Zoldberg -Origins of the Modern World System, A Missing Link

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Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link The Modern World System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European WorldEconomy in the Sixteenth Century by Immanuel Wallerstein Review by: Aristide R. Zolberg World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jan., 1981), pp. 253-281 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010372 . Accessed: 24/06/2013 06:39
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Review Qairticles
ORIGINS OF THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM: A MissingLink
ByARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG*
ImmanuelWallerstein, The Modern World System.CapitalistAgriculture and the Originsof the European World-Economy Cenin the Sixteenth New York:Academic tury. Press, I974, 410 pp., $23.00; $6.50paper.**

educational curricula, history itself has re-emerged at thevery cenof ter social scientific over concerns by way of recentcontroversies and development. it may appear somemodernization At first sight, what paradoxicalto speak of a "re-emergence since the of history," the from developmental was extrapolated paradigm, broadly speaking, past experience of the West, and fostered among the macroanalytic of political a markedly orisegments scienceand sociology diachronic in contrast withthesynchronic bentof thebehavioral persuaentation, sion. Once the extrapolation had been accomplished, however,the West'shistory cametobe viewedas an unproblematic data bankwhose imperfections would be solvedby updatedtechniques of information retrieval. It is the unruliness of thepresent-intheWest itself and in the external worldon whichthe paradigmwas hurriedly imposedthattransformed thestorage facility intoa Pandora'sbox fromwhich in all its complexity, history, has escapedto challengeus again. Precisely becausewidespread dissatisfaction withtheparadigmatic extrapolationhas produced a growing in re-examining theontological interest
* An earlier version of thispaperwas presented at a panelof theConference Group on the PoliticalEconomyof AdvancedIndustrial Societiesheld in conjunction with theAnnualMeeting of the American PoliticalScienceAssociation, Washington, D.C., to Martin forhis invitation, September i979. I am especially Shefter as well as grateful to Ira Katznelson, Adam Przeworski, PeterGourevitch, and Ron Rogowskifortheir comments and criticisms of earlier drafts. ** Readersshouldbe warnedthat the paper editionomitsall footnote references, whichconstitute perhapshalf of the originaltext.Many of themcontainextensive in support of them. of the author's developments arguments as well as citations Their to themin thepresent is demonstrated references review. importance by thenumerous

EVEN as thesocial sciences began of todisplace history at all levels

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moldwithin which itwasformed, theterm "re-emergence ofhistory" is an appropriate characterization ofthepresent trend. Given this reorientation, itis notsurprising that social scientists have focused a great dealofattention on theepochal transformation ofthe cultural outlook andofthesocial, economic, andpolitical organization ofWestern in thebroad Europe period hinged around i500, as it is common wisdom thatthese changes generally constitute thematrix ofwhat we labelmodernity. Although everyone is aware that this was alsotheage ofthegreat discoveries and of European expansion, only a fewexceptional historians suchas WilliamMcNeilland Fernand haveaddressed Braudel themselves to theoverall relationship between these In phenomena. this respect, Immanuel Wallerstein hasrendered service tosocial a more considerable scientists bydelineating systematic problematique: Whatwerethespecific processes linking thetransformation of theWestin theearlymodern era withits riseto paramountcy, and how did theresulting configuration generate further in which in turn processes determinatively shaped subsequent changes other oftheworld? parts Although there is reason to hopethat a re-examination oftheearly in innovative modern erafrom a broader perspective willresult theoeleretical breakthroughs (since this fertile historical ground spawned in thenineteenth ofourprincipal traditions cenments macroanalytic in will result is also a considerable there tury), riskthatour efforts another theprincipal contenders. Sucha standoff is stalemate between as a subject unto tooccur instead thepast likely if, ofconsidering itself, we transform As we evaluate it intoa mere metaphor ofthepresent. we would of themodern historical of thebeginning analyses world, to historians MarcBloch's admonition do wellto remember therefore the ambiguity of the "theidol of origins." concerning Unraveling butalso"causes," which means word"origins," notonly"beginning" of meanoutthatthisleadsto a "cross-contamination" Blochpoints ofwhich which is a complete theworst is "a beginning ings, explanahe contion"of thehistorian's own time. By wayof thisconfusion, "in many of origins has been, casesthedemon cludes, perhaps, only themaniafor of truehistory: of thatother theincarnation enemy making judgments."' is very mucha casein point: hissolution Wallerstein's undertaking on a conjurer's trick he hasposedis founded to theproblem whereby eachother, andwhat is saidabout aremadetomirror andpresent past is saidabout what theother. His depiction tosubstantiate eachappears
1 Bloch,The Historian's Craft(New York: VintageBooks,I964),
29-3L.

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periodfromabout I450 to i65o. When considered fromthatvantagepoint,Wallerstein's characterizationof themodern worldsystem and theexplanation he givesof its are notmerely origins incomplete, but demonstrably wrong.The two flawsare inextricably relatedbecause,by minimizing the importance of one majorfeature of thesystem, he givesundueweight to theother -therebydistorting thewhole accountso much thatit becomesinaccurate.Concomitantly, the explanation an outcomeotherthan befits theone thatin factoccurred. These errors and distortions are specifically attributable to Wallerstein's systematic neglectof politicalstructures and processes. That is not to say thathe does not discussthemat all. Rather, he variously exhibits a reductionist tendency, viewingpoliticalprocesses as epiphenomenalin relation to economiccausation;a functionalist tendency, viewingparticular politicalconfigurations as arisingwhen neededby the system, withoutany otherexplanation; or merelya tendency to consider political variables as givens-a pell-mell heap akin to residual error in theregression equationsof conventional social science.In the first instance, his explanations are unpersuasive and ofteninvalid; in thesecond, he violates his own correct judgment-advanced as a criticismof otherscholars-that functional explanations providean inadequate resolution of "the geneticproblem"(p. I34, n. 8); and in the he is inexcusably third, The neglect negligent. is flagrant at thelevelof generalconceptualization, where carefulscrutiny reveals a glaring theoretical void withrespect to politicallife; and the consequences of thisvoid are repeatedly evidentat critical in the historical junctures account itself.

oftheworld ofthesixteenth century appears credible because itbears an uncanny resemblance tothefamiliar representation oftheworld of thelatetwentieth century in theliterature on dependency; and the realism ofthelatter portrait is in turn vouchsafed byitsresemblance to the ancestor. Whatever message it purports to disseminate with respect toourowntime, however, as a work ofscholarship thepresent bookmust be evaluated in relation to theunitof analysis to which it explicitly refers-the "modern worldsystem"; butthemodern world system when ? One of therequirements of theoretically oriented history is that, as outcomes keepchanging, theboundaries of theunitof analysis must be specified in timeas well as in space.In thepresent I shalltherefore review, address myself onlyto thevalidity ofWallerstein's propositions concerning the"longsixteenth that century," is,the

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drawn athavealready reviewers andcommentators Although other in this respect, lessconsideraweakness overall tention toWallerstein's ofthis flaw.2 theoretical implications tothebroader tion hasbeengiven his them before discussing at somelength It is necessary to consider becentury itself, thelongsixteenth concerning empirical propositions theintroductory from theconcluding essay, from causeit is evident of the thequickinstitutionalization Reprise," and from "Theoretical of a research center foundation as theintellectual author's framework of his epistemothatthegrandeur of publications, and of a plethora ofhisprojected theempirical magnitude ambition exceeds even logical asAs he himself world.3 natural history ofthemodern multivolume in theintroduction, hisultimate short ofthecreaserts goalis nothing suitable forthe approach "unidisciplinary" tionof a comprehensive that can be distinsuchentities He believes study of"socialsystems." forms life, suchas thefunclesscomprehensive ofsocial guished from aroundwhose and "organizations" "groups" tionally differentiated havegrown; social scientific disciplines conventionally study, heasserts, that the"communities," and "nation-states" or evenfrom "societies," minded social treated as self-contained units by holistically areoften
scientists (pp. 7, II, 348). thatin orderto achievethe level of validity There is no gainsaying oriented mustcease socialscience to whichit aspires, macroanalytically identical theworldas a setof self-contained, morphologically viewing identified or societies by place cards at the United Nations, systems as thelatest-born prophylogeny recapitulates amongwhomontogeny inof economic or lurch from successive ceed through growth stages a seriesof crisesof politicaldevelopment. to maturity through fancy is a return to vulgardevelopmentalism The mostreasonable alternative a broad-spectrum intellectual tradition to theworld-historical outlook, suchdifferent theorists as Tocquevilleand Marx, whichencompasses

2 See in particular: WorldCapitalist Theda Skocpol,"Wallerstein's A TheoSystem: Journal Vol. 82 (March I977), American and Historical retical Critique," of Sociology, and RegimeFormation: A CritiPeterGourevitch, "The International System I075-90; x (April 1978), 4I9-38; and Wallerstein," cal Reviewof Anderson Politics, Comparative and theNation-State," "The Long Cycleof Global Politics ComparaGeorgeModelski, xx (April I978), 2I4-35; and WilliamMcNeill,in and History, tiveStudiesin Society at chairedby ImmanuelWallerstein discussion to a round-table his oral contribution of Europeanists, theConference Washington, D.C., MarchI979. 3 Wallerstein of whichthisis thefirst of thelarger an overview has provided project Concept System: volume:see "The Rise and FutureDemise of the World Capitalist xvi (Septemand History, Studiesin Society forComparative Analysis," Comparative ber1974), 387-415.

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historians such andSchumpeter, as wellas more eclectic Weber global andGeoffrey Barraclough. as McNeill and Braudel, Robert R. Palmer with however, is that hisverThe fundamental problem Wallerstein, outlook consists of a largedose of antisionof theworld-historical witha smalldoseofconventional materialism combined quated petty an impossible so as toform hybrid paradigm. systems analysis is founded on thenotion His position that, on thebasisof twocria "real" itis possible or"total" social system: (a) "life teria, toidentify it is largely (b) "thedywithin self-contained"; and,concomitantly, are largely of itsdevelopment internal" (p. 347). Sincethe namics thevery foundation of the concept "self-contained life"is admittedly it is surprising thatWallerstein nowhere bothers overall framework, thecontext that itrelates toeconomic toexplicate it.We caninfer from ofhuman existence activity; butwhyshould that aspect ofthetotality be singled out as thenecessary and sufficient element of a defining "real" this matter asidefor reconsideration social system? Setting grave in the relevant we encounter historical further conceptual context, within theboundaries of Wallerstein's In own framework. problems in thefirst hisview, instance as a function of the socialsystems vary and in thesecond scaleof their economic geographical organization, in relation to the as a function of thescaleof political organization to thefirst thetypological variation, economic (p. 348). Withrespect is abrupt: there aretwomajor the"small" forms, andthe elaboration subsistence notpart autonomous communities of "large"-i.e., "highly and "worldsystems." That someregular tribute-demanding system," thepolitical structure of smallsocialsysmoreis saidabout nothing thepresent As for tems is notimportant for thelarge, Wallerpurpose. either thescaleof political considers orstein onlytwopossibilities: withtheeconomic, or it is smaller. In thefirst coincides ganization is the realized, case,we obtaintwo further types: one,historically theother, which exists at thelevel oftheoretical "world only empire"; in which, after a lengthy is a "world socialist possibility, government" the economic and the political historical Dumpty hiatus, Humpty In the there second wouldbe putbacktogether case,however, again. a plurality a "world of is onlyone possibility: containing economy" "states." Land rests Promised on theperAttainment of thesocialscientific demonstration that all the important of Wallerstein's suasiveness in thesixteenth canbe subsumed under that occurred century changes "a kindof socialsystem the ofa single theappearance phenomenon, is a termed knownbefore," which properly worldhas not really

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theparts thebasiclinkage between of the because "'world-economy' that"this grants is economic. . . ." Although he immediately system links as we and eventually, to someextent wasreinforced bycultural and evenconfederal structures" arrangements shallsee,by political on the proposition thateconomic rests clearly (p. I5), the theory ofthe system and modern world the genesis determined processes alone it cameintobeing. after itsoperations governed thelooseendsrelegated to theheap of residual If we reassemble theoretical to Wallerstein's contrary however, theworkreveals, error, was theparts ofthesystem" between that the"basic linkage intention, identianother beginning, Fromthevery atno time merely economic. ushe shows thestructural linkage with structure is interacting fiable the"missing he doesnotseeor willnotsee,and to which a structure became states which ofthetitle refers. It is thesystem link" ofmodern in thecourse of thelong more in western Europe clearly articulated can be traced to muchearlier sixteenth century, but whoseorigins "themodern than merely states," rather of modern times. "System in the states" or "modern of political organization, state" as a form the structural because or yet"international political system," plural, I havein mindencompasses a setof politico-strategic actors, linkage as their as actors depends, theinternal on which capability structures whatis conventionally well as theexternal interactions whichform the"international political albeitsomewhat anachronistically, called, ofEurope. system" The system states interacted not onlywiththe "basic of modern at thelevelofwestern but outbyWallerstein Europe singled linkage" the actors outside -even more alsowith politico-strategic importantcounamongwestern European region, so as to shaperelationships If themodern them and theexternal world. as wellas between tries, isbetter ofthesixteenth as a comworld conceptualized century system an identifiable structure with towhich determinapolitical plexentity then itwasnota world economy only, and canbe ascribed, tive effects wasperhaps notas entirely distinctive as Walitsoverall organization ifit canbe shown that someimportant feaasserts. lerstein Moreover, were the of the interactions by tures configuration shaped European structures withpolitico-strategic and political of itseconomic actors themodern then world wasnotas self-contheregion, outside system that theentity has singled Wallerstein either. It wouldfollow tained forcomprehensive suitable socialscientific out as uniquely analysis as theconventional units he rejects, thesamedefect and from suffers socialscience to analyze we wouldneedyetanother unidisciplinary

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a component. Were ofwhich itis only system the more comprehensive for eachtype of"real"or "toapproach tobe devised a unidisciplinary conceivable, we wouldsoonfacea socialscientific tal"human system oftheonewe arebeing urged to leavebehind. babelreminiscent the I shallreconstruct quickfixes. In whatfollows, History resists link evidence and demonstrate its effects, drawing empirical missing possible. Thisapproach ownwork whenever from within Wallerstein's thedouble thenegative critical task willserve purpose of completing adequate a foundation for more andofproviding already adumbrated in thissphere. theory construction III ofeffects link, Direct andindirect traces attributable to themissing of an economistic on behalf of the inadequacy and henceevidence in the long sixteenth of world-historical processes conceptualization can with the of to following keyfeatures respect century, be adduced ofEuropean social orWallerstein's historical account: (i) description of the in themedieval characteristics period;(2) overall ganization from of its (3) determination European expansion; entity resulting counexternal ofthelocation ofspecific boundaries; (4) determinants in the"core," and (5) variation tries or"periphery"; "semi-periphery," in theEuropean itself. ofstate structures region Wallerstein runsintotrouble Withrespect to themedieval period, because theentire millennium socialorganization, during European andtherise between oftheRoman ofthemodern Empire the breakup cellshe hasproworld doesnotfit intoanyofthetypological system, he "TheMedieval Attheoutset entitled Prelude," vided. ofthechapter be clearwhatfeudalism was not.It was asserts "We must forcefully: thatis, an economy of self-subsistence" (p. nota 'natural economy,' he states with hand, that itwasnot equalconfidence I7). On theother of a a "world-system" (pp. i8, 36). As he seesit,Europeconsisted for themost small, relatively part "relatively ofsocial systems, plurality based on theexploitation ofa limited self-sufficient economic nodules," linked a certain extent and to bytrade, bynobles, agricultural surplus in Northwith "atleast twosmaller world-economies" found together but ernItalyand in northwestern and Flanders), Europe(Germany . in whosenetworks involved "most of Europewas notdirectly on theeveoftheexpansion of thefifEurope, (p. 37). He describes teenth as "a nascent world-economy, composed of smallemcentury, in Wallerstein's andcity-states" nation-states, (p. 57). Yet,since pires, morethana meregeographical ownviewEurope constituted expres-

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a wholewithsomedegreeof cohersion,thosedisparate piecesformed ence.On whatwas thiscoherence founded? The aspectthatimmediately comesto mindis thebond provided by he acknowledges thatmedievalEuropewas inChristianity. Although seemsunawarethatthe deed a "civilization" (pp. i8, 36), Wallerstein identity and cohesioncontradicts his use of a concept evoking cultural thevalidity of criteria of own theoretical assertions becauseit suggests "self-contained life"otherthanthe one he has singledout. If so, why on thebasisof economic exchanges alone be shouldentities delineated processes?'But privileged objectsin the analysisof world-historical that is notall. Moreimportant forthepresent purpose is that, although he devotesa few pages to "the slow rise of the centralized stateburudimentary states to float in a poreaucracy," Wallerstein allowsthese liticalvacuum because he does not attribute a politicalstructure to in the flies feudalism qua system (pp. 28-33). Such a denial,however, evidenceconcerning the plurality of face of commonplace historical medievalauthority and lesser including notonlykingdoms structures, of the same ilk, together with theirconstituterritorial organizations tionsand estates, but also Papacy and Empire,as well as the complex among thesevariousactors.5 patterns of politico-strategic interactions theseauthority strucSimultaneously complementary and competitive, elements of politicalorganizaturesmightbe considered as disparate encompassing the tion, articulated so as to form a fieldof relationships of economic and thereby to thecoherence contributing bitsand pieces, thatmedievalEuropeconstiEuropeas a whole.It is thusconceivable was a socialentity in whichthedomainof thepolitical structure tuted thanthe economic. morecomprehensive Although, giventhe stateof the precisecharacter of medievalEuavailablehistorical information, remainsindeterminate for the time rope's overallpoliticalstructure thatthe possibility of identifying being,enoughis known to suggest
is the keystone of ArnoldToynbee's the concept"civilization" idealistic 4Although witha cultural it is also used as a unitof analysis referent of history, by the theory FernandBraudel,who includes"civilizations" self-admitted "materialist" along with and societies as appropriate theeconomic objectsfor "socialhistory"systems, states, thatis distinguishable fromthe history "withslow but perceptible a history rhythms" to theenvironment l'histoire e'venemenofman'srelationship (longuedure'e)and from men." See Braudel,The conceived "on the scale not of man,but of individual tielle, Worldin the Age of Philip 11 (New York: and the Mediterranean Mediterranean to the larger Harper ColophonBooks, 1976), 20-2i, 824-25. WilliamMcNeill refers Eurasiancivilizations as "ecumene"; see his The Rise wholeconstituted by interacting (New York: American Library, of the West:A History of the Human Community I963), throughout. R. Strayer, On the MedievalOrigins of the ModernState 5 See, forexample, Joseph Princeton (Princeton: University Press,i970), and BernardGuenee,L'Occidentaux Universitaires de France,I970). XlVe et XVe siicles.Les Etats (Paris: Presses

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sucha structure should notbe ruled outon theoretical grounds; Wallerstein is ledtodo justthat because thevery ideais incompatible with hisproposition that economic processes arethenecessary andsufficient constitutive elements of socialsystems. In anycase,he cannot avoid attributing to medieval political structures relatively independent effects in shaping theoutcome with which he is concerned. Thatacquisitiveness was theprominent motive ofEuropean expansionat thebeginning of the long sixteenth century is self-evident. is theextent Whatis debatable towhich this reflected expansion processes that canbe subsumed under theterm "'capitalism," and whether theterm "worldeconomy" appropriately theentity describes constituted by European countries and theregions they dominated by the endof theperiod. The question of labelsis no smallmatter because they facilitate theperformance oftheconjurer's trick referred toin the worldsystem discussion of "origins." Whathas madethemodern so in Wallerstein's is that in resulted different, view, European expansion a world was notsubsequently unlike itspredecessors, economy which, to "the transformed intoa worldempire. He attributes thisoutcome and thetechnology sciof modern of modern techniques capitalism thetwobeingsomewhat linked . . ." (p. i6). Moreover, Euroence, that hadthe"political wisdom torealize" peans capitalist organization and expand wouldenabletheir worldeconomy "to thrive, produce, without theemergence ofa unified structure" and political (p. i6,text n. 3).6 Although ofa work these at theoutset devoted remarks appear thatthey to theperiodI450-i650, it is evident applyto an outcome realized onlymuchlateron, perhaps onlyin thelatter partof the twentieth whenwhatis commonly known as neocolonialism century, colonialism tout court. replaced Withrespect totheperiod covered theterm bythis book, however, anachronistic. Wallerstein "world is surely himself economy" grants that "ithassporadically seemed as though" theEuropean world econofempire as though"? would omy go inthedirection (p. i6). "Seemed if Europe's In fact it did.Withthis muchhe agrees: domination did it was notforlack of effort nottaketheclassic form of empire, to The Emperor Charles aboutsuchan outcome. bring V, he writes, not a core-state within a world-empire, a worldto create "sought he writes, "We presented thepolitics of economy" (p. 355).Elsewhere, around theattempts sixteenth as revolving the'first' century bySpain
6 Wallerstein's the outcomeeven more is ambiguous:he attributes overallposition in the passagebeginning "The variousadvantages to the will of capitalists explicitly thison p. i6o. had . . ." (p. 127), but qualifies merchants

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intoa worldworld-economy theEuropean and France to transform on, the nationcentury the sixteenth empire" (p. 265); and "from homogeneous nato create relatively Europe sought states ofwestern Standard historical . . ." (p. 20). at thecoreofempires tional societies andWallerwere largely successful, accounts that these efforts suggest That,in evidence to thecontrary. stein himself no empirical presents certain zones Europeans also exploited empires, addition to building notunpolities was certainly without them intotheir incorporating did muchthesame variety empires of thetraditional usual, as world thing. thehistorian argument, Wallerstein tohisowntheoretical Contrary at thevery outset, that thus to agree with myowncontention appears wasnotmerely ecoofthesystem" between theparts "the basic linkage couldnothave The system politico-strategic. nomic butalso largely couldmuster as a Europeans off theground without theforce gotten organization of a modeof political achievement consequence oftheir In the thatantedated theformation of a capitalist worldeconomy.

of "international" oweda great deal indeed to thefinancial support in Spainpreinvested butthese entrepreneurs entrepreneurs; capitalist out undertakings becausethatstatehad the powerto carry cisely which The Hapsburgs did buildan overseas great returns. promised from it to and subsequently usedtheadvantages they reaped empire, and military linksamongtheir European consolidate administrative to bear as well as to bring their might imperial imperial possessions in the over other in a bidfortotal Theyfailed hegemony. Europeans overseas. andthefailure changes triggered important quickly latter, was notthatexpansion reWhatwas special aboutEurope, then, intoan empire, wasnottransformed which in a world sulted economy first soongave which wasestablished that butrather theworld empire failure therefore The the of to several. proHapsburgs' analysis way of the of contending test forthevalidity videsa crucial explanations in thechapter viewshis account transformation. Wallerstein overall as a demonstration ofEmpire" Failure "Seville toAmsterdam: entitled as a system overa oftheworld-economy of"thestructural advantages he fallsshort of as a system" (pp. 178-79).Although world-empire forthealterconsiderable this support provides goal,he inadvertently in Europe couldnotovercome that native building empire proposition and ofmodern theconstraints states, system imposed bytheincipient wereableto takeroot of a world that someoftheelements economy oftheinterstices because bythat system. provided

overseas expansion "first" century (i.e.,I450-I550), Spanish sixteenth

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ofan "Europeanequilibrium" (p. I7I; also notes30 and 31). The theoretical issue, then, leads us toward an explanationof France's"strength." It is evidentthatthis strength was not derived from primacy in theincipient worldeconomy, sinceearlier Frenchdevelopment had "led to an economicstructure whichwas less able to maneuver" within it,and sinceat thistimeFrance"lackedthebacking ofinternational foroverseas capital"required expansion (p. i82). Wallerstein's is that in the preceding explanationfor French strength period, Francehad put itseggsin the"state"rather thanin the"economy"basket;thisanalysis thecontributions of Europe'sprehighlights modernpoliticalstructure to the shapingof the modernsystem and, moregenerally, of political and ecotherelative suggests independence nomicdevelopment. To theextent thatWallerstein an explaprovides it supports contention. nation, my general Yet thisexplanation is incomplete. Becauseofhisinattention to internationalstrategy, Wallerstein completely ignoresthe well-established view thatFrance's survival historical was vastlyfacilitated by its alwith this between a coalition Christian liance Turkey; unprecedented nationand Christianity's the strategic historical foe drastically altered of Europe. As G. R. Elton has shown,Francis I had configuration withtheOttomansultanas earlyas I525, openednegotiations
7 See also the quotation fromTawney (p. i84), and the reference to H. Hauser (p. i85).

The lightning growth of Iberian transatlantic trade was accompaniedbythespectacular political expansion ofSpainin Europe. Wallerstein invokes several historians, including Braudel, to support hissuggestion that theHapsburg Empire ultimately collapsed because it was "toovast"(p. i79). Thisvastness required thediversion ofthesurplus extracted from its dominions intocostly bureaucratic and military a detrimental management, process compounded bytheeffects ofinflation. ButBraudel, whois cited principally tobackup a point concerningtheimpact of inflation, urges us in that citation to bearin mind especially "theenormous expenses ofwarfare for this toovast empire" (p. i79, n. 73).7 Whatever maybe thefate ofempires in general, this oneultimately collapsed because ofFrance's ability to resist. On that particular point, there is no dispute. As the chapter shows, France lacked theresources torealize itsownproject ofterritorial expansion; butit was located at theheart of theHapsburg Empire and strong enough to interfere with theHapsburg project throughout thecrucial half-century. Financially exhausted in I557, thetwocontenders made peacein i559, a dateconventionally viewed as marking thebeginning

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and his envoys theTurkish encouraged advance whichterminated at Viennain I529. The beginnings werethuslaid forthatunderstanding between theMostChristian King and theOttoman infidel whichat camenear times toformal alliance andalways ensured some measure of cooperation between these twochief enemies of theHapsburgs.8 Ludwig Dehio, elaborating on Ranke,transforms thisstartling develit as a major opmentinto a theoretical buildingblock and interprets stepin thegenesisof the earlymodernsystem of states:it is the first instance of theappearance a to conof "counterweight" to an attempt solidate Europeanstates intoone unit.9 In his view,sinceat thistime Englandwas "notyet"readyto playwhatwould becomeitshistorical role in this respect, "it was therefore all the more important that a nation-Turkey,in this instance-existed on the Continentwhich as a spring.'10 could function We need not endorse Dehio's somewhat devisedon behalfof a plea fora continued teleological functionalism, in WesternEurope afterWorld War II, to accepthis U.S. presence The introduction historical argument. of Turkeyinto the European arenanotonly"showedup theweakenednature of the universal relibut also "played giousoutlookin a particularly frightening manner," a most significant the freedom of the system part in preserving of states. CharlesV, whoselandsthreatened thoseof hisFrenchadversary was now himself war that on two fronts, caughtup in a two-front lastedfor decades."' In this light,the stalemate betweenthe Hapsas "the defeatof an burgsand the Valois,whichWallerstein regards to recreate thatwould matcheconomic areas" attempt political empires (p. i84), mustbe considered morethana mereevent:it is theoutcome thatwas itself notepiphenomenal of a process generated by a structure of the worldeconomy. to the formation The outcome itself contributed to thefurther of a syscrystallization and reduced to an level temof states, thereby low theprobaextremely thatEurope'sdomination would taketheform of a singleworld bility than does Wallerstein who empire.I cannotput thisbetter himself, thatthe mid-century stalemate marked"the establishment states of a states whichaimedat balanceofpowerin Europewhichwould permit to come into theirown beingnations(let us call themnation-states) and to battenon the stillflourishing world-economy" (p. i84). He trend was not indicates that this realized further although overnight, or actualizedin the courseof the nexthalf-century, it was confirmed
8Elton, ReformationEurope 1517-1559 (New York: HarperTorchbooks, i963), (New York: Vintage Books, i962), 42. 10Ibid., 38.

Balance: Four Centuries 9Dehio, The Precarious of the EuropeanPower Struggle 11Ibid., 40.

II9.

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(beginning in theNetherlands thecollapse ofSpanish authority with Armada toconquer England launched oftheSpanish I576),thedefeat war theend of renewed marking (i588), and thePeaceof Vervins thefirst I havesuggested, point thevantage (1598). From with France actors whose of twonew strategic theemergence twodatessignaled almost ofplayers thenumber scene brought on theEuropean presence forthees"sufficient" consider theorists tothelevelthat international which we may thethird-to system; ofa balance-of-power tablishment ProvwiththeUnited and thearmistice England add thepeacewith the decade-notonlyconfirmed incesnegotiated in the subsequent to power ofSpanish thereduction butalsomarked ofFrance survival impuwithrelative to encroach Europeans other a levelthat enabled preserve. nity uponitsAmerican imperial in order at length these developments It is notnecessary to retrace of economic center ofthe to theshift Withrespect tomakemypoint. butto give hasno alternative Wallerstein Amsterdam, toward gravity of theuprising Although configuration. to thepolitical weight great one withSpainremains conflict theNetherlands and thesubsequent of in thedevelopment points majorturning of theleastwell studied actorsof external thatthecontributions there is no doubt Europe, their activithrough Turks andtheOttoman directly other Europeans the final outcome."2 to significantly front-contributed ties on a second WallerGeyl, ofPeter account on thenowdated himself solely Basing France and Eng1559, Spain, after "because that, stein acknowledges had thesocialspace off, theNetherlanders landbalanced eachother Thiswas paryoke. off theSpanish and throw their identity to assert in 1588" (pp. 210, Armada oftheSpanish true after thedefeat ticularly a vitalfluid" that "provided theNetherlands 217-I9). By surviving, and consoliin moved France and thesystem England openuntil kept success of theDutchwas dedatedit after i6oo; and theeconomic "hadyet pushed norFrance on thefact neither England that pendent to capacity (p. 214)-i.e., thestrategic tendencies" their mercantilist thepoint where they entrepreneurs-to for their economic makeroom cutin. could the contributions underestimates One might add thatWallerstein
12 The complexities at this time are skillfully configuration of the international (London: account by J.H. Elliottin EuropeDivided,i559-1I5 wovenintoa coherent of Europe,"i968). See also the pathbreaking studyof Collins,"The FontanaHistory in Geoffrey situation Parker,The Armyol the military aspectof the Netherlands Press, Flandersand the Spanish Road, I567-i659 (London: CambridgeUniversity and its outcomein a and the same author's superbaccountof the uprising i972), The DutchRevolt(Hammondsworth: PenguinBooks,i979). globalcontext,

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madeto the of theartof navalwarfare mastery that theprecocious and to theriseof theDutchcapitalists; survival of theDutchrebels that the he ignores ofworld economy bytheconcept he is so blinded dohad also established their political Provinces fact that theUnited and wereable to back the of theworld, minion overvarious parts with themost navy economic powerful activities oftheir entrepreneurs in thisbook,Englandand covered afloat. At theend of theperiod theDutch-a complex hadalready efforts to displace launched France England ultimately which shifting coalitions-from struggle involving shareof the spoilsbecause, amongother withthelargest emerged in thedevelopment of a superior navalcapainvested things, itsstate ofcontirelied whereas France more on a costly strategy heavily bility nental conquest. of the I say"amongother because further consideration things," this a discussion us the limits of into essay wouldtake beyond subject variations between naval orcontinental orientation, oftherelationships dictates of secuactivity, degree of entrepreneurial in socialstructure, forthetime of political Whatmatters organization. rity, and forms theSpanish was reduced whereas to a much Empire beingis that, sizethan achieved because itcouldnotmuster ithadoriginally smaller itover thelongterm against European thestrategic todefend capacity of the predators, thiswas equallytruelateron of the undertaking thearchetypical considers "world-economy," which Wallerstein Dutch, The innovative ecobutwhichlooksmorelike a seaborne empire. flourished in seventeenth-century can nomic that Amsterdam processes the label well be subsumed under thistransformation "capitalism"; intheorganization ofDutchoverseas wasreflected andthese activities, a great in turn contributed activities deal to thefurther development in Europe andthereby ofcapitalism inthe Netherlands more generally. under consideration, France andEngToward theendoftheperiod combinations ofstrategic different force andeconomic mustering land, Behemoth hadbecome andLeviathan, ableto assert themdynamism, beasts in lesser and abroad. WallerEurope selves forcefully against riseto paramountcy is found in thechapter account of their stein's be examined in thelight CoreStates." It must ofhis entitled "Strong theposition of countries in theworld contention that keytheoretical thecharacter oftheir determines regimes and,conpolitical economy foritsmaintenance that theworld as a economy requires, comitantly, states at thecoreas well as weak political structures system, strong areas(pp. 354-56, in theperipheral further that I34). He maintains in theworld notonlydetermined thesimilartheir economy position

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France and England-i.e., itybetween their also the "strength"-but differences between them. By theend of thelongsixteenth century, wasbetter foreconomic whereas the England equipped development; members of the English aristocracy had lostin the short run and gained in thelongbytransforming themselves intobourgeois capitaltheFrench ists, had gainedin theshort run-absolutism was more thorough-but lostin thelongbyforcing thebourgeoisie to abandon itsfunction (p. 284). validandgives Wallerstein's historical account isgenerally Although due weight social to exogenous factors-factors thaninternal other structural Moore configurations suchas areemphasized byBarrington andothers-he can vastly exaggerates theextent these factors towhich be attributed as he conto processes generated bytheworld economy it.He characterizes ceptualized before thecrisis of British development i620 as follows: rela"In short, itwas a question ofoptimal position: tivepolitical of the insulation theeconomic whilehaving advantages whichmaxiworld-economy, a relative balanceof forces internally mized internal peace, butminimized theerrors state ofan overbearing machinery" (p. 257). He introduces thisconfiguration that bystating in theworld-economy "England's position madethis balancprecisely inggamepossible" (p. 256). The first step up thedevelopmental ofthe ladder wastherelocation center ofindustrial to EngEuropean production, particularly textiles, land in thecourse of the"first sixteenth century" (i.e., after 1450). WhatmadeEngland from theLow attractive to textile entrepreneurs Countries and northern One of thecontributing Germany? factors, to Wallerstein, according was thatEnglandpossessed "thepolitical of early advantages" unification. he attribFollowing Joseph Strayer, utes this in turn totheparticularities ofEnglish medieval socialstructure and to factors of natural theprecocious geography that fostered ofa strong development monarchy (p. 231). Further economic develafter opment bytheHenrician administrative revoi5oo wasfacilitated thecreation of a strong to maintain lution, theability incapital city, ternal an expensive peace without standing and (exceptfor army, thelackofcumbersome Ireland) possessions (pp.231-32). Most important thelatter among hadbeentheareaclaimed bytheEnglish monin France; archy Wallerstein doesnotdiscuss how, after four centuries ofcostly effort, England had finally itscontinental relinquished possessions as a consequence ofthebelated butultimately successful process of monarchical in FranceunderLouis XI. Albeit consolidation determined largely by internal interactions amongsocialforces, this

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then contributed to thecrystallization ofa European development system ofstates with a dynamic ofitsown;andtheconstraints this system inward at thehistorically generated fostered England's fateful turning moment. appropriate Wallerstein does recognize thatthe international politico-strategic configuration subsequently facilitated England's ascent. Until i559, interference from too muchoutside England"was sheltered by the struggle ofthetwogreat military powers: SpainandFrance" (p. 276). Similarly, whentheinternal "balance" was jeopardized aroundi6oo in conse(as England became more dependent on theworldmarket ofitsprecocious quence industrialization), itwasredressed bycolonial expansion. Wallerstein acknowledges that whatmadeexpansion possible atthis critical time, rather than earlier, wasspecifically thedecline of Spain'smilitary strength (p. 28i). Indeed, thechanging strategic balance was determinative: it was in thelastdecadeof thesixteenth theDutchandEnglish century that "invaded" thePortuguese-Spanish in Asia,andtheDutch"attack" on Brazilin i624 inaugumonopoly rated theshift of theAtlantic trade to thenorthern powers (p. 272). To Wallerstein, all this is a mere however, of happenstance "given." We shallsee, that wasnotall that sheltered. On the however, England one hand,theconflict between Franceand Spaingenerated repeated intoEngland's interventions internal political bybothof these giants as wellas strategic and at sea; affairs, threats on land (i.e.,Scotland) onthe itsresistance II oweda great other, toPhilip dealtotherebellion in theLow Countries, which was in turn supported by theEnglish. In short, thesurvival was largely of England attributable to theslow evolution of theinternational in thedirection of a sysconfiguration tem ofstates-adevelopment that wasonly marginally favorable from theEnglish point ofview, butthat couldbe exploited bytheruthless exercise of statecraft. In thismanner, this Englanditself accelerated evolution from it as theformation and subsequently benefited of a of states madeitsown overseas Its initial system expansion possible. in theworld was onlyone oftheelements thatacposition economy fortheoverall counts outcome. in thecourse of demonstrating with Curiously, why-in contrast "balance" was achieved in not WalEngland-the appropriate France, lerstein to abandon seems his world-economy framework altogether on behalf of geographical determinism. he states Whereas thattheir "natural advantages" enabledEnglandand the United geographic a strong Provinces to develop and a national simultaneously polity forFrance, he maintains of its geography, "because economy, that,

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remi(p. 266). In a manner these options weresomewhat contradictory" by Edward WhitingFox niscent of the ingeniousanalysispresented he suggests thatthe tensionbetween (but not citedby Wallerstein), contributed to bring France's continental and maritime orientations was about protracted civil war, in the courseof which the country was maintained by vulnerable to foreign intrusion.13 France'sintegrity an adaptation thatwould proveto be meansofbureaucratic centralism, afteri6io, the dysfunctional: when the world economycontracted withcapitalists (p. 29I). In Frenchstate was strong enoughto interfere we are asked to believethat, although Francedid acceed to the short, core,"it failedto achieveparamountcy within it becausethestatewas by locationin an too strong, and thatthisacromegaly was determined unhealthy geographical environment. as fromthe analysis of thefailure What emerges from thisaccount, of the HapsburgEmpire, is not merely the importance of geography. acquirednew significance durGeographical configurations themselves of theconcurrent ing theperiodunderconsideration as a consequence formation of a world economyand of a system of states.England's on thesouthern in relation location partof an island,and itsinsularity to thecontinent-but not in relation actorin the another to Scotland, or an asset, depending upon international system-could be a liability and withrespect policies.Similarassertions circumstances to different can be made about the respective of the configurations geographical northern Netherlands and of France. As forthemoregeneralpointconcerning the"strength" of thestate withinthe incipient structures to take veryse"core,"it is difficult an attribute involving thatdoes not riously anytheoretical proposition differentiate clearlybetweenthe regimesof Spain, France,England, and the UnitedProvinces merely duringthisperiodor, alternatively, or lack of it withthe preferences denotes and interests of congruence If all thatis being said is thatthe states in the northern capitalists."4
13 See Fox, Historyin Geographic The Other France (New York: Perspective: to theissuesdiscussed relevant in thisessay. Norton, 1971). Fox's workis generally 14 Wallerstein for example,that the United Provinces consisted of acknowledges, without the administrative of mostotherstates," a "looseconfederation but apparatus that the Republic"functioned much betterand thencitesJ. W. Smit to the effect of a higher degree of economicintegration the achievement than any permitted of Europe" because the bourgeoisie"had carried throughthe of the monarchies economicexpansion it needed to promote and yet feel free exactdegreeof reform SmitintroIn the work cited,however, fromovercentralization" (Wallerstein, 209). that "around i6oo the duces the passage with a quote fromBraudel to the effect withthe is compatible statewas themostviable."His generalargument middle-sized becausesuch a statedid not have to be that thiswas the case precisely hypothesis in theappropriately historical senseof thatterm, i.e., on thescale of centrali"strong"

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during this period triad managed toretain their political independence we are still and to perfect their bureaucratic and military apparatus, oftheworld faced with theproblem ofrelating this to theoperations benefited greatly economy. It is evident that, whereas state builders from expansion, in from theeconomic gainstheir countries derived enabled those counthetwocases examined here itwas"strength" that in thefirst tries to expand place.Moreover, in theDutchcase,precofailed "strength" toenable cious economic success togenerate sufficient a moment. toremain atthetopoftheheapfor more than that country efWallerstein's general proposition concerning thedeterminative doesnotstand up fects oftheworld economy uponpolitical structure in its withrespect to theexperience located anybetter of countries Letus remember that theworld economy outer segments. in hisview, alsorequires that oftheperipheral be "weak," areas political structures and thatit is thelocation in thedependent segmentsof countries and periphery-which their weakness (p. semi-periphery determines devoted to thesubject indicates that chapter 349).5 Yet Wallerstein's the ofcountries western Europe pre-existing political structures beyond in fact world largely accounted fortheinitial shapeof theEuropean and thatthese as elesystem, political structures can be understood ments ofan international Onceagain, Wallerpolitico-strategic system. thefacts and evendrawssomeanalytic stein himself acknowledges short oftaking them from butstops intoaccount at conclusions them, theoretical level. themore general with concludes theobservation that The lastsubstantive the chapter ofa world "area matter ofequilibboundaries geographical economy than thegain.One determiitexpands thelossis greater until rium": the costsof transportation, is thatof "distance"-i.e., native factor conditions. under The other is broadly speaking, existing technological These conclusions the"resistance ofestablished are authority" (p. 339). outcomes: basedon probing thefollowing whyeastern Europe (i)
foundin Europe at thattime.The Smit zationand thesize of bureaucratic apparatus to Robert and JackP. Greene, Forster are fromhis contribution eds.,Prequotations conditions of Revolutions in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins whichI cannotpursuein University Press,I970), 52. The case of the Netherlands, theflowof causation of ascertaining theproblem between detailhere, regime pinpoints As Douglass C. Northand Robert Paul Thomas and capitalist form entrepreneurship. put it in The Rise of the Western World. A New Economic History, "It was in this betweenthe interests of the stateand the occurred area thata fortunate conjunction sectorof society"(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity of the progressive interests Press,I973), I32. 15 The passage reads: "World economies. . . are divided into core-states and of a peripheral states becauseone characteristic areas.I do notsayperipheral peripheral stateis weak...." area is thattheindigenous

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into the "periphery," (and particularly Poland) was incorporated area" and was ultian "external whereas Russiaremained initially than the"periphery"; into the"semi-periphery" rather mately included as a outset wereincorporated from thevery (2) whytheAmericas "periphery" through direct colonization, whereas theOttoman Empire, were these outcomes deandAsiagenerally, not. Together, differential of theworldeconomy theapproximate external boundaries termined of itsinternal byabouti650, as wellas themajorcharacteristics segmentation. that thesixteenth tothefirst Wallerstein With respect point, suggests in eastern for state both "wasan eraofdecline century power Europe, in relation to ofthelatter's economic causeandconsequence position" in Polandand in theGerman western Europe(p. 309). Weak states and subsequently region facilitated Western economic intrusion, this for tostate economic dependency accounted further obstacles building. Thisappears tobe an illustration ofmutually reinforcing political and with I haveno quarrel. economic causation which One exception, howwas Sweden, "a milddeviant case"(p. 3I2). Here,themagician ever, a rabbit ofimpediments appears tobe pulling outofa hat.Because to thegrowth thenobility ofcommercial agriculture, had no choice but toprey onitsneighbors, "andfor that they needed a strong, nota weak
state"(p. 3I3). In fact, no magicis neededto explainwhythe Swedeswere able to achievewhat othergreedy aristocrats could not. Wallerstein does not thewell-established mention factthattheforging ofthe"Swedishhammer"was largely supported byFrenchsubsidies fromi63I on, accountone-fourth of the Swedishstatebudget;neither ing forapproximately does he relatethelesswell-known fact-emphasized by the Soviethison whose accounthe reliesforothermatterstorianB. F. Porshnev at the same timefroman evenlarger thatthe Swedishstatebenefited hiddensubsidy Both France and Russia granted by the Muscovites.16 actedin keeping withstrategic interests dictated by thethreat from the AustrianHapsburgs.Sweden thus became a "deviantcase" in the Years' War, muchas Brandenburg-Prussia course of theThirty would British at thetimeof Marlborough. benefit from subsequently strategy of statestructures In bothcases,thecourseof development was largely and it owed as much of theworldeconomy's independent constraints;
16B. F. Porshnev, occidentale "Les rapports et de 1'Europe politiquesde 1'Europe of Historide la guerre de trente Committee orientate a 1'epoque ans,"in International des Sciences Xle Congres IV. Histoire International cal Sciences, Historiques. Rapports. & Wiksell, Moderne(Uppsala: Almqvist i960), I50-5I.

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at thelevelof the international politicalsystem generated to processes socialgroupsand classes.The of indigenous as it did to theinteraction was enhancedby the moreequal distrivalue of thesestatestructures butionof poweramongEuropeanstates;thesepoorlyendowedcounpositionin the gained access to a more advantageous triesthereby agreeswith the result:Sweden world economyas well. Wallerstein and eighteenth to use centuries "would be able in the seventeenth and hencebe sparedthe advance, as a leverof industrial mercantilism fateofPoland" (p. 3I3). Much thesamecan be said of Prussia. himself the mannerin which "reacknowledges Since Wallerstein dolimitedthe new world system's authority" of established sistance to resist thatthiscapacity to pointout,in addition, main,it is sufficient of i.e.,it was a function as a relational attribute; mustbe understood The attempts stressed. I have repeatedly thesorts of systemic processes world Russia into the incipient Europeansto incorporate by western was and not yet economy failed"becauseEurope'stechnology economy a strong statein the becauseRussiahad developed sufficiently strong"; becauseit could takeadvanof itsown reconquista; and finally, course diverted Russia'simof Europeans "whichconstantly tageof divisions tasks" (p. 3I9). There is an obmediateenemiesintomorepressing and theconditions thatfacilitated thatsituation viousparallelbetween the survival of the Dutch rebels,as well as thosethatinsulatedthe in Englandfrom external interference somedecstate-building process withinthe framework All thesecases can be understood ades earlier. in of states," a notionthatis veryprominent of an emerging "system on whom Wallerstein relieswith the historian theworkof Porshnev, to Russia.17 respect role in the erstwhile whichplayedan important OttomanTurkey, to thatof Russiaduringthislater survival of France,also contributed authorities in agreeswith the established period.Indeed,Wallerstein balance on land favored the Ottoman out thatthe strategic pointing It is therefore understandable thatEurocentury. Empireforanother Asia werelimited tothetakeover oftheArab in western peanconquests basedon thesuperiority of their naval an achievement maritime trade, to eastern Asia, he relieson Donald Lach who With respect artillery. balancehas pointedout thatfor similarreasons-i.e.,the strategic "were Asian states with conducted within relations ordinarily Europe's established and on terms a framework by Asian nations"(p. 330 and of the worldeconn. I37). Here as in eastern Europe,theboundaries at thelevelof a morecompregenerated omywereshapedbyprocesses
17 For details on

see ibid.,pp. 138, i6i-62. Russia'salliances,

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world hensive constituted interactions a vasystem bystrategic among ofpolitical riety units. the outcome was generally the otherway In SpanishAmerica, For reasons thatare not yetentirely around. clear,the highly orAmerindian states ganized rapidly collapsed in thefaceof a limited European force.18 Whatis remarkable in that caseis notthat in theabsence ofpolitical what obstacles theEuropeans proceeded tobuild must be acknowledged tobe empires, theearliest ofwhich lasted over three hundred years, but thatstrategic considerations based on processes generated internally (thatis,bytheEuropean system of states itself) overrode policy preferences founded on narrowly economic calculaFor example, who tions. Wallerstein cites thecaseof thePortuguese havepreferred the might to exploit Brazilas an "entrepot," following Asianpattern, butwereinstead "forced to colonize it as a pre-emptive measure as of 1530" in order and England toprevent France from escoastal enclaves on whatthePortuguese considered to be tablishing their territory (p. 335andn. i70). Suchstrategic considerations played an important in northern America rolein theactivities of Europeans and theCaribbean oncethescramble gotunder wayaround i6oo,as well as a century and a halflater at theheight of industrial when, in Africa.19 lastimperial venture capitalism, they precipitated Europe's It wouldappear, in short, the thatby Wallerstein's own account, boundaries oftheEuropean weremuchlessattributable world system toan economic than costs "equilibrium" determined bytransportation tothedistribution oforganized in theexisting world. Thisfactor force should notbe considered but as a static given (as itis byWallerstein), as a process was within whosedeployment subject to variation states, alsoa function ofinteractions between states bywayoftheorganizationofshifting thatthisdistricoalitions. I am byno means arguing was then, bution or wouldalways of the remain, totally independent levelof technological and economic development. Unliketheinadeframework setforth quateunidimensional byWallerstein, thealternative these havepointed is notfounded onetoward which remarks on a monistic of political conceptualization poweror force, but on the
18 It is possible diseasewas thedeterminative element in themilitary thatdecimating resistance. See WilliamH. McNeill,Plagues and and political collapseof Amerindian N.Y.: Anchor Peoples(GardenCity, Books,1976), 176-9i. 19For the Americas, see J. H. Parry,The Establishment of the European Hegethe discussion mony, 1415-1715 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), especially of countermoves theactivities of Franceand Englandwhichhe likensto "thetactical of Worldin theSeventhechess-board" (p. 107); and K. G. Davies,The NorthAtlantic of MinnesotaPress, 1974), esp. pp. 25-31 teenthCentury(Minneapolis:University

and 34-45.

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recognition ofthat element as oneoftheconstituting structures ofany world system. Finally, concerning thegeneral proposition that thepolitical organization ofcountries varies as a function oftheir location in thevarious segments of theworldeconomy, it is evident that, moreoften than not,Wallerstein usespolitical organization as a sortof independent variable (in relation totheworld economy, that is) to account forthe location ofstates within theseveral segments oftheworld economy as wellas in theexternal area.We haveseenthat"strength" accounted for theascent ofEngland andFrance to"core" status, much as lackof strength accounted fortheinability of theNetherlands to prevent it; at theother extreme, it was Poland's pre-existing "weakness" that determined itsincorporation intothe"periphery." The "semi-periphery" appears tohavebeenpopulated bystates that wereabletocounter the tendencies of theworldeconomy. The existence of a strong state in Russia accounted notonly for itsinitial ability towithstand incorporain thesemi-periphery tion, butalsoforitssubsequent rather position thantheperiphery whenincorporation did occur;the same finally factor ofpolitical limited thedecline organization ofSpainin theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries to a position at thesemi-peripheral rather than at theperipheral level;anditenabled Sweden andPrussia tojoinSpaininthesemi-periphery rather than Polandin theperiphery whoseplacewas clearly in (p. 3i8)."2 Who is left, then, determined accordance withthedictates ofWallerstein's theory?

IV
Immanuel Wallerstein has devised theparadigm to acAlthough thetransformation for oftheworld in thelongsixteenth count century is thecaseleadstoheurisa consideration ofwhy that is unsatisfactory, intohowthetaskoftheory construction ticinsights be carried might contribution thenotion on.He hasmadea notable that byarticulating a had multilevel of transformation theprocesses character, involving between altered social within notonly eachofsevrelationships groups butalsobetween eralEuropean eachofthem and others in countries, western as well as between as a wholeand other theregion, Europe
20 indicates that the semi-peripheral On p. 349 Wallerstein areas are "in between on variousdimensions, the core and the periphery" of the state including"strength for theirdecline) that some "had he maintains(withoutaccounting machinery"; of a givenworld-economy," beencore-areas of earlier versions whereas others "had been so to speak,as a resultof the changing areas thatwere laterpromoted, peripheral of an expanding geopolitics world-economy." My point here is simplythat an "or" shouldbe inserted after "geopolitics."

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thetransthat However, although he acknowledges parts oftheworld. in political and economic organichanges entailed epochal formation oftheone invaintodemonstrate causal precedence zation, he attempts that an indicate section in thepreceding Mycomments over theother. between two structural interactions alternative framework, positing provide thepolitical as basicas theeconomic-would linkages-with Once we account underconsideration. a better fitforthehistorical autonomous and relatively as an irreducible structure viewpolitical conceptualithatWallerstein's apparent element, it becomes systemic by western Europearound dominated zationof thezone of activity as must be amended worldeconomy self-contained i65o as a largely beinteractions well.Itsboundaries to politico-strategic owedas much as they political actors organized tween Europeans and other western was itsinternal stratification didtoendogenously processes; generated as wellas byan emerging geographical determined bypower andforce as a polymore accurately division oflabor;andit couldbe described of The benefits thanas a capitalist worldeconomy.21 centric empire the centers so as to foster among several weredistributed exploitation mercantilisms, in the formof competing of capitalism emergence which in turn thesystem ofstates. reinforced thatI am by no insist Lestmyposition I must be misunderstood, indeed, I argument; of Wallerstein's the reverse meansproposing maintain transformations suchas he has emphasized thateconomic I am structure to which ofthepolitical to theemergence contributed toa "materialist" ofopposing an "idealist" Noris ita matter pointing. appears to materialism restrictive Wallerstein's unnecessarily approach. withthe combine thefundamentalist Marxism economism of vulgar school, of theAnnales by somemembers popularized misconception, consists of mere"events." Political has an thatpolitics organization andeconomic an equally material organization dimension, irreducible in Europeweredetercultural forms evolving irreducible one; their at bothlevels. of global In an analysis occurring mined by changes it depends muchon the investigator's starting very transformation, culture or socialstructure, or economics, is conwhether politics point Thatstarting itself is dictated bythe dominant. point sidered causally tradition, inclination toward oneortheother intellectual investigator's
21 The sharpcontrast Wallerstein drawsbetween"empire"and the European-domias a underconsideration natedentities imageof "empire" maystemfromhis implicit whichis also suggested of Eisenstadt's definition continentalformation, by his citation is unfortunate, as the empires of western Eurasia were (p. 15). This misconception in largepartmaritime. often

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ormerely incontemporary controversies, byhis political byhisposition field ofacademic specialization. theconceptualization oftheoveras a corrective, However valuable structures as an "interandeconomic political all relationship between interfarunless of these themodalities action" doesnotlead us very It is further evident that little are specified moreprecisely. actions we focus on political unless will be madein thisdirection progress in itsownright. I cannot do moreherethanto as a subject linkage howwe might re-orient ourefforts to suggest, bywayof conclusion, account of the formation of the elaborate a theoretically grounded a sugprocess, modern world political structure as a multilevel system's byWallerstein's work. gestion obviously inspired theoWhether articulated ina Weberian ora Marxian current mode, in Europe arealmost ofmodern states retical analyses oftheformation ofparticular accounts oftheexperience entirely founded on historical they tendto attribute taken ifthey arecomparative, countries singly; features ofEuropean civoutcomes to common similarities ofpolitical socialconfigurato variations in theinternal ilization, and differences wholes, allowtobe largely self-contained tions ofwhat areconsidered Yet,further reflection of cultural diffusion.22 ingforsomepossibility onthecommonplace several reinforced kingdoms conthat observation at thebeginning of emerged simultaneously trolling largeterritories thelongsixteenth thatthisoccurred century suggests thehypothesis processes that contribnotonly because ofthecultural andsocial some utedto bring aboutthese werethemselves region-wide, but changes alsoquitespecifically as a consequence interactions ofpolitico-strategic
22 Such interpretations are largely in theoretical outlook. independent of variations and Democracy Moore,The Social Origins of Dictatorship See,forexample, Barrington to CharlesTilly,ed., The Formation (Boston:Beacon Press,i966); the contributions University Press,I975); Europe (Princeton: Princeton of NationalStatesin Western to Raymond in Europe the contributions Grew,ed., Crisesof PoliticalDevelopment and NorthAmerica(Princeton: Princeton Press,I979); ReinhardBendix, University of California University Kings or People: Powerand the Mandateto Rule (Berkeley: Badie and PierreBirnbaum, Sociologiede l'Etat (Paris: Press,I978); and Bertrand otherstrengths or weaknesses, all of theseworksillusWhatever their Grasset, i979). framework thatdoes not takeintoconsideraof a "comparative" theinadequacies trate tion interaction among the units.I became aware of the problemin the courseof to Grew's volumea decade ago. Othershave begun preparing my own contribution Statesand Social Revolutions to deal withit as well. See, forexample:Theda Skocpol, Anderson, Lineagesof the University Press,1979), and Perry (Cambridge: Cambridge allows the international Absolutist State (London: New LeftBooks,i974). Anderson back door of "overinto his framework throughthe Althusserian politicalsystem to the Soviethistorian his n. 37, p. 37, whichrefers see in particular determination"; Lenin as an authorwho in turninvokes citedin fn. i6 of thepresent Porshnev essay, of states"as a relatively the "international independent system ityforconceptualizing of international CharlesTilly has also becomeawareof theimportance factor. politicointeractions strategic (see theworkcitedabove,pp. 45-46and 73-76).

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among their weaker predecessors. Moreover, thepresence on thescene of several suchactors generated further interactions of thesamesort which, together withchanges attributable to other factors, continued to shape thepolitical transformation ofeachofthem. Without barebonesat thistime, it can be sugfleshing out these gested that similar processes arevisible as faras thehistorical eyecan see,backward or forward from theperiod under consideration. Any attempt to trace theorigins ofcapitalism or ofindustrialization leads usbackmuch earlier intime totheidentification ofrudimentary structures andprocesses that bear a family resemblance tothefinal outcome, and thatdistinguished theEuropean region from others longbefore capitalism orindustrialization cameinto being in theform denoted by such labels; so itis with thesystem ofstates. The political organization ofEurope wascharacterized bya plurality ofsovereignties nearly half a millennium before thebeginning ofthelongsixteenth century. That feature wasitself anchored in and an aspect of Europe's longstanding heterogeneity in comparison with other Eurasian civilizations.23 What must be recognized is that theplurality is a structural element ofEuropean political organization rather thanmerely an incidental aspect ofit. feature of European The theoretical challenge posedbythis politics Better known wasidentified as longago as 1902 byOttoHintze. today as a sociological of European structures close to historian political ofstate he wasthen a Rankean for whom theories Weber, sociological but granting formation meant Marx.Attacking socialdeterminism, "thata that"there is a germ of truth" in thecontention reluctantly is in effect Hintze constitution people's shaped byitssocialstructure," insisted that "onepoint is overlooked-namely, thedevelopment ofthe state in relation doctrine to itsneighbors." ofthe Inspired byRanke's derAussen-Politik, Primat he elaborates: Theformation which andthe demarcation ofthe within state's territory thesocial developments take in theexternal place-briefly, alterations ofa state-have on itsinternal Basiexistence their structure. bearing and cally, the external existence ofstate andpeople isregarded as a fixed immutable on thesocial quality. Interest hastended tocenter changes occur arethen that within that deemed this setframework, changes for ofthepolitical institutions. Thisis,in efresponsible the alteration from in which it was to wrench eachsingle state thecontext fect, initself, without the inisolation, exclusive formed; state is seen raising
23The "heterogeneity"of the West is a major theme in McNeill (fn. 4), as well as in Moore (fn. 22), esp. p. 415. Anderson (fn. 22) similarlyemphasizes "detotalization of sovereignty"as one of its fundamentalfeatures (pp. 23, 405, 409, 412, 423-24).

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thequestion whether itspeculiar character is co-determined byitsrelationto itssurroundings.24 that"no theory can covertheevents Conceding of worldhistory, the powerstruggles of states and nations," Hintze goes on to state his own problematique as follows: Whatis at stake is whether, and to whatextent, theexternal form ofa which state, is conditioned byfactors offoreign policy, hashad an influencealso on itsinternal structure, i.e.,on itsconstitution. Further, we must establish whether thecasesof which thisis trueare isolated and exceptional, or whether they can be organized in groups and presented as evidence ofa typical regular pattern.25 The bodyof Hintze's essayconsists of a demonstration thatsuch patterns can indeedbe identified. His principal the chain pointsconcern of causation thesurvival from of theRoman Imperialtradistemming tion in dual form-Churchand Empire-whose struggles produced interstices withinwhich a European system of statescould develop. The existence of a number of states adjoiningeach otherand on relatively equal terms was, forHintze,a sine qua non forthe emergence of Europe'ssingularcontribution to politicalorganization: medieval constitutionalism as anchored in thesystem As forthemodof estates. ernperiod, itwas hisviewthattheexistence of a system of states determinedabsolutist bureaucracy as thenatural constitutional form oftransition. Franceand theHapsburgs led theway,and theothers followed in orderto preserve theirindependence, withsome variations thathe ascribes to specific strategic configurations. Hintze's initialminimization Without of social structure, endorsing or evenhis specific thepolitical of hypotheses concerning development he adumbrated opens up an Europe, I believe that the orientation avenue for theoretical fruitful extremely reflection. Hintze remains one ofvery fewscholars who identify theinteractions between endogenous processes of variouskindsand exogenous politicalprocesses as a of Europeanpolitical problematiquefortheanalysis development. Unhe himself did not elaborate a systematic and framework fortunately, to appearsto have returned the subjectonlyintermittently. This may
of Statesand Constitutional A Studyin 24Hintze,"The Formation Development: Historyand Politics,"in Felix Gilbert, ed., The HistoricalEssays of Otto Hintze to JohnBoyerfor (New York: OxfordUniversity Press,1975), i59. I am grateful Prussian the lineagesof the relevant and particuguidingme through historiography, of external me to Ranke.For the "primacy see particularlyforintroducing politics," larly GeorgG. Iggersand Konradvon Moltke, eds.,Leopold von Ranke: The Theory and Practiceof History(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), I-liii, 70-73, and ii6-i9. 25Hintze (fn. 24), i60.

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a whilesuggesting it might be possible to identify havebeenbecause, ofexternal events with to theimpact regular pattern" respect "typical of thestate, it wouldbe structure he did notbelieve on theinternal a theory toconstruct "thepower struggles ofstates concerning possible In somewhat thesamevein, suchevents. andnations" which generate whohasrecently advanced a number ofhypothH. G. Koenigsberger, as a "social esesinspired incidentally, by Hintze-whomhe views, Eliasconofhislater work-andbyNorbert structuralist" on thebasis the determinants of variation in the regimes among European cerning ofexternal modern repeatedly illustrates thecontributions early period, buthe concludes to thesocioevents to these outcomes; withrespect did with theories ofHintzeand Eliasmuchas Hintzehimself logical respect to Marx: The most in theconstruction ofan overall theory is difficulty serious struggles between ofoutside powers inthe presented bythe intervention Suchintervention andtheir would alter the relative kings parliaments. is,I believe, unpreoftheinternal forces to an extent which strength even ifwewere tousegame ora computer.26 theory dictable, ofthemissing linkthus reality Acknowledgment oftheundeniable bind:theories thatdo nottakeit appears to haveputus in a double areboundto remain butif it is takeninto intoaccount inadequate, Whatarewe to do? Koenigsberbecomes impossible. account, theory on his substantive advises thatwhereas conclusions, ger,following are "valuable to historical and models theories understanding," they that havelimits inthe weset tosolve. Andsoweareleft areinherent ourselves problem tasks ofthe theories alsothe traditional historian: topursue not but only ofevents, totell andchains not the toanalyze events and, least, specific ofevents.27 story claims ofmodelers is reasonable, oftheextreme hisdismissal Whereas of hisbetween thelegitimate thecontrast he exaggerates aspirations to the socialscience. Withrespect and of theoretically-minded tory as ifa great writes before deal us,Koenigsberger particular challenge to construct had already beenexpended a frameeffort of scholarly
26Konigsberger, in EarlyModernEurope:Dominium and Parliaments "Monarchies v (March I978), 214. et Regale,"Theoryand Society, Regaleor DominiumPoliticum the developments in seventeenth-century On thesubstantive England, side,concerning was partof the Europeanstatesystem and he asserts forexample, that"GreatBritain in spite of the Channel and North Sea," and that intervention, subjectto foreign in a purelyEnglish context" "none of these eventscan be understood therefore
(p. 27 2II).

Ibid.,2I5.

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has been done,becausethe appearance work.In fact,almostnothing state as a structure withtwofaces, and ofthemodern political internal thatled to the contemexternal, producedan intellectual bifurcation and the social sciencesinto sub-disciporarydivisionwithinhistory withone or theother of theseaspects. Alplinesconcerned exclusively is widelyrecognized as thoughthe end of the long sixteenth century thetimewhenrelationships intoa amongEuropeanstates crystallized balance-of-power system, and considerable theoretical attention has been paid to the subsequentoperations much less of that system, has been givento its interactions withexternal thought actors, to the and itssocioeconomic between thepolitico-strategic relationships entity environment, and especially to itsgenesis.28 If it is necessary in thedirection to go beyond Wallerstein of worldwiththe politicaldimenhistorical thatdeal moreadequately theories sion,it is also necessary to borrowa leaf fromhis book and adapt to theanalysis of theformaof thepolitical linkagehis conceptualization In short, to extricate tionoftheworldeconomy as a multilevel process. fromthe doublebind,we have littlechoicebut to take the ourselves as theunitof analysis. We must nascent system of modernstates itself of the variouscountries involvedas considerthe politicalstructures interacting partsof a largerwhole,of whichthe "international politiat one cal system" in theconventional senseis itself buta manifestation as much of a system warrants level.The emergence of modernstates has long received attention as the emergence theoretical of capitalism and social scientists fromhistorians of many persuasions;it is an of the transformation the changes equally originalfeature whereby in one region, in thelong sixteenth thatoriginated beginning century, thefaceof theworld. altered eventually a theory neverbe able to construct for We will probably accounting a specific politicaleventsand chains of events, or, for that matter, theory dealing with singulareventsgenerated by otherculturaland is a theory socialprocesses. What we can aspireto more legitimately in Europe-when it did-of a unique forthe appearance accounting thatwas simultaneously closeto thewar of all against socialformation of the formalequalityof its all and foundedon an acknowledgment
28 Withrespect to thesystem's we are fortunate to havetwo authors genesis, however, of departure: worksare points whoseseminal Ludwig Dehio,theneo-Rankean citedin fn.9; and Garret Renaissance Diplomacy (Baltimore: Mattingly, PenguinBooks,i964). workmay have already The issuesraisedby Wallerstein's stimulated renewedinterest of international as suggested amongstudents politics, by GeorgeModelski's "The Long and the Nation-State" Cycleof GlobalPolitics (fn. 2). But whycycles? None of these itselfto the theoretical betweendomestic works,however, addresses interfacing and and othersocialstructural international politics, and between politics processes.

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collective actors. Were we to make someprogress towardthe realizationof thisverydifficult task,we shouldalso be able to conceptualize moreclearly the relationships betweenthe dynamic generated by this and othersocial processes, politicalstructure the economic. including We shouldkeepin mind,however, of suchinteractions thatthenature undoubtedly variedovertimeand in different places,so thatpropositionsconcerning themmustbe historically if theyare to be of specific anysignificance. Some timeago, arguingthatpremature constitute a hinparadigms dranceto understanding, AlbertHirschmanwarned social scientists one might against conclure.29 To this, falling preyto la ragede vouloir add another bit of Frenchaphoristic mal wisdom: qui tropembrasse etreint. Thereare indeedmanygood reasons to adopta skeptical stance toward thepossibility of everdevising an eleganttheory encompassing the originsof the modernworld and its subsequent Our evolution. efforts mightmore fruitfully be directed towardthe elaboration of theories variousaspectsof the transformation, unified concerning not by a beliefin the possibility of delineating a system movedby a singulardynamic, but rather by a sharedsenseof the fundamental interconnectedness among the disparate strands of human experience and Howeverlackingin overallelegance, do history. suchdisparate efforts notconstitute a wasteoftime:they can lead to moreprecise knowledge ofsomeaspects ofthetransformation and thereby in a somewhat result morecoherent of thewhole. understanding
29 Hirschman, to Understanding," World "The SearchforParadigms as a Hindrance xxii (April i970), 335. Politics,

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