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition was
docketed as G.R. No. L-82380.

A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitiioner Hal McElroy also filed separate Petition for certiorari with
Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March 1988, docketed as G.R.
No. L-82398.
By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were consolidated and private respondent was
required to file a consolidated Answer. Further, in the same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary
Restraining Order partially enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March
1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and allowing the petitioners to resume
producing and filming those portions of the projected mini-series which do not make any reference to
private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on or respondent.
Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April 1988 invoking in the main a right
of privacy.
I
The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are sharply drawn. Petitioners' claim that
in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of speech and of
expression protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts a right of
privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an
unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.
Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression the Court would once more
stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a
univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of expression. Along with the press, radio and
television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information,
education and entertainment. In Gonzales v. Katigbak, 3 former Chief Justice Fernando, speaking for the
Court, explained:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and
the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effect on the perception by our people of
issues and public officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural traits is
considerable. Nor as pointed out inBurstyn v. Wilson (343 US 495 [19421) is the
Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid, 501). There is no clear
dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a
distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free
expression. ... 4
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture
companies. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial
activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and
of expression. In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are owned either by the
government or the private sector but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be
sustained by being devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. Indeed, commercial media
constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned
and operated media from the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of speech and of expression can
only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.

The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was demonstrated sometime ago by
the then Dean Irene R. Cortes that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. 5 It
is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of
particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is
not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute of apublic character. 7 Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist
publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. 8 The interest sought to be protected by the
right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the
private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. 9
Lagunzad v. Vda.de Gonzales, 10 on which private respondent relies heavily, recognized a right to privacy
in a context which included a claim to freedom of speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a suit
fortion picture producer as licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises Padilla as licensors. This
agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a motion Picture Portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental during
the November 1951 elections and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal
Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. 11 In the judgment of the lower court enforcing
the licensing agreement against the licensee who had produced the motion picture and exhibited it but
refused to pay the stipulated royalties, the Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that the Licensing Agreement is null and
void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration, while it is true that
petitioner bad pled the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did
not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to
portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the
member of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],147 NY 434,42 NE 31
LRA 286.49 Am St Rep 671), 'a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a
deperson to protect his memory, but the privilege wts for the benefit of the living, to
protect their feelings and to preventa violation of their own rights in the character and
memory of the deceased.'
Petitioners averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the
life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a
public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does
not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public
a he or she may be (Garner v. Triangle Publications, DCNY 97 F. Supp., SU 549
[1951]). In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life Story Of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance
in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. 12
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to deal with contraposed claims to
freedom of speech and of expression and to privacy. Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, in the name
of freedom of speech and expression, a right to produce a motion picture biography at least partly
"fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the consent of and without paying pre-agreed royalties to the
widow and family of Padilla. In rejecting the licensee's claim, the Court said:
Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing Agreement
infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a

citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the
public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint.The right freedom of expression,
indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51
SCRA 191 [1963]). It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
xxx xxx xxx
The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights,
1970 ed. p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of
situation" (Separation Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. taking into
account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be
upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern." 13
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of the
instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and
filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy."
1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on
the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The
respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed motion
picture. It is important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restrain of any kind imposed upon the
movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. Because of the
speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates. 14 The invalidity of a measure of
prior restraint doesnot, of course, mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a
person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have stayed his
hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by
the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected
motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There
was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private
respondent could lawfully assert.
2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that
took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that
denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners'
argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this

countryand as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate
subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject mater, as set out
in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and
certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned
the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is
not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day
Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled,
if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the
constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.

of news, as a glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes
homicide and othe crimes, arrests and police raides, suicides, marriages and divorces,
accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare disease, the birth of a
child to a twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been
murdered years ago, and undoubtedly many other similar matters of genuine, if more
or less deplorable, popular appeal.
The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited, to the
dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It extended also to information or
education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films
and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as
the reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and travelogues. In determining
where to draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over
what the public may be permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in
allowing the benefit of the doubt. 15

3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed
by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character.
The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account.
Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any
part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family.
4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners
propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to
as a "public figure:"
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or
mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a
legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public
personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this
category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before
the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any
other entertainment. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public
officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an
infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It
includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is
focused upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to
privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions" that
they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they
received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no
longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a privilege,
under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate
matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it
was held that there was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to
matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused.
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public interest, was
held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in
the world, and the freedom of the press and other agencies of information to tell
it. "News" includes all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary
hum-drum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information which
arouses public attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its experience or
instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definination

Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor
in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986. Because his participation therein
was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the
role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure"
is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the
seclusion of simple private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political
campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in
the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines.
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in
other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the
unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. 17 The
proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred
to as "matters of essentially private concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself
in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are
directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private
respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out
even without a license from private respondent.
II
In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy informed this Court that a Temporary
Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988, was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 88-413, entitled "Gregorio B. Honasan vs. Ayer Productions Pty.
Ltd., McElroy Film Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures Production"
enjoining him and his production company from further filimg any scene of the projected mini-series film.
Petitioner alleged that Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and paste" pleading, cut out straight grom the
complaint of private respondent Ponce Enrile in Civil Case No. 88-151. Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a
separate Manifestation dated 4 April 1988, brought to the attention of the Court the same information
given by petitoner Hal McElroy, reiterating that the complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was substantially
identical to that filed by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing to join Honasan in Civil

Case No. 88-151, counsel for private respondent, with whom counsel for Gregorio Honasan are apparently
associated, deliberately engaged in "forum shopping."
Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988 stating that the "slight similarity"
between private respondent's complaint and that on Honasan in the construction of their legal basis of the
right to privacy as a component of the cause of action is understandable considering that court pleadings
are public records; that private respondent's cause of action for invasion of privacy is separate and distinct
from that of Honasan's although they arose from the same tortious act of petitioners' that the rule on
permissive joinder of parties is not mandatory and that, the cited cases on "forum shopping" were not in
point because the parties here and those in Civil Case No. 88-413 are not identical.
For reasons that by now have become clear, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with the question of
whether or not the lawyers of private respondent Ponce Enrile have engaged in "forum shopping." It is,
however, important to dispose to the complaint filed by former Colonel Honasan who, having refused to
subject himself to the legal processes of the Republic and having become once again in fugitive from
justice, must be deemed to have forfeited any right the might have had to protect his privacy through court
processes.
WHEREFORE,
a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated 16 March 1988 of
respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited
Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining
unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and made
PERMANENT, and
b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4 April 1988 as separate Petitions
for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise of its
plenary and supervisory jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET ASIDE and
DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary Injunction that
may have been issued by him.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS),
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157870

VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

- versus DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR.,
G.R. No. 158633
Petitioner,

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done
by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x
The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening
test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following
shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx

- versus DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
G.R. No. 161658
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

November 3, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the
school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be
positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this
Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the
public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured
that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it
under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA]
9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates,
the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to
candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.—All candidates for public office, both national and
local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their
respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the
Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of
those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.—Before the start
of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed
to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate.—No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his

office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in
the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks
(1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered
political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to
harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search

and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal
protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to
allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.[2]
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. [3] But even with the presence of an
actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. [4] To have standing,
one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May
10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter
of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to
relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public
interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications
for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the
provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down
in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
(5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The

Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, [7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of
the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. [8] In the discharge
of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits
on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government,
like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments,
however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each
of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it
cannot leap.[10]
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable
subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of
Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of
candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. [13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really
of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance
with the drug-testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the
provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying

factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if
the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drugtesting on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the
adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to
and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal
would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and
effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no
longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized
elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court
deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary
level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process “the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs.” This statutory
purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of “an
intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and
projects.”[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be
exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and
55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement,
Treatment and Rehabilitation.—A drug dependent or any person who violates Section
15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the
Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent,
he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a
Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary
Submission Program.—A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program,
who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal
liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically
impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly
low rate.[15]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure [16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the
Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first
time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug
testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue
tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random
drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18] both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided
cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in
their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After
consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school’s athletes. James
Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to
undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school’s drug testing policy
violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights
than non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining
the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision
and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student’s privacy since a student need not
undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous
effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy
constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a
drug test for high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of
the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the
drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls
argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in
locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among
non-athletes on the basis of the school’s custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court
made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in
place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in

holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test
was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.[29]

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction
are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that
are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. [30] And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the governmentmandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees––and students for that matter––
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift
and informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be
that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in
question.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that
threatens the well-being of the people, [21] particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as
victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random
drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary
if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are
to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, “[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation’s laws against the
importation of drugs”; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a druginfested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.
[22]
Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the
testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying
that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” [23] has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
[24]
Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made
various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the
workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory
drug tests violate a citizen’s constitutional right to privacy and right against
unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25]
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. [26] In context, the right to privacy means the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there
has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search,
“translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees’
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such
privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged
law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search “narrowly drawn” or “narrowly focused”? [32]
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards
preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance
for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained
in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect
as much as possible the employee’s privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to
ensure an accurate chain of custody. [33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the
drug results shall be on the “need to know” basis; [34] that the “drug test result and the records shall be
[kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results.”[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the

employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus
protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.
The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. [36] To the Court, the need
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture,
or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor’s dream were it not for the
illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the
martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back
stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random
drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices,
the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen
method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. [37] And if RA 9165 passes
the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]
Petitioner SJS’ next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue
delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in
question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine
the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and
tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the
persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the
school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company’s work rules. In either case, the
random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked
by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the
DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of
Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then,

the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of
RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to
determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.
In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of
power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become
imperative, as here.
[39]

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and
from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and
“suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither
are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled
out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. [40] To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and
to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA
9165CONSTITUTIONAL,
but
declaring
its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.