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Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate CourtGR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987 FACTS: In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626 -A which orders that nocarabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be sub ject to confiscatio n and fo rf eitu re b y th e gov ern ment, to be d istributed to ch aritab le institution s an d o ther similar in stitutions as the Ch air man of th e Nation al Meat Inspection Co mmission may see f it fo r th e carab eef and to d eserv ing farmers through d isp ersal as th e Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos. On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626A. He issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not police power is properly enforced HELD: NO.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.
As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.
In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the same
lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase)
but NOT the same lawful method.
the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Monday, July 19, 2010
Philippine Association of Services Exporters Inc v Drilon Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents. G.R. June Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar No. 30, 81958 1988
skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. Issue: Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment valid. Held: "The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZONCAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents. Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent. CRUZ, J.: The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. But first the facts. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3 We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court: Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools” and of “improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country.” Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the socalled “three-flunk rule.” We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5 In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one’s ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that “every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6 The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be “swamped with mediocrity,” in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
#2 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ (Labrador, J.)
101 Phil 1155 Facts: -RA 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” – nationalizes the retail trade business -The main provisions of the Act are: “ (1) prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Phils., and against associations, partnerships and corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Phils., from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade … (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.” -Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional because it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law and that it violates international treaties. -in answer, the solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed. Issue: WON the enactment falls within the scope of the police power of the state.
Ruling: Yes. RD: The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta Date: June 24, 1983 Petitioners: City Government of Quezon City and City Council of Quezon City Respondents: Hon. Judge Vicente Ericta and Himlayang Pilipino Inc Ponente: Gutierrez Jr Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial. For several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space for pauper burial.
Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power Held: No Ratio: An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery. There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of
law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
Association of Small Landowners of the Phil v Secretary of DAR Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS (ARTS 7-11, LABOR CODE)
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. July
No. 14,
78742 1989
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
Facts: The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land.
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Issue: Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657. Held: P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner"
of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead." R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana Posted by Chester Cabalza at 8:52 AM
Cayetano vs. Monsod201 SCRA 210September 1991Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino tothe position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination becauseallegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in thepractice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, ArticleIX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and sixCommissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and mustnot have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the PhilippineBar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engagedin the practice of law for at least ten years.Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of lawis not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, andconducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have beenheld to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, whichrequires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of havingengaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s pastwork experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELECchairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten yearsdoes In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. Sarmiento vs. COMELEC212 SCRA 307, August 6, 1992 Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-2662) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-3233) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-2884) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-3155) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-2716) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-0397) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-1538) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-2939) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087 Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having beenissued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia , the Commission, sitting en banc ,took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of itDivisions. Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned SpecialCases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, ArticleIX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shallpromulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard anddecided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decidedby the Commission en banc .Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, theappeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisionspursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be inorder. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation casespending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the officeinvolved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitionscommenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such aresolution would only be an exercise in futility. 1
LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS REVIEWER BY: RENE CALLANTALAWYER’S OATH:“I, _______________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintainallegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitutionan d o b ey t h e l aw s as w el l as t h e l ega l or d e rs of t he d ul y c on s t i t ut e d authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not willingly nor willfully promote or sue any groundless,false or unlawful suit; or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay noman for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according tothe best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well as tothe court as to my clients; and I impose or purpose of evasion. So help meGod.”
* Memorize this and think that you will take this oath after the Bar and it shall be so. (Sabi ng mga pumasa na ng BAR dito lang daw sa LAWYER’S OATH umiikot ang mga tanongsa LEGAL ETHICS) Nature of a Lawyer’s Oath: ► The lawyer’s oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashingcameras and before the presence of select witness. (In re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. 285 SCRA 59, January 27. 1998). ► The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must beupheld and kept inviolable. (Sebastian v. Calis, Adm. Case No. 5118, Sept. 9, 1999) Duties of Attorneys: a.to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support theConstitution and obey the laws of the Philippines;b.observe and maintain the respect due to t he courts of justice and judicial officers;c.to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him as just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the laws;d.to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the caus es confided to him, suchmeans as only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to misleadthe judge as any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;e.to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve thesecrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with hisclient’s business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;f.to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of thecause with which he is charged;g.not to encourage either in the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest;h.never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself, the cause of thedefenseless or oppressed;i.in the defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means
ISSUE: Whether or not police power is properly enforced HELD: NO.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.
As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.
In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the same
lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase)
but NOT the same lawful method.
the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Monday, July 19, 2010
Philippine Association of Services Exporters Inc v Drilon Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents. G.R. June Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar No. 30, 81958 1988
skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. Issue: Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment valid. Held: "The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZONCAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents. Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent. CRUZ, J.: The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. But first the facts. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3 We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court: Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools” and of “improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country.” Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the socalled “three-flunk rule.” We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5 In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one’s ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that “every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6 The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be “swamped with mediocrity,” in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
#2 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ (Labrador, J.)
101 Phil 1155 Facts: -RA 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” – nationalizes the retail trade business -The main provisions of the Act are: “ (1) prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Phils., and against associations, partnerships and corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Phils., from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade … (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.” -Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional because it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law and that it violates international treaties. -in answer, the solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed. Issue: WON the enactment falls within the scope of the police power of the state.
Ruling: Yes. RD: The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.
City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta Date: June 24, 1983 Petitioners: City Government of Quezon City and City Council of Quezon City Respondents: Hon. Judge Vicente Ericta and Himlayang Pilipino Inc Ponente: Gutierrez Jr Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial. For several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space for pauper burial.
Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power Held: No Ratio: An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery. There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of
law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
Association of Small Landowners of the Phil v Secretary of DAR Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS (ARTS 7-11, LABOR CODE)
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. July
No. 14,
78742 1989
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
Facts: The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land.
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Issue: Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657. Held: P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner"
of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead." R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana Posted by Chester Cabalza at 8:52 AM
Cayetano vs. Monsod201 SCRA 210September 1991Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino tothe position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination becauseallegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in thepractice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, ArticleIX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and sixCommissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and mustnot have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the PhilippineBar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engagedin the practice of law for at least ten years.Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of lawis not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, andconducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have beenheld to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, whichrequires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of havingengaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s pastwork experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELECchairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten yearsdoes In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. Sarmiento vs. COMELEC212 SCRA 307, August 6, 1992 Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-2662) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-3233) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-2884) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-3155) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-2716) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-0397) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-1538) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-2939) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087 Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having beenissued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia , the Commission, sitting en banc ,took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of itDivisions. Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned SpecialCases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, ArticleIX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shallpromulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard anddecided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decidedby the Commission en banc .Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, theappeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisionspursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be inorder. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation casespending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the officeinvolved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitionscommenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such aresolution would only be an exercise in futility. 1
LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS REVIEWER BY: RENE CALLANTALAWYER’S OATH:“I, _______________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintainallegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitutionan d o b ey t h e l aw s as w el l as t h e l ega l or d e rs of t he d ul y c on s t i t ut e d authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not willingly nor willfully promote or sue any groundless,false or unlawful suit; or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay noman for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according tothe best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well as tothe court as to my clients; and I impose or purpose of evasion. So help meGod.”
* Memorize this and think that you will take this oath after the Bar and it shall be so. (Sabi ng mga pumasa na ng BAR dito lang daw sa LAWYER’S OATH umiikot ang mga tanongsa LEGAL ETHICS) Nature of a Lawyer’s Oath: ► The lawyer’s oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashingcameras and before the presence of select witness. (In re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. 285 SCRA 59, January 27. 1998). ► The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must beupheld and kept inviolable. (Sebastian v. Calis, Adm. Case No. 5118, Sept. 9, 1999) Duties of Attorneys: a.to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support theConstitution and obey the laws of the Philippines;b.observe and maintain the respect due to t he courts of justice and judicial officers;c.to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him as just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the laws;d.to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the caus es confided to him, suchmeans as only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to misleadthe judge as any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;e.to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve thesecrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with hisclient’s business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;f.to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of thecause with which he is charged;g.not to encourage either in the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest;h.never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself, the cause of thedefenseless or oppressed;i.in the defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means
