HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE
No. S6
Editors :
HERBERT
Prof.
FISHER, M.A., F.B.A.
GILBERT MURRAY,
Litt.D.,
LL.D., F.B.A.
Prof.
Prof.
J.
ARTHUR THOMSON,
W.LLIAM
T.
M.A.
M.A.
BREWSTER,
A
complete classified
Home
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of the volumes tf
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already
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The
published
THE PROBLEMS
OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
BERTRAND RUSSELL
M.A., F.R.8.
LECTURER AND LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE
CAMBRIDGE
NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
LONDON
WILLIAMS AND N ORG ATE
PREFACE
In the following pages, I have confined
myself in the main to those problems of
philosophy in regard to which
I
thought
possible to say something positive and
constructive, since merely negative criticism
it
seemed out
For
this reason, theory
a
larger space than
knowledge occupies
metaphysics in the present volume, and some
of place.
of
topics
much
discussed
by philosophers are
at
all.
treated very briefly,
I have derived valuable assistance from
if
unpublished writings of Mr. G. E. Moore and
from the former, as reMr. J. M. Keynes
:
gards the relations of sense-data to physical
objects, and from the latter as regards probI have also profited
ability and induction.
greatly
by the
criticisms
Professor Gilbert Murray.
and suggestions
of
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I
II
PAGE
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
.
.
9
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
.
.
26
III
THE NATURE OF MATTER
IV
IDEALISM
...
58
V KNOWLEDGE
BY
ACQUAINTANCE
KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION
VI
ON INDUCTION
Vn ON
OUR
IX
HOW
A PRIORI
AND
.
OF
KNOWLEDGE
IS
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
vii
.
72
93
GENERAL
POSSIBLE
.
X ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
XI
.
.....
.....
KNOWLEDGE
PRINCIPLES
VIII
42
.
109
127
.142
.
158
.174
CONTENTS
viii
PAOE
OHAPTEB
XII
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
Xin KNOWLEDGE,
OPINION
.
.
.
.....
ERROR,
186
AND PROBABLE
204
XIV THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOW-
LEDGE
220
XV THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
.
.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
.
.251
INDEX
.
237
253
THE
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER
I
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
any knowledge in the world which
is so certain that no reasonable man could
doubt it ? This question, which at first sight
Is there
might not seem difficult, is really one of the
most difficult that can be asked. When we
have realised the obstacles in the way of a
straightforward
and confident answer, we
on the study of philo-
shall be well launched
—
sophy for philosophy is merely the attempt
to answer such ultimate questions, not
carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in
ordinary
life
and even
critically, after
in the sciences,
exploring
9
all
but
that makes such
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
10
queitions puzzling, and after realising all
the vagueness and confusion that underlie
our ordinary ideas.
In daily life, we assume as certain
many
things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found
to be so full of apparent contradictions that
only a great amount of thought enables us
to
know what
it is
we
that
really
may
believe.
In the search for certainty, it is natural to
begin with our present experiences, and in
no doubt, knowledge is to be
derived from them. But any statement as
to what it is that our immediate experiences
some
sense,
make us know
seems to
me
very likely to be wrong. It
that I am now sitting in a chair,
is
at a table of a certain shape, on which I see
sheets of paper with writing or print.
By
turning
my
head
I see
out of the window
I believe
buildings and clouds and the sun.
that the sun is about ninety-three million miles
from the earth that it is a hot globe many
times bigger than the earth that, owing to
;
;
the earth's rotation,
and
will
it
rises
every morning,
continue to do so for an indefinite
time in the future.
I
believe that,
if
any
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
11
other normal person comes into my room, he
will see the same chairs and tables and books
and papers as I see, and that the table which
I see is the same as the table which I feel
pressing against my arm. All this seems to
be so evident as to be hardly worth stating,
man who
except in answer to a
know
whether I
anything.
be reasonably doubted, and
much
Yet
all
of
careful discussion before
sure that
we have
stated
it
in a
doubts
all this
it
may
requires
we can be
form that
is
wholly true.
To make our
difficulties plain, let
centrate attention on the table.
us con-
To
the eye
oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch
it is
smooth and cool and hard when I
tap it, it gives out a wooden sound. Any one
else who sees and feels and hears the table
it
is
;
will agree
with this description, so that
it
might seem as if no difficulty would arise
but as soon as we try to be more precise our
;
troubles begin.
table
the
**
is
really
Although I believe that the
" of the same colour all
over,
the light look
other parts, and
parts that reflect
brighter than the
much
some
12
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
parts look white because of reflected light.
I know that, if I move, the parts that rC'
fleet the light will be different, so that the
apparent distribution of colours on the table
change. It follows that if several people
are looking at the table at the same moment,
no two of them will see exactly the same
will
of colours,
because no two
from exactly the same point of
view, and any change in the point of view
makes some change in the way the light is
distribution
can see
it
reflected.
For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to the painter
the painter has to
they are all-important
unlearn the habit of thinking that things
seem to have the colour which common sense
"
"
have, and to learn the
really
says they
:
habit of seeing things as they appear.
we have already the beginning
of
Here
one of
the distinctions that cause most trouble in
"
apphilosophy the distinction between
" and "
reality," between what
pearance
—
things seem to be and
painter wants to know
what they are. The
what tilings seem to
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
man and
be, the practical
want to know what
sopher's wish to
they are
know
the philosopher
; but the philo-
this is stronger
man's, and
13
than
more troubled by
the practical
knowledge as to the difficulties of answering
the question.
is
To return to the table. It is evident from
what we have found, that there is no colour
which pre-eminently appears to be the colour
of the table, or even of any one particular
part of the table it appears to be of different
—
colours from different points of view, and
there is no reason for regarding some of
these as
more
And we know
really its colour
that even from a given point
of view the colour will
artificial light,
to a
than others.
seem
different
by
or to a colour-blind man, or
man
wearing blue spectacles, while in
the dark there will be no colour at all, though
to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. Thus colour is not something which
inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator
is
and the way the
When,
in ordinary
light falls
life,
on the
we speak
table.
of the colour
U
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
of the table,
we only mean the
sort of colour
seem to have to a normal
spectator from an ordinary point of view
under usual conditions of light. But the
other colours which appear under other
conditions have just as good a right to be
and therefore, to avoid
considered real
which
it
will
;
in itself,
we
are compelled to deny that,
the table has any one particular
favouritism,
colour.
The same thing applies to the texture.
With the naked eye one can see the grain,
but otherwise the table looks smooth and
If we looked at it through a microeven.
we
should see roughnesses and hills
scope,
and valleys, and all sorts of differences that
Which
are imperceptible to the naked eye.
of these
is
the "real" table?
rally tempted to say that
through the microscope is
We
are natu-
what we see
more real, but
Lliat in turn would be changed by a still
more powerful microscope.
If, then, we
cannot trust what we see with the naked
eye, why should we trust what we see
through a microscope
?
Thus,
again,
the
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
15
we
be-
confidence in our senses with which
gan deserts
The
us.
sha'pe of the table is
no
We
better.
all in the habit of judging as to the
" real "
shapes of things, and we do this so
are
unreflectingly that we come
actually see the real shapes.
as
we
all
have to learn
given thing looks
if
we
different
think
to
try to draw, a
in
shape from
If our table
every different point of view.
"
"
it will
is
almost
acute
all
points of view, as
and two
angles
if
from
had two
look,
rectangular,
really
we
But, in fact,
it
obtuse
angles.
If
opposite sides are parallel, they will look as
if they converged to a point away from the
spectator ; if they are of equal length, they
will look as if the nearer side were longer.
All these things are not
commonly
noticed
in looking at a table, because experience has
"
"
taught us to construct the real shape from
" real "
the apparent shape, and the
shape
But
is what interests us as practical men.
"
"
it
is
we
see
not
what
real
the
;
shape is
something inferred from what we
what we
see
is
see.
And
in
shape
constantly changing
16
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
we move about the room
as
;
so that here
again the senses seem not to give us the truth
about the table itself, but only about the
appearance of the table.
when we
Similar difficulties arise
the sense of touch.
consider
It is true that the table
always gives us a sensation of hardness, and
we feel that it resists pressure. But the
sensation
we obtain depends upon how hard
we
press the table and also upon what part
of the body we press with
thus the various
;
sensations due to various pressures or various
parts of the body cannot be supposed to
reveal directly
table, but at
any definite property of the
most to be sig7is of some
which
property
perhaps causes all the senbut
sations,
of
them.
is
And
not actually apparent in any
the same applies still more
obviously to the sounds which can be elicited
by rapping the table.
Thus
if
it
there
is
becomes evident that the real table,
one, is not the same as what we
immediately experience by sight or touch or
hearing.
The
real table,
not immediately
known
if
there
to us at
all,
is
one,
is
but must
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
be an inference from what
Hence, two very
known.
at once arise
&t
;
namely,
(2) If so,
all ?
is
immediately
difficult
(1) Is there
what
17
questions
a real table
can
sort of object
it
be?
It will help us in considering these questions
to have a few simple terms of which the
is
meaning
the
name
of
definite
"
and
sense-data
Let us give
to the things that
in sensation
such
clear.
"
are immediately known
things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses,
shall give the
roughnesses, and so on.
:
We
name "
sensation
"
to
the
experience of
of these things.
being immediately aware
Thus, whenever we see a colour,
we have a
sensation of the colour, but the colour itself
is
a
colour
sense-datum, not a sensation. The
is that of which we are
immediately
aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation.
It
is
plain that
about the table,
we are to know anything
it must be by means of the
if
—brown colour,
—which we
smoothness,
sense-data
oblong
shape,
with
but for the reasons which have
been given, we cannot say that the table is the
etc.
the table
;
associate
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
18
sense-data, or even that the sense-data are
properties of the table. Thus a
problem arises as to the relation of the sensedata to the real table, supposing there is
directly
such a thing.
The
real table,
"
if
it exists, we
Thus we have
will call a
to consider
physical object."
the relation of sense-data to physical objects.
The
"
collection of all physical objects
is
called
Thus our two questions may
(1) Is there any
such thing as matter ? (2) If so, what is its
matter."
be re-stated as follows
nature
:
?
The philosopher who
first brought profor regarding
forward
the
reasons
minently
the immediate objects of our senses as not
existing
independently
of us was Bishop
His Three Dialogues
Berkeley (1685-1753).
between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition
to Sceptics and Atheists, undertake to prove
is no such thing as matter at all,
and that the world consists of nothing but
minds and their ideas. Hylas has hitherto
believed in matter, but he is no match for
Philonous, who mercilessly drives him into
that there
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
and paradoxes,
contradictions
his
as
own
it
if
19
and makes
denial of matter seem, in the end,
were almost
common
sense.
The
arguments employed are of very different
some are important and sound,
value
:
others
are
confused
or
quibbling.
But
Berkeley retains the merit of having shown
that the existence of matter is capable of
being denied without absurdity, and that if
there are any things that exist independently
of us
of
they cannot be the immediate objects
our sensations.
There are two different questions involved
when we ask whether matter exists, and it is
important to keep them clear. We commonly
mean by " matter " something which is
"
mind," something which we
opposed to
think of as occupying space and as radically
incapable of any sort of thought or consciousIt is chiefly in this sense that Berkeley
ness.
denies matter
;
that
is
to say, he does not
deny that the sense-data which we commonly
take as signs of the existence of the table are
really signs of the existence of something inde-
pendent of
us,
but he does deny that this some^
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
20
thing is non-mental, that
nor ideas entertained by
it is
neither
mind
some mind.
He
admits that there must be something which
continues to exist when we go out of the room
or shut our eyes,
and that what we
call
seeing the table does really give us reason
something which persists
even when we are not seeing it. But he
thinks that this something cannot be radi-
for
believing
in
cally different in nature
from what we see, and
cannot be independent of seeing altogether,
though it must be independent of our seeing.
"
"
real
table as
thus led to regard the
God.
Such
an idea
of
mind
the
an idea in
He
is
has the required permanence and independence
of ourselves, without being as matter would
—
otherwise
be — something
in the sense that
can never be directly
of
quite unknowable,
we can only
and
and immediately aware
infer
it,
it.
Other philosophers since Berkeley
have
also held that, although the table does not
depend for its existence upon being seen by
me, it does depend upon being seen (or
otherwise apprehended in sensation) by some
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
21
—
mind not necessarily the mind of God,
but more often the whole collective mind of
the universe.
This they hold, as Berkeley
does, chiefly because they think there can
—
—
be
nothing real or at any rate nothing
known to be real except minds and their
thoughts and feelings. We might state the
argument by which they support their view
"
in some such way as this
Whatever
can be thought of is an idea in the
:
mind
of the person thinking of
it
;
therefore
nothing can be thought of except ideas in
minds
;
ceivable,
therefore
and what
anything
is
else
is
incon-
inconceivable cannot
exist."
Such an argument, in my opinion, is
and of course those who advance
it do not put it so
But
shortly or so crudely.
whether valid or not, the argument has been
fallacious
;
very widely advanced in one form or another
and
;
philosophers, perhaps a
have
held
that there is nothing real
majority,
except minds and their ideas. Such philo-
very
many
sophers are called
come
"
idealists."
When
they
to explaining matter, they either say,
22
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
like Berkeley,
that matter
is
really nothing
but a collection of ideas, or they say, like
Leibniz (1646-1716), that what appears as
matter is really a collection of more or less
rudimentary minds.
But these philosophers, though they deny
matter as opposed to mind, nevertheless, in
another sense, admit matter. It will be
remembered that we asked two questions
namely,
so,
;
(1) Is there a real table at all ? (2) If
what
sort
of
object can
be
it
?
Now
both Berkeley and Leibniz admit that there
is a real table, but Berkeley says it is certain
ideas in the mind of God, and Leibniz says
it is a
colony of souls. Thus both of them
answer our
question in the affirmative,
and only diverge from the views of ordinary mortals in their answer to our second
question.
first
In
almost
fact,
all
seem to be agreed that there
is
—
—may
currence
depend upon
is
a
independently
sign
of
:
however much
they almost all agree that,
our sense-data colour, shape,
etc.
philosophers
a real table
of
us,
us,
smoothness,
yet
something
something
their
oc-
existing
differing,
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
23
completely from our sense-data,
and yet to be regarded as causing those
sense-data whenever we are in a suitable
perhaps,
relation to the real table.
Now
obviously this point in which the
philosophers are agreed the view that there
is
—
—
a real table, whatever
its
nature
may
be
vitally important, and it will be worth
while to consider what reasons there are for
is
accepting this view before we go on to the
further question as to the nature of the real
Our next
table.
concerned with
that there
is
chapter, therefore, will be
the reasons for supposing
a real table at
all.
will be well to
Before we go farther
consider for a moment what it is that we
it
have discovered so
that,
sort
far.
It
has
appeared
we take any common object of the
that is supposed to be known by the
if
what the senses immediately tell us
not the truth about the object as it is
apart from us, but only the truth about
senses,
is
certain sense-data which, so far as
we can
depend upon the relations between us
and the object. Thus what we directly see
see,
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
24
"
merely
appearance," which we
"
"
believe to be a sign of some
reality
behind. But if the reality is not what
and
feel is
have we any means of knowing
appears,
any reality at all ? And if
have we any means of finding out what
whether there
so,
it is
is
like ?
Such questions are bewildering, and it is
difficult to know that even the strangest
hypotheses may not be true. Thus our
familiar table,
which has
roused but the
slightest thoughts in us hitherto, has
a
problem
full
of
surprising
become
possibilities.
The one thing we know about it is that it
is not what it seems.
Beyond this modest
the most complete
we
have
so
far,
result,
liberty
is
it
Leibniz
conjecture.
;
science,
is
of
scarcely
less
a vast collection
wonderful,
of
electric
us
it
tells
us
tells
a community of souls
Berkeley
God
is an idea in the mind of
;
tells
sober
us
it
charges in
violent motion.
these surprising possibilities, doubt
suggests that perhaps there is no table at all.
Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many
Among
APPEARANCE AND REALITY
questions as
power
the
of
we could
asking
interest
of
25
wish, has at least the
questions which increase
the world, and show the
strangeness and wonder lying just below the
surface even in the commonest things of
daily
life.
CHAPTER
II
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
In
this chapter
we have
to ask ourselves
any sense at all, there is such a
thing as matter. Is there a table which
has a certain intrinsic nature, and continues
whether, in
to exist
when
I
am
not looking, or
is
the table
merely a product of my imagination, a dreamtable in a very prolonged dream ? This
question
if
is
of the greatest importance.
we cannot be
sure
of
For
the independent
existence of objects, we cannot be sure of
the independent existence of other people's
bodies, and therefore still less of other people's
minds, since we have no grounds for believing in their minds except such as are
derived from observing their bodies. Thus
sure of the independent
if we cannot be
existence of objects,
we
36
shall be left alone
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
a
in
desert
—
outer world
that
we
be that
whole
the
nothing but a dream, and
This is an uncomfort-
is
alone exist.
but although it cannot be
proved to be false, there is not the
able possibility
strictly
may
it
27
;
slightest reason to suppose that
In this chapter we have to see
it
is
why
true.
this is
the case.
we embark upon doubtful matters,
us try to find some more or less fixed point
from which to start. Although we are
Before
let
doubting the physical existence of the table,
we are not doubting the existence of the
sense-data which
made
us think there was a
we
are not doubting that, while we
look, a certain colour and shape appear to
table
us,
;
and while we
hardness
which
is
question.
is
press, a certain sensation of
experienced
psychological,
In
fact,
we
by
us.
All
this,
are not calling in
whatever
else
may
be
some at least of our immediate
experiences seem absolutely certain.
doubtful,
Descartes
(1596-1650),
the
founder
of
modern philosophy, invented a method which
may still be used with profit the method of
—
28
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
systematic doubt.
He determined
that he
would believe nothing which he did not see
quite clearly and distinctly to be true. Whatever he could bring himself to doubt, he would
doubt, until he saw reason for not doubting
applying this method he gradually
became convinced that the only existence of
it.
By
which he could be quite certain was his own.
He imagined a deceitful demon, who presented
unreal
things
to
his
senses
in
a
might be very
perpetual phantasmagoria
improbable that such a demon existed, but
;
still
it
was
possible,
it
and therefore doubt
by the senses
was possible.
But doubt concerning his own existence
was not possible, for if he did not exist, no
concerning things perceived
demon could
he must exist
deceive him.
;
if
If
he doubted,
he had any experiences
whatever, he must exist. Thus his own existence was an absolute certainty to him.
"
I think, therefore I am," he said {Cogiio,
ergo
sum)
;
and on the
basis of this certainty
he set to work to build up again the world
of knowledge which his doubt had laid in
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
29
inventing the method of doubt,
and by showing that subjective things are
the most certain, Descartes performed a
By
ruins.
great service to philosophy, and one which
makes him still useful to all students of
the subject.
But some care
"
cartes'
am "
needed in using Des-
is
argument.
/ think, therefore /
says rather more than
tain.
is
strictly cer-
might seem as though we were
It
quite sure of being the same person to-day
as we were yesterday, and this is no doubt
true
in
some
But the
sense.
Self
real
is
as hard to arrive at as the real table, and
does not seem to have that absolute, convincing certainty that belongs to particular
When
experiences.
see a certain
brown
tain at once
is
not
colour," but rather,
This
seen."
of
I look at
colour,
"
"
/
my
what
am
is
table
seeing a
a brown colour
course
involves
and
quite cer-
is
brown
being
something
somebody) which (or who) sees the brown
but it does not of itself involve that
more or less permanent person whom we call
(or
colour
"
I.'-
;
So
far as
immediate certainty goes.
30
it
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
be
might
that
the
something which
brown colour is quite momentary,
and not the same as the something which
has some different experience the next
moment.
Thus it is our particular thoughts and
sees the
have primitive certainty. And
this applies to dreams and hallucinations as
when we
well as to normal perceptions
feelings that
:
dream or
we certainly do have
we think we have, but for
see a ghost,
the sensations
is held that no physical
to
these sensations. Thus
object corresponds
various reasons
it
the certainty of our knowledge of our own
experiences does not have to be limited in
any way to allow
therefore,
solid basis
of
for exceptional cases.
we have,
for
what
it is
Here,
worth, a
from which to begin our pursuit
knowledge.
The problem we have to consider is this
Granted that we are certain of our own sensedata, have we any reason for regarding them
:
as signs of the existence of something else,
which we can call the physical object? When
we have enumerated
all
the sense-data which
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
81
we should naturally regard as connected with
the table, have we said all there is to say
about the table, or is there still something
else
something not a sense-datum, some-
—
thing which persists when we go out of the
room? Common sense unhesitatingly answers
What can
be bought and sold
and pushed about and have a cloth laid on it,
and so on, cannot be a mere collection of sensethat there
is.
data.
If
the
table,
we
shall
cloth
completely
hides
the
derive no sense-data from
the table, and therefore,
if
the table were
it would have ceased to
and the cloth would be suspended in
merely sense-data,
exist,
air, resting, by a miracle, in the place
where the table formerly was. This seems
but whoever wishes to beplainly absurd
empty
;
come a philosopher must
frightened by absurdities.
One great reason why it is
learn not to be
felt
that
we must
secure a physical object in addition to the
sense-data, is that we want the same object
for different people.
When ten people are
round a dinner-table, it seems preposterous to maintain that they are not
sitting
32
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
seeing the same tablecloth, the same knives
and forks and spoons and glasses. But the
sense-data are private to each separate person ;
what is immediately present to the sight
not immediately present to the
they all see things from
sight of another
of one
is
:
slightly different points of view,
see
them
slightly differently.
and therefore
Thus,
if
there
are to be public neutral objects, which can be
in some sense known to many different people,
must be something over and above the
private and particular sense-data which ap-
there
pear to various people.
What
reason, then,
have we for believing that there are such
public neutral objects ?
The first answer that naturally occurs to
one
is
that, although different people
see the table slightly differently,
still
may
they
all
more or less similar things when they
look at the table, and the variations in what
they see follow the laws of perspective and
reflection of light, so that it is easy to arrive
see
at a
permanent object underlying all the different people's sense-data. I bought my table
from the former occupant of my room ; I
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
33
could not buy his sense-data, which died
when he went away, but I could and did buy
the confident expectation of more or less
similar sense-data.
Thus it is the fact that
have similar sense-data, and
that one person in a given place at different
times has similar sense-data, which makes
different people
us suppose that over and above the sensedata there is a permanent public object which
underlies or causes the sense-data of various
people and various times.
Now in so far as the above considerations
depend upon supposing that there are other
people besides ourselves, they beg the very
question at issue. Other people are repre-
sented to
me by
certain sense-data, such as
them or the sound of their voices,
had no reason to believe that there
the sight of
and
if
I
were physical objects independent of my
sense-data, I should have no reason to believe
that other people exist except as part of my
dream. Thus, when we are trying to show that
must be objects independent of our own
sense-data, we cannot appeal to the testimony
there
of other people, since this testimony itself
B
34
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
consists of sense-data,
and does not reveal
other people's experiences unless our own
sense-data are signs of things existing inde-
oendently
of
us.
in
We
our
must
therefore,
if
own
find,
purely private
experiences, characteristics which show, or
tend to show, that there are in the world
possible,
things other than ourselves and our private
experiences.
In one sense
it
must be admitted that we
can never prove the existence of things other
than ourselves and our experiences. No
from the hypothesis
that the world consists of myself and my
logical absurdity results
thoughts and feelings and sensations, and
that everything else is mere fancy. In
dreams a very complicated world may seem
to be present, and yet on waking we find it
was a delusion
;
that
is
to say,
we
find that
the sense-data in the dream do not appear to
have corresponded with such physical objects
as
we should
data.
world
(It
is
is
naturally infer from our sensetrue that, when the physical
assumed,
it is
possible to find physical
causes for the sense-data in dreams
:
a door
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
35
banging, for instance, may cause us to dream
But although, in
of a naval engagement.
this case, there is a physical cause for the
not a physical object
in the way in
sense-data
corresponding to the
which an actual naval battle would correthere
sense-data,
is
spond.) There is no logical impossibility in
the supposition that the whole of life is a
dream, in which we ourselves create
all
the
come before us. But although
not logically impossible, there is no
reason whatever to suppose that it is true
objects that
this is
;
and
it
in fact, a less simple hypothesis,
is,
viewed as a means of accounting for the
facts of our own life, than the common-sense
hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action on us causes our
sensations.
The way in which
supposing
that
simplicity
there
comes
in
from
are
physical
the
cat
appears at
objects
one moment in one part of the room, and at
another in another part, it is natural to
is
easily seen.
suppose that
it
has
really
If
moved from the one
to
the other, passing over a series of intermediate
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
36
But if it is merely a set of sensehave ever been in any place
cannot
data,
thus we shall have
where I did not see it
to suppose that it did not exist at all while
positions.
it
;
I
was not looking, but suddenly sprang
being
in
whether
a
new
If
place.
I see it or not,
into
the cat exists
we can understand
from our own experience how it gets hungry
but if it
between one meal and the next
;
does not exist when I
am
not seeing it, it
should
that
seems odd
grow during
appetite
non-existence as fast as
during existence.
consists
the
cat
And
only of sense-data, it
cannot be hungry, since no hunger but my
if
own can be
a sense-datum to me.
Thus
the behaviour of the sense-data which represent the cat to me, though it seems quite
natural
when regarded
as
an expression
of
hunger, becomes utterly inexplicable when
regarded as mere movements and changes
of patches of colour, which are as incapable
of
hunger as a triangle
is
of playing foot-
ball.
But the
difficulty in the case of the cat is
nothing compared to the difTiculty in the case
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
of
human
When human
when we hear
beings speak
certain noises which
associate with ideas,
and simultaneously
—that
we
37
is,
beings.
see certain motions of lips and expressions of
face it is very difficult to suppose that what
—
we hear is not the expression of a thought,
as we know it would be if we emitted the
same sounds. Of course similar things happen
in dreams, where we are mistaken as to the
existence of other people. But dreams are
more or less suggested by what we call waking
more or less
life, and are capable of being
accounted for on scientific principles if we
assume
that
there
really
is
a
physical
Thus every
simplicity
that
natural
the
us
to
view,
adopt
urges
our
than
other
there really are objects
principle of
world.
selves
and our sense-data which have an
existence not dependent
upon our perceiving
them.
not by argument that we
originally come by our belief in an independent
We find this belief ready
external world.
in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect
Of course
it is
:
it is
what may be
called
an
instinctive belief
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
38
We
should never have been led to question
this belief but for the fact that, at any rate
in the case of sight, it seems as if the sense-
were instinctively believed to
be the independent object, whereas argument
shows that the object cannot be identical
datum
itself
This discovery, hownot at all paradoxical in the
with the sense-datum.
ever—which
case of taste
is
and smell and sound, and only
touch
slightly so in the case of
—leaves
un-
diminished our instinctive belief that there
are objects corresponding to our sense-data.
Since this belief does not lead to any diffi-
but on the contrary tends to simplify
and systematise our account of our experi-
culties,
no good reason for rejecting
We may therefore admit though with
it.
a slight doubt derived from dreams that
the external world does really exist, and is not
ences, there seems
—
wholly dependent for
its
continuing to perceive
it.
existence
The argument which has
clusion
is
wish, but
—
upon our
led us to this con-
doubtless less strong than
we could
typical of many philosophical
to
arguments, and it is therefore worth while
it is
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
39
and
All knowledge, we find, must be
validity.
built up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if
these are rejected, nothing is left. But among
our instinctive beliefs some are much stronger
than others, while many have, by habit and
consider
briefly
character
general
become entangled with other
association,
beliefs,
its
not
really
supposed to be
but
instinctive,
part
of
what
is
falsely
believed
instinctively.
Philosophy should show us the hierarchy
of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with
those we hold most strongly, and presenting
each as
much
isolated
and as
vant additions as possible.
care to
show
that, in the
free
from
irrele-
It should take
form
in
which they
are finally set forth, our instinctive beliefs
but form a harmonious system.
There can never be any reason for rejecting
do not
clash,
one instinctive belief except that it clashes
with others thus, if they are found to harmonise, the whole system becomes worthy of
;
acceptance.
It is of course possible that
beliefs
may
all
or
any
of our
be mistaken, and therefore
all
40
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
ought to be held with at least some
element of doubt. But we cannot
reason
to
of
ground
reject
some
a
belief
other
except
belief.
slight
on
have
the
Hence, by
organising our instinctive beliefs and their
consequences, by considering which
them
is
it
modify
most
possible,
if
necessary, to
abandon, we can
or
the basis
of
what we
instinctively
accepting
as
among
our
believe,
arrive,
sole
at
an
on
data
or-
derly systematic organisation of our knowledge, in which, though the possibility of
error remains,
its likelihood is diminished
the
interrelation
of the parts and by
by
the critical scrutiny which has preceded
acquiescence.
This function, at least, philosophy can perform. Most philosophers, rightly or wrongly,
believe that philosophy can do
than
not
this
— that
it
much more
can give us knowledge,
otherwise
attainable, concerning the
universe as a whole, and concerning the nature
of ultimate reality.
Whether this be the
case or not, the
spoken
of
more modest function we have
can certainly be performed by
THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
41
philosophy, and certainly suffices, for those
to doubt the adequacy
who have once begun
of
common
difficult
involve.
sense, to justify the
arduous and
labours that philosophical problems
CHAPTER
III
THE NATURE OF MATTER
preceding chapter we agreed,
though without being able to find demonstrative reasons, that it is rational to believe that
In
the
our sense-data
regard
as
really
signs
—for example, those which we
with
associated
of
my
table
—are
the existence of something
and our perceptions. That
independent of us
is
and above the sensations of
hardness, noise, and so on, which
to say, over
colour,
make up
the appearance of the table to
me, I assume that there is something else,
are
appearances.
of which these things
The colour
ceases to exist
eyes, the sensation of
exist
if
I
remove
if
I
shut
my
hardness ceases to
my arm
from contact
with the table, the sound ceases to exist if
I cease to rap the table with my knuckles.
42
THE NATURE OF MATTER
But
I
things
do not believe that when
the
cease
table
43
these
all
On
ceases.
the
contrary, I believe that it is because the
table exists continuously that all
these
when
sense-data will reappear
replace
eyes,
to
rap with
my
my knuckles.
we have
to
What
is
the
which
persists
ception of
To
and
arm,
consider in
nature
of
my
open
begin
again
The question
this
chapter
this
real
independently
of
is
table,
my
per-
this question physical science gives
still
:
it ?
answer, somewhat incomplete
part
I
it is
true,
and
an
in
very hypothetical, but yet deserving
of respect so far as it goes.
Physical science,
more or less unconsciously, has drifted into
the view that all natural phenomena ought to
be reduced to motions.
Light and heat and
sound are all due to wave-motions, which
from the body emitting them to the
travel
person
sound.
who
sees light or feels heat or hears
That which has the wave-motion
either cether or
case
is
"
is
gross matter," but in either
what the philosopher would call matter.
The only properties which
science assigns to
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
44
are position in space, and the povyer of
motion according to the laws of motion.
it
I
1
Science does not deny that
may have
it
other
properties ; but if so, such other properties
are not useful to the man of science, and in
no way
mena.
It
is
him
assist
in explaining the
sometimes said that "
of wave-motion," but this
is
pheno-
light is a
form
misleading, for
the light which we immediately
see,
which
we know
is
directly by means of our senses,
not a form of wave-motion, but some-
thing
different
quite
we all know if we
we cannot describe
— something
which
are not blind, though
it so as to convey our
knowledge to a man who is blind. A wavemotion, on the contrary, could quite well
be
described to
can
a
blind
man,
a
he
since
of
acquire
knowledge
space by
the sense of touch
and he can experience
a wave-motion by a sea voyage almost
;
as
well
blind
as
man
mean by
we
can.
But
can understand,
light:
which a blind
we mean by
man
this,
is
which
a
not what we
light just
that
can never understand,
THE NATURE OF MATTER
and
which
we
can
never
45
describe
to
him.
Now this something,
which
all of
us
who
are
not blind know, is not, according to science,
it is
really to be found in the outer world
:
something caused by the action of certain
waves upon the eyes and nerves and brain
of
the person who sees the light.
When it is
said that light is waves, what is
really
meant is that waves are the physical cause
of our sensations of light.
But
light itself,
thing which seeing people experience
and blind people do not, is not supposed by
the
science to form
any part of the world that
us and our senses.
And
remarks would apply to other
independent of
is
very similar
kinds of sensations.
It is not only colours
and sounds and so
on that are absent from the scientific world
of matter, but also space as we get it
through
sight or touch.
It
is
essential to science that
matter should be in a space, but the
space in which it is cannot be exactly the
its
space
as
we
we
see or feel.
see it
is
To begin
v/ith, space
not the same as space as we
46
get
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
it
of touch
by the sense
experience in infancy that
it
;
we
is
learn
only by
how
to
touch things we see, or how to get a sight
of things which we feel touching us.
But
the
space
of
science
is
neutral
as
be-
tween touch and sight
thus it cannot be
either the space of touch or the space of
;
sight.
Again, different people see the same object
as
of
different
shapes,
according to
their
point of view. A circular coin, for example,
though we should always judge it to be
circular,
will
oval
look
straight in front of
unless
we
are
When we
judge that
it is circular, we are judging that it has a
real shape which is not its apparent shape,
but belongs to
it.
it
intrinsically
apart from
appearance. But this real shape, which
what concerns science, must be in a real
space, not the same as anybody's apparent
The real space is public, the apparent
space.
its
is
space is private to the percipient. In different people's private spaces the same object
seems to have different shapes thus the real
;
space, in which
it
has
its real
shape,
must be
THE NATURE OF MATTER
different
from the private spaces.
of science, therefore,
47
The space
'
though connected with
the spaces we see and feel, is not identical
with them, and the manner of its connection,
'
requires investigation.
We
agreed provisionally that physical
objects cannot be quite like our sense-data,
but may be regarded as causing our sensations.
These physical objects are in the
which we may call " physi-
space of science,
"
It is important to notice that,
space.
our sensations are to be caused by physical objects, there must be a physical space
cal
if
containing
these
and
objects
our
sense-
organs and nerves and brain. We get a
sensation of touch from an object when
we are in
when some
contact with
part of our
it
;
that
is
to say,
body occupies a place
in physical space quite close to the space
see an object
occupied by the object.
We
speaking) when no opaque body
between the object and our eyes in phy-
(roughly
is
sical space.
Similarly, we only hear or smell
or taste an object when we are sufficiently
near to it, or when it touches the tongue.
48
or
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
has
some
suitable
position in physical
our
to
space relatively
body. We cannot
begin to state what different sensations
we shall derive from a given object under
different circumstances unless
object and our body as both
we regard the
in one physical
space, for it is mainly the relative positions
of the object and our body that determine
what sensations we
shall
derive
from the
object.
Now
our sense-data are situated in our
private spaces, either the space of sight or
the space of touch or such vaguer spaces
as other senses may give us.
If, as science
and common sense assume, there
is
one
public all-embracing physical space in which
physical objects are, the relative positions of
physical objects in physical space must more
or less correspond to the relative positions of
sense-data in our private spaces. There is
no difficulty in supposing this to be the case.
If we see on a road one house nearer to us
than another, our other senses will bear
out the view that it is nearer ; for example,
it
will
be reached sooner
if
we walk along
THE NATURE OF MATTER
49
Other people will agree that the
house which looks nearer to us is nearer ;
the road.
the ordnance
map
will
take the same view
;
and thus everything points to a spatial
relation between the houses corresponding
to the relation between the sense-data which
we
when we look at the houses. Thus we
assume
that there is a physical space
may
in which physical objects have spatial resee
corresponding to those which the
corresponding sense-data have in our private
lations
spaces.
dealt
It
is
this physical
with in
space which
geometry and
physics and astronomy.
Assuming that there
is
assumed
physical
is
in
space,
and that it does thus correspond to private
We
spaces, what can we know about it ?
can know only what
is required in order to
secure the correspondence.
That is to say,
we can know nothing of what it is like in itself,
but we can know the sort of arrangement
of physical objects
spatial relations.
which
results
We can know,
that the earth and
from their
for example,
moon and sun
one straight line during an
eclipse,
are in
though
50
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
we cannot know what a physical straight
line is in itself, as we know the look of a
Thus we
straight line in our visual space.
come to know much more about the relations of distances in physical space than
about the distances themselves; we may
know
that
one
another, or that
distance
it is
line as the other,
is
greater
than
along the same straight
but we cannot have that
immediate acquaintance with physical distances that we have with distances in our
private spaces, or with colours or sounds
or other sense-data. We can know all those
things about physical space which a man
born blind might know through other people
but the kind of
about the space of sight
things which a man born blind could never
;
know about the space
know about physical
of sight
we
space.
We
also cannot
can know
the properties of the relations required to
preserve the correspondence with sense-data,
but we cannot know the nature of the terms
between which the relations hold.
With regard
to time, our feeling of dura-
tion or of the lapse of time
is
notoriously an
THE NATURE OF MATTER
51
unsafe guide as to the time that has elapsed
by the clock. Times when we are bored or
suffering pain pass
times
slowly,
when we
are agreeably occupied pass quickly, and
times when we are sleeping pass almost as
if they did not exist.
Thus, in so far as time
is
constituted
by duration, there
is
the same
necessity for distinguishing a public and a
private time as there was in the case of
But
space.
an order
to
so
in
of before
make such a
far
and
as time consists
after, there is
distinction
which events seem to have
;
in
no need
the time-order
is,
so far as
we
can see, the same as the time-order which
they do have. At any rate no reason can
be given for supposing that the two orders are
not the same. The same is usually true of
a regiment of men are marching
along a road, the shape of the regiment will
look different from different points of view,
space
:
but the
same
if
men
order
will
from
we regard the
all
appear arranged in the
points of view.
Hence
order as true also in physical
space, whereas the shape is only supposed
to correspond to the physical space so far
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
52
as
required for the preservation of the
is
order.
In saying that the time-order which events
seem
have
to
which they
is
the same as the time-orier
have, it is necessary to
a
possible misunderstanding.
guard against
It must not be supposed that the various
states
of
the same
really
physical objects have
time-order as the sense-data which
different
constitute the perceptions of those objects.
Considered as physical objects, the thunder
and
lightning
are
simultaneous
to say, the lightning
the disturbance of the
is
;
that
is
simultaneous with
air in the place
the
disturbance
where
begins, namely, where
the lightning is. But the sense-datum
which we
call
Similarly,
it
hearing the thunder does not
take place until the disturbance of the air
has travelled as far as to where we are.
takes about eight minutes for
the sun's light to reach us thus, when we
see the sun we are seeing the sun of eight
;
minutes
ago.
So
far
as
our
sense-data
afford evidence as to the physical sun they
afford evidence as to the physical sun of
THE NATURE OF MATTER
53
if the physical sun had
eight minutes ago
ceased to exist within the last eight minutes,
;
that would
which
data
make no difference to the sensewe call " seeing the sun."
This affords a fresh illustration of the necesof
sity
distinguishing
and physical
between sense-data
objects.
What we have found as regards
much the same as what we find in
space
is
relation
to the correspondence of the sense-data with
their
physical counterparts.
looks blue and another red,
If
one object
we may
reason-
ably presume that there is some corresponding
difference between the physical objects ; if
two objects both look blue, we may presume
a corresponding similarity. But we cannot
hope to be acquainted directly with the
quality in the physical object which makes
Science tells us that
it look blue or red.
this
is
quality
motion, and
a
certain
sort
of
wave-
sounds familiar, because
we think of wave-motions in the space we
be
no
wave-motions must really
physical space, with which we have
But
see.
in
this
direct
the
acquaintance
;
thus
the
real
54
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
wave - motions have not that f amiharity
which we might have supposed them to
have. And what holds for colours is closely
similar to what holds for other sense-data.
Thus we find that, although the relations
of physical objects have all sorts of knowable
properties,
derived from
their corre-
spondence with the relations of sense-data,
the physical objects themselves remain un-
known
in their intrinsic nature, so far at least
by means of the senses.
The question remains whether there is any
other method of discovering the intrinsic
as can be discovered
nature of physical objects.
The most natural, though not ultimately
the most defensible, hypothesis to adopt in the
any rate as regards visual
sense-data, would be that, though physical
objects cannot, for the reasons we have been
first
instance, at
considering,
they
may
be exactly like sense-data, yet
be more or
less like.
According to
this view, physical objects will, for example,
have colours, and we might, by good
luck, see an object as of the colour it really
is.
The colour which an object seems to
really
THE NATURE OF MATTER
55
have at any given moment will in general
be very similar, though not quite the same,
from many different points of view we might
"
" colour to be a sort
real
thus suppose the
of medium colour, intermediate between
;
the various shades which appear from the
different points of view.
perhaps not capable of
being definitely refuted, but it can be shown
to be groundless. To begin with, it is plain
Such a theory
is
we see depends only upon the
nature of the light-waves that strike the eye,
and is therefore modified by the medium
that the colour
intervening between us and the object, as
well as by the manner in which light is reflected
from the object in the direction of
the eye.
unless it
The intervening
is
air alters colours
and any strong
them completely. Thus
perfectly clear,
reflection will alter
we see is a result of the ray as it
the
reaches
eye, and not simply a property
of the object from which the ray comes.
Hence, also, provided certain waves reach
the colour
the eye, we shall see a certain colour, whether
the object from which the waves start has
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
56
any colour or
tuitous
have
to
Thus
not.
suppose
and
colours,
it
is
physical objects
therefore there is no
making such a
justification for
Exactly similar
quite gra-
that
arguments
supposition.
will
apply
to
other sense-data.
It remains to ask
whether there are any
general philosophical arguments enabling us
to say that, if matter is real, it must be of
such and such a nature. As explained above,
,
very
philosophers, perhaps most, have
many
held that whatever
is
real
must be
in
some
sense mental, or at any rate that whatever
we can know anything about must be
'
sense mental.
*'
idealists."
in
some
Such philosophers are called
what ap-
Idealists tell us that
pears as matter
is
really
something mental
;
namely, either (as Leibniz held) more or less
rudimentary minds, or (as Berkeley contended)
ideas in the
monly
say,
idealists
minds which, as we should com"
"
the matter. Thus
perceive
deny the existence
of
matter as
from mind,
something
though they do not deny that our sense-data
are signs of something which exists indeintrinsically different
THE NATURE OF MATTER
pendently of our private sensations.
chapter we
following
the reasons
—in
my
shall
57
In the
consider briefly
—
opinion fallacious
which idealists advance in favour of their
theory.
CHAPTER
IV
IDEALISM
The word
philosophers
We
shall
whatever
be
"
idealism
in
"
is
somewhat
understand by
it
to exist,
different
senses,.
the doctrine thai;
rate whatever can.
exists, or at
known
used by different
any
must be
in
some
senses
This doctrine, which is very widely
held among philosophers, has several forms,.
mental.
and is advocated on several
The doctrine is so widely
teresting
in
itself,
that
different grounds.
held,
and
so in"
even the briefest
survey of philosophy must give some account of it.
Those who are unaccustomed to philosophical speculation may be inclined to
dismiss such a doctrine as obviously absurd.
There is no doubt that common sense regards
tables and chairs and the sun and moon and
68
IDEALISM
59
material objects generally as something radicand the contents of
ally different from minds
minds, and as having an existence which
might continue if minds ceased. We think
matter as having existed long before there
were any minds, and it is hard to think of it
But
as a mere product of mental activity.
be
is
not
to
idealism
or
true
whether
false,
of
dismissed as obviously absurd.
We have seen that, even if physical objects
)
do have an independent existence, they must
differ very widely from sense-data, and can
only have a correspondence with sense-data,
in the same sort of way in which a catalogue
has a correspondence with the things catalogued.
Hence
common
sense
leaves
us
completely in the dark as to the true intrinsic
nature of physical objects, and if there were
good reason to regard them as mental, we
not legitimately reject this opinion
merely because it strikes us as strange. The
truth about physical objects must be strange.
could
It
may be unattainable, but if any
believes that he has attained
what he
it,
philosopher
the fact that
offers as the truth is strange
ought
\
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
60
made a ground
not to be
of objection to his
opinion.
The grounds on which ideahsm
is
advocated
are generally grounds derived from the theory
of knowledge, that is to say, from a discussion
which things must satisfy
in order that we may be able to know them.
of the conditions
The
first
serious attempt to establish idealism
on such grounds was that of Bishop Berkeley.
He proved first, by arguments which were
largely valid, that our sense-data cannot be
supposed to have an existence independent
"
"
in
but must be, in part at least,
the mind, in the sense that their existence
would not continue if there were no seeing
of us,
or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting.
So far, his contention was almost certainly
even if some of his arguments were not
But he went on to argue that sense-data
valid,
so.
were the only things of whose existence our
perceptions could assure us, and that to be
"
"
a mind, and therefore
Hence he concluded that
nothing can ever be known except what is in
some mind, and that whatever is known
known
to
be
is
to be
mental.
in
IDEALISM
my mind
without being in
other mind.
61
must be
in
some
In order to understand his argument, it is
necessary to understand his use of the word
"
"
"
idea." He gives the name
idea
to anything which is immediately known, as, for
example, sense-data are known. Thus a particular colour which we see is an idea so is
;
a voice which we hear, and so on. But the
term is not wholly confined to sense-data.
There
be things remembered or
we have
also
will
imagined, for with such things also
immediate acquaintance at the moment of
remembering or imagining.
mediate data he
He
calls
then
"
All
ceive
all
"
im-
ideas."
to
consider
proceeds
such
as
a
for
instance.
tree,
objects,
that
such
common
He shows
we know immediately when we "
per-
the tree consists of ideas in his sense
and he argues that there is not
the slightest ground for supposing that there
is anything real about the tree except what is
of the word,
perceived.
Its
being perceived
"
"
men its
esse
he says, consists in
in the Latin of the school-
being,
:
is
"
percipi.^'
He fully admits
\
i
1
62
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
that the tree must continue to exist even
we shut our eyes
near
it.
says,
is
But
or
when
when no human being is
continued existence, he
due to the fact that God continues to
"
"
the
real
perceive it
tree, which corresponds to what we called the physical object,
this
;
mind of God, ideas
those we have when we see
consists of ideas in the
more or
less like
the tree, but differing in the fact that they are
permanent in God's mind so long as the tree
continues
to exist.
All our perceptions,
to
him, consist in a partial partiaccording
God's
in
cipation
perceptions,
and
it
is
because of this participation that different
people see more or less the same tree. Thus
apart from minds and their ideas there is
nothing in the world, nor is it possible that
else
anything
whatever
is
known
There are in
fallacies
should ever be known, since
is
necessarily an idea.
argument a good many
which have been important in the
this
history of philosophy, and which it will be
as well to bring to light.
In the first place,
there
of the
is
a confusion engendered by the use
We think of an idea
word " idea."
IDEALISM
63
something in somebody's mind,
as essentially
and thus when we are told that a tree
entirely of ideas,
if so,
it is
consists
natural to suppose that,
the tree must be entirely in minds. But
"
"
in
the mind is am-
the notion of being
We
speak of bearing a person in
mind, not meaning that the person is in our
minds, but that a thought of him is in our
biguous.
minds.
When
a
man
says that some business
he had to arrange went clean out of his mind,
he does not mean to imply that the business
itself was ever in his mind, but only that a
thought of the business was formerly in his
mind, but afterwards ceased to be in his
mind.
tree
And
must be
so
when Berkeley says that the
minds if we can know it,
in our
that he really has a right to say is that a
thought of the tree must be in our minds. To
all
argue that the tree itself must be in our minds
like arguing that a person whom we bear
is
in
mind
is
himself in our minds.
This con-
fusion may seem too gross to have been really
committed by any competent philosopher,
but various attendant circumstances rendered
it
possible.
In order to see how
it
was
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
64
possible,
we must go more deeply
into the
question as to the nature of ideas.
Before taking up the general question of
the nature of ideas, we must disentangle two
entirely separate questions
which
arise con-
cerning sense-data and physical objects. We
saw that, for various reasons of detail,
Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data
which constitute our perception of the tree
as
more or
less subjective, in
they depend upon us as
and would not exist
tree,
being
perceived.
different
the sense that
much
if
as
upon the
the tree were not
But this is an entirely
from the one by which
point
Berkeley seeks to prove that whatever can be
immediately known must be in a mind. For
purpose arguments of detail as to the dependence of sense-data upon us are useless.
this
It is necessary to prove, generally, that
by
being known, things are shown to be mental.
This is what Berkeley believes himself to
this question, and not our
to the difference between
as
previous question
sense-data and the physical object, that must
have done.
now concern
It
is
us.
IDEALISM
65
"
"
idea
in Berkeley's
Taking the word
sense, there are two quite distinct things to
be considered whenever an idea is before the
There is on the one hand the thing
which we are av/are say the colour of
my table and on the other hand the actual
mind.
of
—
—
awareness
the mental act of apprehending the thing. The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason
itself,
to suppose that the thing apprehended is
in any sense mental ?
Our previous arguments concerning the colour did not prove
it
to be mental
;
they only proved that
its
existence depends upon the relation of our
sense organs to the physical object in our
That is to say, they proved
case, the table.
—
that a certain colour will exist, in a certain
light, if a normal eye is placed at a certain
point relatively to the table. They did not
prove that the colour is in the mind of the
percipient.
Berkeley's view, that obviously the colour
must be in the mind, seems to depend for
its
upon confusing the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension. Either
plausibility
o
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
66
"
"
might be called an idea
probably
either would have been called an idea by
of these
;
Berkeley. The act is undoubtedly in the
mind hence, when we are thinking of the
act, we readily assent to the view that ideas
must be in the mind. Then, forgetting that
this was only true when ideas were taken
as acts of apprehension, we transfer the pro"
"
ideas are in the mind
to
position that
;
ideas in the other sense,
i.e.
to the things
apprehended by our acts of apprehension.
Thus, by an unconscious equivocation, we
arrive at the conclusion that whatever we
can apprehend must be in our minds. This
seems to be the true analysis of Berkeley's
and the ultimate
argument,
which
it
fallacy
upon
rests.
This question of the distinction between
act and object in our apprehending of things
is
vitally important, since our
of acquiring
The
knowledge
is
whole power
bound up with it.
faculty of being acquainted
main
with things
other than
itself
of a mind.
Acquaintance with objects essenbetween the mind
is
the
tially consists in a relation
characteristic
IDEALISM
67
and something other than the mind it
this that constitutes the mind's power
;
knowing things.
known must be
If
in
we say that the
the mind, we are
is
of
things
either
unduly limiting the mind's power of knowing,
or we are uttering a mere tautology. We
are uttering a mere tautology if we mean by
"
"
"
the same as by
in the mind
before the
mind," i.e. if we mean merely being apprehended by the mind. But if we mean this,
we shall have to admit that what, in this
sense, is in the mind, may nevertheless be not
mental.
Thus when we
realise the nature of
knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to
be wrong in substance as well as in form, and
—
grounds for supposing that "ideas" i.e.
the objects apprehended must be mental,
are found to have no validity whatever.
his
—
grounds in favour of idealism may
It remains to see whether
be dismissed.
Hence
his
there are any other grounds.
It is often said, as though
it
were a
self-
we cannot know that
which we do not know. It
evident truism, that
anything exists
is
inferred that whatever can in
any way be
68
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
must be at least
whence it
being known by us
relevant to our experience
capable of
follows that
;
matter were essentially somewith
which
we could not become acthing
quainted, matter would be something which
if
we could not know to
and which could
exist,
have for us no importance whatever.
generally
also
implied,
for
reasons
It is
which
remain obscure, that what can have no importance for us cannot be real, and that
not composed of
minds or of mental ideas, is impossible and a
therefore matter,
if
it is
mere chimoera.
To go
this argument fully at our
would
be impossible, since it
present stage
into
points requiring a considerable prebut certain reasons for
liminary discussion
raises
;
argument may be noticed at
To begin at the end
there is no
once.
reason why what cannot have any practical
rejecting the
:
importance for us should not be
true that,
if
truth
It
is
theoretical
everything real
since,
real.
is
of
importance is included,
some importance to us,
persons desirous of knowing the
about the universe, we have some
as
IDEALISM
in
interest
included,
everything
But
contains.
it is
if
this
69
that
sort
universe
interest
is
not the case that matter has no
importance for us, provided
if
the
of
we cannot know that
obviously, suspect that
wonder whether it does
it
it
exists.
it
may
;
even
exists,
hence
We
can,
exist,
and
it
con-
is
nected with our desire for knowledge, and
has the importance of either satisfying or
thwarting this desire.
Again,
is
in
it
fact
is
by no means a
false,
that
we
truism,
cannot
and
know
that anything exists which we do not know.
The word " know " is here used in two differ(1) In its first use it is applicable
to the sort of knowledge which is opposed to
error, the sense in which what we know is
ent senses.
the sense which applies to our beliefs
and convictions, i.e. to what are called judgtrue,
ments.
In this sense of the word we know
something is the case. This sort of knowledge may be described as knowledge of truths.
"
know "
(2) In the second use of the word
that
above, the word applies to our knowledge of
This
things^ which we may call acquaintance.
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
70
is
the sense in which
we know
sense-data.
involved
(The
roughly that
between savoir and connaitre in French, or
between wissen and kennen in German.)
Thus the statement which seemed like a
distinction
is
truism becomes, when re-stated, the following
"
We can never truly judge that something
with which we are not acquainted exists."
:
This
by no means a truism, but on the
is
contrary a palpable falsehood, I have not
the honour to be acquainted with the Emperor
but
of Russia,
It
may
be
I truly
judge that he
exists.
said, of course, that I judge this be-
cause of other people's acquaintance with him.
This, however, would be an irrelevant retort,
since,
know
him.
the principle were true, I could not
that any one else i^ acquainted with
But further there is no reason why I
if
:
should not
know of the existence of something
with which nobody
is
is
acquainted.
This point
important, and demands elucidation.
I am acquainted with a thing which
If
me the knowBut it is not true that,
conversely, whenever I can know that a
exists,
my
ledge that
acquaintance gives
it exists.
IDEALISM
71
thing of a certain sort exists, I or some one
else must be acquainted with the thing.
What
happens, in cases where I have true
judgment without acquaintance, is that the
thing is known to me
virtue of some
in
by
description,
general
and
principle,
that,
the
a thing answering to this decan
be inferred from the existence
scription
of something with which I am acquainted.
existence of
In order to understand this point fully, it
will be well first to deal with the difference
between
by acquaintance and
knowledge by description, and then to consider what knowledge of general principles,
if any, has the same kind of
certainty as our
knowledge
knowledge of the existence of our own exThese subjects will be dealt with
periences.
m the
following chapters.
CHAPTER V
KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION
In the preceding chapter we saw that
there are two sorts of knowledge
knowledge
:
and knowledge of truths. In this
shall be concerned exclusively
with knowledge of things, of which in turn we
Knowshall have to distinguish two kinds.
kind
we
it
of
the
when
is
of
things,
ledge
of things,
chapter we
call
knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially
simpler than any knowledge of truths, and
logically independent of knowledge of truths,
though it would be rash to assume that human
beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with
things without at the same time knowing
some truth about them. Knowledge of things
by description, on the contrary, always involves, as
we
shall find in the course of the
72
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
78
present chapter, some knowledge of truths as
But first of all we
its source and ground.
"
must make clear what we mean by acquaint"
"
and what we mean by description."
ance
We shall say that w^e have acquaintance
with anything of which we are directly aware,
without the intermediary of any process of
inference or
any knowledge
of truths.
Thus
my table I am acquainted
with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table its colour, shape, hardness,
in the presence of
—
smoothness,
etc.
;
all
these are things of
which am immediately conscious when I am
The particular
seeing and touching my table.
shade of colour that I am seeing may have
I
—
things said about it I may say that it
brown, that it is rather dark, and so on.
many
is
But such statements, though they make me
know truths about the colour, do not make me
know the colour itself any better than I did
before
colour
:
so far as concerns knowledge of the
itself, as opposed to knowledge of
I know the colour perfectly
I see it, and no further
when
and completely
truths about
knowledge of
it,
it
itself
is
even theoretically
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
74
Thus the sense-data which make
possible.
up the appearance
of
my
table are things
with which I have acquaintance, things im-
known
mediately
to
me
just as they are.
My
knowledge of the table as a physical
object, on the contrary, is not direct know-
Such as
it is, it is obtained through
the sense-data that make
with
acquaintance
up the appearance of the table. We have
ledge.
seen that
it is
possible, without absurdity, to
doubt whether there is a table at all, whereas
it is not possible to doubt the sense-data.
My
knowledge of the table is of the kind which we
shall call
"
knowledge by description."
The
"
the physical object which causes
This describes
such-and-such sense-data."
table
is
the table by means of the sense-data. In
order to know anything at all about the
table,
we must know
truths connecting
it
with things with which we have acquaint"
such-and-such
we must know that
ance
:
sense-data are caused by a physical object."
There
is
no
state of
directly aware
mind
of the table
ledge of the table
is
in
;
really
which we are
all
our know-
knowledge
of
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
and the actual thing which
truths,
table
at
is
all.
not, strictly speaking,
We know
that there
is
is
75
the
known to us
and we know
a description,
just one object to which this
description applies, though the object itself
In such a case,
is not directly known to us.
we say that our knowledge
of the object is
knowledge by description.
All our knowledge, both knowledge of,
things and knowledge of truths, rests upon
acquaintance as
its
foundation.
fore
to
consider what kinds of
important
things there are with which
It is there-
we have acquaint-
ance.
Sense-data, as
among
the
we have
already seen, are
things with which we are ac-
in fact, they supply the most
quainted
obvious and striking example of knowledge
;
by acquaintance. But if they were the sole
example, our knowledge would be very much
more restricted than it is. We should only
know what is now present to our senses we
:
could not
know anything about the past
—
—not
even that there was a past nor could we
know any truths about our sense-data, for all
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
76
knowledge of truths, as we shall show, demands acquaintance with things which are of
an
from sensedata, the things which are sometimes called
"
abstract ideas," but which we shall call
"
essentially different character
universals."
We
have therefore to con-
i|ider acquaintance with other things besides
sense-data if we are to obtain any tolerably
adequate analysis of our knowledge.
The
extension beyond sense-data to
be considered is acquaintance by memory.
first
we
remember what
we have seen or heard or had otherwise
present to our senses, and that in such cases
we are still immediately aware of what we
It
is
obvious that
often
remember, in spite of the fact that it appears
as past and not as present.
This immediate
knowledge by memory is the source of all
our knowledge concerning the past
without
it, there could be no knowledge of the past by
:
inference, since
we should never know
that
there was anything past to be inferred.
The next extension to be considered
is
acquaintance by introspection. We are not
only aware of things, but we are often aware
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
of being
I
"
aware of them.
am
often aware of
my
seeing the sun
When
77
I see the sun,
my
seeing the sun
''
an object with which
is
;
thus
have acquaintance. When I desire food, I
may be aware of my desire for food thus
I
;
*'
"
an object with which
I
Similarly we may be
aware of our feeling pleasure or pain, and
generally of the events which happen in our
my desiring food
am acquainted.
is
This kind of acquaintance, which
called
be
self-consciousness, is the source
may
It is
of all our knowledge of mental things.
minds.
obvious that
it is
only what goes on in our
own minds that can be thus known immediately. What goes on in the minds of others
is known to us through our perception of their
bodies, that is, through the sense-data in us
which are associated with their bodies. But
for our acquaintance with the contents of our
own minds, we
should be unable to imagine
the minds of others, and therefore we could
never arrive at the knowledge that they have
minds. It seems natural to suppose that
self-consciousness
distinguish
men
is
one of the things that
from animals
:
animals,
we
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
78
suppose, though they have acquaintance
with sense-data, never become aware of this
acquaintance, and thus never know of their
may
own
existence.
I
do not mean that they
doubt whether they exist, but that they have
never become conscious of the fact that they
have sensations and feehngs, nor therefore
of
the fact that they, the subjects of their
sensations and feehngs, exist.
We have spoken of acquaintance with the
contents of our minds as seZ/-consciousness,
but
self
it is
:
it
not, of course, consciousness of our
is
consciousness
thoughts and feehngs.
we
of
particular
The question whether
are also acquainted with oui bare selves,
as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings,
a very difficult one, upon which it would
be rash to speak positively. When we try to
is
we always seem to come
some
upon
particular thought or feeling, and
" "
not upon the
I
which has the thought or
Nevertheless
there are some reasons
feeling.
look into ourselves
we are acquainted with the
the
though
acquaintance is hard to
disentangle from other things. To make clear
for thinking that
"
I,"
1
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
what
a
sort of reason there
is,
79
let us consider for
moment what our acquaintance with
par-
ticular thoughts really involves.
When
am
*'
acquainted with
my seeing
the sun," it seems plain that I am
acquainted
with two different things in relation to each
other.
On the one hand there is the senseI
datum which represents the sun to me, on the
other hand there is that which sees this
sense-datum.
All acquaintance, such as
my
acquaintance with the sense-datum which
represents the sun, seems obviously a relation
between the person acquainted and the object
with which the person
is
acquainted.
When
a case of acquaintance
is one with which I
can be acquainted (as I am acquainted with
my acquaintance with the sense-datum re-
presenting the sun),
it is
plain that the person
acquainted
Thus, when I am
myself.
acquainted with my seeing the sun, the whole
"
fact with which I am
Selfacquainted is
is
acquainted-with-sense-datum."
Further,
we know the
truth
"
quainted with this sense-datum."
to see
how we could know
this
I
am
It
is
ac-
hard
truth,
or
THE
80
PROr.LE^lS OF PPIIL030PIIY
even understand what is meant by it, unless
we were acquainted with something which we
"
It docs not seem necessary to
I."
call
suppose that we are acquainted with a more
permanent person, the same to-day as
yesterday, but it does seem as though we
must be acquainted with that thing, whatever
or less
its
nature, which sees the sun and has ac-
quaintance with sense-data.
sense
it
Thus, in some
would seem we must be acquainted
with our Selves as opposed to our particular
experiences.
But the question
is
difficult,
and complicated arguments can be adduced
on either side. Hence, although acquaintance
with ourselves seems probably to occur, it is
not wise to assert that it undoubtedly does
occur.
We may
therefore
sum up
as follov/s
what
has been said concerning acquaintance with
things that exist. We have acquaintance in
sensation with the data of the outer senses,
and
may
in introspection with the data of
be
called
the inner sense
we have acquaintance
with things which have been data
feelings, desires, etc.
in
memory
what
— thoughts,
;
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
81
either of the outer senses or of the inner sense.
Further,
it is
probable, though not certain, that
Self, as that which
we have acquaintance with
is
aware of things or has desires towards things.
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall
call universals,
that
to say, general ideas, such as whiteness,
diversity, brotherhood, and so on.
Every comis
plete sentence
must contain at
least
which stands for a universal, since
have a meaning which is universal.
one word
all
We
verbs
shall
return to universals later on, in Chapter IX ;
for the present, it is only necessary to guard
against the supposition that whatever
we can
be acquainted with must be something particular
is
and
existent.
called conceiving,
we
are aware
It will
is
Awareness of universals
and a universal of which
called a concept.
be seen that
the objects with
which we are acquainted are not included
physical objects (as opposed to sense-data),
among
nor other people's minds. These things are
known to us by what I call " knowledge by
description," which
we must now
consider.
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
82
"
"
I mean any phrase of
description
"
"
the form
a so-and-so
or "the so-and-so."
"
A phrase of the form a so-and-so " I shall
"
"
call an
a phrase
ambiguous
description
"
"
of the form
the so-and-so
(in the singular)
"
"
By
a
;
I shall call
"
"
man "
the man
a
a
is
definite
Thus
description.
an ambiguous description, and
with the iron mask
"
is
a definite
There are various problems condescription.
nected with ambiguous descriptions, but I
pass them by, since they do not directly concern the matter we are discussing, which is the
nature of our knowledge concerning objects
in cases where we know that there is an object
answering to a definite description, though
we are not acquainted with any such object.
This is a matter which
is
concerned exclusively
with definite descriptions. I shall therefore, in
"
"
the sequel, speak simply of
descriptions
"
Thus
when
I
mean
a description
"
the
form
We
definite descriptions."
will
mean any phrase
so-and-so
"
so-and-so,"
of the
in the singular.
"
known by
when we know that it is " the
i.e. when we know that there is
shall say that
description
"
an object
is
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
88
one object, and no more, having a certain
and it will generally be implied
property
;
we do not have knowledge of the same
We know that the
object by acquaintance.
man with the iron mask existed, and many
propositions are known about him but we do
not know who he was. We know that the
candidate who gets the most votes v/ill be
elected, and in this case we are very likely also
that
;
acquainted (in the only sense in which one
can be acquainted with some one else) with
the
man who
is,
in fact, the candidate
who will
get most votes but we do not know which of
the candidates he is, i.e. we do not know any
"
A is the candidate
proposition of the form
"
who will get most votes where A is one of
the candidates by name. We shall say that
we have " merely descriptive knowledge " of
;
the so-and-so when, although we know^ that
the so-and-so exists, and although we may
possibly be acquainted with the object which
is, in fact, the so-and-so, yet we do not know
any proposition
a
"
a
is
the so-and-so," where
something with which we are acquainted.
When we say " the so-and-so exists," we
is
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
84
mean that
there
so-and-so.
so
"
is
just one object which
The proposition
"
a
is
means that a has the property
and nothing else has.
" Mr. A.
is
the
the so-andso-and-so,
the Unionist
"
candidate for this constituency
means
"
Mr. A. is a Unionist candidate for this
is
"The
constituency, and no one else is."
Unionist candidate for this constituency
"
some one is a Unionist candiexists" means
date for this constituency, and no one else is."
Thus, when we are acquainted with an object
which
the so-and-so,
so-and-so exists but we
is
;
we know that
may know that
the
the
when we are not acquainted
with any object which we know to be the soand-so, and even when we are not acquainted
so-and-so exists
with any object which, in fact, is the so-and-so.
Common words, even proper names, are
usually really descriptions. That is to say,
the thought in the mind of a person using a
name
correctly can generally only be
expressed explicitly if we replace the proper
proper
name by a
description.
Moreover, the de-
scription required to express the thought will
vary for different people, or for the same
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
85
person at different times. The only thing
constant (so long as the name is rightly used)
is the object to which the name applies.
But
so long as this remains constant, the particular
description involved usually makes no difference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition in
which the name appears.
Let us take some
illustrations.
Suppose
some statement made about Bismarck.
suming that there
is
As-
such a thing as direct
acquaintance with oneself, Bismarck himself
might have used his name directly to designate the particular person with whom he was
acquainted. In this case, if he made a
judgment about himself, he himself might be
a constituent of the judgment. Here the
proper
name has the
direct use
which
it
always wishes to have, as simply standing for
a certain object, and not for a description
of the object.
But
if
a person
who knew
Bismarck made a judgment about him, the
case is different. What this person was acquainted with were certain sense-data which
he connected (rightly, we will suppose) with
Bismarck's body.
His body, as a physical
86
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
more his mind, were only
known as the body and the mijid connected
with these sense-data. That is, they were
and
object,
still
known by description. It is, of course, very
much a matter of chance which characteristics of
friend's
a man's appearance will come into a
of him
thus
mind when he thinks
;
the description actually in the friend's mind
is accidental.
The essential point is that he
knows that the various descriptions all apply
same entity, in spite of not being ac-
to the
quainted with the entity in question.
When we, who did not know Bismarck,
make a judgment about him,
in our
minds
will
the description
probably be some more or
—
vague mass of historical knowledge far
more, in most cases, than is required to idenless
But, for the sake of illustration, let
"
us assume that we think of him as
the first
tify
him.
German Empire."
Here
all the words are abstract except
German."
The word " German" will, again, have different meanings for different people. To some it
will recall travels in Germany, to some the
look of Germany on the map, and so on. But
Chancellor of the
"
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
87
we are to obtain a description which we
know to be applicable, we shall be compelled,
at some point, to bring in a reference to a
particular with which we are acquainted.
if
Such reference
involved in any mention of
and
future (as opposed to
past, present,
definite dates), or of here and there, or of what
others have told us. Thus it would seem that,
in some way or other, a description known to
is
be applicable to a particular must involve
some reference to a particular with which we
are acquainted,
thing described
if
our knowledge about the
to be merely what follows
is not
from the description. For example,
"the most long-lived of men" is a description
involving only universals, which must apply to
logically
some man, but we can make no judgments concerning this man which involve knowledge
about him beyond what the description
gives.
"
The first Chancellor of
If, however, we say,
the German Empire was an astute
diplomatist,"
of our
we can only be assured
judgment
in virtue of
of the truth
something with
which we are acquainted usually a
testimony
heard or read. Apart from the information
—
\
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
88
we convey to others, apart from the
fact about
the actual Bismarck, which gives importance
to our judgment, the thought we really have
contains the one or more particulars involved,
and otherwise consists wholly of concepts.
All
names
—
of
places London, England,
the Solar System simi,the
Earth,
Europe,
larly involve,
start
—
when
from some
used, descriptions which
one or more particulars with
which we are acquainted.
I suspect that
even
the Universe, as considered by metaphysics,
involves such a connection with particulars.
In
logic,
on the contrary, where we are
concerned not merely with what does exist,
but with whatever might or could exist or
be,
no reference to actual
particulars
is
involved.
would seem that, when we make a
statement about something only known by
It
description,
we
often intend to
make our
statement, not in the form involving the
description, but about the actual thing de-
That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we
could, to make the judgment which Bismarck
scribed.
ACQUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
89
alone can make, namely, the judgment of
which he himself is a constituent. In this
we
are necessarily defeated, since the actual
But we know
is unknown to us.
Bismarck
that there
B
and that
an object B, called Bismarck,
was an astute diplomatist. We
is
can thus describe the proposition we should
"
namely, B was an astute diplo-
like to affirm,
matist," where
Bismarck.
" the
first
B
is
the object which was
If we are describing Bismarck as
Chancellor of the German Empire,"
the proposition we should like to affirm may
"
the proposition asserting,
be described as
concerning the actual object which was the
first
Chancellor of the
this
What
German Empire,
that
object was an astute diplomatist."
enables us to communicate in spite of
the varying descriptions we employ is that
we know there is a true proposition concerning
the actual Bismarck, and that however
may
we
vary the description (so long as the
description is correct) the proposition described is still the same. This proposition,
which
is
is
described and
is
known
to be true,
what interests us but we are not acquainted
;
90
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
with the proposition
itself,
and do not know
though we know it is true.
It will be seen that there are various stages
in the removal from acquaintance with
it,
particulars
:
there
is
Bismarck to people who
knew him, Bismarck to those who only know
of him through history, the man with the
These
iron mask, the longest -lived of men.
are progressively further removed from acquaintance with particulars the first comes
;
as near to acquaintance as
is
possible
in
regard to another person ; in the second, we
shall still be said to know "who Bismarck
"
was ; in the third, we do not know who
was the man with the iron mask, though we
many propositions about him which
are not logically deducible from the fact that
can know
he wore an iron mask
;
in the fourth, finally,
we know nothing beyond what
is
logically
deducible from the definition of the man.
There
is
a similar hierarchy in the region of
Many universals, like many parare
ticulars,
only known to us by description.
But here, as in the case of particulars, knowuniversals.
ledge concerning what
is
known by
descrip-
ACiJUAINTANCE AND DESCRIPTION
tion
ultimately reducible
is
to
91
knowledge
concerning what is known by acquaintance.
The fundamental principle in the analysis
of propositions containing descriptions
is
this
:
Every 'proposition which we can understand]
must be composed wholly of constituents with
ivhich
we are acquainted.
We
answer
not at this stage attempt to
the objections which may be urged
shall
all
against this fundamental principle.
present,
we
shall
For the
merely point out that, in
some way or other, it must be possible to
meet these objections, for it is scarcely
conceivable that we can make a judgment
or entertain a supposition without knowing
what it is tliat we are judging or supposing
We
must attach some meaning to
the words we use, if we are to speak signiand the
ficantly and not utter mere noise
meaning we attach to our words must be
something with which we are acquainted.
Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Ctesar, it is plain that
about.
;
not before our minds,
We
since we are not acquainted with him.
Julius Csesar himself
is
92
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
have
in
Caesar
:
mind some
"
the
description
man who was
Julius
of
assassinated on
the Ides of March," "the founder of the Roperhaps, merely "the man
was Julius CcBsar." (In this last
man Empire,"
whose name
or,
a noise or shape
Thus our
are acquainted.)
description, Julius Cossar
with which we
statement does not
to
mean,
mean
is
quite
what
it
seems
but means something involving,
instead of Julius Caesar, some description of
him which is composed wholly of particulars
and universals with which we are acquainted.
The chief importance of knowledge by
description is that it enables us to pass
beyond the limits of our private experience.
In spite of the fact that we can only know
truths which are wholly composed of terms
which we have experienced in acquaintance,
we can yet have knowledge by description
which we have never experienced.
In view of the very narrow range of our
immediate experience, this result is vital,
of things
and
until
it is
understood,
much
of our
know-
ledge must remain mysterious and therefore
doubtful.
CHAPTER VI
ON INDUCTION
In almost
our previous discussions we
have been concerned in the attempt to get
all
clear as to our data in the
of existence.
way
of
knowledge
What
things are there in the
universe whose existence is known to us owing
to our being acquainted with
our answer has been that
them
?
So
far,
we
are acquainted
with our sense-data, and, probably, with ourselves.
These we know to
sense-data which are
And past
remembered are known
to have existed in the
exist.
past.
ledge supplies our data.
But if we are to be able to
from these data
—
if
we
This know-
draw
are to
inferences
know
of the
existence of matter, of other people, of the
past before our individual memory begins,
or of tiie future, we must know general
prin93
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
94
some kind by means of which such
It must be known
of
some one sort of
to us that the existence
of
is
a
the
existence
of some
A,
sign
thing,
of
either
at
the
sort
same
other
time
thing, B,
as A or at some earher or later time, as, for
ciples of
inferences can be drawn.
a sign of the earlier
If this were not known
existence of lightning.
to us, we could never extend our knowledge
example, thunder
is
beyond the sphere of our private experience
and this sphere, as we have seen, is exceedingly limited. The question we have now to
consider is whether such an extension is
;
possible,
and
if
so,
how
it is
effected.
Let us take as an illustration a matter about
which none of
us, in fact, feel the slightest
doubt.
We
will rise
to-morrow.
are
all
mere blind outcome
can
is
convinced that the sun
Why
?
Is this belief
a
of past experience, or
be justified as a reasonable belief ? It
not easy to find a test by which to judge
it
whether a
not, but
belief of this
we can
is
reasonable or
at least ascertain
would
what
sort
if
true, to
judgment that the sun
will rise
of general beliefs
justify the
kind
suffice,
ON INDUCTION
95
to-morrow, and the many other similar judgments upon which our actions are based.
It is obvious that
if
we
are asked
why we
we
believe that the sun will rise to-morrow,
shall
"
Because it always
has risen every day." We have a firm belief
that it will rise in the future, because it has
risen in the past.
If we are challenged as to
naturally answer,
why we
believe that
as heretofore,
motion
:
the
it will
continue to
rise
we may appeal to the laws of
earth, we shall say, is a freely
rotating body, and such bodies do not cease
to rotate unless something interferes from
outside,
and there
is
nothing
interfere with the earth
to-morrow.
Of course
it
outside
to
between now and
might be doubted
whether we are quite certain that there is
nothing outside to interfere, but this is not
the
doubt.
The interesting
interesting
doubt is as to whether the laws of motion
remain in operation until to-morrow. If
this doubt is raised, we find ourselves in the
will
same position as when the doubt about the
sunrise was first raised.
The only reason
for believing that the laws
96
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
motion will remain in operation is that
they have operated hitherto, so far as our
knowledge of the past enables us to judge.
It is true that we have a greater body of
evidence from the past in favour of the laws
of motion than we have in favour of the sunof
because the sunrise
merely a particular
case of fulfilment of the laws of motion, and
rise,
is
there are countless other particular cases.
But the real question is
Do any number
:
of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past
afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the
?
If not, it becomes plain that we
have no ground whatever for expecting the
sun to rise to-morrow, or for expecting the
bread we shall eat at our next meal not to
future
poison us, or for any of the other scarcely
conscious expectations that control our daily
lives.
It
is
to be observed that
all
such
expectations are only probable thus we have
not to seek for a proof that they must be ful;
but only for some reason in favour of
the view that they are likely to be fulfilled.
filled,
Now in dealing with this question we must,
to begin with, make an important distinction,
ON INDUCTION
97
without which we should soon become involved in hopeless confusions. Experience
has shown us that, hitherto, the
frequent
repetition
of
some uniform succession or
coexistence has been a cause of our
expecting
the same succession or coexistence on the
next
occasion.
Food that has a
certain
appearance generally has a certain taste, and
it is a severe shock to our
expectations when
the familiar appearance is found to be associated with an unusual taste.
Things which
associated, by habit, with
certain tactile sensations which we
expect
if we touch them
one of the horrors of a
we
become
see
;
ghost (in many ghost-stories) is that it fails
to give us any sensations of touch.
Uneducated people who go abroad for the first time
are so surprised as to be incredulous when
they find their native language not understood.
to
A
And this kind of association is not confined
men in animals also it is very strong.
;
horse which has been often driven
along a
certain road resists the
attempt to drive him
in
a different direction.
D
Domestic animals
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
98
expect food when they see the person who
usually feeds them. We know that all these
rather crude expectations of uniformity are
liable to be misleading.
The man who has
fed the chicken every day throughout its life
at last wrings its neck instead, showing that
more
refined views as to the uniformity of
nature would have been useful to the chicken.
But
in spite of the misleadingness of such
expectations, they nevertheless exist. The
mere fact that something has happened a
certain
men
number
of times causes animals
to expect that
Thus our instincts
it
and
will
happen again.
certainly cause us to believe
that the sun will rise to-morrow, but
we may
be in no better a position than the chicken
which unexpectedly has its neck wrung. We
have therefore to distinguish the fact that
past uniformities cause expectations as to the
future, from the question whether there is
for giving weight to
such expectations after the question of their
validity has been raised.
any reasonable ground
The problem we have to discuss
there is any reason for believing
is
in
whether
what
is
ON INDUCTION
called
"
the
of
uniformity
belief in the uniformity of
99
nature."
nature
is
The
the belief
that everything that has happened or will
happen is an instance of some general law
to which there are no exceptions. The crude
expectations which we have been considering
are all subject to exceptions, and therefore
liable to disappoint those
who entertain them.
But science habitually assumes, at
least as
a
working hypothesis, that general rules
which have exceptions can be replaced by
which have no exceptions.
"
bodies
in air fall
is a general
Unsupported
rule to which balloons and aeroplanes are
general
"
rules
But the laws of motion and the
exceptions.
law of gravitation, which account for the
fact that
most bodies
fall,
also account for
the fact that balloons and aeroplanes can rise ;
thus the laws of motion and the law of gravitation are not subject to these
exceptions.
The
belief that the sun will rise to-morrow
be
falsified if the earth came
might
suddenly
into contact with a large body which
destroyed
its rotation
but the laws of motion and the
law of gravitation would not be
;
infringed
by
100
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
such an event.
The business
of science
find uniformities, such as the laws of
is
to
motion
and the law
of gravitation, to which, so far
as our experience extends, there are no exIn this search science has been
ceptions.
remarkably successful, and it may be conceded
that such uniformities have held hitherto.
Have
This brings us back to the question
we any reason, assuming that they have
:
always held in the past, to suppose that they
will hold in the future ?
It has
been argued that we have reason to
know
that the future will resemble the past,
because what was the future has constantly
become the
past,
and has always been found
to resemble the past, so that we really have
experience of the future, namely of times
which were formerly future, which we may
But such an argument
call past futures.
really begs the very question at issue.
We
have experience of past futures, but not of
future futures, and the question is Will future
:
futures resemble past futures ? This question is not to be answered by an argument
which starts from past futures alone.
We
ON INDUCTION
have therefore
still
to seek for
which shall enable us to
will follow
The
know
some
101
principle
that the future
the same laws as the past.
reference to the future in this question
not essential. The same question arises
when we apply the laws that work in our
experience to past things of which we have
is
no experience
—
as,
for example, in geology,
or in theories as to the origin of the Solar
System. The question we really have to ask
"
is
When two things have been found to be
often associated, and no instance is known
:
of the one occurring without the other, does
the occurrence of one of the two, in a fresh
instance, give
the other
?
"
any good ground for expecting
On our answer to this question
must depend the
validity of the whole of our
expectations as to the future, the whole of
the results obtained by induction, and in fact
practically all
daily
life is
the beliefs upon which our
based.
It must be conceded, to begin with, that
the fact that two things have been found often
together and never apart does not, by itself,
suffice
to prove demonstratively that they
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
102
be found together in the next case we
examine. The most we can hope is that the
will
oftener things are found together, the more
probable it becomes that they will be found
together another time, and that, if they have
been found together often enough, the probIt
ability will amount almost to certainty.
can never quite reach certainty, because we
know
that in spite of frequent repetitions
is a failure at the last, as
there sometimes
in the case of the chicken
whose neck is wrung.
Thus probability
we ought
is all
to seek.
It might be urged, as against the view we
are advocating, that we know all natural
phenomena to be subject to the reign of law,
and that sometimes, on the
basis of observa-
we can see that only one law can possibly
the facts of the case. Now to this view
tion,
fit
there are two answers.
The
first
is
that,
some law which has no exceptions
to
our case, we can never, in practice,
applies
be sure that we have discovered that law and
even
if
not one to which there are exceptions. The
second is that the reign of law would seem to
be
itself
only probable, and that our belief
ON INDUCTION
that
it
will
hold in the future, or in unexamined
cases in the past,
is itself
based upon the very
we
are examining.
principle we are examining
principle
The
103
called the principle of induction,
parts
(a)
be stated as follows
may
When
may
and
be
its
two
A
has
:
a thing of a certain sort
been found to be associated with a thing of a
certain other sort B, and has never been found
dissociated from a thing of the sort B, the
greater the number of cases in which A and B
have been associated,
greater is the
probability that they will be associated in a
fresh case in which one of them is known to
be present
(6)
cient
the
;
Under the same circumstances, a suffinumber of cases of association will make
the probability of a fresh association nearly
a certainty, and will make
tainty without limit.
it
approach
cer-
As
just stated, the principle applies only to
the verification of our expectation in a single
fresh instance.
that there
is
But we want
also to
know
a probability in favour of the
A are
general law that things of the sort
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
104
always associated with things of the sort B,
provided a sufficient number of cases of
known, and no cases of failure
of association are known.
The probabihty of
the general law is obviously less than the
association are
probability of the particular case, since if
the general law is true, the particular case
must also be true, whereas the particular
case
may be true without the general law being
Nevertheless the
true.
general law
is
the
of
probability
increased
by repetitions, just
as the probability of the particular case is.
may therefore repeat the two parts of
We
our principle as regards the
thus
general
law,
:
(a)
The greater the number
which a thing of the sort
A
of
cases
in
has been found
associated with a thing of the sort B, the more
probable it is (if no cases of failure of association are
with
{b)
cient
B
known) that
A
is
always associated
;
Under the same circumstances, a suffinumber of cases of the association of
A
with
is
always associated with B,
B
will
make
it
nearlv certain that
and
will
A
make
ON INDUCTION
105
law approach certainty without
this general
limit.
should
It
be noted that probability is
In our case,
always relative to certain data.
the data are merely the known cases of coexistence of A and B. There may be other
which might be taken into account,
which would gravely alter the probability.
For example, a man who had seen a great
many white swans might argue, by our principle, that on the data it was probable that all
data,
swans were white, and this might be a perThe argument is
fectly sound argument.
not disproved by the fact that some swans
are black, because a thing may very well
happen in spite of the fact that some data
render
it
swans, a
improbable.
In the case of the
man might know
that colour
very variable characteristic in
of animals,
as
and
this
a
species
that, therefore, an induction
peculiarly liable to error.
knowledge would be a fresh datum,
to colour
But
many
is
is
by no means proving that the probability
relatively to our previous data had been
wrongly estimated. The fact, therefore, that
106
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
things often fail to fulfil our expectations
is no evidence that our expectations will not
probably be fulfilled in a given case or a given
Thus our inductive principle
class of cases.
any rate not capable of being disproved
by an appeal to experience.
The inductive principle, however, is equally
incapable of being proved by an appeal to
is
at
Experience might conceivably
experience.
confirm the inductive principle as regards the
cases that have been already examined ; but
as regards unexamined cases, it is the in-
ductive principle alone that can justify any
inference from what has been examined to
what has not been examined.
All arguments
which, on the basis of experience, argue as
to the future or the unexperienced parts of the
past or present, assume the inductive principle ; hence we can never use experience to
prove the inductive principle without begging
the question. Thus we must either accept
the inductive principle on the ground of its
intrinsic evidence, or forgo all justification
1
of our expectations
principle
is
about the future.
If
the
unsound, we have no reason to
ON INDUCTION
107
expect the sun to rise to-morrow, to expect
bread to be more nourishing than a stone, or
to expect that if we throw ourselves off the
roof
we
shall fall.
When we
see
what looks
our best friend approaching us, we shall
have no reason to suppose that his body is
not inhabited by the mind of our worst enemy
like
or of
some
total stranger.
All our conduct
is
based upon associations which have worked
in the past, and which we therefore regard as
work
likely to
hood
is
and
this likeli-
for its validity
upon the
in the future
dependent
;
inductive principle.
principles of science, such as
the belief in the reign of law, and the belief
The general
that every event must have a cause, are as
completely dependent upon the inductive
All
principle as are the beliefs of daily life.
because
believed
are
such general principles
mankind have found innumerable instances of
their truth, and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their
truth in
principle
Thus
the future,
is
all
unless
the
inductive
assumed.
knowledge which, on a basis of
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
108
experience, tells us something about what is
not experienced, is based upon a belief which
experience can neither confirm nor confute,
yet which, at least in its more concrete applications, appears to be as firmly rooted in us
the facts of experience. The
existence and justification of such beliefs
as
many
of
—
for the inductive principle, as
is
not the
most
—
only example
difficult
we
shall see,
raises some of the
and most debated problems of
philosophy. We will, in the next chapter,
consider briefly what may be said to account
for
such knowledge, and what
its
degree of certainty.
is its
scope and
CHAPTER
VII
ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
We
saw
in
experience,
is
the preceding chapter that
the principle of induction, while necessary
to the validity of all arguments based on
not capable of being
itself
proved by experience, and yet is unhesitatingly believed by every one, at least in all its
concrete
applications.
In
these
character-
the principle of induction does not stand
alone.
There are a number of other prin-
istics
which cannot be proved or disproved by
experience, but are used in arguments which
ciples
start
from what
Some
is
experienced.
of these principles
evidence than
the
and the knowledge
have even greater
principle
of
of
induction,
them has the same
degree of certainty as the knowledge of the
existence of sense-data.
They constitute the
109
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
110
drawing inferences from what is
and if what we infer is
given in sensation
to be true, it is just as necessary that our
means
of
;
principles of inference should be true as
is
The
that our data should be true.
it
prin-
ciples of inference are apt to be overlooked
because of their very obviousness the as-
—
assented to without our
sumption involved
is
realising that
an assumption.
it is
But
it is
very important to realise the use of principles
of inference, if a correct theory of knowledge
is
to be obtained
;
raises interesting
for our
and
knowledge
difficult
of
them
questions.
our knowledge of general principles,
what actually happens is that first of all we
In
all
some particular application
principle, and then we realise that the
realise
larity
is
irrelevant, andthatthere
is
of
the
particu-
a generality
equally truly be affirmed. This
is of course familiar in such matters as teach"
"
two and two are four is
ing arithmetic
which
may
:
first
case,
some particular pair
some other particular
at last it becomes possible
learnt in the case of
of couples,
and
and then
so on, until
to see that
it is
in
true of any pair of couples.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
111
The same thing happens with logical prinSuppose two men are discussing
ciples.
what day of the month it is. One of them
"
At least you will admit that if yestersays,
day was the 15th to-day must be the 16th."
"Yes," says the other, "I admit that."
"
And you know," the first continues, "that
yesterday was the 15th, because you dined
with Jones, and your diary will tell you that
"
was on the 15th."
Yes," says the second
;
"
therefore to-day is
the 16th."
Now such an argument is not hard to follow
and
if it is
in fact,
must
granted that
no one
also be
will
true.
;
premisses are true
that the conclusion
its
deny
But
depends for
it
its
truth upon an instance of a general logical
The logical principle is as follows
principle.
"
Suppose it known that if this is true, then
:
that
is
true.
is true,
When
is
true,
Suppose
then
it is
we
it
it
also
known
follows that that
the case that
if
that this
is
true."
this is true, that
shall say that this
"
"
implies
"
and that that " follows from
this.
that,
Thus
our principle states that if this implies that,
and this is true, then that is true. In other
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
112
"
anything implied by a true pro"
whatever follows from
position is true," or
words,
a true proposition is true."
This principle is really involved
least,
concrete instances of
in all
demonstrations.
we
believe
is
it
are
—at
involved—
Whenever one thing which
used to prove something
which we consequently
If
is
relevant.
any
else,
believe, this principle
one
asks
"
:
Why
accept the results of valid arguments
"
we can only
based on true premisses ?
answer by appealing to our principle. In
should
I
the truth of the principle is impossible
and its obviousness is so great that
Such
at first sight it seems almost trivial.
fact,
to doubt,
principles,
however, » are not
trivial
to the
show that we may have
indubitable knowledge which is in no way
derived from objects of sense.
The above principle is merely one of a
certain number of self-evident logical prinSome at least of these principles must
ciples.
philosopher, for they
be granted before any argument or proof
becomes possible. When some of them have
been granted, others can be proved, though
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
113
these others, so long as they are simple, are
for
just as obvious as the principles taken
of
granted. For no very good reason, three
out
been
have
these principles
by
singled
"
Laws of
tradition under the name of
Thought."
They
(1)
are as follows
The
:
law of identity:
"Whatever
is,
is."
The law of contradiction :
can both be and not be."
(3) The law of excluded middle
thing must either be or not be."
"
(2)
Nothing
"
:
Every-
These three laws are samples of self-evident
more
logical principles, but are not really
fundamental or more self-evident than various
other similar principles for instance, the one
:
we
considered just now, which states that
what follows from a true premiss is true.
"
"
is also mislaws of thought
The name
is important is not the fact
for
what
leading,
that we think in accordance with these laws,
but the fact that things behave in accordance
with them in other words, the fact that when
we think in accordance with them we think
;
114
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
But this is a
we must return at a
truly.
large question, to which
later stage.
In addition to the logical principles which
enable us to prove from a given premiss that
something is certainly true, there are other
logical principles
which enable us to prove,
from a given premiss, that there
is
or less probability that something
An example
of
such principles
example —
a greater
is
true.
—perhaps
the
is the inductive
most important
we
in the prewhich
considered
principle,
ceding chapter.
One of the great historic controversies in
philosophy is the controversy between the
two schools called respectively "empiricists "
"
rationalists."
The empiricists who
and
—
by the British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume maintained that all our knowledge is derived from
are best represented
—
—
the rationalists who are repreexperience
sented by the Continental philosophers of the
;
seventeenth century, especially Descartes and
Leibniz maintained that, in addition to
—
what we know by experience, there are certain
"
**
"
and
innate principles,"
innate ideas
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
115
which we know independently of experience.
It has
now become
possible to decide with
some confidence as to the truth or falsehood
of
these opposing schools. It must be admitted,
for the reasons already stated, that logical
principles are
known
to us,
and cannot be
themselves proved by experience, since all
proof presupposes them. In this, therefore,
which was the most important point of the
controversy, the rationalists were in the
right.
On
the other hand, even that part of our
knowledge which
is logically
independent of
experience (in the sense that experience cannot prove it) is yet elicited and caused by
experience. It is on occasion of particular experiences that we become aware of the general
laws which their connections exemplify.
It would certainly be absurd to suppose that
there are innate principles in the sense that
babies are born with a knowledge of every-
thing which
men know and which
deduced from what
reason, the word
"
cannot be
experienced. For this
"
innate
would not now
is
be employed to describe our knowledge of
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
116
The phrase " a pn'on " is
less objectionable, and is more usual in modern
writers. Thus, while admitting that all knowledge is elicited and caused by experience, we
shall nevertheless hold that some knowledge
logical principles.
is
priori^ in the sense that the experience
a
which makes us think
of it does not suffice to
prove it, but merely so directs our attention
that we see its truth without requiring any
proof from experience.
another point of great importance,
in which the empiricists were in the right
There
is
as against the rationalists.
Nothing can be
known to exist except by the help of experi-
we wish to prove
that something of which we have no direct
experience exists, we must have among our
ence.
That
is
to say,
if
premisses the existence of one or more things
of which we have direct experience. Our be-
Emperor of Russia exists, for
example, rests upon testimony, and testimony
lief
that the
consists,
in the last analysis, of sense-data
seen or heard in reading or being spoken
Rationalists believed that, from general
consideration as to what must be, they could
to.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
117
deduce the existence of this or that in the
In this belief they seem to
actual world.
have been mistaken. All the knowledge that
we can
acquire a priori concerning existence
seems to be hypothetical it tells us that if
:
one thing
exists,
generally,
that
another must
if
exist, or,
more
one proposition is true,
This is exemplified by
another must be true.
the principles
we have already dealt with, such
as'' if this
true,
that
is
true," or
is
"
and
this implies that, then
if this
and that have been
repeatedly found connected, they will probably be connected in the next instance in
which one of them
and power
is
found."
Thus the scope
of a priori principles is strictly
knowledge that something exists
must be in part dependent on experience.
limited.
When
All
is known immediately, its
known by experience alone when
anything
existence
anything
is
is
;
proved to exist, without being
known immediately, both
experience and a
priori principles must be required in the proof.
Knowledge
is
called empirical
when
wholly or partly upon experience.
it
rests
Thus
all
knowledge which asserts existence is empirical.
118
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
and the only a
among
knowledge concerning
priori
hypothetical, giving connections
things that exist or may exist, but
existence
is
not giving actual existence.
A priori knowledge is not
kind
we have been
all of
hitherto
the logical
considering.
Perhaps the most important example of nonis knowledge as to
logical a priori knowledge
ethical value.
I
ments as to what
virtuous,
for
am
is
such
not speaking of judguseful or as to
judgments
do
what
is
require
empirical premisses ; I am speaking of judgments as to the intrinsic desirability of things.
must be useful because
it secures some end; the end must, if we have
gone far enough, be valuable on its own account, and not merely because it is useful for
some further end. Thus all judgments as
to what is useful depend upon judgments as
to what has value on its own account.
If
something is useful,
We
more
it
judge, for example, that happiness is
desirable than misery, knowledge than
ignorance, goodwill than hatred, and so on.
Such judgments must, in part at least, be
immediate and a
priori.
Like our previous
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
119
a priori judgments, they may be elicited by
for it
experience, and indeed they must be
;
seems not possible to judge whether anything
is
intrinsically valuable unless we have
something of the same kind.
obvious that they cannot be
experienced
But
it is fairly
for the fact that a
proved by experience
thing exists or does not exist cannot prove
;
either that
that
it
is
it is
bad.
it
should exist or
The pursuit
of this subject
good that
ethics, where the impossibility
belongs
of deducing what ought to be from what is
has to be established. In the present con-
to
nection,
it is
only important to realise that
what is intrinsically of value
knowledge as to
is
a priori in the same sense in which logic
a priori, namely in the sense that the truth
of such knowledge can be neither proved nor
is
disproved by experience.
mathematics
a priori, like logic.
This was strenuously denied by the empirical
philosophers, who maintained that experience
All pure
was as much the source
is
of our
knowledge of
arithmetic as of our knowledge of geography.
They maintained that by the repeated ex-
120
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
perience of seeing
two things and two other
things, and finding that altogether they made
four things, we were led by induction to the
conclusion that two things and two other
things would always
gether.
If,
make
four things altohowever, this were the source of
our knowledge that two and two are four,
we should proceed differently, in persuading
ourselves of its truth, from the way in which
we do actually proceed. In fact, a certain
number of instances are needed to make us
think of two abstractly, rather than of two
coins or two books or two people, or two of
any other specified kind. But as soon as we
are able to divest our thoughts of irrelevant
particularity, we become able to see the
general principle that two and two are four
any one instance is seen to be typical, and the
;
examination of other instances becomes unnecessary.*
The same thing is exemplified in geometry.
If we want to prove some property of all
triangles, we draw some one triangle and
*
Cf. A.
(Home
N. Whitehead, Introduction
University Library).
to
Mathematics
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
121
but we can avoid making
use of any property which it does not share
with all other triangles, and thus, from our
reason about
it
;
We
two
we obtain a
general result.
do not, in fact, feel our certainty that
and two are four increased by fresh
particular case,
instances, because, as soon as
we have seen
the truth of this proposition, our certainty
becomes so great as to be incapable of growing
some quality of
"
two and
necessity about the proposition
two are four," which is absent from even the
best attested empirical generalisations. Such
mere facts
generalisations always remain
in which
be
a
world
there
that
we feel
might
greater.
we
IVIoreover,
feel
:
they were
false,
though
in the actual
to be true.
world
In any possible
they happen
world, on the contrary, we feel that two and
two would be four this is not a mere fact,
:
but a necessity to which everything actual
and possible must conform.
The case may be made
clearer
by con-
sidering a genuinely empirical generalisation,
"
such as All men are mortal." It is plain that
we
believe this proposition, in the
first
place,
122
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
no known instance of men
living beyond a certain age, and in the second
place because there seem to be physiological
grounds for thinking that an organism such
as a man's body must sooner or later wear
because there
out.
is
Neglecting
the
second
ground,
and
considering merely our experience of men's
mortality, it is plain that we should not be
content with one quite clearly understood!
instance of a man dying, whereas, in the case:
"
two and two are four," one instance doeji
of
suffice,
when
carefully considered, to persuade
us that the same must happen in any other
instance. Also we can be forced to admit,,
on reflection, that there may be some doubt,
however slight, as to whether all men are;
mortal.
This
may
be made plain by
the;
attempt to imagine two different worlds, in
one of which there are men who are not
mortal, while in the other two and two make
When Swift invites us to consider the
five.
race of Struldbugs who never die, we are
But a world
able to acquiesce in imagination.
where two and two make
a different
level.
five
seems quite on
We feel that such a world,
if
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
123
there were one, would upset the whole fabric
of our knowledge and reduce us to utter doubt.
The
fact
is
that, in simple mathematical
and
also in
"
two and two are four,"
many judgments of logic, we can
judgments such as
know the general
it
proposition without inferring
from instances, although some instance is
usually necessary to
make
clear to us
general proposition means.
is
This
is
what the
why there
real utility in the process of deduction,
which
goes from the general to the general or from
the general to the particular, as well as in the
process of induction, which goes from the particular to the particular, or from the particular
to the general. It is an old debate among
philosophers whether deduction ever gives
new knowledge. We can now see that in
we
make
two
and
two
that
know
always
already
four, and we know that Brown and Jones are
two, and so are Robinson and Smith, we can
deduce that Brown and Jones and Robinson
and Smith are four. This is new knowledge,
certain cases, at least,
it
does do
so.
If
not contained in our premisses, because the
"
are
general proposition,
two and two
four,"
\
"
'
f
124
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
never told us there were such people as Brown
and Jones and Robinson and Smith, and the
there
particular premisses did not tell us that
were four of them, whereas the particular
proposition deduced does tell us both these
things.
But the newness of the knowledge is much
less certain if we take the stock instance of
deduction that
"
namely,
a man, therefore
logic,
is
always given in books on
All men are mortal Socrates
is
;
Socrates
is
mortal."
know beyond
In this case, what we really
reasonable doubt is that certain men, A,
B, C, were mortal, since, in fact, they have
died.
If Socrates is
one of these men,
it is
foiolish to go the roundabout way through
"
*'
to arrive at the conall men are mortal
mortal.
If
men on whom
our
clusion that probably Socrates
Socrates
is
induction
not one of the
is
based,
we
shall
is
still
do better to
argue straight from our A, B, C, to Socrates,
than to go round by the general proposition,
"
are mortal." For the
all
men
that Socrates
probability
is
mortal
is
greater, on our data,
than the probability that
all
men
are mortal.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
obvious, because
(This
is
so
Socrates
is
;
but
does not follow that
Hence we
shall
if all
men are mortal,
Socrates
if
all
125
men
is
mortal,
it
are mortal.)
reach the conclusion that
mortal with a greater approach to
we make our argument purely
certainty
"
inductive than if we go by way of
all men
"
are mortal
and then use deduction.
Socrates
is
if
This
illustrates
the
general propositions
"
two and two are
difference
known a
four,"
"
priori,
between
such as
and empirical
all men are mortal."
generalisations such as
In regard to the former, deduction is the
mode
right
of argument,
the latter, induction
is
whereas in regard to
always theoretically
and warrants a greater confidence
preferable,
in the truth of our conclusion, because all
empirical generalisations are
than the instances of them.
more uncertain
We
tions
have now seen that there are proposiknown a priori, and that among them are
the propositions of logic and pure mathematics,
as well as the fundamental propositions of
ethics.
us
is
The question which must next occupy
this
:
How
is
it
possible that there
'
126
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
should be such knowledge ? And more particularly, how can there be knowledge of
general propositions in cases where we have
not examined all the instances, and indeed
never can examine them
number
were
the
all,
These questions, which
brought prominently forward by
is infinite ?
first
German philosopher Kant
are very difficult,
portant.
because their
and
(1724-1804),
historically very im-
CHAPTER
HOW
KNOWLEDGE
A PRIORI
Immanuel Kant
the
VIII
of
IS
POSSIBLE
generally regarded as
is
modern
the
philosophers.
greatest
lived through the Seven Years'
Though he
War and
the French Revolution, he never
interrupted
Konigsberg
his
teaching
tinctive contribution
he called the
of
East Prussia.
in
"
philosophy at
His most dis-
was the invention of what
assuming as a datum
"
philosophy, which,
that there is knowledge
critical
of various kinds, inquired
how such know-
ledge comes to be possible, and deduced, from
the answer to this inquiry, many metaphysical results as to the nature of the world.
Whether these results were valid may well be
doubted. But Kant undoubtedly deserves
credit for two things
first, for having perceived that we have a priori knowledge wluch
:
127
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
128
not
is
the
"
purely
analytic,"
would
opposite
and secondly,
for
be
i.e.
such that
self -contradictory
having made
;
evident the
importance of the theory of
philosophical
knowledge.
Before the time of Kant, it was generally
held that whatever knowledge was a priori
must be "
analytic.''
What
this
word means
be best illustrated by examples. If I
A bald man is a man," " A plane figure
say,
"
is a figure,"
A bad poet is a poet," I make
will
"
a purely analytic judgment
the subject
is
about
spoken
given as having at least two
:
properties, of which one is singled out to be
Such propositions as the above
asserted of it.
are trivial, and would never be enunciated in
except by an orator preparing the
for a piece of sophistry.
They are called
real life
way
"
"
because the predicate is obtained
by merely analysing the subject. Before the
time of Kant it was thought that all judgments
analytic
of
which we could be certain a
of this kind
:
that in
all
of
priori were
them there was a
predicate which was only part of the subject
of
which
it
was
asserted.
If this
were
so,
we
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
should
be
diction
if
involved
in
129
a definite contra-
we attempted to deny anything
known a priori. " A bald man
that could be
is
"
would assert and deny baldness
same man, and would therefore conThus according to the philoitself.
not bald
of the
tradict
sophers before Kant, the law of contradiction,
which asserts that nothing can at the same
time have and not have a certain property,
sufficed to establish the truth of all a priori
knowledge.
Hume
(1711-1776), who preceded Kant,
accepting the usual view as to what makes
knowledge a priori, discovered that, in many
had previously been supposed
analytic, and notably in the case of cause and
effect, the connection was really synthetic.
Before Hume, rationalists at least had
cases which
supposed that the effect could be logically
deduced from the cause, if only we had
sufficient
rectly,
—that
—
Hume
argued coras would now be generally admitted
knowledge.
Hence he
more doubtful proposition
this could not be done.
inferred the far
that nothing could be
known a
priori
about
130
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
the connection of cause and effect.
Kant,
who had been educated in the rationahst
tradition, was much perturbed by Hume's
scepticism,
and endeavoured to
find
an answer
He
perceived that not only the connection of cause and effect, but all the propo-
to
it.
of
sitions
arithmetic
"
synthetic,"
propositions,
will
reveal
i.e.
geometry,
not analytic
no
the
and
analysis
of
:
in all these
the
subject
His stock
predicate.
are
in-
=
the proposition 7 + 5
12.
He pointed out, quite truly, that 7 and 5
have to be put together to give 12
the
stance was
:
is not contained in them, nor
of
even in the idea of adding them together.
Thus he was led to the conclusion that all
12
idea
pure mathematics, though a
thetic
;
and
this
problem of which
priori, is
syn-
conclusion raised a
new
he endeavoured to find
the solution.
The question which Kant put at the be"
How is
ginning of his philosophy, namely
pure mathematics possible
"
is an interand
difficult
to
which
one,
esting
every philosophy which is not purely sceptical must find
?
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
some
The
answer.
empiricists,
that
answer
of
131
the
pure
know-
mathematical
our
derived by induction from particular
instances, we have already seen to be inade-
ledge
is
quate, for two reasons first, that the validity
of the inductive principle itself cannot be
proved by induction ; secondly, that the
:
general propositions of mathematics, such as
" two and two
always make four," can obvi-
ously be known with certainty by consideration of a single instance, and gain nothing by
enumeration of other cases in which they
have been found to be
true.
Thus our
the
general propositions of
knowledge
mathematics (and the same applies to
for otherwise than
logic) must be accounted
our (merely probable) knowledge of emof
pirical generalisations
such as
"
all
men
are
mortal."
The problem
such knowledge
perience
is
through the fact that
general, whereas all ex-
arises
is
particular.
It
we should apparently be
seems strange that
able to
know some
truths in advance about particular things of
which we have as yet no experience
;
but
it
1S2
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
cannot easily be doubted that logic and arithmetic will apply to such things. We do not
know who
will
be the inhabitants of London
but we know that
them and any other two of them
a hundred years hence
any two
will
of
make
four
;
them.
of
of anticipating facts
This apparent
about things of
power
which we have no experience
surprising.
is
certainly
Kant's solution of the problem,
though not valid
in
my opinion,
is
interesting.
however, very difficult, and is differently
understood by different philosophers. We
It
is,
can, therefore, only give the merest outline
of it, and even that will be thought mis-
leading
by
many
exponents
of
Kant's
system.
What Kant maintained was
that in
all
our
two elements to be
experience
distinguished, the one due to the object
"
{i.e. to what we have called the
physical
object"), the other due to our own nature.
We saw, in discussing matter and sensethere
are
data, that the physical object is different
from the associated sense-data, and that
the sense-data are to be regarded as resulting
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
1S3
from an interaction between the physical
So far, we are in
object and ourselves.
But what is distinctive of Kant is the way in which he apportions the shares of ourselves and the physical
agreement with Kant.
He considers that the
object respectively.
the
crude material given in sensation
colour, hardness, etc.
—
—
is
due to the object,
and that what we supply is the arrangement
in space and time, and all the relations between sense -data which result from comparison or from considering one as the cause
of
the
other
or
in
any other way.
chief reason in favour of this
view
is
His
that
we seem
to have a 'priori knowledge as to
time and causality and compariand
space
son,
of
but not as to the actual crude material
sensation.
that
We
anything
we
can be sure,
shall
he
says,
ever
experience
must show the characteristics affirmed of it
our a priori knowledge, because these
characteristics are due to our own nature,
in
and therefore nothing can ever come
our
experience
characteristic*.
without
acquiring
into
these
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
134
The
physical object, which he calls the
*
he regards as essentially
thing in itself,"
unknowable what can be known is the object
*'
;
as
we have
the
ing
it
in experience,
which he
calls
"
The phenomenon, bephenomenon."
a joint product of us and the thing in
itself,
is
sure to have those characteristics
which are due to us, and is therefore sure to
conform to our a priori knowledge. Hence
this knowledge, though true of all actual and
possible experience, must not be supposed
to apply outside experience. Thus in spite
of the existence of a priori knowledge, we
cannot know anything about the thing in
itself or
about what
is
object of experience.
reconcile
not an actual or possible
In this way he tries to
and harmonise the contentions
of
the rationalists with the arguments of the
empiricists.
Apart from minor grounds on which
Kant's philosophy may be criticised, there is
"
"
* Kant's
is identical in definition
thing in itself
with the physical object, namely, it is the cause of sensaIn the properties deduced from the definition it is
tion.
not identical, since Kant held (in spite of some inconsistency as regards cause) that we can know that none of the
categories are applicable to the
"
thing in itself."
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
135
one main objection which seems fatal to any
attempt to deal with the problem of a priori
knowledge by
accounted for
his
is
The thing to be
method.
our certainty that the facts
must always conform to logic and arithmetic.
To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account for this. Our
nature is as much a fact of the existing world
as anything, and there can be no certainty
that it will remain constant
It might happen,
.
Kant
right, that to-morrow our nature
would so change as to make two and two
if
is
become five. This possibility seems never
to have occurred to him, yet it is one which
utterly destroys the certainty and universality which he is anxious to vindicate for
arithmetical propositions.
It is true that this
is
inconsistent
with the
possibility, formally,
Kantian view
that
time
itself
is
a form
imposed by the subject upon phenomena,
so that our real Self is not in time and has
no to-morrow.
But he
will
still
have to
suppose that the time-order of phenomena
is determined by characteristics of what is
behind phenomena, and this
substance of our argument.
suffices for the
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
186
Reflection, moreover, seems to
that,
if
there
is
make it clear
any truth in our arithmetical
they must apply to things equally
whether we think of them or not. Two
physical objects and two other physical
objects must make four physical objects, even
if
physical objects cannot be experienced.
beliefs,
To
assert this
is
certainly within the scope
state that two and
what we mean when we
two are four. Its truth is
of
as
the
truth
of
just as indubitable
the assertion
that
two
phenomena and two other phenomena make
four phenomena. Thus Kant's solution unduly limits the scope of a priori propositions,
in addition to failing in the attempt at explaining their certainty.
Apart from the special doctrines advocated
by Kant,
it
is
very
common among
philois
a
what
as
in
some
to
regard
priori
sophers
sense mental, as concerned rather with the
way we must
think than with any fact of the
We noted in the preceding
chapter the three principles commonly called
*'
laws of thought." The view which led to
outer world.
their being so
named
is
a natural one, but
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
137
there are strong reasons for thinking that it
erroneous.
Let us take as an illustra-
is
the
tion
law
of
This
contradiction.
is
form " Nothing
commonly
can both be and not be," which is intended
to express the fact that nothing can at once
have and not have a given quality. Thus,
for example, if a tree is a beech it cannot
stated in
also be not a beech
gular
it
;
the
my
if
table
is
rectan-
cannot also be not rectangular, and
so on.
Now what makes
it
natural to call this
principle a law of thought is that it is by
thought rather than by outward observation
we persuade ourselves of its necessary
truth.
When we have seen that a tree is a
we
do not need to look again in order
beech,
that
to ascertain whether
it is
also not a beech
;
makes us know that this is
But the conclusion that the law
thought alone
impossible.
of contradiction
is
theless erroneous.
we
a law of thought
What we
mind
is
so
made
that
the law of contradiction.
when
believe,
believe the law of contradiction,
that the
never-
is
it
must
is
not
believe
This belief
is
a
188
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
subsequent result of psychological
The
contradiction.
contradiction
is
reflection,
belief in the
which presupposes the
belief
law
in the law
of
of
a belief about things, not
It is not, e.g., the
only about thoughts.
belief that if we think a certain tree is a
beech,
that
it
we cannot
is
at the
not a beech
;
same time
it
is
think
the belief
a beech, it cannot at
the same time be not a beech. Thus the
law of contradiction is about things, and not
that
if
the tree
is
and although belief
merely about thoughts
in the law of contradiction is a thought, the
;
law of contradiction
itself is
not a thought,
but a fact concerning the things in the world.
If this, which we believe when we believe the
law
of contradiction,
were not true of the
things in the world, the fact that we were
compelled to think it true would not save
the law of contradiction from being false
and this shows that the law is not a law of
;
thought.
A
similar
argument applies to any other
When we
judge that
two and two are four, we are not making a
a priori judgment.
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
139
judgment about our thoughts, but about all
actual or possible couples. The fact that
our minds are so constituted as to believe
that two and two are four, though
it is
true,
emphatically not what we assert when we
assert that two and two are four.
And no
is
fact
about the constitution of our minds
could
four.
make
it
true that
two and two are
Thus our a
priori knowledge, if it
not erroneous, is not merely knowledge
about the constitution of our minds, but
is
applicable to whatever the world may
contain, both what is mental and what is
is
non-mental.
The
seems to be that
fact
all
our a priori
knowledge is concerned with entities which
do not, properly speaking, exist, either in the
mental or in the physical world. These entities are such as can be named
by parts of
which
are
not
substantives
speech
they are
such entities as qualities and relations. Sup;
pose, for instance, that I
am
in
my
room.
I
and my room exists but does " in "
exist ?
Yet obviously the word " in " has
a meaning it denotes a relation which holds
exist,
;
;
140
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
between
me and my
room.
This relation
we cannot say
something, although
that
is
it
same sense in which I and my
room exist. The relation " in " is something
which we can think about and understand,
exists in the
we could not understand
for, if
it,
not understand the sentence " I
room."
we could
am
in
my
Many
philosophers, following Kant,
have maintained that relations are the work
of the
mind, that things in themselves have
no relations, but that the mind brings them
together in one act of thought and thus produces the relations which it judges them to
have.
This view, however, seems open to objec-
which we urged before
Kant.
It seems plain that it is not
against
thought which produces the truth of the
"
I am in my room."
It may be
proposition
tions similar to those
true that an earwig is in my room, even
neither I nor the earwig nor any one else
aware
of this truth
;
if
is
for this truth concerns
only the earwig and the room, and does not
depend upon anything
as
we
shall tee
more
else.
Thus
fully in the
relations,
next chapter.
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
must be placed
in
a world which
mental nor physical.
This world
i«
is
141
neither
of great
importance to philosophy, and in particular
to the problems of a priori knowledge. In the
next chapter we shall proceed to develop its
nature and its bearing upon the questions
with which we have been dealing.
CHAPTER IX
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
At
the end of the preceding chapter we saw
that such entities as relations appear to have
some way different from
that of physical objects, and also different
from that of minds and from that of senseIn the present chapter we have to
data.
consider what is the nature of this kind of
being, and also what objects there are that
have this kind of being. We will begin with
a being which
is
in
the latter question.
The problem with which we are
cerned
is
a very old one, since
into philosophy
"
by
Plato.
it
now
con-
was brought
Plato's
"
theory
an attempt to solve this very
problem, and in my opinion it is one of the
most successful attempts hitherto made. The
of ideas
is
theory to be advocated in what follows
142
is
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
143
modificalargely Plato's, with merely such
tions as time has shown to be necessary.
The way the problem arose for Plato was
more or less as follows. Let us consider, say,
such a notion as justice. If we ask ourselves
what
justice
is,
it is
considering this, that,
natural to proceed by
and the other just act,
with a view to discovering what they have in
common.
They must
some
in
all,
sense,
partake of a common nature, which will be
found in whatever is just and in nothing else.
This
common
they are
nature, in
all just, will
virtue
be justice
of
itself,
which
the pure
essence the admixture of which with facts of
produces the multiplicity of just
Similarly with any other word which
ordinary
acts.
life
be applicable to common facts, such as
"
The word will be
for example.
whiteness
applicable to a number of particular things
may
"
because they all participate in a common
nature or essence. This pure essence is what
"
""
"
form." (It must
idea
or
Plato calls an
"
not be supposed that
ideas," in his sense,
exist in minds,
though they
hended by minds.)
The
"
be apprejustice is not
may
idea
"
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
144
identical with anything that
is
just
:
it is
some-
other than particular things, which
thing
particular
Not being
partake of.
cannot itself exist in the world
things
particular,
it
of
Moreover
sense.
changeable
like
it
not
is
or
fleeting
the things of sense
:
it
is
itself, immutable and indestructible.
Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world,
more real than the common world of sense,
eternally
the unchangeable world of ideas, which alone
gives to the world of sense whatever pale
may
reflection of reality
belong to
it.
The
truly real world, for Plato, is the world of
ideas
;
for
whatever we
attempt to say
we can
may
about things in the world
of sense,
only succeed in saying that they participate
in such and such ideas, which, therefore,
constitute
all
Hence
their character.
it
is
easy to pass on into a mysticism. We may
hope, in a mystic illumination, to see the ideas
as
we
see objects ot sense
;
and we may
in heaven.
imagine
These mystical developments are very natural,
but the basis of the theory is in logic, and it is
that
the
ideas
as based in logic that
exist
we have
to consider
it.
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
145
" has
acquired, in the
course of time, many associations which are
The word
*'
idea
quite misleading when applied to Plato's
"
ideas."
We shall therefore use the word
"universal" instead of the word "idea," to
what Plato meant. The essence of
describe
the sort of entity that Plato meant is that it
is opposed to the particular things that are
given in sensation.
is
We
given in sensation, or
is
speak of whatever
of the same nature
as things given in sensation, as a particular
by
;
opposition to this, a universal will be any-
thing which
culars,
may be
shared by
and has those
many
parti-
characteristics which,
we saw,
distinguish justice and whiteness
from just acts and white things.
as
When we examine common
find that,
stand
for
broadly speaking,
particulars,
we
proper names
words,
while
other
,
;
sub'
stantives, adjectives, prepositions,
stand for universals.
particulars, but are
Pronouns
and verbs
stand
for
ambiguous it is only
the
context
or
the
circumstances that
by
we know what particulars they stand for.
The word " now " stands for a particular.
:
•
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
146
namely the present moment but like pronouns, it stands for an ambiguous particular,
;
because the present is always changing.
It will be seen that no sentence can be
made up without
at least one
word which
The nearest approach
"
I like
would be some such statement as
"
"
this."
But even here the word like dedenotes a universal.
notes a universal, for I
may
and other people may
like things.
like other things,
truths involve universals, and
of
all
Thus
all
knowledge
truths involves acquaintance with uni-
versals.
1-
Seeing that nearly all the words to be
found in the dictionary stand for universals,
strange that hardly anybody except
students of philosophy ever realises that there
it
is
are such entities as universals.
naturally dwell
upon those words
We
do not
in a sentence
which do not stand for particulars and if we
are forced to dwell upon a word which stands
;
a universal, we naturally think of it as
standing for some one of the particulars that
for
come under the universal. When, for example,
we hear the sentence, " Charles I.'s head was
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
we may
cut off,"
Charles
naturally enough think of
and of the
of Charles I.'s head,
I.,
operation of cutting
particulars
147
;
off his
head, which are
all
but we do not naturally dwell
meant by the word " head " or
upon what is
"
the word
cut," which is a universal. We
feel such words to be incomplete and insubstantial
they seem to demand a context
;
anything can be done with them.
Hence we succeed in avoiding all notice of
before
universals as such, until the study of philosophy forces them upon our attention.
Even among
we may
philosophers,
say,
broadly, that only those universals which are
named by adjectives or substantives have been
much
or often recognised, while those
named
by verbs and prepositions have been usually
overlooked. This omission has had a very
it is
great effect upon philosophy
hardly
too much to say that most metaphysics, since
;
Spinoza, has been largely determined by it.
The way this has occurred is, in outline, as
follows
:
common
of
single
Speaking generally, adjectives and
nouns express qualities or properties
things,
whereas prepositions and
148
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
verbs tend to express relations between two
Thus the neglect of preor more things.
positions
and verbs
led to the belief that
every proposition can be regarded as attributing a property to a single thing, rather
than as expressing a relation between two or
Hence
was supposed that,
ultimately, there can be no such entities as
Hence either there
relations between things.
more
things.
it
can be only one thing in the universe, or, if
many things, they cannot possibly
there are
interact in
any way,
would be a
relation,
since
and
any interaction
relations are im-
possible.
The
first
of these views,
which was advo-
cated by Spinoza, and is held in our own day
by Mr. Bradley and many other philosophers,
is
called
monism
;
the second, which was
advocated by Leibniz, but is not very common
nowadays, is called monadism, because each
of the isolated things is called a monad. Both
these opposing
philosophies,
interesting as
result, in my opinion, from an undue
attention to one sort of universals, namely the
they are,
sort represented
by adjectives and substan-
THE WORLD OF UNI VERS ALS
tives
rather
than
149
by verbs and prepoji-
tions.
As a matter
of fact,
if
any one were anxious
to deny altogether that there are such things
as universals, we should find that we cannot
strictly
prove that there are such entities as
qualities,
i.e.
the universals represented by
adjectives and substantives, whereas
prove that there must be relations,
we can
i.e.
sort of universals generally represented
the
by
verbs and prepositions. Let us take in illustration the universal whiteness.
If we believe
is such a universal, we shall say
that things are white because they have the
quality of whiteness. This view, however,
that there
was strenuously denied by Berkeley and
Hume, who have been followed in this by
later
empiricists.
The
form
which
their
denial took was to deny that there are such
"
abstract ideas." When we want
things as
to think of whiteness, they said, we form an
image
of
some particular white
thing,
and
reason concerning this particular, taking care
not to deduce anything concerning it which
we cannot
see to be equally true of
any other
150
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
As an account
white thing.
mental processes, this
of our actual
no doubt largely
is
In geometry, for example, when we
wash to prove something about all triangles,
we draw a particular triangle and reason about
true.
taking care not to use any characteristic
which it does not share with other triangles.
it,
The beginner,
finds
it
in order to avoid error, often
useful to
draw several
triangles, as
unlike each other as possible, in order to
make sure that his reasoning is equally applicable to
all of
as soon as
them.
we ask
But a
difficulty
emerges
how we know
a triangle. If we
ourselves
that a thing is white or
wish to avoid the universals whiteness and
triangularity,
we
some particular
some particular triangle,
shall choose
patch of white or
and say that anything
is
white or a triangle
has the right sort of resemblance to our
chosen particular. But then the resemblance
if it
required will have to be a universal. Since
there are many white things, the resemblance
must hold between many pairs of particular
white things
and this is the characteristic
;
of a universal.
It will
be useless to say that
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
there
is
a different resemblance
for
151
each
pair, for then we shall have to say that these
resemblances resemble each other, and thus
at last we shall be forced to admit resem-
The relation of remust
be a true universal.
semblance, therefore,
And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth
while to invent difficult and unplausible
blance as a universal.
theories to
avoid
the
universals as whiteness
Berkeley and
Hume
admission
and
of
triangularity.
failed
to
this refutation of their rejection of
perceive
"
abstract
ideas," because, like their adversaries,
only
thought
ignored
of
relations
such
they
and altogether
as universals.
We have
qualities,
therefore here another respect in which the
rationalists appear to have been in the right
as against the empiricists, although, owing
to the neglect or denial of relations, the
deductions
made by
rationalists were,
if
any-
more apt to be mistaken than those
made by empiricists.
Having now seen that there must be such
thing,
entities as universals, the
next point to be
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
152
that their being is not merely mental.
this is meant that whatever being belongs
proved
By
is
them
independent of their being thought
of or or in any way apprehended by minds.
to
is
We
have already touched on this subject at
the end of the preceding chapter, but we
must now consider more fully what sort of
being it is that belongs to universals.
"
Consider such a proposition as
Edinburgh
is
Here we have a rebetween two places, and it seems plain
north of London."
lation
that the relation subsists independently of
our knowledge of it. When we come to know
that Edinburgh is north of London, we come
to
know something which
Edinburgh and London
:
has to do only with
we do not cause the
by coming to know
truth of the proposition
it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a
The
fact which was there before we knew it.
part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh
stands would be north of the part where
London
stands, even
even
if
if
there were no
know about north and
being to
there were no minds at
universe.
This
is,
human
south,
all
of course, denied
and
in the
by many
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
153
philosophers, either for Berkeley's reasons
or for Kant's. Cut we have already con-
sidered these reasons,
are
nd decided that they
inadequate. We may therefore now
it to be true that nothing mental is
assume
presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is
north of London. But this fact involves the
"
north of," which is a universal
and it would be impossible for the whole fact to
relation
;
"
north
involve nothing mental if the relation
of," which is a constituent part of the fact,
did involve anything mental. Hence we
must admit that the
it
relation, like the
terms
not dependent upon thought, but
to the independent world which
relates, is
belongs
thought apprehends but does not create.
This conclusion, however, is met by the
"
"
north of
does
difficulty that the relation
not seem to exist in the same sense in which
Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask
"
Where and when does this relation exist ? "
"
Nowhere and no when."
the answer must be
or
time where we can find
There is no place
the relation
"
north of."
It does not exist in
Edinburgh any more than in London, for
it
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
154
two and
relates the
neutral as between
is
Nor can we say that
them.
Now
(particular time.
it
exists at
any
everything that can
be apprehended by the senses or by intro:spection
exists
Hence the
different
at
relation
from
some
"
particular
north of
such things.
"
It
is
time.
radically
is
neither
in space nor in time, neither material nor
mental
It
is
;
yet
it is
largely
something.
the very peculiar kind of
being that belongs to universals which has led
many people to suppose that they are really
mental.
We
can think
of
a universal, and our
thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary
sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for
example, that we are thinking of whiteness.
Then in one sense it may be said that white"
We have here the
in our mind."
ness is
same ambiguity as we noted
in discussing
Chapter IV. In the strict sense,
not whiteness that is in our mind, but the
Berkeley in
it is
act of thinking of whiteness. The connected
"
idea," which we
ambiguity in the word
noted at the same time, also causes confusion
In one sense of this word, namely the
here.
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
155
denotes the object of an act
"
idea." Hence,
of thought, whiteness is an
if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we
sense in which
may come
"
"
it
to
think that whiteness
is
an
i.e. an act of
to think that
and
thus
we
come
thought
whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we
idea
in the other sense,
;
rob
it
of its essential quality of universality.
One man's act
of thought is necessarily a
one
from
another man's
thing
man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's
different
;
act of thought at another time. Hence, if
whiteness were the thought as opposed to its
no two different men could think of it,
and no one man could think of it twice.
That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this
object is different from all of them. Thus
object,
not thoughts, though when
are the objects of thoughts.
shall find it convenient only to speak
universals
are
known they
We
when they are in time, that
when we can point to some time ai
of things existing
is
to say,
which they exist (not excluding the
possi-
156
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
bility of their existing at all times).
thoughts and
objects exist.
in this sense
;
Thus*
feelings, minds and physical
But universals do not exist
we
shall say that
"
they subsist
"
or have being, where
is opposed to
being
*'
"
existence
as being timeless.
The world
of universals, therefore,
may
as the world of being.
also be described
The world
of being
is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to
the mathematician, the logician, the builder
metaphysical systems, and all who love
The world of
perfection more than life.
of
existence
is
vague, without
sharp
boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement, but it contains all thoughts and feelings,
fleeting,
the data of sense, and
all physical objects,
do
that
can
either
good or harm,
everything
everything that makes any difference to the
all
value of
life
and the world.
According to
our temperaments, we shall prefer the contemplation of the one or of the other. The
one we do not prefer will probably seem to us
a pale shadow of the one we prefer, and hardly
worthy to be regarded as in any sense real.
But the truth is that both have the same
THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
157
cairn on our impartial attention, both are
real, and both are important to the meta-
Indeed no sooner have we
physician.
dis-
tinguished the two worlds than it becomes
necessary to consider their relations.
But
first
knowledge
of
all
we must examine our
of universals.
This consideration
occupy us in the following chapter,
where we shall find that it solves the problem
of a priori knowledge, from which we were
will
first
led to consider universals.
CHAPTER X
ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
In regard to one man's knowledge at a
given time, universals, like particulars, may
be divided into those known by acquaintance,
those known only by description, and those
not
known
either
by acquaintance
or
by de-
scription.
Let us consider
universals
the knowledge of
first
by acquaintance.
It is obvious,
to begin with, that we are acquainted with
such universals as white, red, black, SAveet,
loud,
sour,
hard,
i.e.
etc.,
with qualities
which are exemplified in sense-data.
we
in
are acquainted,
see a white patch,
the first instance, with the particular
white patches,
easily learn to abstract the whiteness
patch
we
When
we
;
but by seeing
which they
all
have
many
in
158
common, and
in
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
learning to
do
this
we
159
are learning to be
acquainted with whiteness. A similar process will make us acquainted with any
other universal of the same sort,
"
of this sort
ties."
may
be called
Universals
sensible quali-
They can be apprehended with
less
of abstraction than any others, and
seem
less removed
from particulars
they
than other universals are.
We come next to relations. The easiest
effort
apprehend are those which hold
between the different parts of a single complex
sense-datum. For example, I can see at a
relations to
glance the whole of the page on which I am
writing ; thus the whole page is included in
But I perceive that some
are
to the left of other parts,
page
parts are above other parts. The
one sense-datum.
parts of the
and some
process of abstraction in this case seems to
proceed somewhat as follows I see success:
ively a number of sense-data in which one
part is to the left of another I perceive, as in
;
the case of different white patches, that all
these sense-data have something in com-
mon, and by abstraction
I find that
what
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
ICO
they have in common is a certain relation
between their parts, namely the relation
"
which I call
In
being to the left of."
this
way
I
become acquainted with the
universal relation.
In like manner I become aware of the
relation of before
I
and
after in time.
hear a chime of bells
:
when
Suppose
the last bell of
the chime sounds, I can retain the whole
chime before
mind, and I can perceive
my
that the earlier bells
Also
ones.
what
am
I
in
came before the
I
memory
later
perceive that
before the
remembering came
present time. From either of these sources
I can abstract the universal relation of be-
and
fore
universal
after,
Thus time
are
just
relation
-
among
as
I
abstracted
"being to the
left
the
of."
space relations,
those with which we are ac-
relations,
like
quainted.
Another relation with which we become
acquainted in much the same way is resemof green, I
other
;
simultaneously two shades
can see that they resemble each
also see a shade of red at the same
If I see
blance.
if
I
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
161
that the two greens have
more resemblance to each other than either
time, I can
see
has to the red.
In
this
way
I
become
acquainted with the universal resemblance or
similarity.
Between
as
between
parti-
culars, there are relations of
which we
may be
universals,
immediately aware. We have just seen that
we can perceive that the resemblance between
two shades of green is greater than the resemblance between a shade of red and a shade
of green.
Here we are dealing with a relation,
"
namely
greater than," between two relations.
Our knowledge of such relations,
though it requires more power of abstraction
than
required for perceiving the qualities
of sense-data, appears to be equally immediate,
and
is
(at least in
able.
some
Thus there
is
cases) equally indubit-
immediate knowledge
concerning universals as well as concerning
sense-data.
Returning now to the problem of a priori
knowledge, which we left unsolved when we
began the consideration of universals, we find
ourselves in a position to deal with it in a
F
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
162
much more
satisfactory manner than was
Let us revert to the propossible before.
"
two
and
two are four." It is
position
obvious, in view
fairly
of
what has been
that this proposition states a relation
"
between the universal
two " and the uni-
said,
versal "four."
which we
blish
;
now endeavour
to
esta-
namely, All a priori knowledge deals
exclusively
This
This suggests a proposition
shall
with
the
proposition
relations
is
of
great
of
universals.
importance,
and goes a long way towards solving our
previous difficulties concerning a priori knowledge.
The only case
in which it might seem, at
our proposition were untrue,
the case in which an a priori proposition
first sight,
is
as
if
one class of particulars
belong to some other class, or (what comes to
states that
all of
the same thing) that
all particulars
having
some one property also have some other. In
this case it might seem as though we were
dealing with the particulars that have the
property rather than with the property. The
"
two and tv»o are four " is really
proposition
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
163
a case in point, for this may be stated in the
form " any two and any other two are four,"
"
or
any collection formed of two twos is a
collection of four."
If
we can show
that
such statements as this really deal only with
universals, our proposition may be regarded
as proved.
One way
what a proposition
deals with is to ask ourselves what words we
must understand in other words, what obin order
jects we must be acquainted with
to see what the proposition means. As soon
as we see what the proposition means, even
of discovering
—
—
if
we do not yet know whether it is true
it is evident that we must
have
or false,
acquaintance with whatever is really dealt
with by the proposition. By applying this
test,
it
appears that
many
propositions
which might seem to be concerned with particulars are really concerned only with uni"
In the special case of
versals.
two and
two are four," even when we interpret it as
"
meaning any collection formed of two twos
a collection of four," it is plain that we
can understand the proposition, i.e. we can
is
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
164
see
what
it is
know what
is
"
"
two
"
and
that
it
asserts, as
meant by "
soon as w«
"
and
collection
four."
It is quite unnecessary
the couples in the world
if it
were necessary, obviously we could never
to
know
all
:
understand the proposition, since the couples
are infinitely numerous and therefore cannot
all
be known to us
.
Thus although our general
statement implies statements about particular couples, as soon as we know that there are
such particular couples, yet it does not itself
assert or imply that there are such particular
and thus fails to make any statement
whatever about any actual particular couple.
couples,
The
statement
made
the universal, and not
is
about
about
"couple,"
this or that
couple.
Thus the statement " two and two are four **
deals exclusively with universals, and therefore
be known by anybody who is acquainted
with the universals concerned and can per-
may
them which the
statement asserts. It must be taken as a
fact, discovered by reflecting upon our knowledge, that we have the power of sometimes
ceive the relation between
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
165
perceiving such relations between universals,
and therefore
sometimes knowing general
a priori propositions such as those of arithmetic and logic. The thing that seemed
mysterious,
of
when we formerly considered such
knowledge, was that
it
seemed to anticipate
and control experience. This, however, we
can now see to have been an error. No fact
concerning anything capable of being experienced can be
experience.
known independently
of
We know a priori that two things
and two other things together make four
things, but we do not know a priori that if
Brown and Jones are two, and Robinson and
Smith are two, then Brown and Jones and
Robinson and Smith are four. The reason is
that this proposition cannot be understood
at all unless we know that there are such
Brown and Jones and Robinson
and Smith, and this we can only know by
people as
experience.
is
Hence, although our general
a priori, all its applications
proposition
to actual particulars involve experience and
In
therefore contain an empirical element.
this
way what seemed mysterious
in our a
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
166
knowledge
an
error.
upon
priori
is
seen to have been based
It will serve to make the point clearer if we
contrast our genuine a priori judgment with an
"
empirical generalisation, such as all men are
mortals." Here as before, we can understand
what the proposition means as soon as we
understand the universals involved, namely
man and mortal. It is obviously unnecessary
to have an individual acquaintance with the
whole human race in order to understand
what our proposition means. Thus the difference between an a priori general proposition
and an empirical generalisation does
not come in the meaning of the proposition
it comes in the nature of the evidence for it.
;
In the empirical case, the evidence consists
in
the
that
all
We
particular instances.
men are mortal because
believe
we know
that there are innumerable instances of
men
dying, and no instances of their living beyond a certain age. We do not believe it
because
we
universal
is
see a connection
man and
true that
if
between the
the universal mortal.
It
physiology can prove, assum-
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
1G7
ing the general laws that govern living bodies,
that no living organism can last for ever, that
gives a connection between man and mortality
which would enable us to assert our proposition without appealing to the special evidence
But that only means that our
has
been subsumed under a
generalisation
wider generalisation, for which the evidence
of
men
dying.
is
still
of the
sive.
same kind, though more exten-
The progress
of science
is
constantly
producing such subsumptions, and therefore
giving a constantly wider inductive basis
for scientific generalisations.
But although
a greater degree of certainty, it
does not give a different kind the ultimate
ground remains inductive, i.e. derived from
this gives
:
instances,
and not an a
of universals such as
priori connection
we have
in logic
and
arithmetic.
Two
opposite points are to be observed
concerning a priori general propositions. The
particular instances are
known, our general proposition may be arrived
at in the first instance by induction, and the
first is
that,
if
many
connection of universals
may
be only sub-
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
168
sequently perceived. For example, it is known
that if we draw perpendiculars to the sides of
a triangle from the opposite angles, all three
perpendiculars meet in a point. It would be
quite possible to be
first
led to this proposition
by
actually drawing perpendiculars in many
cases, and finding that they always met in a
point
;
this experience
for the general proof
are
might lead us to look
find it.
Such cases
and
common in the experience of every mathe-
matician.
The other point is more interesting, and of
more philosophical importance. It is, that
we may sometimes know a general proposition
in cases where we do not know a single inTake such a case as the following
numbers can be
and
will
give a third
multiplied together,
stance of it.
We know
:
that any two
called their product.
We know
of integers the product of
that
which
all
is less
pairs
than
100 have been actually multiplied together,
and the value of the product recorded in the
multiplication table. But we also know that
the number of integers is infinite, and that
only a finite number of pairs of integers ever
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
have been or ever
Hence
beings.
will
be thought of by
human
follows that there are pairs
which never have been and never
of integers
will
it
169
be thought of by human beings, and that
them deal with integers the product of
all of
which
is
over 10(^
"
proposition
:
Hence we
All products of
arrive at the
two
which never have been and never
thought of
Here
is
truth
is
integers,
will
be
by any human being, are over 100."
a general proposition of which the
undeniable, and yet, from the very
nature of the case,
we can never
give an in-
because any two numbers we may
think of are excluded by the terms of the
stance
;
proposition.
This possibility, of knowledge of general
propositions of which no instance can be given,
is
often denied, because
it
is
not perceived
that the knowledge of such propositions only
requires a knowledge of the relations of universals, and does not require any knowledge of
instances of the universals in question. Yet
the knowledge of such general propositions
is quite vital to a great deal of what is
generFor example, we
ally admitted to be known.
170
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
saw,
in
our early chapters, that physical
opposed to sense-data, are only
obtained by an inference, and are not things
with which we are acquainted. Hence we
can never know any proposition of the form
"
"
"
this is a physical object," where
this
is
objects, as
something immediately known. It follows
that all our knowledge concerning physical
objects is such that no actual instance can be
We
can give instances of the associated sense-data, but we cannot give instances
given.
of the actual physical objects.
Hence our
knowledge as to physical objects depends
throughout upon this possibility of general
knowledge where no instance can be given.
And
the same applies to our knowledge of
other people's minds, or of any other class of
things of which no instance is known to us by
acquaintance.
We may now
take a survey of the sources
our knowledge, as they have appeared
We have
in the course of our analysis.
of
to distinguish knowledge of things
knowledge of truths. In each there are
first
kinds,
and
two
one immediate and one derivative.
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
Our immediate knowledge
of things,
171
which we
acquaintance, consists of two sorts,
according as the things known are particulars
or universals.
Among particulars, we have
called
acquaintance with sense-data and (probably)
with ourselves. Among universals, there seems
to be
no principle by which we can decide
which can be known by acquaintance, but it
is clear that among those that can be so known
are sensible qualities, relations of space and
time, similarity, and certain abstract logical
Our
which we
universals.
things,
derivative
call
knowledge
of
knowledge by descripboth acquaintance
involves
always
with something and knowledge of truths.
Our immediate knowledge of truths may be
tion,
called intuitive knowledge,
known may be
Among
called
and the truths
self-evident
so
truths.
such truths are included those which
merely state what
is
given in sense, and also
certain abstract logical
and arithmetical
prin-
and (though with less certainty) some
ethical propositions.
Our derivative know-
ciples,
ledge of truths consists of everything that
we can deduce from self-evident truths
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
172
by the use
of
self
-
evident
principles
of
deduction.
If the
,
above account is
correct, all our
know-
If
ledge of truths depends
upon our intuitive
becomes important
and scope of intuitive
knowledge, in much the same way as, at an
earlier stage, we considered the nature and
scope of knowledge by acquaintance. But
knowledge.
It therefore
to consider the nature
knowledge of truths raises a further problem,
which does not arise in regard to knowledge
of things,
namely the problem
of error.
Some
and
becomes necessary to consider
at all, we can distinguish knowledge
of our beliefs turn out to be erroneous,
therefore
how,
from
if
it
error.
This problem
does
not
arise
with regard to knowledge by acquaintance,
for, whatever may be the object of acquaintance, even in dreams
and hallucinations, there
no error involved so long as we do not go
beyond the immediate object error can only
arise when we regard the immediate object,
is
:
mark of some
Thus
the
physical object.
problems connected with knowledge of truths arc more
i.e.
the sense-datum, as the
ON KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
difficult
173
than those connected with know-
As the
the problems
connected with knowledge of truths, let us
examine the nature and scope of our intuiledge of things.
tive judgments.
first of
CHAPTER XI
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
common impression that everything that we believe ought to be capable of
proof, or at least of being shown to be highly
There
probable.
for
a
is
It is felt
by many that a
which no reason can be given
reasonable belief.
just.
Almost
all
is
belief
an un-
In the main, this view
our
common
beliefs
is
are
either inferred, or capable of being inferred,
from other
beliefs which may be regarded as
the
for them.
reason
As a rule, the
giving
reason has been forgotten, or has even never
been consciously present to our minds. Few
of us ever ask ourselves, for example, what
to suppose the food we are just
going to eat will not turn out to be poison.
Yet we feel, when challenged, that a perfectly
reason there
is
good reason could be found, even
174
if
we
are
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
not ready with
this belief
we
it
at the
175
And
moment.
in
are usually justified.
us imagine some insistent Socrates,
who, whatever reason we give him, continues
to demand a reason for the reason. We must
But
let
sooner or later, and probably before very long,
be driven to a point where we cannot find any
further reason, and where it becomes almost
certain that no further reason
discoverable.
retically
is
Starting
even theowith
the
we can be driven
backfrom point to point, until we come to some
common
beliefs of daily life,
general principle, or
some instance
of
a general
which seems luminously evident,
and is not itself capable of being deduced
from anything more evident. In most questions of daily life, such as whether our food is
principle,
be nourishing and not poisonous, we
shall be driven back to the inductive principle,
likely to
which we discussed in Chapter VI. But beyond that, there seems to be no further
regress.
The principle itself is constantly used
in our reasoning,
sometimes consciously, somebut there is no reasoning
times unconsciously
;
which, starting from some simpler self-evident
176
THE PROBLEMwS OF PHILOSOPHY
principle, leads us to the principle of induction
And the same holds for
as its conclusion.
other logical principles.
to us, and we employ
them
in constructing
but they themselves, or at
of
them, are incapable of
demonstrations
some
least
Their truth is evident
;
demonstration.
Self-evidence, however,
those
among
general
is
principles
When
incapable of proof.
not confined to
which are
a certain number
have been admitted, the
from them
but the
deduced
rest can be
propositions deduced are often just as selfevident as those that were assumed without
of logical principles
;
proof.
All
arithmetic,
moreover,
deduced from the general principles
can
be
of logic,
yet the simple propositions of arithmetic,
"
two and two are four," are just
such as
as self-evident as the principles of logic.
though this is more
disputable, that there are some self-evident
"
we ought to
ethical principles, such as
pursue what is good."
It
would seem,
It should
also,
be observed that, in
all
casei of
general principles, particular instances, dealing
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
177
with familiar things, are more evident than
general principle. For example, the
the
law of contradiction states that nothing can
both have a certain property and not have
it.
This
but
it is
rose which
not red.
evident as soon as
understood,
not so evident as that a particular
is
we
it is
see cannot be both red
(It is of
and
course possible, that parts
may be red and parts not red,
or that the rose may be of a shade of pink
which we hardly know whether to call red
of the rose
or not
;
but in the former case
the rose as a whole
latter case the
as soon as
is
answer
it is
plain that
not red, while in the
is
theoretically definite
we have decided on a
precise de-
"
red.") It is usually through
that we come to be able
instances
particular
to see the general principle.
Only those
finition
who
of
are practised in dealing with abstractions
can readily grasp a general principle without
the help of instances.
In addition to general principles, the other
kind of self-evident truths are those imme-
We
will call
diately derived from sensation.
"
truths of perception," and the
such truths
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
178
judgments
"
of
judgments
certain
them we will call
perception." But here a
expressing
amount
of care
is required in getof the truths that
nature
ting at the precise
The actual sense-data
are self-evident.
A
neither true nor false.
which
colour
exists
it
:
is
true or false.
are
particular patch of
I see, for example, simply
not the sort of thing that is
It is true that there is such
has a certain shape and
degree of brightness, true that it is surrounded
by certain other colours. But the patch
a patch, true that
itself,
like
sense,
is
of
it
everything else in the world of
a radically different kind from
the things that are true or false, and therefore
cannot properly be said to be true. Thus
whatever
self-evident
truths
be
may
obtained from our senses must be different
from the sense-data from which they are
obtained.
It
would seem that there are two kinds
self-evident
truths
of
coalesce.
First,
though
two kinds
perception,
perhaps in the last analysis the
may
of
there
which simply asserts the
is
the
existence
of
kind
the
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
179
sense-datum, without in any way analysing
We see a patch of red, and we judge
"
there is such-and-such a patch of red," or
"
this is one
more strictly " there is that
it.
;
kind of intuitive judgment of perception.
The other kind arises when the object of
sense
is
complex, and we subject
degree of analysis.
If,
a round patch of red, we
patch of red is round."
judgment
to
it
for instance,
of perception,
may
This
but
it
"
judge
is
some
we
see
that
again a
differs
from
our previous kind. In our present kind we
have a single sense-datum which has both
colour and shape
the shape is round.
is red and
Our judgment analyses
the datum into colour and shape, and then
recombines them by stating that the red
:
colour
is
the colour
round in shape. Another example
"
this is to the
judgment is
"
"
"
"
this
and
that
that," where
of this kind of
right of
seen simultaneously. In this kind of
judgment the sense-datum contains con-
are
which have some relation to each
and
the judgment asserts that these
other,
constituents have this relation.
stituents
180
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
Another
class of intuitive judgments, ana-
logous to those of sense and yet quite distinct from them, are judgments of memory.
is some danger of confusion as to the
nature of memory, owing to the fact that
memory of an object is apt to be accompanied
There
by an image of the object, and yet the image
cannot be what constitutes memory. This
is
easily seen
image
by merely noticing that the
present, whereas what is
in the
is
remembered is known to be in the past. Moreover, we are certainly able to some extent
to compare our image with the object remembered, so that we often know, within
somewhat wide limits, how far our image is
but this would be impossible,
accurate
;
unless the object, as opposed to the image,
were in some way before the mind. Thus
the essence of
memory
is
not constituted by
the image, but by having immediately before
the mind an object which is recognised as
But for the fact of memory in this
past.
sense,
we should not know
that there evei
was a past at all, nor should we be able to
"
understand the word
past," any more than
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
a
"
man born
blind can understand the word
Thus there must be
light."
181
intuitive judg-
ments of memory, and it is upon them, ultimately, that all our knowledge of the past
depends.
The case of memory, however, raises a
difficulty, for it is notoriously fallacious,
and
thus throws doubt on the trustworthiness of
judgments in general.
no light one. But let us
This
intuitive
culty
is
first
diffi-
narrow
scope as far as possible.
Broadly speaking,
trustworthy in proportion to the
vividness of the experience and to its near-
its
memory
is
ness in time.
If
the house next door was
by lightning half a minute ago, my
memory of what I saw and heard will be so
reliable that it would be preposterous to
doubt whether there had been a flash at all.
And the same applies to less vivid experiences,
struck
so long as they are recent.
I
am
certain that half a minute ago I
absolutely
was
sitting
same chair in which I am sitting now.
Going backward over the day, I find things
of which I am quite certain, other things of
in the
which
I
am
almost certain, other things of
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
182
can become certain by thought and
by calHng up attendant circumstances, and
some things of which I am by no means
which
I
I am quite certain that I ate my
certain.
breakfast this morning, but if I were as
indifferent to my breakfast as a philosopher
should be, I should be doubtful. As to the
conversation at breakfast, I can recall some
effort, some only
of
element
with a large
doubt, and some not
at all. Thus there is a continual gradation
of
it easily,
some with an
what
I
remember, and a corresponding gradation
in
in
the degree
of
self-evidence
the trustworthiness of
Thus the
fallacious
first
my
memory.
answer to the
memory
is
of
difficulty of
to say that
memory
has degrees of self-evidence, and that these
correspond to the degrees of its trustworthiness, reaching a limit of perfect self-evidence
and
perfect trustworthiness in our memory
of events which are recent and vivid.
would seem, however, that there are
cases of very firm belief in a memory which
It
is
wholly
cases,
false.
what
is
It is probable that, in these
really
remembered, in the
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
183
sense of being immediately before the mind,
is
something other than what is falsely
though something generally associated with it, George IV. is said to have at
last believed that he was at the battle of
believed
in,
Waterloo, because he had so often said that
he was. In this case, what was immediately
remembered was his repeated assertion the
belief in what he was asserting (if it existed)
;
would be produced by association with the
remembered assertion, and would therefore
not be a genuine case of memory. It would
seem that cases of fallacious memory can
probably all be dealt with in this way, i.e.
they can be shown to be not cases of memory
in the strict sense at
is
is,
all.
One important point about self-evidence
made clear by the case of memory, and that
that self-evidence has degrees:
it is
not
a quality which is simply present or absent,
but a quality which may be more or less
from absolute
present, in gradations ranging
down
an almost imperceptible
Truths of perception and some of
faintness.
the principles of logic have the very highest
certainty
to
184
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
truths of immediate
degree of self-evidence
memory have an almost equally high degree.
The inductive principle has less self-evidence
;
than some of the other principles oi logic,
such as *' what follows from a true premiss
must be true." Memories have a diminishing self-evidence as they become remoter and
fainter
the truths of logic and mathematics
;
have (broadly speaking) less self-evidence as
they become more complicated. Judgments
of intrinsic ethical or aesthetic value are apt
to have some self-evidence, but not much.
Degrees of self-evidence are important in
the theory of knowledge, since, if propositions
may
(as
seems
likely)
have some degree
of self -evidence without being true,
not be necessary to abandon
all
it
will
connection
between self-evidence and truth, but merely
to say that, where there is a conflict, the
more self-evident proposition is to be retained
and the less self-evident rejected.
seems, however, highly probable that
two different notions are combined in " self"
evidence
as above explained
that one of
them, which corresponds to the highest
It
;
ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
185
degree of self-evidence, is really an infallible
guarantee of truth, while the other, which
corresponds to all the other degrees, does
not give an infallible guarantee, but only a
greater or less presumption. This, however,
only a suggestion, which we cannot as yet
develop further. After we have dealt with
is
the nature of truth,
we
shall return to the
subject of self -evidence, in connection with
the distinction between knowledge and error.
CHAPTER
XII
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
Our knowledge
of
unlike
truths,
of things, has
our
an opposite, namely
knowledge
So far as things are concerned, we may
error.
know them or not know them, but there is no
positive state of mind which can be described
as erroneous knowledge of things, so long, at
any rate, as we confine ourselves to knowledge
acquaintance. Whatever we
quainted with must be something
are
by
:
ac-
we may
draw wrong inferences from our acquaintance,
but the acquaintance
cannot be decepno dualism as regards
itself
Thus there is
acquaintance. But as regards knowledge
tive.
truths, there
what
is
is
a dualism.
false as well
as
know
We may
what
is
of
believe
true.
We
that on very many subjects different people hold different and incompatible
186
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
187
hence some oeliefs must be erroopinions
neous. Since erroneous beliefs are often held
:
just as strongly as true beliefs,
it
becomes
question how they are to be distinguished from true beliefs. How are we to
know, in a given case, that our belief is not
a
difficult
erroneous
?
This
is
a question of the very
greatest difficulty, to which
no completely
There is,
satisfactory answer is possible.
a
however,
preliminary question which is
rather less difficult, and that is
What do we
:
viean
by
truth and falsehood
preliminary question which
is
?
It
this
is
to be considered
in this chapter.
In this chapter we are not asking
can know whether a
are asking
whether a
what
is
how we
we
belief is true or false
:
meant by the question
belief is true or false.
It
is
to be
hoped that a
clear answer to this question
us
to
obtain an answer to the quesmay help
tion what beliefs are true, but for the present
"
we ask only What is truth ? " and " What
" not "
is falsehood ?
What beliefs are true ? "
"
and
What beliefs are false ? " It is very
important to keep these different questions
188
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
any confusion between
sure to produce an answer which is
entirely separate, since
them
is
not really applicable to either.
There are three points to observe in the
attempt to discover the nature of truth, three
requisites which any theory must fulfil.
(1)
admit
Our theory
of
its
of truth
opposite,
must be such as to
falsehood.
A
good
philosophers have failed adequately to
satisfy this condition
they have constructed
many
:
theories according to which all our thinking
ought to have been true, and have then had
the greatest difficulty in finding a place for
falsehood.
In this respect our theory of
belief must differ from our theory of acquaintance, since in the case of
acquaintance
was not necessary to take account
of
it
any
opposite.
(2) It
were no
seems
beliefs there could
and no truth
truth
is
fairly evident that
if
be no falsehood,
either, in the sense in
correlative
to
there
falsehood.
which
If
we
imagine a world of mere matter, there would
be no room for falsehood in such a world,
and although
it
would contain what may be
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
"
189
would not contain any
truths, in the sense in which truths are things
of the same kind as falsehoods.
In fact,
truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs
and statements
hence a world of mere
it
since
would
contain no beliefs or
matter,
statements, would also contain no truth or
called
it
facts,"
:
falsehood.
But, as against what we have just said,
to be observed that the truth or falsehood
(3)
it is
of
a belief always depends upon something
lies outside the belief itself.
If I be-
which
lieve that Charles
I.
died on the scaffold, I
believe truly, not because of any intrinsic
quality of my belief, which could be dis-
covered by merely examining the belief, but
because of an historical event which happened
two and a
half centuries ago.
that Charles
falsely
:
I.
If I believe
died in his bed, I believe
no degree
of vividness in
my
belief,
from
it, prevents
again because of what happened
long ago, and not because of any intrinsic
property of my belief. Hence, although truth
or of care in arriving at
being
it
false,
and falsehood are properties
of beliefs, they
190
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
are properties dependent upon the relations
of the behefs to other things, not upon any
internal quality of the beliefs.
The third of the above requisites leads us to
—
adopt the view which has on the whole
been commonest among philosophers that
—
truth consists in some form of correspondence
between
belief
and
fact.
It
is, however, by
no means an easy matter to discover a form
of correspondence to which there are no
irrefutable objections.
By this partly and
—
partly
by the
feeling that,
if
truth consists
in a correspondence of thought with some-
thing outside thought, thought can never
know when truth has been attained many
—
philosophers have been led to try to find some
definition of truth which shall not consist in
relation to something wholly outside belief.
The most important attempt
of this sort
is
in coherence.
at a definition
the theory that truth consists
It is said that the mark of
failure to cohere in the body of
and that it is the essence of a
truth to form part of the completely rounded
system which is The Truth.
falsehood
our
is
beliefs,
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
There
is,
19i
however, a great difficulty in this
view, or rather two great difficulties. The
first is that there is no reason to suppose that
only one coherent body of beliefs is possible.
It may be that, with sufficient imagination, a
might invent a past for the world
that would perfectly fit on to what we know,
and yet be quite different from the real past.
novelist
In more
scientific matters, it is certain that
there are often two or more hypotheses which
account for all the known facts on some sub-
and although, in such cases, men of
science endeavour to find facts which will
ject,
rule out all the hypotheses except one, there
is no reason why they should always succeed.
In philosophy, again,
common
for
two
it
seems not un-
hypotheses to be both
the facts. Thus, for
possible that life is one long
rival
able to account for
all
example, it is
dream, and that the outer world has only that
degree of reality that the objects of dreams
but although such a view does not
have
;
seem inconsistent with known facts, there is
no reason to prefer it to the common-sense
view, according to which other people and
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
192
things do really exist.
the definition of truth
Thus coherence as
fails
because there
is
no proof that there can be only one coherent
system.
The other objection
truth
is
to this definition of
"
assumes the meaning of co"
coherknown, whereas, in fact,
that
"
it
herence
"
ence
presupposes the truth of the laws of
Two propositions are coherent when
logic.
be true, and are incoherent when
one at least must be false. Now in order to
both
may
know whether two propositions can both be
true, we must know such truths as the law
contradiction.
For example, the two
"
"
and
this
tree is a beech
propositions
"
this tree is not a beech," are not coherent,
of
because of the law of contradiction.
if
the law of contradiction
itself
jected to the test of coherence,
else.
were sub-
we should
find
we choose
to suppose it false, nothing
be
incoherent with anything
any longer
that,
will
But
if
Thus the laws
of
logic
supply the
skeleton or framework within which the test
of coherence
applies,
and they themselves
cannot be established by this
test.
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
For the above two reasons,
198
coherence
cannot be accepted as giving the meaning of
truth, though it is often a most important
test
of truth after
a certain amount of truth
has become known.
Hence we are driven back to correspondence
with fact as constituting the nature of truth.
It remains to define precisely what we mean
by
"
fact,"
and what
is
the nature of the
correspondence which must subsist between
beUef and fact, in order that behef may be
true.
In accordance with our three requisites,
to seek a theory of truth which!
we have
allows truth to have an opposite, namely
falsehood, (2) makes truth a property of
(1)
makes
a property wholly
dependent upon the relation of the beliefs,
beliefs,
but
(3)
it
to outside things.
The necessity of allowing for falsehood
makes it impossible to regard belief as a
relation of the mind to a single object, which
could be said to be what is believed. If
belief were so regarded, we should find that,
like acquaintance, it would not admit of the
a
1
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
194
opposition of truth and falsehood, but would
have to be always true. This may be made
by examples. Othello believes falsely
that Desdemona loves Cassio. We cannot
clear
say that this belief consists in a relation to a
"
single object,
Desdemona's love
for Cassio,"
if there were such an object, the belief
would be true. There is in fact no such
object, and therefore Othello cannot have
any relation to such an object. Hence his
for
belief
cannot possibly consist in a relation to
this object.
It
might be said that
"
to a different object,
mona
loves Cassio
difficult
his belief is a relation
namely
"
;
but
it
that Desde-
is
to suppose that there
almost as
is
such an
object as this, when Desdemona does not love
Cassio, as it was to suppose that there is
"
Desdemona's love
for
Cassio."
Hence
it
be better to seek for a theory of belief
which does not make it consist in a relation
will
mind
to a single object.
It is common to think of relations as though
they always held between two terms, but in
of the
fact this
is
not always the case.
Some
re-
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
lations
so
"
demand
Take,
on.
195
three terms, some four, and
for
instance,
the
relation
between." So long as only two terms
"
"
is imbetween
come in, the relation
possible
:
three terms are the smallest
that render
it
possible.
London and Edinburgh
;
number
between
York
but if London and
is
Edinburgh were the only places in the world,
there could be nothing which was between
one place and another.
Similarly jealousy
there can be no such
requires three people
three at least.
involve
not
does
relation that
"
Such a proposition as A wishes B to promote
" involves a relation of
C's marriage with D
:
four terms
;
that
D all come in, and
to say, A and B and C and
the relation involved cannot
is
be expressed otherwise than in a form inbe multivolving all four. Instances might
but enough has been said
plied indefinitely,
to show that there are relations which re-
two terms before they can
quire more than
occur.
The relation involved in judging or bemust, if falsehood is to be duly allowed
be taken to be a relation between several
lieving
for,
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
196
between
not
terms,
two.
When
Othello
Desdemona loves Cassio, he
must not have before his mind a single object,
that
believes
"
Desdemona's love
Desdemona
loves
for
Cassio,"
Cassio,"
for
or
"
that
that would
require that there should be objective falsehoods, which subsist independently of any
minds
futable,
Thus
and
;
though not logically rea theory to be avoided if possible.
easier to account for falsehood if
is
it is
this,
we take judgment
mind and the
to be a relation in which
the
various objects concerned
that is to say, Desdemona
all occur severally
and loving and Cassio must all be terms in
;
the
relation
believes that
which subsists when Othello
Desdemona
relation, therefore,
since Othello also
is
is
loves Cassio.
This
a relation of four terms,
one of the terms of the
When we
relation.
four terms,
we
say that it is a relation of
do not mean that Othello has
a certain relation to Desdemona, and has the
same
This
relation to loving
and
also to Cassio.
be true of some other relation than
may
but believing, plainly, is not a
believing
relation which Othello has to each of the three
;
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
197
terms concerned, but to all of them together
there is only one example of the relation of
:
believing involved, but this one example
knits together four terms.
Thus the actual
moment when
occurrence, at the
entertaining his belief,
called "believing"
is
Othello
is
that the relation
knitting together into
one complex whole the four terms Othello,
Desdemona,
loving,
called belief or
is
and
judgment
Cassio.
is
What
is
nothing but this
relation of believing or judging,
which
relates
several things other than itself. An
act of belief or of judgment is the occurrence
a
mind to
between certain terms at some particular
time, of the relation of believing or judging.
are now in a position to understand
We
what it is that distinguishes a true judgment
from a false one. For this purpose we will
adopt certain
definitions.
In every act of
judgment there is a mind which judges, and
there are terms concerning which it judges.
We
will
call
judgment,
objects.
demona
the
mind the
subject in the
and the remaining terms the
Thus, when Othello judges that Desis the subject,
loves Cassio, Othello
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
198
Desdemona and loving
The subject and the objects
while the objects are
and
Cassio.
together are called the constituents of the
judgment. It will be observed that the
of judging has what is called a
" or "
sense
direction."
We may say, meta-
relation
"
phorically, that
order,
it
puts
its
objects in a certain
which we may indicate by means
the order of the words in the sentence.
of
(In
an inflected language, the same thing will
be indicated by inflections, e.g. by the difference between nominative and accusative.)
Othello's
mona
mona
judgment that Cassio loves Desdefrom his judgment that Desde-
differs
loves Cassio, in spite of the fact that it
same constituents, because the
consists of the
relation of judging places the constituents
Simiin a different order in the two cases.
judges that Desdemona loves
Othello, the constituents of the judgment are
larly, if Cassio
the same, but their order is different.
This property of having a "sense" or "di"
rection
is one which the relation of judging
"
"
shares with all other relations. The
sense
still
of relations
is
the ultimate source of order
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
and
series
and a host
of
199
mathematical con-
but we need not concern ourselves
cepts
further with this aspect.
"
"
spoke of the relation called judging
" as
"
or
knitting together into one
believing
;
We
complex whole the subject and the
In this respect, judging
Whenever a
between two or more terms,
other relation.
terms into a complex
loves
Desdemona, there
whole as
"
objects,
is exactly like
it
whole.
is
every
relation holds
unites the
If
Othello
such a complex
Othello's love for
Desdemona."
The terms united by the relation may be
themselves complex, or may be simple, but
the whole which results from their being
united must be complex. Wherever there
is
a relation which relates certain terms, there
is
a complex object formed of the union
terms and conversely, wherever
of those
there
is
;
a complex object, there
which relates
its
constituents.
is
a relation
When an
act of believing occurs, there is a complex,
"
"
is the uniting
rein which
believing
are
and
and
lation,
objects
subject
arranged
in a certain order
by the "sense"
of the
i
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
200
relation
of
Among
believing.
the objects,
we saw in considering " Othello believes
that Desdemona loves Cassio," one must be
as
a
"
relation
—in
this
But
the
instance,
this relation, as
it
relation
occurs in
loving."
the act of believing, is not the relation which
creates the unity of the complex whole conThe
sisting of the subject and the objects.
"
relation
as
it
occurs
in
the
act
of
loving,"
is
one
of
the
it
is
a brick
believing,
objects
—
in
the
cement
not
structure,
is
the belief
is
true,
the
cement.
"
the relation
believing."
there
is
The
When
another complex
unity, in which the relation which was one
of the objects of the belief relates the other
objects.
that
Thus,
e.g.,
Desdemona
if
Othello believes truly
loves Cassio, then there
is
a complex unity, " Desdemona's love for
Cassio," which is composed exclusively of
the objects of the belief, in the same order as
they had in the belief, with the relation which
was one of the objects occurring now as the
cement that binds together the other objects
of the belief.
belief
is false,
On
the other hand, when a
there is no such complex unity
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
of the objects of the oelief.
composed only
If Othello believes
falsely that
loves Cassio, then there
unity as
"
Thus a
201
is
no such complex
Desdemona's love
belief is true
Desdemona
when
for Cassio."
it
corresponds to
a certain associated complex, and false when
it does not.
Assuming, for the sake of definiteness, that the objects of the belief are
two terms and a
terms being put
"
" of the
sense
the
by
the two terms in that order
relation, the
in a certain order
believing, then
if
are united
by the
the belief
true
is
;
relation into a complex,
not, it
if
is
false.
constitutes the definition of truth
we were
and
This
false-
Judging or
believing is a certain complex unity of which
if the remaining
a mind is a constituent
constituents, taken in the order which they
hood that
in search of.
;
have in the
belief,
then the belief
is
form a complex unity,
true
;
if
not,
it is false.
Thus although truth and falsehood are
in a sense
properties of beliefs, yet they are
extrinsic properties, for the condition of the
something not involving
general) any mind at all, but
truth of a belief
beliefs, or (in
is
202
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
only the objects of the
belief.
A
believes, believes truly
when
there
mind, which
is a corre-
sponding complex not involving the mind, but
only its objects. This correspondence ensures
and its absence entails
Hence we account simultaneously
truth,
'
falsehood.
two
for the
depend on minds for
do not depend on minds
facts that beliefs (o)
their existence, (6)
for their truth.
We may
restate our theory as follows
;
If
we take such a belief as " Othello believes
that Desdemona loves Cassio," we will call
Desdemona and Cassio the object-terms, and
loving the object-relation.
"
plex unity
If there is
Desdemona's love
a com-
for Cassio,"
consisting of the object-terms related by the
object-relation in the same order as they have
then this complex unity is called
the fact corresponding to the belief. Thus a
belief is true when there is a corresponding
fact, and is false when there is no correspondin the belief,
ing fact.
It will
be seen that minds do not
truth or falsehood.
when once
They
create
create beliefs, but
the beliefs are created, the
mind
TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
203
cannot make them true or
false, except in the
concern
future things
special case where they
which are within the power of the person
catching trains. What
makes a belief true is a fact, and this fact does
believing,
such
as
not (except in exceptional cases) in any way
involve the mind of the person who has the
belief.
Having now decided what we mean by
truth and falsehood,
we have next
what ways there are
of
or that belief
is
to consider
knowing whether
true or false.
this
This considera-
tion will occupy the next chapter.
CHAPTER
XIII
KNOWLEDGE, ERROR, AND PROBABLE
OPINION
The
question as to what
we mean by truth
and falsehood, which we considered
in the
much less interest
preceding chapter,
than the question as to how we can know what
is
true and
what
of
This question will
occupy us in the present chapter. There can
be no doubt that some of our beliefs are
is
erroneous
certainty
is false.
thus we are led to inquire what
we can ever have that such and
;
such a belief is not erroneous.
In other words,
can we ever know anything at all, or do we
merely sometimes by good luck believe what
true ? Before we can attack this question,
we must, however, first decide what we mean
is
by
"
knowing," and this question
might be supposed.
easy as
204
is
not so
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
At
first
ledge
sight
we might imagine that know-
could be defined as
When what we
205
believe
is
"
true
true, it
belief.'*
might be
supposed that we had achieved a knowledge
But this would not acof what we believe.
cord with the
in
way
To
used.
commonly
stance
If
:
a
man
which the word
is
take a very trivial inthat the late
believes
Prime Minister's last name began with a B, he
believes what is true, since the late Prime
Minister was Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman.
But
if
he believes that Mr. Balfour was the
Prime Minister, he will still believe that
Prime Minister's last name began
with a B, yet this belief, though true, would
late
the late
If
not be thought to constitute knowledge.
a
newspaper, by an intelligent anticipation,
announces the result of a battle before any
telegram giving the result has been received, it
may by good fortune announce what after-
wards turns out to be the right result, and it
may produce belief in some of its less experienced readers.
But
in spite of the truth of
their belief, they cannot be said to
ledge.
Thus it is
have know-
clear that a true belief
is
not
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
206
knowledge when
it
is
deduced from a
false
belief.
In like manner, a true belief cannot be
knowledge when it is deduced by a
called
fallacious process of reasoning,
even
if
the
premisses from which it is deduced are true.
If I know that all Greeks are men and that
Socrates was a man, and I infer that Socrates
was a Greek, I cannot be said to know that
Socrates was a Greek, because, although my
premisses and my conclusion are true, the
conclusion does not follow from the premisses.
But are we to say that nothing is knowledge
except what is validly deduced from true
premisses ? Obviously we cannot say this.
Such a definition is at once too wide and too
In the
narrow.
because
it is
should be
man who
late
first
place,
it
is
too wide,
not enough that our premisses
they must also be known. The
true,
was the
Prime Minister may proceed to draw
believes that Mr. Balfour
valid deductions from the true premiss that the
late
Prime Minister's name began with a B,
but he cannot be said to know the conclusions
reached by these deductions.
Thus we
shall
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
207
have to amend our definition by saying that
knowledge is what is vaHdly deduced from
known premisses.
cular definition
know what
is
:
This, however,
it
is
a
cir-
assumes that we already
meant by " known premisses."
It can, therefore, at best define
knowledge, the sort
we
call
one sort of
derivative, as
opposed to intuitive knowledge.
"
Derivative knowledge is what
say
:
We may
is
validly
deduced from premisses known intuitively."
In this statement there is no formal defect,
but
it
ledge
leaves the definition of intuitive
still
know-
to seek.
Leaving on one
side, for the
moment, the
question of intuitive knowledge, let us consider the
above suggested definition of de-
rivative knowledge.
it
is
that
it
The
chief objection to
unduly limits knowledge.
It
constantly happens that people entertain a
true belief, which has grown up in them because of some piece of intuitive knowledge from
which it is capable of being validly inferred,
but from which it has not, as a matter of fact,
been inferred by any logical process.
Take, for example, the beliefs produced by
208
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
If the newspapers announce the
death of the King, we are fairly well justified
reading.
in believing that the
is
be
King is dead, since this
the sort of announcement which would not
made
were
And we
are quite
amply justified in believing that the newspaper asserts that the King is dead. But here
if it
false.
the intuitive knowledge upon which our belief
is based is knowledge of the existence of sense-
data derived from looking at the print which
gives the news. This knowledge scarcely
except in a person
read easily. A child may be
aware of the shapes of the letters, and pass
rises into consciousness,
who cannot
gradually and painfully to a realisation of
their meaning.
But anybody accustomed to
what the letters
reading passes at once to
not av/are, except on reflection,
that he has derived this knowledge from the
mean, and
is
sense-data called seeing the printed letters.
Thus although a valid inference from the
meaning is possible, and could
be performed by the reader, it is not in fact
letters to their
performed, since he does not in fact perform
any operation which can be called logical
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
Yet
inference.
it
200
would be absurd to
say-
that the reader does not know that the news-
paper announces the King's death.
We must, therefore, admit as derivative
knowledge whatever is the result of intuitive
knowledge even
if
by mere
association, pro-
a valid logical connection, and
the person in question could become aware of
this connection by reflection.
There are in
vided there
is
ways, besides logical inference, by
which we pass from one belief to another the
fact
many
:
passage from the print to its meaning illustrates these ways.
These ways may be called
"
psychological inference." We shall, then,
admit such psychological inference as a means
of obtaining derivative
there
is
knowledge, provided
a discoverable logical inference which
runs parallel to the psychological inference.
This renders our definition of derivative knowledge less precise than we could wish, since
"
"
the word
discoverable
is vague
it does
:
not
tell
us
how much reflection may be needed
make the discovery. But in fact
in order to
"
"
knowledge
merges into
"
is
not a precise conception
probable opinion," as
we
:
it
shall
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
210
see
more
chapter.
fully in the course of the present
A very
precise definition, therefore,
should not be sought, since any such definition
must be more or less misleading.
The chief difficulty in regard to knowledge,
however, does not arise over derivative knowSo long
ledge, but over intuitive knowledge.
as we are dealing with derivative knowledge,
we have the test of intuitive knowledge to fall
back upon. But in regard to intuitive beliefs,
it is by no means easy to discover any criterion
by which to distinguish some as true and
In this question it is
scarcely possible to reach any very precise
result
all our knowledge of truths is infected
others as erroneous.
:
with some degree of doubt, and a theory which
ignored this fact would be plainly wrong.
Something
be done, however, to mitigate
of the question.
may
the difficulties
Our theory
of truth, to begin with, supplies
the possibility of distinguishing certain truths
as self-evident in a sense which ensures infallibility.
When
a
belief is true,
we
said,
a corresponding fact, in which the
several objects of the belief form a single
there
is
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
The
complex.
belief
is
said
knowledge of this fact, provided
211
to constitute
it fulfils
those
further somewhat vague conditions which we
have been considering in the present chapter.
any fact, besides the knowledge constituted by belief, we may also have
the kind of knowledge constituted by perception (taking this word in its widest possible
But
in regard to
For example, if you know the hour
the sunset, you can at that hour know the
sense).
of
fact that the sun
of the fact
is
setting
by way
:
this
is
knowledge
of
knowledge of truths
the weather is fine, look
;
but you can also, if
to the west and actually see the setting sun
you then know the same fact by the way of
:
knowledge of things.
Thus in regard to any complex fact, there
are, theoretically, two ways in which it may
be known
which
its
:
by means
a judgment, in
several parts are judged to be
(1)
of
related as they are in fact related
means
itself,
of acquaintance with the
which
may
(in
;
(2)
complex
by
fact
a large sense) be called
by no means confined
it is
perception, though
to objects of the senses.
Now
it
will
be
212
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
observed that the second
complex
fact,
the
when
of
way
knowing a
way of acquaintance, is
there really is such a fact,
only possible
while the first way, like all judgment, is
The second way gives us
liable to error.
the complex whole, and
when
therefore only
is
parts do actually have that
possible
relation which makes them combine to form
such a complex. The first way, on the contrary, gives us the parts and the relation
severally, and demands only the reality of
its
the relation may
the parts and the relation
not relate those parts in that way, and yet
the judgment may occur.
:
It will be
remembered that
XI we
at the
end
of
suggested that there might
Chapter
be two kinds of self-evidence, one giving an
absolute guarantee of truth, the other only a
These two kinds can now
partial guarantee.
be distinguished.
We may say that a truth
in the first
is
and most absolute
self-evident,
sense,
when
we have acquaintance with the fact which
corresponds to the truth. When Othello
believes that
Desdemona
loves Cassio, the
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
218
corresponding fact, if his belief were true,
"
would be
Desdemona's love for Cassio."
This would be a fact with which no one could
have acquaintance except Desdemona
in the sense of self-evidence that
sidering,
we
;
hence
are con-
the truth that Desdemona loves
were a truth) could only be selfevident to Desdemona. All mental facts,
Cassio
(if it
and all facts concerning sense-data, have this
same privacy
there is only one person to
:
whom
they can be self-evident in our present
sense, since there is only one person who can
be acquainted with the mental things or the
sense-data concerned.
Thus no
fact about
any particular existing thing can be selfevident to more than one person. On the
other hand, facts about universals do not
privacy. Many minds may be
acquainted with the same universals ; hence
a relation between universals may be known
have
this
In
all
cases
to
many different people.
where we know by acquaintance
by acquaintance
a complex fact consisting of certain terms in
a certain relation, we say that the truth that
these terms are so related has the
first
or
214
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these
judgment that the terms are so
related must be true. Thus this sort of selfevidence is an absolute guarantee of truth.
But although this sort of self-evidence is an
cases the
absolute guarantee of truth, it does not enable
us to be absolutely certain, in the case of any
given judgment, that the judgment in question is true.
Suppose we first perceive the
sun shining, which is a complex fact, and
"
the
thence proceed to make the judgment
sun is shining." In passing from the perception to the judgment, it is necessary to
we have to
analyse the given complex fact
"
"
"
"
sun
as
out
the
and
shining
separate
constituents of the fact. In this process it
:
is
possible to
where a
fact
commit an
has the
first
error
;
hence even
or absolute kind of
self-evidence, a judgment believed to correspond to the fact is not absolutely infallible,
because
fact.
it
may
But
if it
not really correspond to the
does correspond (in the sense
explained in the preceding chapter),
must be
then
it
true.
The second
sort of self -evidence will be that
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
215
which belongs to judgments in the first
instance, and is not derived from direct
perception of a fact as a single complex
whole. This second kind of self-evidence
have degrees, from the very highest
degree down to a bare inclination in favour
will
Take, for example, the case of
a horse trotting away from us along a hard
road. At first our certainty that we hear the
of the belief.
hoofs
is
intently,
we listen
comes a moment when we
complete
there
;
gradually,
if
think perhaps it was imagination or the blind
at last we
upstairs or our own heart-beats
;
become doubtful whether there was any noise
then we think we no longer hear
at all
anything, and at last we know we no longer
;
hear anything. In this process, there is a
continual gradation of self-evidence, from the
highest degree to the least, not in the sensedata themselves, but in the judgments based
on them.
Or again: Suppose we are comparing two
shades of colour, one blue and one green.
We can be quite sure they are different shades
of colour
;
but
if
the green colour
is
gradually
216
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
altered to be
more and more
like the blue,
a blue-green, then a greenybecoming
blue, then blue, there will come a moment
first
when we
we can see any
difference, and then a moment when we
know that we cannot see any difference.
The same thing happens in tuning a musical
are doubtful whether
instrument, or in any other case where there
is a continuous gradation.
Thus self-evidence
of this sort is a
matter of degree
;
and
it
seems plain that the higher degrees are more
to be trusted than the lower degrees.
knowledge our ultimate
premisses must have some degree of selfIn
derivative
evidence, and so
must
their connection with
the conclusions deduced from them.
Take for
example a piece of reasoning in geometry.
It is not enough that the axioms from which
we start should be self-evident
it is necessary
the
also that, at each step in
reasoning, the
connection of premiss and conclusion should
In
be self-evident.
:
difficult reasoning,
this
connection has often only a very small degree
hence errors of reasoning are
not improbable where the difficulty is great.
of self -evidence
;
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
From what has been
said
it is
217
evident that,
both as regards intuitive knowledge and as
regards derivative knowledge, if we assume
that intuitive knowledge is trustworthy in
proportion to the degree of its self-evidence,
there will be a gradation in trustworthiness,
from the existence of noteworthy sense-data
and the simpler truths of logic and arithmetic, which may be taken as quite certain,
down to judgments which seem only just
more probable than their opposites. What
we
firmly believe,
provided
ledge,
f erred
logically.
true,
is
if it is
it
(logically
intuitive
if it is
is
or
true, is called
either intuitive or
psychologically)
knowledge from which
What we
called error.
know-
firmly believe,
What we
it
in-|
from]
is
'
follows
if it is
not]
firmly believe,
'
neither knowledge nor error, and also
believe hesitatingly, because it is,
what we
or
1
derived from, something which has not
may be
the highest degree of self -evidence,
called probable opinion.
Thus the
greater
what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable opinion.
part of
In regard to probable opinion,
we can
218
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
derive great assistance from coherence, which
we rejected as the definition of truth, but may
A
often use as a criterion.
ally
if
probable opinions,
body
of individu-
they are mutually
become more probable than any one
them would be individually. It is in this
coherent,
of
way that many
scientific
hypotheses acquire
into a coherent
They
and
thus become
system of probable opinions,
more probable than they would be in isolatheir probability.
tion.
fit
The same thing
applies
to
general
philosophical hypotheses. Often in a single
case such hypotheses may seem highly doubtful, while yet, when we consider the order
and coherence which they introduce into a
mass of probable opinion, they become pretty
nearly certain. This applies, in particular,
to such matters as the distinction between
dreams and waking life. If our dreams, night
after night, were as coherent one with another
as our days, we should hardly know whether
to believe the dreams or the waking
life.
As it is, the test of coherence condemns the
dreams and confirms the waking life. But
this
test,
though
it
increases
probability
I
KNOWLEDGE AND ERROR
wnere
it
is
successful,
219
never gives absolute
certainty, unless there is certainty already
Thus
at some point in the coherent system.
the mere organisation of probable opinion
will
never,
by
itself,
dubitable knowledge.
transform
it
into in-
CHAPTER XIV
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE
we have said hitherto concerning
we
have scarcely touched on many
philosophy,
In
all
that
matters that occupy a great space in the
most philosophers. Most philoor, at any rate, very many
profess
to be able to prove, by a priori metaphysical
writings of
—
sophers
—
reasoning, such things as the fundamental
dogmas of religion, the essential rationality
of the universe, the illusoriness of matter, the
unreality of all evil, and so on. There can be
no doubt that the hope of finding reason to
believe such theses as these has been the
chief inspiration of many life-long students
of philosophy.
This hope, I believe, is vain.
It would seem that knowledge concerning the
universe as a whole
not to be obtained by
metaphysics, and that the proposed proofs
that, in virtue of the laws of logic, such and
is
220
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
2J1
such things must exist and such and such
others cannot, are not capable of surviving a
critical
In this chapter we shall
scrutiny.
briefly consider the kind of
such reasoning
is
way
in
which
attempted, with a view
we can hope that it
to discovering whether
may
be valid.
The great representative, in modern times,
of the kind of view which we wish to examine,
was Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel's philosophy
very difficult, and commentators differ
is
the true interpretation of it.
According to the interpretation I shall adopt,
which is that of many, if not most of the
as to
commentators, and has the merit of giving
an interesting and important type of philosophy, his main thesis is that everything
short of the
Whole
is
obviously fragmentary,
and obviously incapable of existing without
the complement supplied by the rest of the
world. Just as a comparative anatomist, from
a single bone, sees what kind of animal the
whole must have been, so the metaphysician,
according to Hegel, sees, from any one piece
of reality, what the whole of reality must be
—
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
222
at least in
its
outlines.
Every apparently separate piece of reality has, as it
were, hooks which grapple it to the next piece
large
;
the next piece, in turn, has fresh hooks, and so
on, until the whole universe is reconstructed.
This essential incompleteness appears, according to Hegel, equally in the world of thought
and
world of things. In the world of
we take any idea which is abstract
in the
thought,
if
or incomplete,
if
we
we
its
on examination, that,
incompleteness, we become
find,
forget
in contradictions
involved
these
;
contra-
dictions turn the idea in question into its
opposite, or antithesis ; and in order to escape,
we have
which
is
to find a new, less incomplete idea,
the synthesis of our original idea and
its antithesis.
This
new
we
the idea
idea,
though
less
incomplete than
started with, will be found, never-
theless, to be
still
not wholly complete, but to
it must be
pass into its antithesis, with which
combined
in a
new
synthesis.
In this
Hegel advances until he reaches the
"
waj'^
Absolute
Idea," which, according to him, has no incompleteness, no opposite, and no need of
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
further
;
reality as
it
is
but
it
to one
Whole.
Idea,
adequate to describe Absolute
is
therefore,
Reality
The Absolute
development.
223
lower ideas only describe
appears to a partial view, not as
all
who
simultaneously surveys the
Thus Hegel reaches the conclusion
that Absolute Reality forms one single harmonious system, not in space or time, not in
any degree
spiritual.
the world
evil,
wholly rational, and wholly
Any appearance to
the contrary, in
we know, can be proved
so he believes
—to
logically
—
be entirely due to our
fragmentary piecemeal view of the universe.
we saw the universe whole, as we may
suppose God sees it, space and time and matter
If
and
and all striving and struggling would
disappear, and we should see instead an eternal
evil
]
perfect unchanging spiritual unity.
\
In this conception, there is undeniably something sublime, something to which we could
wish to yield assent.
Nevertheless,
when the
arguments in support of it are carefully
examined, they appear to involve much confusion and many unwarrantable assumptions.
The fundamental tenet upon which the system
224
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
built up is that what is incomplete must be
not self-subsistent, but must need the support
of other things before it can exist.
It is held
is
that whatever has relations to things outside
itself must contain some reference to those
outside things in
not, therefore,
own
its
be what
things did not exist.
example, is constituted
nature,
it is if
and could
those outside
A
man's nature, for
by his memories and
the rest of his knowledge, by his loves and
hatreds, and so on thus, but for the objects
;
which he knows or loves or hates, he could
not be what he is. He is essentially and
obviously a fragment
of reality he
:
taken as the sum-total
would be self-contradictory.
This whole point of view, however, turns
"
"
upon the notion of the nature of a thing,
which seems to mean
"'
all
the truths about
the thing." It is of course the case that a
truth which connects one thing with another
thing could not subsist if the other thing
did not subsist.
But a truth about a thing
not part of the thing itself, although it
must, according to the above usage, be part
"
"
If we mean
of the thing.
of the
nature
is
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
"
"
by a thing's nature
all
225
the truths about the
we cannot know a thing's
we know all the thing's re-
thing, then plainly
"
nature
"
unless
lations to all the other things in the universe.
But
if
the word
"
nature
"
is
used in this
we shall have to hold that the thing
known when its " nature " is not
may
known, or at any rate is not known completely.
There is a confusion, when this use of the
word " nature " is employed, between knowsense,
be
ledge of things and knowledge of truths.
We
may have knowledge of a thing by acquaintance even if we know very few propositions
about it theoretically we need not know any
—
propositions about it. Thus, acquaintance
with a thing does not involve knowledge of its
"
"
nature
in the above sense.
And although
acquaintance with a thing is involved in our
knowing any one proposition about a thing,
knowledge
is
of its
"
nature," in the above sense,
not involved.
Hence, ( 1 ) acquaintance with
a thing does not logically involve a knowledge
of its relations, and (2) a knowledge of some of
its
relations does not involve a
of all of its relations nor a
knowledge
knowledge of its
226
"
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
nature
"
in the
above sense.
quainted, for example, with
and
I
my
may
be ac-
toothache,
knowledge may be as complete as
knowledge by acquaintance ever can be, withthis
out knowing all that the dentist (who is not
acquainted with it) can tell me about its
cause,
"
and without therefore knowing its
"
in the above sense.
Thus the fact
nature
that a thing has relations does not prove that
are logically necessary. That is
to say, from the mere fact that it is the thing
its relations
it is
we cannot deduce that
it
must have the
various relations which in fact
it
has.
only seems to follow because we
already.
It follows that
This
know
it
we cannot prove that the
universe as a whole forms a single harmonious
system such as Hegel believes that it forms.
And
if
we cannot prove
this,
we
also cannot
prove the unreality of space and time and
matter and evil, for this is deduced by Hegel
from the fragmentary and relational character
Thus we are left to the
of these things.
piecemeal investigation of the world, and are
unable to know the characters of those parts
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
of the universe that are
perience.
227
remote from our ex-
This result, disappointing as
it is
to those whose hopes have been raised by the
systems of philosophers, is in harmony with
the inductive and scientific temper of our age,
and is borne out by the whole examination
of
human knowledge which
has occupied our
previous chapters.
Most of the great ambitious attempts of
metaphysicians have proceeded by the at-
tempt to prove that such and such apparent
features of the actual world were self-contra-
and therefore could not be real. The
whole tendency of modern thought, however,
is more and more in the direction of showing
dictory,
that the supposed contradictions were illusory,
and that very little can be proved a priori
from considerations of what must
be.
A good
by space and
time
and
appear to be infinite
Space
If we
extent, and infinitely divisible.
illustration of this is afforded
time.
in
travel along a straight line in either direction,
it is difficult to believe that we shall finally
reach a last point, beyond which there
nothing, not even empty space. Similarly,
is
if
1
228
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
in imagination we travel backwards or forwards in time, it is difficult to believe that we
shall reach
a
first
or last time, with not even
it.
Thus space
to
infinite
in
be
extent.
appear
empty time beyond
if
Again,
it
we take any two
and time
points on a line,
seems evident that there must be other
points between them, however small the distance between them may be
every distance
:
can be halved, and the halves can be halved
In time,
again, and so on ad infinitum.
however little time may elapse
between two moments, it seems evident that
there will be other moments between them.
Thus space and time appear to be infinitely
But as against these apparent facts
divisible.
infinite extent and infiiiite divisibility
philosophers have advanced arguments tending to show that there could be no infinite
similarly,
—
—
collections of things,
number
must be
and that therefore the
of points in space, or of instants in
time,
finite.
Thus a contradiction
emerged between the apparent nature of space
and time and the supposed impossibility of
infinite collections.
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
229
Kant, who first emphasised this contradiction, deduced the impossibihty of space and
time, which he declared to be merely sub-
and since his time very many philotime
sophers have believed that space and
are mere appearance, not characteristic of the
jective
;
world as
it
really
is.
Now, however, owing
to the labours of the mathematicians, notably
Georg Cantor,
it
has appeared that the imposwas a mistake.
sibility of infinite collections
They are not
in fact self-contradictory, but
only contradictory of certain rather obstinate
mental prejudices. Hence the reasons for
regarding space and time as unreal have become inoperative, and one of the great sources
of metaphysical constructions
is
dried up.
The mathematicians, however, have not
been content with showing that space as it is
commonly supposed to be is possible they
have shown also that many other forms of
;
space are equally possible, so far as logic can
show. Some of Euclid's axioms, which appear
to
common
sense to be necessary, and were
formerly supposed to be necessary by philosophers, are
now known to derive their appear-
230
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
ance of necessity from our mere familiarity
with actual space, and not from any a priori
By imagining worlds in
logical foundation.
which these axioms are
false,
the mathemati-
cians have used logic to loosen the prejudices
of common sense, and to show the possibility
of spaces differing
from that
in
— some
which we
live.
more, some
less
—
And some of these
spaces differ so little from Euclidean space,
where distances such as we can measure are
concerned, that
impossible to discover by
observation whether our actual space is strictly
it is
Euclidean or of one of these other kinds.
Thus the position
completely reversed.
that
Formerly
experience left
appeared
only one kind of space to logic, and logic
showed this one kind to be impossible. Now,
is
it
logic presents
many
kinds of space as possible
apart from experience, and experience only
Thus, while
partially decides between them.
our knowledge of what
is has become less than
was formerly supposed to be, our knowledge
of what may be is enormously increased.
In-
it
stead of being shut in within narrow walls,
of which every nook and cranny could be
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
281
in an open
where much remains
unknown because there is so much to know.
What has happened in the case of space and
explored,
we
find
ourselves
world of free possibilities,
time has happened, to some extent, in other
The attempt to prescribe
the universe by means of a priori principles
directions as well.
to
has broken
down
;
logic, instead of being, as
formerly, the bar to possibilities, has become
the great liberator of the imagination, presenting innumerable alternatives which are closed
common
and leaving to
experience the task of deciding, where decision
is possible, between the many worlds which
to unrefiective
sense,
Thus knowledge as
to what exists becomes limited to what v/e can
learn from experience not to what we can
actually experience, for, as we have seen, there
logic offers for
our choice.
—
much knowledge by description concerning
things of which we have no direct experience.
is
But in all cases of knowledge by description,
we need some connection of universals, enabling us,
from such and such a datum, to
infer
an object of a certain sort as implied by our
datum. Thus in regard to physical objects,
232
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
for example, the principle that sense-data are
signs of physical objects
of universals
;
and
is itself
a connection
only in virtue of this
it is
principle that experience enables us to acquire
knowledge concerning physical objects. The
same applies to the law of causality, or, to
descend to what
is less
general, to such prin-
law of gravitation.
Principles such as the law of gravitation
ciples as the
are proved,
or rather are rendered highly
probable, by a combination of experience with
some wholly a priori principle, such as the
principle of induction.
knowledge, which
knowledge
is
Thus our
the source of
of truths,
is
of
two
all
intuitive
our other
sorts
;
pure
empirical knowledge, which tells us of the
existence and some of the properties of particular things with which
we
are acquainted,
and pure a priori knowledge, which gives us
connections between universals, and enables
us to draw inferences from the particular
facts given in empirical knowledge.
Our
deri-
vative knowledge always depends upon some
pure a priori knowledge and usually also de-
pends upon some pure empirical knowledge.
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
Philosophical knowledge,
above
said
is
if
233
what has been
true, does not differ essentially
knowledge there is no special
source of wisdom which is open to philosophy
but not to science, and the results obtained by
philosophy are not radically different from
from
scientific
;
The essential
philosophy, which makes it a
those obtained from science.
characteristic of
study distinct from science, is criticism. It
examines critically the principles employed in
science
and in daily life
consistencies there
and
it
;
may
it
searches out any in-
be in these principles,
only accepts them when,
as the result of
a critical inquiry, no reason for rejecting them
has appeared. If, as many philosophers have
believed, the principles underlying the sciences
were capable, when disengaged from irrelevant
us knowledge concerning the
universe as a whole, such knowledge would
detail, of giving
have the same claim on our
belief as scientific
but our inquiry has not reknowledge has
vealed any such knowledge, and therefore, as
;
regards the special doctrines of the bolder
metaphysicians, has had a mainly negative
result.
But as regards what would be com-
234
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
monly accepted as knowledge, our result is in
we have seldom found
the main positive
:
reason to reject such knowledge as the result
of our criticism, and we have seen no reason
man
incapable of the kind of
knowledge which he is generally believed
to possess.
to suppose
When, however, we speak
a criticism of knowledge, it
pose a certain limitation.
is
of philosophy as
necessary to imwe adopt the
If
attitude of the complete sceptic, placing ourselves wholly outside all knowledge, and
asking,
from
this
compelled
outside
position,
return within the
to
to be
circle
of
knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible, and our scepticism can never be
refuted.
For
some piece
tants share
all
refutation
must begin with
knowledge which the dispufrom blank doubt, no argument
of
;
can begin. Hence the criticism of knowledge
which philosophy employs must not be of
this destructive kind, if any result is to be
Against this absolute scepticism,
no logical argument can be advanced. But it
is not difficult to see that scepticism of this
achieved.
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE
kind
unreasonable.
is
cal doubt,"
is
Descartes'
"
235
methodi-
with which modern philosophy
not of this kind, but
began,
kind of criticism which
is
rather the
we are asserting to be
"
methodical
the essence of philosophy. His
"
consisted in doubting whatever
doubt
seemed doubtful
;
in pausing, with each ap-
parent piece of knowledge, to ask himself
whether, on reflection, he could feel certain
that he really knew it. This is the kind of
criticism
which constitutes philosophy.
Some
knowledge, such as knowledge of the existence
of our sense-data, appears quite indubitable,
however calmly and thoroughly we
upon
it.
reflect
In regard to such knowledge, philo-
sophical criticism does not require that we
should abstain from belief. But there are
beliefs
— such,
for example, as the belief that
physical objects exactly resemble our sensedata which are entertained until we begin
—
to reflect, but are found to melt
away when
subjected to a close inquiry. Such beliefs
philosophy will bid us reject, unless some
new
line of
them.
But
argument
is
found to support
to reject the beliefs which do not
236
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
any objections, however
closely we examine them, is not reasonable,
and is not what philosophy advocates.
The criticism aimed at, in a word, is not
appear open
to
that which, without reason, determines to re-
but that which considers each piece of
apparent knowledge on its merits, and retains
ject,
whatever
still
appears to be knowledge when
this consideration is completed.
risk of error
That some
remains must be admitted, since
human beings are fallible. Philosophy may
claim justly that it diminishes the risk of error,
and that in some cases it renders the risk so
small as to be practically negligible. To do
more than this is not possible in a world where
and more than this no
mistakes must occur
;
prudent advocate of philosophy would claim
to have performed.
CHAPTER XV
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
Having now come
to the end of our brief
and very incomplete review
of philosophy,
of the problems
be well to consider, in
the value of philosophy
it will
what is
and why it ought to be studied. It is the
more necessary to consider this question, in
view of the fact that many men, under the
conclusion,
influence of science or of practical affairs, are
inclined to doubt whether philosophy
thing better than innocent but useless
is
any-
trifling,
hair-splittingdistinctions, and controversies on
matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.
This view of philosophy appears to result,
partly from a wrong conception of the ends
of
life,
partly from a
wrong conception
of
the kind of goods which philosophy strives to
237
288
THE PROBLEMS 01 PHILOSOPHY
Physical science, through the me-
achieve.
dium
innumerable
of inventions, is useful to
thus
people who are wholly ignorant of it
the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the
;
on the student, but rather because of
the effect on mankind in general. This utility
effect
does not belong to philosophy.
of philosophy has any value at
than students of philosophy,
indirectly,
of those
through
who study
therefore,
if
its effects
it.
anywhere,
It
is
If
all
the study
for others
must be only
upon the lives
it
in these effects,
that the value of
philosophy must be primarily sought.
But further, if we are not to fail in our en-
deavour to determine the value of philosophy,
we must first free our minds from the pre-
what are wrongly called
The " practical " man, as
judices of
men.
often used,
needs,
who
is
"
"
practical
this
word
is
one who recognises only material
men must have food
realises that
for the body, but
is
oblivious of the necessity
If all men
of providing food for the mind.
were well off, if poverty and disease had been
reduced to their lowest possible point, there
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
239
would still remain much to be done to produce
a valuable society and even in the existing
world the goods of the mind are at least as
;
important as the goods of the body. It is
exclusively among the goods of the mind that
the value of philosophy is to be found
and
those
who
are
not
indifferent
to
these
only
;
goods can be persuaded that the study of
philosophy is not a waste of time.
Philosophy, like all other studies, aims
primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it
is the kind of knowledge which gives
and
unity
system to the body of the sciences,
and the kind which results from a critical
aims at
examination of the grounds of our convictions,
But it cannot be
prejudices, and beliefs.
maintained that philosophy has had any very
great measure of success in its attempts to
provide definite answers to its questions. If
you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a
any other man of learning, what
body of truths has been ascertained
historian, or
definite
by his science, his answer will last as long as
you are willing to listen. But if you put the
same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is
240
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
candid, have to confess that his study has not
achieved positive results such as have been
achieved by other sciences. It is true that
this is partly accounted for by the fact that,
as soon as definite knowledge concerning any
subject becomes possible, this subject ceases
to be called philosophy, and becomes a sepaThe whole study of the heavens,
rate science.
which now belongs to astronomy, was once
Newton's great work
included in philosophy
;
"
the mathematical principles of
natural philosophy." Similarly, the study of
was called
the
human mind, which
was, until very lately,
a part of philosophy, has
now been
separated
from philosophy and has become the science
of psychology.
Thus, to a great extent, the
uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent
those questions which are already
than real
:
capable of definite answers are placed in the
sciences, while those only to which, at present,
no definite answer can be given, remain to
form the residue which
is
called philosophy.
however, only a part of the truth
concerning the uncertainty of philosophy.
This
is,
There are
many
questions
—and among them
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
those that are of
to our spiritual
can
see,
must
241
the profoundest interest
life
— which,
so far
remain insoluble to the
as we
human
powers become of quite a
Has
different order from what they are now.
intellect unless its
the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or
Is
is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms ?
consciousness a permanent part of the unigiving hope of indefinite growth in
wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a
verse,
must ultimately
Are good and evil of
small planet on which
become impossible
?
life
importance to the universe or only to man ?
Such questions are asked by philosophy, and
variously answered by various philosophers.
But
it
would seem
that,
whether answers be
otherwise discoverable or not, the answers
of them
suggested by philosophy are none
demonstrably true. Yet, however slight
be the hope of discovering an answer,
may
it
is
to continue
part of the business of philosophy
such
of
consideration
the
questions, to make us
aware of their importance, to examine all the
approaches to them, and to keep alive that
which is
speculative interest in the universe
242
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
apt to be killed by confining ourselves to
definitely ascertainable knowledge.
Many philosophers,
it is
true,
have held that
philosophy could establish the truth of certain
answers to such fundamental questions. They
have supposed that what is of most importance
in religious beliefs could be proved
by
strict
demonstration to be true.
of such attempts,
is
it
In order to judge
necessary to take a
human knowledge, and
to form an
methods and its limitations.
On such a subject it would be unwise to
survey of
opinion as to its
but if the investipronounce dogmatically
gations of our previous chapters have not led
us astray, we shall be compelled to renounce
;
the hope of finding philosophical proofs of
religious beliefs.
We
cannot, therefore, in-
clude as part of the value of philosophy any
set of answers to such questions.
definite
Hence, once more, the value of philosophy
must not depend upon any supposed body of
definitely ascertainable
knowledge to be ac-
quired by those who study it.
The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be
sought largely in
its
very uncertainty.
The
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
243
man who
has no tincture of philosophy goes
Hfe
imprisoned in the prejudices dethrough
rived from common sense, from the habitual
beliefs of
his age
or his nation, and from
convictions which have grown up in
his
mind
/
without the co-operation or consent of hisj
To such a man the world
deliberate reason.
tends to become definite, finite, obvious
common objects rouse no questions, and un;
familiar possibilities are contemptuously reAs soon as we begin to philosophise,
jected.
on the contrary, we
find, as
we saw
in our
opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only
very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty
is the true answer to the doubts which
what
it raises, is
able to suggest
many
possibilities
which enlarge our thoughts and free them
from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while
diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what
things are, it greatly increases our knowledge
what they may be it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have
as to
;
never travelled into the region of liberating
2i4
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
doubt, and
by
it
keeps alive our sense of wonder
showing familiar things in an unfamiliar
aspect.
Apart from
pected
utility in
its
showing unsus-
—
philosophy has a value
chief value
through the greatness
possibilities,
perhaps its
of the objects which
—
contemplates, and the
it
freedom from narrow and personal aims reThe life of
sulting from this contemplation.
the instinctive
circle of
friends
his
may
man
is
shut up within the
family and
be included, but the outer world
interests
private
not regarded except as
what comes within the
is
wishes.
In such a
feverish
and confined,
life
which the philosophic
The private world
it
:
may help or hinder
circle of instinctive
there
in
life
is
something
comparison with
is calm and free.
of instinctive interests
is
a
small one, set in the midst of a great and powerworld which must, sooner or later, lay our
ful
private world in ruins. Unless we can so
enlarge our interests as to include the whole
outer world,
we remain
like a garrison in a
beleaguered fortress, knowing that the enemy
prevents escape and that ultimate surrender
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
is
In such a
inevitable.
but a constant
life
there
is
245
no peace,
between the insistence of
In one
desire and the powerlessness of will.
if
to
or
our
life
is
be
another,
great and
way
strife
we must escape
free,
this
prison and this
strife.
One way
of escape
is
by philosophic con-
templation. Philosophic contemplation does
not, in its widest survey, divide the universe
—
two hostile camps friends and foes,
helpful and hostile, good and bad it views
into
the
—
whole
impartially.
templation, when
it
is
Philosophic conunalloyed, does not
aim at proving that the rest of the universe
akin to man. All acquisition of knowledge
is an enlargement of the Self, but this enlargement is best attained when it is not directly
is
sought.
It is
obtained when the desire for
alone operative, by a study
knowledge
which does not wish in advance that its
is
objects should have this or that character,
but adapts the Self to the characters which
it
This enlargement of
when, taking the Self as
finds in its objects.
Self is not obtained
it is,
we try to show that the world
is
so similar
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
246
to this Self that knowledge of
it is
possible
without any admission of what seems alien.
The desire to prove this is a form of self-assertion,
and like
all self-assertion, it is
to the growth of Self which
which the Self knows that it
an obstacle
it
desires,
is
capable.
and
of
Self-
assertion, in philosophic speculation as else-
where, views the world as a means to its own
ends thus it makes the world of less account
;
than
Self,
and the
Self sets
bounds to the
greatness of its goods. In contemplation,
on the contrary, we start from the not-Self,
and through
its
Self are enlarged
the
universe
greatness the boundaries of
through the infinity of the
;
mind which contemplates
achieves some share in infinity.
For this reason greatness of soul
fostered
those
is
it
not
which
asphilosophies
similate the universe to Man.
Knowledge is
by
a form of union of Self and not-Self
all
union,
therefore
it is
;
like
impaired by dominion, and
by any attempt
to force the uni-
verse into conformity with what we find in
ourselves.
There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view which tells
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
us that
man
that truth
is
is
the measure of
all
247
things,
man-made, that space and time
and the world
the mind, and
of universals are properties of
if
that,
there be anything not
created by the mind, it is unknowable and of
no account for us. This view, if our previous
but in
discussions were correct,
is
untrue
addition to being untrue,
it
has the effect of
;
robbing philosophic contemplation of
gives
it
value, since
it
all
that
fetters contemplation to
Self.
What it calls knowledge is not a union
with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices,
habits,
and
desires,
making an impenetrable
between us and the world beyond. The
man who finds pleasure in such a theory of
veil
knowledge is
the domestic
man who
never leaves
circle for fear his
word might
like the
not be law.
The true philosophic contemplation, on the
contrary, finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that
magnifies the objects contemplated, and
thereby the subject contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that
is personal or
that
private, everything
depends upon habit.
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
248
self-interest, or desire, distorts the object,
and
hence impairs the union which the intellect
By thus making a barrier between
seeks.
subject and object, such personal and private
things become a prison to the intellect. The
free intellect will see as
God might see, without
and now, without hopes and fears,
without the trammels of customary beliefs
and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionof knowately, in the sole and exclusive desire
a here
— knowledge
as impersonal, as purely
it is possible for man to
as
contemplative,
Hence also the free intellect will value
attain.
ledge
more the abstract and universal knowledge
into which the accidents of private history do
not enter, than the knowledge brought by the
senses, and dependent, as such knowledge
of
upon an exclusive and personal point
view and a body whose sense-organs distort
as
much
must
be,
as they reveal.
The mind which has become accustomed to
the freedom and impartiality of philosophic
contemplation will preserve something of the
same freedom and impartiality in the world of
action and emotion.
It will
view
its
purposes
THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
249
and
desires as parts of the whole, with the
absence of insistence that results from seeing
them
as infinitesimal fragments in a world of
which
all
unaffected by any one
The impartiality which, in con-
the rest
man's deeds.
is
templation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is
the very same quality of mind which, in action,
is
justice,
and
in emotion
is
that universal
love which can be given to all, and not only to
those who are judged useful or admirable.
Thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of
our thoughts, but also the objects of our
actions
and our
affections
:
it
of the universe, not only of
war with
makes us citizens
one walled city at
In this citizenship of
the universe consists man's true freedom, and
his liberation from the thraldom of narr-^w
all
the
rest.
hopes and fears.
Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value
of philosophy
Philosophy is to be studied,
:
not for the sake of any definite answers to its
questions, since no definite answers can, as a
rule,
be known to be true, but rather for the
sake of the questions themselves ; because
these questions enlarge our conception of what
250
is
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
possible, enrich our intellectual imagination,
and diminish the dogmatic assurance which
closes the mind against speculation but above
;
because, through the greatness of the
universe which philosophy contemplates, the
all
mind
rendered great, and becomes
capable of that union with the universe which
also
is
constitutes its highest good.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The
student who wishes to acquire an elementary knowledge of philosophy will find it both easier and more
profitable to read some of the works of the great philosophers than to attempt to derive an all-round view
from hand-books. The following are specially recom-
mended
Plato Republic,
:
Transespecially Books VI and VTI.
by Davies and Vauqhan. Golden Treasury
:
lated
Series.
Meditations. Translated by Haldane and
Cambridge University Press, 1911.
Ethics.
Translated by Hale White and
Descartes
:
Ross.
Spinoza
:
Amelia Stirling.
The Monadology.
Leibniz
:
Translated by R. Latta.
Oxford, 1898.
Berkeley
Hume
Kant
:
:
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.
Prolegomena to every Future Metaphysic.
:
/
251
INDEX
places wliere a view is
discussed, not asserted.
Uniformity of Nature, 98
Universals, 76, 81, 142-57,
231
knowledge of,
213
not mental, 151
Verbs, 147
ff.
158-73,
ff.
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