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G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FACTS: In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law. Issue: Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law. HELD: The Postal Law does not allow “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a “gift enterprise” but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of “consideration”, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term “gift enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products. By virtue of noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor andEmployment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification asthe sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at theLumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm,alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers andmembers of the union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal andfor the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) andnot to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction. Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction andinterpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereignauthority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed;it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courtsand judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should beresolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arisingfrom employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferredsuch jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change withrespect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claimsof workers or claims for damages arising from employeremployee relations; Article 217 is to beapplied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, aregional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him

by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied astrike.The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from takingany further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissingit. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Paat v. CA GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring Facts:

On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzman‟s truck was seized by Department of Environmentand Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan fromSan Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for theforest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENRO‟s Jovito Layuganissued an order of confiscation of the truck. Its owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the requiredexplanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR RegionalExecutive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENRO‟s action of confiscation andordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied.The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against Layugan andBaggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), contending that the only the court is authorized toconfiscate and forfeit conveyances used in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to thesecond paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the seizure is illegal, as shedid not use the truck in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article 309 and 310of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the RegionalExecutive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court thereafter issued a writordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari withthe Court of Appeals. The appellate court sustained the trial court‟s order ruling that the questioninvolved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition. Issues: • Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances belongs to the courts • Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277 Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively(pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitablyreduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentionednor included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a wayas to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the lightof the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be givensuch construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefitsintended. In the case at bar, the phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the actof forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should bemade “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended courtratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of the amendatory executive order, when

it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code “ and inserted the words “ shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,” meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authorityconstitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmostdispatch

People v. Mapa GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in aninformation dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Codein connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 andas further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being asecret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower courtrendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated tothe Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor isexempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached partsof firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be usedin the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms arein possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued toofficers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincialtreasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails.It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretationcome only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate withoutthem. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speakswith authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in Peoplev. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointmentof the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns anddetection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a „peace officer‟ equivalent evento a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case,therefore, the conviction must stand.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment

Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt. Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code. Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and

unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

Paras v. COMELEC Case Digest

Paras v. COMELEC G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner‟s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official‟s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. Case Digest: People vs Nazario Facts: Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain 2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto Held: 1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”. 2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can‟t be that the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

FLORESCA vs PHILEX MINING CORPORATION Case Digest PERFECTO S. FLORESCA et al vs PHILEX MINING CORPORATION et al

FACTS:

Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen‟s Compensation Act before the Workmen‟s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

HELD:

Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they‟ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law

sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man‟s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

Republic vs. CA and Molina Republic v. CA and Molina GR 108763, 13 February 1997 Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC‟s decision. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of „psychological incapacity‟ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Case Digest on People vs. Licera PEOPLE V. LICERA [65 S 270 (1975)] - F: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.

HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in them¬selves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule.

Aisporna v CA (1982) Aisporna v CA (1982)

Facts Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited theapplication of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife was issued Php 5000 from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminalaction against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent when she solicited the application form. In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her husband was absent when he called. She only left a note on top of her husband‟s desk to inform him of what transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her services) Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city court. In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code. The OSG kept on repeating that she didn‟t violate sec 189 of the insurance code. In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court: 1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code 2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish petitioner‟s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner Issues: Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1st par of the sec 189 of the IC without reference to the 2 nd paragraph of the said section. Or

Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1 st paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph

Decision: Aisporna acquitted

Ruling: Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that “No insurance company doing business with the Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as herein after provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement ofapplications for insurance without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance Commissioner. Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for any insurance compna or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent in the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to which an insurance agent is subject. Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section. The court held that the 1st par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of authority from the commissioner In the 2nd par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1st 2 rules The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and not the 1nd. The fact that she didn‟t receive compensation wasn‟t an excuse for her acquittal because she was actually punished separately under sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of authority as under par 1. The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to paragraph 2 and not applicable to the 1st paragraph. The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits insurance for compensation, but in the 1st paragraph, there was no necessity that a person solicits an insurance compensation in order to be called an agent. The SC said that this was a reversible error. The CA said that Aisporna didn‟t receive compensation. The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189 (check the law) The definition in the 2nd paragraph qualified the definition of an agent used in the 1 st and third paragraphs. DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative intent must be ascertained from the consideration of the statute as a whole. The words shouldn‟t be studied in isolated explanations but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to pronounce the harmonious whole. Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself, the true meaning may be made clear in the company it is fixed in. In applying this, the court held that the definition of an insurance agent in the 2 nd paragraph was applicable in the 1st paragraph. To receive compensation be the agent is an essential element for violation of the 1 stparagraph. The appellate court said that she didn‟t receive compensation by the receipt of compensation wasn‟t an essential element for violation of the 1st paragraph.

The SC said that this view wasn‟t correct owing to the American insurance laws which qualified compensation as a qualifying factor in penalizing unauthorized persons who solicited insurance (Texas code and snyder‟s law)

China Bank v. Ortega (J) GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest DevelopmentCorporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared thedefendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decisionon 20 January 1970.To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B ForestDevelopment Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the bank‟s cashier,disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of anyinformation relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform theCourt if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold thesame intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved toreconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed to comply with the order of theCourt, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bankand Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the informationrequired by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1]upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of acompetent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where themoney deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned ordersare complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to apossible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, theposition of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest DevelopmentCorporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of theaforementioned provisions of law. Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processgarnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405. Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that theprohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does notpreclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry insuch a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to theexecution process. Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank depositsbeyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did notorder an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, ascontemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B ForestDevelopment Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of thegarnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawaluntil further order.The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costsagainst the petitioners.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took activeparticipation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he wasrendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board,(now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with theadministration of different

laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/orwidows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from PulmonaryTuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilao‟s failure to complete hissupporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his claim wasdisapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete hissupporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found outthat his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the basicpension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilao‟smonthly pension was, however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increasesprovided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for thepurpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment infull of the benefits thereunder from said date.In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he claims he isentitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pensionwas finally approved. The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, thatsince the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefitsshould commence from the date of approval of the application. Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968. Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensatea class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers theyencountered, and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness,disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmentalexpression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especiallyduring times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is thegeneral rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled topension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be consideredwith other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its ownparticular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must beaccorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges,and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in government,educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited,pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependentupon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit andintent of the law. Gasilao‟s claim was sustained.The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao‟spension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for eachof his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wifeand his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government fundsappropriated for the purpose

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