Thomas

The Socialist Republic of Chile Author(s): Jack Ray Thomas Source: Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Apr., 1964), pp. 203-220 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165299 . Accessed: 27/09/2013 15:57
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THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF CHILE
Jack Ray Thomas' standards,Chile has enjoyed a remarkablystable By Latin-American there have been significantintervalsof political unrest government. Yet, marked by violence and internal disorder. At both the beginning and the end of the nineteenth century, Liberals and Conservativesclashed in bloody battles, opening wounds that festered for many years.2 In the early decades of the twentieth century, the military revolted three times in the space of eight years (1924-1932) in order to promote social reform. Marmaduke Grove Vallejo figured prominentlyin these events, first as a participant in the January uprising of 1925, later as an opponent of the dictatorshipof Carlos Ibfiez del Campo, and finally as a leader of the military forces that overthrew the governmentof Juan Esteban Montero Rodriguez and established the Socialist Republic of Chile. By studying Grove'simportantbut neglected role in Chilean affairs it is possible to understandmore completely the winds of change that swept the nation during these critical years. In July, 1931, a wave of strikes and popular demonstrationsforced del Campo to resign the presidency and retire the dictatorCarlosIbanfez to Buenos Aires. By virtue of Article 66 of the Constitutionof 1925, the vice-presidency devolved upon Juan Esteban Montero, Minister of Interior.3 On July 27, Monterotook office, organized a new ministry,and soon afterwardsannounceda presidentialelection for October 4.
'A Doherty Foundation Fellowship made possible examinationof Chilean source material for this article. 2I the nineteenth century, the Conservativesdiffered from the Liberals mainly in religious matters. The Conservatives supported the Roman Catholic Church in politics while the Liberals were anti-clerical. For further discussion of these parties see: Alberto Edwards Vives, La fronda aristocrdtica(5th ed.; Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, S. A., 1959); Domingo Amunategui, El progreso intelectual y politico de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Nascimento, 1936); Ricardo Donoso, Desarrollo politico y social de Chile desde la Constituci6n de 1833 (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1942); and Rene Leon Echaiz, Evolucion de los partidos politicos (Santiago: Editorial Ercilla, 1989). 3Chile has no elected vice-president. When the president dies, leaves the country, or is deposed in an insurrection, a minister, designated by a law of succession, becomes vice-president and rules in that capacity until elections can be held. For a discussion of this practice see: Jose Guillermo Guerra, La constitucion de 1925 (Santiago: Establecimientos Graficos "Balcells and Co.," 1929).

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In a rare show of unity, the four major political parties - Liberals, Conservatives, Radicals, and Democrats - separately nominated Montero for the Presidency; a few fraternal organizations and dissident factions placed the name of Arturo Alessandri Palma, a former president, in nomination. In order to avoid a charge of conflict of interest, Montero resigned the vice-presidency in favor of Manuel Trucco, his Minister of the Interior. Trucco remained in office until December 4, when Montero, who had been elected by a wide margin, was inaugurated.4 From the very outset, the Montero government found itself in serious economic difficulties. A great world-wide depression had paralyzed the economy. By 1932, copper and nitrate exports, the backbone of the Chilean economy, fell 89 per cent from 1929 levels. Demand for nitrate had sharply fallen off after World War I while the advent of depression further reduced prices.5 No one, of course, blamed Montero for the depression, but the citizenry expected from him a swift and effective solution to their economic problems. Politically, Montero's government was a coalition of Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals. The smaller parties, however, which represented the workers, who suffered most from the depressed economy, had no voice in the administration and consequently no sympathy for it. Unemployed laborers began to go over in great number to the Socialist, Communist, and other more appealing radical reform movements. Moreover, as the economic crisis deepened many professional people and army officers, who had been Montero's political allies, lost faith in him. Even in his own party (the Radical), there were some who thought him too conservative. They cited as proof the fact that Montero accepted aid from any political party - be it Liberal, Conservative, or far right of center.6 Of the many criticisms leveled at Montero's government two stood out above all others. The first was his stubborn refusal to abolish Cosach, the nitrate industry monopoly which Ibaniez had established and which foreign capital largely controlled. Second, Montero's critics condemned his failure to dissolve the National Congress, allegedly sel ected by Ibaniez, a body which had served as a rubber stamp for his tyranny. In vain did Montero point out that the dissolution of the nitrate monopoly would dislocate the domestic economy and that his
4Alberto Edwards Vives and Eduardo Frei, Historia de los partidos chilenos (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, S. A., 1949), p. 212. 'P. T. Ellsworth, Chile: An Economy in Transition (New York: Macmillan, 1945), pp. 6-8. Edwards and Frei, Historia de los partidos chilenos, pp. 215-16.

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dismissal of Congress would be an unconstitutional act. His explanations satisfied no one and disaffection grew in the country.7 Into this tense political atmosphere in late 1931 stepped Marmaduke Grove Vallejo. Grove, at an early age, embarked upon a military career which carried him to a commission in the army and a five-year tour of duty studying military strategy in Germany. As a result of this experience, Grove contrasted the socially-progressive, orderly, efficient Germany with his backward, disorderly, inefficient Chile. He concluded that alterations must be made in his homeland. By 1920, he was a Major assigned as assistant director of the Military School. As an expression of his growing social consciousness, he tried to institute a program of hot lunches for those public school students, in the vicinity of the academy, whose parents could not afford a healthy noon meal. In the important presidential election of 1920, Grove openly supported Arturo Alessandri, the reform candidate, which promptly cost him his position in Santiago. His superior transferred Grove to an artillery regiment in Traiguen where he remained for a year before Alessandri, now president, returned him to his academy post. But Grove could not refrain from participation in the military revolts of September, 1924, and January, 1925. Later, Ibfiez, the military dictator, sent him to Europe and then, in 1929, cashiered Grove from the air force for plotting against the dictatorship. In 1930, after the failure of a barracks revolt in which Grove participated, Ibaniez' police exiled him to Easter Island. Escaping to Tahiti with the assistance of his friend and co-conspirator, Arturo Alessandri, he made his way to Europe where he intended to remain permanently. But to live in exile requires some means of livelihood and Grove had none. He therefore returned to Chile in the hope of securing a pension for his thirty years of military service. In Santiago Grove visited Manuel Trucco, provisional vice-president, and urged immediate action on his claim. Trucco pointed out that a vice-president could not grant him a pension without the approval of the Senate. The approval, he explained, would be very difficult for a provisional government to obtain. A month later, after Montero took office, Grove took his case to the new government, only to be met with the same reluctance.8 Montero and Trucco knew Grove to be an ardent social reformer, a restless, and, in some respects, a dangerous man. Yet, they recognized
7 Alfredo Guillermo Bravo: 4 de junio: El festin de los audaces (Santiago: Empresa Letras, 1932), p. 52. 8 Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, "Nuevamente en el pais," Claridad, April 7, 1938; and Marmaduke Grove, "Comandante en jefe de la Escuela Aviaci6n," Claridad, April 8, 1938. These are two of some seventy autobiographicalfarticles which appeared in the Socialist newspaper, Claridad, in preparation for Grove's presidential candidacy in the 1938 election.

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that he had been a competent air force officer whose men maintained a deep affection for him. Although the government disliked the idea of Grove's leaving the country, at the same time it feared the consequences if he remained. It was common knowledge that the followers of the late dictator Ibanez sought support among the armed services. Consequently, in February, 1932, Montero decided to reinstate Grove as Commodore of the Air in the hope that his influence would sustain the air force in its loyalty to the government.9 Meanwhile, the political situation in Chile steadily deteriorated. Shortly after election, the Montero government disbanded a special tribunal that had been established to investigate the "crimes" of Ibaiiez. To Montero this investigation appeared pointless, since Ibanez was already in exile and beyond the government's reach. The government, he explained, would have had to pay the commissioners at a time when the economic situation demanded public frugality. The Chilean people resented the dissolution of this commission, suspecting some governmental association with the ex-dictator. Worse still for the popularity of his government, Montero adamantly refused to call congressional elections or to purge the former supporters of Ibfiez from that body. Early in 1932, opposition elements began to crystallize. On January 27, Aurelio Nuiiez Morgado, a close associate of Alessandri, called a meeting at his home. Among the few non-alessandristas present was Eugenio Matte Hurtado, the founder of Nueva Acci6n Politica, a small Socialist political action group. In the course of their conversation they reached an agreement that Cosach should be abolished and new congressional elections held. Characteristically, both men regarded an insurrection as the only means to attain these ends. A loyal opposition working within the constitutional framework of government would take too long, they felt, to effect the desired reforms. At a second meeting, again held in the Niuiez house, one of Matte's supporters submited a list of ministers to be named when Montero fell. Significantly, every name on the list was a supporter of Alessandri, who was at this time the acknowledged leader of the majority of the reform parties. At a third meeting, held at the same residence, the conspirators
9For a varying view on Grove's character and his reputation as a military officer see: Ram6n Vergara Montero, Por rutas extraviadas (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1933), pp. 141-43. Sefior Vergara was Undersecretary of Aviation in the Montero government and as such, Grove's superior. Carlos Saez M., Chief of the General Staff in 1932, evaluates Grove's personality, after a long acquaintanceship, in his three-volume work, Recuerdos de un soldado: El ejercito y la politica (Santiago: Biblioteca Ercilla, 1934), III, 60f. Further information was compiled in a series of interviews with three of Grove's children, Hiram, Rebecca, and Blanca Elena, all now residing in Santiago. The Chilean journalist, Mario Planet, described Grove as members of the Socialist Party knew him in the thirties and forties.

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formed a revolutionary committee, again composed mainly of alessandristas, but which now included Matte. For the time being Grove remained outside this plot, loyally carrying out his duties to the government.10 Meanwhile, the periodical Hoy, and the daily Socialist newspaper, Cronica, controlled by Alessandri, hammered away at Montero. Carlos DAvila, a journalist who had been ambassador to the United States during the Ibaniez regime, edited Hoy. He assailed the administration for its failure to come to grips with economic problems and its refusal to call congressional elections. These attacks were as vehement as those launched by Cronica, but instead of allying himself with Alessandri, DAvila remained loyal to the man he served for three years in Washington." Oddly enough, it was not the more articulate alessandristas who first attempted to overthrow Montero's government but the followers of Ib6fiez. In March, 1932, Valparaiso police uncovered evidence implicating Daivila in a plot against the government. Although the court failed to convict DAvila, the trial did bring to light the fact that the rebels had unsuccessfully contacted Alessandri for his support. The defendants also admitted that they had discussed the possibility of enlisting Grove in their conspiracy but had not contacted him. Two of the conspirators received short sentences for attempted insurrection. But, less than three months later, when Davila came to power, their sentences were commuted and several obtained responsible posts in the government.12 At the very beginning of April, a group of air force officers began to plot against Montero's government. Learning of their meetings Grove called the participants to his office and persuaded them to abandon their plans. In an effort to enhance his own position with the government Grove informed Montero of his intervention and took full credit for averting the insurrection. But, as Grove stifled one conspiracy, others appeared throughout Chile. By the middle of May the opposition forces had converged into three major factions. Arturo Merino Benitez, who had been dismissed from his position in the air force by the Montero government, led the first. He firmly suported Arturo Alessandri. A second faction, headed by Carlos D6vila, ostensibly owed
10 Boletinde las sesionesordinarias, de Senadores, Camara I, May23, 1934,p. 93 and June 11, 1934, p. 283. The meetingsare also discussedin RicardoDonoso, 1954) Economica, (MexicoCity: Fondo de Cultura Alessandri, y demoledor agitador was the eventsto come out of these early gatherings II, 78. One of the important refusal of the Universityof Chile's Federationof Studentsto participate. They in professional that they had no confidence declinedon the grounds politicians. 1 Camara Boletinde las sesionesordinarias, de Senadores, I, May 23, 1934, 93. 4 de junio:El festin de los audaces,pp. 71-82. 12 Bravo,

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its allegiance to Carlos Ibaniez. Both parties relied heavily upon military support. The third group, under the guidance of Eugenio Matte Hurtado, drew its strength from the workers, a portion of the lower middle class, and some intellectuals.13 Matte, for his part, intended to succeed without military support, basing his hopes solely on a general strike. But, he soon realized the ineffectiveness of worker demonstrations and altered his plans to include some cooperation with the military. Matte next turned to Commodore Grove for advice and assistance. He knew of Grove's concern for social reform and of his popularity with his fellow officers. He suspected, with cynical sagacity, that Grove would agree to resort to insurrection if he could be convinced that a change of government was imperative. To Matte's overtures Grove at first turned a deaf ear. He confessed a sympathy for the views expressed but insisted that he had pledged to support Montero when he returned to active duty earlier in the year. By the end of April, the military had agreed upon a joint policy to be followed in the event of an uprising. The navy issued a secret document which indicated that it would defend the government only if such action did not conflict with the wishes and desires of the other branches of service. Inter-service solidarity must prevail even if it meant the end of the legally-constituted government.14 In the meantime, Grove's relations with the Montero government improved immeasurably. By revealing the details of a dangerous conspiracy against the government, Grove had dispelled earlier suspicions. He therefore took the opportunity to discuss the problems of Cosach and congressional elections with the president. When Montero sharply rejected his advice, Grove warned that if the government did not settle these and other old problems quickly the consequences could prove to be disastrous for the government.15 While Grove appeared to be moving closer to the government, Davila, working with a group of conspirators, had evolved a program of reforms which La Opinion, the left-wing newspaper, set forward on May 5. In the so-called Davila Plan, he pointed out that unemployment was the greatest problem facing Chile. Neither workman's compensation or public-works projects, DAvila believed, would solve the issue. In his view the solution. lay with the establishment of state enterprises. At the heart of the plan was a national bank which would
Camarade Senadores, Boletin de las sesiones ordinarias,I, May 23, 1934, p. 95. 4 Bravo, 4 de junio: El festin de los audaces, pp. 25-30. "5 MarmadukeGrove, "Los dias que precedieron al 4 de junio," Claridad, April 10, 1938.
1

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finance state companies in such varied fields as agriculture, mining, industry, transportation, commerce, and public utilities. This bank could not function properly, however, unless there was a general reorganization of the government. Representatives of each state enterprise would meet in an economic council which would in turn inform an executive committee, composed of the president of the republic, several ministers of state, and the president of the state bank, of its progress. Davila intended this committee to manage the national economy. Midway through the month of May the revolutionary committee shifted its meetings to Eugenio Matte's apartment. In the absence of Nufiez Morgado, who was directing Alessandri's Senatorial campaign, Matte assumed leadership of this group. His first maneuver was to counter D&vila's program for a planned economy with a scheme of his own, called the Lagarrigue Plan. Matte's thinking, though remarkably similar to Davila's program, represented a step closer to a Socialist economy.16 With both groups now in open support of economic programs their leadership drifted together. By this time Matte was the sole leader of the coalition of alessandristas and Socialists. His followers refused to place complete faith in Alessandri as the leader of the new government. They had progressed far beyond Alessandri's reform program of 1920, and they firmly believed that time had by-passed Alessandri. This faction, now dominated by Socialists, began to negotiate with DAvila, who had used his friendship with Arturo Merino Benitez to enlist the support of Pedro Lagos and Aurelio Concha, leaders of the School of Infantry. Early in June, the rebels met at the home of Pedro Lagos. Matte, Aurelio Concha, Grove, DAvila, and various military officers attended the gathering. For some time Davila had tried to win Grove's support, but because of his close relationship with Ibtfiez Grove found him unacceptable. As a result, Grove objected to DAvila's presence at the meeting and spent most of the evening sulking. The discussion not only revolved about the familiar theme of Cosach and congressional elections but also reached the matter of securing military support for the movement. After a lengthy examination of the political situation the officers present agreed to visit Montero the next morning - June 3. They would tell him that they could not guarantee the support of the military in case of rebellion. Instead they would inform the president that reforms must be made at once or they would be forced to intervene. The plan called for civilians to accompany the officers. To emphasize
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Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, II, 82.

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their opposition,they designated noon the next day for a general strike. This would be the first step toward the overthrowof Montero.17 In the meantime, inside La Moneda, rumors circulated of growing unrest among the military, particularlyat the aviation headquartersin El Bosque. Similarrumors,many implicating Grove, had inundated the government for some time with the result that the leadership paid little attentionto this new crop.18 On the morning of June 3rd, Grove called a meeting to explain the political situationto his officers. Soon after,Pedro Lagos informedGrove that the projected meeting with the government had been postponed until two o'clock. Later he called to report that the proposal had been dropped completely. News of Grove's meeting leaked out almost immediately, and the governmentat last decided that the situation might be growing serious. Previously, Grove had informed General Carlos Saez, Army Chief of Staff, that he took no part in the revolutionary intrigue. Now in the afternoon of June 3rd, after General Carlos Vergara, Commanderof the Second Division, told Siez of Grove'smorning meeting and hinted that the government planned drastic action, SAez decided to talk to Grove. In their discussion, Saez brought up Grove'searly morning meeting. Indignantly,Grove denied that the matter of insurrectionhad been mentioned to his subordinates. He pointed out that he frequently called his officers together to keep them advised of political as well as military events. He then began to denounce the injustice of his treatment at the hands of the government. He assured Saez that he would retire as soon as the governmentgranted him his pension and that he would gladly leave the country if the government desired. His attitude convinced Saez that Grove was a victim of his enemies' foul play.l9 While Grove and Saez talked the government moved swiftly. At a cabinet meeting Ignacio Urrutia Manzano,Minister of Defense, claimed possession of material that would prove Grove the central figure in a plot against the government. The president hoped to avoid a hasty decision but the cabinet insisted on expelling Grove from the service. After further conferences with high-ranking government officials and
military leaders, Montero finally agreed to fire Grove.20
17Jorge Grove Vallejo, Descorriendo el velo (Valparaiso: Imprenta "Aurora de Chile," 1934), pp. 9-10; and Marmaduke Grove, "Los dias que precedieron al 4 de junio," Claridad, April 12, 1938. 18 Manuel Aranguiz Latorre, El 4 de junio (Santiago: Empresa Zig-Zig, 1933), pp. 11-12. Sefior Aranguiz was the private secretary to President Juan Esteban Montero. 19 Saez, Recuerdos de un soldado, III, 131-43. Ramon Vergara, Por rutas extraviadas,pp. 102-04. 20

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At 6:30 Urrutia Manzano called to tell Grove that he had been relieved of his command. Shocked and angry Grove shouted into the phone, "Tell President Montero that among all the hands he has shaken lately, none are more loyal than mine, and if you proceed in this manner you assume responsibility for that which could follow." Grove also promised the Minister that his men would take measures to insure that no injustice was done him.21 After dismissing Grove the government had to face the problem of a successor. The two logical choices were Captains Jessen and Aracena. Neither had been present at Grove's morning meeting; Aracena was ill and Jessen was visiting the Naval Academy. The Under Secretary of the Air Force, Ram6n Vergara, favored Aracena for the post although he was the younger of the two. The administration accepted Vergara's choice but Aracena refused on the grounds that the president had no confidence in him. When Vergara persisted, Aracena changed his plea to ill health and suggested Jessen. Jessen also refused partially because of past affronts by the government over promotions, and partially because he was a second choice. Both Aracena and Jessen protested against Grove's dismissal in their conversations with Ramon Vergara. With the refusal of any high-ranking air force officer to accept Grove's vacated position, Ram6n Vergara himself replaced the rebellious colonel.22 At the El Bosque air base Grove prepared to leave for home. As he packed his belongings, a group of officers vowed they were ready to fight to forestall the government's action. Grove later claimed that he planned to accept dismissal quietly, but when he saw how much support he had among his officers, he decided to remain and defend his position.23 Meanwhile, at La Moneda, the government learned that coded messages were being sent from El Bosque to army units in and around Santiago. At this point Ram6n Vergara decided to go immediately to the air base to assume command and thereby halt the insurrection. Before leaving, he contacted his brother, Carlos, Commander of the Second Division, who assured him that all military units would support the government and that Pedro Lagos and the Infantry School could be counted upon to protect Montero and his cabinet. Ramon left instructions with his brother that if he did not return by morning, Lagos and his troops were to occupy the air base. On arriving Marmaduke April 12, 1938 and "El 4 de junio,"Claridad, Grove,Claridad, April 13, 1988. 22 Forrutasextraviadas, pp. 100-02. Ram6n Vergara, 3Marmaduke April13, 1938. Grove,Claridad,

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at El Bosque Vergara found only hostility among the officers and considerable evidence of their allegiance to Grove. When he threatened to inform the government of their attitude, the officers took Vergara prisoner but not before he shot one of his assailants in the arm.24 When Grove returned to his office from dinner, he first prepared plans for an air assault on the capital. He then sent representatives to army units of the Santiago garrison to enlist their aid. By midnight word that many unit commanders had agreed to join the movement reached Grove, followed shortly by the arrival of Pedro Lagos who announced that his Infantry School troops, under orders to capture the air base, were but one kilometer away. After a short conversation with Grove, Lagos agreed to hold his troops in their position while Grove sent an ultimatum to President Montero.25 With the Infantry School force temporarily neutralized, Grove turned once more to the problem of acquiring support from the army units. He invited those who had already pledged their allegiance to send representatives to a meeting scheduled for the air base; at the same time, he sent subordinate officers to seek adhesion of other troops. Despite the obvious progress of the movement Grove began to doubt Lagos' sincerity. He learned, from his informants throughout Santiago, that Lagos had accompanied General Vergara on a tour of military installations in an effort to win support for the government. Grove suspected that Lagos intended to maintain good relations with both sides until he could be certain of the victor.26 Yet in spite of this Grove had to cooperate with Lagos because the Infantry School constituted the best trained and most powerful military unit in Santiago. Consequently, Grove found himself forced to negotiate with Lagos without fully trusting him. The two military leaders then agreed upon a junta to replace Montero. Grove insisted upon filling one vacancy with Matte while Lagos demanded a position for Davila. The third member, retired army general Arturo Puga, was expected to act as mediator between the two antagonistic elements represented by Matte and Davila.27 While Grove and Lagos resolved their difficulties, the government desperately strove to avoid a disaster. Finally, after several late evening meetings, Montero decided to attack El Bosque. He planned a twopronged advance composed of artillery regiments moving in from the north while the Infantry School attacked from the south. Montero en24Ram6n Vergara, Por rutas extraviadas,pp. 113-15. 2 MarmadukeGrove, Claridad, April 13, 1938. 26MarmadukeGrove, "Alessandri el 4 de y junio," Claridad, April 14, 1938. 27Marmaduke Grove, Claridad, April 14, 1938; and Saez, Recuerdos de un soldado, III, 152.

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trusted the entire maneuver to Pedro Lagos, who moved his troops into position and then informed Grove of his action. Through the night news of one defection after another arrived at La Moneda, rendering the government's position ever more difficult. At 6:30 on the following morning, Lagos arrived at the presidential offices for a high-level meeting. He reported that the situation was more difficult than expected, yet he staunchly maintained that he would attack if President Montero issued a written order. Lagos also carried with him Grove's ultimatum, demanding surrender by noon. In these uncertain circumstances the government played a careful and waiting game. The carabineros remained uncommitted, which left Montero some hope. In addition, a group of his representatives visiting several army regiments, here and there received some encouragement. Shortly before noon Montero sent a mission to El Bosque to attempt to reason with Grove. But now he was confident of support from a majority of units within the Santiago garrison. The meeting accomplished nothing more than an extension of Grove's ultimatum to 2:00 that afternoon.28 Meanwhile, the atmosphere in Santiago grew tense. Crowds formed in the streets calling for the downfall of the government and the establishment of the Socialist Republic. Earlier there had been some popular display of support for Montero when a group of university students demonstrated outside the Moneda, but by mid-day all signs pointed to a general acceptance of the rebellion.29 At a noon meeting Montero asked advice from his cabinet and other members of the government. Some ministers suggested going into the streets to seek popular support against the military; others felt they should comply with Grove's ultimatum and resign. Nearly everyone present expressed concern for the precedent which would be set by a military insurrection; but no one had any idea how to prevent it. As the meeting ended Grove's planes flew low over the city dropping leaflets which proclaimed the establishment of the Socialist Republic. The message declared that the nation was in a state of "total economic and moral bankruptcy," a situation which forced the military "to hurl down a . . . government of oligarchic reaction which served only the interests of foreign capitalism." 30 Later that same afternoon, President Montero granted extraordinary
28Aranguiz Latorre, El 4 de junio, p. 24. "9S6ez, Recuerdos de un soldado, III, 166. 30 Aranguiz Latorre, El 4 de junio, pp. 27-41; and El Mercurio, June 5, 1932.

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powers to Arturo Alessandri for the negotiation of a settlement with the revolutionaries at El Bosque. In a conference with Grove, Alessandri tried to dissuade him from revolutionary action by recalling his previous statements on the effectiveness of civilian government. Alessandri now conveyed President Montero's proposal that the insurgents could appoint cabinet members without changing the office of president. Grove remained adamant, however, and persisted in his belief that only a complete change of government, not a mere replacement of top personnel, could bring stability to Chile and respect for a legally-constituted government.31 Alessandri then reported his failure to Montero who suggested that a proposal be made to the effect that Alessandri would be vice-president to head the government that Grove and his followers would form. Still Grove declined, forcing Montero to look to the carabineros, his government's last hope. In a conference with the carabinero leadership, Montero met only evasion and hesitation which prompted him to order the police not to resist should the rebellion deteriorate into open battle.32 By 6:30 on the evening of June 4 Grove prepared to move. The rebel leaders boarded vehicles, both military and civilian, for the trip to La Moneda. Led by Grove the principal figures in the plot entered La Moneda unopposed and rode straight to the presidential offices where Montero awaited them. Nervously, Grove announced that his forces had come to depose the government and to replace it with the Socialist Republic of Chile. Montero then asked Carlos Vergara, his military adviser, if he could count on any military support. When Vergara replied in the negative Montero reluctantly turned over his government to Grove.33 The Montero government collapsed amid general indifference on the part of the citizenry, mainly because it had lost the backing of the officers commanding the Santiago Garrison. Only a few months before Montero had received the support of every major political party, yet now he could not claim the aid of one soldier or, for that matter, of one civilian in his government. Some high-placed officials spoke vaguely of assisting the president; one or two even suggested enlisting the people against the military; but no one actively opposed the rebellion. Montero, in the center of the president's red room, surrounded by rebels,
1 This meeting is discussed in Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor; Aranguiz Latorre, El 4 de junio, pp. 45-7; Saez, Recuerdos de un soldado, III, 168; and MarmadukeGrove, Claridad, April 14, 1938. "2Jorge Grove, Descorriendo el velo, p. 19; Marmaduke Grove, Claridad, April 14, 1938; and Aranguiz Latorre, El 4 de junio, pp. 46-50. 33 Marmaduke Grove, "La Republica Socialista," Claridad, April 15, 1938.

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stood with his hands in his pockets, alone, frustrated, defeated - Chile incarnate.34 The people made no attempt to rescue Montero. For those out of work, hungry, and with no recognizable future, Grove and the Socialist Republic held out hope. An economic report published by the Central Bank listed unemployment as the greatest internal problem in May, 1932. In that same month the Inspector of Work reported that this department could find jobs for only three per cent of those applying. Meanwhile, the national economy had reached the lowest point in the history of Chile. In January, 1929, monthly exports had soared to a record 256,000,000 pesos, falling three years later to 53,000,000 and by May, 1932, to 17,000,000. The same trend was evident in imports. In December, 1929, imports reached 158,000,000 pesos dropping to only 6,900,000 in May, 1932.35 With Montero deposed, the junta set about to construct the Socialist Republic. From the outset, however, Matte and Davila were unable to reach agreement on the personnel of the new government. They clashed first over the selection of a cabinet, specifically over Davila's suggestion that Juan Antonio Rios be named Minister of the Interior, and Matte's wish that Grove, blocked from the junta by the Davila faction, be granted a cabinet post. Matte opposed Rios because he had been a member of Ibanez' docile congress, while Davila distrusted Grove's loyalty. Finally, in a spirit of compromise Davila withdrew Rios' name and accepted Grove as Minister of National Defense in return for the appointment of Puga as president of the junta. Rebel leaders encountered difficulty in other areas as well. Some military units grew restive, forcing Grove to spend much of his time assuring the rebels that the military should stay out of political matters, which some must have considered rather hollow advice in view of the events of preceding days. Rumor also circulated that counter revolutionaries were plotting against the new government, which led many citizens to lose confidence in its stability.36 Politically the junta exercised legislative as well as executive power. In the junta's view the congress had acted without popular support and the new government, therefore, issued a decree dissolving that body. Next, the leadership promised to hold election in the immediate future. At the same time, the junta began to adopt solutions for the many ills which confronted the nation. It announced free meals for the poor until
34 El Mercurio, June 5, 1932. 3Banco Central de Chile, Boletin Mensual, 1932, Boletin No. 52, June 30,

1932, p. 120. 86 MarmadukeGrove, Claridad, April 15, 1938 and El Mercurio,June 6, 1932.

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the employment situation had improved. For those without shelter the junta set up a temporary commission designed to find places in homes of reliable families. Desperately seeking to stabilize the financial situation, the government declared a three-day bank holiday. It followed this action with a law creating two new cabinet posts of Work and Hygiene. Both maneuvers were initiated in order to implement the social reform program of the new administration. Still another move reorganized the Ministry of Lands and Colonization in order to open up agricultural areas for unemployed farm workers. At the same time the junta granted small businessmen financial credits and established a thirty-day moratorium on debts of businesses capitalized at less than 200,000 pesos.37 A list of the decree laws proclaimed in the first days of the Socialist Republic indicates that the junta made an honest effort to restore vitality to the economy; to set up a program of government participation in many areas of everyday life; and to ease the plight of the poor, the infirm, and the unemployed. Marmaduke Grove reputedly authored one of the most controversial and famous of the early decree laws, the law of the Credito Popular. Through association with Matte and other Socialists, Grove had aquired many left-wing political ideas. In his first term as president Alessandri had stood for social reform and he and Grove exchanged views in Europe on the social problems of Chile.38 Consequently, Grove developed a social awareness seldom found in the ranks of Latin-American military forces. Grove knew that many of the unemployed borrowed from the Caja de Credito Popular, a government lending agency which used household goods and tools for collateral. When the depression struck many people had deposited, as security for cash loans, the tools with which they earned their living. Without work they could not obtain the money necessary to redeem their equipment. Consequently, Decree Law 15 dissolved the agency and ordered the return of merchandise left for collateral, which included such items as sewing machines, plumbers tools, and typewriters. The law also named clothing, explaining that people might injure their health in the winter without the proper attire. The government undertook to pay the cost of redemption for the people to whom this decree related.39 With this type of legislation the rebel government gained the support of many elements of society. The Federation of Railroad Workers, for
Secretaria General, Recopilacion de De" Contraloria General de la Repiblica, cretos Leyes, 1932. 8 Camara de Senadores. Boletin de las sesiones ordinarias, I, June 11, 1934, 281. 39Ibid.; and El Mercurio, June 6, 1932. The law was revoked after Grove's

junta fell.

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example, pledged its loyalty to the junta. At the same time, representatives from 11,500 families, living in 145 southern agricultural colonies, visited the junta to pledge their adhesion to the revolutionary cause. But opposition also developed. Chief among the antagonists, and by far the most articulate, was the Assembly of the Federation of Students of Chile. At a meeting held the day following the successful insurrection leaders of this group agreed upon an indefinite strike in protest against the new administration.40 Civilian groups did not, of course, constitute an immediate danger to the new government. Lacking any effective organization they were divided in opinion and irresolute. The major threat came from the military. To be sure, the armed forces had been the deciding factor in the downfall of the Montero government, but there was no assurance that they would not tire of the new regime and launch a revolt against it. No one recognized this fact more than Grove. Through circulars and public announcements Grove referred to the strategic position of the army behind the new administration. At the same time Grove realized the traditional antagonism to military intervention in Chile. He, therefore, tried to ease the minds of civilians by pointing out that while the army had played a prominent role in the establishment of the Socialist Republic, it was now a civilian government, not a military dictatorship.41 Davila pursued this same line of argument both at home and abroad. Seeking to reassure foreign business interests, he announced publicly:
The new Government does not represent the Soviet system in any form.... We have no intention of molesting private property now owned by ChiOf course, in order to socialize, to the extent that we leans or foreigners.... propose, it will be necessary for authority to remain in the hands of the

junta and for congress to be dissolved.4

From the outset of the new government Davila enjoyed the role of principal spokesman. Still unsatisfied he endeavored to secure ever more authority, leading many observers to believe that his ultimate aim was a dictatorship resembling that of his friend, Carlos Ibaniez. But, Grove and Matte opposed any extension of Davila's influence and authority, a fact which convinced Davila that he would have to dispose of both his fellow junta member and the Minister of National Defense. sat. Ironically, Davila resolved to destroy the junta on which he himself Aware of the universal and unreasoning fear of Communism
40 El
41

Mercurio, June 6, 1932.

Ibid. 42El Mercurio,June 7, 1932.

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throughout Chile, and particularly within military ranks, he charged that Communism daily gained strength within the government.43 Groups of army officers, by now thoroughly alarmed, met to discuss the Communist threat and the measures they should take to combat it. Grove knew of these meetings and made inquires about them. But after one high-ranking officer, General Moreno, assured him of the loyalty of the officer corps he remained confident that the army would support the new government. To bolster his confidence in the military, army officers promised Grove that they would work to maintain loyalty and discipline within their ranks.44 By June 16, after several days of calm, it appeared that the military threat had passed. That very evening, however, a column of soldiers from a Santiago regiment drew up outside the Ministry of National Defense. Sensing another insurrection Grove and his friends slipped out a back door. On the street, Grove met a friend who suggested he call out the workers to combat the army. Grove declined because he believed that it was too early to determine the extent of the uprising and that such drastic steps should be taken only as a last resort. At La Moneda Grove found a great deal of confusion with troops and civilians milling about. He immediately called the air base and received assurance that the air force supported the government and that planes stood ready to come to its assistance the moment such orders arrived.45 At 8:00 a group of naval officers arrived and demanded the resignation from the government of Matte and Grove. Both men refused to resign and Grove vainly ordered several officers to move their units into position to protect the government. Shortly after eight Pedro Lagos led the Infantry School troops against La Moneda. Meanwhile, Grove had contacted El Bosque and received the pledge of air force support. Before he could order planes into the air, however, Matte convinced him that the matter should be settled without violence. By this time communications with the air base had been severed, and Grove and Matte were at the mercy of the army. Grove tried one last desperate expedient to save the government. Taking his cause to the people he went on the radio and reviewed the political situation for his audience. Desperately he urged the citizens to take measures to counteract the military uprising. But it was all in vain. Less than a half hour after his
8 El Mercurio, June 17, 1932.

Socialistade Chile," Claridad,April 17, 4Marmaduke Grove,"La Repuiblica 1938; and El Mercurio, June 17, 1932.
4

ta," Claridad, April18, 1938.

El Mercurio, June 17, 1932; and Marmaduke Grove, "La Repiiblica Socialis-

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address the last of the loyal troops left La Moneda and Grove, along with Matte, was forced to surrender to a revolutionary committee.4 The committee members justified their act by repeating that the government had appeared to be leaning toward Communism. They placed no charges against Puga and Davila but demanded the immediate removal of Matte and Grove, both of whom, they maintained, openly propounded Communistic theories. With this announcement the military leaders took Grove and Matte into custody. Almost at once the revolutionary committee announced its intention of preserving the social reforms of the June 4 movement, while guarding against the Communist threat. Civilian organizations followed the lead of the officers and proclaimed their continuing support of the Socialistic Republic. Shortly after the fall of Grove and Matte, a new junta assumed control of the government. DAvila was held over from the previous regime joining two new members, Nolasco Cardenas, a Democrat who had been Minister of Agriculture under the junta, and Alberto Cabero, a Radical Senator. On June 17, the press announced that the junta had selected DAvila as its president. The news shocked Cabero since the junta had not yet met, and no one had mentioned to him anything about the selection of a president. Although nettled over Davila's power grab, Cabero, who wanted to retain his position on the junta, chose to remain silent. Cabero later suggested that immediate elections for congress be held, to be followed by a presidential election. But Davila insisted that elections could not be held for several months. This prompted Cabero's resignation only four days after his appointment. With only the pliable Cardenas remaining, D&vila was now the sole ruler of Chile.47 After their arrest, government police took Grove and Matte, along with some other political prisoners, aboard the destroyer Lynch and struck out for Easter Island. The Socialist Republic, in everything but name, ended on June 16. With Matte and Grove out of the way D'avila set about to perpetuate himself in power. He continued to call his government the Socialist Republic but he fostered nothing in the form of Socialist legislation for the remaining eighty-eight days of his rule. With the passage of Decree Law 50 Davila imposed strict restrictions on the freedoms of speech and press. These made it a crime, punishable by imprisonment or exile, to speak or to write, "doctrine that tend to 48 destroy by means of violence the social or political order of the State."
^Maraduke Grove, "16 de junio de 1932," Claridad, April 19, 1988; El Mercurio, June 17, 1982; and An6nimo, jPor Que Cayo Grove? (Santiago: Talleres grAficos La Naci6n, n.d.), pp. 6-7. 47Alberto Cabero, "16 de junio de 1932," El Mecurio, June 16, 1934. 4Contraloria General de la Repuiblica, Recopilaci6n de Decretos Leyes, 1932.

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In this fashion, Davila had realized his ambition. Using Grove and Matte to unseat Montero, he then proceeded to eliminate all their cohorts, imposing himself upon the Chilean people. He skillfully outmaneuveredthe alessandristasas well as his own ibanistas. While this took a great deal of political cunning, along with some extreme good fortune, Davila was not adroit enough to maintain himself in office for more than a few brief months. He, too, soon fell victim to the omnipresent military which forced his designation in September. Meanwhile, Grove and Matte from the time of their arrest protested the charge of Communist affiliation. From the Lynch they issued a statement in which they denied contact at any time with Communists. Their announcement also insisted that they had carried out the functions of government in an honest, honorable fashion. These protests went unheeded, however, and both men found themselves state prisoners on EasterIsland.49 While in exile Matte and Grove decided that their greatest weakness had been the lack of a large political party upon which they could have relied when opposition arose. They felt that if such a party had existed the army would not so easily have overturnedtheir government. They vowed that upon their return to Chile they would work to unite the many small reformparties into one great Socialist Party. The next time they rose to power it would be as a result of the strength of this party, through peaceful means. No more would they rely upon the fickle military which within a two week period carried them to La Moneda, unseated them, and sent them into exile. Both Grove and Matte held to these views. Less than a year after the collapse of the Socialist Republic they were back in Chile working to erect the Socialist Party they envisioned while on Easter Island. That party came into existence on April 19, 1933, and true to the lessons learned in the June 4 movement,it has never attempted to use the military to gain political power.
49 El Mercurio, June18, 1932.

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