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SUMMARY OF FACTS:On February 10, 1976, Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged by the Naga City fiscal's office with vagrancy (Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code) in respondent judge's court. The case was dismissed on the ground that her court "has no jurisdiction to continue to take further cognizance of this case" without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court.The sole issue to be resolved is whether the City Court of Naga or the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines and Cities of Naga and Iriga should properly exercise jurisdiction over the accused.

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ATTY. REFUGIO
NOTES AND ASSIGNMENTS
JUNE 21, 2014

PP VS. PALMA G.R. NO. L-44113 (1977)

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

On February 10, 1976, Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged
by the Naga City fiscal's office with vagrancy (Article 202, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code) in respondent judge's court. The case was dismissed on
the ground that her court "has no jurisdiction to continue to take further
cognizance of this case" without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the
Juvenile Court.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

The sole issue to be resolved is whether the City Court of Naga or the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines and Cities of Naga and
Iriga should properly exercise jurisdiction over the accused.
SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

It was very clear that the accused cannot be tried under R.A 6591 because
he was, at the time the case was filed, 17 years old thus, not within the
purview of such Act. Even Article 189 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which took effect on June 11, 1975 that defines a youthful offender as "one
who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense" cannot support the respondent’s Judge’
contention. Such definition did not mean a transfer of jurisdiction over

criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21 years of
age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.

As a general law, P.D. 603 cannot repeal a special law like R.A. 6591 by mere
implication. The repeal must be express and specific.

vagrancy (vay-gran-see), n. (l7c) 1. ]b. a state or condition
of wandering from place to place without a home, job,
or means of support. •

The Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the child and
youth throughout the country is a general law

R.A. 6591 which defined and confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for Camarines Sur is a special law 3 classifying expressly that it
can try in criminal cases involving offenders below the age of majority only those
accused who are under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and there is nothing in either R.A. 6591 or P.D.
603 that would sustain respondent judge's ruling on reconsideration that "together,
these two laws, the latter amending the former confer jurisdiction on youthful
offenders who are above 16 years but under 21 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime upon the JDRC of Camarines Sur and remove the same
from the City Court."

A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be
express and specific. Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Camarines Sur is a court of special and limited jurisdiction and the enlargement or

conferment of additional jurisdiction on said court to include accused persons who
are 16 years and under 21 years of age must positively appear in express terms.

fiat

(fee-aht or fee-at or fI-at or fI-at), n. [Latin "let it be

done") 07c) 1. An order or decree, esp. an arbitrary one
<judicial fiat>. 2. A court decree, esp. one relating to a
routine matter such as scheduling <the court requires
all motions to contain a fiat - to be filled in by the
court - setting the hearing date>.

PREMECIAS VS. MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA G.R. NO. L26702

SUMMARY OF FACTS:
JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS was criminally charged before the Municipal Court of
Urdaneta for violating Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 for over speeding. Due to
the charge, Primicias thereafter initiated a legal action for the annulment of the
aforesaid ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the
purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:
The lone issue to be resolved in this appeal is the validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series
of 1964, enacted on March 13, 1964

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court because Ordinance No. 3
Series of 1964 was replete with legal infirmities. For one, the Revised Motor Vehicle
law which the Ordinance was patterned after have been superseded by R.A. No.
4136 and such repeal was expressly spelled out in Section 63 of Republic Act No.

4136. Perfunctorily, the ordinance was within the purview of such Act and its
validity must be assessed in conjunction with R.A. No. 4136 not with Act No. 3992.
By its very nature, the ordinance in question is, however, inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the State.
Furthermore, the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its
thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38,
Republic Act No. 4136.
Corollary the ordinance relied upon was held invalid, the issuance of the writ of
injunction was thus in order.
Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on
Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law)." In so
arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic
Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on
June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by
Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in
Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, to wit:

Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as amended, and all laws,
executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conflict
with the provisions of this Act are repealed.

General rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law

Pursuant to Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed
within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992
The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined vis-avis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother statute" so to speak, which was in force at
the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the violation of the said
ordinance.

vis-a-vis (veez-<l-vee). [French "face to face"] (ISc) In
relation to; opposite to <the creditor established a preferred
position vis-a-vis the other creditors>.

injunction

(in-j3ngk-sh.m), n. (16c) A court order

commanding or preventing an action. - To get an
injunction, the complainant must show that there is
no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and
that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is
granted.

An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must
not contravene . . . the statute," 7 for it is a "fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the
state." 8 Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an
ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way.
Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness
and certainty are all the more important so that "an average man should be
able, with due care, after reading it,, to understand and ascertain whether he
will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. The general rule
is that "ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court
prohibition or injunction." 17 Exceptions however are allowed in the following
instances:

1.

for the orderly administration of justice;

2.
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner;

3.

to avoid multiplicity of actions;

4.

to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;

5.
in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was held invalid.

PP VS. PURISIMA G.R. NO. L-42050—66

SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Information were filed in equal level jurisdictional venues against several
accused with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of PD No. 9.
Thereafter the Judge issued an Order granting the subsequent motion to
quash filed by the accused on the ground that there was no allegation that
such facts constitutes the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9.

inter alia (in-tJr ay-Iee-J or ah-Iee-J), adv. [Latin] (l7c)
Among other things.

Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of
deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden handle of
5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried
outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement
necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the
same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor
being used in connection therewith.

On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the Judges issued the Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not

allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his

residence a

deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very
nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a
livelihood

Judge Purisima:

specifically allege that the possession of bladed
weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in
furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited
in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific
The information must

allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it
does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9.
The information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.

Judge Maceren:

Paragraph 3 of PD 1081:
3.
It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or
blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong,"
"barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as
necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

Judge Polo:

And in order to restore the tranquillity and stability of the country and to
secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible
manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons
without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is
prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider
the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict

enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean
the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.

viz. (viz). abbr. [Latin videlicet] (16c) Namely; that is to
say <the defendant engaged in fraudulent activities,

viz., misrepresenting his gross income, misrepresenting
the value of his assets, and forging his wife's signature>.
See VIDELICET.

malum prohibitum (mal-am proh-hib-i-tam), n. [Latin
"prohibited evil"] (I8c) An act that is a crime merely
because it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself
is not necessarily immoraL - Misdemeanors such as
jaywalking and running a stoplight are mala prohibita,
as are many regulatory violations.

Abet = help somebody: to assist somebody to do something, especially
something illegal

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

Whether or not those Informations filed by the People are sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon"
penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

In handing down the decision, the Supreme Court basically took bearing from Art.
IV, Sec. 19, 1973 Constitution. It further stated that the questioned Information did
not comply with fundamental requirements enunciated therein.
Moreover, it was the second element among the two in paragraph 3, P.D. 9 that
removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon outside the mantle of the statute or
the city ordinance mentioned therein since the simple act of carrying any of the
weapons described does not necessitate criminal liability. It is the motivation why
should the accused bring such a weapon outside his dwelling that should control.

Aside from these there were conflicting views which was revealed during its
implementation and so the judicial task of interpreting it becomes a task to construe
and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure would naturally follow as
was done by the Highest Tribunal.

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires
that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the
designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned
in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the
statute violated is essential in these cases.

Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there
exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the
one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the
commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.

We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city
ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any

repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal
statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in
favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree
in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's

residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as
a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the
act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet,
or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from
the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When
ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and
interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the
basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied
liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a
presidential decree in these cases — the primary rule is to search
for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent
is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict

adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions.

A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the
makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects
which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
(West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words
and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)

While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may,
when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of
interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or
uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16
N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For
taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated.

CASCO PHILS VS. JIMENEZ G.R. NO. L-17931

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. is engaged in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers. Respondents Hon. Pedro Gimenez and Hon. Ismael Mathay is Auditor
General of the Philippines and Auditor of the Central Bank respectively. In
accordance with the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the
Philippines issued its Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign

exchange transactions. As supplementary to the circular the Bank later promulgated
a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the
payment of said fee. Petitioner, believing that it is entitled to a refund according to
the exemptions - relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said
Bank - claimed for the refund. It further asseverated among others that the
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.
conformably, the Auditor of the Bank refused to grant refund upon the ground that
the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations
of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2,
paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of
the aforesaid margin fee is the issue to be resolved in the case.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde",
and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of
this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration
of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements
do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is

by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS G.R. NO. L-23475

SUMMARY OF FACTS:
A bill of local application was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964.
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence then it was
referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas who suggested that instead
of the City Engineer it will be the President Protempore of the Municipal
Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to
act as Mayor.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May
20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The

amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

hermeneutics (h<lr-m;J-n[y]oo-tiks), n. (I8c) The art of
interpreting texts, esp. as a technique used in critical
legal studies.

rider. An attachment to some document, such as a legislative
bill or an insurance policy, that amends or supplements
the document.• A rider to a legislative bill
often addresses subject matter unrelated to the main
purpose ofthe bill.

Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one
recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which
were the ones actually approved by the Senate.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation
mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from
Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the
Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved
on the Senate floor.

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by
Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held
that the case involved a political question which was not within the
province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of
powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon

merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning
being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."

Obiter dictum (ob-i-tar dik-tam). [Latin "something said
in passing"] (18c) A judicial comment made while delivering
a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to
the decision in the case and therefore not precedential
(although it may be considered persuasive).

in pari materia (in par-I m,,-teer-ee-d). [Latin "in the
same matter"] 1. adj. On the same subject; relating to
the same matter .• It is a canon of construction that
statutes that are in pari materia may be construed
together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may
be resolved by looking at another statute on the same

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