STATUTE and Other Definitions

STATUTE and other definitions
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A law established by an act of the legislature. Under the U.S. and state constitutions, statutes are considered the primary source of law in the U.S. -- that is, legislatures make the law (statutes) and courts interpret the law (cases). Most state statutes are organized by subject matter and published in books referred to as codes. Typically, a state has a family or civil code (where the divorce laws are usually contained), a criminal code (where incest, bigamy and domestic violence laws are often found), welfare code (which contains laws related to public benefits), probate code (where laws about wills, trusts and probate proceedings are collected) and many other codes dealing with a wide variety of topics. Federal statutes are organized into subject matter titles within the United States Code (for example, Title 18 for crimes and Title 11 for bankruptcy). The written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms prescribed in the Constitution; an act of the legislature. This word is used in contradistinction to the common law. Statutes acquire their force from the time of their passage unless otherwise provided. It is a general rule that when the provision of a statute is general, everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by the common law and when a power is given by statute, everything necessary for making it effectual is given by implication. Statutes are of several kinds; namely, Public or private. 1. Public statutes are those of which the judges will take notice without pleading; as, those which concern all officers in general; acts concerning trade in general or any specific trade; acts concerning all persons generally.

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2. Private acts, are those of which the judges wiil not take notice without pleading; such as concern only a particular species, or person; as, acts relating to any particular place, or to several particular places, or to one or several particular counties. Private statutes may be rendered public by being so declared by the legislature. Declaratory or remedial. 1. A declaratory statute is one which is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what the common law is, and which declares what it is, and has ever been. 2. Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such superfluities in the common law as may have been discovered. These remedial statutes are themselves divided into enlarging statutes, by which the common law is made more comprehensive and extended than it was before; and into restraining statutes, by which it is narrowed down to that which is just and proper. The term remedial statute is also applied to those acts which give the party injured a remedy, and in some respects those statutes are penal. Temporary or perpetual. 1. A temporary statute is one which is limited in its duration at the time of its enactment. It continues in force until the time of its limitation has expired, unless sooner repealed. 2. A perpetual statute is one for the continuance of which there is no limited time, although it be not expressly declared to be so. If, however, a statute which did not itself contain any limitation, is to be governed by another which is temporary only, the former will also be temporary and dependent upon the existence of the latter.Affirmative or negative. 1. An affirmative statute is one which is enacted in affirmative terms; such a statute does not take away the common law. If, for example, a statute without negative words, declares that when certain requisites shall have been complied with, deeds shall, have in evidence a certain effect, this does not prevent their being used in evidence, though the requisites have not been complied with, in the same manner as they might have been before the statute was passed. 2. A negative statute is one expressed in negative terms, and so controls the common law, that it has no force in opposition to the statute. Penal statutes are those which order or prohibit a thing under a certain penalty. Among the civilians, the term statute is generally applied to all sorts of laws and regulations; every provision of law which ordains, permits, or prohibits anything is a statute without considering from what source it arises. Sometimes the word is used in contradistinction to the imperial Roman law, which, by way of eminence, civilians call the common law. They divide statutes into three classes, personal, real and mixed. Personal statutes are those which have principally for their object the person, and treat of property only incidentally; such are those which regard birth, legitimacy, freedom, the fight of instituting suits, majority as to age, incapacity to contract, to make a will, to plead in person, and 2

the like. A personal statute is universal in its operation, and in force everywhere. Real statutes are those which have principally for their object, property, and which do not speak of persons, except in relation to property; such are those which concern the disposition, which one may make of his property either alive or by testament. A real statute, unlike a personal one, is confined in its operation to the country of its origin. Mixed statutes are those which concern at once both persons and property. But in this sense almost all statutes are mixed, there being scarcely any law relative to persons, which does not at the same time relate to things. --b—
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s071.htm http://www.lectlaw.com/def/f111.htm

FICTION OF LAW
The assumption that a certain thing is true, and which gives to a person or thing a quality which is not natural to it, and consequently establishes, a certain disposition, which, without the fiction, would be repugnant to reason and to truth. It is an order of things which does not exist, but which the law prescribes or authorizes. It differs from presumption because it establishes as true, something which is false; whereas presumption supplies the proof of something true. The law never feigns what is impossible. Fiction is like art; it imitates nature, but never disfigures it. It aids truth, but it ought never to destroy it. It may well suppose that what was possible, but which does not exist; but it will never feign that what was impossible actually is. Fictions were invented by the Roman praetors who, not possessing the power to abrogate the law, were nevertheless willing to derogate from it under the pretence of doing equity. Fiction is the resource of weakness which, in order to obtain its object, assumes as a fact what is known to be contrary to truth: when the legislator desires to accomplish his object, he need not feign, he commands. Fictions of law owe their origin to the legislative usurpations of the bench. It is said that every fiction must be framed according to the rules of law, and that every legal fiction must have equity for its object. To prevent their evil effects, they are not allowed to be carried further than the reasons which introduced them necessarily require. 3

The law abounds in fictions. That an estate is in abeyance; the doctrine of remitter, by which a party who has been disseised of his freehold and afterwards acquires a defective title, is remitted to his former good title; that one thing done today, is considered as done at a preceding time by the doctrine of relation; that because one thing is proved, another shall be presumed to be true, which is the case in all presumptions; that the heir, executor, and administrator stand by representation in the place of the deceased are all fictions of law. "Our various introduction of John Doe and Richard Roe; our solemn process upon disseisin by Hugh Hunt; our casually losing and finding a ship (which never was in Europe) in the parish of St. Mary Le Bow, in the ward of Cheap; our trying the validity of a will by an imaginary wager of five pounds; our imagining and compassing the king's death, by giving information which may defeat an attack upon an enemy's settlement in the antipodes; our charge of picking a pocket or forging a bill with force and arms; of neglecting to repair a bridge, against the peace of the king, his crown and dignity are circumstances, which, looked at by themselves, would convey an impression of no very favorable nature, with respect to the wisdom of our jurisprudence." --b— Legal Definition of Postliminium www.lectlaw.com www.lectlaw.com/def2/p125.htm Legal Definition of Postliminium The jus posiliminii was a fiction of the Roman law. It is a right recognized by the law of nations, and contributes essentially to mitigate the, calamities of war. www.lectlaw.com www.lectlaw.com/def2/p125.htm

http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c252.htm

COLOR
A wrong committed by an officer under the pretended authority of his office; in some cases the act amounts to a misdemeanor, and the party may then be indicted. In other cases, the remedy to redress the wrong is by an action. For example Section 1983, et sec. civil rights actions often include allegations that the defendants were acting under color of state law. Pleading. It is of two kinds, namely, express color and implied color.

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Express Color. This is defined to be a feigned matter, pleaded by the defendant, in an action of trespass, from which the plaintiff seems to have a good cause of action, whereas he has in truth only an appearance or color of cause. The practice of giving express color in pleas, obtained in the mixed actions of assize, the writ of entry in the nature of assize, as well as in the personal action of trespass. It is a general rule in pleading that no man shall be allowed to plead specially such plea as amounts to the general issue, or a total denial of the charges contained in the declaration and must in such cases plead the general issue in terms by which the whole question is referred to the jury; yet, if the defendant in an action of trespass be desirous to refer the validity of his title to the court, rather than to the jury, he may in his plea stated his title specially, by expressly giving color of title to the plaintiff, or supposing him to have an appearance of title had indeed in point of law, but of which the jury are not competent judges. Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff was in wrongful possession of the close, without any further appearance of title than the possession itself, at the time of the trespass alleged, and that the defendants entered upon him in assertion of their title; but being unable to set forth this title in the pleading in consequence of the objection that would arise for want of color, are driven to plead the general issue of not guilty. By this plea an issue is produced whether the defendants are guilty or not of the trespass; but upon the trial of the issue, it will be found that the question turns entirely upon a construction of law. The defendants say they are not guilty of the trespasses because they are not guilty of breaking the close of the plaintiff as alleged in the declaration; and that they are not guilty of breaking the close of the plaintiff because they themselves had the property in that close; and their title is this; that the father of one of the defendants being seised of the close in fee, gave it in tail to his eldest son, remainder in tail to one of the defendants; the eldest son was disseised, but made continual claim till the death of the disseisor; after whose death, the descent being cast upon the heir, the disseisee entered upon the heir and afterwards died, when the remainder took effect in the said defendant who demised to the other defendant. Now, this title involves a legal question; namely, whether continual claim will no preserve the right of entry in the disseisee, notwithstanding a descent cast on the heir of the disseisor. The issue however is merely not guilty, and this is triable by jury; and the effect, therefore, would be that a jury would have to decide this question of law, subject to the direction upon it which they would receive from the court. But let it be supposed that the defendants, in a view to the more satisfactory decision of the question, wish to bring it under the consideration of the court in bank rather than have it referred to a jury. If they have any means of setting forth their title specially in the plea the object will be attained; for then the plaintiff, if disposed to question the sufficiently of the title, may demur to the plea and thus refer the question to the decision of the judges. But such plea if pleaded simply, according to the state of the fact, would be informal for want of color and hence arises a difficulty.

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The pleaders of former days contrived to overcome this difficulty in the following singular manner. In such case as that supposed, the plea wanting implied color, they gave in lieu of it an express one by inserting a fictitious allegation of some colorable title in the plaintiff which they at the same time avoided by the preferable title of the defendant. Formerly various suggestions of apparent right might be adopted according to the fancy of the pleader; and though the same latitude is, perhaps, still available, yet, in practice it is unusual to resort to any except certain known fictions which long usage has applied to the particular case. E.g., in trespass to land, the color universally given is that of a defective charter of the demise. Implied Color. That in pleading which admits by implication, an apparent right in the opposite party, and avoids it by pleading some new matter by which that apparent right is defeated. It is a rule that every pleading by way of confession and avoidance must give color; that is, it must admit an apparent right in the opposite party and therefore rely on some new matter by which that apparent right is defeated. For example, where the defendant pleads a release to an action for breach of covenant the tendency of the plea is to admit an apparent right in the plaintiff, namely that the defendant did, as alleged in the declaration, execute the deed and break the covenant therein contained and would therefore, prima facie, be liable on that ground; but shows new matter not before disclosed by which that apparent right is done away, namely that the plaintiff executed to him a release. Again, if the plaintiff reply that such release was obtained by duress in his replication, he impliedly admits that the defendant has, prima facie, a good defence, namely that such release was executed as alleged in the plea; and that the defefadant therefore would be discharged; but relies on new matter by which the plea is avoided, namely that the release was obtained by duress. Therefore, the plea in this case gives color to the declaration, and the replication to the plea. But let it be supposed that the plaintiff has replied that the release was executed by him, but to another person and not to the defendant; this would be an informal replication wanting color because, if the release were not to the defendant there would not exist even an apparent defence requiring the allegation of new matter to avoid it, and the plea might be sufficiently answered by a traverse denying that the deed stated in the plea is the deed of the plaintiff. --b- Court Info & Rules, Fed  Court Info & Rules, State  Criminal Justice System  Criminal Law & Procedure http://www.lectlaw.com/tfia.htm http://www.lectlaw.com/tstf.htm

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FBI — Color of Law www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/color_of_l... That's why it's a federal crime for anyone acting under “color of law” willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive a person of a right protected by the Constitution or ... Color of Law | Directhit.com www.directhit.com/ansres/Color-of-Law.html Top Q&A for:Color of Law What Is Color of Law? The color of law is a legal term that refers to acting under...... http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-color-of-law.htm When do police officers act under color of law? No abstract is available for this item Definition of Color of Law | Directhit.com www.directhit.com/ansres/Definition-of-Color-of-Law.htm... of ... http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Co..... What is the definition of "under color of law"? Under 'color of law', it is a crime... Top Q&A for:Definition of Color of Law What is legal definition of Color of Law ? The appearance of a legal http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/u001.htm

UNDER COLOR OF LAW
When a person acts or purports to act in the performance of official duties under any law, ordinance, or regulation.

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/u002.htm

UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW
Covers not only acts done by an official under a State law, but also acts done by an official under any ordinance of a county or municipality of the State, as well as acts done under any regulation issued by any State or County or Municipal official, and even acts done by an official under color of some State or local custom. To act "under color of state law" means to act beyond the bounds of lawful authority, but in such a manner that the unlawful acts were done while the official was purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his official duties. In other words, the unlawful acts must consist of an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by the official only because he is an official.A person may be found guilty even though he was not an official or employee of the State, or of any county, city, or other governmental unit if the essential elements of the offense charged have been established and the person was a willful participant with the state or its agents in the doing of such acts. 7

"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1988) http://www.lectlaw.com/def/e072.htm

EXTORTION UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
The wrongful taking by a public officer of money or property not due to him or his office, whether or not the taking was accomplished by force, threats, or use of fear. In other words, the wrongful use of otherwise valid official power may convert lawful action into unlawful extortion. So, if a public official misuses his office by threatening to take or withhold official action for the wrongful purpose of inducing a victim to part with property, such a threat would constitute extortion even though the official was already duty bound to take or withhold the action in question.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Any intentional detention of the person of another not authorized by law is false imprisonment. It is any illegal imprisonment, without any process whatever, or under color of process wholly illegal, without regard to the question whether any crime has been committed or a debt due. The remedy is an order to be restored to liberty by writ of habeas corpus and to recover damages for the injury by action of trespass. To punish the wrong done to the public by the false imprisonment of an individual, the offender may be indicted. Under California law, false imprisonment is the 'nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.' Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 872 P.2d 559, 567 (Cal.'94) (quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 63 (Cal.'88)). A false imprisonment action may also be maintained if 'the defendant unlawfully detains the [plaintiff] for an unreasonable period of time' after an otherwise legal seizure or arrest. Lincoln v. Grazer, 329 P.2d 928, 30 (Cal.Ct.App.'58). 8

Once the plaintiff has proven the elements of the tort, the defendant has the burden to establish that the detention or arrest was legally justified. See Cervantes v. J.C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 982 (Cal.'79). --b— http://www.lectlaw.com/def/f082.htm http://www.lectlaw.com/search-g.html?cx=partner-pub2230761106156972%3Aog4cafqrpno&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=ISO-88591&q=color+of+law&sa=Search&siteurl=www.lectlaw.com %2Fdef2%2Fs071.htm&ref=&siteurl=www.lectlaw.com%2Fdef2%2Fs071.htm&ref=

"Chancery, Court Of Equity" Defined The name of a court exercising jurisdiction at law, but mainly in equity. It is not easy to determine how courts of equity originally obtained the jurisdiction they now ...www.lectlaw.com www.lectlaw.com/def/c225.htm http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c225.htm

CHANCERY, COURT OF EQUITY
The name of a court exercising jurisdiction at law, but mainly in equity. It is not easy to determine how courts of equity originally obtained the jurisdiction they now exercise. Their authority, and the extent of it, have been subjects of much question, but time has firmly established them; and the limits of their jurisdiction seem to be in a great degree fixed and ascertained. The judge of the court of chancery, often called a court of equity, bears the title of chancellor. The equity jurisdiction in England is vested, principally, in the high court of chancery. This court is distinct from courts of law. American courts of equity are, in some instances, distinct from those of law; in others, the same tribunals exercise the jurisdiction both of courts of law and equity though their forms of proceeding are different in their two capacities. The Supreme Court of the United States and the circuit courts are invested with general equity powers and act either as courts of law or equity, according to the form of the process and the subject of adjudication. In some of the states, as New York, Virginia, and South Carolina, the equity court is a distinct tribunal, having its appropriate judge, or chancellor, and officers. In most of the states, the two jurisdictions centre in the same judicial officers, as in the courts of the United States; and the extent of equity jurisdiction and proceedings is very various in the different states, being very ample in Connecticut, 9

New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, and more restricted in Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. But the salutary influence of these powers on the judicial administration generally, by the adaptation of chancery forms and modes of proceeding to many cases in which a court of law affords but an imperfect remedy, or no remedy at all, is producing a gradual extension of them in those states where they have been, heretofore, very limited. The jurisdiction of a court of equity differs essentially from that of a court of law. The remedies for wrongs, or for the enforcement of rights, may be distinguished into two classes; those which are administered in courts of law, and those which are administered in courts of equity. The rights secured by the former are called legal; those secured by the latter are called equitable. The former are said to be rights and remedies at common law, because recognized and enforced in courts of common law. The latter are said to be rights and remedies in equity, because they are administered in courts of equity or chancery, or by proceedings in other courts analogous to those in courts of equity or chancery. Now, in England and America, courts of common law proceed by certain prescribed forms and give a general judgment for or against the defendant. They entertain jurisdiction only in certain actions and give remedies according to the particular exigency of such actions. But there are many cases in which a simple judgment for either party, without qualifications and conditions, and particular arrangements, will not do entire justice, ex aequo et bono, to either party. Some modification of the rights of both parties is required; some restraints on one side or the other; and some peculiar adjustments, either present or future, temporary or perpetual. Now, in all these cases, courts of common law have no methods of proceeding which can accomplish such objects. Their forms of actions and judgment are not adapted to them. The proper remedy cannot be found or cannot be administered to the full extent of the relative rights of all parties. Such prescribed forms of actions are not confined to our law. They were known in the civil law; and the party could apply them only to their original purposes. In other cases he had a special remedy. In such cases where the courts of common law cannot grant the proper remedy or relief, the law of England and of the United States (in those states where equity is administered) authorizes an application to the courts of equity or chancery, which are not confined or limited in their modes of relief by such narrow regulations, but which grant relief to all parties in cases where they have rights, ex aequo et bono, and modify and fashion that relief according to circumstances. The most general description of a court of equity is that it has jurisdiction in cases where a plain, adequate and complete remedy cannot be had at law, that is, in common law courts. The remedy must be plain; for if it be doubtful and obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction. So it must be adequate at law; for if it fall short of what the party is entitled to, that founds a jurisdiction in equity. And it must be complete; that is, it must attain its full end at law, must reach the whole mischief and secure the whole right of the party, now and for the future otherwise equity will interpose and give relief.

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The jurisdiction of a court of equity is sometimes concurrent with that of courts of law and sometimes it is exclusive. It exercises concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the rights are purely of a legal nature, but where other and more efficient aid is required than a court of law can afford, to meet the difficulties of the case and ensure full redress. In some of these cases courts of law formerly refused all redress but now will grant it. But the jurisdiction having been once justly acquired at a time when there was no such redress at law, it is not now relinquished. The most common exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is in cases of account, accident, dower, fraud, mistake, partnership and partition. The remedy is here often more complete and effectual than it can be at law. In many cases falling under these heads, and especially in some cases of fraud, mistake and accident, courts of law cannot and do not afford any redress; in others they do, but not always in so perfect a manner. A court of equity also is assistant to the jurisdiction of courts of law in many cases where the latter have no like authority. It will remove legal impediments to the fair decision of a question depending at law. It will prevent a party from improperly setting up, at a trial, some title or claim, which would be inequitable. It will compel him to discover, on his own oath, facts which he knows are material to the rights of the other party, but which a court of law cannot compel the party to discover. It will perpetuate the testmony of witnesses to rights and titles which are in danger of being lost, before the matter can be tried. It will provide for the safety of property in dispute pending litigation. It will counteract and control, or set aside, fraudulent judgments. It will exercise, in many cases, an exclusive jurisdiction. This it does in all cases of morely equitable rights, that is, such rights as are not recognized in courts of law. Most cases of trust and confidence fall under this head. Its exclusive jurisdiction is also extensively exercised in granting special relief beyond the reach of the common law. It will grant injunctions to prevent waste, or irreparable injury, or to secure a settled right, or to prevent vexatious litigations, or to compel the restitution of title deeds; it will appoint receivers of property, where it is in danger of misapplication it will compel the surrender of securities improperly obtained; it will prohibit a party from leaving the country in order to avoid a suit it will restrain any undue exercise of a legal right against conscience and equity; it will decree a specific performance of contracts respecting real estates; it will, in many cases, supply the imperfect execution of instruments and reform and alter them according to the real intention of the parties; it will grant relief in cases of lost deeds or securities; and in all cases in which its interference is asked, its general rule is that he who asks equity must do equity. If a party, therefore, should ask to have a bond for a usurious debt given up, equity could not decree it unless he could bring into court the money honestly due without usury. This is a very general and imperfect outline of the jurisdiction of a court of equity; in respect to which it has been justly remarked that, in matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, where substantial justice entitles the party to relief, but the positive law is silent, it is impossible to define the boundaries of that jurisdiction, or to enumerate, with precision, its various principles. --b--

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http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p078.htm

PRIMA-FACIE, EVIDENCE, CASE
Latin for "at first view." Evidence that is sufficient to raise a presumption of fact or to establish the fact in question unless rebutted. A prima-facie case is a lawsuit that alleges facts adequate to prove the underlying conduct supporting the cause of action and thereby prevail. Below's an example dealing with employment discrimination claims. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII by establishing that (1) he or she belongs to a racial minority; (2) he or she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) he or she was rejected for the position despite his or her qualifications; and (4) the position remained open after his or her rejection and the employer continued to seek applications from other people with similar qualifications to the plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that"[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous." After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection. Id. If the employer sustains the burden, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to present evidence showing that the employer's stated reason for the rejection was merely pretextual. Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807; Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1437 ("The defendant's articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason serves . . . to shift the burden back to the plaintiff to raise a genuine factual question as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual.") (quoting Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008). The third step does not require that a plaintiff prove that "he was rejected because of his protected status." The plaintiff must only show in step three that "despite his qualifications, he was rejected." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The two standards are quite different. The McDonnell Douglas test merely requires that a plaintiff raise an inference of disparate treatment to establish a prima facie case, not actual proof of such treatment. Under McDonnell Douglas, to establish his prima facie case, the plaintiff need not prove that discrimination was the motivating factor in his dismissal. All he must do is raise an inference that such misconduct occurred. A plaintiff can also establish a prima facie case by "offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criteria illegal under 12

[Title VII]." Mitchell v. Office of the Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools, 805 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)); see Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff can establish prima facie case of disparate treatment without satisfying McDonnell Douglas test if he or she provides evidence suggesting rejection was based on discriminatory criteria), amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986). A plaintiff who provides such evidence for his or her prima facie case may be able to survive summary judgment on this evidence alone. Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1008. Although "the mere existence of a prima facie case, based on the minimum evidence necessary to raise a McDonnell Douglas presumption, does not preclude summary judgment," Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1994), "the plaintiff [who has established a prima facie case] need produce very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of fact" as to pretext. Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1437. In fact, any indication of discriminatory motive . . . may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder. Once a prima facie case is established . . . summary judgment for the defendant will ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because the crux of a Title VII dispute is the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. Id. at 1438 (quoting Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1009) (citation omitted). Thus, burden at the summary judgment stage is not great. The first blush; the first view or appearance of the business; as, the holder of a bill of exchange, indorsed in blank, is prima facie its owner. Prima facie evidence of a fact, is in law sufficient to establish the fact, unless rebutted. For example, when buildings are fired by sparks emitted from a locomotive engine passing along the road, it is prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of those who have the charge of it. --b--

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/t065.htm

TENTH AMENDMENT
The Tenth Amendment provides that " The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. " U.S. Const. amend. X. As a textual matter, therefore, the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). By its terms, the Amendment does not purport to limit the commerce power or any other enumerated power of Congress. In recent years, however, the Tenth Amendment has been interpreted "to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress' authority to regulate state activities, whether 13

grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution." South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5 (1988). Thus, "the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). There are numbers of ways in which the federal government is permitted to secure the assistance of state authorities in achieving federal legislative goals. First and most directly, the federal government may coerce the states and their employees into complying with federal laws of general applicability. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Second, Congress may condition the grant of federal funds on the States' taking governmental action desired by Congress. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). State judicial and administrative bodies may be required to apply federal law. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1982). The federal government may offer to preempt regulation in a given area, and permit the states to avoid preemption if they regulate in a manner acceptable to Congress. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290-91 (1981). The federal government has been permitted effectively to compel the states to issue registered rather than bearer bonds. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988). Finally, the federal government has been permitted to require state utility regulators to consider prescribed federal standards in determining regulatory policies. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 765. In the course of the latter ruling, the Supreme Court referred to and rejected the "19th century view" that "Congress has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." Id. at 761 (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861)). That view, said the Court, "is not representative of the law today." Id. "The federal government has some power to enlist a branch of state government . . . to further federal ends." Id. at 762. United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), "a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would . . . be beyond the power of Congress." Id. at 176. the Court in New York stated: "whether or not a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress to bring state governments within the orbit of generally applicable federal regulation, no Member of the Court has ever suggested that such a federal interest would enable Congress to command a state government to enact state regulation." Id. at 178. In the same vein was the Court's conclusion after reviewing the debates at the time of the founding of the Constitution: We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. E.g., FERC v. Mississippi. . . . The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 166.

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Other decisions of the Supreme Court have recognized this proposition that the federal government cannot coerce States into performing the ultimately sovereign acts of legislating or regulating in a manner specified by the federal government. In Virginia Surface Mining, the Court noted that the provision of an alternative of federal regulation rendered federal standards for state regulation permissible; because the State had a constitutional option, "there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added). Similarly, In FERC v. Mississippi, the Court noted that the federal command that the State "consider" federal alternatives was constitutional because "[t]here is nothing in PURPA 'directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative program." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 765. "[T]he etiquette of federalism has been violated by a formal command from the National Government directing the State to enact a certain policy, cf. New York." United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993) ("direct commands to the states to regulate according to Congress's instructions" "violate the Tenth Amendment as interpreted by New York"). There are good reasons for focusing Tenth Amemdment concern on federal coercion of a State's enactment of legislation or regulations or creation of an administrative program. These activities are inherently central acts of a sovereign; if an area of state activity is to be protected from direct coercion by an implication drawn from the Tenth Amendment, legislating and regulating are prime candidates. "[T]he power to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 761. There is a second reason, also, emphasized in New York itself. Democratic governments must be politically accountable. When the federal government requires the States to enact legislation, the enacted legislation is state legislation. Thus, it will likely "be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision." New York, 505 U.S. at 169. When the federal government itself imposes a requirement on a state official, the requirement is more clearly an act of the federal government and thus does not, to the same extent, undermine political accountability. The Tenth Amendment view espoused in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987), was that "the Federal Government . . . has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatsoever . . . ." See Brown, 521 F.2d at 841. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the view espoused in Kentucky v. Dennison is no longer representative of the law. FERC, 456 U.S. at 761.

http://www.lectlaw.com/def/j009.htm

JUDGMENT
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A court's official decision on the matters before it. The declaration, by a court, of the rights and duties of the parties to a lawsuit which has been submitted to it for decision. Can also include an "injunction" a specific order to do or not to do something. A final decision made by a judge on a material issue during a case is termed a judgment. A judgment can provide all or a portion of the relief sought in a case, including property division, alimony, child support, custody or an injunction. In most states, the court order granting a divorce and ruling on the issues associated with the divorce (alimony, child support, custody, visitation and division of property) is called a decree. Decrees can be temporary, interlocutory (semi-permanent) or permanent. For all practical purposes, a decree is the same thing as a judgment. (2) The decision or sentence of the law given by a court of justice or other competent tribunal as the result of proceedings instituted therein for the redress of an injury. The language of judgments therefore is not that 'it is decreed,' or 'resolved,' by the court; but 'it is considered,' that the plaintiff recover his debt, damages or possession as the case may require or that the defendant do go without day. This implies that the judgment is not so much the decision of the court as the sentence of the law pronounced and decreed by the court, after due deliberation and inquiry. To be valid, a judicial judgment must be given by a competent judge or court at a time and place appointed by law and in the form it requires. A judgment would be null if the judge had not jurisdiction of the matter; or having such jurisdiction, he exercised it when there was no court held or but of his district; or if be rendered a judgment before the cause was prepared for a hearing. The judgment must confine itself to the question raised before the court and cannot extend beyond it. For example, where the plaintiff sued for an injury committed on his lands by animals owned and kept carelessly by defendant, the judgment may be for damages, but it cannot command the defendant for the future to keep his cattle out of the plaintiff's land. That would be to usurp the power of the legislature. A judgment declares the rights which belong to the citizen, the law alone rules future actions. The law commands all men, it is the same for all because it is general; judgments are particular decisions, which apply only to particular persons and bind no others; they vary like the circumstances on which they are founded. Litigious contests present to the courts facts to appreciate, agreements to be construed, and points of law to be resolved. The judgment is the result of the full examination of all these. There are four kinds of judgments in civil cases, namely: 1. When the facts are admitted by the parties, but the law is disputed; as in case of judgment upon demurrer; 2. When the law is admitted, but the facts are disputed; as in, case of judgment upon a verdict; 3. When both the law and the facts are admitted by confession; as in the case of cognovit actionem, on the part of the defendant; or nolle prosequi, on the part of the plaintiff; 4. By default of

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either party in the course of legal proceedings, as in the case of judgment by nihil disit or non sum informatus, when the defendant has omitted to plead or instruct his attorney to do so after a proper notice or in cases of judgment by non pros; or as in case of nonsuit, when the plaintiff omits to follow up his proceedings. These four species of judgments, again, are either interlocutory or final. A list of various types of judgments follows: JUDGMENT IN ASSUMPSIT is either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant; when in favor of the plaintiff, it is that he recover a specified sum, assessed by a jury or on reference to the prothonotary or other proper officer, for the damages which he has sustained, by reason of the defendant's non-performance of his promises and undertakings and for full costs of suit. When the judgment is for the defendant, it is that he recover his costs. JUDGMENT IN ACTIONS ON THE CASE FOR TORTS, when for the plaintiff, is that he recover a sum of money ascertained by a jury for his damages occasioned by the committing of the grievances complained of and the costs of suit. When for the defendant, it is for costs. Judgment OF CASSETUR BREVE or BILLA, is in cases of pleas in abatement where the plaintiff prays that his 'writ' or ' bill' 'may be quashed, that he may sue or exhibit a better one.' JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION. When instead of entering a plea, the defendant chooses to confess the action; or, after pleading; he does, at any time before trial, both confess the action and withdraw his plea or other allegations; the judgment against him, in these two cases, is called a judgment by confession or by confession relicta verificatione. CONTRADICTORY JUDGMENT. By this term is understood, in the state of Louisiana, a judgment which has been given after the parties have been heard, either in support of their claims or in their defence. A judgment is called contradictory to distinguish it from one which is rendered by default. JUDGMENT IN COVENANT; when for the plaintiff, is that he recover an ascertained sum for his damages, which he has sustained by reason of the breach or breaches of the defendant's covenant, together with costs of suit. When for the defendant, the judgment, is for costs. JUDGMENT IN THE ACTION OF DEBT; when for the plaintiff, is that he recover his debt and in general, nominal damages for the detention thereof. In some penal and other particular actions the plaintiff does not, however, always recover costs. When the judgment is for the defendant, it is generally for costs. In some penal actions, however, neither party can recover costs.

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JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT, is a judgment rendered in consequence of tho nonappearance of the defendant and is either by nil dicit or by non sum informatus. This judgment is interlocutory in assumpsit, covenant, trespass, case and replevin, where the sole object of the action is damages; but in debt, damages not being the principal object of the action, the plaintiff usually signs final judgment in the first instance. JUDGMENT IN THE ACTION OF DETINUE; when for the plaintiff, is in the alternative, that he recover the goods or the value thereof, if he cannot have the goods themselves and his damage for the detention and costs. JUDGMENT IN ERROR, is a judgment rendered by a court ot error, on a record sent up, from an inferior court. These judgments are of two kinds, of affirmance and reversal. When the judgment is for the defendant in error, whether the errors assigned be in law or in fact, it is 'that the former judgment be affirmed and stand in full force and effect, the said causes and matters assigned for error notwithstanding and that the defendant in error recover $____ for his damages, charges and costs which he hath sustained,' etc. When it is for the plaintiff in error, the judgment is that it be reversed or recalled. It is to be reversed for error in law, in this form, that it be reversed, annulled and altogether holden for nought.' For error in fact the judgment is recalled, revocatur. A FINAL JUDGMENT is one which puts an end to the suit. When the issue is one in fact and is tried by a jury, the jury at the time that they try the issue, assess the damages and the judgment is final in the first instance and is that the plaintiff do recover the damages assessed. When an interlocutory judgment has been rendered and a writ of inquiry has issued to ascertain the damages, on the return of the inquisition the plaintiff is entitled to a final judgment, namely, that he recover the amount of damages so assessed. AN INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT is one given in the course of a cause, before final judgment. When the action sounds in damages and the issue is an issue in law or when any issue in fact not tried by a jury is decided in favor of the plaintiff, then the judgment is that the plaintiff ought to recover his damages without specifying their amount; for, as there has been no trial by jury in the case, the amount of damages is not yet ascertained. The judgment is then said to be interlocutory. To ascertain such damages it is the practice to issue a writ of inquiry. When the action is founded on a promissory note, bond or other writing or any other contract by which the amount due may be readily computed, the practice is, in some courts, to refer it to the prothonotary or clerk to assess the damages. There is one species of interlocutory judgment which establishes nothing but the inadequacy of the defence set up this is the judgment for the plaintiff on demurrer to a plea in abatement, by which it appears that the defendant has mistaken the law on a point which does not affect the merits of his case; and it being but reasonable that he should offer, if he can, a further defence, that judgment is that he do answer over, in technical language, judgment of respondeat ouster.

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JUDGMENT OF NIL CAPIAT PER BREVE or PER BILLAM. When an issue arises upon a declaration or peremptory plea and it is decided in favor of the defendant, the judgment is, in general, that, the plaintiff take nothing by his writ, (or bill,) and that the defendant go thereof without day, etc. This is called a judgment of nil capiat per breve or per billam. JUDGMENT BY NIL DICIT, is one rendered against a defendant for want of a plea. The plaintiff obtains a rule on the defendant to plead within a time specified, of which he serves a notice on the defendant or his attorney; if the defendant neglect to enter a plea within the time specified, the plaintiff may sign judgment against him. JUDGMENT OF NOLLE PROSEQUI, is a judgment entered against the plaintiff, where, after appearance and before judgment, he says, 'he will not further prosecute his suit.' JUDGMENT OF NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO, is a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, without regard to the verdict obtained by the defendant. The motion for such judgment is made where after a pleading by the defendant in confession and avoidance, as for example, a plea in bar and issue joined thereon and verdict found for, the defendant, the plaintiff on retrospective examination of the record, conceives that such plea was bad in substance and might have been made the subject of demurrer on that ground. If the plea was itself substantially bad in law, of course the verdict, which merely shows it to be true in point of fact, cannot avail to entitle the defendant to judgment; while on the other hand the plea being in confession and avoidance, involves a confession of the plaintiff's declaration and shows that he was entitled. to maintain his action. In such case, therefore, this court will give judgment for the plaintiff, without regard to the verdict; and this, for the reasons above explained, is called a judgment upon confession. Sometimes it may be expedient for the plaintiff to move for judgment non obstante, etc., even though the verdict be in his own favor; for, if in such case as above described, he takes judgment as upon the verdict, it seems that such judgment would be erroneous and that the only safe course is to take it as upon confession. JUDGMENT BY NON SUM INFORMATUS, is one which is rendered, when instead of entering a plea, the defendant's attorney says he is not informed of any answer to be given to the action. . JUDGMENT OF NON PROS. (from non prosequitur,) is one given against the plaintiff, in any class of actions, for not declaring or replying or surrejoining, etc. or for not entering the issue. JUDGMENT OF NONSUIT, Practice, is one against the plaintiff, which happens when, on trial by jury, the plaintiff, on being called or demanded, at the instance of the defendant, to be present while the jury give their verdict, fails to make his appearance. In this case, no verdict is given, but the judgment of nonsuit passes against the plaintiff. So if, after issue be joined, the plaintiff neglect to bring such issue on to be tried in due time, as limited by the practice of the court, in the particular case, judgment will be also given against him for this default; and it is called judgment as in case of nonsuit. After suffering a nonsuit, the plaintiff may commence another action for the same cause for which the first had been

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instituted. In some cases, plaintiffs having obtained information in what manner the jury had agreed upon their verdict before it was delivered in court, have, when the jury were ready to give in such verdict against them, suffered a nonsuit for the purpose of commencing another action and obtaining another trial. To prevent this abuse, the legislature of Pennsylvania have provided, by the Act of March 28, 1814, 6:Reed's L. 208, that 'whenever on the trial of any cause, the jury shall be ready to give in their verdict, the plaintiff shall not be called, nor shall he then be permitted to suffer a nonsuit.' JUDGMENT QUOD COMPUTET. The name of an interlocutory judgment in an action of account render that the defendant do account, quod computet. JUDGMENT QUOD RECUPERET. When an issue in law, other than one arising on a dilatory plea or an issue in fact, is decided in favor of the plaintiff, the judgment is, that the plaintiff do recover, which is called a judgment guod recuperet. This judgment is of two kinds, namely, interlocutory or final. JUDGMENT IN REPLEVIN, is either for the plaintiff or defendant. For The Plaintiff. 1. When the declaration is in the detinuit, that is, where the plaintiff declares, that the chattels 'were detained until replevied by the sheriff,' the judgment is that he recover the damages assessed by the jury for the taking and unjust detention or for the latter only, where the former was justifiable, as also his costs. If the replevin is in the detinet, that is, where the plaintiff declares that the chattels taken are 'yet detained,' the jury must find, 'in addition to the above, the value of the chattels, (assuming that they are still detained,) not in a gross sum, but each separate article; for tho defendant, perhaps, will restore some, in which case the plaintiff is to recover the value of the remainder. For The Defendant. 1. If the replevin be abated, the judgment is, that the writ or plaint abate and that the defendant (having avowed) have a return of the chattels. When the plaintiff is nonsuited, the judgment for the defendant, at common law, is, that the chattels be restored to him and this without his first assigning the purpose for which they were taken, because, by abandoning his suit, the plaintiff admits that he had no right to dispossess the defendant by prosecuting the replevin. The form of this judgment. is simply 'to have a return,' without adding the words 'to hold irreplevisable.' When tho avowant succeeds upon the merits of his case, the common law judgment is, that he 'have return irreplevisable,' for it is apparent that he is by law entitled to keep possession of the goods. JUDGMENT OF RESPONDEAT OUSTER. When there is an issue in law, arising on a dilatory plea and it is decided in favor of the plaintiff, the judgment is only that the defendant answer over, which is called a judgment of respondeat ouster. The pleading is accordingly resumed and the action proceeds. JUDGMENT OF RETRAXIT, is one where, after appearance and before judgment, the, plaintiff enters upon the record that he 'withdraws his suit;' in such case judgment is given against him.

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JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION ON TRESPASS, when for the plaintiff, is that he recover the damages assessed by the jury and the costs. For the defendant, that he recover the costs. JUDGMENT IN ACTION ON THE CASE FOR TROVER, when for the plaintiff, is, that he recover damages and costs. For the defendant, the judgment is, that he recover his costs. JUDGMENT OF CAPIATUR. At common law, on conviction, in a civil action, of a forcible wrong, alleged to have been committed vi et armis, etc., the defendant was obliged to pay a fine to the king, for the breach of the peace implied in the act and a judgment of capiatur pro fine was rendered against him, under which he was liable to be arrested and imprisoned till the fine was paid. But the judgment of capiatur pro fine was abolished. JUDGMENT OF MISERICORDIA. At common law, the party to, a suit who did not prevail was punished for his unjust vexation and therefore judgment was given against him, quod sit in misericordia pro falso clamore. Hence, when the plaintiff sued out a writ, the sheriff was obliged to take pledges of prosecution before he returned it, which when fines and amercements were considerable, were real and responsible persons and answerable for those amercements; but now they are never levied and the pledges are merely formal, namely, John Doe and Richard Roe. JUDGMENT QUOD PARTITIO FIAT is a judgment in a writ of partition, that partition be made; this is not a final judgment. The final judgment is, quod partitio facta firma et stabilis in perpetuum teneatur. JUDGMENT QUOD PARTES REPLACITENT. The name of a judgment given when the court award a repleader. When issue is joined on an immaterial point or a point on which the court cannot give a judgment determining the right, they award a repleader or judgment quod partes replacitent. --b-http://www.lectlaw.com/def/f101.htm

FALSE PRETENCES
False representations and statements, made with a fraudulent design, to obtain " money, goods, wares, and merchandise " with intent to cheat. The Nature Of The False Pretence. When the false pretence is such as to impose upon a person of ordinary caution, it will doubtless be sufficient. But although it may be difficult to restrain false pretences to such as an ordinarily prudent man may avoid, yet it is not every absurd or irrational pretence which will be sufficient. It is not necessary that all the pretences should be false, if one of them is sufficient to constitute the offence. And although other circumstances may have 21

induced the credit or the delivery of the property, yet it will be sufficient if the false pretences had such an influence that, without them, the credit would not have been given or the property delivered. The false pretences must have been used before the contract was completed. What Must Be Obtained. The wording of the statutes of the several states on this subject is not the same, as to the acts which are indictable. In Pennsylvania, the words of the act are, "every person who, with intent to cheat or defraud another, shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing, or by any false pretence whatever, obtain from any person any money, personal property or other valuable, things," etc. In Massachusetts, the intent must be to obtain "money, goods, wares, merchandise, or other things." Stat. of 1815. In New York, the words are "money, goods, or chattels, or other effects." Under this statute it has been holden that obtaining a signature to a note or an endorsement on a promissory note fell within the spirit of the statute and that where credit was obtained by false pretence, it was also within the statute. The Intent. There must be an intent to cheat or defraud same person. This may be inferred from a false representation. The intent is all that is requisite; it is not necessary that the party defrauded should sustain any loss. --b—

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p089.htm

PROBABLE CAUSE
A reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime. The test the court of appeals employs to determine whether probable cause existed for purposes of arrest is whether facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. U.S. v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992). In terms of seizure of items, probable cause merely requires that the facts available to the officer warrants a "man of reasonable caution" to conclude that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as

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evidence of a crime. U.S. v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. Denied, 112 S. Ct. 401 (1992). It is undisputed that the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits an officer from making an arrest without probable cause. McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1984). Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 825 (1990) (citing United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1185 (1986)). When there are grounds for suspicion that a person has committed a crime or misdemeanor, and public justice and the good of the community require that the matter should be examined, there is said to be a probable cause for, making a charge against the accused, however malicious the intention of the accuser may have been. And probable cause will be presumed till the contrary appears. In an action, then, for a malicious prosecution, the plaintiff is bound to show total absence of probable cause, whether the original proceedings were civil or criminal. --b-THE 'LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY(tm) -- http://www.lectlaw.com

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/n010.htm

NEGLIGENCE
The failure to use reasonable care. The doing of something which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do under like circumstances. A departure from what an ordinary reasonable member of the community would do in the same community.

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Negligence is a 'legal cause' of damage if it directly and in natural and continuous sequence produces or contributes substantially to producing such damage, so it can reasonably be said that if not for the negligence, the loss, injury or damage would not have occurred. Negligence may be a legal cause of damage even though it operates in combination with the act of another, a natural cause, or some other cause if the other cause occurs at the same time as the negligence and if the negligence contributes substantially to producing such damage. In cases involving allegedly defective, unreasonably dangerous products, the manufacturer may be liable even though it exercised all reasonable care in the design, manufacture and sale of the product in question. On the other hand, any failure of a manufacturer of a product to adopt the most modern, or even a better safeguard, does not necessarily make the manufacturer legally liable to a person injured by that product. The manufacturer is not a guarantor that nobody will get hurt in using its product, and a product is not defective or unreasonably dangerous merely because it is possible to be injured while using it. There is no duty upon the manufacturer to produce a product that is 'accident-proof.' What the manufacturer is required to do is to make a product which is free from defective and unreasonably dangerous conditions. In general, the law of California declares that '[e]very one is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person . . . .' Cal.Civ.Code Sec. 1714(a). That, of course, means that people are generally liable when they negligently injure others. If the language is a bit quaint, it is because that has been the law of California since at least 1872. The California courts have assiduously enforced that principle and only deviate from it when some powerful public policy dictates a contrary result. See Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362, 372-73 (1982). When considered in relation to contracts, negligence may be divided into various degrees: Ordinary negligence is the want of ordinary diligence; Slight or less than ordinary negligence is the want of great diligence; Gross or more than ordinary negligence is the want of slight diligence. Three great principles of responsibility seem naturally to follow this division. In those contracts which are made for the sole benefit of the creditor, the debtor is responsible only for gross negligence, good faith alone being required of him, as in the case of a depositary who is a bailee without reward. In those contracts which are for the reciprocal benefit of both parties such as those of sale, of hiring, of pledge and the like, the party is bound to take that care which a prudent man ordinarily takes of his affairs and he will therefore be held responsible for ordinary neglect.

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In those contracts made for the sole interest of the party who has received and is to return the thing which is the object of the contract, e.g., a loan for a thing's use, the slightest negligence will make him responsible. In general, a party who has caused an injury or loss to another in consequence of his negligence is responsible for all the consequences. An example of this may be found in the case of a person who drives a car during a dark night on the wrong side of the road and injures another. When the law imposes a duty on an officer, whether by common law or statute, and he neglects to perform it, he may be held accountable for such neglect and in some cases such neglect will amount to a forfeiture of the office. --b-http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c174.htm

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
Any claim or cause of action predicated on a right or duty established by the Constitution. 'Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .' 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983 (1988) Inverse condemnation suits do not provide only the just compensation required under state law. Rather, such suits are a method of obtaining the just compensation required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 'A landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation.' First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). 'Claims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself.' Id.

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p050.htm

PIRACY (BY U.S. CITIZEN)

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Whoever, being a citizen of the U.S., commits any murder or robbery, or any act of hostility against the U.S., or against any citizen thereof, on the high seas, under color of any commission from any foreign prince, or state, or on pretense of authority from any person, is a pirate, and shall be imprisoned for life. 18 USC

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/m035.htm

MITIGATE DAMAGES
Taking action to avoid or reduce damages.A person who claims damages as a result of an alleged wrongful act on the part of another has a duty under the law to "mitigate" those damages; that is, to take advantage of any reasonable opportunity he may have had under the circumstances to reduce or minimize the loss or damage. So, if a Plaintiff [within the limitations of any disability he may have sustained] fails to seek out or take advantage of a business or employment opportunity that was reasonably available to him under all the circumstances, then the amount of damages awarded may be reduced by the amount he could have reasonably realized if he had taken advantage of such opportunity.

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/t004.htm

TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS
Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 1512, makes it a Federal crime or offense for anyone to use intimidation or physical force to threaten another person with intent to influence the testimony of a witness in any Court proceeding. A person can be found guilty of that offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That the witness was scheduled to be a witness in court; Second: That the person used intimidation/physical force against such witness; and Third: That the person did so knowingly and willfully with the intent to influence the testimony of the witness. To act with intent to "influence" the testimony of a witness means to act for the purpose of getting the witness to change or color or shade his or her testimony in some way; but it is not necessary to prove that the witness' testimony was, in fact, changed in any way.

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http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c103.htm

CONSPIRACY
18 U.S.C. 371 makes it a separate Federal crime or offense for anyone to conspire or agree with someone else to do something which, if actually carried out, would amount to another Federal crime or offense. So, under this law, a 'conspiracy' is an agreement or a kind of 'partnership' in criminal purposes in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every other member. In order to establish a conspiracy offense it is not necessary for the Government to prove that all of the people named in the indictment were members of the scheme; or that those who were members had entered into any formal type of agreement; or that the members had planned together all of the details of the scheme or the 'overt acts' that the indictment charges would be carried out in an effort to commit the intended crime. Also, because the essence of a conspiracy offense is the making of the agreement itself (followed by the commission of any overt act), it is not necessary for the Government to prove that the conspirators actually succeeded in accomplishing their unlawful plan. What the evidence in the case must show beyond a reasonable doubt is: First: That two or more persons, in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, as charged in the indictment; Second: That the person willfully became a member of such conspiracy; Third: That one of the conspirators during the existence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the methods (or 'overt acts') described in the indictment; and Fourth: That such 'overt act' was knowingly committed at or about the time alleged in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy. An 'overt act' is any transaction or event, even one which may be entirely innocent when considered alone, but which is knowingly committed by a conspirator in an effort to accomplish some object of the conspiracy. A person may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all of the details of the unlawful scheme, and without knowing who all of the other members are. So, if a person has an understanding of the unlawful nature of a plan and knowingly and willfully joins in that plan on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though he did not participate before, and even though he played only a minor part. Of course, mere presence at the scene of a transaction or event, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other, and may have assembled together and 27

discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a conspirator. A combination or agreement of two or more persons to join together to attempt to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of 'partnership in criminal purposes,' and willful participation in such a scheme or agreement, followed by the commission of an overt act by one of the conspirators is sufficient to complete the offense of 'conspiracy' itself even though the ultimate criminal object of the conspiracy is not accomplished or carried out. To establish the offense of 'conspiracy' the Government must prove: (1) That two or more persons in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, as charged in the indictment; (2) That the person willfully became a member of such conspiracy; (3) That one of the conspirators during the existence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the methods (or 'overt acts') described in the indictment; and (4) That such 'overt act' was knowingly committed at or about the time alleged in an effort to effect or accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy. A person may become a member of a conspiracy without full knowledge of all of the details of the unlawful scheme or the names and identities of all of the other alleged conspirators. So, if a person has an understanding of the unlawful nature of a plan and knowingly and willfully joins in that plan on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though he had not participated before and even though he played only a minor part. Of course, mere presence at the scene of a transaction or event, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other, and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a conspirator. An agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or an act which may become by the combination injurious to others. Formerly this offence was much more circumscribed in its meaning than it is now. Lord Coke describes it as 'a consultation or agreement between two or more to appeal or indict an innocent person falsely and maliciously, whom accordingly they cause to be indicted or appealed and afterwards the party is acquitted by the verdict of twelve men.' The crime of conspiracy, according to its modern interpretation, may be of two kinds, Damely, conspiracies against the public, or such as endanger the public health, violate public morals, insult public justice, destroy the public peace, or affect public trade or business. To remedy these evils the guilty persons may be indicted in the name of the commonwealth. Conspiracies against individuals are such as have a tendency to injure

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them in their persons, reputation, or property. The remedy in these cases is either by indictment or by a civil action. In order to render the offence complete, there is no occasion that any act should be done in pursuance of the unlawful agreement entered into between the parties, or that any one should have been defrauded or injured by it. The conspiracy is the gist of the crane. By the former laws of the United States, a willful and corrupt conspiracy to cast away, burn or otherwise destroy any ship or vessel with intent to injure any underwriter thereon, or the goods on board thereof, or any lender of money on such vessel, on bottomry or respondentia, is made felony, and the offender punishable by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars and by imprisonment and confinement at hard labor not exceeding ten years. By the old Revised Statutes of New York it is enacted that if any two or more persons shall conspire either: 1. To commit any offence, or; 2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any offence, or; 3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit, or; 4. To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means which are in themselves criminal, or; 5. To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by means which, if executed, would amount to a cheat, or to obtaining property by false pretences, or; 6. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade and commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or the due administration of the laws; they shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. No other conspiracies are there punishable criminally. And no agreement, except to commit a felony upon the person of another, or to commit arson or burglary, shall be deemed a conspiracy, unless some act besides such agreement be done to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement. When a felony has been committed in pursuance of a conspiracy, the latter, which is only a misdemeanor, is merged in the former; but when a misdemeanor only has been committed in pursuance of such conspiracy, the two crimes being of equal degree, there can be no legal technical merger. --b--

http://www.lectlaw.com/def/f087.htm

FACT or OPINION re Defamation
In libel and defamation actions it's a general rule that no remedy can be had for a statement that was issued in the form of an opinion. The distinction between a statement of fact and one of opinion is frequently difficult. In characterizing a statement, courts must look at it not as lawyers and judges but by placing ourselves in the position of the hearer or reader, and determine the sense or meaning of the 29

statement according to its natural and popular construction. In short, the measure is not the effect of the statement on a mind trained in the law, but by the natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader. (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 260.) Accordingly, "what constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another, in light of the nature and content of the communication taken as a whole." (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 601.) "For these reasons, California courts have developed a 'totality of the circumstances' test to determine whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact or of opinion. First, the language of the statement is examined. For words to be defamatory, they must be understood in a defamatory sense. Where the language of the statement is 'cautiously phrased in terms of apparency,' the statement is less likely to be reasonably understood as a statement of fact rather than opinion. Next, the context in which the statement was made must be considered. Since '[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, [but] is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used,' the facts surrounding the publication must also be carefully considered. "This contextual analysis demands that the courts look at the nature and full content of the communication and to the knowledge and understanding of the audience to whom the publication was directed. '"[T]he publication in question must be considered in its entirety; '[i]t may not be divided into segments and each portion treated as a separate unit.' It must be read as a whole in order to understand its import and the effect which it was calculated to have on the reader, and construed in the light of the whole scope and apparent object of the writer, considering not only the actual language used, but the sense and meaning which may have been fairly presumed to have been conveyed to those who read it. If the publication so construed is not reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in the defamatory sense, [the statement is not actionable]. (Baker, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 260-261.) Given the trial court's special role in ruling on dispositive motions in libel cases (the distinction between fact and opinion is a question for the court, not the jury) (Baker, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 260).

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s177.htm

STELLIONATE
A name given generally, to all species of frauds committed in making contracts. This word is said to be derived from the Latin stellio, a kind of lizard remarkable for its cunning and the change of its color, because those guilty of frauds used every art and cunning to conceal them. But more particularly it was the crime of a person who 30

fraudulently assigned, sold, or engaged the thing which he had before assigned sold, or engaged to another, unknown to the person with whom be was dealing.In South Carolina and Georgia, a mortgagor who makes a second mortgage without disclosing in writing, to the second mortgagee, the existence of the first mortgage, is not allowed to redeem and, in the foraier state, when a person suffers a judgment, or enters into a statute or recognizance binding his land, afterwards mortgages it, without giving notice, in writing, of the prior incumbrance, he shall not be allowed to redeem, unless, within six months from a written demand, he discharges such incumbrauce. In Ohio a fraudulent conveyance is punished as a crime and, in Indians, any party to a fraudulent conveyance is subjected to a flue and to double damages. --b--

CONFESSIONS AND AVOIDANCE
Pleas in confession and avoidance are those which admit the averments in the plaintiff's declaration to be true, and allege new facts which obviate and repel their legal effects. These pleas are to be considered first with respect to their division. Of pleas in confession and avoidance, some are distinguished (in reference to their subject matter) as pleas in justification or excuse, others as pleas in discharge. The pleas of the former class, show some justification or excuse of the matter charged in the declaration; of the latter, some discharge or release of that matter. Therefore, the effect of the former is to show that the plaintiff never had any right of action, because the act charged was lawful; the effect of the latter is to show that though he had once a right of action, it is discharged or released by some matter subsequent. Of those in justification or excuse, the plea of son assault demesne is an example of those in discharge, a release. This division applies to pleas only; replications and other subsequent pleadings in confession and avoidance are not subject to such Classification. Secondly, they are to be considered in respect to their form. In common with all pleadings which do not tender issue, they always conclude with a verification and prayer of judgment. Thirdly, with respect to the quality of these pleadings, it is a rule that every pleading by way of confession and avoidance must give color. --b— http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c275.htm

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http://www.lectlaw.com/def/i071.htm

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE & PEONAGE
A condition of compulsory service or labor performed by one person, against his will, for the benefit of another person due to force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion directed against him. In considering whether service or labor was performed by someone against his will or involuntarily, it makes no difference that the person may have initially agreed, voluntarily, to render the service or perform the work. If a person willingly begins work but later desires to withdraw and is then forced to remain and perform work against his will, his service becomes involuntary. Also, whether a person is paid a salary or a wage is not determinative of the question as to whether that person has been held in involuntary servitude. In other words, if a person is forced to labor against his will, his service is involuntary even though he is paid for his work. However, it is necessary to prove that the person knowingly and willfully took action, by way of force, threats, intimidation or other form of coercion, causing the victim to reasonably believe that he had no way to avoid continued service, that he was confronted by the existence of a superior and overpowering authority, constantly threatening to the extent that his will was completely subjugated. Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 1584, makes it a Federal crime or offense for anyone to willfully hold another person in involuntary servitude. A person can be found guilty of that offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That the person held the victim in a condition of 'involuntary servitude'; Second: That such holding was for a 'term,'; and Third: That the person acted knowingly and willfully. It must be shown that a person held to involuntary servitude was so held for a 'term.' It is not necessary, however, that any specific period of time be proved so long as the 'term' of the involuntary service was not wholly insubstantial or insignificant. Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 1581(a) is the peonage law cited in the indictment. The specific facts which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish the offense of peonage include each and all of the three specific factual elements constituting involuntary servitude as previously stated and explained in these instructions,

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plus a fourth specific fact; namely, that the involuntary servitude was compelled by the person in order to satisfy a real or imagined debt regardless of amount.

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/t028.htm

THREATS AGAINST PRESIDENT
18 USC 871, makes it a Federal crime or offense for anyone to willfully make a true threat to injure or kill the President of the United States. A person can be found guilty of that offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That the person uttered words alleged to be the threat against the President; Second: That the person understood and meant the words he used as a true threat; and Third: That the person uttered the words knowingly and willfully. A "threat" is a statement expressing an intention to kill or injure the President; and a "true threat" means a serious threat as distinguished from words used as mere political argument, idle or careless talk, or something said in a joking manner. The essence of the offense is the knowing and willful making of a true threat. So, if it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly made a true threat against the President, willfully intending that it be understood by others as a serious threat, then the offense is complete; it is not necessary to prove that the person actually intended to carry out the threat.

http://constitution.laws.com/ http://www.lectlaw.com/def/e027.htm

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Portion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that prohibits discrimination by state government institutions. The clause grants all people "equal protection of the laws," which means that the states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or class of persons over another.

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Remedial statute
Writing Sample for Kristopher Edwin Moore Excerpted from Petition .... The "Compensation to Persons Wrongfully Imprisoned" Statute is a Remedial Statute and Should Be Read to Allow Full Compensation to a Person for All Time Spent Wrongfully ... http://www.kristophermoore.com/uploads/Writing_Sample_for_Kristopher _Moore__In_re_Wallis_.pdf Submitted at : 2012-03-28 State v. Williams. amendments enacted by S.B. 5 had not “transmogrified the remedial statute into a punitive one.” Id. at ¶ 32. Further, we acknowledged the General Assembly’s http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2011/2011-ohio-3374.pdf Submitted at : 2012-03-27 COMMENT: SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA: IT'S TIME TO FULLY .... The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 1 is the primary federal remedial statute governing hazardous waste contamination ... https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app? action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=156+U.+Pa. +L.+Rev. +767&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=326fad2289aca40ee0ebbc5195d 852d2 Submitted at : 2012-03-31 remedial - Definition of remedial - Online Dictionary from .... That which affords a remedy; as, a remedial statute, or one which is made to supply some defects or abridge some superfluities of the common law. 1 131. http://onlinedictionary.datasegment.com/word/remedial Submitted at : 2012-03-23 Administrative law | LII / Legal Information Institute. The FAPA is a remedial statute designed to ensure uniformity and openness in the procedures used by federal agencies. The Act is comprised of a comprehensive regulatory ... 34

http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_law Submitted at : 2012-03-31 In Clarifying Application of CERCLA's Statute of Limitations .... Tags: Atlantic Research, CERCLA, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Removal or Remedial, Statute of Limitations, Superfund, Waste and Contamination http://www.environmentallawresource.com/2011/04/articles/waste/inclarifying-application-of-cerclas-statute-of-limitations-eighth-circuitaffirms-summary-judgment-for-reed-smith-client/ Submitted at : 2012-03-31 Chapter 3 BENEFIT COMPUTATION FACTORS Sections 27(b)(c)(f), 46, 46a. A remedial statute may be applied retroactively. A remedial statute is related to remedies or modes of procedure which do not create new or take away vested rights, but ... http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/ham/mes/digest/mes_digest/Chapter %203.htm Submitted at : 2012-03-25 USCA6 Opinion 02a0123p.06 - Lawyer, Lawyers, Attorney, Attorneys .... Ass'n, 747 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1984) ("TILA is a remedial statute and should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer.") (citations omitted). http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/decisions/lower_court/pfen nighca041102opn.html Submitted at : 2012-03-31 Statutory Analysis. 5) Strictly construe statutes in derogation of the common law; liberally construe remedial statutes. What if the remedial statute is in derogation of the ... http://bama.ua.edu/~dcpowell/Statutes/04.Stat.anal.ppt Submitted at : 2012-03-23 Remediate - definition of Remediate by the Free Online Dictionary .... Remedial Statute Remedial teacher Remedial teacher Remedial teacher Remedial/Field Investigation Team remedially remedially remedially remedially http://www.thefreedictionary.com/remediate Submitted at : 2012-04-01 Liberal Construction. ESD 93 Wn. App. 21 1998 Voluntary Layoff --Authority of Department's Rules The Employment Security Act is a highly remedial statute. Its provisions are liberally construed to ... http://www.esd.wa.gov/newsandinformation/legresources/uistudies/liber al-construction-2006.pdf 35

Submitted at : 2012-03-28 Liberal Construction. The Act remained a remedial statute even when the liberal construction language was removed. Finally, the state is required to administer its unemployment insurance program ... http://www.esd.wa.gov/newsandinformation/legresources/uistudies/liber al-construction-2007.pdf Submitted at : 2012-03-25 FLSA - limits of protection against Retaliation in 4th Circuit. testimony clause must be broadly construed because FLSA is a remedial. statute. As a result, the words in question-- "proceeding [instituted http://www.robertslaw.org/FLSA_limits_retaliation.htm Submitted at : 2012-03-31 www.angelfire.com. Remedial statute. "A Remedial statute is one changing the common-law, that is, in derogation of the common-law." Frank Hall Childs, A Treatise on American Business ... http://www.angelfire.com/la/LAWGIVER/Equity.html Submitted at : 2012-04-01 ASA : How to Defend a Medical Marijuana Case in Washington State. We would argue that RCW 69.51A is clearly a remedial statute, meant to grant relief to suffering patients previously unable to acquire their medicine or subject to ... http://www.safeaccessnow.org/article.php?id=3931 Submitted at : 2012-03-22 remedial statutes - definition and meaning. Dictionary definitions and example sentences on Wordnik.com ... ‘remedial statutes’ hasn't been added to any lists yet. http://www.wordnik.com/words/remedial%20statutes Submitted at : 2012-03-28 Illinois Legal Aid | Contract Requirements in Credit Sales. It is a remedial statute which must be liberally construed in favor of borrowers. This means that Courts should assure that consumers are accorded the full remedies ... http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/index.cfm? fuseaction=home.dsp_content&contentID=285 Submitted at : 2012-04-01

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remediation - definition of remediation by the Free Online .... Remedial Statute Remedial teacher Remedial teacher Remedial teacher Remedial/Field Investigation Team remedially remedially remedially remedially remediate http://www.thefreedictionary.com/remediation Submitted at : 2012-04-01 NOTE: Eleventh Circuit Treatment of Certification of Collective .... NOTE: Eleventh Circuit Treatment of Certification of Collective Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: A Remedial Statute Without a Remedy? https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app? action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=62+U. +Miami+L.+Rev. +1191&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=bb6ab5872a93c38e6ae392dc6 9848c4d Submitted at : 2012-04-01

statute legal definition of statute. statute synonyms by the Free .... Associated concepts: affirmative statute, criminal statute, declaratory statute, enabling statute, penal statute, priiate statute, remedial statute, statute of frauds, ... http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Statute Submitted at : 2012-04-01

Statute - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. A statute is a formal written enactment of a legislative authority that governs a state, city, or county. Typically, statutes command or prohibit something, or ... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute Submitted at : 2012-03-31

Legal Definition of Statute - The 'Lectric Law Library's Entrance ....

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The term remedial statute is also applied to those acts which give the party injured a remedy, and in some respects those statutes are penal. Temporary or perpetual. http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s071.htm Submitted at : 2012-04-01

Remedial Statute Law & Legal Definition. A remedial statute refers to a statute enacted to cure a defect in a prior law. The following is an example of a case law on remedial statute: Remedial statutes are ... http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/remedial-statute/ Submitted at : 2012-03-22

Remedial Statute: Information from Answers.com. This entry contains information applicable to United States law only. Remedial Statute A law enacted for the purpose of http://www.answers.com/topic/remedial-statute Submitted at : 2012-03-30 Learn More About "Remedial statute"
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Statute Law Definition State Statutes Definition Penal Statute Definition Initiated Statute Definition Statute Legal Definition of Statute Example of Federal Statute Statue of Law

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