The Sergeant Lesson Plan

LESSON PLAN
V1.0
Copyright © 2014 - Reid Kirby, All Rights Reserved.
If you have any suggestions or recommendation on how to improve this lesson plan, please contact the
author at [email protected].
This lesson plan is for use in conjunction with The Sergeant: A Biological Missile textbook as student
training material (ISBN: 978-0-9677264-5-8 ). The book may be purchased individually through Barnes &
Noble, Amazon.com, and other online book retailers. Contact the author for special bulk sale discounts for
classroom use, including guest lecturing if desired.
Like our FaceBook page (http://www.facebook.com/TheSergeantABiologicalMissile) to receive news and
ideas for using The Sergeant in your curriculum.
Overview
Stylized as a comic book, Te Sergeant illustrates key concepts and provides a framework for approximating biological
weapon efecs. It is intended to be used as an entertaining educational resource for instrucing researchers and ana-
lysts on biological weapons through a tangible historical example in either a seminar or college course.
The comic book format was chosen deliberately to make the subjec approachable. Comics have also been used as an
efecive medium in the United States Army, for example DA Pam 750-30 Te M16A1 Rifle Operation and Preven-
tative Maintenance (http://www.ep.tc/problems/25/index.html). Cartoonist Will Eisner illustrated what would be an
otherwise dull topic into something that would be widely read by soldiers in the feld, and was the illustrator for PS
Magazine, an Army monthly periodical on preventative maintenance.
Rather than instruc on the nature of biological weapons using abstrac and theoretical depicions, Te Sergeant is a
fcionalized DA Pam focused on every aspec of the M210 Biological Warhead for the MGM-29 Sergeant Missile. It
is a self-contained publication which is historically authentic on how the United States Army would have conduced
biological operations circa-1968. It is also technically accurate in that it will reproduce the weapon efecs estimates
United States military planners made during the 1960s. Its framework may be used to assess contemporary scenarios
involving biological weapons, as many regional threats are at a comparable technology point (e.g., SCUD missile with
cluster bomblet warhead flled with wet-type Anthrax).
Anticipatory
From 1943 to 1969 The United States had an acive biological weapons program. While there were over two hundred
biological weapon systems developed, only a small number of these reached the point of acceptance by the military
establishment. One of these was the M210 Biological Warhead for the MGM-29 Sergeant Missile. It was a Standard
A item for use on the nuclear battlefeld containing 720 M-143 3.4-inch spherical bursting bomblets to infic mass
casualties with Tularemia (Rabbit Fever).
The M210 represented the state of the art of biological weapons in the 1960s. The Sergeant: A Biological Missile is a
comic book styled fcionalized Army pamphlet that describes how the United States would have conduced biological
operations with the M210 Biological Warhead in 1968. The relevance today is that of the nations which may attempt
acquiring biological weapons; these are in technology terms comparable to the M210. Also, the approach to estimat-
ing biological weapon efecs can be applied to most any biological weapon system using self-dispersing bomblets.
Objectives
1) Historically, that the United States had a biological weapons program from 1943 to 1969, its organiza-
tional roles and national policies, and that the M210 biological warhead was a Standard A item that had not
been procured.
2) Teoretically, the principles of war, targeting, capabilities, posology, and generalized efecs of biological
weapons pertinent to military operations.
3) Logistically, the stockpile-to-target-sequence of biological weapons and how to estimate weapon efecs
for specifc scenarios to understand the elements infuencing military planning.
4) Defensively, the protecive acions available against biological weapons and infuence on outcomes.
5) Alternatively, the synergy of biological-nuclear operations and possibilities of improved or alternative
biological weapon technologies to biological weapon efecs.
Schedule
Ideally, Te Sergeant should be introduced into a curriculum as a workshop or lab exercise, with the book being dis-
tributed at the onset of the presentation, or the day before. In this manner it can be integrated into cirriculum as a
seminar, or over a week of course-work.
Instructional
A biological weapon is an integrated device consisting of agent (e.g., wet-type Tularemia), disseminaiton means (e.g.,
bursting bombletsr), and delivery system (e.g., missile warhead). It is a capability when there is also a platform to use
it (e.g., a Sergeant missile), and a threat when there is a force trained and equiped to make use of it (e.g., a biological
weapons establishment). The following is background information for use in lecure on the historical, theoretical,
logistical, defensive, and alternative objecives of this lesson plan.
Historical – The United States began its biological weapons program in 1943 through cooperation with British and
Canadian biological warfare researchers. The program had equal priority as the Manhattan Projec, but did not com-
plete safe-operation validation of its producion facility in Vigo, Indiana before the Second World War ended. The
500-lb cluster bomb with its 108 4-lb bomblets for disseminating Anthrax was not available during the war.
In the years following the Second World War biological weapons were noted as important to the nation’s defense along
with nuclear weapons in most policy papers. This was at a time when there was a scarcity of nuclear weapons, and
interest dissipated as the nuclear arsenal grew. Even though there were over 200 biological weapon concepts, only the
following gained any sort of acceptance by the military establishment:
• The M33 500-lb cluster bomb containing 108 M114 4-lb bomblets for disseminating Porcine Brucellosis
(NX). 23,900 cluster bombs procured with producion of NX and flling capabilities maintained from 1954
– C. 1962. USAF initially planned to use the M33/M114/NX in strategic bombing from B-50 bombers in
combination with nuclear weapons, but plans switched to use against Soviet ground forces in combination
with cluster bombs of Sarin (GB) throughout the so-called “Retardation Zone” in Europe when operational
suitability tests indicated logistical problems. The war plans were canceled in 1954, and after 1958 there
were no bombers in the USAF inventory to deliver.
• The M210 31-inch guided missile warhead containing 720 M143 3.4-inch bursting spherical bomblets
for disseminating Tularemia (TT). The warhead was a Standard A item for the MGM-29 Sergeant missile
in 1964. By 1968, without approved war plans calling for its use, the M210/M143/TT was rescinded and it
did not go into full-rate producion.
• The Aero-14/B spray tank with M537 BW mod kit for disseminating Q Fever (MN) and Venezuelan
Equine Encephalitis (FX). There were 200 Aero-14/B spray tanks procured in 1955, but they required be-
ing refurbished in 1961 and were not available for use as a biological weapon until after C. 1962. In 1967
6,400-gallons of MN and FX were procured as frozen pellets to support approved contingency plans, and by
1968 there was 4,400-gallons of MN and 3,950-gallons of FX frozen pellets in the stockpile to support these
plans.
• The “Big Five” a series of minor biological weapons for use by Special Forces. This included the M1 Bio-
dart to deliver either 1g Botulinum Toxin A (XR) or Saxitoxin (TZ) from a 7.62mm rife, the M2 Separable
Bullet to deliver a 15g aerosol puf of either XR or Anthrax (TR2) inside a room from a 7.62mm rife, the M4
Disseminator to deliver 75g of Tularemia (ZZ) as a sabotage device, the M5 Depositor to deliver 150g of
TR2 as an anti-convoy device, and the M32 Disperser for disseminating 700g of Tularemia as an of-target
generator. These were procured C. 1964 to support unconventional warfare for unknown plans.
The Biological Program was under the auspices of the United States Army Chemical Corps until 1962 when the Army
reorganized and moved its technical funcions under the Army Material Command (AMC). The research, develop-
ment, engineering, test and evaluation, and producion of biological weapons were under the AMC’s Munitions Com-
mand (MUCOM). The Commandant of the United States Army Chemical School became the Chief of Chemical
under the reorganization and continued to represent the center for biological warfghting docrine.
Prior to 1969 the formal policy concerning biological weapons was not well defned (see page 6 of Te Sergeant). The
National Security Council (NSC) began formal policy study of the chemical biological weapons programs on the in-
sistence of Secretary of Defense Melvin Liard. After several months the NSC made its recommendations to President
Richard M. Nixon, who on 25 November 1969 unilaterally declared the United States would not engage in ofensive
biological warfare. Following his decision, the stockpile of biological agents, weapons and facilities were destroyed. By
1975 an international prohibition against biological weapons took efec (the Biological Weapons Convention).
Theoretical – Review pages 7 – 19 of Te Sergeant.
• Targeting. It may be useful to introduce the terms Counter-Value (e.g., cities), and Counter-Force (e.g.,
military bases). Because of the delayed rate-of-acion of biological weapons, they are generally thought of
as not suitable for tacical targets, but more for operational and strategic targets. In the 1960s the concept
of CARVER was introduced as a maneuverist method of prioritizing targets for Special Forces. This was
later taken up by the feld artillery, and after 9-11 it was adopted as an analysis means to identify the most
vulnerable aspecs of the United States infrastrucure by Homeland Security.
• Principles of War. Pages 8 through 10 of Te Sergeant show the nine Principles of War accepted by the
United States Army. Other nations have their own Principles of War. The Prussian General Carl Von
Clausewitz is credited with introducing a scientifc approach to military operations as a process of creating
these principles. The Sergeant describes these principles as they relate to Biological operations. Appendix
A of Joint Publication JP3-0 Joint Operations describes these principles in more detail (http://www.dtic.
mil/docrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf). In lecure, it may be of interest to introduce the principles of restraint,
perseverance, and legitimacy, which were introduced for operations other than war (e.g., peacekeeping).
• Weapon Efecs Concepts. Pages 11, 15, and 18 – 19 cover key concepts in biological weapon efecs. Bi-
ological weapons are used to attack producivity and a specifc casualty rate is required to destroy specifc
types of targets. The envelope-of-acion concept is important for understanding the time aspec of integrat-
ing biological weapons into military plans. Make use of the term “G-Day”, a term used by the Chemical
Corps for CB operations since the Second World War (G for either Gas or Germ). The delayed casualty
efec of biological weapons may contribute to the surprise, and biological aerosols are able to defeat targets
normally proteced by concealment or cover. Unlike most any other weapon system, biological weapons
do not physically destroy targets and can be seleced for a less than lethal efec – aspecs that engender
possibilities not previously considered by military planners. On the surface the less than lethal aspec is ap-
pealing until it is quantifed for a large area target (i.e., in the thousands if an M210 were used on a densely
populated city with biological having a 2% fatality rate).
• Posology. One of the most important concepts of chemical biological weapons to understand is the posol-
ogy (i.e., the science of dose and dosage). One page 12 of Te Sergeant it is seen that biological weapons
are area weapons, mass acion weapons, and mass casualty weapons; corresponding to amount (quantity),
extent (area), and degree (casualties) on page 17. These are inter-related, e.g., if the area is decreased, then
the loading of agent on the target increases and so does the casualty rate. This relationship works because
of posology as detailed on page 13, where the amount is the Quantity. The Quantity (Q
0
) translates into a
casualty by covering half the target with a Dosage (D
0
), which in turn translates into an inhaled Dose (d
0
).
On page 14 the Dose-Response relationship shows to indicate the probability of a casualty, so if a target
receives a Q
50
, then half of it is covered with an ICt
50
, were on the average people throughout the target will
breathe in an ID
50
for an integrated 50% casualty rate for the target. Mathematically this is a transitivity, so
that halving the Quantity translates to a halving of the Dosage, and conversely a halving of the Dose; and
according to the Dose-Response for the independent acion of biologicals represents a 30% casualty rate,
changing the notation to Q
30
, ICt
30
, and ID
30
respecively. The mathematical relationship is also surjecive,
meaning that there is more than one Dosage fgure corresponding to a fgure of Dose (e.g., diferent rates
of breathing), and conversely there are multiple Quantity fgures corresponding to a fgure of Dosage (e.g.,
diferent feld conditions).
Logisically – Review pages 16 – 17 and 20 – 47 of Te Sergeant. The planning process on page 16 is how biological
weapons were incorporated into war plans during the 1960s. Field Manual FM 3-10 Chemical Biological Weapons
Employment, and its classifed supplement for biological weapons FM 3-10A represented the docrine, capabilities and
weapon expenditure estimating methods for biological weapons available or expeced to be available in three to fve
years. It was frst published in 1962 and again in 1966. Commands were to perform detailed target analyses to deter-
mine if the weapon systems should be incorporated in Operational or Contingency Plans (OPLANs or CONPLANs).
The Chemical Biological Radiological Element (CBRE) was to lead the efort, using G2 (Intelligence), G3 (operations),
G4 (logistics), and in the case of the MGM-29 Sergeant Missile the Fire Support Element (FSE) to propose how bio-
logical weapons were to be included into war plans.
For estimating the logistics involved with the M210 for Tularemia (TT), it is necessary to use the Half-Life Estimate ta-
ble (page 25), Source Strength Graph (page 26), Bomblet Density table (page 31) , and Weapon Efecs Graphs (pages
42 – 47). By understanding the temperature-time infuence of the stockpile-to-target-sequence to source strength, ac-
counting for delivery and location errors in selecing a Height of Burst (HOB), and the infuences of feld conditions in
selecing the proper Weapon Efecs Graph and adjustment facors, it is possible to determine the number of warheads
for a specifc casualty rate, the casualty rate from a specifc attack, and the maximum usable age of the M210 warhead.
Estimating weapon efecs was derived from the work of Kenneth L. Calder of the BWL. He was a mathematician,
formerly from Porton Down, England where he worked as Oliver Graham Sutton’s understudy on atmospheric difu-
sion. Sutton is credited with devising the Gaussian model for estimating atmospheric difusion. Calder had developed
a LaPlace transform model for estimating biological weapon efecs from an area source (the bases of the Weapon Ef-
fecs Graphs in Te Sergeant). Also critical to biological weapon efecs is the science of aerobiology, which the BWL
was a leading pioneer.
The reason that biological weapons are not to be used during unstable atmospheric conditions (page 34) is that those
conditions are where there is biological aerosols are rapidly dispersed upward under strong sunlight and low winds,
conditions having the least biological load on a target. What is not represented in Te Sergeant is Open Air Facors
(OAF), an aerobiological phenomenon discovered in the 1970s in forests and cities where the decay rate was substan-
tially higher in the open than in a closed chamber. It was later found to relate to the presence of highly reacive chem-
icals in the air having a biocide efec. If the United States biological weapons program had continued, it is likely OAF
would have been accounted for in a manner similar to Rainout using some benchmark of air quality.
Defensively – Pages 48 – 58 of Te Sergeant cover biological defense. The United States seleced biologicals which
though highly infecive, were also had a low contagion. Therefore, it was expeced that using Tularemia would not re-
quire quarantine, isolation, or have signifcant hazards after use which might impac military operations. It is interest-
ing to note that to this day the preferred treatment for Tularemia is streptomycin. The Tularemia vaccine developed to
protec United States forces had one draw-back that has hampered its consideration today – it can revert to a virulent
strain for unknown reasons. Also, on the radiological battlefeld, a live vaccine may turn into an infecion. In general,
the defensive material is for historical perspecive and to depic the risks played in the conduc of biological operations.
The distincion is that while a military force should have means for protecing against biological weapon efecs, those
that acually plan to use such weapons have the beneft of knowing the source strength and agent involved to make a
more precise investment.
Alternatively – the material on pages 59 – 64 of Te Sergeant represent an extension of the methodology in the book.
The military establishment did not expec to use lethal biological weapons in anything short of a nuclear confic. The
Sergeant was a produc of the United States Army’s Pentomic era, a time when the army was strucured to fght on
the tacical nuclear battlefeld. As such, biological fres must be coordinated with nuclear fres to avoid a biological
equivalent to “pre-initiation.” However, the radiological efecs on the human immune system also create a synergistic
efec for using biological and nuclear weapons together.
There was work to create a biological warhead for the Sergeant missile using 5.1-inch fettner rotor bomblets. These
would have the advantage of greater area coverage and by using dry-type agents deliver more infecive doses to the tar-
get. While the biological program had explored a great many diseases as possible biologicals, the ones available from
the X201 facility in the late 1960s was limited to Tularemia (SR), Anthrax (TR), Q Fever (LM), Venezuelan Equine
Encephalitis (DK), and Porcine Brucellosis (OZ) in wet-type formulations. Dry-type formulations were also available,
but in far more limited quantities.
The same method for estimating weapon efecs for wet-type Tularemia (TT) can be used, so long as the Source
Strength can be estimated as detailed on page 25. What is missing is the infuence of other storage temperatures on
the source strength and the aerobiological decay rate. Each biological formulation has its own unique storage stabil-
ities and aerobiological decay rates. For most purposes of comparison, an aerobiological decay rate of 0% to 5% per
minute is reasonable, assuming no sunlight. If students can estimate weapon efecs for these alternative agents, they
can also make their own analysis to estimate the possible weapon efecs of biologicals of more contemporary concern
(e.g., Ebola).
The 1966 edition of FM 3-10 mentions the possibility of using entomological bomblets without further detail. Yellow
Fever Mosquitoes (UT) were standardized as an A item in 1959, and there was a producion facility construced. How-
ever, targeting studies in the early 1960s demonstrated that UT was not logistically feasible. Using the information on
pages 63 and 64 it demonstrates this point.
Assessment
Discussion – class participation in discussion using the information in Te Sergeant is a basic means to assess student
understanding of the material. There are three paradoxes which will refec a deeper understanding of the material
that should be considered:
a) Policy versus Capabilities. If the policy in 1968 did not permit the use of lethal biological weapons unless
in retaliation, then how did the M210 conform to national policy? Tularemia (SR) is a lethal biological.
National policy may have permitted frst-use of incapacitating biological weapons in a special emergency,
but could SR be considered incapacitating due to the disparity of medical treatment available?
b) Scenarios versus Efecs. Biological weapons like the M210 would have rendered substantial military ef-
fecs, even though they had logistical challenges and were highly sensitive to changes feld conditions (cause
and efec). What scenarios, if any, would have been politically reasonable for using such weapons (anteced-
ents and consequences)?
c) Efecs versus Reliability. Military commanders require weapons that are not only destrucive, but also
reliable and safe. Was the M210 reliable? What role does human testing play in validating weapon efecs,
and why would the more lethal Anthrax (TR) be an unreliable choice of biological? What role would con-
tagion play in military selecion of biological weapons?
Examination – A multiple choice exam may be given to test student’s working knowledge. The questions should be
designed in a manner to not have specifc correlation to material in Te Sergeant, but involve a hypothetical scenario
where the student must use Te Sergeant to conceptually solve the problem. For example:
a) If the quantity of dry-type Ebola (Eb) necessary for inficing 50% casualties to a target under some
nominal feld conditions (Q
50
) is 1 kg/km
2
, what would be a reasonable estimate of quantity necessary for
inficing 30% casualties?
a. 0.27 kg/km
2
b. 0.3 kg/km
2
c. 0.5 kg/km
2
d. 0.8 kg/km
2
The correc answer is “c” 0.5 kg/km
2
based after the posological theory of CB weapons where the expeced Q
30
is half
of the Q
50
.
Exercise – Students use the information in Te Sergeant to complete a table of casualty efecs (%) assuming four
half-lifes weapon age:
HOB
(feet)
Open Terrain Urban Terrain High Aerobiological Decay
Graph A Graph B Graph C Graph D Graph E Graph F
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
The table may be shortened to only a few HOBs and feld conditions, or expanded to include other terrain features
such as hilly, wooded, and jungle. A useful outcome would be to summarize the information into a more simplifed
table with Low and High HOB and percent casualties. An alternative, or for extra-credit, would be to compare Tula-
remia (SR) against the other biologicals on page 62.
Writing – Students work individually or in groups to complete one of two possible writing assignments:
a) Target Analysis Paper. Prepare a detailed target analysis as outlined on Page 17 and using information
in The Sergeant. Assume the Sergeant missile launcher is located at the school and the prevailing weather
conditions associated with the month or semester of the course. Students are to selec targets within range
of the Sergeant assuming a commander’s vision to use the M210 to neutralize an enemy’s base of support
in the region before ceasing the area and repurposing logistical facilities to support future operations. For
extra credit students should analyze possibilities of items on pages 61 – 64 as recommendations.
b) Hypothetical Treat Assessment Memorandum. Students prepare a fve page memorandum to a policy
maker assessing the threat from a reported cruise missile comparable to the Tomahawk using 5.1-inch
Flettner Rotar bomblets to deliver a dry-type militarized human prion biological (PrP
mil
). Students will
need to make own assumptions on weapon characeristic and efecs using information colleced from
public sources, including number of bomblets and coverage of each cruise missile. Students should make
comparisons with other possible weapon systems for reference. The instrucor may choose to change the
weapon system and possible agent, supplying the information in a one-page faux intelligence report and
lecuring on the style used in National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).
ANNEX A - Parts of the Book
Theme Pages Purpose
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
1 – 4
Introduces the security situation in 1968, the sergeant missile, comparison
of Biological, Nuclear, and Chemical warheads, and details of the M210
Biological Warhead.
5 – 6
Description of the roles and policies associated with biological weapons in
the United States in 1968.
D
o
c
t
r
i
n
e
7 – 12
The doctrinal characteristics of biological weapons in terms of targeting,
principles of war, and capabilities.
13 – 15
Introduces the fundamental operation of chemical biological weapons
(posology), infectivity aspects of biological aerosols, biological casualties,
and specifc envelope-of-action for Tularemia casualties.
16 – 20
How biological weapons are incorporated into war plans, targeting,
outcomes, timing, and logistics.
L
o
g
i
s
t
i
c
s
21 – 23 Stockpile-to-target-sequence from production to deployment.
24 – 26
Infuence of storage temperature on estimating source strength of
biological weapons.
27 – 30 Stockpile-to-target-sequence from issuing to impacting target.
31 – 33
The area coverage requirements and bomblet density of the M210 warhead
based on height of burst and accuracy.
W
e
a
p
o
n

E
f
e
c
t
s

E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
34 – 35 Atmospheric Stability infuences on biological weapon efects.
36 Aerobiology of wet-type Tularemia (TT).
37 Infuence of enemy protective action on biological weapon efects.
38 – 47
Method and graphs for estimating biological weapon efects in terms
of number of weapons, casualties, and weapon age for diferent feld
conditions.
B
i
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l

D
e
f
e
n
s
e
48 Medical treatment, prophylaxis, and vaccination pertaining to Tularemia.
49 – 54 Troop safety acceptable risks and minimum safe distance estimation.
55 – 58 Protective action, decontamination and retroactive hazards.
N
u
c
l
e
a
r

C
o
m
b
a
t
59 – 60 Using biological weapons with nuclear weapons.
T
h
e

F
u
t
u
r
e
61 – 64
Future enhancements, alternatives, and possibilities for the M210 warhead
in 1968.
T
h
e

E
n
d
65 What actually happened in 1968, 1969, and 1975.