Statutory Construction

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WRITTEN REPORT

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Legal Management

Submitted by: Aquino, Marie Ginette Alexis H. Betia, Angela Jill G. Reamico, Krizia Mae P.

February 18, 2012

This paper will discuss the adherence to, or departure from, language of stature with regards to the implications. The body of the paper will tackle on the topics assigned (1) Grant of power includes incidental power, (2) grant of power excludes greater power, (3) What is implied should not be against the law, (4) Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied, (5) Illegality of act implied from prohibition,(6) Exceptions to the rule, (7) What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, and (8) There should be no penalty for compliance with law. The explanations per topic are supported by jurisprudence, statutes and related cases.

Grant of power includes incidental power It is a rule that when a general power is conferred, every particular power needed to exercise a performance bestowed by the other can be granted. When a general power is conferred, he may do or perform anything including the incidental powers to make the duty enjoined effective on his performance. In the case of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 where issues raised regarding on whether the Supreme Court has jurisidiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy and whether the said Electoral commission acted without or in excess if its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of the petitioner. The jurisdiction given to the National Assembly was determined by laying down its scope on where its consent through its Commission on Appointment is necessary in the appointments of certain officers. It was concluded in this case that the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission and that such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. This rule was also reiterated in the case Lozano v. Nograles2 which stated, ―it is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its ―solemn and sacred obligation‖ under the Constitution. This Court‘s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversiesdealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised. Incidental power must be ―necessary‖ to give effect to the express power, but the court has interpreted this as ―real or sufficient connection‖ which is broader. In the case Grannall v
1
2

Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139 (1936)
Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009

Marrickville Margarine 3, it is of lesser degree than the power granted. Furthermore, as stated above about the scope of jurisdiction assigned to the National Assembly, its ruling was that the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent like the exercises of the judicial power of trying impeachments, it is a part of the incidental powers included to perform the work effectively by the National Commission. And so as to Angara‘s contention that the constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commision solely as regards to the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore gas no jurisdiction to hear the case, Atty. Calzada have digested the ruling as: ―The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matthers within its jurisdiction, ans is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution indended them to be asbolutelt restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the working of the various departments of the government.‖ (Calzada, 2008) Another example of grant of incidental power is:  Power to establish an office includes authority to abolish it, unless xxx  Warrant issued shall be made upon probable cause determined by the judge xxx implies the grant of power to the judge to conduct preliminary investigations Power to approve a license includes by implication the power to revoke it  Power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant license, from which it is derived Power to deport includes the power to arrest undesirable aliens after investigation Power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments , unless xxx Power to appropriate money includes power to withdraw unexpended money already appropriated

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  

3

Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty. Ltd. (1955) 93 C.L.R. 55

To state examples about the rule where general power is conferred and where incidental powers th are necessarily included to perform such act, it is proper to illustrate examples of power which are conferred like of the power to establish an office where it includes the authority to abolish it unless there are constitutional provisions expressly or impliedly providing otherwise, example of this is the case of People v. Gutierrez 4. Also, the Constitutional provision that ― no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce‖ implies the grant of power to the judge to conduct preliminary investigation. (Agpalo, 2009) In the case of Escribano v. Ovila 5, it questioned a judge‘s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense which disclaims the Constitutional provision were the grant of power is given to the judge. This case was trying to resolve whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct preliminart investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether the power is lidged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. According to the implication of the grant of power that includes incidental power in Statutory Construction, when a statue authorizes details temporarily for a fixed period of a judge in another district other on his own for the purpose of trying cases, the power includes the the making and renderring of decision in the span of the period fixed. The law does not mean to authorize the judge but to only try a case then deprive him again of his power to to render his decision after the fixed period given is already done. And as to the ruling of the case, it is said the the enumeration in the amendatory of law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for written defamation was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the proper Court of First Instance of that same power. (Aldea, 2011) Also, the power to approve license includes the power to revoke it even if it was not stated in the rule. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license, from which it was derived. In Gordon v. Veridiano 6, the issue discussed the conflict between the FDA‘S and the Mayor‘s power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of a drugstore. It was ruled that the FDA had the authority to order closure of the drug store, the Mayor however did not (Villamor, 2010)

Another example is the authority of the president to deport as when a statute provides that the president may not deport foreigners except upon investigation. The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is vested in the Executive by virtue of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject.
4 5

People v. Gutierrez, G.R No. 32282, 36 SCRA 172 Escribano v. Ovila G.R No. 30375, 85 SCRA 245 6 Gordon v. Veridiano, 167 SCRA 5 (1988)

(In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41.) 7 Article VI, section 22 (2), of the Constitution provides: The Congress may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions, as it may impose, to fix, within specified limits, tariffs rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues. And as the case of Marc Donnely & Associates, Inc. v. Agregado: 8 It is clear from the above that Congress may by law authorize the President, subject to certain limitations, to fix, within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues. And pursuant to this constitutional provision, Congress approved Commonwealth Act No. 728 conferring upon the President authority to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the exports of scrap metals and to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out its provisions. And implementing this broad authority, the Cabinet approved the resolution now in question authorizing the levy and collection of certain royalty fees as a condition for the exportation of scrap metals and other merchandise. This case confers to the President‘s power to regulate, curtail, control and prohibit the exportation.

Grant of power excludes greater power The power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. Also, considerable time cannot later be heard to say that the appointment was, in reality, permanent and therefore there can be no removal except for cause.(Cabiling v. Pabualan) 9 To express the statutory grant of power to local governments, they have statutory power to regulate telephone services includes the power to establish and operate by themselves a telephone service. This power vested upon local governments is clearly stated in this case: On January 1999, petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. (PLDT) applied for a Mayor‘s Permit to operate its Davao Metro Exchange. Respondent City of Davao withheld action on the application pending payment by petitioner of the local franchise tax in the amount of P3,681,985.72 for the first to the fourth quarter of 1999. In a letter dated May 31, 1999, petitioner protested the assessment of the local franchise tax and requested a refund of the franchise tax paid by it for the year 1997 and the first to the third quarters of 1998. Petitioner contended that it was exempt from the payment of
7 8

In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918) Marc Donnely & Associates, Inc. v. Agregado 95. Phil. 142 9 Cabiling v. Pabualan, G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274

franchise tax based on an opinion of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), dated June 2, 1998. The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers necessary to make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those which are greater than that conferred o Power of supervision DOES NOT INCLUDE power to suspend or removal o Power to reorganize DOES NOT INCLUDE the authority to deprive the courts certain jurisdiction and to transfer it to a quasi-judicial tribunal o Power to regulate business DOES NOT INCLUDE power to prohibit With this, the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner‘s franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. Consequently, petitioner is liable to pay local franchise taxes in the amount for the period covering the first to the fourth quarter of 1999 and that it is not entitled to a refund of taxes paid by it for the period covering the first to the third quarter of 1998. (Phil. Long distance Tel. Co. v. City of Davao) 10

The 1935 Philippine Constitution defined powers that the President can control. It is in Article VII of the 1935 Constitution called as the Executive Department. According to Section 10, that the president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general provision overl all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Power of the administrative officer includes the power of a government office to set the details in the enforcement of the law/laws which the office operates under. These rules and regulations have the force and effect of law; they bind whoever comes under them and the courts can take judicial notice of them. It also has the power to issue rules and regulations to execute and also to delegate to a subordinate officer a particular function. As the administrative officer can freely assign duties and sub-delegation of power, which has been justified by sound principles of organization which demand that those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important matters of details, the SC ruled in American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents 11 that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the
10 11

Phil. Long distance Tel. Co. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 23080 American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents G.R. No. 26803

basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to ―give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.‖ According to Agpalo, the principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers necessary to make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those which are greater than the conferred. (Agpalo, 2009) Because of this, the constitutional grant of power of supervision in favour of the President over local governments. Hebron v. Reyes 12 discussed the issue of those who won a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code which was resolved under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations and none has been cited to us said procedure is exclusive; that the executive department of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision over local governments. Though grant of power is in favour of the president, there is an absence of power to suspend or remove local elective officials. In De los Santos v. Mallare,13 Eduardo de los Santos was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946 by the President of the Philippines. His appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office. The City Mayor and the other city officials ignored him and
12 13

Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil 289

paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position. Santos filed this quo warrant to question the legality of the appointment of respondent Gil R. Mallare to the office of city engineer for the City of Baguio which the petitioner occupied and claims to be still occupying. Similarly, the President‘s power to reorganize the executive department, bureaus and offices, as conferred upon him by law, does not embrace the authority to deprive the courts of certain jurisdiction and to transfer it to a quasi-judicial tribunal, the same not being germane or incidental to the power conferred. And the power to regulate business does not include the power to prohibit, the reason being that by prohibiting, nothing would be left to regulate, thereby rendering the authority to regulate nugstory. Can the President exercise such power under Republic Act No. 442? According to the case of University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals14, Republic Act No. 442 was enacted with the only purpose of giving to the President the authority "to reorganize within one year the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the Government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it, to promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency, and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." The purpose of said Act is merely to effect a reorganization of the different bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government. The power so delegated is therefore limited in scope. It cannot be extended to other matters not embraced therein, nor are incidental thereto. To do so would be an encroachement on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution. The power conferred to make regulations for carrying a statute into effect must be exercised within the powers delegated, that is to say, must be confined to details for regulating the mode of proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amending or adding to the requirements of the statute itself; but it is to be presumed that regulations adopted were to carry out only the provisions of the statute and not to embrace matters not covered, nor intended to be covered, thereby. Rules that operate to subvert the statute may not be framed under a delegation of power to the executive. (12 Corpus Juris, pp. 845-846.)

What is implied should not be against the law.

14

University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 506

The statutory grant of power does not include such incidental power which cannot be exercised without violating the Constitution, the statute granting power, or other laws of the same subject. While the power to appoint ordinarily carries with it the power to suspend or remove, the constitutional restriction against suspension or removal of civil service employees except for cause as provided for by law preludes such implication, unless the appointment is made outside the civil service law. As stated in De los Santos v. Mallare15, Article XII, Sec. 4 of the 1935 Constitution which states that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. However, Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61 entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein. It is obvious that the aforequoted constitutional provision is contrary to the provision of the RAC. And Sec. 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that all laws of the Philippines shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines. The phrase "for cause" in connection with the removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. This rule was also reiterated in the case Pelaes v. The Auditor General 16 which held that, the power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Also, where a statute empowers the President to appoint a public officer for a fixed term, unless sooner removed, the implication is that the President cannot remove him without just cause as provided by law. As stated in the case Jover v. Borra17, touching the office of City
15 16

De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950) Pelaes v. The Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965 17 Jover v. Borra, 93 Phil. 506 (1953)

Mayor of Iloilo, that ―The President cannot derive from the constitutional provision the authority to relieve or remove the Petitioner from office, because his power is merely one of general supervision over all local governments and such supervision is to be exercised ‗as may be provided by law‘―. They declared that in the absence of statutory authority the President could not remove the City Mayor. This was also reiterated on the case Cometa v. Andamar18 which held that, the designation or appointment of one to replace an incumbent municipal mayor who by such designation or appointment is removed from office without cause is unauthorized and illegal, because the petitioners were entitled to hold the office of mayor, unless removed for cause, until after the people shall have chosen their mayor at the next general election. In the case, Lacson v. Roque19, the power of the President to remove the Mayor of the City of Manila is that it must be for cause. Even those who would uphold the legality of the Mayor's suspension do not go so far as to claim power in the Chief Executive to remove the Mayor at pleasure. Untramelled discretionary power to remove does not apply to appointed officers whose term of office is definite, much less elective officers. As has been pointedly stated: "Fixity of tenure destroy the power of removal at pleasure otherwise incident to the appointing power.‖ In the case Cuadra v. Cordova20, the Petitioner's action in subsequently accepting a temporary appointment thus changed the nature of his employment from permanent to that of a temporary one and as he does not possess any Civil Service eligibility, in the light of the doctrine laid down by this Court in this case, his term of office thus becomes terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power, for the law affords him no protection against dismissal nor basis to question the right of the President of the Senate to remove him from the service. However, where the statute fixes the term of office to be at the pleasure of the appointing power, as distinguished from a statute which makes the appointed officer removable at the pleasure of the appointing power, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove at any time. This rule was held on the case Alba v. Evangelista21, it is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office — two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.

18 19

Cometa v. Andanar, 95 Phil. 604 (1954) Lacson v. Roque, G.R. No. L-6225, January 10, 1953 20 Cuadra vs. Cordova, 103 Phil., 391 21 Alba v. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957)

Also in the case Fernandez v. Ledesma22, which involved here the creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of tenure has been provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with the policy laid down by Congress therein. The power to investigate officials or employees as conferred by law upon a public officer does not include the power to delegate the authority to take testimony of witnesses whose appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena. Nor does such power to investigate include the power to delegate the authority to administer oath. This ruling was established in the case of Carmelo v. Ramos23, a public officer, such as the Mayor has no power to cite witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. There is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand witnesses to testify under oath. In Francia v. Pecson24 the Supreme Court stated that, ―He must show that he has "authority to take testimony or evidence." There is no law giving him such authority. We have seen that he is not even one of those authorized by law to administer oaths. We do not think the mayor can delegate or confer the powers to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas. All that respondent Subido may lawfully do as investigator for the mayor is to gather proofs and present them to the city fiscal, who may subpoena witnesses if he finds it necessary to do so.

Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied Unless a statute so authorizes, no claim against public funds may be allowed. A statute cannot be construed as to authorize, by implication, a charge against public funds. In the case Macatangay v. Chairman of Commission of Audit25, there is no specific provision of law authorizing neither leave privileges nor commutation thereof for elective officials, in general, and municipal mayors in particular. Thus, where a statute grants leave privileges in favor of appointive officials and employees of the government, the statute may not be construed as to entitle elective officials the same privileges. Also, the case De Villa v. Mathay26, there is no question that the petitioner is not entitled to accumulated leave credits. It follows that there is also nothing to commute since he has failed to cite any applicable law which would entitle him to the same. The remedy for local elective
22 23

Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18878, March 30, 1963 Carmelo v. Ramos, G.R. No. 17778, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 836 24 Francia, v. Pecson, et al., G.R. No. L-3779, July 25, 1950 25 Macatangay v. Chairman of Commission of Audit, G.R. No. 38728, Sept. 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 231 26 De Villa v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-38426 May 11, 1988

officials who may wish to have vacation and sick leave privileges similar to those enjoyed by appointive officers is to have the existing law amended. Also in the case Tenorio v. Commissioner on Audit27, the SC held that under existing law petitioner as municipal mayor is not entitled to leave privileges and that no elective official (including municipal mayors) has any leave to commute, there being no law authorizing earning and accumulation of leave credits. In another case Maleniza v. Commission on Audit28, before a retiring official or employee may be entitled to commutation of his vacation and sick leave which he may have to his credit at the time of his retirement, he must first show entitlement to such leave credit because in the absence of such entitlement, he enjoys no such right of commutation for there is nothing to commute. There must be a law authorizing such privilege. But there is no such statutory authority insofar as elective officials are concerned except Sec. 2187 which authorizes sick leave of mayors only. The petitioner in the case at bar, who was a provincial governor is not covered. The reason is obvious. If it were the intention of the law to authorize accumulation of leave to provincial governors, it could have so easily provided under the chapter governing provincial governors. The absence of any such authority gives rise to only one conclusion and that is, that all elective officials, with the exception of municipal mayors, are not entitled to commutation of leave privileges since there is no law authorizing said elective officials to earn and accumulate leave credits. Where a statute requires ―employers‖ to pay a thirteenth month pay to their employees receiving less than 1000 Php a month, the statute may not be construed to include to sovereign, nor may the term ―employers‖ be construed to embrace the government. The case Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment29 also reiterates the rule, the Supreme Court held that the no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Phil. as a sovereign cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.

Illegality of act implied from prohibition Where a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in violation thereof is by implication null and void. Prohibited act cannot serve as foundation of a cause of action for relief. No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or inequity or in Latin,

27 28

Tenorio v. Commissioner, 122 SCRA 77, G.R. No. L-51282, May 10, 1983 Maleniza v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. L-39632 November 15, 1989 29 Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 60403, Aug. 3, 1983

ex dolo malo non oritur actio. Or nullus coomodum capere potest de injuria sua propria that means no man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. No man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. It is popularly known by the maim, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis. In the case Bough v. Cantiveros 30, t is rudimentary that contracting parties may not establish pacts, clauses, and conditions, which conflict with the laws, morals, or public order and public policy. It is further well settled, that a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The rule is expressed in the maxims: "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio," and "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis." Also in the case, Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo31 provides that "when both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have given by virtue of the contract, nor enforce the performance of the undertaking of the other party". This maxim was also used in the case Acabal v. Acabal32, the proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation. The rule has sometimes been laid down as though it were equally universal, that where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other. Also, stated in the United States jurisprudence case Thomas v. City of Richmond33, ―but if the receiving as well as issuing were prohibited, both parties would be in pari delicto, and no action could be sustained for the amount of the bills.‖ And "If the act be in itself immoral, or a violation of the general laws of public policy, both parties are in pari delicto, but where the law violated is calculated for the protection of the subject against oppression, extortion, and deceit, and the defendant takes advantage of the plaintiff's condition or situation, then the plaintiff shall recover. Another United States case entitled Holman v. Johnson34, the principle of pari delicto is grounded on two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality. This doctrine of ancient vintage is not a principle of justice but one of policy as articulated in 1775 by Lord Mansfield in the aforesaid case. Also in Titong v. Court of Appeals35, petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a rice field and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and
30 31

Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 210 (1919) Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil. 103 (1951) 32 Acabal v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376, March 31, 2005 33 Thomas v. City of Richmond, 79 U. S. 349 (1870) 34 Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341 (1775) 35 Titong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111141, March 6, 1998

therefore "tantamount to bad faith." To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that "ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith." Petitioner's alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137. Public policy requires that parties to an act prohibited by statute be left where they are, to make the statute effective and to accomplish its object. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. In Dinglasan v. Lee Bun36, the doctrine of in pari delicto barred petitioner-appellants from recovering the title to the property in question and renders unnecessary the consideration of the other arguments presented. Petitioners sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen (predecessor of Lee Bun Ting), a parcel of land situated in Capiz, for P6,000. After the sale Lee Lion constructed a concrete building which he used for his lumber business and his residence. Petitioners sought for the declaration of nullity of the sale. Petitioners contend that the sale was a conditional sale with the right to repurchase, but the RTC and CA found that the sale was absolute. Another contention was that the sale is null and void as it violated the 1973 Constitution, Art XIII, Sec. 5(that foreigners cannot own land in the Philippines). On June 27, 1956, the Court upheld the sale. The Supreme Court held that even if Lee Liong violated the Constitution, the sale cannot be deemed null and void because at the time of the sale, one of the plaintiffs, Judge Rafael Dinglasan (an assistant attorney at the DOJ) knew of the said Constitutional provision. The vendor was equally guilty, and the doctrine of pari delicto applied. The doctrine of in pari delicto barred petitionerappellants from recovering the title to the property in question and renders unnecessary the consideration of the other arguments presented. The Court pointed out the absence of policy governing lands sold to aliens in violation of the Constitutional prohibition Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila37 which detailed the evolution of the provision in the public land laws, Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Krivenko ruling that "under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands" is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy. Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se or merely pro-exhibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was
36 37

Dinglasan v. Lee Bun, 99 Phil. 427 (1956) Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461 (1947)

never intended to apply. However, a citizen who sold his land to an alien in violation of the constitutional restriction cannot annul the same and recover the land, for both seller and buyer are guilty of having violated the Constitution as stated in the Cabatuan38 case.

Exception to the rule. With regard to the adherence to, or departure from language of the statues – its implications, there are two exceptions handed down, the principle of pari delicto recognizes certain exceptions and/or limitations. Pari delicto39 is defined as the parties are equally at fult, and neither party is entitled to legal protection. The two exceptions laid down are (1) it will not apply when its enforcement or application will violate an avowed fundamental policy or public interest, the court may interfere and grant relief at the suit of one of them and (2) when the transaction is not illegal per se but merely prohibited and the prohibition of law is designed for the protection of one party, the court may grant relief in the favor of the latter. The first exception to the rule is that it will not apply when its enforcement or application will violate an avowed fundamental policy or public interest. Hence, although the parties are in pari delicto, he courts may interfere and grant relief at the suit of one, where public policy requires its intervention, even though the result may be that a benefit will be derived by plaintiff who is in equal guilt with defendant. For the first exception it is ruled in the case, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals40, stated that the basic prop of respondents' plea for reconsideration is that it was inappropriate for the Supreme Court to apply in this case the principle of retroactivity. Indeed, as matters stood at the time of the passage, there could be no doubt that the Bank's resolution authorizing the purchase in question was, if well intentioned as far as the welfare of its employees was concerned, definitely beyond the powers of said board, if not on its face, more importantly in its intention. Thus, Article 4 of the Civil Code ordains explicitly that laws ―have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.". Article 1411 provides that "when the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted." In the case at bar, however, it is neither the cause nor the object that is illegal, rather it is the objective as already explained earlier. More, We are impressed that the prohibition against an officer or employee to borrow money from the employer - bank is intrinsically against public policy and not merely illegal by statutory precept. We have already
38 39

Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil. 103 (1951) Jose Menchavez v. Fkorentino Teves Jr., G.R. 153201, January 26, 2005 40 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 28774, September 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 636

held that the doctrine of in pari delicto cannot be invoked when to disallow the illegal transaction would enhance public policy. (Philippine Banking vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827) Logically and corrolarily, the deprivation of any right of action to the PHHC vis-a-vis the Bank does not carry with it the loss of the right of action by a third party who precisely predicated his transaction on the very premise that the agreement between the Bank and PHHC was non-existent, hence his priority over the prohibited party or the Bank. Moreover, 1 Section 23 of Republic Act 85 originally read thus: "No officer or employee of the bank nor any government official who may exercise executive or supervisory authority over the said bank either directly, or indirectly, for himself or as representative or agent of others shall borrow money from the Bank, nor shall become a guarantor, indorser or surety for loans from the said bank to the others, or in any manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the said Bank. Any such officer or employee who violates the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed by competent authority and said officer or employee shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one year nor exceeding five years and by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos. To explain further, the policy of a homestead law is to give and preserve in the homesteader and his family a piece of land for his house and for cultivation. For the policy to be implemented, the law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within five years following the issuance of the patent and provides that any contract of a conveyance in a contravention thereof shall be null and void.  According to the case of De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church 41, a homestead patent covering a tract of land situated in the municipality of Midsayap, Province of Cotabato, was granted to Julio Sarabillo. Homestead Law – to give and preserve in the homesteader and his family a piece of land for his house and cultivation After which, Julio Sarabillo sold two hectares of said land to the Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap for the sum of P800 to be dedicated to educational and charitable purposes. However, no new title was issued in favor of the Roman Catholic Church although the deed was annotated on the back of the title issued to the homesteader And having found in the course of her (Catalina de los Santos – estate) administration that the sale of the land to the Roman Catholic Church was made in violation of section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the administratrix instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato praying that the sale be declared null and void and of no legal effect. As ruled, the provision of the law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory. hat is important is the period within which the sale is executed. The provision of the law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory. This cannot be obviated even if official approval is granted beyond the

41

De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church, 94 Phil. 405 (1954)

expiration of that period, because the purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him." But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction." (Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hu, supra.) The second exception is that when the transaction is not illegal in itself but merely prohibited and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of one party, the court may grant relief in favor of the latter. In the case of Barsobia v. Cuenco42 ruled that Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule on pari delicto that when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has sold or delivered. Also, according to the case of Acierto v. De los Santos43 Supreme Court consistently held that "the pari delicto doctrine may not be invoked in a case of this kind since it would run counter to an avowed fundamental policy of the State, that the forfeiture of a homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee or his heirs, and that until the State had taken steps to annul the grant and asserts title to the homestead the purchaser is, as against the vendor or his heirs, no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder." Also, it gave insights on the extra-judicial settlement as it stated that: if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. As to the case of Sps. Arsenal v. Appellate court44, it stated that The original owners in this case, the respondent Palaos and his wife, have never disaffirmed the contracts executed between them and the respondent Suralta. More than that, they expressly sustained the title of the latter in court and failed to show any
42 43

Barsobia v. Cuenco, G.R. 33048, April 16, 1982, 113 SCRA 57 Acierto v. De Los Santos, 95 Phil 887 (1954) 44 FRANCISCA ARSENAL and REMEDIO ARSENAL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HEIRS OF TORCUATO SURALTA, and SPOUSES FILOMENO PALAOS and MAHINA LAGWAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-66696 July 14, 1986

interest in recovering the land. Nonetheless, we apply our earlier rulings because we believe that as in pari delicto may not be invoked to defeat the policy of the State neither may the doctrine of estoppel give a validating effect to a void contract. Indeed, it is generally considered that as between parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy (19 Am. Jur. 802). It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. v. De los Amas and Aliño, supra). Of course, this pronouncement covers only the previous transactions between the respondents. We cannot pass upon any new contract, between the same parties involving the same land if this is their clear intention. Any new transaction, however, would be subject to whatever steps the Government may take for the reversion of the property to it.

What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This is based on the axiom, ―Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum‖. This means, what the law prohibits cannot be legally accomplished. When anything is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly. This suggests that an act can be prohibited by two ways, first, by directly affecting the effect and second by indirectly affecting the effect of the act. Thus, it can be concluded that any action that the law prohibits – directly or indirectly, cannot and will not push through. In the case of People v. Concepcion45, accordingly, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank and as member of the board of directors of this bank. Later on, he was charged with a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. Section 35 of Act No. 2747 read as follows: "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director. What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer should borrow of the bank, and "if any director," etc., "shall be convicted," etc., "of directly or indirectly violating this section he shall be punished by fine and imprisonment?" We say to protect the stockholders, depositors and creditors of the bank, against the temptation to which the directors and officers might be exposed, and the power which as such they must necessarily possess in the control and management of the bank, and the legislature unwilling to rely upon the implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would not acquire any interest hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful discharge of duty, declared in express terms that they should not borrow, etc.,
45

People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil 126, November 29, 1922, G.R. No. L 19190

of the bank. The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors, and to each director separately and individually. (People vs. Concepcion, supra.) Accordingly, where a corporation is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors and to each director separately and individually. Based on the case of Cruz v. Tantuico46 stated that Whatever infirmities or limitations existed in said clearances were cured after respondent Chairman favorably indorsed petitioner's application for retirement to the Government Service Insurance System and recommended its approval to take effect. The National Treasurer withheld the retirement benefits of an employee because of his finding that she negligently allowed the anomalous encashment of falsified treasury warrants. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and enable the respondent to do indirectly what they can not do directly under Section 3 of the Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies Section 624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. Considering Section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority granted in Section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two provisions is avoided (Hunt v. Hernandez, 64 Phil. 753 [1937]). Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended (The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), the benefits granted there under "shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes." Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood (Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]). Where a law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or of an employee from attachment, garnishment or other process, an earlier law which authorizes the government to withhold an amount due such officer or employee to pay his indebtedness to the government should not be construed to withhold so much of his retirement benefits to pay said indebtedness because the appropriation , to do indirectly what it cannot do directly because the retirement benefits are exempt from attachment, garnishment or other processes.
46

Cruz V, Tantuico, G.R. No. 96422 February 28, 1994, 166 SCRA 670

Related to the case above is the case of Tantuico Jr v. Domingo 47, the petition mainly questions the withholding of one-half of petitioner's retirement benefits. The ruling was reiterated that we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally construed in favor of the pensioner. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner. It has been stated that nor the government withhold payment of retirement benefits of a public officer until his accountabilities with the government has been all cleared.

There should be no penalty for compliance with law. It has been said that a person who complies with what a statute requires cannot, by implication, be penalized thereby. The law being the guidelines, standards and measures to be followed in a country, should be strictly follow. And upon no compliance to the given laws has a corresponding punishment and sanctions. With the full awareness of people on the laws of a state, rest upon the compliance of the people, as it lessens ignorance in favor of the public and as a result a more effective campaign of the law. There should be no penalty for compliance with law, as this act coincides with what is right, moral with the standards in a legal perspective. According to the case of Quimpo v. Mendoza48, the decision under review states that: The law imposes only one annual real estate tax (plus the additional tax under RA 5447). This tax is due and payable only once, on or before March 31 of every year. Before the effectivity of RA 5447 the taxpayer was given the option to pay the tax in two installments, the first on or before May 31, and the second on or before October 30th. The payment in two installments was a privilege extended to the taxpayer for his accommodation and convenience. With the imposition of the additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon the amount of the tax shouldered by the taxpayer has practically been doubled, and it is for this reason, to the mind of the Court, that the new law now allows him to pay his real tax in four equal installments instead of only two. There is only one tax, payable in four equal installments on specified dates; not four different taxes, each with a different due date. At the option of the taxpayer, the tax for any year may be paid in two installments to be fixed annually by the Municipal Board simultaneously with the rate per centum of ad valorem taxation; Provided, That the time limit for the first and second installments
47

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., Petitioner vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Audit, ESTELITO SALVADOR, MARGARITO SILO, G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994. 48 Quimpo v. Mendoza, August 31, 1981, GR No 33092, 107 SCRA 73,82

shall be set at not later than the thirty first day of May and the thirtieth day of October of each year, respectively. At the expiration of the time for the payment of the real estate tax without penalty, the taxpayer shall be subject, from the first day of delinquency, to the payment of a penalty at the rate of two per centum for each full month of delinquency that has expired, on the amount of the original tax due, until the tax shall have been paid in full or until the property shall have been forfeited to the city as provided in this Act: Provided, That in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-four per centum of the original tax due. he law is specific and mandatory. It calls for application as thus worded. There is no room for interpretation. The penalty is to be based 'on the amount of the original tax due.' The fact that the first installment was made on time does not benefit the taxpayer at all, thereafter the second installment were not paid on time. In effect then, the option thus granted, to pay in two installments, must be strictly complied with, otherwise the operation of the plain statutory command that the tax due and payable on June 1st becomes unavoidable and delinquency is to be computed from such a date. We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the interpretation of tax statutes that such statutes are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. Moreover, simple logic fairness and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done in compliance with the law. Since petitioner is allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal installments due and payable on four specified dates and having paid the first three (3) installments faithfully and religiously, it is manifest injustice, sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing so when he fails to pay the fourth end last installment.

APPENDIX CASE INDEX Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139 (1936) Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty. Ltd. (1955) 93 C.L.R. 55 People v. Gutierrez, G.R No. 32282, 36 SCRA 172 Escribano v. Ovila G.R No. 30375, 85 SCRA 245 Gordon v. Veridiano, 167 SCRA 5 (1988) In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918) Marc Donnely & Associates, Inc. v. Agregado 95. Phil. 142 Cabiling v. Pabualan, G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274 Phil. Long distance Tel. Co. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 23080 American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents G.R. No. 26803 Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil 289 University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 506 De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950) Pelaes v. The Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965 Jover v. Borra, 93 Phil. 506 (1953) Cometa v. Andanar, 95 Phil. 604 (1954) Lacson v. Roque, G.R. No. L-6225, January 10, 1953 Cuadra vs. Cordova, 103 Phil., 391 Alba v. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957) Fernandez v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-18878, March 30, 1963 Carmelo v. Ramos, G.R. No. 17778, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 836 Francia, v. Pecson, et al., G.R. No. L-3779, July 25, 1950 Macatangay v. Chairman of Commission of Audit, G.R. No. 38728, Sept. 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 231 De Villa v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-38426 May 11, 1988 Tenorio v. Commissioner, 122 SCRA 77, G.R. No. L-51282, May 10, 1983 Maleniza v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. L-39632 November 15, 1989 Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 60403, Aug. 3, 1983 Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 210 (1919) Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil. 103 (1951) Acabal v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376, March 31, 2005 Thomas v. City of Richmond, 79 U. S. 349 (1870) Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341 (1775) Titong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111141, March 6, 1998 Dinglasan v. Lee Bun, 99 Phil. 427 (1956)

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461 (1947) Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil. 103 (1951) Jose Menchavez v. Fkorentino Teves Jr., G.R. 153201, January 26, 2005 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 28774, September 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 636 De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church, 94 Phil. 405 (1954) Barsobia v. Cuenco, G.R. 33048, April 16, 1982, 113 SCRA 57 Acierto v. De Los Santos, 95 Phil 887 (1954) FRANCISCA ARSENAL and REMEDIO ARSENAL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HEIRS OF TORCUATO SURALTA, and SPOUSES FILOMENO PALAOS and MAHINA LAGWAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-66696 July 14, 1986

People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil 126, November 29, 1922, G.R. No. L 19190 Cruz V, Tantuico, G.R. No. 96422 February 28, 1994, 166 SCRA 670 FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., Petitioner vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Audit, ESTELITO SALVADOR, MARGARITO SILO, G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994. Quimpo v. Mendoza, August 31, 1981, GR No 33092, 107 SCRA 73,82

Grant of power includes incidental power   Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred The incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted o Examples  Power to establish an office includes authority to abolish it, unless xxx  Warrant issued shall be made upon probable cause determined by the judge xxx implies the grant of power to the judge to conduct preliminary investigations  Power to approve a license includes by implication the power to revoke it  Power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant license, from which it is derived  Power to deport includes the power to arrest undesirable aliens after investigation  Power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments , unless xxx  Power to appropriate money includes power to withdraw unexpended money already appropriated  Etc… see page 171-172

Grant of power excludes greater power  The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers necessary to make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those which are greater than that conferred o Power of supervision DOES NOT INCLUDE power to suspend or removal o Power to reorganize DOES NOT INCLUDE the authority to deprive the courts certain jurisdiction and to transfer it to a quasi-judicial tribunal o Power to regulate business DOES NOT INCLUDE power to prohibit

What is implied should not be against the law  Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remove – o Constitutional restriction of CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, that it must be a cause provided for by law precludes such implication (unless the appointment was made outside the civil service law Power to appoint a public officer by the President includes power to remove o Provided that such removal is made with just cause o Except is such statute provides that term of office to be at the pleasure of the appointing officer, power to appoint carries with it power to remove anytime Power to investigate officials DOES NOT INCLUDE the power to delegate the authority to take testimony of witnesses whose appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena. Nor does such power to investigate include the power to delegate the authority to administer oath





Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied  It is well-settled that unless a statute expressly so authorizes, no claim against public funds may be allowed o Statute grants leave privileges to APPOINTIVE officials, this cannot be construed to include ELECTIVE officials th o “employer” to pay 13 month pay, does not imply that it includes “government

Illegality of act implied from prohibition      In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis - where a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in violation thereof is by implication null and void Prohibited act cannot serve as foundation of a cause of action for relief Ex dolo malo non oritur actio – no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or inequity Nullus coomodum capere potest de injuria sua propria – no man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong Public policy requires that parties to an act prohibited by statute be left where they are, to make the statute effective and to accomplish its object o Party to an illegal contract cannot come to court of law and ask that his illegal object be carried out o A citizen who sold his land to an alien in violation of the constitutional restriction cannot annul the same and recover the land, for both seller and buyer are guilty of having violated the Constitution

Two (2) Exceptions to the rule  Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its enforcement or application will violate an avowed fundamental policy or public interest

Delos Santos v. Roman Catholic Church    Homestead Law – to give and preserve in the homesteader and his family a piece of land for his house and cultivation The law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within 5 years following the issuance of the patent and provides that any contract of a conveyance in contravention thereof shall be null and void The seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may recover the land subject of such illegal sale

Barsobia v. Cuenco  Another exception is that when the transaction is not illegal per se but merely prohibited and the prohibition by law is designed for protection of one party, the court may grant relief in favor of the latter

What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly  Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum – what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly

Peo v. Concepcion

 

Where a corporation is forbidden from doing an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors and to each director separately and individually Where the board of directors is prohibited from granting loans to its director, a loan to a partnership of which the wife of a director is a partner falls within the prohibition

Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. PNB  Where a statute prohibits the payment of the principal obligation during a fixed period, the interest thereon during the existence of the restriction is not demandable

Cruz v. Tantuico   Law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or employee from attachment, garnishment etc Earlier law authorizes the government to withhold an amount due such officer or employee to pay his indebtedness to the government SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED to withhold so much of his retirement benefits as this amount to attachment garnishment etc.

Tantuico, Jr. v Domingo   Law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or employee from attachment, garnishment etc Government cannot withhold payment of retirement benefits of a public officer until his accountabilities with the government shall have been cleared, as such action is doing indirectly what the government is prohibited from doing directly

There should be no penalty from compliance with law   A person who complies with what a statute requires cannot, by implication, be penalized thereby For “simple logic and fairness and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done in compliance with the law” 