Statutory Construction (Part 2)

STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
If a statute should be strictly construed, nothing should be included within the scope that
does not come clearly within the meaning of the language used. Its language must be given
its exact and technical meaning, with no extension on account of implications or equitable
considerations; or as has been aptly asserted, its operation must be confined to cases
coming clearly within the letter of the statutes as well as within its spirit or reason.
SECTION 5. RULES OF INTERPRETATION
In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the
local government unit concerned;
(b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly
against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.
Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit
pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person
claiming it.
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community;
PENAL STATUTE
Are to be construed strictly against the state in favor of the accused. The tendency is to
subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the accused.
MARTIN CENTANO VS. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994)
FACTS
In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for
the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan.
Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of Tikay, and
the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made without a permit from the
DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564, which states “Any
person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall
secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and
Development.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” in P.D. 1564 is meant to include religious
purposes.

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HELD: No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats the words “charitable” and
“religious” separately and independently from each other.
Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit
from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations
for religious purposes within its coverage. The term “charitable” should be strictly
construed to exclude solicitations for “religious” purposes.
Moreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. Decision reversed & set aside. Petitioner
acquitted.
“PENAL STATUTES SHOULD BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED”
CESARIO URSUA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996)
FACTS
Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman.
He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman
because the law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal matters.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez.”
Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman.
He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be
remedied by C.A. No. 142
HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The court may consider the spirit of the statute
where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute that should be construed strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused.
“PENAL LAWS ARE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. WALPAN LADJAALAM Y MILAPIL
G.R. Nos. 136149-51 (September 19, 2000)
FACTS
Appellant Ladjaalam was charged and convicted by the RTC of Zamboanga City the crime of
Direct Assault with Multiple Homicide for firing M-14 rifle at several policemen who were
about to enter his house to serve a search warrant.
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Under the same circumstance, he was likewise charged and convicted for the crime Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under PD 1866, as amended by R.A.
8294.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused appellant can be convicted of Illegal Possession of Firearm under
R.A. 8294 when he used said firearm in the commission of another crime.
HELD: Judgment affirmed with modification. R.A. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that the person arrested committed “no other crime”.
If the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an
aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense.
The accused cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession f firearms.
TAX LAWS
As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its
range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be
found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency who are to pay it.
“IN CASE OF DOUBT, TAX STATUTES ARE TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER, FOR TAXES, BEING BURDENS,
ARE NOT TO BE PRESUMED BEYOND WHAT THE APPLICABLE STATUTE EXPRESSLY AND
CLEARLY DECLARES”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SPS. ANTONIO
AND CLARA PASTOR
G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991)
FACTS
Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283,621.63 for
taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount
was changed to P17,117.08.
They applied for tax amnesty under P.D. 23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even
decreased to about P12,000. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as
proofs of such.
The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P.D.
213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for
those who had pending assessments with the BIR.
Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null because
P.D. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty.
HELD: The petition is devoid of merit.
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Assuming the tax assessment against Sps. Pastor were correct, since they have already paid
almost the equivalent amount to the government by way of amnesty taxes under PD No.
213, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax failings,
the Government is stopped from collecting the differences between the deficiency tax
assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax.
Petitioned Denied.
“AS A RULE, ANY CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION FROM A TAX STATUTE IS STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE TAXPAYER. HOWEVER, WHERE THE LAW IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, THE
LAW MUST BE TAKEN AS IT IS, DEVOID OF JUDICIAL ADDITION OR SUBTRACTION”
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY AND COURT OF TAX
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977)
FACTS
RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and
also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature.
Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes.
ISSUE: Whether or not insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its
taxes.
HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into the definition
of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th Edition. The court found out
that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there is no question that the
insulating oil that Respondent is importing, is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law
frowns on exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi
juris.
“TAX EXEMPTION MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE TAXPAYER AND
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE STATE”
MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS, INC. V. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
SECRETARY
G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994)
FACTS
Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. Prior
to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra was classified as a food product
under Sec. 103 (b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in
all stages, including distribution.
Under Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is
exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which
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the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultural food products in their
original state is exempt from VAT in all stages.
RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product.
ISSUE: Whether or not copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus
not under the purview of RMC 47-91.
HELD: No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exempt from VAT. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s interpretation is entitled to great respect because it is the
government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of tax laws. In fact,
although copra is from coconut, and 80% of the coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not
intended for human consumption. Petition Dismissed.
“TAX EXEMPTION STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE TAXPAYER”
RESINS INC. V. AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968)
FACTS
Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt
from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”,
as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act
speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from
“UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”.
Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal).
Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent
Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous
resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of
urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory
language that granted such exemption.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s allegations are valid.
HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and
“FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives.
If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by
judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the
statute.
“STATUTES GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED IN STRICTISSIMI JURIS
AGAINST THE TAXPAYER AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXING AUTHORITY”
“IN CONSTRUING A STATUTE, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURTS TO SEEK THE REAL INTENT
OF THE LEGISLATURE, EVEN IF, BY SO DOING, THEY MAY LIMIT THE LITERAL MEANING OF
THE BROAD LANGUAGE”
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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY
G.R. No. 140230 (December 15, 2005)
FACTS
PLDT is a grantee of franchise under R.A. 7082 to install, operate and maintain
telecommunications system throughout the Philippines.
PLDT paid the BIR an amount of P164,510,953.00 for the different taxes (for equipments,
machineries and spare parts it imported for its business)
Petitioner addressed a letter to the respondent seeking a confirmatory ruling on its tax
exemption privilege under Section 12 of R.A. 7082.
Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting PLDT’s petition.
Respondent BIR Commissioner, unable to accept the decision of CTA elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals.
CA Affirmed CTA and dismissed the BIR petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent is exempt from the
payment of value added tax, compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and other BIR taxes on its
importations, by virtue of the provision in its franchise that the 3% franchise tax on its gross
receipts shall be in lieu of all taxes on its franchise or earning thereof.
HELD: “in lieu of all taxes” clause found in Section 12 of PLDT’s franchise (R.A. 7082) covers all
taxes, whether direct or indirect. The Appellate court agreed with PLDT that the term “all”
encompasses any and all taxes collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code. The court
failed to see how Section 12 of R.A. 7082 operates as granting PLDT blanket exemption from
payment of indirect taxes, which, in the ultimate analysis, are not taxes on its franchise or
earnings.
PLDT has not shown its eligibility for the desired exemption. None should be granted.
Petition partially granted. Decision of the Court of Appeals modified.
“NATURALIZATION LAWS SHOULD BE RIGIDLY ENFORCED AND STRICTLY CONSTRUED IN
FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT AND AGAINST THE APPLICANT”
ONG CHIA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 127240 (March 27, 2000)
FACTS
Petitioner was born in Amoy, China (January 1, 1923)
He arrived at the port of Manila (1932 – 9 yrs. Old) on board the vessel of “Angking”
He stayed in the Philippines, found employment and started with his own business.
Ong Chia married a Filipina with whom he had four children.
At the age of 66 (1989), he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under
C.A. No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) as amended.
The trial court granted the petition and admitted Ong Chia to Philippine Citizenship. State
through Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that:
 Failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known
 Failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, Sec. 7
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 Failed to conduct himself in proper and irreproachable manner during his entire
stay in the Philippines (violation of Sec. 2)
 Has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been
insufficient or misdeclared (contravention of Sec. 2)
 Failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
1996, Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and denied petitioner’s
application for naturalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appellant’s brief without having
been presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence justified the reversal of the trial court’s decision.
HELD: The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of court.
Rule 143. These rules shall not apply to land registration, codastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases and herein provided for, except
by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Rule of strict application of the law in naturalization defeat petitioner’s argument of
substantial compliance with the requirement under RNL.
Petition denied.
INSURANCE LAW
“CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE ARE TO BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE
INSURED AND STRICTLY AGAINST THE INSURER”
FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No 100970 (September 2, 1992)
FACTS
Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his
beneficiaries.
On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. After a written notice of claim by
the beneficiaries to the insurance company, the latter denied the claim, saying that murder
and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.
The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15,000, and
this decision was affirmed by the appellate court.
Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using “expressio unius exclusio alterius” in a
personal accident insurance policy since deaths resulting from murder and/or assault are
impliedly excluded said insurance policy.
ISSUE: Whether or not death resulting from assault or murder deemed included in the terms
“accident” and “accidental”
HELD: Yes. As correctly pointed out by Court of Appeals, it cannot be pretended that Calie Surposa
died in the course of an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very
nature of these crimes.
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Art. 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:
“The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity”
Ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its
beneficiary.
Petition denied for lack of merit.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS
The liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the
pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and PD 626 are clear and leave no room for
interpretation.
RAMON CORPORAL VS. EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND G.S.I.S
G.R. No. 86020 (August 5, 1994)
FACTS
Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. During the course of her work, she
had several pregnancies.
On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered complete abortion. On her 5th pregnancy, she gave
birth to a baby boy with the help of a “hilot”. An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital
due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards.
Her husband, herein Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said
agency denied.
The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because the cause of
his wife’s death was non-work-related.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit.
HELD: No. The determination of whether the prolapsed of Norma’s uterus developed before or
after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure
and changes in the body. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be
liberally construed in favor of the applicant, there is also a rule that such liberal construction
cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear.
“DOUBTS IN INTERPRETATION OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND LABOR CODE SHOULD
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE WORKER”
MARIA MANAHAN VS. EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND G.S.I.S
G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981)
FACTS
Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las
Pinas Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the deceased, filed a claim in the
GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband was due to his occupation.
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However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging
that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the
deceased is attributable to his employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then
appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her
claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits.
HELD: Yes. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior
to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment, he was treated for
Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This was supported by his medical records and a
medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a
common complication of Enteric Fever.
Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the
claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case should be resolved in
favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed to give relief to the
worker and his dependents.
“BASICALLY, SOCIAL LEGISLATION IS LIBERALLY CONSTRUED”
SALVADOR LAZO VS. EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND G.S.I.S
G.R. No. 78617 (June 18, 1990)
FACTS
Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main
office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June 18, 1986, the Petitioner
rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the
Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day.
On his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained injuries. For injuries
sustained, he claimed for disability benefits under P.D. 626 but was denied by the GSIS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of compensation under P.D. 626 was valid.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank
several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not come on time. There is no
evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route. While
presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the
law in general favor of the workingman still subsists.
“THE SYMPATHY OF THE LAW ON SOCIAL SECURITY IS TOWARDS ITS BENEFICIARIES AND
THE LAW BY ITS OWN TERMS, REQUIRES A CONSTRUCTION OF UTMOST LIBERALITY IN
THEIR FAVOR”
DOMINGO VICENTE VS. EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991)
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FACTS
Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his employment, he had
several physical complications which forced him to retire.
At the age of forty-five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to “income benefits”
under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a physician’s
certification that Petitioner was classified as under “permanent total disability.”
The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full
income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only “permanent partial disability”.
The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial
disability.
HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not an employee
suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue
performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. The Court takes this occasion to
stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers, especially the
humble rank and file. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward
its beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.
RETIREMENT LAWS
Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree
because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, when he is no
longer capable of earning his livelihood.
FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR. VS. EUFEMIO DOMINGO
G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994)
FACTS
The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits.
Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for
and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money,
property, and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement.
After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for
the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986.
Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment
acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended
Petitioner’s clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respondent
approved Petitioner’s application for retirement but added that the money value of benefits
due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits
may be withheld.
HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and
members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution.
Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits
granted “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.”
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Withholding Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that
retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide
for the retiree’s well-being.
ELECTION RULES
Statutes providing for election contests are to be literally construed to the end that the will
of the people in the choice of public officer may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
ROLETO PAHILAN VS. RUDY A. TABALBA, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HON. JUDGE
SINFOROSO V. TABANO, JR.
G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994)
FACTS
Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin.
Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest
although the docket fees he paid were insufficient.
The trial court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees
for filing an initiatory pleading.
Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a “verified appeal” brief. But the Clerk of
Court said that his office did not receive any “notice of appeal” from Petitioner.
Petitioner’s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the “verified appeal” was validly dismissed.
2. Whether or not the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for nonpayment on time of the required fees.
HELD
1. No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. The filing and
approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. The
RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed period, and is assumed to be
received in the regular course of the mail, filed as of the date of mailing.
2. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Statutes providing for election contests
are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may
not be defeated by mere technical objections.
“LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES OF COURT”
DSM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MEGAWORLD GLOBUS ASIA, INC.
G.R. No. 166993 (December 19, 2005)
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